The Military Balance 2022 - PDFCOFFEE.COM (2025)

THE

MILITARY BALANCE 2022

published by

for

The International Institute for Strategic Studies

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THE MILITARY BALANCE 2022 The International Institute for Strategic Studies

Arundel House | 6 Temple Place | London | wc2r 2pg | UK

Director-General and Chief Executive Dr John Chipman Director for Defence and Military Analysis Dr Bastian Giegerich Editor James Hackett Associate Editor Natalia Forrest Military Aerospace Douglas Barrie MRAeS Land Warfare Brigadier (Retd) Benjamin Barry Military Forces and Equipment Henry Boyd Naval Forces and Maritime Security Nick Childs Defence Economics Fenella McGerty Research and Analysis Jonathan Bentham, Charlotte Le Breton, Hugo Decis, Joseph Dempsey, Haena Jo, Amanda Lapo, Yohann Michel, Alienor le Mire-Cahn, Robert Mitchell, Meia Nouwens, Dr Simona Soare, Michael Tong, Tom Waldwyn, Timothy Wright Editorial Flora Bell, Gregory Brooks, Mubasil Chaudhry, Katie Holland, Graham Ivory, Kevin Jewell, Jill Lally, Jack May, Michael Marsden Design, Production, Information Graphics John Buck, Carolina Vargas, Kelly Verity Cartography John Buck, Carolina Vargas, Kelly Verity Research Support Franz-Stefan Gady, Yuka Koshino, Ben Papworth, Erica Pepe, Christie Soo, Kai-Lin Tay This publication has been prepared by the Director-General and Chief Executive of the Institute and his Staff, who accept full responsibility for its contents. The views expressed herein do not, and indeed cannot, represent a consensus of views among the worldwide membership of the Institute as a whole. first published February 2022 © The International Institute for Strategic Studies 2022 All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored, transmitted, or disseminated, in any form, or by any means, without prior written permission from Taylor & Francis, to whom all requests to reproduce copyright material should be directed, in writing. ISBN 978-1-032-27900-8 ISSN 0459-7222 Cover images: Mi-24 attack helicopter at the Zapad 2021 exercise (Sergei Savostyanov/TASS via Getty); Exercise Gallic Strike (Christophe Simon/AFP via Getty); A Y-20 aircraft at Airshow China 2021 (Yue Shuhua/VCG via Getty); Bastion missile system at Nagurskoye (Alexander Zemlianichenko/AP/Shutterstock); Joint Sea 2021 exercise (Sun Zifa/China News Service via Getty); A C-17 aircraft departs Kabul (Marcus Yam/LA Times via Getty); US Marine Corps F-35B lands on JS Izumo (US Marine Corps/Lance Cpl. Tyler Harmon); Maritime Partnership Exercise 2021 (US Navy/Russell Lindsey); Self-propelled artillery at the Zapad 2021 exercise (Alexey Kudenko/Sputnik via AP) The Military Balance (ISSN 0459-7222) is published annually by Routledge Journals, an imprint of Taylor & Francis, 4 Park Square, Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxfordshire OX14 4RN, UK. A subscription to the institution print edition, ISSN 0459-7222, includes free access for any number of concurrent users across a local area network to the online edition, ISSN 1479-9022. All subscriptions are payable in advance and all rates include postage. Journals are sent by air to the USA, Canada, Mexico, India,

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Contents Indexes of Tables, Figures and Maps .........................................................................................................................................................................................4 Editor’s Introduction ............................................................................................................................................................................................................................5

Part One Capabilities, Trends and Economics Chapter 1

Domain trends ........................................................................................................................................................................................................7 Domain trends 7; Defence budgets and expenditure 9; Tracked self-propelled artillery: selected current and nextgeneration systems 11; Amphibious ship programmes and capabilities 12; In-service or in-development bomber aircraft 13

Chapter 2

Defence and military analysis ..................................................................................................................................................................14 Defence intelligence: Maintaining relevance in the open-source era 14; Simulation and defence: Training benefits and trends 18; Military adaptation to climate change: Reducing emissions and maintaining military effectiveness 23

Chapter 3

North America.......................................................................................................................................................................................................26 Regional trends in 2021 26; United States: defence policy and economics 28; Canada: defence policy 40;

Chapter 4

Europe .........................................................................................................................................................................................................................64 Regional trends in 2021 64; Regional defence policy and economics 66; Spain: defence policy and economics 76;

Chapter 5

Arms procurements and deliveries 329; Armed forces data section 332

Latin America and the Caribbean...................................................................................................................................................... 378 Regional trends in 2021 378; Regional defence policy and economics 380; Colombia: defence policy and economics 387;

Chapter 9

Arms procurements and deliveries 244; Armed forces data section 247

Middle East and North Africa ................................................................................................................................................................ 318 Regional trends in 2021 318; Regional defence policy and economics 320; Israel: defence policy 327;

Chapter 8

Arms procurements and deliveries 178; Armed forces data section 181

Asia ............................................................................................................................................................................................................................ 218 Regional trends in 2021 218; Regional defence policy and economics 220; China: defence policy and economics 233;

Chapter 7

United Kingdom: defence policy 79; Arms procurements and deliveries 83; Armed forces data section 86

Russia and Eurasia ......................................................................................................................................................................................... 164 Regional trends in 2021 164; Russia: defence policy and economics 166; Armenia: defence policy and economics 175;

Chapter 6

Arms procurements and deliveries 42; Armed forces data section 45

Arms procurements and deliveries 390; Armed forces data section 392

Sub-Saharan Africa ....................................................................................................................................................................................... 436 Regional trends in 2021 436; West Africa: defence policy 438; East Africa: defence policy 440; Central and Southern Africa: defence policy 443

South Africa: defence policy 444; Regional defence economics 445; Arms procurements and deliveries 450; Armed forces data section 452

Chapter 10 Military cyber capabilities ....................................................................................................................................................................... 507

Part Two Reference Explanatory notes ........................................................................................................................................................................................................................... 511 Principal land definitions 515; Principal naval definitions 516; Principal aviation definitions 517

List of abbreviations for data sections ............................................................................................................................................................................... 519 International comparisons of defence expenditure and military personnel ............................................................................................ 521 Index of country/territory abbreviations .......................................................................................................................................................................... 527 Index of countries and territories ......................................................................................................................................................................................... 528

Index of TABLES 1 The US president’s budget request by appropriation title, USDm 37 2 US National Defense Budget Function and other selected budgets, 2000, 2010–22 .............................................................. 38 3 The US president’s budget request by service, USDm ...................... 39 4 US fixed-wing fighter-aircraft exports, 2010–October 2021 ............ 43 5 Hungary: defence procurement since 2010 ........................................... 84 6 Russia: defence expenditure, 2011–21 ..................................................173 7 Russia: Volume of military-technical cooperation and arms exports (USD billion, current) ........................................................175

8 9 10 11 12 13

Belarus: defence procurement since 2010 ............................................179 North Korea: ballistic missile test launches, 2021 ..............................228 Kuwait: defence procurement since 2010.............................................330 Argentina: defence procurement since 2010 ......................................391 List of abbreviations for data sections ...................................................519 International comparisons of defence expenditure and military personnel .................................................................................521 14 Index of country/territory abbreviations...............................................527 15 Index of countries and territories ............................................................528

Index of FIGURES 1 2 3 4

North America US missile defence assets .............................................................................. 30 R/UGM-109 Tomahawk Block V upgrade................................................. 34 US defence budget as % of GDP................................................................. 37 Canada: non-US defence exports, 2000–20 ........................................... 44

Europe 5 Leopard 2 main battle tank (MBT): major upgrades, 1979–2014 .... 68 6 Western Europe: selected countries, fiscal balance (% of GDP), 2008–26 ....................................................................................... 73 7 Europe: defence spending by country and sub-region, 2021 ......... 74 8 Europe: regional defence spending as % of GDP (average) ............. 74 9 European Multi-Mission Frigate (FREMM) ............................................... 85 Russia and Eurasia 10 Russia Yasen/Yasen-M (Project 885/08851 (Severodvinsk I/II)) SSGN ...............................................................................170 11 Russia: defence spending as % of GDP ..................................................172 12 Russia: Airborne Forces (VDV) armoured-vehicle modernisation 180 13 14 15 16 17

Asia Asia: defence spending by country and sub-region, 2021 .............229 Asia: regional defence spending as % of GDP (average) .................231 China: defence budget compared with the rest of Asia (total), 2008–21, USDbn, constant 2015 ..............................................................231 Asia: sub-regional real-terms defence-spending growth, 2020–21 (USDbn, constant 2015).............................................................232 People’s Liberation Army (PLA) incursions into Taiwan’s Air Defence Identification Zone ................................................................235

18 China Coast Guard (CCG): patrol ships, 2021 ......................................238 19 Vietnam: indigenous naval shipbuilding capability ..........................245 20 Republic of Korea: K2 Black Panther main battle tank ......................246 Middle East and North Africa 21 Middle East and North Africa: defence spending by country and sub-region, 2021 .............................................................325 22 Middle East and North Africa: defence spending as % of GDP (average) ..................................................................................326 23 Israel: UAV exports to armed forces since 2000 ..................................331 Latin America and the Caribbean 24 Latin America and the Caribbean: defence spending by country and sub-region, 2021 .............................................................385 25 Latin America and the Caribbean: regional defence spending as % of GDP (average) ..............................................................385 26 Latin America selected countries, gross public debt (% of GDP), 2008–26 .....................................................................................386 Sub-Saharan Africa 27 Sub-Saharan Africa: regional defence spending as % of GDP (average) ..................................................................................447 28 Sub-Saharan Africa: defence spending by country and sub-region, 2021....................................................................................447 29 Sub-Saharan Africa: total defence spending by sub-region, 2008–21 ...............................................................................448 30 Sudan: defence imports since 2005 ........................................................451 Military cyber capabilities 31 Cyber force structures ..................................................................................508

Index of MAPS 1 2 3 4 5

Europe: regional defence spending .......................................................... 72 Spain: principal defence industrial manufacturing sites ................... 78 Russia and Eurasia: regional defence spending ..................................173 Asia: regional defence spending ..............................................................230 Middle East and North Africa: regional defence spending .............324

6 China: defence and security exports to Latin America since the early 2000s, selected systems .................................................382 7 Latin America and the Caribbean: regional defence spending.....384 8 Maritime security in the Gulf of Guinea .................................................439 9 Sub-Saharan Africa: regional defence spending ................................446

Editor’s Introduction Two years into the coronavirus pandemic, armed forces across the world continue to support public health measures. This support is likely to persist if new COVID-19 variants emerge. Nonetheless, in 2021 many armed forces sought to resume activities that had been affected by the pandemic. Military training and exercises adapted to become COVID-secure, to the extent that was possible, and large-scale deployments resumed, such as the UK-led Carrier Strike Group 21. However, infection risks remained as armed forces grappled with introducing vaccinations and other preventive measures: COVID could still undermine operational readiness. At the same time, as in 2020, there was no reduction in conflict or confrontation. Heightened perceptions of great-power competition still motivated many countries’ defence-planning considerations and influenced important procurement decisions. Persistent conflicts remained unresolved. In Africa, France moved to reshape its involvement in the Sahel, focusing its military presence around the Takuba counter-terrorist mission, while elsewhere, war in Ethiopia and insurgency in Mozambique provoked concern. In the Middle East, wars in Libya, Syria and Yemen continued, even if a combination of fatigue and stalemate led to tentative de-escalation. Middle Eastern states also awaited decisions on future US force dispositions. In 2021 the US withdrew missile-defence batteries, and the Biden administration has said it would ‘right-size’ the US regional presence. Specific details, however, remained scant in advance of the National Security Strategy, expected in 2022. Moreover, reports of the conclusions of the Global Posture Review contained little firm detail other than the ambition to develop a more robust presence in both the Indo-Pacific and Europe. This was linked to the administration’s Interim National Security Strategic Guidance, which said the US would end ‘forever wars’. Biden’s election brought expectations for improved transatlantic ties. However, the manner of the US withdrawal from Afghanistan – and the knowledge among European states that they lacked the military capability to do anything but follow Washington’s decision – dampened hopes for a strengthened relationship, particularly when viewed alongside the diplomatic fallout in Europe from the announcement in September of the AUKUS arrangement. Despite unifying rhetoric, European allies were still expected to do more for their own defence. It is likely that this will be reflected in NATO’s new Strategic Concept and in the EU’s so-called ‘Strategic Compass’.

Defence spending

Nonetheless, it is clear that European states have turned a corner in terms of their defence spending, since Russia’s annexation of Crimea in 2014 and subsequent military intervention in eastern Ukraine upended the continent’s security landscape. In 2021, European defence spending grew by 4.8% in real terms, more than in any other region. This marked the seventh

consecutive year of real-terms growth. The 2021 increase, combined with reduced spending in other regions, means that European spending represented 18.7% of the global total, after hovering between 16.5% and 17% annually since 2014. The continued upward trajectory of European defence spending reflects sharpened threat perceptions. Moreover, this higher European spending is adjusted for inflation; elsewhere, surging inflation has reduced the effect of nominal defence-budget increases. Indeed, while global spending rose again in 2021, reaching USD1.92 trillion – 3.4% higher than in 2020 – inflation in all regions meant this amounted to a 1.8% reduction in real terms. There were real-terms spending contractions in Latin America, sub-Saharan Africa, the Middle East and North Africa and in Russia and Eurasia, even though nominal increases were evident across most regions. In real terms, spending in Latin America – largely insulated from any major threat – is at the same level as in 2009. Meanwhile, economic constraints in sub-Saharan Africa have continued to subdue defence expenditure. In real terms, the region’s spending in 2021 is the same as it was in 2012. If inflation continues to rise, it may increase pressure on defence budgets. Defence spending in Asia has proven resilient, and there is little evidence that the pandemic has derailed planned defence investments. Total regional spending came to USD488bn in 2021, more than double the 2008 total of USD226bn. China accounted for 43% of total regional spending in 2021, with its defence budget of USD207bn supporting Beijing’s military modernisation. Our budget projections indicate that, if current trends continue, China’s official budget could reach just under USD270bn by 2030.

China and Russia

The public revelation that China was probably pursuing a significant expansion of its nuclear forces highlighted the breadth and scale of ambition underlying its military modernisation. China’s naval transformation has in recent years been remarkable and rapid by any measure. Fully developing the capabilities of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) Navy will, however, require further investments, not least in training. Nonetheless, the navy may be at an important stage in its force development. China’s shipbuilding output remains prodigious. Near-seas capability has been strengthened, with 72 Type-056/056A corvettes commissioned into servicesince 2012. But the commissioning of the first Type-075large aviation-capable amphibious assault ship, continued aircraftcarrier development and the commissioning of a growing number of frigates and destroyers reflect determined efforts to develop a blue-water navy. In late April, in the presence of President Xi Jinping, the navy simultaneously commissioned its third Type-055 cruiser, a Type-094 nuclear-powered ballistic-missile submarine and the amphibious assault ship.

THE MILITARY BALANCE 2022

Importantly, as well as commissioning new vessels, the retirement of legacy platforms continued. The last Type053H1 frigate in service is likely to decommission soon. Meanwhile, China’s Coast Guard is an important component of a three-layered maritime strategy alongside the navy and the maritime militia. The introduction of two 12,000+-tonne Zhaotou-class cutters was particularly noteworthy; these are the largest such coast guard vessels in the world. The PLA Air Force has continued to exercise its capabilities, including close to Taiwan. From January to November 2021, the PLA conducted 230 incursions into Taiwan’s Air Defence Identification Zone. Over 800 aircraft were employed, including fighters, bombers and also special mission types, particularly KQ-200 anti-submarine warfare (ASW) aircraft, as well as ASW and army attack helicopters. Meanwhile, the appearance of China’s Y-20 transport aircraft in a tanker variant indicated not only that the days of the ageing H-6U may be numbered in that role, but also that China may soon possess a more modern means of refuelling its aircraft and extending their range over the South China Sea. The scale and quality of the air force’s re-equipment programme is concerning other air forces in the region (notably India, Japan and Taiwan) and also making it a credible peer-level threat to US forces. Beijing is also offering for export increasingly capable combat aircraft, uninhabited aerial vehicles and guided weapons, such as the PL-15 (CH-AA-10) medium- to long-range air-to-air missile – which only entered PLA service in 2018. In late 2021, attention again focused on Russia’s buildup of forces near the border with Ukraine. The November build-up once more highlighted not just the military units Moscow could mobilise and deploy, but also the supporting civilian and military infrastructure that enabled this. The navy continued testing 3M22 Tsirkon sea-launched hypersonic missiles, with the first surface and submerged firings from a submarine, the Yasen (Project 885) vessel Severodvinsk, in October. The first serial-production Tsirkon weapons are scheduled to enter service in 2022. The Aerospace Forces have begun taking delivery of the first of up to 24 upgraded Su-34 Fullback bombers, but other air force re-equipment was limited: service entry for the Su-57 Felon remains some way off, while the new Checkmate combat aircraft concept is perhaps intended more for export. Meanwhile, Russia has looked to introduce upgraded capabilities in various locations, including in the Arctic and the Far East.

Regional reactions

It is clear that concern over Chinese and Russian military developments is driving regional as well as wider international military developments. In Europe, there is continued focus on improving combat air capabilities as well as airdefence and rocket artillery, while there is growing attention on countering the non-military tools that Russia employs as part of its overall strategy. These worries are also driving closer cooperation between NATO and non-NATO states that are particularly concerned by Russia’s activity, notably Finland, Sweden and Ukraine. In Asia, China’s military modernisation provides a lens through which to examine regional states’ defence poli-

cies and capability development programmes. Much attention has focused on PLA activity near Taiwan, but Southeast Asian countries are also feeling Chinese military pressure. Indonesia’s government and armed forces have become increasingly concerned about Chinese activities inside its exclusive economic zone near the Natuna islands, while Malaysia’s government issued a tender for a new long-range air surveillance radar a month after its air force intercepted a formation of PLA transport aircraft 60 nautical miles off the coast of Sarawak State in May. Meanwhile, Japan is strengthening its military capabilities: it will acquire F-35Bs and its Izumo helicopter carriers will be modified to operate these aircraft. In contrast to Europe, there is no multilateral alliance framework in Asia, so states there have used bilateral or mini-lateral groupings to support their security and defence efforts. An example is the AUKUS partnership, signed by Australia, the UK and US in September, which while initially concerned with helping Australia develop a nuclear-powered submarine capability is also intended to promote deeper collaboration between its three members on cyber, artificial intelligence (AI), quantum and ‘additional undersea’ capabilities. However, effective military cooperation also depends on a range of often unheralded bilateral agreements, for instance relating to military logistics support and intelligence sharing.

Technological change

China’s development of and integration of advanced defence technology continues at pace. US government officials reportedly expressed surprise at the level of technological sophistication evident in the August test of a hypersonic glide vehicle. China is, of course, not the only nation pursuing such technology. Russia’s boost-glide Avangard system is already entering service and other nations, including the US, are developing new hypersonic systems. But Beijing is attempting to build an overarching integrated strategic structure in which the civilian, defence and national-security sectors are closely aligned and coordinated. In Western states, attempts at civil– military technology collaboration have run into problems. As the speed of technological change accelerates, and as states look to integrate into their defence capabilities emerging technologies like AI and machine learning, it will be important for states in the West to tackle this issue. NATO is seeking to do so with its Defence Innovation Accelerator, but this will probably still rely on national pledges to the innovation fund, making effectiveness dependent on national priorities. At the same time, adopting more complex capabilities also risks creating vulnerability, for instance to adversaries targeting the systems on which networked armed forces depend. It also has the potential to complicate military cooperation, if not all members of an alliance can afford to keep up. Plans for increased Western military deployments to the Asia-Pacific will exacerbate these issues. The US may be able to afford to meet these tasks and to modernise its armed forces while facing challenges from China as well as Russia, but the same is not true of other Western or like-minded states. Moreover, the problem of managing these demands will only become more acute as long-term ‘strategic competition’ replaces ‘forever wars’ in the lexicon.

Chapter One

Domain trends Defence economics Global defence expenditure reached USD1.92 trillion in 2021, 3.4% higher than 2020 levels. However, surging inflation in all regions meant this amounted to a 1.8% reduction in real terms. If inflation continues to increase, this will put pressure on defence budgets as factor-input costs increase, while military personnel may call for higher wages to keep pace with cost-of-living increases. In 2020, the United States was the primary driver of global defence-spending growth. However, US defence-budget authority fell to USD754bn in 2021, from USD775bn in 2020. Inflation rose from 3.1% to 6.4% in 2021, which meant that the budget contracted by 6% in real terms. High inflation rates also resulted in real spending contractions in Latin America, sub-Saharan Africa, the Middle East and North Africa, and Russia and Eurasia, even though nominal increases were evident across most regions. In real terms, Latin American spending is at the same level as in 2009. Meanwhile, economic constraints in sub-Saharan Africa have continued to subdue defence expenditure. In real terms, the region’s spending in 2021 is the same as it was in 2012. Middle Eastern regional defence spending has been relatively stable in nominal terms, but with rates of inflation averaging

6.9% annually (and in some countries exceeding 30%), there have been sizeable real-terms reductions, with cuts averaging 3.6% annually in the four years to 2021. Defence budgets in Asia have proved resilient, despite a constrained fiscal backdrop, and there is little evidence that the coronavirus pandemic has derailed planned defence investments. Regional spending growth slowed in 2020 and 2021, down to 3.4% and 2.8% respectively from 5.3% in 2019 in real terms, but only a few countries implemented cuts, with others choosing instead to rein in spending plans. With a defence budget of USD207bn, China accounted for 43% of total regional spending in 2021. Total regional spending came to USD488bn in 2021, more than double the 2008 total of USD226bn. In 2021, European defence spending grew by 4.8% in real terms, higher than in any other region. This marked the seventh consecutive year of real-terms growth. The 2021 increase, combined with reduced spending in other regions, means that European spending represented 18.7% of the global total after hovering between 16.5% and 17% annually since 2014.

Land The proliferation of more precise and longer-range firesupport capabilities will continue to complicate ground manoeuvre at both the tactical and operational levels. While some armed forces are increasing their investments in both kinetic and non-kinetic defensive systems and counter measures, their relative cost is likely to limit availability in the near term, leaving armed forces at risk of being overwhelmed by larger quantities of cheaper offensive systems. The use of civilian-transport and logistics-support capabilities in Chinese exercises and Russian readiness drills in 2021 illustrates the key role such assets can be expected to play in any large-scale conflict between peer adversaries. Even countries that have invested in substantial military-transport and

logistics equipment inventories, such as China and the United States, would still be dependent on non-military capacity to mobilise, deploy and sustain forces in the required quantities. Military capacity-building in fragile states remains a challenging concept, particularly under fraught political conditions, as illustrated by the rapid collapse of the Afghan security forces. Nonetheless, demand for such external assistance continues to grow, particularly in states facing significant challenges from armed non-state actors, such as Mozambique. This has led to a proliferation of different actors and approaches, often with competing ideas about the objectives of such capacitybuilding.

Maritime The importance and challenges of the underwater battle space continue to grow, as do investments in subsurface capabilities. This was underlined by the September 2021 AUKUS partnership, under which Australia, the United Kingdom and the United States will work together to develop nuclear-powered attack submarines (SSNs) for the Royal Australian Navy. Meanwhile, the UK also announced contracts in September for early design work on its next-generation SSN; South Korea commissioned a conventionally powered boat capable of launching ballistic missiles; NATO members continue to enhance submarine and anti-submarine warfare training; and Germany confirmed in June an order of five P-8A Poseidon maritime-patrol aircraft.

The US and some of its major allies and partners are engaging in increasing numbers of complex, often multinational naval task group exercises, chiefly but not exclusively in the IndoPacific, to hone skills for operating in high-intensity peer or near-peer scenarios. There is a growing focus on hybrid or ‘grey zone’ threats in the maritime domain, challenging naval forces in terms of capabilities and doctrine. They must also balance the competing deployment requirements of more aggregated capabilities for high-end tasks and those for a more dispersed presence. This has led to an increase in forward-deployment patterns among some naval forces, as well as moves towards

THE MILITARY BALANCE 2022

coordinated deployments and shared maritime-domain awareness. Navies are continuing to balance increasing capability requirements for high-intensity warfare (including increased magazine provision) with the demand for greater affordability to maintain or increase hull numbers for presence and lower-end maritime-security missions. Germany and Italy will

likely join the group of states procuring 10,000-tonne-plus principal surface combatants, while next-generation UK and US destroyers could also be in that class or, in the UK’s case, perhaps within a dispersed system of systems. Meanwhile, the UK is pursuing the more affordable Type-31 and Type-32 designs, while France, Greece, Italy and Spain are leading the European Patrol Corvette programme.

Aerospace Range and speed are of heightened importance for peer and near-peer powers looking to their next generation of aircraft and weapons. The US focus on the Indo-Pacific places a premium on both. The geography of the region favours longer-range combat aircraft, given the likely mission radius required for operations there. Extended-range weapons will allow for greater stand-off, while increased speed will reduce the time from launch to target. Washington, however, is not alone in pursuing such goals, with Beijing and Moscow developing high-speed land-attack and antiship missiles. Air forces continued to struggle with balancing the cost of quality with the growing demand for quantity. The reemergence of the risk of peer or near-peer state-on-state warfare, and the associated consequence of high attrition rates, is focusing attention on combat aircraft numbers and how they could be supplemented. Crewed–uninhabited teaming, and uninhabited systems more broadly, are emerging as ways to supplement combat-aircraft fleet numbers and reduce the potential attrition rate of crewed platforms in high-threat environments. Comparatively low-cost armed uninhabited aerial vehicles (UAVs) are increasingly being adopted to supplement more

traditional airpower. China and Turkey are emerging as leaders in addressing this market. The corollary is that there is a further increase in efforts to develop detection and engagement systems to defeat armed UAVs. Uninhabited combat aerial vehicle (UCAV) research and development is ongoing in several countries, with India the latest to begin flight tests of its design as part of the Ghatak UCAV programme. Russia and China also have UCAV flight vehicles in test. The weaponisation of space continues in parallel with efforts to curtail or manage this. China, Russia and the US are developing a variety of counter-space systems. Middle powers are also bolstering their space capabilities. France, having established a space command in 2019, carried out its first satellitedefence exercise, AsterX, in March 2021. The United Kingdom and Germany created space commands in April and July 2021 respectively. Air forces remain worried about platform survivability, principally that of enablers including tankers, early warning aircraft and large UAVs, which are vulnerable even at long range to some air-to-air and surface-to-air missiles currently in development. Concerns over runway vulnerability have also reemerged, with more air forces now conducting training in dispersed operations for their combat-aircraft fleets.

Cyber Defence policymakers are now coming to terms with the impact of artificial intelligence (AI) on all aspects of military and intelligence operations. Advanced military powers are increasingly seeking cyber capabilities supported by narrow artificial intelligence/machine learning (AI/ML) for both defensive and offensive operations. The use of narrow AI/ML is confined mostly to standardising secure data collection, as well as network mapping and incident detection, although AI/MLsupported cyber tools are being slowly introduced alongside investments in zero-trust and cloud network architectures. This is leading military powers to concentrate on increasing numbers of AI-literate personnel. A deficit in governmental AI talents is increasingly seen as a key challenge to using these technologies for enhanced national-security purposes. Efforts are continuing among leading military powers to connect weapons systems, platforms, information infrastructure, and other devices in the Internet of Military Things (IoMT). There is also an ongoing push towards integrating electronic warfare and cyber capabilities. Cyberspace and the electromagnetic spectrum are interlinked because the IoMT primarily relies on radio frequency pathways for connectivity. US Cyber Command has expressed a demand for radio-

frequency-enabled cyber tools for operations at the tactical level. Defence budgets are reflecting a new priority to expand military cyber forces and provision for commissioning external providers for specific cyber operations. This is being driven in part by military needs but also by growing concern that civilian cyber-defence mechanisms are inadequate by themselves to protect national critical infrastructure – both in wartime and peacetime. Trends towards multi-domain integration and multi-domain operations (MDO) are continuing. However, MDO concepts, the integration of capabilities, and the synchronisation of operations and fires across all domains are imposing new demands on military information and communications systems, requiring investments that perhaps only some countries will be able to meet. As part of overall MDO efforts, Australia, the UK and the US are increasingly experimenting with the integration of narrow AI/ML as part of their tactical suites. A major concern remains to what degree such command and control capabilities (and MDO) will be feasible in a degraded operational environment.

Domain trends

Defence budgets and expenditure Defence budgets: top 15 in 2021† USDbn 1. United States

2. China 4. India

3. United Kingdoma

USDbn 207.3

800 71.6

65.1

700

(PPP ε332)

600

5. Russiab

6. France

7. Germany

500 400

62.2 754.0

59.3

56.1

9. Saudi Arabiac

10. South Korea

(PPP ε178) 8. Japan

300 200 100

49.3

46.7

11. Australia

12. Italy

13. Iran

14. Israel

15. Canada

34.3

33.8

25.0

23.6

23.2

0 United States

Other Rest top 15 of the countries world

Includes Armed Forces Pension Scheme; b Total defence expenditure including National Guard, Border service of Federal Security Service and social support and military pensions; c Excludes security expenditure; d Includes US Foreign Military Assistance. Note: Unless otherwise indicated, US dollar totals are calculated using average market exchange rates for 2021, derived using IMF data. The relative position of countries will vary not only as a result of actual adjustments in defence spending levels, but also due to exchange-rate fluctuations between domestic currencies and the US dollar. The effects of such movements can be significant in a number of cases. Dashed line reflects an estimate for the value of the Chinese and Russian defence budget in PPP (purchasing power parity) terms to take into account the lower input costs in these countries. This is for academic consideration; PPP conversions are not suitable for all countries in the world and are therefore not ideal for international comparisons. These PPP figures are not used in any regional or global totals in this publication. ©IISS a

2021 top 15 defence budgets as a % of GDP* Afghanistan

Oman

8.5%

8.0%

Kuwait

7.3%

Saudi Algeria Arabia 5.5%

5.5%

Azerbaijan

Jordan

Israel

Morocco

UAE

Armenia

Mali

Cambodia

Russia

Qatar

5.1%

5.0%

4.7%

4.4%

3.9%

3.8%

3.7%

* Analysis only includes countries for which sufficient comparable data is available. Notable exceptions include Cuba, Eritrea, Libya, North Korea and Syria.

Planned global defence spending by region 2021† Latin America and the Caribbean, 2.6% Asia, 25.3% North America 40.3%

Middle East and North Africa 8.9% Sub-Saharan Africa 0.9% Russia and Eurasia, 3.8% † At current prices and exchange rates

Europe 18.2%

©IISS

Planned defence spending by country 2021† Other Eurasia, 0.5% Russia, 3.2% Other Middle East and North Africa, 6.5% Saudi Arabia, 2.4% Other Asia 6.2% South Korea, 2.4% Japan, 2.6% India, 3.4% China, 10.8% Non-NATO Europe,1.4%

Sub-Saharan Africa, 0.9% Latin America, 2.6% United States 39.1%

United Kingdom 3.7% France, 3.1% Other NATO Germany, 2.9% 8.3%

©IISS

THE MILITARY BALANCE 2022

Real global defence-spending changes by region, 2019–21* 8

2019 2020 2021

6 4 2

0 -2 -4 -6 -8

North America

Asia

Russia and Eurasia

Europe

Middle East and Latin America North Africa and the Caribbean

Sub-Saharan Africa

Global

* Excludes states for which insufficient data is available

2021 regional defence spending, growth (%) and % GDP 5.0%

Defence spending % GDP (average)

4.5% MENA USD171bn

4.0% 3.5%

Asia (excl. China) USD280bn

3.0% North America USD777bn

2.5% Russia & E urasia U SD72bn

Europe USD351bn

Asia (incl. China)

2.0%

USD488bn

1.5% Sub‐Saharan Africa USD18bn

Latin America USD50bn

1.0%

USD207bn China

0.5%

–10%

–8%

–6%

–4%

–2%

0.0%

Real defence spending growth, 2020–21 Note: Chart compares regional defence spending totals (size of circle) in 2021, the real growth in 2021 spending compared to 2020 levels (x-axis), and defence as % of GDP average allocations (y-axis) in 2021. Please note growth rates are in real terms and will therefore reflect the higher rates of inflation globally in 2021. The North America drop in 2021 is the result of a return to trend budget level in the US following a surge in 2020 evident in the Operations and Maintenance (O&M) and military construction account of the Department of Defense (DoD) budget.

Composition of real defence-spending increases 2020–21‡ Sub-Saharan Africa, 1.4%

Latin America and the Caribbean, 3.0%

Other Europe, 10.1% China, 22.6%

Other Middle East, 2.0%

Composition of real defence-spending reductions 2020–21‡ Other Sub-Saharan Africa, 2.7%

Other Asia 1.4%

Other Russia and Eurasia, 0.8% Other North America, 0.2%

Other Latin America and the Caribbean, 2.6% Other Europe, 0.9% UAE, 1.5%

Other Asia, 8.5%

Other Middle East and North Africa, 0.8%

Total increases 2020–21:‡ USD38.8bn

France, 3.4%

Oman, 1.7%

Finland, 3.4%

United Kingdom 13.9%

Israel, 3.7% Iran, 4.1% Italy, 4.9% ©IISS ‡ At constant 2015 prices and exchange rates

South Korea, 6.9% Kuwait, 5.9% Greece, 6.1%

Total decreases 2020–21:‡ USD69.6bn

Turkey, 1.8% United States 61.8%

Australia, 2.0% Algeria, 2.1% Iraq, 2.6%

Brazil, 3.7% Russia, 4.4%

Saudi Arabia, 9.3%

The Extended-Range Cannon Artillery (ERCA) is in development to replace the US Army’s older M109 systems. Based on the M109A6 Paladin Integrated Management chassis, ERCA aims to achieve a range of 70 km through a combination of its longer 58 calibre armament and higherenergy propellent charges.

Developmental Weight n.k. but the programme aims to maintain ‘the weight found in current systems’ 4 crewmembers Armament: 155mm L58 Range: Rocket-assisted round – 70 km Rate of fire 4 rounds per minute There are future plans to add an autoloader, which will significantly increase the rate of fire. MRSI

Key features Koalitsiya is beginning to enter service as the Russian army’s next-generation self-propelled artillery system. A high level of automation allows for a faster rate of fire, and Russian sources claim a maximum range in excess of 70 km when using rocket-assisted ammunition.

2S35 Koalitsiya-SV

Entered service in 1999 47 tonnes 5 crewmembers Armament: 155mm L52 Range: Standard round – 30 km Base bleed round – 40 km Rocket-assisted round – 50 km Rate of fire 6–8 rounds per minute 3 round MRSI

Entered service in 2015, based on 1960s design 38 tonnes 4 crewmembers Armament: 155mm L39 Range: Standard round – 24 km Rocket-assisted round – 30 km+ Rate of fire 4 rounds per minute

M1299 Extended-Range Cannon Artillery

Key features

Entered service in 2008 56 tonnes 5 crewmembers Armament: 155mm L52 Range: Standard round – 30 km Base bleed round – 47 km Rocket-assisted round – 60 km Rate of fire 10 rounds per minute 5 round MRSI

M109A7

Entered service for testing in 2020 Estimated 48 tonnes 3 crewmembers Armament: 152mm L52 Range: Base bleed round – 29 km Rocket-assisted round – 70 km Rate of fire Approximately 16 rounds per minute claimed MRSI

Key features

Entered service c. 2013 43 tonnes 5 crewmembers Armament: 152mm L48 Range: Standard round – 25 km Rocket-assisted round – 29 km Rate of fire 10 rounds per minute 4 round MRSI

Key features

2S19M2 Msta-SM

footprint than wheeled self-propelled artillery systems, which offer greater mobility on roads. Current and next-generation tracked systems are focused on achieving longer ranges and higher rates of fire. Developments in computerised fire control and automated gun laying also allows many systems to perform Multiple Round Simultaneous Impact (MRSI) fire missions. An increased rate of fire allows fire missions to be conducted more rapidly, enabling faster repositioning before counter-battery fire can be effectively brought to bear. Most self-propelled artillery systems – both wheeled and tracked – are also capable of firing precision guided shells, enabling greater accuracy at long range.

Key features

PzH 2000

Self-propelled artillery systems provide mobile indirect firepower to support many armoured and mechanised manoeuvre formations. They also provide several important benefits over towed systems. For example, they can move under their own power to firing positions and they take less time to prepare for firing or for repositioning, which is intended to increase survivability against counter-battery fire. A number of nations are pursuing improvements to tracked and armoured self-propelled systems. These are designed for tactical mobility on unprepared ground, benefiting from a level of protection that enables close liaison with armoured units. That said, they may have a larger logistic

Domain trends 11

Tracked self-propelled artillery: selected current and next-generation systems

Dokdo-class LHD 19,000 tonnes 10 helicopters; 700 troops South Korea (2)

Trieste-class LHD 36,000 tonnes 15 aircraft/helicopters; 600 troops Italy (1 on trials)

Mistral-class LHD 21,500 tonnes 16 helicopters; 450 troops Egypt (2) and France (3)

Juan Carlos I-class LHD 27,500 tones 18 aircraft/helicopters; 900 troops Australia (2), Spain (1) and Turkey (1 in build)

Wasp/America-class LHD/LHA 42,000–44,000 tonnes 23–29 aircraft/helicopters; 1,687–1,800 troops US (9 + 1 in build)

H/PJ-11 close-in weapons system

To support the US Marine Corps’ vision of a more distributed and agile future operating concept including its Expeditionary Advanced Base Operations model (chiefly intended to respond to a more contested operating environment and the challenge from China), the US Navy is seeking a new class of LAW of approximately 4,000 tonnes and with the capacity to

Internal hangar and other facilities for helicopters, armoured vehicles and embarked troops

Floodable stern well deck for tank landing craft, air cushion vehicles and amphibious vehicles

H/PJ-11 close-in weapons system

2021

2016

EUROPE

LATAM

LPD/LSD

MENA

2016

lia ra st Au

2021

2016

RUS/EURASIA NORTH (Russia) AMERICA (US)

2026

*LHA = large aviation-capable amphibious ship with or without well deck LPH = landing platform helicopters (amphibious helicopter carrier)

ASIA

2021

LPD/LSD

a in Ch

sia ne do In

a di In

n pa Ja

ya M

e ar es an nd or iw ila nm ppin ap Ta ha ili ng T i h S P

LHD/LHA/LPH

Principal amphibious ship inventories: Asia

LHD/LHA/LPH*

2016

carry at least 75 marines and their equipment. A number of design concepts have already been produced. The US Navy would like 24–35 of such vessels. Judgements about the nature of the future operating environment will affect how navies operate and equip their LHDs, LPDs and LSDs in the future, and could generate a variety of new amphibious ship designs.

24-cell Guided-Missile Launch System for HHQ-10 (CH-SA-N-17) point-defence surface-to-air missile

Light Amphibious Warship (LAW)

Full-length flight deck with seven spots for helicopter operations

Design provides potential to accommodate future short or vertical take-off and landing aircraft in a light aircraft carrier role

2021

2026

Principal amphibious ship inventories

2026

2016

Operator: China (1 + 2 on trials)

2021

Full-load displacement: Est. 35,000 tonnes Capacity: Est. 28 helicopters; 800 troops

2026

Type-075 (Yushen)-class LHD

2016

(LPD) and Landing Ship Dock (LSD) vessels, designed to fulfil roles from amphibious power projection to strategic sealift and humanitarian assistance and disaster relief (HADR), the latter seen as of particular strategic significance in the Indo-Pacific. For the PLAN, the Type-075 will reinforce its fleet of Type-071 (Yuzhao) LPDs, likely to be used for regional power projection, HADR, and to support Beijing’s growing global interests. There are reports of a possible follow-on Type-076 LHD with enhanced aviation facilities. The United States still maintains the most sizeable fleet of large amphibious vessels but is also considering a new class of light amphibious warships (LAWs) for dispersed operations.

2021

China’s People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) has filled a major gap in its amphibious warfare inventory with the arrival of the Type-075 (Yushen) large aviation-capable amphibious assault ships with a floodable well-deck (LHD). Such vessels can transport and rapidly land a significant embarked force and its equipment. Because of the versatility of such platforms, a number of countries have recently invested in them, notably Australia, Egypt, France, South Korea and Spain. Italy and Turkey each have a new LHD nearing completion, Russia has begun building two and India has a longstanding requirement for up to four. Others have been acquiring Landing Platform Dock

2026

2016 2021 2026 2016 2021 2026 2016 2021 2026 2016 2021 2026 2016 2021 2026 2016 2021 2026 2016 2021 2026 2016 2021 2026 2016 2021 2026 2016 2021 2026 2016 2021 2026

12 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2022

Amphibious ship programmes and capabilities

1968 H-6A ES with the PLAAF

FF by 2025? 2040 OSD

Tu-95MSM TBD

2013–14 Kh-101/102 (RS-AS-23A/B Kodiak) nuclear/ conventional LACM ES on Tu-95MS mod

2004–5 Kh-555 (RS-AS-22 Kluge) conventional LACM ES on Tu-95MS

1994 Last new a/c delivered

1987 Tu-160 Blackjack A ES

OSD currently unclear

2018 Tu-22M3M FF

1993 Last new a/c delivered (total built all variants 497)

1990 Tu-22M3 upgrade proposed

1989

2003 AGM-158A JASSM ES with the B-52H

1991 AGM-86C conventional LACM ES on B-52H

1982 AGM-86B nuclear LACM ES on B-52G

First flight;

Entry into service.

After 2050 OSD

2013–14 Kh-101/102 2008 Concept (RS-AS-23A/B work on PAK Kodiak) nuclear/ DA underway 2019 AGM-86C conventional LACM 2009 Initial withdrawn ES on Tu-160 mod defence ministry 2017 Previously contract with 2020 AGM-158B unfinished airframe Tupolev JASSM-ER ES on completed and 2016 Initial design B-52H flown work on PAK DA completed by 2021 Re-engining 2020 Upgraded Tupolev contract Tu-160 with new awarded engine 2020? Prototype airframe in build 2022 First flight of new-build Post-2025 FF Tu-160M?

1990 Kh-55 (RS-AS-15 Kent) nuclear LACM Kh-22NA (RS-AS-4 Kitchen) ES on 1994 Production Tu-22M2/3 TBD halted after 34 aircraft 1977 Tu-22M3 FF

1976 Kh-22M (RS-AS-4 Kitchen) ES on Tu-22M2/3

1976 Tu-22M2 ES

1962 Last B-52H delivered

1955 B-52B ES

1954 B-52A FF

Boeing B-52 Stratofortress*,**

United States

1972 Tu-22M2 Backfire B

PAK DA

1961 B-52H FF

1981 Tu-160 FF

Tu-160 Blackjack**

2032 OSD

2014 AGM-158B ES on B-1B

2003 AGM-158A ES on B-1B

1988 Last B-1B delivered

1986 ES

1984 B-1B FF

Rockwell B-1B Lancer

2032 OSD

2021 AGM-158B (JASSM-ER) integration ongoing

2003 AGM-158A (JASSM) conventional LACM

1997 ES

1988 B-2A FF

Northrop B-2A Spirit

Post-2025 Initial operating capability

2022 FF planned

2015 Development contract awarded to Northrop Grumman

Northrop Grumman B-21 Raider

first. The status of the Chinese Xian H-20 and the design, by Tupolev, to meet Russia’s PAK DA future bomber requirement is less certain. Russia is also returning the Tu-160 Blackjack to production and upgrading the aircraft though its capacity to conduct the two programmes in parallel has been questioned. All of the new aircraft are assumed to be subsonic flying wing designs with low observable characteristics, for operating in contested airspace. At the same time, older designs like the B-52 continue in service with this latter aircraft increasingly envisaged as a stand-off weapons delivery platform.

1969 Tu-22M0 Backfire A FF

Tu-22M Backfire*,**

LACM: land-attack cruise missile; *Selected type variants shown; ** nuclear and conventional LACM shown.

Out of Service Date (OSD) possibly after 2040

2019 H-6N ES (will carry CH-AS-X-13 air-launched ballistic missile – possible nuclear variant)

2011 H-6K ES with CJ-20 LACM

2005 Project 2005 H-6H with for an H-6 YJ-63 conventional successor LACM ES underway 2007 H-6M ES

1983 Kh-55 (RS-AS-15A Kent) nuclear LACM ES with Tu-95MS

1981 Tu-95MS Bear H enters production

1959 First licence assembled H-6 aircraft

1995 H-6A nuclear role dropped

1959 Tu-95K Bear B enters production

1957 ES

1952 FF

Tupolev Tu-95 Bear*,**

1957 Tu-16 Badger licence build granted

Russia

Xian H-20

China

Xian H-6*

Only a handful of nations continue to operate what are considered dedicated bomber aircraft. Two are the world's main nuclear powers, Russia and the US, while the third, China, is modernising and expanding its nuclear arsenal. All of the designs currently in service had nuclear weapons delivery as a core part of their role when conceived, and the same is likely true for those in development. Long-range bombers remain part of Moscow’s and Washington’s nuclear triad, while China is now at least on the brink of fielding the same capability. All three nations are also pursuing new bombers, with the US Northrop Grumman B-21 Raider most likely to be flown and introduced into service

Domain trends 13

In-service or in-development bomber aircraft

Chapter Two: Defence and military analysis

Defence intelligence Maintaining relevance in the open-source era Defence intelligence organisations are generally less well known than civilian, ostensibly more secretive, intelligence agencies. Whilst in recent years Russia’s GRU has entered the public eye because of its involvement in the Salisbury poisonings in the United Kingdom in 2018 and other similar operations, it is less familiar than Russia’s domestic-intelligence agency, the FSB. Similarly, there is more public awareness of the United States’ CIA or the UK’s MI5 or MI6 than the United States’ Defense Intelligence Agency or the UK’s Defence Intelligence. The same arguably holds true for these countries’ signals intelligence agencies. Much less has been written about or by defence intelligence organisations, despite their work often underpinning the strategic intelligence insights that support decisions in defence ministries and at the highest levels of government, as well as their respective country’s deep expertise on topics such as nuclear or chemical weapons. Defence intelligence organisations should start with the advantage of being part of a system, within defence organisations, which is predisposed to require insights to support both policy and operational decisions. Armed forces and defence ministries turn to their ‘J2’ intelligence branch when they need information on, for instance, an adversary’s order of battle or the capability of its weapons systems. Indeed, an intelligence division is as much a part of a standard military organisation as an operations or logistics branch. However, defence intelligence organisations are distinct from the intelligence sections found in military units, which provide tactical intelligence to support operations. That said, while not all will follow the same model (as, for instance, the GRU in light of the operation cited above), defence intelligence organisations nevertheless share similar functions, such as the oversight of or responsibility for intelligence collection from military sensors (for example, on aircraft or ships), and the provision of analysis to support decision-making at the defence ministry level.

The growth of ‘open source’

Relevance is a perennial problem for any intelligence body. There is a risk that if it is not providing insights

or contributing to the thinking of decision-makers, its value will be questioned and it may be sidelined and have its level of funding reviewed (perhaps under the guise of an administrative reorganisation). At any time, but perhaps more so today than before, such organisations are faced with competing sources of information, ranging from domestic and foreign newspapers, magazines and journals and the output of think tanks to personal contacts, special advisers and meetings with foreign leaders. Accordingly, it may be tempting for ministers, senior civilian officials and military officers to question what extra value their intelligence organisation can offer. However, ‘open source’ (often referred to as ‘publicly available’) information is nothing new. At the turn of the nineteenth century, Vice Admiral Nelson’s multilingual chaplain, and effectively his intelligence officer, would go through and summarise foreign newspapers and pamphlets. More recently, in the UK, a key conclusion of the Franks Report on the Argentinian invasion of the Falkland Islands in 1982 focused on open-source material: The aim should be to ensure that the assessments staff are able to take fully into account both relevant diplomatic and political developments and foreign press treatment of sensitive foreign policy issues … We consider that the assessment machinery should be reviewed … [including] the arrangements for bringing to the Joint Intelligence Organisation’s attention information other than intelligence reports. A key difference in the current era is that so much more material is available and publicly accessible, alongside tools that can triage and analyse information to help citizen analysts make sense of it. During the Cold War, access to satellite imagery was highly sensitive and restricted to those with the highest security clearances. Today, clear and detailed satellite imagery of any place in the world is open to all, in what has been called ‘the democratisation of information’. Crowdsourced, academic and think-tank-driven projects have made remarkable discoveries and contributed analysis to issues ranging from the location of Chinese ICBM

Defence and military analysis: Defence intelligence

silos to an image of a North Korean missile in flight. The investigation by Bellingcat, the Netherlands-based investigative-journalism website, into the shooting down of Malaysia Airlines flight MH17 over eastern Ukraine in July 2014 – attributing it to a Russian missile launcher – is just one example of how ‘citizen journalists’ have used satellite imagery, together with photographs and videos taken by locals in the area. This poses a challenge to intelligence organisations, because they have to justify their added value, as well as the expense and risk involved in maintaining them and in collecting secret intelligence. With the possibility that leaders question the distinctiveness of their agencies’ intelligence assessments compared to what they themselves can find in the media or on the internet, defence intelligence organisations have to adapt to survive. However, there are means available that can help this process, including the same tools and techniques that appear to threaten these agencies’ previously unique position.

The data explosion

Figures vary, but a 2020 study by the US-based International Data Corporation reported that ‘the amount of data created over the next three years will be more than the data created over the past 30 years, and the world will create more than three times the data over the next five years than it did in the previous five’. This prediction may not translate precisely into the volume of data for defence and national security, but it is unlikely to be much different. The days when an analyst could file all the material on their subject in secure cabinets in their office are long past. It is impossible for human analysts to keep pace with such a rate of growth, even if money is no issue. Additionally, those inside government are constrained by high-security information technology (IT) systems designed to protect the most sensitive information, obtained at high cost and risk by their intelligence agencies. While those secret ‘nuggets’ ought to provide key insights that are not available to those in the unclassified world, they can be drowned out by the data that is publicly available. Classified systems can also be limited in the ways they can present data in an attractive and accessible way and share it with customers. In this realm, much use has been made of text-based documents and PowerPoint presentations in hard copy or on secure office computers – a less attractive means of accessing and engaging with information compared to an interactive tablet computer at home. An additional

challenge for the intelligence analyst arises when information comes from a respected citizen-journalist body and appears more rapidly than a classified assessment. While long aware of the problem, defence intelligence organisations around the world have been slow to respond beyond limited steps – partly because changing IT in government is a slow process and partly because of a predilection amongst analysts for secret intelligence. Added to this is the complexity of exploiting material in multiple languages, some relatively obscure, and the need to teach analysts how to effectively exploit material on the internet and in social media. The pace of events also presents a challenge and requires agility. Supporting deployed forces at a speed that can inform their decision-making cycle and at a classification that they can deal with combines all the issues highlighted above. In other words, what is the level of classification that the deployed unit’s systems can safely hold? If timely assessments are not delivered by their intelligence organisations, there is a risk that frustrated decision-makers may be tempted to turn to unfiltered news reports and social media.

Ways of adapting Improved technology While technological solutions are available, and some are already in use, intelligence assessment organisations have generally been slow in taking full advantage of new tools and technologies. To a degree, this can be explained by the time it takes to effect change within government IT infrastructures. This challenge has been recognised in the UK, with attention given to improving intelligence-related IT in the government’s ‘Integrated Review of Security, Defence, Development and Foreign Policy’ and the Defence Command Paper, both published in March 2021. The latter placed emphasis on regaining the technological lead over the UK’s adversaries, including implementing a ‘secure Digital Backbone’ linking different secure networks. It also suggested that to succeed in the modern environment, ‘open source intelligence, automation and AI [artificial intelligence] provide potentially game-changing ways to understand and counter these new challenges’. Automation and AI are not seen as supplanting analysts, with the ‘Integrated Review’ emphasising the need for ‘rigorous, independent assessment for effective national security policy-making’. But advanced IT tools – like those that can scour the internet, predigest material to present to the analyst and combine it in one place with other,

THE MILITARY BALANCE 2022

highly classified material – need to be delivered more rapidly than normal government IT projects. And they need to draw in innovative solutions from the private sector. At the same time, the increasing use of technology raises other issues that need to be addressed, including understanding how AI makes decisions and the ethics of allowing machines to make decisions, as well as deciding where and when humans should intervene.

Access and ethos Technology, however, is not the only answer. Intelligence analysts have a unique advantage in that they can work alongside their customers; for instance, attending their meetings, listening to their problems and requirements and, as a result, responding in a tailored way. This relationship should be interactive. Meetings like these enable customers from policy and operations backgrounds to ask further questions; indeed, according to senior practitioners, these personnel have a responsibility to be questioning and demanding. It is important for clear priorities to be established, with each side holding the other to account for their contribution. This means that honest and robust discussions are needed from the early planning stage. While it is difficult to generalise, most military and civilian analysts work in government with a sense of public service, of service to their country, and not for profit or personal gain. They are accountable for their advice but have to work on the basis of providing the best advice that they can to the decision-maker without advocating any particular course of action. As a result, their advice may be unwelcome but – depending on the process followed in each country – it can be probed and questioned, and should be presented with clear statements about the degree of confidence analysts have in their judgements and about the alternatives that have been considered. This may lead to uncomfortable discussions; though in these cases, the decision-maker knows that the assessment they receive has not, for instance, come with an eye to a future contract or a desire not to upset the client.

The importance of training However, there is a risk that the consumers of intelligence assessments may forget that these are not simply another ‘point of view’. In the Five Eyes intelligence assessment community (comprising Australia, Canada, New Zealand, UK and US), there has been much emphasis in recent years on professionalising the business of intelligence assessment, particularly in

the light of lessons from the failure to prevent the 9/11 attacks in the US and from the UK’s ‘dossier’ entitled ‘Iraq’s Weapons of Mass Destruction – The Assessment of the British Government’. For instance, analysts are better trained now than in the past to understand the advantages and limitations of different types of intelligence. They learn analytical techniques to help them to recognise and minimise biases and to be open to challenge. And they learn to make reasoned judgements and to be able to explain and justify them. Increasingly, formal training includes guidance on how to make the most of open source, such as using the tools available to them, conducting safe and effective searches and making judgements about the veracity of different sources, ranging from social media to scientific publications. But that training needs greater emphasis and weight in an analyst’s overall career development, and to be renewed and refreshed. It is also important that customers of intelligence assessments become demanding and critical consumers, and understand the product they are receiving and the process that has gone into its creation; this will help them to recognise that an all-source intelligence assessment is not simply an opinion.

Classified sources Despite the emphasis on open sources, analysts within government continue to have access to confidential insights provided by diplomats and other government officials with relevant access, as well as classified material acquired by their intelligence agencies, sometimes from highly technical capacities. The exclusive nature of secret intelligence should be able to give analysts insights that are not available to those without access. The optimum combination should be to provide insights that can only be gained through the fusion at scale of both open source and classified information. However, the agencies that collect secret intelligence (and diplomats) need to be tasked effectively and need time to develop their sources and access, whether human or technical. This means that the process cannot necessarily be as agile as an analyst may need, especially in a developing crisis in an area not previously considered a priority. The analyst also needs to be able to recognise how best to address the problem they are trying to understand. It might be that open-source information is perfectly adequate to meet a particular requirement. But if this is the case, the analyst still has to use the analytical process to give it the same level of scrutiny and ‘added value’ as that given to secret sources. For these analysts,

Defence and military analysis: Defence intelligence

to rely on open source, rather than classified intelligence, may not always be instinctive. It also requires collection agencies to focus on where they can make a difference, not to simply collect what might be regarded as ‘low-hanging fruit’. This calls for clear prioritisation, emanating from the most senior policy/ operational decision-makers, that feeds into collection and analysis. It also requires a close and open relationship between the collector and the analyst about where secret intelligence can make a real difference. Without that, agencies risk following the approach taken by Soviet agencies during the Cold War, when extracts gained from official publications or think tanks were stamped with a security classification and given the status of secret intelligence, whether or not they had originally come from the public domain.

Allies and burden-sharing Defence intelligence organisations can also draw on the insights, sources, and challenge function that can be offered by their counterparts around the world. While the Five Eyes relationship may be the most enduring, trusting and deep, others can provide insights and local knowledge that add value and are worth investment, especially in their specific region, or where their armed forces are deployed on operations. In some countries, particularly where the armed forces are more prominent in government and the security apparatus, the defence intelligence relationship can be more important and valuable than that between the traditional civilian agencies. ‘Burdensharing’ in the strict sense, where countries decide not to collect and instead rely on a partner country to do this, is more difficult than it may appear because governments are usually unwilling to sacrifice their own capacity to provide analysis. But it does happen in some areas and can be particularly valuable when an issue or crisis arises in a place that is normally a low priority – especially when they know they can rely on the analysis of their counterparts.

Developing genuine all-source analysis If analysts are to develop the best all-source analysis, this also means that the security and classification of material need to be addressed. Security can stifle engagement with experts in academia and think tanks, and particularly with those ‘citizen analysts’ whose contributions should be part of a genuine allsource process; the latter especially may be unfamiliar to agencies. This places a premium on the regular review of security systems and processes to ensure

that they are not self-defeating. While security is essential to protect sensitive material and the means by which it was acquired, it also gets in the way of making intelligence useful and sharing it with those who need it most. For instance, intelligence insights are not just for senior decision-makers in secure locations, but for troops deployed in challenging environments, perhaps with limited communications bandwidth. Moreover, in the face of pressure for increased openness, and with greater value placed on countering disinformation, defence intelligence organisations – like other members of the intelligence community – will need to consider either their conclusions can be made publicly available, whether on an ad hoc or regular basis. There will, therefore, always need to be pressure on the classification process so that intelligence becomes more accessible. Intelligence analysts have always had a challenging task: they are working in an environment that can be fast-moving and where they can have significant gaps in their knowledge. Yet decision-makers want immediate answers with a degree of certainty that the analyst cannot generally provide. The vast increase in data of all types is both an asset – it can give insights only previously available through secret intelligence – and a huge challenge if it is to be assimilated and used to advantage. And there is always a requirement to be relevant and timely or risk obsolescence. There is a greater chance that this task can be achieved by analysts who are able to work closely with their customers and have the ability to fuse secret and open sources of information in order to create an all-source assessment that is tailored, objective and non-partisan. But this needs to be paired with a continued desire to improve, including incorporating new tools and techniques. Those tools, IT and training exist and could help the analyst in their work. In the UK, the government’s ‘Integrated Review’ recognised the importance of delivering on these issues if decision-makers are to retain an advantage over their adversaries. But this issue is not one for the UK and its close allies and partners alone. With information increasingly ubiquitous, crossing national borders and challenging previous definitions of classification, similar concerns over how to cope with the rise of open-source data and analysis face defence intelligence organisations around the world. Those in closed regimes, who might regard open source as more of a threat than an opportunity, and perhaps with analysts who are encouraged to ‘toe the line’ and are actively discouraged from providing challenging assessments, may find it harder to adapt.

Simulation and defence Training benefits and trends

Simulation has become progressively more important to military forces, defence industry and defence organisations. Its utility is being seen in training and mission preparation and other key defence activities, including experimentation, concept development, and equipment design, manufacturing, testing and support. Although computer-based simulation or synthetic environments have supported armed forces since the latter half of the twentieth century, contemporary advances in technologies, such as the internet, artificial intelligence (AI), gaming and eXtended Reality (XR) systems, are increasing the practical and potential utility of simulation technologies. Whatever use is intended for them, simulations imitate the real world over time and are intended to help the armed forces, government and defence industry to prepare for the future and enhance their readiness. However, while simulations are often seen as driven by computers, this does not necessarily need to be the case, and some live exercises or paper-based war games may require no or only limited computer support. Although simulation is used across defence organisations, analysts suggest that it is not often managed strategically, with piecemeal procurement and support leading to duplicative investments (for example, acquiring multiple terrain databases) and to reduced interoperability between systems and the data that they rely on. Simulation is an approximation or an estimate and cannot completely replicate the real world, as the models it employs may not be accurate and variables may be unknown in advance. Further, important real-world physical and psychological effects may not be faithfully replicated in simulation, reducing its training benefit or, in the worst case, leading to ‘negative training’, where incorrect information or invalid concepts are unintentionally introduced or acquired. Nevertheless, the saying that ‘all but war is simulation’ remains common among simulation practitioners; that nothing can fully prepare personnel for the actual operational and physical environment.

Simulation and training

In its earliest days, simulation was used in training principally for safety reasons. Simulation supported

higher-risk activities such as pilot training; for example, instrument flying could safely be taught and practised in a simulator prior to taking to the air. Used from the early twentieth century, pilot-training devices like these transformed from largely mechanical to electrically powered devices by mid-century, before the widespread adoption of analogue then digital computers further improved their capability. Up until the 1990s, simulation was important particularly for pilot training, although it was also used in the maritime and land sectors. The cost of flying, as well as safety, were significant factors. In the 1990s, non-defence sectors, such as IT and gaming, began to influence military-simulator technology, moving it progressively away from bespoke and highly expensive technology to more commoditised hardware and software. This trend, together with more adaptable technology, has meant that simulation has become more affordable to training designers and providers for land, sea, air and space, and for command, control, communications, computers and intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (C4ISR) and cyber. Today, most training courses can be supported by simulation, in part or wholly. Beyond safety and cost, simulation has other advantages to purely live training. Simulation is not weather dependent, so the risk of an exercise being cancelled or curtailed due to bad weather is minimised. Indeed, to a large extent, weather can be altered within the simulation to best reflect the training requirement and increase variety within training serials. Additional important benefits of simulation are that complexity can be introduced into training, and certain tactics and techniques can be practised – or novel capabilities introduced into exercises – which might be impracticable or carry security risks if conducted in a live environment. This is particularly relevant to the modern, networked, multi-domain battlespace, where many activities and capability effects can be simulated as part of training programmes. That said, one of the downsides of training in such a secure environment is that the training cannot readily be observed and thus has little of the deterrence or influence benefits that

Defence and military analysis: Simulation and defence

come from more obviously ‘advertising’ capability developments or from training close to a border, with partners, or in another country. Live training can be instrumented to an extent, but simulations by their digital nature are data rich, which can make afteraction reviews and debriefing additionally insightful and increase training value. Another benefit of simulation may be in helping armed forces to reduce their carbon footprint.

Live/synthetic balance

Armed forces around the world are considering the balance between live and synthetic training at a more strategic level. While simulation might have been previously considered on a case-by-case basis, military leaders are now pursuing broader defence-wide approaches to save resources and respond to environmental pressures. By making central investments in simulation research and technology, together with providing the necessary leadership and culture changes, those in charge of training systems seem to be demonstrating greater motivation to move more training from the live environment to simulation. The live/synthetic balance is not only a consideration of cost effectiveness. Platforms like the F-35 combat aircraft cannot easily train and test their full capabilities in the real world, not least for security reasons. Typically, the time spent in the aircraft versus the simulator is split at least 50/50, and the time spent in the simulator is only expected to grow. That said, armed forces ultimately conduct their missions in the live environment, and rather than simulation being seen as a direct competitor to live training, it is likely that this will not be a binary choice; in time, simulation will be a precursor and means to better prepare for live training – which in turn, although reduced, may be better utilised.

Simulation types

Training simulation systems reflect the diversity of military training; for instance, the years-long training for a warship captain, or firefighting training that must be delivered in volume. They are typically termed live, virtual or constructive (LVC). Live defines a simulation involving real people operating real systems and, for some training, it will be instrumented to enhance training and debriefing. Virtual describes a simulation involving real people operating simulated systems; the flight simulator is a typical example. A constructive simulation is one involving simulated people operating simulated systems, for example,

one that supports command-and-control training, where a live-training equivalent would be expensive for a relatively small training audience. Moreover, live, virtual and constructive simulations can be combined to provide a richer LVC-based training experience. For instance, the British Army’s ‘synthetic wrap’ is intended to generate capabilities that are difficult to reproduce in live training, injecting into the training both real and synthetic forces and C4ISR feeds to enhance headquarters training. Similarly, a real pilot in a flight simulator can interact with a live land-training exercise, negating the need for flying. Such LVC-training capabilities can also generate useful data for improving both the lessons-learned process and analysis after the training is over. Mock battles at the United States’ National Training Center (NTC) at Fort Irwin demonstrated this functionality: when simulators and instrumentation were added to existing capabilities, they reportedly showed that attack helicopters on both sides were vulnerable to tank main armament, something that neither US armour nor army aviation personnel had anticipated. Military-simulation specialists have worked for several decades to develop international simulation standards that permit such interoperability. As well as LVC interoperability, simulation standards also facilitate distributed simulation and training. One example is the US Air Force (USAF) Distributed Mission Operations Network, which since 1999 has enabled interoperability and training between dissimilar aircraft platforms located across the globe in a virtual environment. Moreover, broader networks are periodically established. The Swedish-led Viking exercise is another example. In a recent iteration, up to 2,600 participants, representing 24 countries and 33 organisations, were networked in order to enhance multinational and multifunctional cooperation in peace operations through distributed commandpost exercises. Simulation-based training can now also be delivered to individuals and small teams over military networks or the internet using standard information-services technologies such as personal computers and mobile devices. Further, good levels of immersion can be achieved through today’s offthe-shelf virtual reality (VR) headsets.

Fidelity

The realism of a training simulation, or its fidelity, is an important driver of a system’s cost and complexity. Its definition can depend on the industrial sector but, for defence, it can be considered, as the UK MoD has

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termed it, ‘the necessary degree of correspondence between the training and operational environments’. Motion and vision are important aspects of simulation fidelity, but how the simulation responds to human input can also be critical to training. Motion is a cost driver because expensive systems are often required to generate motion features, although whether it is actually required can be based as much on precedent and human judgement as science. Visuals were a significant cost driver up to the late 1990s, as until then the technology behind computerised graphics was generally bespoke for the application. However, as gaming and wider IT technology have advanced, the relative cost has come down, for instance, as components such as graphics cards have become commoditised. Further, small domes (structures onto which simulations can be presented ‘in the round’ via projection) and XR systems are reducing the cost further. Ultimately, simulation design needs to be driven by training needs and, because of this, the highest levels of physical fidelity are not always required. Instead, good instructors and training design may be more critical in delivering the necessary ‘psychological fidelity’.

International trends

Barriers to the adoption of simulation in training have traditionally been the change to culture and process required to transition from live training, as well as cost. However, as simulation has improved and become more cost-effective, it is now being exploited at all levels of training. This trend is being seen across the world, and also in countries with only modest defence budgets. Furthermore, pressures to reduce the cost and duration of training are progressively increasing adoption. Some current initiatives are looking to simulation and new processes to transform training; for instance, the USAF is introducing its Rebuilding the Forge (Reforge) Concept of Operations. This is looking to reduce the time by over a year between finishing undergraduate pilot training and assuming the position of a combat flight leader in an operational fighter. Reforge builds on the USAF’s Pilot Training Next trials of VR-based simulation and redesigned courses, and will also involve AI tools to help identify student strengths and weaknesses. Likewise, the British Army is looking to make its collective training more challenging and to conduct training in more dynamic and complex environments (physical, virtual and cognitive) through its Collective Training Transformation Programme.

This programme will make greater use of virtual training with a paradigm shift to ‘virtual before live’, where training will be carried out in virtual simulation before going to live instrumented training. LVC-simulation systems will be routinely held and operated at the unit level, with all training data captured, analysed and exploited. The US Army’s Synthetic Training Environment (STE) is similarly seeking to transform training through technology but also to enhance mission rehearsal in support of multi-domain operations. Full operational capability is planned for 2023 and it is planned to combine all LVC-training environments into a single STE, accessing One World Terrain software and data, which will be compatible with Joint All-Domain Command-and-Control architecture. Simulation has supported mission preparation before, but this has been mainly on a case-by-case basis – for instance, the NTC was turned into simulated Iraqi and Afghan provinces for the pre-tour training of US Army brigades. In contrast, STE is a US Army-wide initiative. The global exploitation of advanced simulation technology can be exemplified by China, which has established a pilot-training simulation centre that, according to reports, has reduced live training. Beyond pilot training, the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) is reported to be using VR simulators to train for naval pipeline maintenance and to have introduced VR-training simulation rooms for instruction in some areas, while the PLA Rocket Force is said by Chinese media sources to be using similar simulation technologies to practice missile launches.

Technological advances

Today’s simulation systems have high-fidelity graphics and audio capabilities, principally leveraging advances in computer-gaming technology, and military leaders are now looking to other advances to improve the flexibility, accessibility and cost effectiveness of training. These fall into five broad categories: human interfaces; data and analytics; AI; networking and the cloud; and system convergence. The most prominent human interfaces now are XR technologies. These encompass real-andvirtual combined environments, such as virtual and augmented reality (AR) as well as human machine interfaces. Fully immersive systems, such as VR, are now routinely used for military training. Mixed reality (MR) systems that blend the physical and digital worlds are also showing promise and may reduce the need for expensive simulator domes, or at

Defence and military analysis: Simulation and defence

least support training when domes are not available. Their maturity can be illustrated by the European Union Aviation Safety Agency’s recent approval of an MR-based helicopter simulator for (civil) pilot training. It is possible, meanwhile, that XR may develop to the extent that the distinction between live and virtual simulations becomes less relevant and creating a live/virtual blend may become increasingly viable. AR systems overlay virtual content onto the real world and are finding utility in training, for example the combination of manikins and AR overlays in medical training, and in operations, such as the US Army’s development of its Integrated Visual Augmentation System. Data and analytics can enable a more quantitative approach to training design and assessment. Indeed, technology trends are offering new opportunities. Data can be captured through wearables, eye-tracking and a variety of other sensors to provide improved feedback to trainees and instructors and to influence training design. At the ‘enterprise’ or headquarters level, such data can help to monitor the cost-effectiveness of training and training systems, enabling authorities to rebalance resources as necessary. The concept of linking digital replicas with real-world data, known as ‘digital twins’, has existed for some time, but it is becoming more mainstream with advances in digital technologies. The benefit for armed forces is that there will be a single source of data for simulations accessible across defence organisations, accurately and dynamically representing future operating environments and able to capture the whole life of operational systems, such as wearand-tear over time. AI will likely influence many areas of military training. It has the potential to accelerate the planning and preparation of training events, reduce the demand for human role players, support training data analytics, and support more realistic environments as well as human and team behaviour. Moreover, simulation can also assist in the training of the AI systems themselves, which will likely become more important as humans and machines increasingly operate together in the battlespace. The networking of simulation systems allows training audiences to be expanded and geographically dispersed. It also offers the prospect of connecting to public or private cloud services, interacting with larger, more secure data sources, and reducing localhardware requirements through streaming services. Although network bandwidth, latency, reliability

and security are all issues to be addressed, gaming is already moving in this direction and similar trends are anticipated in simulation. Wireless technologies, such as 5G, may also enable training establishments with currently poor fixed-line networks to benefit from simulation technologies in order to enhance their live and virtual training. Specialists are now discussing the convergence of systems, where previously distinct simulation systems become more closely integrated and unified; for example, simulation systems may draw on a single source of data for a training scenario or forthcoming operation, or trainees and instructors will use the same user interface regardless of the system they are using for training. This convergence is still some way off, because of the number of legacy systems that need to be updated, but nonetheless, the adoption of open standards and consolidation in the wider technology sector will drive this trend. Moreover, it will not be restricted to simulation systems. For example, United States Special Operations Command is funding a simulation and training company to create a digital ecosystem that fuses data from a variety of sources and delivers a common operational picture. Indeed, some simulation specialists consider that the ultimate convergence may be in the form of the so-called metaverse: a future vision of the digital world that goes beyond today’s internet, in which people socialise, work and play across multiple connected virtual domains, but remain socially and economically integrated with the physical world. This remains some way off, and it will likely be some time before defence establishments could themselves create such an environment, but it is apparent that some technology CEOs see the metaverse as the direction in which these developments may ultimately move.

Training and the pandemic

At the outset of the coronavirus pandemic, travel restrictions and base closures led many training events to be cancelled or scaled back. The reliance on civilian contractors for simulator operations and maintenance further contributed to disruption. However, the pandemic also led some military officials to more fully consider the power of distributed learning, training and connectivity. For instance, in the UK, the Scottish and North Irish Yeomanry, an Army Reserve light cavalry regiment, set up – under their own initiative – a distributed system based on existing military and gaming software so they could continue to train from their homes. Another, perhaps

THE MILITARY BALANCE 2022

unforeseen consequence of social distancing has been its impact on instructors who previously worked close to trainees, for example, within flight simulators. In such cases, instructors were moved outside the simulators but remained nearby. Moreover, some training centres started to include short online courses for their trainees, which had the benefit of allowing students to review subjects before attending practical training. But perhaps the greatest change is the realisation within the simulation and training community that capabilities previously seen as only desirable, such as remote training, could overnight become imperative. Trends that existed before the pandemic have rapidly accelerated.

Beyond training

Simulation is widely used in training and mission preparation but is also supporting a broad range of other defence activities. The UK MoD is funding a ‘single synthetic environment’, or digital replica of the country, to test resilience to natural disasters and attacks by hostile states. With geographical and critical infrastructure layers, the virtual ‘twin’ uses AI to simulate future scenarios and support the war gaming of responses. Meanwhile, the UK/Italy/Sweden sixthgeneration fighter-jet collaboration, known as Tempest in the UK, has been put on a ‘digital first’ footing, whereby simulated design and testing are expected to significantly reduce costs, time and carbon emissions. In the field of AI, the environments within which new systems will operate can be simulated, and the resulting synthetic data used to train the system using machine learning. These digital twin approaches to defence planning and equipment design and acquisition are likely to become more important and main-

stream as technology advances, though issues of data ownership, financing and control will need to be addressed.

Future simulation

In the 1985 novel Ender’s Game, the young protagonist learns how to fight and lead others in a training simulator, but what he is told is his last training exercise is in fact a real operation – one that he leads successfully. This is perhaps the ultimate simulation, one that accurately reflects the operational system such that the trainee(s) can seamlessly move from training to operations. Ender’s Game is not just about such technology; it has other human characters who provide guidance and instruction to the protagonist and his comrades. As such, however good the simulation is and however capable AI becomes, the role of humans in instructing and inspiring trainees is unlikely to go away. Nevertheless, as simulation and training technologies advance and as training content becomes more ubiquitous, the trainees of today and tomorrow may look to instructors and other trainees more as mentors and collaborators, with training adapted to individual styles of learning. Decision-makers also need to consider a generation of new recruits who have predominantly grown up with digital technologies and gaming, the so-called Generations Z and A, who may have quite different views and needs regarding the best way for them to learn and train. It is possible that in the longer term, as today’s recruits become decision-makers who have been immersed their whole lives in virtual worlds with seamless connectivity, simulation may be seen instinctively by them as an important means of helping to solve a raft of defence problems.

Military adaptation to climate change Reducing emissions and maintaining military effectiveness Climate change is an accelerator and multiplier of conflict risk. First-order physical effects of the changing climate include storms, floods, heatwaves and droughts. Second-order effects include degradation of water supplies, reduced agricultural productivity, and damage to infrastructure and disruption to energy generation, with all these having potential consequences for economies and employment. These changes could increase migration and forced displacement, adding challenges to stressed governance systems that could in turn increase grievances, weaken the social compact and contribute to political instability. In late 2021, the United States National Intelligence Council published an assessment referencing many of these challenges, also raising the possibility that competition and disputes may grow as states look to acquire technologies and resources needed to assist their adaptation to renewable energy sources or carbon reduction. These trends are likely to increase the requirement to deploy military forces for humanitarian assistance and disaster-relief missions, both at home and abroad. They will also increase the demand for a range of peacekeeping, stabilisation and combat missions. Furthermore, climate change has the potential to affect global trade patterns, for instance by opening up waterways in previously ice-bound regions, which might lead some states to adjust their overseas deployments. The radius of action and frequency of international military operations may increase as a result. With current military equipment, this would increase military greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions.

Mitigating the impact of climate change on military effectiveness

Military operations will be increasingly affected by climate change. This is not only because it may make planning and executing operations more complex, but also because armed forces will need to adapt their equipment capabilities for operations in warming and variable climates. For example, as polar ice melts, it is possible that ice floes may fragment more than before, creating challenges for ships and possibly requiring extra hull strengthening to enable safe operations in

previously ice-free areas. Further south, the likely rise in summer temperatures in the Gulf will increasingly strain the performance of people, radios, aircraft and warship engine-cooling systems; changes in water temperature and salinity will affect underwater operations; while there may also be effects on sensor and weapons performance. Moreover, ameliorating these problems can bring unhelpful secondary effects. For example, fitting additional cooling systems, as these are currently designed, will increase GHG emissions. Climate change will have negative effects on military bases and infrastructure. Ports and other coastal installations will be threatened by rising sea levels from unpredictable weather events, while rising temperatures may require longer runways. Some of these risks can be alleviated by physical defences, but it is possible that some bases will have to be abandoned. Similarly, a growing threat of fires on increasingly arid military-training areas and ranges will require mitigation.

The armed forces and decarbonisation

These trends raise the question of what actions armed forces and defence establishments might undertake to reduce their emissions and contribute to national sustainability targets. In the 2015 Paris Agreement, many nations committed to reducing carbon emissions to net zero by 2050. While many countries have made policy declarations to this effect, only a few have so far legislated to achieve this goal, including France and the United Kingdom. However, it is still up to each nation whether they include their military emissions in net-zero targets. Military emissions were exempt under the Kyoto Protocol and, while Paris eliminated that loophole, reporting on them remains voluntary. For states that include military emissions in their legal net-zero requirements, the question of reducing military emissions may be one of not ‘when’ or ‘if’, but ‘how’, although this is not the same for all. Moreover, much depends on how states actually report their emissions: pressure groups that aggregate military-related emissions data that is reported to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change assert that reporting remains partial.

THE MILITARY BALANCE 2022

Indeed, calculating military emissions remains an inexact science, something NATO hopes to address for the Alliance with its Climate Change and Security Action Plan. Nonetheless, it is acknowledged that military facilities and equipment emit large amounts of greenhouse gases, with these rising as a consequence of increased use – for instance on operations. As one example, the UK Ministry of Defence assessed that in 2020 about 3.8 million tonnes of these gases were emitted by its forces. This was about half of all UK government emissions. If emissions by the UK defence supply chain were included, this figure rose to 5m tonnes. Accepting these caveats on overall reporting, reducing emissions to a net total of zero by 2050 will nonetheless be a challenge for governments wishing to do so. The full spectrum of military activity, including travel and training, will need to adapt to reduce unnecessary emissions. Increasing the proportion of training in simulated environments would assist in this change. Military estates of barracks, docks, airfields and training areas offer opportunities to reduce emissions, such as through better insulation; to generate renewable energy, for instance by using solar power; and to capture carbon dioxide emissions, with planting trees one example. This could help offset military emissions elsewhere and may increase resilience by making bases more energy independent.

Decarbonising military equipment

Military equipment is currently optimised for military advantage, with little consideration of climate sustainability issues such as emissions reduction. Many planned future equipment acquisitions appear to continue in this mode. For nations that have committed to decarbonisation, the most difficult issue will be whether operational capability should be reduced to meet emissions targets, or whether priority should be given instead to protecting capabilities at the expense of emissions reductions. It is unlikely that politicians, citizens or armed forces will want decarbonisation to result in the loss of military capability. On the other hand, adopting climate-adapted equipment could reduce emissions and might provide useful options for improving military effectiveness, operational capability and climate resilience. For example, increased use of uninhabited, robotic and autonomous systems would, by removing

human operators, reduce fuel consumption and thus emissions. Moreover, reducing fuel consumption and carbon emissions would increase the range and endurance of military platforms, thus expanding options for employment and reducing logistic dependency. There is much research and development (R&D) underway in relevant civilian industries. Examples include increased use of electric vehicles, reducing aircraft fuel emissions and reducing the carbon footprint of shipping. In the medium term, advanced fuels and new sources of energy may further reduce emissions, but it is likely that some options will have limitations without significant technological progress. There are range and payload trade-offs to consider, for one thing. For example, it is probable that electrical propulsion would have utility for shorthaul missions with aircraft carrying relatively light payloads, but be insufficient to power large aircraft or jet fighters. However, notwithstanding the global diffusion and commercial availability of advanced technologies, progress in this area might still be faster among those states in the global ‘north’ that have the funds and technical capacity either in government or in the private sector to pursue or acquire them. Indeed, even in these states, the pace of private-sector development indicates that for many military capabilities, the best option will likely be ‘fast following’ of civilian R&D, applying new technologies to new-generation systems, but also to mid-life updates of in-service equipment.

Near-term steps

US President Joe Biden has identified climate change as a national-security issue, underscoring the growing impact it will have on US and allied armed forces from combat units to their support and logistics arms. The Pentagon has published an ambitious strategy for climate change adaptation and mitigation, paralleled by ongoing efforts in the US services to explore relevant technologies, such as the US Marine Corps developing more sustainable combat outposts and the US Army trialling electric drives for its vehicles. But the Pentagon has neither been set any hard targets to reduce emissions, nor imposed them on the four US services. In the UK, meanwhile, the MoD has issued a blueprint for addressing the environmental challenge as a consumer and emitter. Its leadership, including service chiefs, has publicly committed to achieving net zero by 2050.

Defence and military analysis: Military adaptation to climate change

Nonetheless, the fact remains that achieving net zero, for armed forces, largely remains dependent on national policy on emissions reporting. Moreover, few countries would find it politically feasible to agree to net-zero commitments if it constrained their ability to defend themselves. Indeed, the dilemma remains – for the states that do go down this route – of accepting risk, aware that some adversaries might not follow the same path and may instead focus on maintaining either legacy or new equipment that is emissionintensive but which they judge is necessary to secure military advantage. So, being a ‘first mover’ may

have its disadvantages. But perhaps there are also advantages, and faster transformation could occur if states are able to field climate-adapted equipment that increases military advantage in a progressively climate-changed world. The fact remains, however, that not all states will be able to, or may wish to, follow this path. For countries who are looking ahead at emission reduction targets, as well as the future threat landscape, the question of whether and how to include military emissions in their climate efforts, and navigating the potential political repercussions of these choices, is likely to become increasingly complicated.

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Chapter Three

North America While the US defence budget’s USD715 billion top line constitutes an USD11.27bn increase on the enacted FY2021 US defence budget, the FY2022 budget request is essentially flat in real terms when adjusted for inflation. Reflecting the Pentagon’s focus on the Indo-Pacific, the air force and navy budgets are set to increase, making up 52% of the top-line DoD budget in FY2022, up from 48% in the enacted FY21 budget. The US conducted its Global Posture Review during 2021. The Review was anticipated to reshape global United States military deployments, likely heralding reductions in all regions bar Europe and the IndoPacific, where there were to be increased infrastructure developments with a focus on survivability. The US army is recapitalising its mobile air defence. The first prototype M-SHORAD Increment 1 vehicles arrived in Germany in early 2021. Meanwhile, M-SHORAD Increment 2 is a directed-energy variant. Another project, the Indirect Fire Protection Capability (IFPC) Increment 2, is designed to tackle threats including from uninhabited aerial systems and cruise missiles. While uncertainty remains over plans to increase the size of the US navy’s fleet, there has been consistent focus on an eventual fleet that is more distributed, with

United States, attack submarines 2014–21

The US air force’s stated acquisition target of 1,763 F-35As is coming under scrutiny. F-15EX Eagle IIs are being bought to replace F-15Cs, and there was talk of restarting F-16 acquisition or even building a new successor. Meanwhile, a demonstrator for elements of the Next-Generation Air Dominance programme reportedly flew in 2021. In September, Secretary of the Air Force Frank Kendall said that five B-21 bombers were in various states of production. Air transport and air refuelling remain essential to US expeditionary operations, as the evacuation from Afghanistan showed. This also highlighted the importance of overseas bases for logistical support. There are as yet no identified replacements for the C-17 or C-5M; a C-17 sustainment contract was awarded in late 2021. Canada and the US are building more icebreakers. Three new heavy icebreakers are being procured for the US Coast Guard, to be followed by three medium icebreakers. In June 2021, the Royal Canadian Navy commissioned the first of its six planned Harry DeWolfclass Arctic Offshore Patrol Ships.

Active military personnel

Global total 19,605,000

(25,000 per unit)

2014

46 8

2016

47 4

2018

2020

a shift in balance to smaller surface combatants and with significant numbers of uninhabited surface and underwater vehicles.

US 1,395,350

3 51

Canada 66,500 2021

2 51 SSN: Nuclear-powered attack submarine SSGN: Nuclear-powered attack submarine with dedicated launch tubes for guided missiles

7.5%

Regional total 1,461,850

Regional defence policy and economics

28 ►

Arms procurements and deliveries

42 ►

Armed forces data section

45 ►

US F-35 numbers, 2014–21 300

Air Force (F-35A) Marine Corps Aviation (F-35B) Marine Corps Aviation (F-35C)

250 200

Naval Aviation (F-35C) Air National Guard (F-35A)

150 100 50 0 2014

2016

2018

US heavy air transport and tankers, 2014–21

2020

US cruisers, destroyers and frigates, 2014–21

Heavy transport aircraft Tanker; tkr/tpt aircraft

Cruisers

600

120

500

100

400

300

200

100

2014

2016

2018

2020

2021

US real-terms defence budget trend, 2011–21 800

2021

2014

2016

Destroyers

2018

Frigates

2020

2021

Canada real-terms defence budget trend, 2011–21 10

100

4 2 0

400

-2 -4 -6

200

-8

9 6

3 0

-3 -6

-9

-10 0

-12 2011

2013

2015

2017

2019

2021

-12 2011

2013

2015

2017

2019

2021

Year-on-year % change

600

USDbn, constant 2015

Year-on-year % change

USDbn, constant 2015

North America

THE MILITARY BALANCE 2022

North America UNITED STATES Defence policy

The Biden administration took office in January 2021. President Joe Biden pledged a wholesale overhaul of foreign policy, vowing to bring back professionalism, multilateralism, diplomacy and cooperation after the Trump presidency. The chaotic nature of the final withdrawal from Afghanistan cast some doubt on these goals, though Biden emphasised that he was following through on commitments made by his predecessor. Overall, on many other matters – including the defence budget, weapons acquisition, overseas basing and force deployments, and principal ideas for defence innovation – there had been only limited change as 2021 drew to a close. This continuity is attributed by some to factors including bureaucratic inertia, the influence of the defence-industrial sector and congressional earmarks, as well as it being the administration’s first year. But it also seems likely that there is strong bipartisan consensus around many of the ideas in the Trump administration’s 2018 National Defense Strategy (NDS), which was drawn up during the term of the then-defence secretary James Mattis. That document, and the budgetary changes that accompanied it, were themselves in part inspired by the ‘rebalance’ in the Indo-Pacific and the ‘Third Offset’ of the Obama administration. These earlier initiatives placed a much greater emphasis on great-power competition, and deterrence, than had been the case under previous political and military thinking in the post-Cold War period.

Minor modifications, so far

The main change over the last half decade is arguably the approximate USD100 billion increase in the annual total defence budget – from the low USD600bn range in the late Obama years (2013–15) to the mid-USD700bn range in place since 2019. While this might mean that some of the goals set out in the 2018 NDS can be addressed, such as high-technology projects, the actual shift in relative priorities has been modest. It is generally easier for the Pentagon

to add new ideas, such as a greater emphasis on artificial intelligence, or research into boost-glide hypersonic vehicles, than to reduce emphasis on previous priorities. For instance, when discussing the military challenges posed by Russia and China, and how these states field new capabilities, the Future of Defense Task Force report, issued in 2020 by the House Armed Services Committee, stated (in reference to the Pentagon’s acquisition system) that ‘the current system is predisposed and incentivized to invest in incrementally better versions of existing legacy systems’. The Biden administration’s Interim National Security Strategic Guidance (NSSG), issued in March 2021, ranged across themes including transnational threats like the coronavirus pandemic, strengthening America’s democracy, ‘building back better’ at home and restoring alliance solidarity as much as it discussed specific defence priorities. Regarding the latter, those mentioned ranged from improving conditions for personnel and their families, enhancing force training and readiness, innovation and modernisation, the need to focus more on China and Russia, and ensuring cyber and climate resilience. Other priorities were to shift emphasis from ‘unneeded legacy platforms’ and the suggestion of a reduction in the overall US troop presence in the Middle East. During the Trump administration, troop numbers in South Korea and Germany did not substantially change, despite the then-president’s call to reduce numbers. Indeed, the period from 2014–21 produced a stronger US presence in Poland in particular, as NATO buttressed its position in front-line states. However, the withdrawal from Afghanistan indicated that more consequential change was likely. The Interim NSSG clearly stated that ‘the United States should not, and will not, engage in “forever wars”’. And the president was unrepentant in the wake of the collapse of the Afghan National Defense and Security Forces and the Ghani administration, stating that Washington was implementing agreements made by his predecessor. Moreover, as Biden said in a speech on 31 August, the decision concerning Afghanistan ‘was not just about Afghanistan’; it was

also about ‘ending an era of major military operations to remake other countries’. The lessons were that ‘first, we must set missions with clear, achievable goals – not ones we’ll never reach. And second, we must stay clearly focused on the fundamental national security interest of the United States of America.’ If anything, this accorded with the Interim NSSG, which said that the US would ‘right-size’ its presence in the Middle East ‘to disrupt international terrorist networks, deter Iranian aggression, and protect other vital U.S. interests … as we position ourselves to deter our adversaries and defend our interests … our presence will be most robust in the Indo-Pacific and Europe.’ The US presence has been boosted in Europe, but there has been minimal change so far to the size or deployment patterns of the Indo-Pacific Command’s assets. Moreover, Afghanistan dominated the defencepolicy debate in mid-2021, and it remains to be seen whether the nature of the final exit from that country, and its aftermath, will adjust thinking on future deployments, particularly in the Middle East. The Global Posture Review will set the scale and pattern of the future US military presence abroad, though there was little detail made public when the document was approved in November 2021.

Looking ahead

While in recent years there have been a number of new DoD documents and concepts, such as the Tri-Service Maritime Strategy document and the Joint All-Domain Command and Control (JADC2) initiative (related to the Multi-Domain Operations (MDO) concept), so far this year there has generally only been minor modification to the armed forces’ size and structure. Exceptions include the creation of the US Space Force and the US Marine Corps’ (USMC) decision to give up main battle tanks as it seeks to develop a more agile and distributed force. Modernisation priorities such as the replacement of the nuclear triad, the army’s ‘big six’ priorities and the development of a new bomber, the B-21 Raider, remain on the agenda. But while continuity may have been the watchword so far, there may be more movement in 2022, as the Biden administration prepares its first comprehensive budget request (for Fiscal Year (FY) 2023), as well as its own formal defence strategy document, while the services further develop their own modernisation plans. A key issue for the DoD is that while it is urged to refocus its plans and priorities and to innovate, reform and improve great-power deterrence, it has to meet

a range of demands, including its disparate global responsibilities. And while modernisation plans might herald ground-breaking capabilities, ‘legacy’ platforms will continue to arrive and established logistics enablers – like refuelling and transport aircraft – will remain key to future operations. Indeed, as the armed services look to reshape for future military operations and develop novel formations (such as the Space Force and the army’s Multi-Domain Task Forces) (MDTFs) – it remains the case that the force still has to focus on other areas: the army’s Security Force Assistance Brigades, for instance, are being adapted to align with Combatant Commands (a key reason underpinning these units is that they can free up Brigade Combat Teams for other operations). That said, as the Pentagon charts its course, a number of the initiatives from the final months of the Trump administration and the early period under Biden could be consequential in determining the direction of defence policy and procurement and future capability development. They include: • The administration’s budget request for FY2022 (which will likely increase real resources by about 3%, as the 2018 NDS had advocated); • Former secretary of defense Mark Esper’s late 2020 ‘Battle Force 2045’ proposal to raise the overall goal for the navy’s fleet size to at least 500 vessels, with a future fleet comprising a mix of uninhabited and crewed vessels; • JADC2, which emphasises the construction of a survivable, inter-operable and fastacting command-and-control network. Related service initiatives include Project Convergence (army), Project Overmatch (navy) and the Advanced Battle Management System (air force). • Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin’s concept of ‘integrated deterrence’ which seeks to combine economic, diplomatic and allied instruments of foreign policy into an overall framework for handling China’s rise and deterring aggression. This may constitute a significant departure in US security policy, particularly if it is carried through into the Biden administration’s future national-security strategy and security planning in Washington and allied capitals. As Austin said, when discussing the idea at an IISS Fullerton Lecture in Singapore, ‘we’re

North America

1.5

9.5

Continental United States

TOTAL

Patriot THAAD battalions batteries

Rotationally deployed

Permanently forward deployed

Location

Continental United States

Notional airlift sortie requirement for simultaneous deployment of three Patriot batteries and one THAAD battery

USSOUTHCOM

~60 x C-17A Globemaster III ~15 x C-5M Super Galaxy

Total US strategic airlift

162

C-17A Globemaster III

USCENTCOM

USEUCOM

Total 222

C-5M Super Galaxy

THAAD battery

returned

Total 52

USINDOPACOM

returned

withdrawn withdrawn

Patriot battalion

challenges, however. Transporting a notional battalion-sized force of Patriot and/or THAAD systems from the United States to Europe or Asia by air in a single lift would require the use of between 60 and 80 heavy transport aircraft, about a quarter of the total US inventory, at a time when these aircraft can be expected to be in high demand from other arms and services. Using multiple sequential airlifts, or shipping these forces by sea, as the army has historically preferred to do, however, risks depriving operational commanders of these key defensive assets in advance of, or in the early stages of, hostilities, when the threat from hostile missile forces is likely to be at its greatest.

USAFRICOM

By the end of 2020, around half of the US Army’s long-range air- and missile-defence units were forward deployed in Europe, Asia and the Middle East. However, in early 2021, the army began a significant drawdown of its air- and missile-defence assets in the Middle East, reducing its overall footprint in the region by about two-thirds. These moves will help relieve the immediate pressure on both crew training and equipment overhaul and maintenance, as well as offering the Pentagon greater flexibility in its planning, by recreating a sizeable ‘contingency’ force based in the United States that can be deployed in response to future operational demands. This strategy of emphasising a central reserve over forward-deployed forces offers its own

30 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2022

▼ Figure 1 US missile defence assets

aiming to coordinate better, to network tighter, and to innovate faster. And we’re working to ensure that our allies and partners have the capabilities, the capacities, and the information that they need.’ The examples he quoted included cyber-defence cooperation with Singapore, more complex exercises, and the test (by US and Japanese forces) of the HIMARS artillery system in Japan. However, it will be important for Washington to ensure that concepts like integrated deterrence, as well as US actions (such as the withdrawal from Afghanistan) and relationships (like the AUKUS security partnership and that with the ‘Quad’ countries), are mutually reinforcing developments that also strengthen the US security posture and core alliances and are not disconnected, improvised policy developments.

US Army

The US army continues to adapt, based on the priorities identified in the Army Strategy and the National Military Strategy, both released in 2018, which highlight the re-emergence of greatpower competition and the need to deter or defeat conventional attacks. The March 2021 Interim NSSG maintained this emphasis. The administration’s new national security and military strategies are awaited not only to see if the army’s current plans and priorities need to be modified, but also to gauge its share of the budget in relation to the other armed services given the continued focus on rebalancing the US defence establishment towards military challenges in the Indo-Pacific. At present the army is aiming to transition to an MDO-ready force under its AimPoint initiative for 2035. As part of this process, the army has set a ‘Waypoint 2028–2029’ to assess its progress towards the 2035 target and then reassess its assumptions and adjust as required.

Improving interoperability Project Convergence, the army’s series of annual experiments and exercises intended to improve joint inter-operability, is intended to help the army integrate into the JADC2 concept. The army’s development of very long-range weapons under its Long-Range Precision Fires (LRPF) programme will rely heavily on the type of joint inter-operability that the JADC2 programme seeks to enable.

Modernisation The LRPF programme remains the top priority among the army’s six key modernisation areas,

although disagreement remains about how much and what type of very long-range fires capability the army needs in relation to the other services. The LongRange Hypersonic Weapon (LRHW) programme (dubbed ‘Dark Eagle’) began delivering hardware in early 2021, with an initial battery planned to be operational with prototype equipment by 2023. While the army has been tight-lipped about the LRHW’s capabilities, it was reportedly confirmed that its range is anticipated as being ‘greater than 2,775 km’. At the other end of the army’s range spectrum, the 1st Armored Division’s 4th Battalion, 27th Field Artillery Regiment has started taking delivery of revised Extended Range Cannon Artillery (ERCA) platforms for operational testing. Coupling a longer 58-calibre gun with new rocket-assisted ammunition, ERCA aims to increase the maximum range of the army’s current self-propelled artillery to 70 km. The service expects to have the first battalion of the XM1299 (Increment 1C) Improved Range variant fielded by 2023 and is working on an XM1299A1 (Increment 2) Increased Rate of Fire variant. The army’s Air Defense branch suffered cuts to both its force structure and its modernisation programmes during operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, particularly in mobile systems designed to protect manoeuvre forces. The arrival of the first prototype M-SHORAD Increment 1 vehicles (based on a Stryker chassis fitted with Stinger and Longbow Hellfire missiles) with the 5th Battalion, 4th Air Defense Artillery Regiment (5-4 ADA) in Germany in early 2021 marks the first step in renewing this capability, and the army currently plans on fielding ten battalion sets of M-SHORAD. In addition to the kinetic capabilities of the Increment 1 vehicles, the army is also looking at directed-energy capabilities, with an initial platoon of 50Kw-class laser-fitted vehicles planned for delivery in 2022 as part of M-SHORAD Increment 2. Another priority is the Indirect Fire Protection Capability (IFPC) Increment 2 project, which is designed to tackle threats including from uninhabited aerial systems and cruise missiles. Two systems were reportedly tested against this requirement in early 2021: the Rafael and Raytheon bid of the Iron Dome system and Tamir interceptor and the Dynetics Enduring Shield variant of the army’s Multi-Mission Launcher paired with Raytheon’s AIM-9X Sidewinder missile. In September, the army officially announced it had selected Dynetics’ offering. The eventual fate of the two Iron Dome batteries that had already been delivered as part of the testing

North America

THE MILITARY BALANCE 2022

process for an interim cruise-missile solution remains unclear. IFPC work also has a directed-energy strand, with prototype platoons of 300Kw-class laser and high-powered microwave systems (respectively dubbed ‘Valkyrie’ and ‘Thor’) due for delivery by 2024 and intended to defend fixed sites.

Balancing between Europe and Asia Emphasis on the Indo-Pacific in the recent strategic guidance has led the army to explore how it would contribute to operations in that region, and there is particular interest in establishing a role for its stillevolving very long-range fires capabilities. However, it remains unclear where those new fires units could be based, while there is equal importance in determining the army’s role, alongside other services, in the event of a conflict in the region. At the same time, there remains a need to deter possible Russian aggression in Europe. In mid-September, the 2nd MDTF was officially activated in the European Command (EUCOM) area of responsibility (AOR) whilst it was conducting its first exercise, in Norway, designed to test capabilities and tactics. Subsequently, the army’s first (EUCOMbased) Theater Fires Command (TFC) was also activated in the EUCOM–AOR in November 2021. TFCs, part of the army’s adaption for MDO, are intended to plan very long-range fires at the theatre level, while the brigade-sized MDTFs are intended to synchronise effects across domains, including traditional fires as well as space and cyber operations. Broader equipment recapitalisation efforts are also proceeding, with an eye on EUCOM requirements. The EUCOM-based APS-2 (Army Prepositioned Stock 2) has nearly completed its expansion to two Armored Brigade Combat Team (ABCT) sets, including some of the latest M1A2 Abrams SEPv3 variants and M109A7 Paladins. The pre-positioning of supplies and unit equipment is being expanded, including in Germany, the Netherlands and also at Powidz, in Poland. The Powidz APS-2 site is scheduled to be operational by 2024 at the latest. The M1074 Joint Assault Bridge is being fielded after issues during testing were resolved; the bridge is reported to have a higher load-bearing capacity than its predecessor and to be able to support the new, heavier Abrams and Paladin variants. Meanwhile, deliveries of the Trophy Active Protection System were reported as complete in early 2021, though it is unclear whether any of the four ABCTs on which the army intends to field Trophy have yet integrated

the capability. The plan is that these ABCTs will pair Trophy-fitted M1A2 SEPv2 and SEPv3 Abrams with upgraded Bradley M2A4 IFVs for the EUCOM theatre; after some delay the first brigade is now scheduled to be equipped with the A4 Bradley in late 2022.

US Navy

The US Navy continues to grapple with questions over the size and structure of its future fleet, budget allocations and long-term shipbuilding plans, as well as how to integrate uninhabited systems into the fleet mix. Meanwhile, the force remains under stress from the current high operational tempo. In December 2020, the navy, the USMC and the US Coast Guard (USCG) jointly unveiled a new maritime strategy ‘Advantage at Sea: Prevailing with Integrated All-Domain Naval Power’. While it portrayed a maritime domain characterised by persistent competition from both China and Russia, the focus was on the former. It stressed integration of the services and the value of alliances and partnerships. As well as high-end combat capabilities, it set out a requirement for presence and for ‘a more assertive posture’ in routine operations to counter the incremental, grey-zone approaches of adversary states. Driven by concern about the pace of Chinese maritime developments, the document also called for aggressive force modernisation and experimentation. US naval forces, it said, must ‘boldly’ modernise by creating a new ‘balanced, hybrid fleet’ of existing and new platforms, both crewed and uninhabited. US naval forces will divest themselves of legacy capabilities, it said, and there would be a new mix between larger platforms and smaller, more affordable ones. Future combat readiness would be prioritised over near-term demands. In early 2021 the navy and USMC unveiled a new Arctic strategy, which spoke of the need for US naval forces to operate more assertively, but also more cooperatively with like-minded nations, in response to the challenges from Russia and China in the region. Nonetheless, uncertainty remains over plans to increase the size of the fleet. The official ambition set in 2016 was for a ‘battle force’ of 355 ships, compared to a recent level of just around 300. Various efforts have been made to update the target, among them Battle Force 2045, proposed by then-defence secretary Mark Esper in October 2020. All these efforts have tended to include the characteristics of a more distributed fleet, with a shift in the balance from larger to smaller

surface combatants and with significant numbers of uninhabited surface and underwater vehicles. The Biden administration gave no early sign regarding its intentions in this area. A new Secretary of the Navy, Carlos Del Toro, was only confirmed in August 2021, although in his confirmation hearings he endorsed the principle that the fleet should increase. A key challenge is the prospect that future budgets are likely to be static or declining in real terms. As a result, the navy’s FY2022 budget request included the addition of just eight new ships – four combatants and four support vessels – which is below the level necessary to build towards a 355-ship navy. As a corollary, in the context of a ‘divest to invest’ approach, the navy is seeking to retire seven of the ageing Ticonderoga-class cruisers and four more Littoral Combat Ships. This led to friction with legislators in Congress. Concerns have included the loss of capability by retiring the cruisers, as well as doubts about the navy’s approach to replacing them, especially its plans for incorporating uninhabited vehicles into the fleet. In June 2021, the navy also released a long-range shipbuilding document looking 30 years ahead. It included a range of targets for fleet growth, of between 321–372 crewed vessels and 77–140 uninhabited vessels. A Congressional Budget Office report in September 2021 estimated that such targets would require higher shipbuilding budgets than have been allocated in recent years. As a result, the navy’s force-structure work appeared to be a ‘work in progress’. In part this may also be a result of the fact that the Pentagon is also conducting the Global Posture Review and a review of the NDS. In shipbuilding terms, the navy’s top priority is the new-generation Columbia-class of SSBNs, 12 of which are slated to replace the existing 14 Ohio-class SSBNs. The construction contract for the lead vessel of the class, and advanced funding for the second, were announced in November 2020. USS Columbia is scheduled to undertake its first patrol in 2031, but there remain concerns about possible delays and potential cost growth. The other key project is for the Constellation-class frigates. Construction of the first vessel – a modification of the Italian variant of the Franco-Italian FREMM frigate design – is due to begin in the latter part of 2021 or early 2022. The initial plan was to build 20 vessels, but their eventual significance in future fleet composition remains to be seen.

A high operational tempo continued in 2021, including freedom of navigation operations in and around the South China Sea. Transits of the Taiwan Strait were being conducted at a rate of approximately one per month, on par with 2020. The navy also deployed a carrier presence to help cover the withdrawal of US forces from Afghanistan, including the deployment to the Central Command area of the Japan-based carrier USS Ronald Reagan, in part a reflection of the operational stress on the carrier force. That said, the much-delayed new carrier, USS Gerald R. Ford, may finally be ready for a first deployment in 2022. Meanwhile, the USS Carl Vinson undertook a first operational-carrier deployment into the Pacific with F-35C Lightning II combat aircraft and the CMV-22B Osprey vertical take-off transport aircraft incorporated into its air wing. Land-based trials of a prototype MQ-25 Stingray uninhabited air-to-air refueller were also under way ahead of anticipated shipboard trials in 2022. In August 2021, the Carl Vinson strike group took part in the navy’s Large-Scale Exercise 21 (LSA21), dubbed the largest of its kind in a generation. Among other things, it incorporated five carrier strike groups and four amphibious groups and ranged across the west and east coasts of the United States, the European theatre and the western Pacific. It was designed to test doctrines for high-end combat, including the navy’s Distributed Maritime Operations concept, as well as the US Marine Corps’ Expeditionary Advanced Base Operations (EABO) and Littoral Operations in a Contested Environment concepts.

US Marine Corps

The marines continue to implement and update their plan to transform into a more agile, distributed force under the Force Design 2030 concept, which has included the loss of its main battle tank units. Among the aims is to integrate more fully with the navy for its sea control and naval interdiction missions. This was underscored during LSA21 when the USMC demonstrated its Navy–Marine Expeditionary Ship Interdiction System (NMESIS). In the context of the EABO, which is essentially an ‘island-hopping’ strategy for the western Pacific in a potential confrontation with China, NMESIS provides a mobile land-based anti-ship missile capability, and specifically in this exercise the Naval Strike Missile. It could also include the Tactical Tomahawk cruisemissile variant. The plan is for NMESIS to deploy operationally from 2023.

North America

1,500 km (ship-launched)

454 kg conventional warhead

4 metres • Faster launch timeline. • Upgraded data link allowing re-routing in-flight to preplanned or new targets. • Installation of electrooptical sensors provides battle damage information.

1,300 km (ship-launched)

454 kg conventional warhead

10 metres • Installation of jam-resistant GPS guidance. • Reduced mission planning time. • Ability to loiter over target area. • New turbofan engine for lower fuel consumption and increased thrust.

1,300 km (both variants, shiplaunched) 925 km (both variants, submarine-launched) 454 kg conventional warhead (TLAM-C) 454 kg fragmentation unitary warhead (TLAM-D) 10 metres • Improved booster rocket. • Installation of a radar altimeter. • Equipped with Digital Scene Matching Area Correlator (DSMAC).

2,500 km (TLAM-N: submarine-launched) 2,500 km (BGM-109 Gryphon: ground-launched) 460 km (TASM: submarine-launched) W80 5 – 150 kt nuclear warhead (TLAM-N) W84 0.2 – 130 kt nuclear warhead (BGM 109 Gryphon) 454 kg conventional warhead (TASM) 30 metres • First variant of Tomahawk • TASM version equipped with active radar seeker. • Capable of various flight patterns and profiles, including sea-skimming.

Range (kilometres)

Warhead

Circular Error Probable (CEP)

Key features

2004

Block IV (TLAM-E)

1994

1983

Block III (TLAM-C, TLAM-D)

Block II (TLAM-A, TLAM-B)

New Ultra High Frequency (UHF) antenna replaces existing UHF antenna. Second antenna installed to provide additional frequency band in case of jamming

1983

Improved electronics to counter jamming

New Joint Multiple Effects Warhead System (JMEWS) for Block Vb combines blast-fragmentation capabilities with enhanced penetration capabilities

Block I (TLAM-N, BGM-109 Gryphon and TASM)

Integrated Single Box Solution (ISBS) radio replaces existing Satellite Data Link Terminal (SDLT)

Block V, will provide the US with a more survivable system with greater targeting options (including striking moving targets for the first time). The Tomahawk ’s continued evolution highlights that, despite significant interest in developing hypersonic (Mach 5+) LACMs, accurate and survivable subsonic systems still have significant value for long-range and deep-strike roles.

Initial Operational Capability (IOC)

IOC: 2021 Range: 1,500 km Warhead: 454 kg conventional warhead (Block V TACTOM and Block Va) Joint Multi-Effects Warhead System (Block Vb) Circular Error Probable: 4 metres Key features: The Tomahawk Block V will be produced in three versions: TACTOM, Block Va for maritime targets and Block Vb for destroying hardened targets

Tomahawk Block V

The R/UGM-109 Tomahawk land-attack cruise missile (LACM) has undergone multiple upgrades since its introduction into service with the US Navy in 1983. Early iterations of the missile mostly had nuclear roles amid only limited precision-strike capability. However, improvements in guidance technology have correspondingly enhanced the Tomahawk ’s suitability for conventional roles. The latest version of the Tomahawk, the

34 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2022

▼ Figure 2 R/UGM-109 Tomahawk Block V upgrade

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US Coast Guard

Another aim of the new Tri-Service Martime Strategy is greater integration of the USCG. To this end, the USCG continued high-profile deployments in the western Pacific, not least the participation of the USCG cutter Munro in a Taiwan Strait transit in August 2021, while the USCG cutter Hamilton deployed to the Mediterranean Sea and the Black Sea (the first USCG cutter in more than a decade to deploy there) in April 2021. The USCG continues a significant recapitalisation programme. Partly in recognition of its expanding presence operations, Congress has authorised and funded new Legend-class National Security Cutters (NSCs) over and above the eight originally planned. The ninth NSC, Stone, was commissioned on 19 March 2021. The tenth and eleventh ships of the class are also under construction, out of a possible 12. The next priority is the slightly smaller Offshore Patrol Cutter programme for up to 25 vessels, with the first set to be delivered in 2022. The most highprofile procurement programme, however, is for three new heavy icebreakers or Polar Security Cutters (PSCs), to be followed by three medium icebreakers, or Arctic Security Cutters. Despite growing interest in the Arctic, the current US fleet consists of just one ageing heavy and one medium icebreaker. The first PSC was due to start construction during 2021 for delivery in late 2025.

US Air Force

The United States Air Force (USAF) is re-evaluating its tactical aircraft force mix, under the guidance of Chief of Staff General Charles Brown. A previous commitment to fifth-generation aircraft seems increasingly balanced by consideration of more diverse missions and concern over operating costs. Fiscal pressure may be just one of the reasons that the USAF’s target of growing to 386 squadrons, declared in September 2018 and labelled ‘The Air Force We Need’, is no longer the goal. Like the other services, the USAF assumed an increase in funding following expiration of the Budget Control Act caps in FY2021. That anticipated additional funding has yet to arrive, not least because the incoming Biden team, like many new administrations, only submitted a modestly revised budget for its initial 2022 submission while promising full details and five-year projections in the fiscal 2023 plan. Further diluting the 386-squadron aim, Brown has placed renewed emphasis on readiness, and better means of gauging this rather than a specific number of units. Brown has posed the question, rhetorically at least, as to whether the same effectiveness could be provided by fewer squadrons, asking ‘what is the capability that would give me the equivalent of 386?’ His August 2020 policy paper ‘Accelerate Change or Lose’ will affect force structure, doctrine and systems, with legacy systems or programmes that ‘once held promise, but are no longer affordable or will not deliver needed capabilities on competition-relevant timelines’ facing cancellation. A review of the tactical aircraft portfolio is also looking at new capabilities, with results expected to appear in the FY2023 budget. Service experiments with comparatively low-cost uninhabited combat air vehicles, notably the XQ-58 Valkyrie, highlight future capabilities that could augment or even replace planned crewed-combat aircraft in some roles or in high-threat airspace. Experiments, including with directed-energy weapons, may give current platforms improved lethality. It is possible that the outcome of such experiments may lead to doctrinal changes and a subsequent shift in force mix.

Funding numbers To date the procurement target of 1,763 F-35A Lightning IIs has not been revised since the programme began. But signs increasingly point to a more heterogeneous future fighter fleet. The service’s procurement of an initial 144 F-15EX Eagle IIs to replace

North America

Plans were also proceeding to stand up the first of potentially three lighter regimental units – to be called Marine Littoral Regiments – consisting of some 1,800 to 2,000 personnel (compared to the current Marine Regiment model of about 3,400 personnel) in the latter half of 2021 or early 2022. This, again, is to be better adapted to fulfil the EABO concept. Related to this, in June 2021 the US Navy issued concept design contracts to five companies for a Light Amphibious Warship (LAW). Essentially a small to medium landing craft, up to 35 LAWs could be purchased, and they are seen as critical enablers to the new USMC strategy of being able to move small units around flexibly. One consequence of this change is that the long-time force goal of up to 38 traditional large amphibious ships is essentially being abandoned. The navy’s longrange shipbuilding plan suggested a force goal of 28–31 traditional amphibious ships, along with the LAWs.

THE MILITARY BALANCE 2022

F-15Cs, largely in the Air National Guard, was one such sign, followed by official talk of restarting F-16 acquisition or even building a successor from scratch, with details to be revealed in the 2023 budget submission. Another indication was the interest in the reported flying of a demonstrator for elements of the Next Generation Air Dominance (NGAD) programme, officially a research effort to develop five fighter-relevant technologies, of which only propulsion has been publicly acknowledged. NGAD is described variously by the USAF as a family of systems and/or a family of airframes. At the time of writing, it remains an open question which of the five NGAD-relevant technologies the demonstrator was being used to explore. F-35A numbers will likely come under additional pressure as the B-21 Raider long-range bomber moves from research to production funding in FY2022. This procurement has so far been on schedule and budget, and Secretary of Air Force Frank Kendall said in September that five bombers were now in various states of production. However, the programme’s ambitious timeline will leave the USAF juggling simultaneous acquisitions of F-35A, F-15EX, the T-7 Red Hawk advanced trainer, MH-139 Grey Wolf helicopter, HH-60W Jolly Green II combat rescue helicopter, KC-46A Pegasus tanker, and some C-130 variants at the very least. These programmes need to fit within the USAF’s procurement budget, while also accommodating the investment for the Ground-Based Strategic Deterrent replacement for the Minuteman III ICBM and development of the network-based Advanced Battle Management System. The scope of the recapitalisation programme – only the transport fleet is not undergoing replacement – is placing both financial and cultural demands on the service. Normally, the USAF acquisition chief would be entrusted with managing the challenges. However, Kendall has significant acquisition experience, so his input will likely be important. Meanwhile, it is not clear if procurement initiatives begun under former acquisition executive Dr Will Roper – designed to decrease development time, disaggregate production from development and support, and lower the bar for new entrants in the military aircraft market – will become policy under the new team.

Indo-Pacific real estate The vulnerability and limited numbers of large bases in the Indo-Pacific is an increasing concern. The USAF has been experimenting with what is dubbed

‘agile combat employment’ where combat aircraft are dispersed to austere locations and challenged to operate without a significant logistical footprint. At the same time, the proposed enhancement of Andersen Air Force Base on Guam with munitions storage and stand-off weapon-reloading facilities has the effect of highlighting its relative vulnerability. Recent USAF wargames have also mooted the use of unspecified high-speed short take-off and vertical-landing aircraft, possibly a reference to a stillclassified programme.

Room for space The establishment and development of the Space Force within the Department of the Air Force may prove a mixed blessing. By moving space systems from Brown’s agenda, the USAF has been able to simplify its message within DoD and to legislators regarding its priorities. The force-generation process for the service has been deliberative, as the other services consider which current capabilities they are willing to transfer, personnel are brought on gradually, and the new service develops its own organisation, doctrine and procedures. First on General Jay Raymond’s list of goals is to protect and defend US assets in space. With peer rivals having demonstrated anti-satellite and space-control capabilities, the development of capabilities and countermeasures is proceeding apace. This leads to a second priority – changing the US space architecture so it is simultaneously more defensible while being accessible to allies and commercial partners. To reach this point, the Space Force is establishing a new acquisition structure and testing programme, but at the same time it has to keep existing space systems operating at full capacity.

DEFENCE ECONOMICS On 28 May 2021, the Biden administration released its FY2022 DoD budget request. The request included a top line DoD budget of USD715 billion. An additional USD37.9bn was requested for non-DoD defence spending, including funding for the Department of Energy’s National Nuclear Security Administration, bringing the total spending on defence activities to USD752.9bn. The USD715bn top line constitutes an USD11.27bn increase on the enacted FY2021 budget, a nominal 1.6% increase. Adjusting for inflation, projected by the IMF to reach 2.4% in 2022, the budget request is essentially flat in real terms.

Table 1 The US president’s budget request by appropriation title, USDm

Requested Budget by Appropriation Title (USDm)

Military Personnel

162,270

167,285

Operation & Maintenance

283,395

290,361

5,015 6,966

Procurement

141,672

133,640

-8,032

RDT&E

106,447

111,964

5,517

Revolving and Management Funds

1,394

1,902

508

Military Construction & Family Housing

8,545

9,847

1,302

703,723

715,000

11,277

Total Defense Budget Request

Source: adapted from the United States DoD Fiscal Year 2022 Budget Request, Appendix A, FY2022_Budget_Request_Overview_Book.pdf (defense.gov)

The president’s request is a starting point for negotiations. Congress has already moved to authorise up to USD740bn in core DoD funding, though there is little detail about how extra funds will be committed. In July, the Senate Appropriations Committee passed a version of the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) that included a USD25bn increase over the Biden request, and on 23 September the US House of Representatives approved an NDAA that included the USD740bn top line and USD778bn in total defence-related spending. The Senate debate on the NDAA, due to begin in October, was delayed by the inclusion of various amendments, including the U.S. Innovation and Competition Act, a bipartisan measure aimed at combating China and boosting investments in research, technology and manufacturing.

Status quo top line foreshadows future trade-offs

The budget request should be considered within the context of the political and process constraints in which it was developed. First-year budgets of new administrations frequently inherit and only marginally adjust the assumptions of the outgoing administration’s Future Years Defense Plan (FYDP) due to the need to release a budget soon after the 20 January inauguration date. Even though the top line reflected the existing state of affairs, the 28 May budget request was the latest since annual-budget submissions were first required in the 1920s. Moreover, the administration

% of GDP

FY2021 FY2022 Change (enacted) (requested)

3.34

3.37

3.54

3.49

2016

2017

2018

2019

3.71 3.29

3 2 1 0

2020

2021

[1] Figures refer to the National Defense (050) Budget Function (Budget Authority) as a % of GDP

▲ Figure 3 US defence budget as % of GDP1 did not release an FYDP, which projects top-line budgets over five years and is traditionally included with the annual-budget request. Some of this delay can be attributed to the contentious presidential transition. The efforts of the Trump administration to obstruct the incoming administration’s planning caused delays in the budget release. But there are other structural reasons behind the late release. Critically, the Biden administration is currently in the process of developing a new national security and national defence strategy that will not be completed until FY2023. The FY2023 and, especially, FY2024 budgets are likely to more accurately reflect the Biden administration’s vision for the future of DoD. The budget request does, however, introduce some new dynamics. As expected, the budget eliminates the controversial Overseas Contingency Operations (OCO) fund, which incorporated expenses related to overseas conflicts into the base budget as ‘direct war and enduring contingencies’. Moreover, Biden’s budget amplifies themes and reinforces priorities from the FY2021 budget – the enhanced focus on air and naval forces and the centrality of the challenge from China’s growing military power – and reveals tensions likely to shape DoD strategy and budget discussions in coming years as it seeks to balance readiness and modernisation and sharpen priority missions related to its three articulated objectives of defending the nation, taking care of people and succeeding through teamwork.

China is the ‘pacing challenge’

At the core of the defence-budget request is the need to meet an expanding threat environment and begin

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THE MILITARY BALANCE 2022

Table 2 US National Defense Budget Function and other selected budgets, 2000, 2010–22 USD in billions, currentyear dollars

National Defense Budget Function

Total Total National Defense Department Department Federal of of Veterans’ Government Homeland Outlays Affairs Security

Other Atomic Defense Energy Defense Activities Activities

Total Federal Budget Surplus/ Deficit

Discretionary BA Outlay

304.0

300.8

294.4

13.8

45.5

1,789.0

236.2

7.3

721.2

714.1

693.5

45.4

124.3

3,457.1

-1,294.4

7.0

717.0

710.1

705.6

41.6

122.8

3,603.1

-1,299.6

18.3

7.7

681.4

669.6

677.9

45.9

124.0

3,526.6

-1,076.6

607.8

17.5

7.4

610.2

600.4

633.4

61.9

136.0

3,454.9

-679.8

595.7

577.9

18.4

8.2

622.3

606.2

603.5

44.1

165.7

3,506.3

-484.8

2015

570.8

562.5

19.0

8.5

598.4

585.9

589.7

45.3

160.5

3,691.9

-442.0

2016

595.7

565.4

20.1

8.3

624.1

606.8

593.4

46.0

163.3

3,852.6

-584.7

2017

626.2

568.9

21.4

8.7

656.3

634.1

598.7

62.3

178.8

3,981.6

-665.4

2018

694.5

600.7

23.3

9.0

726.8

700.9

631.2

103.0

191.8

4,109.0

-779.1

2019

712.6

654.0

24.0

9.1

745.7

718.8

686.0

61.4

194.2

4,447.0

-983.6

2020

738.8

690.4

26.0

9.7

774.5

756.6

724.6

114.2

233.3

6,550.4

-3,129.2

2021*

713.8

712.4

29.4

10.8

754.0

740.8

748.4

124.3

255.6

7,249.5

-3,668.7

2022*

727.9

729.5

29.9

10.5

768.3

752.9

770.6

69.5

283.9

6,011.1

-1,837.0

BA Outlay

2000

290.3 281.00

12.4

1.3

2010

695.6

666.7

18.2

2011

691.5

678.1

18.5

2012

655.4

650.9

2013

585.2

2014

Notes FY = Fiscal Year (1 October–30 September) * (request) 1 The National Defense Budget Function subsumes funding for the DoD, the Department of Energy Atomic Energy Defense Activities and some smaller support agencies (including Federal Emergency Management and Selective Service System). It does not include

funding for International Security Assistance (under International Affairs), the Veterans Administration, the US Coast Guard (Department of Homeland Security), nor for the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA). Funding for civil projects administered by the DoD is excluded from the figures cited here. 2 Early in each calendar year, the US government presents its defence budget to Congress for

to implement a concept of national security that goes beyond military considerations solely. COVID-19 and pandemic preparedness (with USD500 million allocated) and adapting to and mitigating the risks of climate change (USD617m) both featured as priority DoD challenges. Violent extremism, Iran, North Korea and Russia are all also mentioned in the funding request. But it is deterring and maintaining advantage over China that serves as the primary ‘pacing challenge’ for the DoD and that is animating congressional efforts to increase the budget. Several overlapping DoD efforts are explicitly designed to deter China. The Pacific Deterrence Initiative received USD5.1bn in the request, USD4.9bn of which was allocated to joint-force lethality. In addition, the FY2022 DoD budget request included USD27.7bn in modernisation programmes for all three legs of the nuclear triad. Key programmes include the B-21 Raider bomber, the Columbia-class ballistic-missile submarine

the next fiscal year, which begins on 1 October. The government also presents its Future Years Defense Program (FYDP), which covers the next fiscal year plus the following five. Until approved by Congress, the budget is called the Budget Request; after approval, it becomes the Budget Authority (BA).

(SSBN), the Long-Range Stand-Off missile (LRSO), and the Ground Based Strategic Deterrent (GBSD) that will replace the Minuteman III intercontinental ballistic missile. The budget also included USD6.6bn to develop and field multi-service, multi-domain offensive long-range fires, a clear priority of the IndoPacific theatre, characterised by long distances and China’s increasingly sophisticated anti-access/areadenial capabilities.

Budget priorities: research, readiness and people

Biden’s first budget requested USD112bn for research, development, test and evaluation (RDT&E). This was a 5.2% increase over the FY2021-enacted amount, which was itself the largest RDT&E budget at that time. The budget identifies several technologies as central to modernisation and innovation: microelectronics (USD2.3bn), artificial intelligence (USD814m), 5G (USD398m) and hypersonics (USD3.8bn).

In addition to the increase in RDT&E funding, the budget includes a 2.5% increase in the Operations and Maintenance (O&M) budget as part of a parallel effort to ‘sustain and advance readiness’. The budget request allocates USD122bn to ‘readiness’ across the services, augmented by the proposed investment in personnel. The Military Personnel (MILPERS) budget incorporates a 2.7% pay rise across DoD and provides USD8.6bn for family support and training programmes. The budget seeks to align DoD funding with broader DoD initiatives to address workplace and workforce challenges and inequities, including ‘extremism in the ranks’, and DoD efforts to implement the values of ‘diversity, equity, and inclusion’ in all aspects of DoD activities. To pay for the increase in RDT&E, O&M and MILPERS, the FY2022 request cuts procurement by over USD8bn, dropping from USD142bn in FY2021 to USD134bn. Future budgets will likely continue to prioritise other areas of the budget as the DoD pushes forward with efforts at force-wide modernisation and deals with the loss of OCO funding. Funds are also reclaimed through USD2.8bnworth of equipment reductions across the services of ‘older and less-capable platforms and programs’, with notable targets including the A-10 Thunderbolt II, F-16 C/D Fighting Falcon, F-15 C/D Eagle, F/A-18 A-D Hornet, KC-135 Stratotanker, and KC-10 Extender as well as multiple Littoral Combat Ships. The navy and USAF are responsible for USD2.7bn in planned divestments. Choosing to divest legacy systems is politically sensitive, given legislators’ interest in keeping production lines that employ their constituents open. In September 2021, Kendall urged Congress to retain focus on the need to meet the pacing challenge of China, arguing that the US ‘will not succeed against a well-resourced and strategic competitor if we insist on keeping every legacy system we have’. According to Kendall, keeping ‘aircraft that we no longer need and that do not intimidate China’ is ‘consuming precious resources we do need for modernization’.

The services: naval and air focus

The budgets for the Department of the Navy and the USAF are set to increase as part of the effort to deter China and focus DoD operations on the Indo-Pacific. Together, the Department of the Navy and the USAF combine for a 52% share of the total DoD top-line budget, up from 48% in the enacted FY2021 budget.

Table 3 The US president’s budget request by service, USDm Requested budget by service (USDm)

FY2021 FY2022 (requested) (enacted)

Change

Army

174,265

172,734

-1,531

Department of the Navy

207,079

211,721(Total) 163,900 (Navy) 47,800 (Marines)

4,642

Department of the Air Force

204,001

212,764 (Total) 156,300 (Air Force) 17,400 (Space Force) 39,100 (Pass-through)

8,763

Defence-wide

118,377

117,780

-597

Source: The US DoD FY2022 Budget Request Defense Budget Overview Appendix A as well as other open and publicly available sources, FY2022_Budget_Request_Overview_Book.pdf (defense.gov).

There is some nuance to how these budgets are allocated. Of the USD212bn requested for the Department of the Navy, USD164bn is for the navy, an increase of only 0.6% over the FY2021 enacted sum, while USD47.8bn is for the USMC, an increase of 6.2%. The Department of the Air Force budget request of USD213bn is inflated by USD39.1bn in pass-through funding that is not controlled by the USAF and mostly is dedicated to classified activities. Removing the pass-through funding leaves a budget request of USD174bn. The USAF budget of USD156bn is a 2.3% year-on-year increase. The USD17.4bn requested for Space Force is a 13.1% increase from FY2021, reflecting the growing importance of the space domain to operations. Nearly USD8bn of the USAF budget is tied to ‘direct war and enduring costs’ that previously were funded by the OCO account. The navy and USAF are taking different approaches to spending their requested budgets. The navy’s priority is to deliver a ‘combat credible’ force and to improve readiness. The DoD request includes USD48.5bn for the navy’s and the USMC’s readiness, with increases in O&M, MILPERS and infrastructure as well as RDT&E. To cover these costs, naval procurement has declined by 5.7% from the sum enacted in FY2021. The navy will procure only eight ships in FY2022: two Virginia-class submarines, an Arleigh Burkeclass destroyer, a frigate and four support ships. This is down from the 12 planned by the Trump administration, raising questions about future-force structure and the sustainability of the domestic ship-

North America

THE MILITARY BALANCE 2022

building industry. A new force-structure review is underway, though in September 2021 the Chief of Naval Operations announced that the review may not be completed until 2023. USAF spending includes an RDT&E increase of USD3.8bn and stresses modernisation, especially of the nuclear triad. The GBSD, LRSO, National Command, Control, and Communications infrastructure development programmes and B-21 Raider are all ‘fully funded’. Other priorities for RDT&E funding include the Advanced Battle Management System, the Air Force’s component of DoD’s Joint All Domain Command and Control (JADC2) programme, the Next Generation Air Dominance (NGAD) aircraft, and space-based capabilities such as the Next-Generation Overhead Persistent Infrared missile-warning system. The request includes funds for 85 F-35s across the USAF and navy as well as 12 F-15EXs. The KC-46A Pegasus tanker replacement programme receives USD2.5bn for 14 aircraft. The army plays the role of bill payer in the FY2022 budget as it attempts to develop a vision for its role in the Indo-Pacific while also maintaining the capacity to deter Russia and the ability to meet contingencies elsewhere. The army budget of USD173bn is USD1.5bn below the 2021-enacted budget. It constitutes only 24% of the total top-line share, its lowest in a decade. The budget includes USD18.4bn in direct and enduring costs that previously would have been covered by OCO funds. Within these budget constraints, the army has prioritised protecting its end strength, which will remain essentially constant. The army is also defending its 35 prioritised modernisation programmes, as well as 30 additional enabling programmes, deemed essential to future lethality and operational effectiveness. However, after three years of the ‘night court’ process of cutting non-priority programmes in order to free up money for modernisation, a senior officer was reported as saying in mid-2021 that there is little left to cut across its legacy systems. It has, according to acting secretary of the army John Whitley, become ‘progressively harder to find lower-priority programs to realign’. While the top modernisation programmes are protected this year, the army RDT&E and procurement budgets have fallen by USD1.3bn and USD2.8bn respectively, reinforcing the long-term challenge to army modernisation in years ahead.

CANADA Prime Minister Justin Trudeau won a new mandate in the snap general election held on 20 September 2021. This meant at least a degree of continuity in Canadian defence and security policy, which remains based on the Trudeau government’s 2017 defence-policy review entitled ‘Strong, Secure, Engaged’. Nevertheless, Ottawa, like many other capitals, is grappling with the fallout from the coronavirus pandemic, not least potential budgetary implications and added project delays at a time when a number of long-term (and in many cases long overdue) procurement programmes are reaching key decision points. The 2017 review outlined continued support for alliance and coalition ties and a broad global deployment and engagement posture. It also promised to transform Canada’s armed forces, detailing financial commitments and a major procurement programme. Deployments to support NATO continued under the umbrella of Operation Reassurance. These included some 540 personnel leading the NATO Enhanced Presence Battlegroup in Latvia. The naval contribution continued to include the deployment of a frigate, and in January 2021 a Canadian commodore took command of Standing NATO Maritime Group One for 12 months. The air force again deployed to Romania as part of the NATO-enhanced Air Policing mission, while the Operation Unifier military-training mission to Ukraine was also due to continue until at least March 2022. There were also deployments in the Middle East, while in July a frigate took part in the Australia–US Exercise Talisman Sabre off northeast Australia. At the same time, a number of major procurement programmes reached or were approaching important milestones. Since 2019, the army has been pursuing a new operating concept for complex operations against state and non-state actors. The army has also identified a number of equipment priorities, including a modern ground-based air defence system, with decisions pending on defining a programme to deliver an initial capability in 2026–27. Among current land programmes, the first of 360 new Armoured Combat Support Vehicles (based on the LAV 6.0) was accepted in December 2020, with full operational capability scheduled for 2024. This will replace the LAV II Bison and M113. Meanwhile, the first mast was delivered in August 2020 for testing as part of the new Light Armoured

Vehicle Reconnaissance Surveillance System, to be incorporated as an upgrade to 66 LAV III vehicles (at LAV 6.0 standard). The first is due for delivery to the army in October 2021, with full operational capability planned for February 2023. One of the looming pivotal capability decisions concerns Canada’s Future Fighter Capability Project. Final selection to fulfil the requirement for 88 new aircraft is due in 2022, the remaining contenders being the Lockheed Martin F-35A Lightning II and the Saab Gripen E. There could be a down-selection eliminating at least one of the bids in late 2021. This troubled project has been under way for more than a decade, and there are concerns about possible further delays resulting from the coronavirus pandemic. Nevertheless, the plan is for the first aircraft to be delivered in 2025 with all aircraft delivered by the early 2030s. Interim measures to sustain Canada’s existing fighter capability have included the purchase of 18 second-hand F/A-18s from Australia, the last of which was delivered in April 2021, and the upgrading of 36 of Canada’s remaining CF-18s with the AN/ APG-79(V)4 active electronically scanned array radar. Another important development in terms of air-capability recapitalisation was the announcement in April 2021 that Airbus, with its A330 MRTT, was the only qualified bidder for the future Strategic Tanker Transport Capability to replace five CC-150 Polaris aircraft, with an initial operating capability from 2028–29. In the maritime sphere, perhaps as consequential as the future fighter programme in the air domain, is the future Canadian Surface Combatant. After

the selection of the Lockheed Martin bid in 2018, based on the BAE Systems Type-26 frigate design, the programme has proceeded, but not without continuing concern about costs. In April 2021, MBDA was awarded a contract to supply the Sea Ceptor air-defence missile. Given that the plan is also to equip the ships with SM-2 and Evolved SeaSparrow missiles, the ambition for the capability in these vessels is considerable. Also in April, Leonardo was chosen to supply the OTO 127/64 LW Vulcano medium-calibre gun for the class, a departure from the choice for the Australian and UK versions of the Type-26, requiring some significant redesign. The plan is for 15 vessels to be delivered from the early 2030s through to the 2040s. With growing attention on the Arctic, at the end of June 2021 the navy commissioned the first of its planned six Harry DeWolf-class Arctic Offshore Patrol Ships. With a full-load displacement of 6,600 tonnes, they are currently the navy’s largest surface combatants. The second ship was delivered in July 2021 with deliveries to the navy planned at one a year until 2025, followed by two more for the Canadian Coast Guard. The plan remains that the first of the two Protecteurclass Joint Support Ships will be delivered in 2023, although this may be affected by the coronavirus pandemic. The 2017 review also announced a modernisation plan to extend the service life of the four Victoria-class submarines to the mid- to late2030s. One of the submarines, HMCS Corner Brook, which has been undergoing long-running repairs and upgrades, will likely return to service in 2022.

North America

THE MILITARY BALANCE 2022

Arms procurements and deliveries – North America Significant events in 2021

APRIL

CANADA CANCELS TURKEY-RELATED PERMITS

Canada became the latest NATO ally to block the sale of defence equipment to Turkey after restricting 29 export permits. Principally, this stops the sale of WESCAM’s CMX-15D electro-optical/infrared imaging system, which is fitted to some Turkish UAVs, such as the Bayraktar TB2. Canada’s position is that the use of these UAVs in the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict was ‘not consistent with Canadian foreign policy, nor end-use assurances’. The halt on exports to Turkey has hampered several programmes, though it is possible that Ankara will introduce a domestic replacement from ASELSAN for the CMX-15D. Tests began on the ASELSAN product in 2020.

JUNE

US NAVY RELEASES SHIPBUILDING PLAN

The Biden administration released a shipbuilding plan that retained the focus of its predecessor on, for instance, maintaining subsurface advantage. However, it abbreviated its ambitions in the new 30 year plan, indicating an aspiration for a fleet of 321–372 crewed warships and 77–140 uninhabited surface/ subsurface vessels. In contrast, the final plan of the Trump administration, published in December 2020, aimed to have a fleet of 403 crewed ships and submarines and 143 uninhabited maritime systems by 2045. The latest plan is likely informed by a reassessment of industrial capacity and limited growth expected in future shipbuilding budgets, though the administration has indicated that a complete 30year plan will be issued with the FY2023 budget.

JULY

USAF ISSUES KC-Y RFI

The US Air Force (USAF) issued a request for information (RFI) for 140–160 tankers based on a commercial aircraft design to replace the KC-135 Stratotanker under the ‘Bridge’ Tanker (KC-Y) programme. KC-Y is intended as a follow-on programme to the Boeing KC-46A (KC-X programme), of which USAF plans to order 179. However, the KC-46A has suffered from technical problems and has cost Boeing over USD5billion in overruns to date. Interim capability was only certified in 2021, but it is possible that problems may be resolved by the time any KC-Y decision is made before the end of the decade. Indeed, KC-Y will very likely be a competitive programme, as Airbus is expected to offer the A330 MRTT, as it did in several KC-X competitions in the late 2000s and early 2010s. KC-Y will itself be succeeded by the Advanced Air Refueling Tanker (KC-Z) programme, which will be more ambitious, for instance in terms of signature management and endurance.

JULY

L3HARRIS DIVESTS BUSINESSES

Prior to the merger of L3 Technologies and Harris Corporation in 2019, to form L3Harris Technologies, both companies divested parts of their businesses and indicated that more were likely. These began in 2020 and the process has accelerated in 2021, with the sale of the defence-training business to Canada’s CAE for USD1.05bn and propulsion systems to Germany’s RENK for USD400 million. The acquisition significantly expands CAE’s presence in the United States’ simulation-and-training market, with a large F-35 training programme still to be tendered. Only Lockheed Martin currently has a larger market share. RENK’s acquisition is likely also motivated by the potential value of future land programmes, in particular the series of projects that make up the US Army’s Next-Generation Combat Vehicle programme.

JULY

OMFV MOVES FORWARD

The US Army awarded Phase II Concept Design contracts, totalling USD299.4m, for the Optionally Manned Fighting Vehicle (OMFV) to five industrial teams: BAE Systems Land & Armaments, General Dynamics Land Systems, Hanwha Defense and Oshkosh Defense, Point Blank Enterprises and Rheinmetall. A first request for proposals was cancelled in 2020 after companies could not meet the technical or procedural requirements. The reorganisation of the programme in April 2020 set out a five-phase process with a winner being selected in FY2027 and low-rate production beginning in FY2028. This is the third attempt to replace the Bradley infantry fighting vehicle following the cancellation of the Future Combat System and Ground Combat Vehicle programmes in 2010 and 2014, respectively.

Table 4 US fixed-wing fighter-aircraft exports, 2010–October 2021 Country

Equipment

Australia

F-35A

Denmark

F-35A

Egypt

F-16C/D

Indonesia

F-16C/D

Iraq

F-16C/D

Israel

F-35I

Italy

F-16A/B

Italy

F-35A

Italy

F-35B

Japan

F-35A

Korea, Republic of

F-15K

Korea, Republic of

F-35A

Kuwait

F/A-18E/F

Morocco

F-16C/D

Netherlands

F-35A

Norway

F-35A

Pakistan

F-16C/D

Qatar

F-15QA

Saudi Arabia

F-15SA

Singapore

F-15SG

Turkey

F-16C/D

Turkey

F-35A

United Arab Emirates

F-16E/F

United Kingdom

F-35B

Total = 540

2010

2011

2012

2013

2014

2015

2016

2017

2018

2019

2020

2021†

9 4

20 5

2 2

6 1

1 2

*Final assembly outside the US. †January–October

2 3

3 and 1*

North America

Canada: non-US defence exports, 2000–20

200

NATO

200

2 200

Saudi Arabia

3 200

Others

200

5 200

6 200

7 200

8 200

201

2009: A contract worth USD2.2bn is signed to supply Saudi Arabia with 724 LAV II APCs.

201

Ground vehicles and components

48%

201

Other

201

Imaging and countermeasures

2014: A contract reportedly worth USD13.56bn is signed to supply Saudi Arabia with 928 LAV 6.0 APCs.

Aircraft and aero-engines

25%

Canada non-US defence exports by sector, 2000–20

*Canada does not report its exports to the US due to many not requiring permits.

201

8% Training and simulation

13%

2000: Year Equipment 2 numbers

2001: 19

2003: 49 2004: 67 2005: 222

2007: 47

2012: 155

2014: 5

2015: 336

2016: 38

207: 52

2018: 127

2019: 214

2020: 83

202

& Whitney Canada. The former supplies electro-optical/infrared (EO/IR) sensor systems that are fitted onto aircraft, including uninhabited aerial vehicles (UAVs). The use of Turkish-built UAVs, fitted with WESCAM’s MX-15D EO/IR sensor, in the 2020 Armenia– Azerbaijan conflict prompted the Canadian government to halt exports to Turkey. Pratt & Whitney Canada supplies turboprop engines for everything from large transport aircraft to small training aircraft. Canadian firm Bombardier manufactures civilian business jets, which are often sold to form the basis of special-mission aircraft.

Deliveries of Canadian ‘Armoured Combat Vehicles’ and ‘Large-Calibre Artillery Systems’ to Saudi Arabia as reported to the UN Register of Conventional Arms, 2000–20

0.5

1.0

1.5

2.0

2.5

3.0

Canadian non-US defence exports, 2000–20 (USD)

Canada’s non-US defence exports* have quadrupled in value since 2000, with half of this amount coming from the sale of armoured vehicles. Canada’s most significant exporters are subsidiaries of large US companies. For instance, the leading armoured-vehicle firm is General Dynamics Land Systems-Canada (GDLS-C) in London, Ontario. Originally a division of US firm General Motors, since the 1970s the plant has been building Canadian versions, known as Light Armoured Vehicles (LAV), of the Swiss firm MOWAG’s Piranha wheeled armoured vehicle. (MOWAG is now part of General Dynamics.) As well as exporting the design to the United States, GDLS-C has also exported hundreds of LAVs to Saudi Arabia. Indeed, since 2000 total Canadian exports to Saudi Arabia comprise 40% of the non-US total, the vast majority of this being of armoured vehicles. Most recently, a contract was signed in 2014 for 928 LAVs, worth CAD15 billion (USD13.56bn). Saudi Arabia’s military intervention in Yemen led to calls in Canada to either review or cancel the contract, though Canada’s post-2015 Liberal government has suggested in statements that the contract has strict confidentiality clauses and stringent cancellation penalties. Two of Canada’s other major companies are L3Harris subsidiary WESCAM and Pratt & Whitney subsidiary, Pratt

Figure 4

USD billion

44 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2022

North America

Canadian Dollar CAD

per capita Growth Inflation Def exp [a] Def bdgt [b]

2020

2021

CAD

2.20tr

2.52tr

USD

1.64tr

2.02tr

USD

43,295

52,791

-5.3

5.7

0.7

3.2

CAD

31.6bn

33.7bn

USD

23.6bn

26.9bn

CAD

27.0bn

29.1bn

USD

20.1bn

23.2bn

1.34

1.25

USD1= CAD

2022

RESERVE 34,400 (Army 26,800 Navy 4,100 Air 2,000

Other 1,500)

ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE Space EQUIPMENT BY TYPE SATELLITES • SPACE SURVEILLANCE 1 Sapphire

Army 22,500

[a] NATO figure [b] Department of National Defence and Veterans Affairs Real-terms defence budget trend (USDbn, constant 2015)

19.6 15.6

2008

Population

2015

12,100 Other 19,300) Gendarmerie & Paramilitary 4,500

2021

37,943,231

Age

0–14

15–19

20–24

25–29

Male

8.1%

2.7%

2.9%

3.4%

30–64 65 plus 23.4%

8.9%

Female

7.7%

2.6%

2.7%

3.2%

23.7%

10.5%

Capabilities Canada’s armed forces are focused principally on territorial defence, as well as contributing important capabilities to international missions, principally through NATO. The 2017 defence review reaffirmed commitments to NATO, but also to modernising capabilities, including cyber power. The review promised to increase regular and reserve forces, with particular enhancements in the areas of cyber and intelligence. Canada’s deployments, although relatively small scale, underscore a determination to maintain both international engagement and power-projection capability. Canada’s leadership of a NATO battlegroup in Latvia highlights a continuing capability to deploy medium-sized land formations. It has also contributed to NATO’s air-policing mission. Meanwhile, the deployments of frigates to the NATO theatre and the Pacific demonstrate continuing blue-water naval capabilities. It has recently extended its coalition contribution to military capacity-building in Iraq, Jordan and Lebanon until March 2022. The 2017 review pledged to finally deliver on a range of delayed procurements. It raised the target for a new-generation fighter to 88 aircraft with the choice being between the F/A-18E/F Super Hornet, the F-35A Lightning II and the Gripen E, with a final contract award due in 2022. In the interim, Canada has been supplementing its existing fighter force with second-hand Australian F/A-18 Hornets. Despite continuing cost concerns, work has progressed on the future Canadian Surface Combatant programme, based on the UK Type-26 frigate design, with a construction contract expected in 2022 or 2023. In July 2021, the navy commissioned the first of six Arctic Offshore Patrol Ships intended to enhance its Arctic operating capability – its first new warship in nearly 25 years. Canada maintains a well-developed range of mainly small and medium-sized defence firms. The strongest sector is in combat vehicles, though the government is using its latest naval procurements to establish a long-term national shipbuilding strategy.

FORCES BY ROLE MANOEUVRE Mechanised 1 (1st) mech bde gp (1 armd regt, 2 mech inf bn, 1 lt inf bn, 1 arty regt, 1 cbt engr regt, 1 log bn) 2 (2nd & 5th) mech bde gp (1 armd recce regt, 2 mech inf bn, 1 lt inf bn, 1 arty regt, 1 cbt engr regt, 1 log bn) COMBAT SUPPORT 1 engr regt 3 MP pl AIR DEFENCE 1 SAM regt EQUIPMENT BY TYPE ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES MBT 82: 42 Leopard 2A4 (trg role); 20 Leopard 2A4M (upgraded); 20 Leopard 2A6M (52 Leopard 1C2 in store) RECCE ε120 LAV-25 Coyote IFV 550 LAV 6.0 APC 443 APC (T) 268: 235 M113; 33 M577 (CP) APC (W) 175 LAV Bison (incl 10 EW, 32 amb, 32 repair, 64 recovery) AUV 507: 7 Cougar; 500 TAPV ENGINEERING & MAINTENANCE VEHICLES AEV 23: 5 Buffalo; 18 Wisent 2 ARV 12 BPz-3 Büffel ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE MSL • MANPATS TOW-2 RCL 84mm Carl Gustaf ARTILLERY 287 TOWED 163 105mm 126: 98 C3 (M101); 28 LG1 MkII; 155mm 37 M777 MOR 124: 81mm 100; SP 81mm 24 LAV Bison UNINHABITED AERIAL VEHICLES • ISR • Light 5 RQ21A Blackjack

Reserve Organisations 26,800 Canadian Rangers 5,300 Reservists

Provide a limited military presence in Canada’s northern, coastal and isolated areas. Sovereignty, public-safety and surveillance roles FORCES BY ROLE MANOEUVRE Other 5 (patrol) ranger gp (209 patrols)

North America

ACTIVE 66,500 (Army 22,500 Navy 12,600 Air Force

Canada CAN GDP

THE MILITARY BALANCE 2022

Army Reserves 21,500 Reservists

Most units have only coy-sized establishments FORCES BY ROLE COMMAND 10 bde gp HQ MANOEUVRE Reconnaissance 18 recce regt (sqn) Light 51 inf regt (coy) COMBAT SUPPORT 16 fd arty regt (bty) 3 indep fd arty bty 10 cbt engr regt (coy) 1 EW regt (sqn) 4 int coy 10 sigs regt (coy) COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT 10 log bn (coy) 3 MP coy

Royal Canadian Navy 12,600 EQUIPMENT BY TYPE SUBMARINES 4 SSK 4 Victoria (ex-UK Upholder) (of which 1 in long-term refit) with 6 single 533mm TT with Mk 48 HWT PRINCIPAL SURFACE COMBATANTS • FRIGATES 12 FFGHM 12 Halifax with 2 quad lnchr with RGM-84L Harpoon Block II AShM, 2 8-cell Mk 48 mod 0 VLS with RIM-162C ESSM SAM, 2 twin 324mm SVTT Mk 32 mod 9 ASTT with Mk 46 LWT, 1 Mk 15 Phalanx Block 1B CIWS, 1 57mm gun (capacity 1 CH-148 Cyclone ASW hel) PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 1 PSOH 1 Harry DeWolf (capacity 1 CH-148 Cyclone ASW hel) MINE WARFARE • MINE COUNTERMEASURES 12 MCO 12 Kingston (also used in patrol role) LOGISTICS AND SUPPORT 10 AORH 1 Asterix (Resolve) (capacity 2 CH-148 Cyclone ASW hel) AX 9: AXL 8 Orca; AXS 1 Oriole

Reserves 4,100 reservists 24 units tasked with crewing 10 of the 12 MCOs, harbour defence & naval control of shipping

Royal Canadian Air Force (RCAF) 12,100 FORCES BY ROLE FIGHTER/GROUND ATTACK 4 sqn with F/A-18A/B Hornet (CF-18AM/BM) ANTI-SUBMARINE WARFARE 2 sqn with CH-148 Cyclone MARITIME PATROL 2 sqn with P-3 Orion (CP-140M Aurora) SEARCH & RESCUE/TRANSPORT 3 sqn with AW101 Merlin (CH-149 Cormorant); C-130H/H-30 (CC-130) Hercules 1 sqn with DHC-5 (CC-115) Buffalo TANKER/TRANSPORT 1 sqn with A310/A310 MRTT (CC-150/CC-150T) 1 sqn with KC-130H

TRANSPORT 1 sqn with C-17A (CC-177) Globemaster 1 sqn with CL-600 (CC-144B) 1 sqn with C-130J-30 (CC-130) Hercules 1 (utl) sqn with DHC-6 (CC-138) Twin Otter TRAINING 1 OCU sqn with F/A-18A/B Hornet (CF-18AM/BM) 1 OCU sqn with C-130H/H-30/J (CC-130) Hercules 1 OCU sqn with CH-148 Cyclone 1 OCU sqn with Bell 412 (CH-146 Griffon) 1 sqn with P-3 Orion (CP-140M Aurora) TRANSPORT HELICOPTER 5 sqn with Bell 412 (CH-146 Griffon) 3 (cbt spt) sqn with Bell 412 (CH-146 Griffon) 1 (Spec Ops) sqn with Bell 412 (CH-146 Griffon – OPCON Canadian Special Operations Command) 1 sqn with CH-47F (CH-147F) Chinook EQUIPMENT BY TYPE AIRCRAFT 110 combat capable FGA 96: 71 F/A-18A (CF-18AM) Hornet; 25 F/A-18B (CF18BM) Hornet ASW 14 P-3 Orion (CP-140M Aurora) SAR 7 C295W (CC-295) TKR/TPT 5: 2 A310 MRTT (CC-150T); 3 KC-130H TPT 48: Heavy 5 C-17A (CC-177) Globemaster III; Medium 26: 7 C-130H (CC-130) Hercules; 2 C-130H-30 (CC-130) Hercules; 17 C-130J-30 (CC-130) Hercules; Light 10: 6 DHC-5 (CC-115) Buffalo; 4 DHC-6 (CC-138) Twin Otter; PAX 7: 3 A310 (CC-150 Polaris); 4 CL-600 (CC-144B/C) TRG 4 DHC-8 (CT-142) HELICOPTERS ASW 22 CH-148 Cyclone MRH 68 Bell 412 (CH-146 Griffon) TPT 29: Heavy 15 CH-47F (CH-147F) Chinook; Medium 14 AW101 Merlin (CH-149 Cormorant) RADAR 53 AD RADAR • NORTH WARNING SYSTEM 47: 11 AN/ FPS-117 (range 200nm); 36 AN/FPS-124 (range 80nm) STRATEGIC 6: 4 Coastal; 2 Transportable AIR-LAUNCHED MISSILES AAM • IR AIM-9L Sidewinder ARH AIM-120C AMRAAM BOMBS Laser-guided: GBU-10/GBU-12/GBU-16 Paveway II; GBU-24 Paveway III INS/GPS-guided: GBU-31 JDAM; GBU-38 JDAM; GBU49 Enhanced Paveway II

NATO Flight Training Canada EQUIPMENT BY TYPE AIRCRAFT TRG 45: 26 T-6A Texan II (CT-156 Harvard II); 19 Hawk 115 (CT-155) (advanced wpns/tactics trg)

Contracted Flying Services – Southport EQUIPMENT BY TYPE AIRCRAFT TPT • Light 7 Beech C90B King Air TRG 11 G-120A

North America

Canadian Special Operations Forces Command 1,500 FORCES BY ROLE SPECIAL FORCES 1 SF regt (Canadian Special Operations Regiment) 1 SF unit (JTF 2) COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT 1 CBRN unit (Canadian Joint Incident Response Unit – CJIRU) TRANSPORT HELICOPTER 1 (spec ops) sqn, with Bell 412 (CH-146 Griffon – from the RCAF) EQUIPMENT BY TYPE NBC VEHICLES 4 LAV Bison NBC HELICOPTERS • MRH 10 Bell 412 (CH-146 Griffon)

Canadian Forces Joint Operational Support Group FORCES BY ROLE COMBAT SUPPORT 1 engr spt coy 1 (close protection) MP coy 1 (joint) sigs regt COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT 1 (spt) log unit 1 (movement) log unit

Gendarmerie & Paramilitary 4,500 Canadian Coast Guard 4,500 Incl Department of Fisheries and Oceans; all platforms are designated as non-combatant EQUIPMENT BY TYPE PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 71 PSOH 1 Leonard J Cowley PSO 1 Sir Wilfred Grenfell (with hel landing platform) PCO 13: 2 Cape Roger; 1 Gordon Reid; 9 Hero; 1 Tanu PBF 1 Response Boat-Medium (RB-M) PB 55: 6 Baie de Plaisance; 1 Laredo Sound; 10 Type-300A; 36 Type-300B; 1 S. Dudka; 1 Vakta AMPHIBIOUS • LANDING CRAFT 4 UCAC 4 Type-400 LOGISTICS AND SUPPORT 33 ABU 7 AG 4 AGB 17 AGOS 5 HELICOPTERS • MRH 7 Bell 412EP • TPT 19: Medium 1 S-61; Light 18: 3 Bell 206L Long Ranger; 15 Bell 429

DEPLOYMENT CYPRUS: UN • UNFICYP (Operation Snowgoose) 1 DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO: UN • MONUSCO (Operation Crocodile) 8

EGYPT: MFO (Operation Calumet) 55; 1 MP team IRAQ: Operation Inherent Resolve (Impact) 250; 1 SF trg gp; 1 hel flt with 3 Bell 412 (CH-146 Griffon) hel 1 med unit; NATO • NATO Mission Iraq 17 KUWAIT: Operation Inherent Resolve (Impact) 2 C-130J-30 Hercules (CC-130J) LATVIA: NATO • Enhanced Forward Presence (Operation Reassurance) 540; 1 mech inf bn HQ; 1 mech inf coy(+); 1 cbt spt coy; LAV 6.0; M777 MALI: UN • MINUSMA (Operation Presence) 5 MIDDLE EAST: UN • UNTSO (Operation Jade) 5 NORTH SEA: NATO • SNMG 1: 1 FFGHM ROMANIA: NATO • Air Policing 135; 6 F/A-18A Hornet (CF-18) SERBIA: NATO • KFOR • Joint Enterprise (Operation Kobold) 5 SOUTH SUDAN: UN • UNMISS (Operation Soprano) 6 UKRAINE: Operation Unifier 200

FOREIGN FORCES United Kingdom BATUS 400; 1 trg unit; 1 hel flt with SA341 Gazelle AH1 United States 140

North America

HELICOPTERS MRH 9 Bell 412 (CH-146) TPT • Light 7 Bell 206 Jet Ranger (CH-139)

THE MILITARY BALANCE 2022

United States US United States Dollar USD

2020

2021

GDP

USD

20.9tr

22.9tr

per capita

69,375

2022

develop its defensive and offensive cyber capabilities. The country has the world’s most capable defence industry, active in all sectors and with a dominant position in the international defence market.

ACTIVE 1,395,350 (Army 489,050 Navy 349,600 Air Force 329,400 Space Force 6,400 US Marine Corps 179,250 US Coast Guard 41,650)

USD

63,358

Growth

-3.4

6.0

Inflation

1.2

4.3

RESERVE 843,450 (Army 522,300 Navy 100,450 Air

Def exp [a]

USD

785bn

811bn

Def bdgt [b]

USD

775bn

754bn

Force 178,600 Marine Corps Reserve 35,850 US Coast Guard 6,250)

768bn

[a] NATO figure

ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE

[b] National Defense Budget Function (50) Budget Authority. Includes DoD funding, as well as funds for nuclear-weaponsrelated activities undertaken by the Department of Energy. Excludes some military retirement and healthcare costs. Real-terms defence budget trend (USDbn, constant 2015)

2008

Population

US Strategic Command 785

598 2021

2015

334,998,398

Age

0–14

15–19

20–24

25–29

Male

9.4%

3.2%

3.3%

3.5%

30–64 65 plus 22.1%

7.7%

Female

9.0%

3.1%

3.2%

3.4%

22.5%

9.5%

Capabilities The United States remains the world’s most capable military power, with a unique ability to project power on a global basis. In March 2021, the Biden administration issued an Interim National Security Strategic Guidance which heralded international re-engagement and the end of what it termed the US’s ‘forever wars’. It announced a new Global Posture Review that would mainly focus on the Indo-Pacific and Europe with more qualified attention on the Middle East. The manner of the US withdrawal from Afghanistan led to concerns and unease among allies and partners about future US engagements. The US defence secretary has called for an ‘integrated deterrence’ strategy across the domains but also with allies and partners. The Biden administration has also begun a Nuclear Posture Review, after the previous Trump administration review in 2018 backed the development of low-yield warheads and a nuclear-capable sealaunched cruise missile. A Missile Defense Review was published in January 2019 envisaging a number of new programmes and technologies, including space-based systems. In August 2019 the Pentagon established a new Space Command followed by the establishment of a Space Force in December 2019, subsequently endorsed by the Biden administration. In June 2020 it also published a Defense Space Strategy. The US maintains an allvolunteer force, including significant reserves, with high levels of training throughout all commands and services. The Pentagon is trying to improve readiness. Modernisation priorities include a renewal of strategic nuclear capabilities, including a new class of ballistic-missile submarine and a new long-range bomber, and also improved naval capabilities that are likely to include both crewed and uninhabited platforms. In August 2019, the US withdrew from the Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces Treaty, and three weeks later conducted a ground-launched cruisemissile test. Under President Biden, the US agreed to extend the New START treaty in February 2021 but in May 2021 confirmed it would not rejoin the Open Skies Treaty (from which the US had withdrawn in November 2020). The US also continues to actively

HQ at Offutt AFB (NE). Five missions: US nuclear deterrent; missile defence; global strike; info ops; ISR

US Navy EQUIPMENT BY TYPE SUBMARINES • STRATEGIC • SSBN 14 Ohio with up to 20 UGM-133A Trident D-5/D-5LE nuclear SLBM, 4 single 533mm TT with Mk 48 ADCAP mod 6/7 HWT

US Air Force • Global Strike Command FORCES BY ROLE MISSILE 9 sqn with LGM-30G Minuteman III BOMBER 5 sqn with B-52H Stratofortress 2 sqn with B-2A Spirit (+1 ANG sqn personnel only) EQUIPMENT BY TYPE SURFACE-TO-SURFACE MISSILE LAUNCHERS ICBM • Nuclear 400 LGM-30G Minuteman III (1 Mk12A or Mk21 re-entry veh per missile) AIRCRAFT BBR 66: 20 B-2A Spirit; 46 B-52H Stratofortress AIR-LAUNCHED MISSILES ALCM • Nuclear AGM-86B

Strategic Defenses – Early Warning North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD) – a combined US–CAN organisation EQUIPMENT BY TYPE RADAR NORTH WARNING SYSTEM 50: 14 AN/FPS-117; 36 AN/FPS-124 SOLID STATE PHASED ARRAY RADAR SYSTEM (SSPARS) 5 AN/FPS-132 Upgraded Early Warning Radar located at Beale AFB (CA), Cape Cod SFS (MA), Clear SFS (AK), Thule AB (GL) and RAF Fylingdales (UK) SPACETRACK SYSTEM 7: 1 AN/FPS-85 Spacetrack Radar at Eglin AFB (FL); 6 contributing radars at Cavalier SFS (ND), Clear SFS (AK), Thule AB (GL), RAF Fylingdales (UK), Beale AFB (CA) and Cape Cod SFS (MA); 3 Spacetrack Optical Trackers located at Socorro (NM), Maui (HI), Diego Garcia (BIOT)

PERIMETER ACQUISITION RADAR ATTACK CHARACTERISATION SYSTEM (PARCS) 1 AN/ FPQ-16 at Cavalier SFS (ND) DETECTION AND TRACKING RADARS 5 located at Kwajalein Atoll, Ascension Island, Australia, Kaena Point (HI), MIT Lincoln Laboratory (MA) GROUND BASED ELECTRO OPTICAL DEEP SPACE SURVEILLANCE SYSTEM (GEODSS) Socorro (NM), Maui (HI), Diego Garcia (BIOT) STRATEGIC DEFENCES – MISSILE DEFENCES SEA-BASED: Aegis engagement cruisers and destroyers LAND-BASED: 40 ground-based interceptors at Fort Greely (AK); 4 ground-based interceptors at Vandenburg SFB (CA)

Space EQUIPMENT BY TYPE SATELLITES 142 COMMUNICATIONS 46: 6 AEHF; 6 DSCS-III; 2 Milstar-I; 3 Milstar-II; 5 MUOS; 1 PAN-1 (P360); 5 SDS-III; 2 SDS-IV; 6 UFO; 10 WGS SV2 NAVIGATION/POSITIONING/TIMING 30: 12 NAVSTAR Block IIF; 7 NAVSTAR Block IIR; 7 NAVSTAR Block IIRM; 4 NAVSTAR Block III METEOROLOGY/OCEANOGRAPHY 6 DMSP-5 ISR 18: 5 FIA Radar; 6 Evolved Enhanced/Improved Crystal (visible and infrared imagery); 2 Lacrosse (Onyx radar imaging satellite); 1 NRO L-71; 1 NRO L-76; 1 ORS-1; 1 TacSat-4; 1 TacSat-6 ELINT/SIGINT 27: 2 Mentor (advanced Orion); 3 Advanced Mentor; 4 Mercury; 1 NRO L-67; 1 Trumpet; 4 Improved Trumpet; 12 SBWASS (Space Based Wide Area Surveillance System; Naval Ocean Surveillance System) SPACE SURVEILLANCE 6: 4 GSSAP; 1 SBSS (Space Based Surveillance System); 1 ORS-5 EARLY WARNING 9: 4 DSP; 5 SBIRS Geo-1 COUNTERSPACE • EW Counter Communications System (CCS)

US Army 489,050 FORCES BY ROLE Sqn are generally bn sized and tp are generally coy sized COMMAND 4 (I, III, V & XVIII AB) corps HQ 1 (2nd) inf div HQ 1 (56th) arty comd SPECIAL FORCES (see USSOCOM) MANOEUVRE Armoured 2 (1st Armd & 1st Cav) armd div (3 (1st–3rd ABCT) armd bde (1 armd recce sqn, 2 armd bn, 1 armd inf bn, 1 SP arty bn, 1 cbt engr bn, 1 CSS bn); 1 SP arty bde HQ; 1 log bde; 1 (hy cbt avn) hel bde) 1 (1st) inf div (2 (1st & 2nd ABCT) armd bde (1 armd recce sqn, 2 armd bn, 1 armd inf bn, 1 SP arty bn, 1 cbt engr bn, 1 CSS bn); 1 SP arty bde HQ; 1 log bde; 1 (cbt avn) hel bde)

1 (3rd) inf div (2 (1st & 2nd ABCT) armd bde (1 armd recce sqn, 2 armd bn, 1 armd inf bn, 1 SP arty bn, 1 cbt engr bn, 1 CSS bn); 1 lt inf bn; 1 SP arty bde HQ; 1 log bde; 1 (cbt avn) hel bde) Mechanised 1 (4th) inf div (1 (3rd ABCT) armd bde (1 armd recce sqn, 2 armd bn, 1 armd inf bn, 1 SP arty bn, 1 cbt engr bn, 1 CSS bn); 2 (1st & 2nd SBCT) mech bde (1 armd recce sqn, 3 mech inf bn, 1 arty bn, 1 cbt engr bn, 1 CSS bn); 1 SP arty bde HQ; 1 log bde; 1 (hy cbt avn) hel bde) 1 (7th) inf div (2 (1st & 2nd SBCT, 2nd ID) mech bde (1 armd recce sqn, 3 mech inf bn, 1 arty bn, 1 cbt engr bn, 1 CSS bn)) 1 (1st SBCT, 25th ID) mech bde (1 armd recce sqn, 3 mech inf bn, 1 arty bn, 1 cbt engr bn, 1 CSS bn) 2 (2nd & 3rd CR) mech bde (1 armd recce sqn, 3 mech sqn, 1 arty sqn, 1 cbt engr sqn, 1 CSS sqn) Light 1 (10th Mtn) inf div (3 (1st–3rd IBCT) lt inf bde (1 recce sqn, 3 inf bn, 1 arty bn, 1 cbt engr bn, 1 CSS bn); 1 log bde; 1 (cbt avn) hel bde) 1 (25th) inf div (2 (2 & 3rd IBCT) inf bde (1 recce sqn, 2 inf bn, 1 arty bn, 1 cbt engr bn, 1 CSS bn); 1 log bde; 1 (cbt avn) hel bde) 5 (Sy Force Assist) inf bde(-) Air Manoeuvre 1 (82nd) AB div (1 (1st AB BCT) AB bde (1 recce bn, 1 mech coy; 3 para bn, 1 arty bn, 1 cbt engr bn, 1 CSS bn); 2 (2nd & 3rd AB BCT) AB bde (1 recce bn, 3 para bn, 1 arty bn, 1 cbt engr bn, 1 CSS bn); 1 (cbt avn) hel bde; 1 log bde) 1 (101st) air aslt div (3 (1st–3rd AB BCT) AB bde (1 recce bn, 3 para bn, 1 arty bn, 1 cbt engr bn, 1 CSS bn); 1 (cbt avn) hel bde; 1 log bde) 1 (173rd AB BCT) AB bde (1 recce bn, 2 para bn, 1 arty bn, 1 cbt engr bn, 1 CSS bn) 1 (4th AB BCT, 25th ID) AB bde (1 recce bn, 2 para bn, 1 arty bn, 1 cbt engr bn, 1 CSS bn) Other 1 (11th ACR) trg armd cav regt (OPFOR) (2 armd cav sqn, 1 CSS bn) COMBAT SUPPORT 3 MRL bde (2 MRL bn) 1 MRL bde (1 MRL bn; 1 SSM bn (forming)) 1 MRL bde (5 MRL bn) 4 engr bde 2 EOD gp (2 EOD bn) 10 int bde 2 int gp 4 MP bde 1 NBC bde 3 (strat) sigs bde 4 (tac) sigs bde 1 (1st MDTF) cbt spt bde (1 (I2CEWS) cbt spt bn) 1 (2nd MDTF) cbt spt bde(-)

North America

THE MILITARY BALANCE 2022

COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT 2 log bde 3 med bde 1 tpt bde ISR 1 ISR avn bde HELICOPTER 2 (cbt avn) hel bde 1 (cbt avn) hel bde HQ AIR DEFENCE 5 SAM bde

Reserve Organisations Army National Guard 337,150 reservists

Normally dual-funded by DoD and states. Civilemergency responses can be mobilised by state governors. Federal government can mobilise ARNG for major domestic emergencies and for overseas operations FORCES BY ROLE COMMAND 8 div HQ SPECIAL FORCES (see USSOCOM) MANOEUVRE Reconnaissance 1 armd recce sqn Armoured 5 (ABCT) armd bde (1 armd recce sqn, 2 armd bn, 1 armd inf bn, 1 SP arty bn, 1 cbt engr bn, 1 CSS bn) Mechanised 2 (SBCT) mech bde (1 armd recce sqn, 3 mech inf bn, 1 arty bn, 1 cbt engr bn, 1 CSS bn) Light 14 (IBCT) inf bde (1 recce sqn, 3 inf bn, 1 arty bn, 1 cbt engr bn, 1 CSS bn) 6 (IBCT) inf bde (1 recce sqn, 2 inf bn, 1 arty bn, 1 cbt engr bn, 1 CSS bn) 1 (Sy Force Assist) inf bde(-) 4 inf bn Air Manoeuvre 1 AB bn COMBAT SUPPORT 8 arty bde 1 SP arty bn 8 engr bde 1 EOD regt 3 int bde 3 MP bde 1 NBC bde 2 (tac) sigs bde 17 (Mnv Enh) cbt spt bde COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT 10 log bde 17 (regional) log spt gp HELICOPTER 8 (cbt avn) hel bde 5 (theatre avn) hel bde AIR DEFENCE 3 SAM bde

Army Reserve 185,150 reservists

Reserve under full command of US Army. Does not have state-emergency liability of Army National Guard FORCES BY ROLE SPECIAL FORCES (see USSOCOM) COMBAT SUPPORT 4 engr bde 4 MP bde 2 NBC bde 2 sigs bde 3 (Mnv Enh) cbt spt bde COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT 9 log bde 11 med bde HELICOPTER 2 (exp cbt avn) hel bde

Army Stand-by Reserve 700 reservists

Trained individuals for mobilisation

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES MBT 2,645: ε650 M1A1 SA Abrams; 1,605 M1A2 SEPv2 Abrams; ε390 M1A2 SEPv3 Abrams; (ε3,450 more M1A1/ A2 Abrams in store) ASLT ε100 M1128 Stryker MGS (being divested 2022) RECCE 1,745: ε1,200 M3A2/A3 Bradley; 545 M1127 Stryker RV (ε800 more M3 Bradley in store) IFV 2,931: ε14 LAV-25; ε2,500 M2A2/A3 Bradley; 334 M7A3/SA BFIST (OP); 83 M1296 Stryker Dragoon (ε2,000 more M2 Bradley in store) APC 10,607 APC (T) 5,060: 60 AMPV (in test); ε5,000 M113A2/A3 (ε8,000 more in store) APC (W) 2,613: 1,467 M1126 Stryker ICV; 296 M1130 Stryker CV (CP); 167 M1131 Stryker FSV (OP); 258 M1133 Stryker MEV (Amb); 21 M1251A1 Stryker FSV (OP); 46 M1254A1 Stryker MEV (Amb); 52 M1255A1 Stryker CV (CP); 306 M1256A1 Stryker ICV PPV 2,934: 2,633 MaxxPro Dash; 301 MaxxPro LWB (Amb) AUV 19,516+: 10,500+ JLTV; 2,900 M1117 ASV; 465 M1200 Armored Knight (OP); 5,651 M-ATV ENGINEERING & MAINTENANCE VEHICLES AEV 553: ε135 M1150 ABV; 250 M9 ACE; 152 M1132 Stryker ESV; 16 M1257A1 Stryker ESV ARV 1,260+: 360 M88A1; ε900 M88A2 (ε1,000 more M88A1 in store); some M578 VLB 365: ε230 M60 AVLB; 75 M1074 Joint Assault Bridge; 20 REBS; 40 Wolverine HAB MW 3+: Aardvark JSFU Mk4; some Husky 2G; 3+ Hydrema 910 MCV-2; M58/M59 MICLIC; M139; Rhino NBC VEHICLES 234 M1135 Stryker NBCRV ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE MSL SP 1,133: 120 M1134 Stryker ATGM; 13 M1253A1 Stryker ATGM; ε1,000 M1167 HMMWV TOW

North America

US Navy 349,600 Comprises 2 Fleet Areas, Atlantic and Pacific. 6 Fleets: 2nd – Atlantic; 3rd – Pacific; 4th – Caribbean, Central and South America; 5th – Arabian Sea, Persian Gulf, Red Sea; 6th – Mediterranean; 7th – Indian Ocean, East Asia, W. Pacific; plus Military Sealift Command (MSC); Naval Reserve Force (NRF). For Naval Special Warfare Command, see US Special Operations Command EQUIPMENT BY TYPE SUBMARINES 67 STRATEGIC • SSBN 14 Ohio (opcon US STRATCOM) with up to 20 UGM-133A Trident D-5/D-5LE nuclear SLBM, 4 single 533mm TT with Mk 48 ADCAP mod 6/7 HWT TACTICAL 53 SSGN 51: 4 Ohio (mod) with 22 7-cell MAC VLS with UGM109E Tomahawk Block IV LACM , 4 single 533mm TT with Mk 48 ADCAP mod 6/7 HWT 6 Los Angeles Flight II with 1 12-cell VLS with UGM109E Tomahawk Block IV LACM, 4 single 533mm TT with Mk 48 ADCAP mod 6/7 HWT 22 Los Angeles Flight III with 1 12-cell VLS with UGM-109E Tomahawk Block IV LACM, 4 single 533mm TT with Mk 48 ADCAP mod 6/7 HWT 10 Virginia Flight I/II with 1 12-cell VLS with UGM109E Tomahawk Block IV LACM, 4 single 533mm TT with Mk 48 ADCAP mod 6/7 HWT 8 Virginia Flight III with 2 6-cell VPT VLS with UGM109E Tomahawk Block IV LACM, 4 single 533mm TT with Mk 48 ADCAP mod 6/7 HWT 1 Virginia Flight IV with 2 6-cell VPT VLS with UGM109E Tomahawk Block IV LACM, 4 single 533mm TT with Mk 48 ADCAP mod 6/7 HWT SSN 2 Seawolf (one other non-operational after collision in 2021, extent of damage unclear) with 8 single 660mm TT with UGM-109E Tomahawk Block IV LACM/Mk 48 ADCAP mod 6/7 HWT PRINCIPAL SURFACE COMBATANTS 124 AIRCRAFT CARRIERS • CVN 11: 1 Gerald R. Ford with 2 octuple Mk 29 mod 5 GMLS with RIM-162D ESSM SAM, 2 Mk 49 mod 3 GMLS with RIM-116C RAM Block 2 SAM, 3 Mk 15 Phalanx Block 1B CIWS (typical capacity 75+ F/A-18E/F Super Hornet FGA ac; F-35C Lightning II FGA ac; E-2D Hawkeye AEW&C ac; EA-18G Growler EW ac; MH60R Seahawk ASW hel; MH-60S Knight Hawk MRH hel) 10 Nimitz with 2 8-cell Mk29 GMLS with RIM-162 ESSM SAM, 2 Mk 49 GMLS with RIM-116 RAM Block 2 SAM, 3 Mk 15 Phalanx Block 1B CIWS (typical capacity 55 F/A-18E/F Super Hornet FGA ac; F-35C Lightning II FGA ac; 4 EA-18G Growler EW ac; 4 E-2C/D Hawkeye AEW ac; 6 MH-60R/S Seahawk/ Knight Hawk hel) CRUISERS • CGHM 24: 22 Ticonderoga (of which 5 in modernisation programme and 2 more at Reduced Readiness) with Aegis Baseline 5/6/8/9 C2, 2 quad lnchr with RGM84D Harpoon Block 1C AShM, 16 8-cell Mk 41 VLS (of

North America

MANPATS FGM-148 Javelin RCL 84mm Carl Gustaf ARTILLERY 5,123 SP 155mm 689: ε514 M109A6; 175 M109A7 (ε850 more M109A6 in store) TOWED 1,339: 105mm 821 M119A2/3; 155mm 518 M777A2 MRL 227mm 588: 363 M142 HIMARS; 225 M270A1 MLRS MOR 2,507: 81mm 990 M252; 120mm 1,076 M120/ M1064A3; SP 120mm 441; 378 M1129 Stryker MC; 63 M1252A1 Stryker MC SURFACE-TO-SURFACE MISSILE LAUNCHERS SRBM • Conventional MGM-140A/B ATACMS; MGM168 ATACMS (All launched from M270A1 MLRS or M142 HIMARS MRLs) AMPHIBIOUS PRINCIPAL AMPHIBIOUS SHIPS 7 LSL 7 Frank Besson (capacity 24 Abrams MBT) LANDING CRAFT 70 LCT 34 LCU 2000 (capacity 5 M1 Abrams MBT) LCM 36 LCM 8 (capacity either 1 M1 Abrams MBT or 200 troops) AIRCRAFT ISR 47: 8 EMARSS-G; 4 EMARSS-V; 8 EMARSS-M; 19 RC-12X Guardrail (5 trg); 8 RO-6A ARL-E SIGINT 2 CL-600 Artemis ELINT 9: 4 EMARSS-S; 4 EO-5C ARL-M (COMINT/ ELINT); 1 TO-5C (trg) TPT 156: Light 152: 113 Beech A200 King Air (C-12 Huron); 28 Cessna 560 Citation (UC-35A/B); 11 SA227 Metro (C-26E); PAX 4: 1 Gulfstream IV (C-20F); 2 Gulfstream V (C-37A); 1 Gulfstream G550 (C-37B) TRG 4 T-6D Texan II HELICOPTERS ATK 740: ε310 AH-64D Apache; ε430 AH-64E Apache SAR 306: 19 HH-60L Black Hawk; 287 HH-60M Black Hawk (medevac) TPT 2,766: Heavy 450 CH-47F Chinook; Medium 1,794: ε50 UH-60A Black Hawk; ε900 UH-60L Black Hawk; 838 UH-60M Black Hawk; 6 UH-60V Black Hawk; Light 522: 457 UH-72A Lakota; 65 UH-1H/V Iroquois UNINHABITED AERIAL VEHICLES 416 CISR • Heavy ε180 MQ-1C Gray Eagle ISR • Medium 236 RQ-7B Shadow AIR DEFENCE SAM 1,187+ Long-range 480 M902/M903 Patriot PAC-3/PAC-3 MSE Short-range Iron Dome; NASAMS Point-defence 457+: FIM-92 Stinger; 4 M-SHORAD; 453 M1097 Avenger GUNS • Towed • 20mm Phalanx (LPWS) MISSILE DEFENCE • Long-range 42 THAAD AIR-LAUNCHED MISSILES ASM AGM-114K/L/M/N/R Hellfire II; AGM-179A JAGM; APKWS

THE MILITARY BALANCE 2022

which 2 only 5-cell and fitted with reload crane) with RGM-109E Tomahawk Block IV LACM/SM-2 Block III/IIIA/IIIB/IV SAM/SM-3 Block IA/B SAM/SM-6 Block I SAM, 2 triple 324mm SVTT Mk 32 ASTT with Mk 54 LWT, 2 Mk 15 Phalanx Block 1B CIWS, 2 127mm guns (capacity 2 MH-60R Seahawk/MH-60S Knight Hawk hels) 2 Zumwalt with 20 4-cell Mk 57 VLS with RGM-109E Tomahawk Block IV LACM/RIM-162 ESSM SAM/ SM-2 Block IIIA SAM/ASROC A/S msl, 2 155mm guns (capacity 2 MH-60R Seahawk ASW hel or 1 MH60R Seahawk ASW hel and 3 Fire Scout UAV) DESTROYERS 68: DDGHM 40: 5 Arleigh Burke Flight IIA with Aegis Baseline 5/9 C2, 12 8-cell Mk 41 VLS with RGM-109E Tomahawk Block IV LACM/SM-2 Block III/IIIA/IIIB/IV SAM/ SM-3 Block IA/B SAM/SM-6 Block I SAM/ASROC A/S msl, 2 triple 324mm SVTT Mk 32 ASTT with Mk 54 LWT, 2 Mk 15 Phalanx Block 1B CIWS, 1 127mm gun (capacity 2 MH-60R Seahawk/MH-60S Knight Hawk hels) 35 Arleigh Burke Flight IIA with Aegis Baseline 6/7/9 C2, 12 8-cell Mk 41 VLS with RGM-109E Tomahawk Block IV LACM/SM-2 Block III/IIIA/IIIB/IV SAM/ SM-3 Block IA/B SAM/SM-6 Block I SAM/ASROC A/S msl, 2 triple 324mm SVTT Mk 32 ASTT with Mk 54 LWT, 1 Mk 15 Phalanx Block 1B CIWS, 1 127mm gun (capacity 2 MH-60R Seahawk/MH-60S Knight Hawk hels) (of which 1 vessel also with 1 Mk 15 SeaRAM with RIM-116C RAM Block 2 and 2 vessels also with 1 Optical Dazzling Interdictor, Navy (ODIN) LWS) DDGM 28 Arleigh Burke Flight I/II with Aegis Baseline 5/9 C2, 2 quad lnchr with RGM-84D Harpoon Block 1C AShM, 12 8-cell Mk 41 VLS (of which 2 only 5-cell and fitted with reload crane) with RGM-109E Tomahawk Block IV LACM/SM-2 Block III/IIIA/IIIB/IV SAM/SM-3 Block IA/B SAM/SM-6 Block I SAM/ASROC A/S msl, 2 triple 324mm SVTT Mk 32 ASTT with Mk 54 LWT, 2 Mk 15 Phalanx Block 1B CIWS (of which 3 vessels with 1 Mk 15 SeaRAM with RIM-116C RAM Block 2, 1 Mk 15 Phalanx Block 1B instead of 2 Phalanx), 1 127mm gun, 1 hel landing platform FRIGATES 21: FFGHM 4 Independence with 2 quad lnchr with NSM (RGM-184A) AShM, 1 11-cell SeaRAM lnchr with RIM116C Block 2 SAM, 1 57mm gun (capacity 2 MH-60R/S Seahawk/Knight Hawk hel and 3 MQ-8 Fire Scout UAV) FFHM 17: 9 Freedom with 1 21-cell Mk 49 lnchr with RIM-116C RAM Block 2 SAM, 1 57mm gun (capacity 2 MH60R/S Seahawk/Knight Hawk hel or 1 MH-60 with 3 MQ-8 Fire Scout UAV) 8 Independence with 1 11-cell SeaRAM lnchr with RIM-116C Block 2 SAM, 1 57mm gun (capacity 2 MH-60R/S Seahawk/Knight Hawk hel and 3 MQ-8 Fire Scout UAV) PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 86 PCFG 10 Cyclone with 1 quad Mk 208 lnchr with BGM176B Griffin B SSM

PBF 76: 12 Mk VI; 32 Combatant Craft Assault; 2 Combatant Craft Heavy; 30 Combatant Craft Medium Mk 1 MINE WARFARE • MINE COUNTERMEASURES 8 MCO 8 Avenger COMMAND SHIPS LCC 2 Blue Ridge with 2 Mk 15 Phalanx Block 1B CIWS (capacity 3 LCPL; 2 LCVP; 700 troops; 1 med hel) (of which 1 vessel partially crewed by Military Sealift Command personnel) AMPHIBIOUS PRINCIPAL AMPHIBIOUS SHIPS 31: LHA 2 America with 2 8-cell Mk 29 GMLS with RIM162D ESSM SAM, 2 Mk 49 GMLS with RIM-116C RAM Block 2 SAM, 2 Mk 15 Phalanx Block 1B CIWS (capacity up to 29 ac/hel incl: 6-13 F-35B Lightning II FGA ac (possible 20 as full ‘Lightning carrier’; 4 AH-1Z Viper atk hel; up to 12 MV-22B Osprey tpt ac; 2 MH-60S Knight Hawk MRH; 4 CH-53E Sea Stallion tpt hel; 2 UH1Y Iroquois tpt hel; up to 1,800 troops) LHD 7 Wasp with 2 8-cell Mk 29 GMLS with RIM-7M/P Sea Sparrow SAM, 2 Mk 49 GMLS with RIM-116C RAM Block 2 SAM, 2 Mk 15 Phalanx Block 1B CIWS (capacity up to 23 ac/hel incl: 6 AV-8B Harrier II FGA or F-35B Lightning II FGA ac (possible 20 F-35B as full ‘Lightning carrier’; 4 AH-1Z Viper atk hel; 4 CH-53E Sea Stallion hel; up to 6 MV-22B Osprey tpt ac; 3 UH-1Y Iroquois tpt hel; 3 LCAC(L); 60 tanks; 1,687 troops) LPD 11 San Antonio with 2 21-cell Mk 49 GMLS with RIM-116C RAM Block 2 SAM (1 vessel also fitted with 1 Solid-State Laser Technology Maturation (SSL-TM) LWS) (capacity 2 CH-53E Sea Stallion hel or 2 MV-22 Osprey; 2 LCAC(L); 14 AAV; 720 troops) LSD 11: 4 Harpers Ferry with 2 Mk 49 GMLS with RIM116C RAM Block 2 SAM, 2 Mk 15 Phalanx Block 1B CIWS (capacity 2 CH-53E Sea Stallion hel; 2 LCAC(L); 40 tanks; 500 troops) 7 Whidbey Island with 2 Mk 49 GMLS with RIM116C RAM Block 2 SAM, 2 Mk 15 Phalanx Block 1B CIWS (capacity 2 CH-53E Sea Stallion hel; 4 LCAC(L); 40 tanks; 500 troops) LANDING CRAFT 143: LCU 32 LCU 1610 (capacity either 1 M1 Abrams MBT or 350 troops) LCM 8 LCM 8 LCP 33 Maritime Positioning Force Utility Boat (MPFUB) LCAC 70: 68 LCAC(L) (MLU ongoing) (capacity either 1 MBT or 60 troops); 2 Ship To Shore Connector (SSC (capacity 1 MBT or 145 troops) LOGISTICS AND SUPPORT 13 AFDL 1 Dynamic AGOR 6 (all leased out): 2 Ocean; 3 Thomas G. Thompson; 1 Kilo Moana ARD 2 AX 1 Prevail ESB 3 Lewis B. Puller (capacity 4 MH-53/MH-60 hel) UUV (1 Cutthroat for testing) MISSILE DEFENCE • Long-range 3 8-cell Mk 41 VLS with SM-3

Naval Reserve Forces 100,450 Selected Reserve 57,700 Individual Ready Reserve 42,750

Naval Inactive Fleet Notice for reactivation: 60–90 days minimum (still on naval-vessel register) EQUIPMENT BY TYPE PRINCIPAL SURFACE COMBATANTS • FRIGATES 2 FFH 2: 1 Freedom with 1 57mm gun; 1 Independence with 1 57mm gun AMPHIBIOUS 4 LHA 3 Tarawa LSD 1 Whidbey Island LOGISTICS AND SUPPORT 4 AOE 2 Supply ARS 2 Safeguard

Military Sealift Command (MSC) Fleet Oiler (PM1) EQUIPMENT BY TYPE LOGISTICS AND SUPPORT 15 AOR 15 Henry J. Kaiser with 1 hel landing platform

Special Mission (PM2) EQUIPMENT BY TYPE LOGISTICS AND SUPPORT 21 AGM 3: 1 Howard O. Lorenzen; 1 Invincible (commercial operator); 1 Sea-based X-band radar AGOR 6 Pathfinder AGOS 5: 1 Impeccable (commercial operator); 4 Victorious AGS 1 Waters ARC 1 Zeus AS 5 (long-term chartered, of which 1 Dominator, 4 Arrowhead)

Prepositioning (PM3) EQUIPMENT BY TYPE LOGISTICS AND SUPPORT 14 AG 2: 1 V Adm K.R. Wheeler; 1 Fast Tempo AKR 5: 2 Bob Hope; 1 Stockham; 2 Watson AKRH 5 2nd Lt John P. Bobo ESD 2 Montford Point

Service Support (PM4) EQUIPMENT BY TYPE LOGISTICS AND SUPPORT 12 AH 2 Mercy with 1 hel landing platform ARS 2 Safeguard AS 4: 1 Carolyn Chouest; 2 Emory S. Land; 1 Malama (long-term chartered) ATF 4: 1 Gary Chouest; 3 Powhatan

AOT 1 Maersk Peary (long-term chartered) AK 9: 3 Sgt Matej Kocak; 1 1st Lt Harry L. Martin; 1 LCpl Roy M. Wheat; 2 LTC John U.D. Page; 1 Maj. Bernard F. Fisher; 1 CPT David I. Lyon AKR 15: 5 Bob Hope; 2 Gordon; 2 Shughart; 6 Watson

Fleet Ordnance and Dry Cargo (PM6) EQUIPMENT BY TYPE LOGISTICS AND SUPPORT 16 AOE 2 Supply AKEH 14 Lewis and Clark

Expeditionary Fast Transport (PM8) EQUIPMENT BY TYPE LOGISTICS AND SUPPORT 14 AP 2 Guam EPF 12 Spearhead

Dry Cargo and Tankers EQUIPMENT BY TYPE LOGISTICS AND SUPPORT 7 AK 3 (long-term chartered, of which 1 MV Maersk Valencia; 1 Sea Eagle; 1 SLNC Corsica) AOT 4 (long-term chartered, of which 2 Empire State; 1 SLNC Pax; 1 SLNC Goodwill)

US Maritime Administration (MARAD) National Defense Reserve Fleet EQUIPMENT BY TYPE LOGISTICS AND SUPPORT 25 AGOS 2 General Rudder AGM 2: 1 Pacific Collector; 1 Pacific Tracker AK 11: 2 Cape Ann (breakbulk); 1 Cape Chalmers (breakbulk); 2 Cape Farewell; 1 Cape Fear; 2 Cape Jacob; 1 Cape Nome (breakbulk); 1 Del Monte (breakbulk); 1 Savannah AOT 4: 1 Lawrence H. Gianella; 3 Paul Buck AP 4: 1 Empire State VI; 1 Golden Bear; 1 Kennedy; 1 State of Maine AX 2: 1 Freedom Star; 1 Kings Pointer

Ready Reserve Force

Ships at readiness up to a maximum of 30 days EQUIPMENT BY TYPE LOGISTICS AND SUPPORT 42 ACS 6: 2 Flickertail State; 1 Gopher State; 3 Keystone State AK 2 Wright (breakbulk) AKR 33: 1 Adm W.M. Callaghan; 4 Algol; 4 Cape Capella; 1 Cape Decision; 4 Cape Ducato; 1 Cape Edmont; 1 Cape Henry; 2 Cape Hudson; 2 Cape Knox; 4 Cape Island; 1 Cape Orlando; 1 Cape Race; 1 Cape Trinity; 2 Cape Trinity; 2 Cape Victory; 2 Cape Washington AOT 1 Petersburg

Sealift (PM5)

Naval Aviation 98,600

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE LOGISTICS AND SUPPORT 25

10 air wg. Average air wing comprises 8 sqns: 4 with F/A18; 1 with MH-60R; 1 with EA-18G; 1 with E-2C/D; 1 with MH-60S

(At a minimum of 4 days’ readiness)

North America

THE MILITARY BALANCE 2022

FORCES BY ROLE FIGHTER/GROUND ATTACK 22 sqn with F/A-18E Super Hornet 10 sqn with F/A-18F Super Hornet 1 sqn with F-35C Lightning II 1 sqn (forming) with F-35C Lightning II ANTI-SUBMARINE WARFARE 12 sqn with MH-60R Seahawk 3 ASW/ISR sqn with MH-60R Seahawk; MQ-8B Fire Scout ELINT 1 sqn with EP-3E Aries II ELINT/ELECTRONIC WARFARE 13 sqn with EA-18G Growler MARITIME PATROL 12 sqn with P-8A Poseidon 1 (special projects) sqn with P-8A Poseidon AIRBORNE EARLY WARNING & CONTROL 4 sqn with E-2C Hawkeye 5 sqn with E-2D Hawkeye COMMAND & CONTROL 2 sqn with E-6B Mercury MINE COUNTERMEASURES 2 sqn with MH-53E Sea Dragon TRANSPORT 2 sqn with CMV-22B Osprey (forming) 2 sqn with C-2A Greyhound TRAINING 1 (FRS) sqn with EA-18G Growler 1 (FRS) sqn with C-2A Greyhound; E-2C/D Hawkeye; TE2C Hawkeye 1 sqn with E-6B Mercury 2 (FRS) sqn with F/A-18E/F Super Hornet 1 (FRS) sqn with F-35C Lightning II 1 (FRS) sqn with MH-53 Sea Dragon 2 (FRS) sqn with MH-60S Knight Hawk; HH-60H Seahawk 2 (FRS) sqn with MH-60R Seahawk 1 (FRS) sqn with P-3C Orion; P-8A Poseidon 6 sqn with T-6A/B Texan II 2 sqn with T-44C Pegasus 5 sqn with T-45C Goshawk 3 hel sqn with TH-57B/C Sea Ranger 1 (FRS) UAV sqn with MQ-8B Fire Scout; MQ-8C Fire Scout TRANSPORT HELICOPTER 13 sqn with MH-60S Knight Hawk 2 tpt hel/ISR sqn with MH-60S Knight Hawk; MQ-8B Fire Scout; MQ-8C Fire Scout ISR UAV 1 sqn with MQ-4C Triton EQUIPMENT BY TYPE AIRCRAFT 954 combat capable FGA 672: 10 F-16A Fighting Falcon; 4 F-16B Fighting Falcon; 35 F-35C Lightning II; 5 F/A-18B Hornet; 16 F/A-18C Hornet; 4 F/A-18D Hornet; 319 F/A-18E Super Hornet; 279 F/A-18F Super Hornet ASW 124: 14 P-3C Orion; 110 P-8A Poseidon EW 158 EA-18G Growler* ELINT 9 EP-3E Aries II AEW&C 74: 26 E-2C Hawkeye; 48 E-2D Hawkeye C2 16 E-6B Mercury

TKR/TPT 3: 1 KC-130R Hercules; 1 KC-130T Hercules; 1 KC-130J Hercules TPT • Light 54: 4 Beech A200 King Air (C-12C Huron); 6 Beech A200 King Air (UC-12F Huron); 8 Beech A200 King Air (UC-12M Huron); 27 C-2A Greyhound; 2 DHC2 Beaver (U-6A); 7 SA-227-BC Metro III (C-26D) TRG 577: 44 T-6A Texan II; 231 T-6B Texan II; 7 T-38C Talon; 55 T-44C Pegasus; 238 T-45C Goshawk; 2 TE-2C Hawkeye TILTROTOR • TPT 15 CMV-22B Osprey HELICOPTERS ASW 271 MH-60R Seahawk MRH 258 MH-60S Knight Hawk (Multi Mission Support) MCM 28 MH-53E Sea Dragon ISR 3 OH-58C Kiowa TPT 13: Heavy 2 CH-53E Sea Stallion; Medium 3 UH60L Black Hawk; Light 8: 5 UH-72A Lakota; 2 UH-1N Iroquois; 1 UH-1Y Venom TRG 134: 43 TH-57B Sea Ranger; 76 TH-57C Sea Ranger; 15 TH-73A UNINHABITED AERIAL VEHICLES • ISR 113 Heavy 63: 5 MQ-4C Triton; 20 MQ-8B Fire Scout; 34 MQ-8C Fire Scout; 4 RQ-4A Global Hawk (evaluation and trials); Medium 35 RQ-2B Pioneer; Light 15 RQ21A Blackjack AIR-LAUNCHED MISSILES AAM • IR AIM-9M Sidewinder; IIR AIM-9X Sidewinder II; SARH AIM-7 Sparrow (being withdrawn); ARH AIM-120C-5/C-7/D AMRAAM ASM AGM-65F Maverick; AGM-114B/K/M Hellfire; APKWS AShM AGM-84D Harpoon; AGM-119A Penguin 3; AGM-158C LRASM ARM AGM-88B/C/E HARM/AARGM ALCM • Conventional AGM-84E/H/K SLAM/SLAMER BOMBS Laser-guided: GBU-10/12/16 Paveway II; GBU-24 Paveway III INS/GPS guided: GBU-31/32/38 JDAM; Enhanced Paveway II; GBU-54 Laser JDAM; AGM-154A/C/C-1 JSOW

Naval Aviation Reserve FORCES BY ROLE FIGHTER/GROUND ATTACK 1 sqn with F/A-18E/F Super Hornet ANTI-SUBMARINE WARFARE 1 sqn with MH-60R Seahawk ELECTRONIC WARFARE 1 sqn with EA-18G Growler MARITIME PATROL 2 sqn with P-3C Orion TRANSPORT 6 log spt sqn with B-737-700 (C-40A Clipper) 1 log spt sqn with Gulfstream V/G550 (C-37A/B) 5 sqn with C-130T/KC-130T Hercules TRAINING 2 (aggressor) sqn with F-5F/N Tiger II 1 (aggressor) sqn with F/A-18C/D Hornet

TRANSPORT HELICOPTER 1 sqn with MH-60S Knight Hawk EQUIPMENT BY TYPE AIRCRAFT 67 combat capable FTR 31: 2 F-5F Tiger II; 29 F-5N Tiger II FGA 24: 10 F/A-18C Hornet; 2 F/A-18D Hornet; 10 F/A-18E Super Hornet; 2 F/A-18F Super Hornet ASW 7 P-3C Orion EW 5 EA-18G Growler* TKR/TPT 11 KC-130T Hercules TPT 40: Medium 19 C-130T Hercules; PAX 21: 17 B-737-700 (C-40A Clipper); 1 Gulfstream V (C-37A); 3 Gulfstream G550 (C-37B) HELICOPTERS ASW 5 MH-60R Seahawk MRH 12 MH-60S Knight Hawk MCM 6 MH-53E Sea Dragon

US Marine Corps 179,250 3 Marine Expeditionary Forces (MEF), 3 Marine Expeditionary Brigades (MEB), 7 Marine Expeditionary Units (MEU) drawn from 3 div. An MEU usually consists of a battalion landing team (1 SF coy, 1 lt armd recce coy, 1 recce pl, 1 armd pl, 1 amph aslt pl, 1 inf bn, 1 arty bty, 1 cbt engr pl), an aviation combat element (1 medium-lift sqn with attached atk hel, FGA ac and AD assets) and a composite log bn, with a combined total of about 2,200 personnel. Composition varies with mission requirements FORCES BY ROLE SPECIAL FORCES (see USSOCOM) MANOEUVRE Reconnaissance 3 (MEF) recce coy Amphibious 1 (1st) mne div (2 armd recce bn, 1 recce bn, 3 mne regt (4 mne bn), 1 amph aslt bn, 1 arty regt (3 arty bn, 1 MRL bn), 1 cbt engr bn, 1 EW bn, 1 int bn, 1 sigs bn) 1 (2nd) mne div (1 armd recce bn, 1 recce bn, 3 mne regt (3 mne bn), 1 amph aslt bn, 1 arty regt (2 arty bn), 1 cbt engr bn, 1 EW bn, 1 int bn, 1 sigs bn) 1 (3rd) mne div (1 recce bn, 1 inf regt (3 inf bn), 1 arty regt (2 arty bn), 1 cbt spt bn (1 armd recce coy, 1 amph aslt coy, 1 cbt engr coy), 1 EW bn, 1 int bn, 1 sigs bn) COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT 3 log gp EQUIPMENT BY TYPE ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES IFV 488 LAV-25 APC • APC (W) 207 LAV variants (66 CP; 127 log; 14 EW) AAV 1,254: 1,200 AAV-7A1 (all roles); 54 ACV (in test) AUV 6,129+: 1,725 Cougar; 3,700+ JLTV; 704 M-ATV ENGINEERING & MAINTENANCE VEHICLES AEV 42 M1 ABV ARV 105: 60 AAVRA1; 45 LAV-R MW 38 Buffalo; some Husky 2G VLB ε30 M60 AVLB ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE MSL SP 106 LAV-AT

MANPATS FGM-148 Javelin; FGM-172B SRAW-MPV; TOW ARTILLERY 1,459 TOWED 812: 105mm: 331 M101A1; 155mm 481 M777A2 MRL 227mm 47 M142 HIMARS MOR 600: 81mm 535 M252; SP 81mm 65 LAV-M; 120mm (49 EFSS in store for trg) UNINHABITED AERIAL VEHICLES ISR • Light 100 BQM-147 Exdrone AIR DEFENCE • SAM • Point-defence FIM-92 Stinger

Marine Corps Aviation 34,700 3 active Marine Aircraft Wings (MAW) and 1 MCR MAW FORCES BY ROLE FIGHTER 1 sqn with F/A-18A++/C/C+ Hornet 3 sqn with F/A-18C Hornet 2 sqn with F/A-18D Hornet FIGHTER/GROUND ATTACK 4 sqn with AV-8B Harrier II 5 sqn with F-35B Lightning II 1 sqn with F-35C Lightning II COMBAT SEARCH & RESCUE/TRANSPORT 1 sqn with Beech A200/B200 King Air (UC-12F/M Huron); Beech 350 King Air (UC-12W Huron); Cessna 560 Citation Ultra/Encore (UC-35C/D); Gulfstream IV (C-20G) TANKER 3 sqn with KC-130J Hercules TRANSPORT 16 sqn with MV-22B Osprey TRAINING 1 sqn with F/A-18C/D Hornet 2 sqn with F-35B Lightning II 1 sqn with MV-22B Osprey 1 hel sqn with AH-1Z Viper; UH-1Y Venom 1 hel sqn with CH-53E Sea Stallion ATTACK HELICOPTER 7 sqn with AH-1Z Viper; UH-1Y Venom TRANSPORT HELICOPTER 8 sqn with CH-53E Sea Stallion 1 (VIP) sqn with MV-22B Osprey; VH-3D Sea King; VH-60N White Hawk CISR UAV 1 sqn with MQ-9A Reaper ISR UAV 2 sqn with RQ-21A Blackjack AIR DEFENCE 2 bn with M1097 Avenger; FIM-92 Stinger EQUIPMENT BY TYPE AIRCRAFT 366 combat capable FGA 366: 112 F-35B Lightning II; 15 F-35C Lightning II; 10 F/A-18A++ Hornet; 70 F/A-18C Hornet; 1 F/A-18C+ Hornet; 50 F/A-18D Hornet; 95 AV-8B Harrier II; 13 TAV8B Harrier TKR/TPT 44 KC-130J Hercules TPT 17: Light 16: 5 Beech A200/B200 King Air (UC12F/M Huron); 5 Beech 350 King Air (C-12W Huron); 6 Cessna 560 Citation Encore (UC-35D); PAX 1 Gulfstream IV (C-20G)

North America

THE MILITARY BALANCE 2022

TRG 3 T-34C Turbo Mentor TILTROTOR • TPT 309 MV-22B Osprey HELICOPTERS ATK 131 AH-1Z Viper TPT 291: Heavy 140: 136 CH-53E Sea Stallion; 4 CH53K King Stallion (in test); Medium 23: 11 VH-3D Sea King (VIP tpt); 8 VH-60N White Hawk (VIP tpt); 4 VH92A (in test); Light 128 UH-1Y Venom UNINHABITED AERIAL VEHICLES CISR • Heavy 2 MQ-9A Reaper ISR • Light 80 RQ-21A Blackjack AIR DEFENCE SAM • Point-defence FIM-92 Stinger; M1097 Avenger AIR-LAUNCHED MISSILES AAM • IR AIM-9M Sidewinder; IIR AIM-9X Sidewinder II; SARH AIM-7P Sparrow; ARH AIM120C AMRAAM ASM AGM-65E/F IR Maverick; AGM-114 Hellfire; AGM-176 Griffin; APKWS AShM AGM-84D Harpoon ARM AGM-88 HARM LACM AGM-84E/H/K SLAM/SLAM-ER BOMBS Laser-guided GBU-10/-12/-16 Paveway II INS/GPS guided GBU-31 JDAM; AGM-154A/C/C-1 JSOW

Reserve Organisations Marine Corps Reserve 35,850 FORCES BY ROLE MANOEUVRE Reconnaissance 2 MEF recce coy Amphibious 1 (4th) mne div (1 armd recce bn, 1 recce bn, 2 mne regt (3 mne bn), 1 amph aslt bn, 1 arty regt (2 arty bn, 1 MRL bn), 1 cbt engr bn, 1 int bn, 1 sigs bn) COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT 1 log gp

Marine Corps Aviation Reserve 12,000 reservists FORCES BY ROLE FIGHTER 1 sqn with F/A-18A++/C+ Hornet TANKER 2 sqn with KC-130J Hercules TRANSPORT 2 sqn with MV-22B Osprey TRAINING 1 sqn with F-5F/N Tiger II ATTACK HELICOPTER 2 sqn with AH-1Z Viper; UH-1Y Venom TRANSPORT HELICOPTER 1 sqn with CH-53E Sea Stallion ISR UAV 1 sqn with RQ-21A Blackjack EQUIPMENT BY TYPE AIRCRAFT 33 combat capable FTR 12: 1 F-5F Tiger II; 11 F-5N Tiger II FGA 21: 15 F/A-18A++ Hornet; 6 F/A-18C+ Hornet

TKR/TPT 14 KC-130J Hercules TPT • Light 8: 2 Beech 350 King Air (UC-12W Huron); 2 Cessna 560 Citation Ultra (UC-35C); 4 Cessna 560 Citation Encore (UC-35D) TILTROTOR • TPT 24 MV-22B Osprey HELICOPTERS ATK 12 AH-1Z Viper TPT 30: Heavy 8 CH-53E Sea Stallion; Light 22 UH1Y Venom UNINHABITED AERIAL VEHICLES ISR • Light 20 RQ-21A Blackjack

Marine Stand-by Reserve 700 reservists

Trained individuals available for mobilisation

US Coast Guard 41,650

9 districts (4 Pacific, 5 Atlantic) EQUIPMENT BY TYPE PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 343 PSOH 23: 1 Alex Haley; 13 Famous; 9 Legend with 1 Mk 15 Phalanx Block 1B CIWS, 1 57mm gun (capacity 2 MH-65 hel) PCO 59: 14 Reliance (with 1 hel landing platform); 45 Sentinel (Damen 4708) PCC 17 Island PBF 174 Response Boat-Medium (RB-M) PBI 70 Marine Protector LOGISTICS AND SUPPORT 65 ABU 52: 16 Juniper; 4 WLI; 14 Keeper; 18 WLR AGB 12: 9 Bay; 1 Mackinaw; 1 Healy; 1 Polar (1 Polar in reserve) AXS 1 Eagle

US Coast Guard Aviation EQUIPMENT BY TYPE AIRCRAFT SAR 42: 11 HC-130H Hercules; 13 HC-130J Hercules; 10 HC-144A; 8 HC-144B TPT 16: Medium 14 C-27J Spartan; PAX 2 Gulfstream V (C-37A) HELICOPTERS SAR 146: 44 MH-60T Jayhawk; 102 AS366G1 (MH65C/D) Dauphin II

US Air Force (USAF) 329,400

Almost the entire USAF (plus active-force ANG and AFR) is divided into 10 Aerospace Expeditionary Forces (AEF), each on call for 120 days every 20 months. At least 2 of the 10 AEFs are on call at any one time, each with 10,000–15,000 personnel, 90 multi-role ftr and bbr ac, 31 intra-theatre refuelling aircraft and 13 aircraft for ISR and EW missions

Global Strike Command (GSC)

2 active air forces (8th & 20th); 8 wg

FORCES BY ROLE SURFACE-TO-SURFACE MISSILE 9 ICBM sqn with LGM-30G Minuteman III BOMBER 4 sqn with B-1B Lancer 2 sqn with B-2A Spirit 5 sqn (incl 1 trg) with B-52H Stratofortress

COMMAND & CONTROL 1 sqn with E-4B TRANSPORT HELICOPTER 3 sqn with UH-1N Iroquois

Air Combat Command (ACC) 2 active air forces (9th & 12th); 12 wg. ACC numbered air forces provide the air component to CENTCOM, SOUTHCOM and NORTHCOM FORCES BY ROLE FIGHTER 3 sqn with F-22A Raptor FIGHTER/GROUND ATTACK 4 sqn with F-15E Strike Eagle 3 sqn with F-16C/D Fighting Falcon (+6 sqn personnel only) 3 sqn with F-35A Lightning II GROUND ATTACK 3 sqn with A-10C Thunderbolt II (+1 sqn personnel only) ELECTRONIC WARFARE 1 sqn with EA-18G Growler (personnel only – USN aircraft) 2 sqn with EC-130H Compass Call ISR 2 sqn with E-8C J-STARS (personnel only) 5 sqn with OC-135/RC-135/WC-135 2 sqn with U-2S AIRBORNE EARLY WARNING & CONTROL 5 sqn with E-3 Sentry COMBAT SEARCH & RESCUE 2 sqn with HC-130J Combat King II 1 sqn with HH-60G Pave Hawk 1 sqn with HH-60W Jolly Green II (forming) TRAINING 1 sqn with A-10C Thunderbolt II 1 sqn with E-3 Sentry 2 sqn with F-15E Strike Eagle 1 sqn with F-22A Raptor 1 sqn with RQ-4A Global Hawk; TU-2S 1 UAV sqn with MQ-9A Reaper COMBAT/ISR UAV 9 sqn with MQ-9A Reaper ISR UAV 2 sqn with RQ-4B Global Hawk 2 sqn with RQ-170 Sentinel 1 sqn with RQ-180

Pacific Air Forces (PACAF) Provides the air component of PACOM, and commands air units based in Alaska, Hawaii, Japan and South Korea. 3 active air forces (5th, 7th, & 11th); 8 wg FORCES BY ROLE FIGHTER 2 sqn with F-15C/D Eagle 2 sqn with F-22A Raptor (+1 sqn personnel only) FIGHTER/GROUND ATTACK 5 sqn with F-16C/D Fighting Falcon 2 sqn with F-35A Lightning II

GROUND ATTACK 1 sqn with A-10C Thunderbolt II AIRBORNE EARLY WARNING & CONTROL 2 sqn with E-3 Sentry COMBAT SEARCH & RESCUE 1 sqn with HH-60G Pave Hawk TANKER 1 sqn with KC-135R (+1 sqn personnel only) TRANSPORT 1 sqn with B-737-200 (C-40B); Gulfstream V (C-37A) 1 sqn with C-17A Globemaster (+1 sqn personnel only) 1 sqn with C-130J-30 Hercules 1 sqn with Beech 1900C (C-12J); UH-1N Huey TRAINING 1 (aggressor) sqn with F-16C/D Fighting Falcon

United States Air Forces in Europe - Air Forces in Africa (USAFE-AFAFRICA) Provides the air component to both EUCOM and AFRICOM. 1 active air force (3rd); 5 wg FORCES BY ROLE FIGHTER 1 sqn with F-15C/D Eagle FIGHTER/GROUND ATTACK 2 sqn with F-15E Strike Eagle 3 sqn with F-16C/D Fighting Falcon 1 sqn with F-35A Lightning II (forming) COMBAT SEARCH & RESCUE 1 sqn with HH-60G Pave Hawk TANKER 1 sqn with KC-135R Stratotanker TRANSPORT 1 sqn with C-130J-30 Hercules 2 sqn with Gulfstream V (C-37A); Learjet 35A (C-21A); B-737-700 (C-40B)

Air Mobility Command (AMC) Provides strategic and tactical airlift, air-to-air refuelling and aeromedical evacuation. 1 active air force (18th); 12 wg and 1 gp FORCES BY ROLE TANKER 3 sqn with KC-10A Extender 1 sqn with KC-46A Pegasus 1 sqn with KC-46A Pegasus (forming) 8 sqn with KC-135R/T Stratotanker (+2 sqn with personnel only) TRANSPORT 1 VIP sqn with B-737-200 (C-40B); B-757-200 (C-32A) 1 VIP sqn with Gulfstream V (C-37A); Gulfstream 550 (C-37B) 1 VIP sqn with VC-25 Air Force One 2 sqn with C-5M Super Galaxy 8 sqn with C-17A Globemaster III (+1 sqn personnel only) 5 sqn with C-130J-30 Hercules (+1 sqn personnel only) 1 sqn with Learjet 35A (C-21A)

North America

THE MILITARY BALANCE 2022

Air Education and Training Command

1 active air force (2nd), 10 active air wg and 1 gp FORCES BY ROLE TRAINING 1 sqn with C-17A Globemaster III 1 sqn with C-130J-30 Hercules 4 sqn with F-16C/D Fighting Falcon 5 sqn with F-35A Lightning II 1 sqn with KC-46A Pegasus 1 sqn with KC-135R Stratotanker 5 (flying trg) sqn with T-1A Jayhawk 10 (flying trg) sqn with T-6A Texan II 10 (flying trg) sqn with T-38C Talon 5 UAV sqn with MQ-9A Reaper EQUIPMENT BY TYPE SURFACE-TO-SURFACE MISSILE LAUNCHERS ICBM • Nuclear 400 LGM-30G Minuteman III (1 Mk12A or Mk21 re-entry veh per missile) AIRCRAFT 1,574 combat capable BBR 123: 45 B-1B Lancer; 20 B-2A Spirit; 58 B-52H Stratofortress (46 nuclear capable) FTR 261: 86 F-15C Eagle; 10 F-15D Eagle; 165 F-22A Raptor FGA 1,055: 218 F-15E Strike Eagle; 2 F-15EX Eagle II; 439 F-16C Fighting Falcon; 111 F-16D Fighting Falcon; 285 F-35A Lightning II ATK 135 A-10C Thunderbolt II CSAR 16 HC-130J Combat King II EW 13 EC-130H Compass Call ISR 38: 2 E-9A; 4 E-11A; 26 U-2S; 4 TU-2S; 2 WC-135 Constant Phoenix ELINT 22: 8 RC-135V Rivet Joint; 9 RC-135W Rivet Joint; 3 RC-135S Cobra Ball; 2 RC-135U Combat Sent AEW&C 31: 7 E-3B Sentry; 1 E-3C Sentry; 23 E-3G Sentry C2 4 E-4B TKR 156: 126 KC-135R Stratotanker; 30 KC-135T Stratotanker TKR/TPT 82: 51 KC-10A Extender; 31 KC-46A Pegasus TPT 333: Heavy 182: 36 C-5M Super Galaxy; 146 C-17A Globemaster III; Medium 105 C-130J/J-30 Hercules; Light 23: 4 Beech 1900C (C-12J); 19 Learjet 35A (C-21A); PAX 23: 4 B-737-700 (C-40B); 4 B-757-200 (C-32A); 9 Gulfstream V (C-37A); 4 Gulfstream 550 (C-37B); 2 VC-25A Air Force One TRG 1,126: 178 T-1A Jayhawk; 443 T-6A Texan II; 505 T-38A/C Talon HELICOPTERS CSAR 82: 74 HH-60G Pave Hawk; 8 HH-60W Jolly Green II TPT • Light 62 UH-1N Huey UNINHABITED AERIAL VEHICLES 261 CISR • Heavy 210 MQ-9A Reaper ISR • Heavy 47: 30 RQ-4B Global Hawk; ε10 RQ-170 Sentinel; ε7 RQ-180 AIR DEFENCE SAM • Point-defence FIM-92 Stinger AIR-LAUNCHED MISSILES AAM • IR AIM-9M Sidewinder; IIR AIM-9X Sidewinder II; SARH AIM-7M Sparrow; ARH AIM-120C/D AMRAAM ASM AGM-65D/G Maverick; AGM-114K/M/N/R Hellfire II; AGM-130A; AGM-176 Griffin; APKWS

AShM AGM-158C LRASM ALCM Nuclear AGM-86B (ALCM) Conventional AGM-158A JASSM; AGM-158B JASSMER ARM AGM-88B/C HARM EW MALD/MALD-J BOMBS Laser-guided GBU 10/12/16 Paveway II, GBU-24 Paveway III; GBU-28 INS/GPS guided GBU 31/32/38 JDAM; GBU-54 Laser JDAM; GBU-15 (with BLU-109 penetrating warhead or Mk84); GBU-39B Small Diameter Bomb (250lb); GBU43B MOAB; GBU-53/B Stormbreaker; GBU-57A/B MOP; Enhanced Paveway III

Reserve Organisations Air National Guard 108,150 reservists FORCES BY ROLE BOMBER 1 sqn with B-2A Spirit (personnel only) FIGHTER 5 sqn with F-15C/D Eagle 1 sqn with F-22A Raptor (+1 sqn personnel only) FIGHTER/GROUND ATTACK 10 sqn with F-16C/D Fighting Falcon 1 sqn with F-35A Lightning II GROUND ATTACK 4 sqn with A-10C Thunderbolt II ISR 1 sqn with E-8C J-STARS COMBAT SEARCH & RESCUE 3 sqn with HC-130J Combat King II 3 sqn with HH-60G Pave Hawk TANKER 1 sqn with KC-46A Pegasus 16 sqn with KC-135R Stratotanker (+1 sqn personnel only) 3 sqn with KC-135T Stratotanker TRANSPORT 1 sqn with B-737-700 (C-40C) 6 sqn with C-17A Globemaster (+2 sqn personnel only) 10 sqn with C-130H Hercules 1 sqn with C-130H/LC-130H Hercules 4 sqn with C-130J-30 Hercules TRAINING 1 sqn with C-130H Hercules 1 sqn with F-15C/D Eagle 4 sqn with F-16C/D Fighting Falcon 1 sqn with MQ-9A Reaper COMBAT/ISR UAV 10 sqn with MQ-9A Reaper EQUIPMENT BY TYPE AIRCRAFT 597 combat capable FTR 157: 123 F-15C Eagle; 14 F-15D Eagle; 20 F-22A Raptor FGA 355: 289 F-16C Fighting Falcon; 46 F-16D Fighting Falcon; 20 F-35A Lightning II ATK 85 A-10C Thunderbolt II CSAR 12 HC-130J Combat King II ISR 13 E-8C J-STARS

ELINT 11 RC-26B Metroliner TKR 164: 140 KC-135R Stratotanker; 24 KC-135T Stratotanker TKR/TPT 12 KC-46A Pegasus TPT 194: Heavy 50 C-17A Globemaster III; Medium 141: 99 C-130H Hercules; 32 C-130J/J-30 Hercules; 10 LC130H Hercules; PAX 3 B-737-700 (C-40C) HELICOPTERS • CSAR 18 HH-60G Pave Hawk UNINHABITED AERIAL VEHICLES • CISR • Heavy 24 MQ-9A Reaper

Air Force Reserve Command 70,450 reservists FORCES BY ROLE BOMBER 1 sqn with B-52H Stratofortress (personnel only) FIGHTER 2 sqn with F-22A Raptor (personnel only) FIGHTER/GROUND ATTACK 2 sqn with F-16C/D Fighting Falcon (+1 sqn personnel only) 1 sqn with F-35A Lightning II (personnel only) GROUND ATTACK 1 sqn with A-10C Thunderbolt II (+2 sqn personnel only) ISR 1 (Weather Recce) sqn with WC-130J Hercules AIRBORNE EARLY WARNING & CONTROL 1 sqn with E-3 Sentry (personnel only) COMBAT SEARCH & RESCUE 1 sqn with HC-130J Combat King II 2 sqn with HH-60G Pave Hawk TANKER 4 sqn with KC-10A Extender (personnel only) 1 sqn with KC-46A Pegasus 1 sqn with KC-46A Pegasus (personnel only) 6 sqn with KC-135R Stratotanker (+2 sqn personnel only) TRANSPORT 1 (VIP) sqn with B-737-700 (C-40C) 2 sqn with C-5M Super Galaxy (+2 sqn personnel only) 3 sqn with C-17A Globemaster (+9 sqn personnel only) 6 sqn with C-130H Hercules 1 sqn with C-130J-30 Hercules 1 (Aerial Spray) sqn with C-130H Hercules TRAINING 1 (aggressor) sqn with A-10C Thunderbolt II; F-15C/E Eagle; F-16 Fighting Falcon; F-22A Raptor (personnel only) 1 sqn with A-10C Thunderbolt II 1 sqn with B-52H Stratofortress 1 sqn with C-5M Super Galaxy 1 sqn with F-16C/D Fighting Falcon 5 (flying training) sqn with T-1A Jayhawk; T-6A Texan II; T-38C Talon (personnel only) COMBAT/ISR UAV 2 sqn with MQ-9A Reaper (personnel only) ISR UAV 1 sqn with RQ-4B Global Hawk (personnel only) EQUIPMENT BY TYPE AIRCRAFT 133 combat capable BBR 18 B-52H Stratofortress

FGA 54: 52 F-16C Fighting Falcon; 2 F-16D Fighting Falcon ATK 61 A-10C Thunderbolt II CSAR 4 HC-130J Combat King II ISR 10 WC-130J Hercules (Weather Recce) TKR 62 KC-135R Stratotanker TKR/TPT 7 KC-46A Pegasus TPT 98: Heavy 42: 16 C-5M Super Galaxy; 26 C-17A Globemaster III; Medium 52: 42 C-130H Hercules; 10 C-130J-30 Hercules; PAX 4 B-737-700 (C-40C) HELICOPTERS • CSAR 16 HH-60G Pave Hawk

Civil Reserve Air Fleet

Commercial ac numbers fluctuate AIRCRAFT • TPT 517 international (391 long-range and 126 short-range); 36 national

Air Force Stand-by Reserve 16,850 reservists

Trained individuals for mobilisation

US Space Force 6,400

New service established December 2019, currently in the process of being stood up. Tasked with organising, training and equipping forces to protect US and allied space interests and to provide space capabilities to the joint Combatant Commands EQUIPMENT BY TYPE SATELLITES see Space COUNTERSPACE see Space RADAR see Strategic Defenses – Early Warning

US Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) 65,800 Commands all active, reserve and National Guard Special Operations Forces (SOF) of all services based in CONUS

Joint Special Operations Command Reported to comprise elite US SOF, including Special Forces Operations Detachment Delta (‘Delta Force’), SEAL Team 6 and integral USAF support

US Army Special Operations Command 35,000 FORCES BY ROLE SPECIAL FORCES 5 SF gp (4 SF bn, 1 spt bn) 1 ranger regt (3 ranger bn; 1 cbt spt bn) COMBAT SUPPORT 1 civil affairs bde (5 civil affairs bn) 1 psyops gp (3 psyops bn) 1 psyops gp (4 psyops bn) COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT 1 (sustainment) log bde (1 sigs bn) HELICOPTER 1 (160th SOAR) hel regt (4 hel bn) EQUIPMENT BY TYPE ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES APC • APC (W) 28: 16 M1126 Stryker ICV; 12 Pandur AUV 640 M-ATV ARTILLERY 20 MOR • 120mm 20 XM905 EMTAS

North America

THE MILITARY BALANCE 2022

AIRCRAFT TPT 12: Medium 7 C-27J Spartan (parachute training); Light 5 C-212 (parachute training) HELICOPTERS MRH 51 AH-6M/MH-6M Little Bird TPT 140: Heavy 67 MH-47G Chinook; Medium 73 MH60M Black Hawk UNINHABITED AERIAL VEHICLES CISR • Heavy 24 MQ-1C Gray Eagle ISR • Light 29: 15 XPV-1 Tern; 14 XPV-2 Mako TPT • Heavy 28 CQ-10 Snowgoose

Reserve Organisations Army National Guard FORCES BY ROLE SPECIAL FORCES 2 SF gp (3 SF bn)

Army Reserve FORCES BY ROLE COMBAT SUPPORT 2 psyops gp 4 civil affairs comd HQ 8 civil affairs bde HQ 32 civil affairs bn (coy)

US Navy Special Warfare Command 10,500 FORCES BY ROLE SPECIAL FORCES 8 SEAL team (total: 48 SF pl) 2 SEAL Delivery Vehicle team

Reserve Organisations Naval Reserve Force FORCES BY ROLE SPECIAL FORCES 8 SEAL det 10 Naval Special Warfare det 2 Special Boat sqn 2 Special Boat unit 1 SEAL Delivery Vehicle det

US Marine Special Operations Command (MARSOC) 3,500 FORCES BY ROLE SPECIAL FORCES 1 SF regt (3 SF bn) COMBAT SUPPORT 1 int bn COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT 1 spt gp

Air Force Special Operations Command (AFSOC) 16,800 FORCES BY ROLE GROUND ATTACK 2 sqn with AC-130J Ghostrider 1 sqn with AC-130W Stinger II TRANSPORT 4 sqn with CV-22B Osprey

1 sqn with Do-328 (C-146A) 1 sqn with MC-130H Combat Talon 3 sqn with MC-130J Commando II 3 sqn with PC-12 (U-28A) TRAINING 1 sqn with M-28 Skytruck (C-145A) 1 sqn with CV-22A/B Osprey 1 sqn with HC-130J Combat King II; MC-130J Commando II 1 sqn with Bell 205 (TH-1H Iroquois) 1 sqn with HH-60G Pave Hawk; UH-1N Huey COMBAT/ISR UAV 3 sqn with MQ-9 Reaper EQUIPMENT BY TYPE AIRCRAFT 33 combat capable ATK 33: 23 AC-130J Ghostrider; 10 AC-130W Stinger II ISR 22 MC-12 Javaman CSAR 3 HC-130J Combat King II TPT 114: Medium 54: 13 MC-130H Combat Talon II; 41 MC-130J Commando II; Light 60: 20 Do-328 (C-146A); 5 M-28 Skytruck (C-145A); 35 PC-12 (U-28A) TILT-ROTOR 51 CV-22A/B Osprey HELICOPTERS CSAR 3 HH-60G Pave Hawk TPT • Light 34: 28 Bell 205 (TH-1H Iroquois); 6 UH-1N Huey UNINHABITED AERIAL VEHICLES • CISR • Heavy 50 MQ-9 Reaper

Reserve Organisations Air National Guard FORCES BY ROLE ELECTRONIC WARFARE 1 sqn with C-130J Hercules/EC-130J Commando Solo ISR 1 sqn with MC-12W Liberty TRANSPORT 1 flt with B-737-200 (C-32B) EQUIPMENT BY TYPE AIRCRAFT EW 7 EC-130J Commando Solo ISR 13 MC-12W Liberty TPT 5: Medium 3 C-130J Hercules; PAX 2 B-757-200 (C-32B)

Air Force Reserve FORCES BY ROLE TRAINING 1 sqn with AC-130J Ghostrider (personnel only) 1 sqn with M-28 Skytruck (C-145A) (personnel only) COMBAT/ISR UAV 1 sqn with MQ-9 Reaper (personnel only)

DEPLOYMENT ARABIAN SEA: US Central Command • US Navy • 5th Fleet 1,100: 2 SSGN; 1 LPD; 1 LSD; Combined Maritime Forces • TF 53: 3 AKEH; 1 AOR ARUBA: US Southern Command • 1 Forward Operating Location

ASCENSION ISLAND: US Strategic Command • 1 detection and tracking radar at Ascension Auxiliary Air Field AUSTRALIA: US Pacific Command • 1,700; 1 SEWS at Pine Gap; 1 comms facility at Pine Gap; 1 SIGINT stn at Pine Gap; US Strategic Command • 1 detection and tracking radar at Naval Communication Station Harold E. Holt BAHRAIN: US Central Command • 4,700; 1 HQ (5th Fleet); 10 PCFG; 4 MCO; 1 ESB; 1 ASW sqn with 2 P-8A Poseidon; 1 EP-3E Aries II; 2 SAM bty with M902/M903 Patriot PAC-3/PAC-3 MSE BELGIUM: US European Command • 1,150 BRITISH INDIAN OCEAN TERRITORY: US Strategic Command • 300; 1 Spacetrack Optical Tracker at Diego Garcia; 1 ground-based electro-optical deep space surveillance system (GEODSS) at Diego Garcia US Pacific Command • 1 MPS sqn (MPS-2 with equipment for one MEB) at Diego Garcia with 2 AKRH; 3 AKR; 1 AKEH; 1 ESD; 1 naval air base at Diego Garcia, 1 support facility at Diego Garcia CANADA: US Northern Command • 140 CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC: UN • MINUSCA 8 COLOMBIA: US Southern Command • 70 CUBA: US Southern Command • 650 (JTF-GTMO) at Guantanamo Bay CURACAO: US Southern Command • 1 Forward Operating Location DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO: UN • MONUSCO 3 DJIBOUTI: US Africa Command • 4,000; 1 tpt sqn with C-130H/J-30 Hercules; 1 tpt sqn with 6 MV-22B Osprey; 2 KC-130J Hercules; 1 spec ops sqn with MC-130H/J; PC-12 (U-28A); 1 CSAR sqn with HH-60G Pave Hawk; 1 CISR UAV sqn with MQ-9A Reaper; 1 naval air base EGYPT: MFO 452; elm 1 ARNG recce bn; 1 ARNG spt bn EL SALVADOR: US Southern Command • 100; 1 ASW flt with 2 P-8A Poseidon; 1 Forward Operating Location (Military, DEA, USCG and Customs personnel) GERMANY: US Africa Command • 1 HQ at Stuttgart US European Command • 36,950; 1 Combined Service HQ (EUCOM) at Stuttgart–Vaihingen US Army 22,650 FORCES BY ROLE 1 HQ (US Army Europe & Africa (USAREUR-AF)) at Wiesbaden; 1 arty comd; 1 spec ops gp; 1 recce bn; 1 mech bde(-); 1 MRL bde (2 MRL bn); 1 fd arty bn; 1 (cbt avn) hel bde; 1 (cbt avn) hel bde HQ; 1 int bde; 1 MP bde; 1 sigs bde; 1 (MDTF) cbt spt bde(-); 1 spt bde; 1 SAM bn; 1 ARNG SAM bde(-); 2 (APS) armd bde eqpt set EQUIPMENT BY TYPE M1A2 SEPv2/v3 Abrams; M2A3/M3A3 Bradley; M1296 Stryker Dragoon, M109A6; M119A3; M777A2; M270A1; AH-64D/E Apache; CH-47F Chinook; UH-60M Black

Hawk; HH-60M Black Hawk; M902 Patriot PAC-3; M1097 Avenger; M-SHORAD US Navy 450 USAF 13,300 FORCES BY ROLE 1 HQ (US Air Forces in Europe and Africa) at Ramstein AB; 1 HQ (3rd Air Force) at Ramstein AB; 1 FGA wg at Spangdahlem AB with (1 FGA sqn with 24 F-16C/D Fighting Falcon); 1 tpt wg at Ramstein AB with 14 C-130J-30 Hercules; 2 Gulfstream V (C-37A); 5 Learjet 35A (C-21A); 1 B-737-700 (C-40B) USMC 550 GREECE: US European Command • 400; 1 EP-3E Aries II; 1 naval base at Makri; 1 naval base at Souda Bay; 1 air base at Iraklion GREENLAND (DNK): US Strategic Command • 150; 1 AN/ FPS-132 Upgraded Early Warning Radar and 1 Spacetrack Radar at Thule GUAM: US Pacific Command • 9,000; 4 SSGN; 1 MPS sqn (MPS-3 with equipment for one MEB) with 2 AKRH; 4 AKR; 1 ESD; 1 AKEH; 1 tkr sqn with 12 KC-135R Stratotanker; 1 tpt hel sqn with MH-60S; 1 ISR UAV unit with 2 MQ-4C Triton; 1 SAM bty with THAAD; 1 air base; 1 naval base HONDURAS: US Southern Command • 400; 1 avn bn with CH-47F Chinook; UH-60 Black Hawk ICELAND: US European Command • 100; 1 ASW flt with 2 P-8A Poseidon IRAQ: US Central Command • Operation Inherent Resolve 2,000; 1 ARNG inf bde(-); 1 EOD pl; 1 atk hel bn with AH64E Apache; 1 CISR UAV sqn with MQ-9A Reaper; NATO • NATO Mission Iraq 1 ISRAEL: US Strategic Command • 100; 1 AN/TPY-2 X-band radar at Mount Keren ITALY: US European Command • 12,900 US Army 4,100; 1 AB bde(-) US Navy 3,600; 1 HQ (US Naval Forces Europe-Africa (NAVEUR-NAVAF/6th Fleet) at Naples; 1 LCC; 1 ASW sqn with 5 P-8A Poseidon at Sigonella USAF 4,800; 1 FGA wg with (2 FGA sqn with 21 F-16C/D Fighting Falcon at Aviano; 1 CSAR sqn with 8 HH-60G Pave Hawk at Aviano); 1 CISR UAV sqn with MQ-9A Reaper at Sigonella; 1 ISR UAV flt with RQ-4B Global Hawk at Sigonella USMC 400; 1 tpt sqn with 6 MV-22B Osprey; 2 KC-130J Hercules JAPAN: US Pacific Command • 55,600 US Army 2,600; 1 corps HQ (fwd); 1 SF gp; 1 avn bn; 1 SAM bn with M903 Patriot PAC-3 MSE US Navy 20,000; 1 HQ (7th Fleet) at Yokosuka; 1 base at Sasebo; 1 base at Yokosuka FORCES BY ROLE 3 FGA sqn at Iwakuni with 10 F/A-18E Super Hornet; 1 FGA sqn at Iwakuni with 10 F/A-18F Super Hornet; 2 ASW sqn at Misawa/Kadena with 5 P-8A Poseidon; 2 EW sqn at Iwakuni/Misawa with 5 EA-18G Growler; 1 ELINT flt at Okinawa – Kadena AB with 2 EP-3E Aries

North America

THE MILITARY BALANCE 2022 II; 1 AEW&C sqn at Iwakuni with 5 E-2D Hawkeye; 2 ASW hel sqn at Atsugi with 12 MH-60R;1 tpt hel sqn at Atsugi with 12 MH-60S

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE 1 CVN; 3 CGHM; 4 DDGHM; 4 DDGM; 1 LCC; 4 MCO; 1 LHA; 2 LPD; 2 LSD USAF 13,000 FORCES BY ROLE 1 HQ (5th Air Force) at Okinawa – Kadena AB; 1 ftr wg at Misawa AB with (2 FGA sqn with 22 F-16C/D Fighting Falcon); 1 wg at Okinawa – Kadena AB with (2 ftr sqn with 27 F-15C/D Eagle; 1 tkr sqn with 15 KC135R Stratotanker; 1 AEW&C sqn with 2 E-3B Sentry; 1 CSAR sqn with 10 HH-60G Pave Hawk); 1 tpt wg at Yokota AB with 10 C-130J-30 Hercules; 3 Beech 1900C (C-12J); 1 Spec Ops gp at Okinawa – Kadena AB with (1 sqn with 5 MC-130J Commando II; 1 sqn with 5 CV22B Osprey); 1 ISR sqn with RC-135 Rivet Joint; 1 ISR UAV flt with 5 RQ-4A Global Hawk USMC 20,000 FORCES BY ROLE 1 mne div; 1 mne regt HQ; 1 arty regt HQ; 1 recce bn; 1 mne bn; 1 amph aslt bn; 1 arty bn; 1 FGA sqn with 12 F/A-18A++/C+ Hornet; 2 FGA sqn with 12 F-35B Lightning II; 1 tkr sqn with 15 KC-130J Hercules; 2 tpt sqn with 12 MV-22B Osprey US Strategic Command • 1 AN/TPY-2 X-band radar at Shariki; 1 AN/TPY-2 X-band radar at Kyogamisaki JORDAN: US Central Command • Operation Inherent Resolve 2,000: 1 FGA sqn with 18 F-16C Fighting Falcon; 1 CISR UAV sqn with 12 MQ-9A Reaper KOREA, REPUBLIC OF: US Pacific Command • 30,400 US Army 21,500 FORCES BY ROLE 1 HQ (8th Army) at Pyeongtaek; 1 div HQ (2nd Inf) located at Pyeongtaek; 1 armd bde; 1 (cbt avn) hel bde; 1 MRL bde; 1 AD bde; 1 SAM bty with THAAD EQUIPMENT BY TYPE M1A2 SEPv2 Abrams; M2A3/M3A3 Bradley; M109A6; M270A1 MLRS; AH-64D/E Apache; CH-47F Chinook; UH-60L/M Black Hawk; M902 Patriot PAC-3; THAAD; FIM-92A Avenger; 1 (APS) armd bde eqpt set US Navy 350 USAF 8,350 FORCES BY ROLE 1 (AF) HQ (7th Air Force) at Osan AB; 1 ftr wg at Osan AB with (1 ftr sqn with 20 F-16C/D Fighting Falcon; 1 atk sqn with 24 A-10C Thunderbolt II); 1 ftr wg at Kunsan AB with (2 ftr sqn with 20 F-16C/D Fighting Falcon); 1 ISR sqn at Osan AB with U-2S USMC 200 KUWAIT: US Central Command • 10,000; 1 ARNG armd bn; 1 ARNG (cbt avn) hel bde; 1 spt bde; 1 tpt sqn with 6 MV-22B Osprey; 1 CISR UAV sqn with MQ-9A Reaper; 1 (APS) armd bde set; 1 (APS) inf bde set LIBYA: UN • UNSMIL 1 MALI: UN • MINUSMA 8

MARSHALL ISLANDS: US Strategic Command • 20; 1 detection and tracking radar at Kwajalein Atoll MIDDLE EAST: UN • UNTSO 2 NETHERLANDS: US European Command • 450 NIGER: US Africa Command • 800; 1 CISR sqn with MQ9A Reaper NORWAY: US European Command • 1,100; 1 (USMC) MEU eqpt set; 1 (APS) SP 155mm arty bn set PERSIAN GULF: US Central Command • US Navy • 5th Fleet 3,000: 1 LHD; 1 DDGHM; 6 (Coast Guard) PCC PHILIPPINES: US Pacific Command • Operation Pacific Eagle – Philippines 200 POLAND: NATO • Enhanced Forward Presence 691; 1 mech bn with M1296 Stryker Dragoon; M777A2 US European Command • 4,500; 1 corps HQ (fwd); 1 div HQ (fwd); 1 armd bde; M1A2 SEPv2 Abrams; M3A3 Bradley; M2A3 Bradley; M109A7; 1 CISR UAV sqn with MQ-9A Reaper PORTUGAL: US European Command • 500; 1 ASW sqn with 5 P-8A Poseidon; 1 spt facility at Lajes QATAR: US Central Command • 10,000: 1 ISR sqn with 4 RC-135 Rivet Joint; 1 ISR sqn with 4 E-8C JSTARS; 2 tkr sqn with 12 KC-135R/T Stratotanker; 1 tpt sqn with 4 C-17A Globemaster; 4 C-130H/J-30 Hercules; 2 SAM bty with M902/M903 Patriot PAC-3/PAC-3 MSE US Strategic Command • 1 AN/TPY-2 X-band radar ROMANIA: US European Command • 120; 1 Aegis Ashore BMD unit with three 8-cell Mk 41 VLS launchers with SM-3 SAUDI ARABIA: US Central Command • 1,800; 1 FGA sqn with 12 F-16C Fighting Falcon SERBIA: NATO • KFOR • Joint Enterprise 660; elm 1 ARNG inf bde HQ; 1 ARNG recce bn; 1 hel flt with UH-60 SINGAPORE: US Pacific Command • 200; 1 log spt sqn; 1 spt facility SOUTH SUDAN: UN • UNMISS 7 SPAIN: US European Command • 3,250; 4 DDGM; 1 air base at Morón; 1 naval base at Rota SYRIA: US Central Command • Operation Inherent Resolve 900; 1 armd inf coy; 1 mne bn(-) THAILAND: US Pacific Command • 100 TURKEY: US European Command • 1,800; 1 tkr sqn with 14 KC-135; 1 air base at Incirlik; 1 support facility at Ankara; 1 support facility at Izmir US Strategic Command • 1 AN/TPY-2 X-band radar at Kürecik UKRAINE: JMTG-U 150 (trg mission) UNITED ARAB EMIRATES: US Central Command • 5,000: 1 ISR sqn with 4 U-2; 1 AEW&C sqn with 4 E-3B/G Sentry; 1 tkr sqn with 12 KC-10A; 1 ISR UAV sqn with RQ-4 Global Hawk; 2 SAM bty with M902/M903 Patriot PAC-3/ PAC-3 MSE

UNITED KINGDOM: US European Command • 9,500 FORCES BY ROLE 1 ftr wg at RAF Lakenheath with (1 ftr sqn with 24 F-15C/D Eagle, 2 FGA sqn with 23 F-15E Strike Eagle, 1 FGA sqn with F-35A Lightning II (forming)); 1 ISR sqn at RAF Mildenhall with OC-135/RC-135; 1 tkr wg at RAF Mildenhall with 15 KC-135R/T Stratotanker; 1 spec ops gp at RAF Mildenhall with (1 sqn with 8 CV-22B Osprey; 1 sqn with 8 MC-130J Commando II)

US Strategic Command • 1 AN/FPS-132 Upgraded Early Warning Radar and 1 Spacetrack Radar at Fylingdales Moor

FOREIGN FORCES Germany Air Force: trg units with 40 T-38 Talon; 69 T-6A Texan II; • Missile trg at Fort Bliss (TX) Netherlands 1 hel trg sqn with AH-64D Apache; CH-47D Chinook Singapore Air Force: trg units with F-16C/D; 12 F-15SG; AH-64D Apache; 6+ CH-47D Chinook hel

North America

THE MILITARY BALANCE 2022

Chapter Four

Europe In 2021 Europe’s defence expenditure grew at a faster rate than any other region, with real defencespending growth reaching 4.8%. This was primarily driven by the United Kingdom’s increased defence spending plan but there were also notable budget increases in Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Italy and the Netherlands. NATO is working on a new Strategic Concept, due to be endorsed by leaders in 2022. It is likely to mark the formal end of the post-2014 phase in which collective defence returned as the Alliance’s defining mission. Meanwhile, the EU is scheduled to complete its Strategic Compass process by March 2022. This will likely provide guidance concerning how to increase defence capabilities and conduct joint expeditionary operations in a crisis. The Norwegian-led Cold Response exercise is due to take place in Spring 2022, involving up to 40,000 troops, including personnel from Norway and other NATO states. Planning indicates that it will be the largest Norwegian-led military exercise inside the Arctic Circle since the end of the Cold War. The exercise will test cold-weather capabilities and

Europe defence spending, 2021– top 5

operations, including the reinforcement of northern Norway. There is continuing focus on the recapitalisation of Europe’s combat air fleets. The F-35 has been linked with requirements in the Czech Republic, Greece and Spain, and existing customers include Denmark, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway and the UK, while it has been selected in Belgium, Poland and Switzerland, and most recently in Finland to meet the HX requirement. Meanwhile, Croatia and Greece selected the Rafale. A number of European nations are elaborating their ambitions for a security role in the Indo-Pacific. France, Germany and the UK have all either produced strategies focused on the region or significantly referenced the region in other documents, and there has been increased military engagement. The EU also produced an Indo-Pacific strategy in 2021. France maintains permanent forces in the region, and routinely deploys other naval vessels. The UK’s Carrier Strike Group 21 deployment to the region included a Dutch frigate, and the UK has deployed two offshore-patrol vessels to the region. Germany, meanwhile, deployed a frigate for six months and is to step up exercise participation.

Active military personnel – top 10 (15,000 per unit)

United States

Global total 19,605,000

Turkey 355,200

USD754bn

France 203,250 Germany 183,400 Italy 161,550

Total European spending USD351bn

United Kingdom

France

United Kingdom 153,200 Germany

Greece 143,400 Spain 122,850

USD71.6bn

USD59.3bn Italy

USD33.8bn

USD56.1bn

Netherlands

USD14.8bn

Poland 114,050 Romania 71,500 Bulgaria 36,950

10%

Regional total 1,967,000

Europe

Regional defence policy and economics

66 ►

Arms procurements and deliveries

83 ►

Armed forces data section

86 ►

May: Ex Atlantic Trident/Steadfast Defender

June: HMS Defender, HMNLS Evertsen detached to Black Sea

June: Ex Gallic Strike

Karachi Duqm

Mumbai

Sept: UKCSG visits Yokosuka/Sasebo

Sept: HMS Richmond conducts passage of Taiwan Strait, visits Camh Ranh port, Vietnam

Oct: HMS Richmond detached to visit Goa and Karachi

June: Op Shader/ CSG visits Cyprus

Europe

2021: selected European maritime deployments to the Indo-Pacific

Busan

Tokyo

Oct: Ex Maritime Partnership JMSDF, RAN, RN, USN

Colombo

July: IN, RN Ex Salalah

UK CSG21 route and port calls Selected UK CSG21 activities German frigate Bayern, route and port calls

Palau

France: MN CSG Clemenceau mission, Arabian Sea/India Ocean; Jeanne d’Arc group mission, Indian Ocean/ Western Pacific

Darwin

Exercises with SAF

Oct: Astute-class submarine detached to visit Perth

FPDA Exercise Bersama Gold

Perth

Sources: UK MoD, Royal Navy, Bundeswehr, French MoD. Displayed routes are generalised.

Europe: F-35 operators, 2016–21 35

2016

2018

2020

2021

30 F-35A F-35B

25 20 15 10 5

s No Un rw ite ay d Ki ng do m

er la nd

ly Ne

Ita

De nm

Ita ly er la nd s No Un r w ite ay d Ki ng do m th

ay ng do m

nd s

Un ite d

Ita ly

th er Ne

nd s la

th er

Ita ly

Sept: Ex Pacific Crown 21-3 with JMSDF Oct: Ex with USN and JMSDF

Singapore Oct: UKCSG visits Singapore

Diego Garcia

Key: IN: Indian Navy; JMSDF: Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force; MN: Marine Nationale; RAN: Royal Australian Navy; SAF: Singapore Armed Forces; USN: United States Navy

Guam

Oct: Ex Konkan Shakti IN, RN

Aug: Ex Noble Union JMSDF, RN, USN Aug/Sept: UKCSG visits Guam

Ho Chi Minh City Djibouti

May/July Ex ARC-21, MN, JMSDF, RAN, USN

THE MILITARY BALANCE 2022

Europe The 2020 election of Joe Biden as president of the United States provided a moment of relief and optimism for European leaders. It came at a time when they were adjusting to heightened greatpower tension, while also dealing with sub-threshold security challenges, continued instability on Europe’s southern and eastern periphery and the need to manage the implications of the coronavirus pandemic. After the Trump administration had tested NATO cohesion, and amid the EU’s attempts to further develop its own global security role, Biden’s election brought expectations for a return to transatlantic normalcy. In February 2021 Biden said ‘America is back, the transatlantic alliance is back’. Ahead of the June 2021 NATO summit in Brussels, he reassured allies by saying that NATO’s Article 5 collective-defence clause was ‘a sacred commitment’ and that ‘NATO is as important to [US] security as we are to NATO’. EU High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy Josep Borrell explained at the end of 2020 that ‘revitalizing multilateralism’ would be a key priority for 2021. However, optimism about a return to robust transatlantic cooperation diminished during the summer, indicating that underlying structural factors could still create division, despite unifying rhetoric on both sides of the Atlantic. The rapid collapse of Afghanistan’s security forces following the withdrawal of US and allied forces from the country, the chaotic evacuation of international and local staff via Kabul airport, and the Taliban’s return to power surprised and embarrassed many European governments. Some thought that they had been left exposed by Washington’s lack of consultation when it negotiated in 2020 a withdrawal timetable with the Taliban. But fundamentally, these events demonstrated that Europeans lacked the military capability to do anything but follow the US decision to end the military presence in Afghanistan, whatever they thought about its wisdom or the way in which it was implemented. With failure in Afghanistan still present in national debates, on 15 September Australia, the United Kingdom and the US announced a trilateral security arrangement known as AUKUS. According to the

agreement, the UK and US will support Australia’s acquisition of nuclear-powered submarines and deepen cooperation on a range of other technology developments. As a consequence, Australia cancelled a contract with France, signed in 2016, for the acquisition of conventionally powered submarines. Although the contract had been questioned for some time, French leaders initially reacted with anger, arguing that they had been surprised by the trilateral negotiations. Foreign Minister Jean-Yves Le Drian accused the AUKUS signatories of ‘duplicity, a major breach of trust and contempt’. French President Emmanuel Macron said ‘Europeans must come out of their naivety’ regarding international security and the motivations of others. A telephone call between Biden and Macron on 22 September took some of the sting out of the debate, and Macron extracted US support for ‘a stronger and more capable European defense’ complementary to NATO (organised in the EU) and for French-led counter-terrorism efforts in the Sahel. While additional fallout will likely be minimised by damage-limitation efforts and the wider interests of other Europeans, AUKUS has further dampened expectations for a transatlantic revival at the point when NATO and the EU are engaged in strategy debates over the new political guidance due for both in 2022. Strategic autonomy – the idea that the EU and its member states should give themselves the means to act on their own when necessary – is evolving from its origin in security and defence policy into an overall approach for the EU’s international role in an age of great-power competition. However, the experiences of Afghanistan and AUKUS demonstrated once more not just how militarily dependent Europeans are on the US, but also that Washington’s focus has clearly shifted to the Indo-Pacific. It is likely that these factors will be reflected in NATO’s new Strategic Concept and in the EU’s effort to develop political-strategic guidance in the form of the so-called ‘Strategic Compass’.

Strategy and European security in NATO and the EU

In 2019, at NATO’s London Summit, heads of state and government tasked Secretary-General Jens

Stoltenberg with developing recommendations for NATO’s evolution over the coming decade. Stoltenberg argued that NATO 2030 – the label under which this conversation was organised – should be an organisation that is more political, more capable and more global. This agenda was driven by an evolving international environment, including the rise of China, diversifying security challenges and the corresponding requirement for further adaptation. It informed eight priorities that were adopted in the June 2021 summit communiqué as the ‘transatlantic agenda for the future’. Firstly, the Alliance would be strengthened as a forum for consultation on ‘all matters related to our individual and collective security’. Secondly, its deterrence and defence posture would be reinforced by fully implementing the capability and readiness agenda adopted at previous summits. This reinforces the post-2014 emphasis on collective defence, relative to NATO’s other two core tasks of crisis management and cooperative security. Regarding readiness, the summit communiqué stated that NATO had ‘sourced’ all the combat forces required to fulfil the requirements of the NATO Readiness Initiative – the so-called Four Thirties plan agreed in 2018 – but confirmed that these forces are ‘being organized and trained as larger combat formations for reinforcement and high-intensity warfighting, or for rapid military crisis intervention’ and thus were not yet ready. Leaders also agreed that they would, from 2023, aim to increase NATO common funding for the military budget, the civil budget and NATO’s security investment programme. Meanwhile, both the Joint Force Command in Norfolk, Virginia, and the Joint Support and Enabling Command in Ulm, Germany, reached full operating capability in 2021. Thirdly, NATO would improve resilience, aiming ’to reduce vulnerabilities and ensure our militaries can effectively operate in peace, crisis, and conflict’. Resilience objectives will be developed to give governments a reference point for their national plans. Fourthly, NATO would set up a Defence Innovation Accelerator for the North Atlantic (DIANA), as well as a NATO Innovation Fund to foster technological development, interoperability and the ability to integrate dual-use and emerging technologies into NATO thinking and forces. While NATO common budgets are likely to cover staffing costs, it will need to rely on national pledges to the innovation fund. Because of this, a question mark remains over the ultimate ambition of this new tool and how it relates

to the European Defence Fund (which is also trying to leverage national spending from some of the same nations). Points five and six on the agenda underlined NATO’s commitment to a rules-based international order and suggested increased efforts to enable NATO partner nations through training and capacitybuilding measures where instability directly affects the Alliance. Next, NATO would aim to ‘become the leading international organisation when it comes to understanding and adapting to the impact of climate change on security’. And finally, the secretary-general was formally tasked with leading the development of a new Strategic Concept, to be endorsed in 2022. Charting the course for a new Strategic Concept likely absorbed significant diplomatic capital in the run-up to the summit, but the collapse in Afghanistan and the fallout from the AUKUS security partnership later in the year put earlier challenges into perspective. At the very least, it is likely that the idea that NATO should develop its political side, and a more global outlook, will be harder to pursue after these two episodes highlighted (at least for some allies), a lack of political consultation and a failure of out-ofarea operations. Others will likely argue that these problems underline precisely the deficits the new agenda is meant to address. Overall, the new Strategic Concept is likely to mark the formal end of the post2014 phase in which collective defence returned as the Alliance’s defining mission. This does not necessarily mean that other tasks will be abandoned or that new ones will not arise, but it indicates a clearer order of hierarchy than before. The summit communiqué also stated that ‘Russia’s aggressive actions constitute a threat to Euro–Atlantic security’ and that China’s ‘growing influence and international policies can present challenges that we need to address together as an Alliance’. ‘We will engage China’, NATO said, ‘with a view to defending the security interests of the Alliance.’ Working towards a common position on China was seen by some as a measure of progress, but it also highlighted continued disagreement among allies on key security concerns. While China has been Washington’s ‘pacing challenge’ for some years, not all European allies think in such adversarial terms, even if they share misgivings about Beijing’s international policies. For instance, Macron said that ‘NATO is a military organisation, the subject of our relationship with China is not just military. NATO is an organisation … which concerns the North Atlantic, China has little

Europe

THE MILITARY BALANCE 2022

▼ Figure 5 Leopard 2 main battle tank (MBT): major upgrades, 1979–2014 The Leopard 2 main battle tank (MBT) entered service in 1979 as the German army’s successor to the mid-1960s Leopard 1. Manufactured by Krauss-Maffei (later Krauss-Maffei Wegmann), the tank represented a change in design philosophy and a generational leap from the earlier Leopard 1. Advances in composite armour technology gave the Leopard 2 substantially better protection than the earlier model, while the switch from the venerable L7 series of 105mm rifled main guns to the Rheinmetall 120mm smoothbore gun offered a significant increase in firepower. The Leopard 2 was the first production tank to mount this armament. Since then, this weapon, or derivatives of it, has become the standard armament for western MBTs. Having undergone several improvements since its introduction, the Leopard 2 now serves, in its various configurations, with 19 armies worldwide and many of those have developed their own upgrades for the vehicle. While more upgrades may take place, including abroad, in German service the tank will eventually be replaced, likely by the platform developed under the Franco-German Major Ground Combat System programme.

Entry into service Leopard 2 1979

1981

Leopard 2A4 1983

1985

1987

Leopard 2A5 1989

1991

1993

1995

1997

Leopard 2A6 1999

2001

2003

Leopard 2A7 2005

2007

2009

2011

2013

Leopard 2 (1979) Selected features 55 tonnes 1500hp diesel engine

Firepower: RH 120 L/44 120mm smoothbore gun Thermal gunner’s optics (early production vehicles mounted image-intensification night optics) Commander’s panoramic periscope Protection: Composite armour in hull and turret

Leopard 2A4 (1985)

Leopard 2A5 (1995)

Selected features 55 tonnes

62.5 tonnes

Firepower: Fully digital fire-control system Protection: Improved composite armour in hull and turret

Selected features Firepower: Improved fire-control system and fully-electric turret drives Improved commander’s periscope with integrated thermal imaging Protection: Additional spaced armour modules fitted to turret front

Europe

Selected non-German variants

Leopard 2SG (2010) (Singapore)

Leopard 2PL (2020) (Poland)

Selected features Estimated 60 tonnes Based on the Leopard 2A4

59 tonnes Based on the Leopard 2A4

Firepower: New commander’s periscope with integrated thermal imaging Protection: Additional Advanced Modular Armor Protection (AMAP) composite armour package

Selected features

Firepower: Improved fire-control system with data-link allowing the use of

programmable rounds

Electric turret drives Modernised thermal imaging for commander’s and gunner’s sights

Protection: AMAP composite armour package

Leopard 2A6 (2001)

Leopard 2A7 (2014)

Selected features 62.5 tonnes

Selected features 64.5 tonnes Fitted with an auxiliary power unit which allows major systems to be operated when the engine is off

Firepower: Improved RH 120 L/55 120mm smoothbore gun enabling improved muzzle velocity

Firepower: Improved fire-control system with data-link allowing the use of programmable rounds Improved commander’s thermal optics Protection: Mounting points for additional side armour Fitted with additional belly armour ©IISS

THE MILITARY BALANCE 2022

to do with the North Atlantic.’ While France has long tried to put the brakes on a more global role for NATO, many Central and Eastern European allies will also be keen to maintain NATO’s focus on Russia. It will be important for these states to also acknowledge US concerns over China, and perhaps demonstrate support if they can, though the underlying structural changes that are refocusing US attention on the IndoPacific are outside their control. Another point for debate will be the NATO–EU relationship. There is a growing connection between the two organisations, albeit with different positions regarding the desirable division of labour between them. However, the approximate alignment of the strategic processes at the EU and NATO levels presents an opportunity to bring into line their defence planning and capability development priorities. For its part, the EU is scheduled to complete its Strategic Compass process by March 2022, during the French EU presidency. The EU Strategic Compass will, in principle, provide the guidance missing from the 2016 EU Global Strategy concerning how to increase defence capabilities and conduct joint expeditionary operations in a crisis. The process started in 2020 with a classified shared-threat analysis. This was intended to generate common assumptions among EU governments, which the Strategic Compass would address by focusing on capability development, crisis management, partnerships and resilience. While work on all four ‘baskets’ was proceeding in 2021, the proposal to create a 5,000-strong initial entry force, able to mobilise and deploy at short notice for crisismanagement purposes, received wider attention – not least in the context of Afghanistan – as a practical expression of European capacity to act. Borrell said that ‘the EU must be able to intervene to protect our interests when the Americans don’t want to be involved’. European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen adopted a slightly different perspective in her annual State of the Union address to the European Parliament on 15 September: she focused on political will. Nations may have advanced armed forces, she said, but ‘what use are they’ without the will to use them. She continued, ‘what has held us back until now is not just a shortfall of capacity – it is the lack of political will.’ A week earlier, von der Leyen’s successor as German defence minister, Annegret Kramp-Karrenbauer, had said (on the occasion of the opening of the IISS–Europe office in Berlin), that institutions were not the first priority in strengthening

the role of the EU in security and defence matters, and that ‘it is the political will that is needed first’. As such, the responsibility lies with national capitals, not EU-level bodies. Von der Leyen also announced that she would, with President Macron, convene a summit on European defence in 2022.

Responding to Russia and tilting to the Indo-Pacific

The NATO 2021 summit communiqué describes Russia’s military capability developments, its ‘more assertive posture’ and its ‘provocative activities … as well as its large-scale no-notice and snap exercises’ as an increasing threat to Euro–Atlantic security, amplified by Moscow’s use of ‘hybrid actions … including through proxies’. After the summit, Stoltenberg said that NATO’s relationship with Russia was at its ‘lowest point since the Cold War. And Moscow’s aggressive actions are a threat to our security.’ Borrell, meanwhile, visited Moscow for talks in February 2021 to explore areas for EU dialogue with Russia, only to learn during a meeting with Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov that Russia was expelling three European diplomats. NATO defence planners are worried by Russia’s potential ability to create diverse challenges in multiple locations, taxing and possibly undermining the Alliance’s ability to swiftly form a coherent response. In the Arctic, Russian investment in infrastructure and relevant capabilities worries both NATO and non-NATO states alike, has refocused attention on capability development and led to increased exercise activity. The biennial exercise Cold Response in Norway is due to involve up to 40,000 troops in spring 2022. According to current plans, it will be the largest Norwegian-led military exercise inside the Arctic Circle since the end of the Cold War. The North Atlantic, including the so-called Greenland–Iceland–United Kingdom gap, remains of concern as a potential staging ground for Russian power projection and disruption of transatlantic reinforcement routes. NATO’s Joint Force Command, now at full operational capability, is dedicated to protecting these routes. Meanwhile, NATO’s air policing operations have operated at Quick Reaction Alert for some years, and NATO allies including Germany, Norway and the UK are investing in both anti-submarine warfare and intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance capabilities. The Baltic region has been a focal point for NATO, which agreed the Readiness Action Plan at the 2014 Wales Summit

Europe

its view of partnerships, including China while also suggesting it would be unwise to force nations to take sides in the US–China rivalry.

DEFENCE ECONOMICS Macroeconomics

European economies were among the worst affected globally by the coronavirus pandemic. According to the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the region’s real GDP contracted by 5.0% in 2020 with a significant economic contraction in Western and Southern European countries somewhat offset by better performance in Eastern and Northern Europe. Spain and the UK were among the 20 worst performing economies globally in 2020, with real GDP growth rates of -10.8% and -9.8% respectively. France, Greece, Italy and Portugal were not far behind, with the contraction in their real GDP exceeding 8%. The reduction was more muted in the Nordic states and emerging economies in Eastern Europe, where reductions ranged between -1% and -4% in 2020. The IMF expects regional GDP to grow by 5.4% in 2021, pointing to a swift recovery to pre-pandemic (2019) levels of output. This latest assessment is more positive than the IMF’s October 2020 forecast, which expected Europe’s GDP to contract by 7.0% in 2020 and grow by just 4.7% in 2021. The more positive figures result from a better-than-expected performance in the fourth quarter of 2020 and increased external demand for exports, as well as strengthening domestic demand due to extensive fiscal support packages and the knock-on effect of vaccination programmes. However, risks remain, particularly if new infection variants emerge or vaccination or revaccination programmes stall. Extensive support packages, including the European Union’s EUR750 billion (USD958bn) Next Generation EU (NGEU) recovery plan and the UK’s furlough scheme, have helped to avoid more severe economic contractions, but they have come at a cost to government finances. Of the USD16.5bn spent globally on fiscal-support measures (including additional public spending and liquidity support) between January 2020 and July 2021, almost one-third was spent by European countries. Fiscal deficits extended from a regional average of 0.2% of GDP in 2019 to 6.8% in 2020 and will persist into 2022 as countries continue to borrow to support their recovery. However, fiscal support packages have shifted from emergency measures to those aimed at

Europe

and established the Enhanced Forward Presence at the 2016 Warsaw Summit. There was additional scrutiny on Russia’s actions and intentions when it built up armed forces in Crimea and near the eastern border with Ukraine in April 2021 (and again in late 2021), concerning its September 2021 Zapad strategic exercise held with Belarus, as well as in relation to the late-2021 migrant crisis on the Belarusian–Polish border. Allies remain concerned by Russia’s posture and activities in the Black Sea, the Mediterranean and Syria, and NATO has continued to develop its focus on Black Sea security. In 2021, the annual Breeze exercise included some 30 vessels and 2,000 troops from 12 NATO allies as well as Georgia and Ukraine. A number of European nations have started to elaborate their ambitions for a security role in the IndoPacific. France’s 2021 Indo-Pacific strategy document says that it aims to increase interoperability with regional partners, including Australia, India, Japan and the US, while also conducting deployments and exercises, though the effect of the September 2021 AUKUS arrangement on this plan remains to be seen. Germany published Indo-Pacific policy guidelines in 2020 and also intends to expand its footprint in regional exercises and deployments. In 2022 Germany intends to participate in the Australian-led exercise Pitch Black, and plans to strengthen bilateral defence partnerships with Australia and Japan in particular. The UK’s 2021 Integrated Review, meanwhile, identified the Indo-Pacific as a region critical to the UK’s economy and security. To varying degrees, European countries, the UK included, maintain a degree of ambiguity regarding their Indo-Pacific posture, designed to mitigate tensions between their economic and their security interests, both of which centre on China. However, the nations that are frequently identified as priority partners for European nations – like Australia and Japan – may in future demand less hedging and more commitment as their own concerns over China’s activities continue to deepen. In 2021 the UK was the European power most willing to embrace this logic and the US narrative of strategic competition with China. In its 2021 summit communiqué, NATO said that it maintained a ‘constructive dialogue’ with China, but that Beijing’s ‘stated ambitions and assertive behaviour present systemic challenges to the rules-based international order and to areas relevant to Alliance security’. For its part, the EU, which published its Strategy for Cooperation in the IndoPacific on 16 September 2021, is explicitly inclusive in

THE MILITARY BALANCE 2022

Iceland

Finland Norway Sweden Estonia Latvia Denmark United Kingdom*

Lithuania

Netherlands Belgium

Ireland

Poland

Germany Czech Rep.

Luxembourg

Slovakia Austria

France

Switzerland

Slovenia

Hungary Romania

Croatia BiH Serbia

Italy

Montenegro Mo Albania

Spain

Greece

Portugal 2021 Defence Spending (USDbn) Estimate

Bulgaria North Macedonia

71.63 59.34 56.05

Turkey

Malta Cyprus

33.78

10 5 2 1 .25 .05

Real % Change (2020–21) More than 20% increase Between 10% and 20% increase Between 3% and 10% increase Between 0% and 3% increase Between 0% and 3% decrease Between 3% and 10% decrease Between 10% and 20% decrease More than 20% decrease © IISS

*includes Armed Forces Pension Service [1] Map illustrating 2021 planned defence-spending levels (in USD at market exchange rates) as well as the annual real percentage change in planned defence spending between 2020 and 2021 (at constant 2015 prices and exchange rates). Percentage changes in defence spending can vary considerably from year to year, as states revise the level of funding allocated to defence. Changes indicated here highlight the short-term trend in planned defence spending between 2020 and 2021. Actual spending changes prior to 2020, and projected spending levels post-2021, are not reflected.

▲ Map 1 Europe: regional defence spending1 Sub-regional groupings referred to in defence economics text: Central Europe (Austria, Czech Republic, Germany, Hungary, Poland, Slovakia and Switzerland), Northern Europe (Denmark, Estonia, Finland, Latvia, Lithuania, Norway and Sweden), Southern Europe (Cyprus, Greece, Italy, Malta, Portugal and Spain), Southeastern Europe (Bulgaria, Romania and Turkey), the Balkans (Albania, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia, Montenegro, North Macedonia, Serbia and Slovenia) and Western Europe (Belgium, France, Iceland, Ireland, Luxembourg, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom).

Europe

3 0

-6 -9 -12

Europe

Germany Netherlands Italy UK France Spain

-3

-15 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025 2026 Source: IMF World Economic Outlook October 2021

▲ Figure 6 Western Europe: selected countries, fiscal balance (% of GDP), 2008–26 aiding economic recovery, including investment in public services, support for business and boosting employment and skills development. The NGEU plan primarily aims to support the EU members hardest hit by the pandemic and with limited fiscal bandwidth to support their own recovery. Because of this, the IMF projects that the EU’s emerging markets will suffer far less pandemicrelated economic damage than countries around the world which do not receive similar support. Beyond helping the recovery, the NGEU also aims to support investment in green and digital transitions. The NGEU’s Recovery and Resilience Facility, which will allocate most of the recovery plan’s financing, requires that at least 37% of national allocations support the green transition, with at least 20% directed to digital transformation. Similarly, regional debt levels grew from an average of 60.7% in 2019 to 72.5% in 2020, with levels set to persist at around 70% of GDP well into the 2020s, according to the IMF. Indeed, debt levels extend beyond 100% of GDP in Belgium, Cyprus, France, Greece, Italy, Montenegro, Portugal, Spain and the UK. As economic support for the recovery continues, government spending will continue to exceed revenues and debt levels will remain high. This level of debt is sustainable while interest rates are low and borrowing is cheap. However, as inflationary pressures rise in some countries (as a result of higher commodity prices and increased wages due to higher labour demand), interest rates may begin to rise, making borrowing less sustainable.

Defence economics

Despite the sizeable economic contraction in 2020, European defence spending continued to grow and

2021 saw the seventh consecutive year of real growth. Indeed, in 2021 Europe’s defence expenditure growth rate was higher than that of any other region, with real defence spending growth reaching 4.8%. This rise was primarily driven by the UK’s increased spending plan for defence, announced in November 2020, but there were also notable budget increases in Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Italy and the Netherlands, meaning that growth was spread across the region. Total regional spending increased to USD351bn from USD314bn in 2020. Despite sustained growth since 2014, European defence spending had been static as a proportion of total global defence expenditure, hovering between 16.5% and 17.0% annually until 2020. The 2021 increase, combined with a drop in spending in Latin America, sub-Saharan Africa and the Middle East and North Africa, means that European spending is now 18.7% of the global total. Europe’s NATO members have steadily increased their defence budgets as a proportion of GDP since 2014, from 1.26% to 1.52% in 2019. The figures for 2020 and 2021 are distorted by the economic impact of the pandemic, with European members now spending an average of 1.6% of GDP on defence. Using economic projections from the IMF’s October 2019 World Economic Outlook (so, from before the pandemic), the IISS has determined that the proportion would have remained fairly static at 1.5% of GDP in 2020 and 2021 had economic growth continued as expected. Sub-regional trends reflect this broader growth. Northern European spending grew by 7.1% in 2021, up from the 5.2% uplift in 2020. The main source of the increase was a 34.6% real-terms surge in Finland’s defence budget as the country intended to make a final decision on the USD12.3bn HX fighter programme by the end of 2021. Sizeable growth was also evident in

THE MILITARY BALANCE 2022

Sweden, 2.4% Other Southeastern Europe, 2.0% Turkey, 2.9% Other Southern Europe, 3.2% Spain, 3.9%

Norway, 2.1%

2.0

Other Northern Europe, 4.1% The Balkans 1.0%

1.5

United Kingdom 20.4%

% of GDP

1.22

1.25

1.29

2016

2017

2018

1.40

1.47

1.48

2020

2021

1.0

0.5 Italy, 9.6% France 16.9%

Other Central Europe, 5.1% Poland 3.8%

0.0

2019

Netherlands, 4.2% Germany 16.0%

▲ Figure 8 Europe: regional defence spending as % of GDP (average)

Other Western Europe, 2.3%

Other Western Europe – Belgium, Iceland, Ireland, Luxembourg Other Central Europe – Austria, Czech Republic, Hungary, Slovakia, Switzerland Other Northern Europe – Denmark, Estonia, Finland, Latvia, Lithuania Other Southern Europe – Cyprus, Malta, Portugal The Balkans – Albania, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia, Montenegro, North Macedonia, Serbia, Slovenia Other Southeastern Europe – Bulgaria, Romania

▲ Figure 7 Europe: defence spending by country and sub-region, 2021

Sweden with a 7.5% real uplift in 2021 to bring the total defence budget to SEK71.2bn (USD8.40bn), including funding for crisis management and radiation safety. The country is pursuing an ambitious spending plan after its Total Defence 2021–25 bill was signed with unanimous political support in December 2020. The bill indicates that Sweden’s core defence budget will increase annually to reach SEK88.7bn (USD10.4bn) by 2025, bringing the total defence budget to an estimated SEK95.2bn (USD11.2bn). It calls for an enhanced and more resilient force structure and will mean the 2025 budget is 34% higher than 2021 levels and almost double the 2015 total in nominal terms. Spending in Southern Europe surged by 9.2% in real terms in 2021 due to significant uplifts in Greece and Italy. Greek spending rose by 47.9% in real terms to reach EUR6.47bn (USD7.73bn) – including pensions – as the country funds the procurement of 18 Rafale F3R combat aircraft (six new and 12 secondhand from the French air force) in a deal valued at EUR2.5bn (USD3.07bn) including munitions, training and support. Greece’s 2022 budget is projected to be EUR6.15bn (USD7.5bn). This is lower than 2021 spending but well above the trend levels seen over the last decade. Italy’s budget increase comes as the

European Commission continues to waive the fiscal rules of the Stability and Growth Pact and enables the country to enact significant uplifts to investment spending and to begin to allocate funding for the UK-led Tempest combat aircraft programme. Western European spending is also set to rise by 7.6% in real terms, driven by the UK as it pursues the spending profile outlined in its Spending Review 2020, released in December. This announced additional funding totals GBP24bn (USD30.8bn) for defence over the four-year period to 2024–25. This is effectively ‘front-loaded’ with significant increases evident in 2021 and 2022 but only marginal nominal increases in 2023 and 2024, which translate to reductions in real terms. The UK Budget 2021, announced in October 2021, reaffirmed these increases. Meanwhile, France continues to enact increases in line with the Loi de Programmation Militaire (military programming law) 2019–2024, with real-terms increases averaging 1.8% between 2019 and 2021, bringing the total defence budget to EUR49.7bn (USD59.3bn) with a further 2.0% increase projected for 2022. In Southeastern Europe, meanwhile, defence expenditure trends continue to be distorted by volatile movements in Bulgarian and Turkish defence budgets. Bulgaria’s budget continues to decline as spending returns to normal levels following the increase that accompanied the USD1.26bn purchase of eight F-16 Fighting Falcon combat aircraft in 2019. Turkey continues to implement sizeable nominal increases though these have been negated by the ongoing depreciation of the Turkish lira against the US dollar and a persistently high inflation rate that has averaged 14% since 2017. The 2022–24 Medium Term Expenditure Framework sets out increases that

will translate to a real-terms uplift, though increased government expenditure will do little to curb inflation.

Defence industry

The pandemic affected several of the main players in Europe’s defence-industrial base in 2020, particularly those that depend on revenues from commercial aviation, leading many governments to implement support packages or bring forward procurement programmes. In June 2020, France announced a EUR600 million (USD684m) programme of investment intended to accelerate key military aerospace programmes, including the light intelligence and surveillance aircraft (Avion Léger de Surveillance et de Renseignement) programme and the acquisition of three Airbus A330 aircraft and eight Airbus H225M Caracal helicopters for the air force. The investment programme was part of a wider EUR15bn (USD17.1bn) rescue package to support the national aviation sector. Germany announced a EUR130bn (USD148bn) stimulus package in June 2020. EUR10bn (USD11.4bn) was earmarked to accelerate armaments programmes that included a high workshare for local firms. The UK did not bring forward major programmes but instead ensured that cash flow was maintained and that the supply chain was supported by forward ordering and adjusting payment schedules. The UK also indicated a more protective industrial stance on future defence procurement in the Defence and Security Industrial Strategy (DSIS) published on 23 March 2021. The DSIS stated that UK defenceprocurement policy will shift from one where there was open global competition ‘by default’ to a more ‘flexible and nuanced approach’ that balances the required capability with both national-security considerations and the potential impact on UK ‘prosperity’. The DSIS established two new categories of protected capability: ‘strategic imperatives’, which are to be sustained wholly onshore and include nuclear deterrence, cryptographic and offensive cyber capability; and those capabilities that are needed to retain ‘operational independence’. For the latter, the UK should maintain key competencies onshore but full procurement independence is not required, thus allowing the UK to work with partners on wider defence programmes. These capabilities include complex weapons, novel (including directedenergy) weapons, test and evaluation, and chemical,

biological, radiological and nuclear (CBRN) capabilities. This approach brings the UK into alignment with continental Europe, where countries clearly distinguish between key areas that are to be protected domestically and those that are less strategically vital and can therefore be developed with, or procured from, international partners. This approach is, for instance, outlined in Germany’s 2020 Strategy Paper of the Federal Government on Strengthening the Security and Defence Industry. However, despite the UK’s spending increase, affordability concerns endure. The Ministry of Defence (MoD) estimates that the costs of the UK’s 10-year Equipment Plan will be GBP7.3bn (USD10.2bn) higher than the budget between 2020 and 2030. The Public Accounts Committee stated in a November 2021 report that the MoD bears too much of the financial risk in UK defence procurement programmes, relying on ‘a limited specialist supply base’ and lacking at times ‘the skilled personnel to effectively manage the performance of these suppliers’. The report also cited a net delay of 21 years across the 20 projects most recently examined by the National Audit Office. Meanwhile, the UK’s spending announcement indicated a focus on resilience and new technology, as funding for artificial intelligence, cyber, space development and research and development was ring-fenced. Similarly, the 2022 French defence budget allocated EUR1bn (USD1.4bn) to support innovation, with a particular emphasis on cyber defence, the space sector, defence CBRN and research funding for European cooperation programmes (principally the Franco–German–Spanish future combat air system). The coronavirus pandemic caused delays to the acquisition process for Switzerland’s fighter and ground-based air defence (GBAD) Air2030 programme, as well as Finland’s HX fighter programme. In June 2021, it was announced that Lockheed Martin and Raytheon had won the bid in Switzerland, with F-35 Lightning II combat aircraft and Patriot GBAD selected respectively. Meanwhile, Finland received final offers for the HX programme in May 2021. The impact of the pandemic on the defence industry largely depended on firms’ exposure to commercial aviation and on the success of government support initiatives. Airbus reported a 29% drop in annual revenue in 2020 as the significant reduction in the commercial aviation sector was only slightly

Europe

THE MILITARY BALANCE 2022

Spanish defence policy has changed significantly since the end of the Cold War, when it was focused on territorial defence tasks in the Balearic Islands, the Iberian Peninsula and the Canary Islands. At that time, the armed forces mainly comprised conscripts, while the services were equipped with a mix of materiel largely provided by the United States. Since the country became a NATO member in 1982, its level of participation has developed incrementally. Greater involvement in working groups and committees and in military coordination processes followed a referendum in 1986, but it only began to participate in the Alliance’s integrated military structure in January 1999. Spain is now fully integrated into NATO structures and has fully professional armed forces equipped with modern materiel, mainly sourced from manufacturers based in the European Union. The armed forces are focused on projecting stability in Europe, the western Mediterranean, the Atlantic Ocean and the Sahel. Stability in the latter region is seen as vital to Spanish security; the 2017 National Security Strategy (NSS) referred to the Sahel as part of Spain’s ‘advanced border’. Meanwhile, since 2012 there has been renewed focus on Ceuta and Melilla because of continued Moroccan claims to these exclaves as well as concerns over border security. Other defence-policy drivers include maintaining credible capability for self-defence and the projection of security through multilateral organisations. Madrid is a key supporter of EU defence initiatives, though NATO and Europeanlevel defence initiatives are overall seen as essentially compatible.

revised in light of the coronavirus pandemic, though the updated version had not been released at the time of writing. Defence priorities are set by National Defence Directives (NDDs), signed by the prime minister. The current NDD, from June 2020, was shaped by factors including the coronavirus pandemic and the EU Global Strategy, as well as the new legislature and legislation (the 2017 NSS and the 2015 National Security Law). While the preceding NDD, in 2012, prioritised defence transformation and deterrence, the 2020 document reflects a more multilateral and security-based concept of defence, noting that military participation in security tasks or multilateral activities contributes to international peace and stability. However, both documents highlight the importance of reinforcing deterrence, Spain’s role in security organisations and of defence investments (though the 2020 NDD highlights investments in improving conditions of service). The 2020 NDD indicates that Spain will focus its deployments in its European neighbourhood, the Mediterranean, the Atlantic Ocean and the western Sahel through multilateral frameworks. European-level initiatives remain key, with the EU’s Common Security and Defence Policy being central to increasing stability and ‘managing [Spain’s] main security challenges’, though NATO remains a key element of collective defence. Some Spanish analysts have suggested that there is a disconnect between the political rhetoric around threats to security – as well as how these appear in defence documents – and the means allocated to address these challenges. This can in part be explained, they say, by the relatively low visibility of defence debates in political discourse (barring, perhaps, matters around budgeting), as well as by the effect of changes in government and resultant uncertainty over financial allocations. It means, analysts continue, that while there may be emphasis on the operational and capability planning that is needed to address potential challenges, these are less clearly reflected in the procurement portfolio.

Strategy and policy

Armed forces

tempered by an increase of 10% and 15% respectively in revenues for the considerably smaller business segments of Defence and Space and Helicopters. Similarly, Rolls-Royce reported a revenue reduction of 28% with losses reaching GBP4.8bn (USD6.62bn) as demand for engines fell as global commercial aviation ground to a halt.

SPAIN

The 2017 NSS consolidated the ‘national security system’ created by its 2013 predecessor (which led, among other initiatives, to the creation of a National Security Council), recommended improvements to Spain’s crisis management system and indicated that disinformation was a risk to national security. It was

Spain’s current armed forces have been principally shaped by four documents. The Organic Law on defence (5/2005) and other regulations changed defence and military structures; an investment cycle from 1997–2008 modernised much military equipment; and Law 39/2007 established a maximum

strength of 130,000 personnel. Meanwhile, the 2003 Strategic Defence Review set out future force design, combining the transatlantic transformation agenda (including jointness, interoperability, power projection and improved equipment) with Spain’s specific circumstances, such as its ongoing integration into NATO’s military structure and professionalisation process. In July 2020 a new division was created in the defence staff to assist force development, focusing on preparation and interoperability, strategic foresight, concept development and experimentation and doctrine. Together with changes to the planning division, intended to increase its role in capability development and transformation, these developments will support the implementation of the 2035 ‘Operational Environment’ document (issued in 2019), intended to support transformation in line with NATO priorities. Royal Decree 521/2020, meanwhile, bolstered the Joint Staff, transformed the Joint Cyber Defence Command into the Joint Cyberspace Command and gave the chief of defence new responsibilities relating to the employment of the Emergencies Military Unit (which had an active role in Spain’s coronavirus response and comes under the authority of the defence minister). The 2007–08 financial crisis affected training and sustainment, and Madrid prioritised training and maintenance for operational units, those involved in external deployments or most relevant to deterrence and territorial defence. There are fears that the economic effects of the coronavirus pandemic will affect readiness, and the army chief of staff reflected these concerns when he discussed the potential effect of the pandemic on maintenance and training in a June 2020 interview. That said, the armed forces have benefited from the lessons of deployments to the Balkans, Afghanistan and, to a lesser extent, Iraq. There has also been a continued focus on personnel management. As part of the professionalisation process, Law 8/2006 established three types of engagement: an initial commitment of up to six years; a long-term commitment up to 45 years of age; or a permanent engagement (beyond the age of 45), to which service personnel could progress if already engaged in a ‘long-term’ commitment. At the end of a long-term contract, at the age of 45, personnel could leave with a pension of around EUR600 (USD717) per month and be free to find other work. However, there have been reports that some personnel are concerned about their employment prospects after leaving

military service, in light of the pandemic’s effect on the broader employment market and with permanent posts remaining limited in number (and dependent on an examination and existing level of education). The air force, meanwhile, has in recent years lost pilots to civilian airlines, and it is unclear whether the disruption caused to the civil aviation sector by the pandemic will reverse this trend.

Equipment modernisation

A new defence investment programme began in 2018. Due to run until 2032, it intends to replace ageing platforms and boost local defence-industrial production. The programme has enabled new procurements and also unlocked long-running projects that had been delayed due to budget problems. Key acquisitions for the armed forces include five F-110 frigates, ordered in April 2019; 348 Piranha V armoured vehicles (of a total requirement of 998), ordered in September 2015; A330 MRTT aircraft; and NH90 helicopters. The first of the planned four S-80 Plus submarines was launched in April 2021. The first two boats will be retrofitted with air-independent propulsion (AIP) system once development is complete. The project’s financial ceiling was earlier raised by EUR1.8 billion (USD2.13bn) (to EUR3.9bn or USD4.61bn) in November 2018. There are also plans to modernise CH-47 helicopters and Eurofighter combat aircraft (the latter at a cost of EUR906 million or USD1.07bn), as well as to purchase the right to use two communications satellites (for 19 years). In late 2020, Eurofighter submitted a proposal to sell an additional batch of 20 Eurofighters, likely part of Spain’s Project Halcón programme, to replace the air force’s F/A-18 Hornets based at Gran Canaria.

Defence economics

Spain’s baseline defence budget – primarily covering core MoD funding, war pensions and allocations from ‘autonomous agencies’ – came to EUR11.5bn (USD13.8bn) in 2021, amounting to around 1% of GDP, similar to the levels seen since the end of the Cold War. Commitments made at NATO’s Wales Summit in 2014 led defence ministers to pledge to progressively increase defence spending, first to 1.53% of GDP and then to 2% by 2024. (US exhortations that European nations spend more on defence were likely also important.) Prime Minister Pedro Sánchez restated this ambition at NATO’s Brussels Summit in 2018, though Margarita Robles (defence minister since 2018) has reportedly cast doubt on whether

Europe

THE MILITARY BALANCE 2022

Astilleros Gondán

Navantia Ferrol

Ribadeo

Navia

Astilleros Armon

Rodman Polyships

ITP Aero

Oviedo

GDELS Santa Bárbara Sistemas

Vigo

Bilbao

FR A N C E Sapa Placencia

San Sebastian

EXPAL

S P A I N

Burgos

Aresa Shipyard

Freire Shipyard ITP Aero

Escribano Mechanical and Engineering Indra Sistemas

Madrid

Thales Star Defence Logistics and Engineering (SDLE)

Airbus Defence and Space

PORTUGAL

Airbus Defence Airbus Defence and Space and Space

Navantia Navantia (Puerto Real)

Cadiz

Airbus Defence and Space

Aircraft and aerostructures

Indra Sistemas

Missiles and munitions Engines and propulsion

Airbus Helicopters

Valdepeñas Tecnobit

Seville

Barcelona

Albacete ITP Aero Murcia

Armoured vehicles and gun systems Shipyards Radars and other sensors

EXPAL Cartagena

GDELS Santa Bárbara Sistemas

Navantia

Sociedad Anonima Electronica Submarina (SAES)

Navantia

▲ Map 2 Spain: principal defence industrial manufacturing sites these objectives will be reached. With post-pandemic economic factors likely important in this regard, some Spanish analysts also argue that this owes much to the relatively peripheral place they assert defence debates occupy in political discourse. While the defence budget has remained relatively stable at around 1% of GDP, this does not include other allocations that raise defence expenditure to between 1.1% and 1.3% of GDP. These include funds for the Social Institute of the Armed Forces; military pensions; the corresponding part of the Guardia Civil responsible to the MoD; appropriations for research, development and innovation; the military contribution to NATO and the EU under the auspices of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs; and the costs of international missions. Nor does it include financial aid (in the form of credits) from the Ministry of Industry, Trade and Tourism. This is important because the defence budget increase seen in 2017 broadly corresponds with debt payments for Special Armament Programmes (SAPs) linked to the 1997–2008 modernisation cycle. Projects justified by strategic requirements, acquisition cost and

industrial implications were to be funded through an industrial pre-financing system, based on interestfree loans for system development, deferred payment to contractors with MoD funds and the repayment of advances to the Treasury. (These have since been renamed as Special Modernisation Projects.) For instance, while EUR11bn (USD13.1bn) was allocated to modernisation projects from 1997–2008, contracts totalled EUR36.5bn (USD43.6bn), with EUR27bn (USD33.2bn) funded via the SAP mechanism (for which the Ministry of Industry advanced EUR15bn (USD17.9bn) to manufacturers for development and the MoD prepared a payment schedule that would be extended until 2025). This model made it possible to keep the core defence budget low and to meet the convergence criteria for Economic and Monetary Union. However, some platform deliveries coincided with the financial crisis, which meant that some instalments were not paid in 2010 and 2011, forcing a renegotiation of the payment schedule until 2031 and the approval of extraordinary credits to pay the accumulated debt. The Constitutional Court ruled against the extraordinary credits in 2016 and the MoD

announced in March 2017 that funding for the SAP would be incorporated into the core MoD budget going forward. To date, programmes worth some EUR14bn (USD16.7bn) have been approved under the 2018 modernisation cycle, but with payments delayed until the 2030s this has enabled actual military investment to exceed 20% of the defence budget. In order to reduce the economic impact of the pandemic on the defence sector, guarantee spending commitments and support the defence-industrial base, the MoD proposed a plan called Ave Fénix in 2020. It not only included new military programmes – likely following the existing industrial pre-financing model – but also involved EU funding. A first step was taken after Airbus announced redundancies in Spain. To minimise job losses and support the sector, a plan was agreed that included the acquisition of three A330 MRTT, four C295 maritime patrol aircraft, the start of the Future Combat Air System (FCAS) phase II, advance payments for the A400M and support for the development of Tiger MkIII helicopters and a medium-altitude long-endurance uninhabited aerial vehicle (MALE UAV). These decisions reflect the importance of national industrial and social factors in defence investment decision-making. For instance, the modernisation of the Eurofighter fleet and the purchase of 20 additional aircraft would provide the Airbus factory in Getafe with work until at least 2030. But, analysts assert, politics is also an important factor. Spain is one of the prime advocates of the Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO) project, but it only leads two of the 24 projects in which it participates.

Defence industry

Large firms, such as the state-owned Navantia shipyards, Santa Bárbara Sistemas (belonging to General Dynamics European Land Systems) and Airbus, comprise nearly one-quarter of Spain’s defence industrial sector. For several years, the MoD has been trying to strengthen the national defenceindustrial and technological base and improve the competitiveness of defence firms. Participation in PESCO projects may reflect this intent, though much remains to be decided about the level of Spanish industrial participation in project consortia. While defence exports are modest in global terms, they remain an important source of revenue, mainly deriving from sales of Airbus products (such as the A400M, A330 MRTT, C295 or CN235) and Navantia vessels (such as the Canberra-class LHD and Hobart-

class DDG for Australia, as well as corvettes for Saudi Arabia). Other small- and medium-sized companies, such as Urovesa, Escribano, Instalaza, Maxam and Rodman, are also active in the export market. There has been some debate over sales to Middle Eastern states, which led to Royal Decree 679/2014, approving the Regulation for the Control of Foreign Trade in Defence Material, Other Material and Dual-Use Products and Technologies. This is intended to reinforce controls over defence sales (including postsale verification) to prevent weapons from being used outside the importing country. Military sales must also be authorised by the Inter-Ministerial Regulatory Board on External Trade in Defence and Dual-Use Material.

UNITED KINGDOM In March 2021 the UK government unveiled its Integrated Review (IR) of security, defence, development and foreign policy, entitled ‘Global Britain in a Competitive Age’, which it had previously declared would be the largest review of its type carried out in the UK since the end of the Cold War. This was immediately followed by a Defence Command Paper, ‘Defence in a Competitive Age’, which set out in greater detail plans to modernise the armed forces, including some significant cuts to personnel and inventories of platforms, especially in the British Army and the Royal Air Force (RAF), to help pay for new equipment programmes and investment in emerging technologies. This transition from obsolete ‘sunset’ to ‘sunrise’ capabilities is planned to involve networking, the exploitation of data, artificial intelligence, directedenergy weapons and robotic and autonomous systems. These plans include a reconnaissance satellite constellation for the new UK Space Command. Overall, the IR proposed a UK posture that would be more proactive in seeking to shape the international order and, critically, would integrate the key levers of government and national power and influence. To underpin all this, the government had previously announced in November 2020 an uplift of GBP16.5 billion (USD22.8bn) in the defence budget over four years. The most attention-grabbing aspect of the IR was the announcement of an ‘Indo-Pacific tilt’, as well as increased focus on Africa and the Middle East. At the same time, the review suggested that the centre of gravity of the UK’s defence commitments would

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THE MILITARY BALANCE 2022

remain NATO and the Euro–Atlantic arena. Indeed, it identified Russia as posing the ‘most acute direct threat’ to the UK, while China was portrayed as a ‘systemic’ competitor.

Inevitably, this raised questions about whether the government can deliver on all these ambitions. Ministers and senior officers have sought to reconcile this apparent tension by arguing in part that the

Minilateral defence cooperation in Europe Regional and minilateral defence cooperation in Europe accelerated during the coronavirus pandemic. In addition to enhanced interoperability, joint planning and cooperative capability development, initiatives to tackle the coronavirus pandemic, improve resilience and further both NATO’s and the EU’s green defence and innovation priorities all provided an impetus for regional and minilateral formats in 2020 and 2021. The French-led European Intervention Initiative (EI2) focuses on tackling terrorism, improving resilience, anticipating future crises and on enhanced defence cooperation. EI2 activity is structured across eight working groups – four geographical (focusing on the Sahel, the Caribbean, the Baltic region and the Indian Ocean) and four thematic working groups (focusing on power projection, terrorism, external influence in Africa and legal affairs). On 22 June 2021 a conference on European defence cooperation outlined a requirement for European defence cooperation in fully-networked, optionally-crewed, collaborative combat-air capability and showcased the FCAS and Next-Generation Weapons System (NGWS). Earlier, on 25 September 2020, EI2 defence ministers met in Portugal for a third high-level meeting. Among other agenda points, they discussed enlargement, though no new members have been invited to join since 2019 despite reports of interest by Greece and others. This reignited criticism in some quarters over perceptions of the format’s exclusivity and perhaps reflects a lack of consensus on EI2 enlargement among its members. The UK-led Joint Expeditionary Force (JEF) focused on increasing preparedness and interoperability. On 1 July 2021 JEF states adopted a new Policy Direction concerning operational and logistical guidance for rapid deployment and deterrence against hybrid security threats in Northern Europe. On 12 February 2020 the participating states signed a Readiness Declaration, committing the JEF to contribute to NATO’s Readiness Initiative, including with land, maritime and air capabilities, and military logistics. In March 2021 two Royal Navy ships participated alongside Baltic partners in the JEF’s first maritime security activity in the Baltic Sea. This prepared the ground for the JEF’s second large joint exercise, Joint Protector 21, which took place in Sweden in September 2021. Iceland became the tenth JEF member state on joining in April 2021.

The Nordic Defence Cooperation (NORDEFCO) grouping is focused on implementing its Vision 2025 priorities, notably tackling the pandemic; ‘green defence’; consolidating work on ‘total defence’, military logistics and capability development; and strengthening partnerships with the US and Baltic countries. In February 2020, member states activated the NORDEFCO Crisis Consultation Mechanism to collaborate on reducing the pandemic’s impact on the armed forces and resuming training and exercises. During 2020 a Danish-led working group on green defence was set up to discuss options for reducing CO2 emissions by installations, equipment and operations. The National Armaments Directors of NORDEFCO countries met twice to review ongoing work on capability development in Space, Counter Unmanned Aircraft Systems and Electronic Warfare as part of NORDEFCO’s new Long-Term Project Development model. The Military Coordination Committee authorised further action on five lines of effort: ammunition, strategic sea- and airlift, maintenance, joint warehousing and host-nation support within NORDEFCO’s Logistics Forum initiative. Discussions with US European Command in September 2020 focused on cooperation over military mobility, capability development, Arctic security and exercise coordination. In 2021 Finland, as chair, signalled that NORDEFCO will work on project bids for the European Defence Fund and on reducing the impact of the pandemic on security of supply issues, especially relating to defence projects and the Nordic defence industry and industrial base. On 24 June 2020 the Visegrad Four (V4) ministers of defence signed the Long-Term Vision of the Visegrad Countries on their Defence Cooperation, revising a document originally signed in 2014. The 2020 document increases V4 contributions to NATO and EU Common Security and Defence Policy operations and commits them to closer cooperative capability development, including through a joint ammunition project and European Defence Fund bids. Meeting in Krakow from 23–24 June 2021, V4 chiefs of defence updated the 2023 V4 EU Battlegroup preparation process and launched a joint initiative on V4 Training and Exercise Strategy. Improved cooperation against Russian ‘hybrid threats’ through strategic communications and cooperation on digitisation and technical innovation featured in V4 meetings throughout 2020 and 2021.

declared ambition of a greater and more persistent presence in the Indo-Pacific region should not be seen solely, or indeed primarily, in defence terms. However, the prominence given during 2021 to the dispatch to the region of the UK’s Carrier Strike Group on its first operational deployment appeared only to heighten expectations. The September 2021 Australia–UK–US (AUKUS) agreement, centred on cooperation to deliver a nuclear-powered submarine capability for the Royal Australian Navy, could help underpin increased UK commitment to the region, but the specific role of each signatory to the agreement remains unclear at the time of writing. The IR also announced that the ceiling on the UK’s nuclear-warhead stockpile would be raised to counter ‘the developing range of technological and doctrinal threats’ in other countries. This appeared to be a sign of renewed concern about the strength of the UK’s deterrent posture in the face of developments in the nuclear and missile-defence capabilities and postures of Russia and, possibly, China. The budget implications of this move were unclear but could be significant.

Increasing maritime capability – reducing land and air capabilities

In October 2021 Prime Minister Boris Johnson appointed an admiral to the post of chief of the defence staff for the first time in two decades (and for only the third time since 1982), which some analysts understood to suggest a more maritime-centred focus. Johnson declared that his ambition for the Royal Navy was for it to be ‘foremost in Europe’. The navy appears to be a major beneficiary from the review. There will be a short-term dip in destroyer and frigate numbers (already reduced from 19 to 18). Navy chiefs argue that there will be compensation in increased numbers in the future (although the plan to rectify the unreliable propulsion of the Type-45 destroyers appears to be running behind schedule). The aim is to build up to a force of 24 escorts by the mid-2030s, including new Type-26, Type-31 and eventually Type-32 frigates, the last of which is still in the design phase. New autonomous mine-warfare capabilities will replace existing mine countermeasures vessels. Also critical to the navy’s future operational plans is the new Fleet Solid Support ship programme. Two new Littoral Response Groups – one in the Euro–Atlantic area and from late 2023 another in the Indo-Pacific and centred mainly on the Indian

Ocean – will carry Royal Marines as part of a transformed Future Commando Force. Forward presence will also include the latest offshore patrol vessels, to be replaced or supplemented later by some of the new-design frigates. Initial planning is also underway for a new-generation destroyer, the Type-83, and a successor nuclear-powered attack submarine. There are also increasing signs that the navy is looking to keep both of its aircraft carriers available for operations, although at present there are not sufficient assets for two carrier air groups. The UK says it will buy more than its current commitment of 48 F-35B Lightning II aircraft to fly from the ships, though it has not been specific about how many more or when; at the same time, there may be greater focus on developing uninhabited air capabilities to fly from the carriers. The RAF will reduce airframe numbers, allowing a GBP2bn (USD2.8bn) investment in the concept and assessment phase of the FCAS programme, with the Tempest crewed combat aircraft project at its core, to potentially provide a replacement for the Typhoon after 2035. The RAF plans to continue fielding seven Typhoon operational squadrons, although 24 early model Typhoons are to be withdrawn by 2025, five years earlier than anticipated. The 14 C-130J Hercules medium-transport aircraft that support special forces will be retired. The role will be assumed by the larger A400M Atlas. The last three E-3D airborne early-warning and control aircraft were retired in 2021, to be replaced from 2023 by three E-7 Wedgetail aircraft. The Puma HC2 medium-lift helicopter fleet will retire by 2025, to be replaced by an as-yet-unidentified type, while eight of the RAF’s early-model Chinook heavy-lift helicopters are also to be withdrawn, though the UK agreed a contract for 14 H-47(ER) Chinook helicopters in May 2021. A Global Response Force will combine the army’s existing air-assault and combat-aviation brigades. The 3rd Division will remain optimised for high-intensity warfighting and will shift its capabilities in favour of both protection and deep battle. The plan is also for electronic-warfare and air-defence capabilities to double in size. The army will also reduce from three to two armoured Brigade Combat Teams (BCTs), with a mixture of heavy and medium armour. Two-thirds of the current fleet of Challenger 2 main battle tanks will be upgraded, amounting to 148 vehicles. The Warrior infantry fighting vehicle will be retired and the armoured-infantry capability apparently abandoned. Instead, mechanised infantry will use the Boxer

Europe

THE MILITARY BALANCE 2022

wheeled armoured personnel carrier, meaning that the UK will be the only significant NATO member without armoured infantry. This and the reduction in tanks and ground-manoeuvre brigades by one-third will reduce close-combat capability, not least in urban terrain. The army plans to increase capability for deep battle by attacking more targets with greater precision at longer range. The plan is for a new ‘Deep Recce Strike’ BCT to achieve this by using Ajax scout vehicles, electronic warfare and long-range precision artillery, including guided multiple-launch rocket systems (MLRS) and Spike-NLOS missiles, supported by attack helicopters. The Army’s Future Soldier document, released in November 2021, set out these plans, including the creation of a new ‘Ranger’ regiment designed to train, advise ‘and if necessary accompany’ partners, alongside more detail on the new Special Operations Brigade, announced in August 2021. However, the army’s plans depend on the long-overdue replacement of the high proportion of its fighting equipment that is either obsolete or nearing obsolescence, such as the exchange of the Scimitar reconnaissance vehicles with the Ajax. But Ajax is suffering well-publicised problems that have inflicted a considerable delay and its survival remains

in some doubt, indicating that, despite many reforms, the process for procuring UK military equipment still has considerable weaknesses.

Unclear priorities

The review’s analysis of developing challenges appears consistent with the thinking of the US and many of the UK’s allies that are de-emphasising traditional assets – force size and materiel – in favour of emerging technological capabilities. However, there is a risk of too much combat capability being removed, particularly from the army and the RAF. Moreover, many of the new technologies promoted in the review depend on the existence of a secure backbone of digital communications. This has the potential to increase capability, but conversely could increase vulnerability to attack by cyber, electronic warfare or electromagnetic pulse weapons. Meanwhile, reductions in the numbers of aircraft and armoured forces will make it more difficult to sustain the repeated deployments required by the IR. If the ambitions in the review are followed through, it is likely that forces will be spread more thinly, perhaps increasing risk in the move to reduce personnel in favour of technology, not least as the size of reserve forces is to remain static.

Europe

Arms procurements and deliveries – Europe Significant events in 2021

FRENCH SHIPYARD SALE CALLED OFF

The 2018 agreement to sell the Chantiers de l’Atlantique shipyard in Saint-Nazaire to Italy’s Fincantieri was called off, with both sides citing the significant economic challenges facing the cruise ship industry due to the pandemic. Chantiers de l’Atlantique – the only shipyard in France with enough capacity to build the country’s next aircraft carrier – had been majority-owned by Korean firm STX from 2008 until the company’s bankruptcy in 2016. The French government’s subsequent nationalisation of the shipyard was described as a ‘temporary’ measure, with the sale to Fincantieri intended to secure the company’s longer-term health.

FEBRUARY

RHEINMETALL RESTRUCTURING

Rheinmetall announced a restructuring that will dissolve its Automotive and Defence divisions and replace them with five new groups: Weapon & Ammunition, Electronic Solutions, Vehicle Systems, Sensors & Actuators and Materials & Trade. One of the reasons given for the move was to reduce the share of sales of automotive components, such as for internal combustion engines, while the firm also announced that its pistons business will be sold. Rheinmetall intends to focus more on the defence and security sector. Currently comprising 63% (EUR3.65bn (USD4.45bn)) of the firm’s total sales of EUR5.8bn (USD7.06bn), the company expects that defence and security products will by 2025 reach 70% (EUR5.95bn (USD7.25bn)) of its projected total sales of EUR8.5bn (USD10.36bn).

JUNE

SWITZERLAND BUYS AMERICAN

The Swiss government announced the selection of the F-35A and Patriot for its new fighter and groundbased air-defence programmes, respectively. The choice of the former ends a saga that began in the late 2000s and included the rejection of the Swedish Gripen in a popular referendum in 2014, followed by the (narrow) approval of the programme in another referendum in 2020. The government stated that both systems were the lowest-priced offers in their respective competitions. The F-35 has recently begun to see its unit cost reduce as production edges closer to one-third of the number ordered globally so far.

AUGUST

FCAS/SCAF: SIX YEARS OF DEVELOPMENT AGREED

France, Germany and Spain agreed on a further six years of development work for the FCAS/SCAF programme, specifically the Next Generation Weapon System project that includes a fighter aircraft (led by Dassault), an uninhabited systems remote carrier and a combat cloud (both led by Airbus). In March the CEO of Dassault Aviation voiced concerns over workshare arrangements and project management. The addition of Spain as an equal partner in 2019 spreads the financial burden, but it also increases Airbus’s share of the programme. In addition, both companies have concerns over intellectual property, as some technology that will be used in the programme has already been developed by them independently. The respective governments have so far managed to smooth over potential disagreements but their continued attention will be required as the companies negotiate the specifics of the next phase of work.

AUGUST

ULTRA ELECTRONICS: PROPOSED TAKEOVER PROBED

The UK government announced that it would investigate the proposed GBP2.6bn (USD3.61bn) takeover of Ultra Electronics by Cobham Group. Ultra Electronics supplies several key subsystems to the UK and other close allies, and the deal is being assessed for its national security implications. Cobham was itself controversially taken over by US private-equity firm Advent International in December 2019 and has since divested a number of businesses, including its stake in the AirTanker consortium and its Mission Systems pilot-training business. Advent International and Cobham had earlier raised the possibility of acquiring Ultra to create a ‘global defence electronics champion’. However, the UK government will be concerned about the potential implications of the takeover of a company that provides the UK with some of its most sensitive technology, most significantly hull-mounted sonars for frigates.

Europe

JANUARY

THE MILITARY BALANCE 2022

Table 5

Hungary: defence procurement since 2010

Launched in 2017, Hungary’s ten-year Zrínyi 2026 programme aims to achieve the most significant modernisation of the armed forces since the end of the Cold War. There is particular focus on recapitalising equipment across the air and land domains and the development of the defence industry by facilitating offset agreements, local production deals and technology transfer. Over the last three years, Hungary has signed several contracts designed to boost its land capa-

bilities, largely with German companies; of 218 Lynx infantry fighting vehicles contracted from Rheinmetall, the plan is to manufacture 172 in Hungary. Aerospace procurement has focused on acquiring utility transport platforms. The two KC-390 medium transport aircraft ordered from Embraer will provide a significant capability upgrade following the retirement of the four An-26 Curl light transport aircraft in 2020. Construction of the first airframe began in late 2021.

Contract date Aug 2014

Equipment

Type

Quantity

Value

Mistral 3

Point-defence man-portable air defence system

73+

HUF3.68bn (USD15.83m)

Jan 2017

Z-242L

Training aircraft

2 2

Z-143L

MBDA

Deliveries Part of Zrínyi 2026? 2016–19 No

Approx. HUF363m (USD1.32m)

Zlin Aviation

Mar 2017

Yes

Mar 2018

Yes

Jan 2018 Yes Ceská Letecká Servisní (CLS) Airbus Nov 2019– Yes Dec 2021

Dec 2017

A319*

Passenger transport aircraft

εUSD90m

Jun 2018

H145M

Multi-role helicopter

Dec 2018

Leopard 2A4**

Main battle tank

Approx. HUF100bn (USD370.08m) Approx. EUR1.76bn (USD2.08bn)

Leopard 2A7+ Main battle tank

PzH 2000

155mm self-propelled artillery 24

Dec 2018

H225M

Heavy transport helicopter

HUF48bn (USD177.64m)

Dec 2019

Wisent 2

Armoured recovery vehicle

n.k.

Dec 2019

Ejder Yalcin 4x4 Lynx

Protected patrol vehicle

εUSD6.10m

Infantry fighting vehicle

218***

EUR2bn (USD2.28bn)

BPz-3 Büffel

Armoured recovery vehicle

Nov 2020

NASAMS III

Short-range surface-to-air missile system

n.k.

Nov 2020

KC-390

Medium transport aircraft

Dec 2020

Ejder Yalcin 4x4

Protected patrol vehicle

40 (320)****

Sep 2020

KraussMaffei Wegmann (KMW)

Jul–Dec 2020 Expected from 2023

Yes Yes

Expected Yes in 2021–25 M

Airbus

Expected Yes in 2023–25

Flensburger Expected Yes Fahrzeugbau in 2023–25 Gesellschaft (FFG) Nurol Makina Dec 2020 Yes Expected from 2023 Expected from 2023

Yes

EUR410m (USD468.7m)

Raytheon Expected Technologies in 2023 Kongsberg

Yes

Up to HUF75bn (USD243.51m) εUSD23m

Embraer

*second-hand **a second-hand lease agreement ***46 to be built in Germany by Rheinmetall; 172 to be built in Hungary by Rheinmetall Hungary ****40 to be built in Turkey by Nurol Makina; 280 to be built in Hungary by HT Division

M – multinational

Prime contractor

Rheinmetall

Yes

Expected Yes in 2023–24

Nurol Makina n.k.

Yes

Europe

▼Figure 9

In 2002, France and Italy agreed to jointly develop and acquire multi-mission frigates (FRégates Européennes Multi-Missions (FREMM)). The resulting vessels share a basic hull design, propulsion system and some weapons, but little else. Both France and Italy have large and well-established domestic manufacturers of sensors and combat systems, principally Thales and Leonardo, which have integrated equipment on each country’s respective frigates. Italy’s requirement has always been for ten vessels, but while France began with a plan to build 17 this was subsequently reduced to eight. In part because of these changes, French unit-cost estimates have

more than doubled; this is despite the export of two vessels to Morocco and Egypt. In contrast, the unit cost of Italy’s vessels has remained broadly the same. More recently Italy has also exported two of its unfinished frigates to Egypt, with two replacements added to the shipbuilding plan. However, the most significant export was secured in 2020 when the US Navy (USN) selected a modified version of Italy’s FREMM variant for its FFG(X) programme of up to 20 ships. If the USN does build up to 20 vessels, like the UK’s Type-26 frigate the design will be operated in greater numbers by a foreign navy than by the domestic customer.

FREMM exports Order date

Recipient

Variant

Quantity

Value (USD)

Deliveries

2007

Morocco

FRA – ASW

685.23m

2014

2015

Egypt

FRA – ASW

1.11bn

2016

2020*

United States

ITA – Constellation

2.33bn

2026–27

2020

Egypt

ITA – GP

1.37bn

2020–ongoing

2021

Indonesia

ITA – tbd

n.k.

*Contract for first of class; 20 to be built under current Program of Record ASW = Anti-Submarine Warfare; GP = General Purpose

France: planned quantity of purchase and government’s estimated programme cost (EUR million) 12,000

10,000

8,000

6,000

4,000

2,000 0

0 2002

2005

2007

2009

Estimated programme cost

2010

2011

Approximate unit cost

2012

2013

2014

2015

2016

2017

2018

Planned quantity

Italy: planned quantity of purchase and government’s estimated programme cost (EUR million) 12

8,000

6,000

8 6

4,000

2,000 0

2 0 2003

2006

2007

Estimated programme cost

2008

2009

2010

2011

Approximate unit cost

2012

2013

2015

2016

2017

2018

2019

2020

Planned quantity © IISS

Europe

European Multi-Mission Frigate (FREMM)

THE MILITARY BALANCE 2022

Albania ALB 2020

2021

GDP

Albanian Lek ALL ALL

1.61tr

1.72tr

USD

14.8bn

16.8bn

per capita

USD

5,153

5,837

-3.3

5.3

Growth Inflation Def exp [a] Def bdgt [b]

1.6

1.9

ALL

20.4bn

34.5bn

USD

188m

336m

ALL

24.1bn

25.2bn

USD

222m

246m

108.44

102.51

USD1=ALL

2022

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES APC • PPV 40 MaxxPro Plus ARTILLERY • MOR 32: 82mm 20; 120mm 12 32.2bn

Coast Guard

[b] Excludes military pensions Real-terms defence budget trend (USDm, constant 2015) 209 148

Population

Naval Force 700 EQUIPMENT BY TYPE All operational patrol vessels under 10t FLD

[a] NATO figure

2008

MANOEUVRE Light 3 lt inf bn COMBAT SUPPORT 1 mor bty 1 NBC coy

2015

2021

3,088,385

Age

0–14

15–19

20–24

25–29

30–64 65 plus

Male

9.3%

3.4%

4.2%

4.7%

21.5%

6.3%

Female

8.4%

3.0%

3.9%

4.5%

23.6%

7.3%

Capabilities Principal missions for Albania’s armed forces include territorial defence, internal security, disaster-relief tasks and small-scale peacekeeping or training deployments. Tirana is looking to improve the operational readiness and capability of its infantry battalion, including with new equipment closer to NATO standards. Other priorities include improving border management and information sharing to prevent transnational crime and terrorism, establishing a cyber-security unit and developing air capabilities, and creating an armed-forces academy styled on the US Military Academy. Greece and Italy police Albania’s airspace. Albania contributes to NATO, UN and EU missions but does not possess an independent expeditionary capability. Most Soviet-era equipment has been sold. Limited defence modernisation under the Long-Term Development Plan 2016–25 is proceeding, including the purchase of helicopters and UAVs and the installation of an airspace-surveillance system. The navy is expected to receive upgrades to vessels that have been or still are deployed in the Aegean Sea. NATO support for the modernisation of Kucova air base is due to begin in 2022. Albania has little in the way of a domestic defence industry, with no ability to design and manufacture modern military platforms. Nevertheless, the country has some publicly owned defence companies that are capable of producing small arms, explosives and ammunition.

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 14 PB 9: 4 Iliria (Damen Stan Patrol 4207); 3 Mk3 Sea Spectre; 2 Shqypnia PBR 5: 2 Type-227; 1 Type-246; 2 Type-2010

Air Force 650 EQUIPMENT BY TYPE HELICOPTERS TPT 16: Medium 4 AS532AL Cougar; Light 12: 1 AW109; 3 Bell 205 (AB-205); 2 Bell 206C (AB-206C); 4 Bo-105; 2 H145

Military Police FORCES BY ROLE COMBAT SUPPORT 1 MP bn EQUIPMENT BY TYPE ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES AUV 8 IVECO LMV

Support Command 1,650 FORCES BY ROLE COMBAT SUPPORT 1 engr bn 1 cbt spt bn COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT 1 log bde (1 tpt bn, 1 log bn) 1 maint unit

ACTIVE 7,500 (Land Force 2,350 Naval Force 700 Air Force 650 Support Command 1,650 Other 2,150)

DEPLOYMENT

ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE

BOSNIA-HERZEGOVINA: EU • EUFOR • Operation Althea 1

Land Force 2,350

LATVIA: NATO • Enhanced Forward Presence 21; 1 EOD pl

FORCES BY ROLE SPECIAL FORCES 1 spec ops regt (1 SF bn, 1 cdo bn)

SERBIA: NATO • KFOR 29 SOUTH SUDAN: UN • UNMISS 2

Europe

RESERVE 115,950 (Joint structured 35,050; Joint

Austria AUT

unstructured 80,900) 2020

per capita Growth Inflation Def bdgt [a]

2021

EUR

379bn

403bn

USD

433bn

481bn

USD

48,593

53,793

-6.2

3.9

1.4

2.5

EUR

3.04bn

3.08bn

USD

3.47bn

3.68bn

0.88

0.84

USD1=EUR

2022

ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE Land Forces 13,000 3.11bn

[a] Includes military pensions Real-terms defence budget trend (USDbn, constant 2015) 3.12 2.56 2008

Population Age

2015

2021

8,884,864 0–14

15–19

20–24

25–29

Some 12,000 reservists a year undergo refresher trg in tranches

30–64 65 plus

Male

7.2%

2.4%

2.7%

3.3%

24.5%

8.8%

Female

6.8%

2.4%

2.6%

3.2%

24.7%

11.3%

Capabilities Austria remains constitutionally non-aligned, but is an EU member and actively engaged in the CSDP. Defence-policy objectives are based on the 2013 National Security Strategy, the 2014 Defence Strategy and the 2017 Military Strategy, including providing military capabilities to maintain sovereignty and territorial integrity, to enable military assistance to the civil authorities and to participate in crisis-management missions abroad. A 2017 defence plan included structural changes at the operational and tactical command-and-control level. Army brigades have specialised according to roles, such as rapid response, mechanised (heavy), air-mobile (light) and mountain warfare. In June 2021, organisational-reform plans were announced that envisage a streamlining of structures in the Ministry of Defence. These are supposed to be completed by April 2022. While not a NATO member, Austria joined NATO’s Partnership for Peace framework in 1995. A September 2019 defence ministry report defined recapitalisation requirements until 2030. It warned that the gap between requirements and available resources was growing and would ultimately undermine the ability of the armed forces to implement its missions. The level of ambition for crisis response is to be able to deploy and sustain a minimum (on average) of 1,100 troops. The September 2019 report also called for the Typhoon fleet to be upgraded rather than replaced. In July 2020, the defence ministry confirmed that it would retain the Typhoon but in January 2021 the defence minister suggested they might be sold if the opportunity presented itself. There are plans to cooperate with Italy over helicopter procurement, and a letter of intent was signed in November 2020. Austria’s defence-industrial base is comprised of some 100 companies with significant niche capabilities and international ties in the areas of weapons and ammunitions, communications equipment and vehicles.

ACTIVE 23,300 (Land Forces 13,000 Air 2,800 Support 7,500)

Conscript liability 6 months recruit trg, 30 days reservist refresher trg for volunteers; 120–150 days additional for officers, NCOs and specialists. Authorised maximum wartime strength of 55,000

FORCES BY ROLE MANOEUVRE Armoured 1 (4th) armd inf bde (1 recce/SP arty bn, 1 tk bn, 2 armd inf bn, 1 spt bn) Mechanised 1 (3rd) mech inf bde (1 recce/SP arty bn, 3 mech inf bn, 1 cbt engr bn, 1 spt bn) Light 1 (7th) lt inf bde (1 recce bn, 3 inf bn, 1 cbt engr bn, 1 spt bn) 1 (6th) mtn inf bde (3 mtn inf bn, 1 cbt engr bn, 1 spt bn) EQUIPMENT BY TYPE ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES MBT 56 Leopard 2A4 IFV 112 Ulan APC 144 APC (T) 32 BvS-10 APC (W) 112: 78 Pandur; 34 Pandur EVO AUV 216: 66 Dingo 2; 150 IVECO LMV ENGINEERING & MAINTENANCE VEHICLES ARV 49: 27 4KH7FA-SB Greif (11 more in store); 12 Dingo 2 ARV; 10 M88A1 NBC VEHICLES 12 Dingo 2 AC NBC ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE MSL • MANPATS Bill 2 (PAL 2000) ARTILLERY 105 SP 155mm 48 M109A5ÖE MOR 120mm 57 sGrW 86 (40 more in store)

Air Force 2,800 The Air Force is part of Joint Forces Comd and consists of 2 bde; Air Support Comd and Airspace Surveillance Comd FORCES BY ROLE FIGHTER 2 sqn with Eurofighter Typhoon ISR 1 sqn with PC-6B Turbo Porter TRANSPORT 1 sqn with C-130K Hercules TRAINING 1 trg sqn with PC-7 Turbo Trainer TRANSPORT HELICOPTER 2 sqn with Bell 212 (AB-212) 1 sqn with OH-58B Kiowa 1 sqn with S-70A Black Hawk 2 sqn with SA316/SA319 Alouette III AIR DEFENCE 2 bn 1 radar bn

Europe

Euro EUR GDP

THE MILITARY BALANCE 2022

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE AIRCRAFT 15 combat capable FTR 15 Eurofighter Typhoon (Tranche 1) TPT 11: Medium 3 C-130K Hercules; Light 8 PC-6B Turbo Porter TRG 16: 12 PC-7 Turbo Trainer; 4 DA40NG HELICOPTERS MRH 18 SA316/SA319 Alouette III ISR 10 OH-58B Kiowa TPT 32: Medium 9 S-70A-42 Black Hawk; Light 23 Bell 212 (AB-212) AIR DEFENCE SAM • Point-defence Mistral GUNS 35mm 24 GDF-005 (6 more in store) AIR-LAUNCHED MISSILES • AAM • IIR IRIS-T

Belgium BEL

Special Operations Forces

[a] NATO figure

FORCES BY ROLE SPECIAL FORCES 2 SF gp 1 SF gp (reserve)

Support 7,500

Support forces comprise Joint Services Support Command and several agencies, academies and schools

DEPLOYMENT BOSNIA-HERZEGOVINA: EU • EUFOR • Operation Althea 258; 1 inf bn HQ; 1 inf coy; 1 hel unit CYPRUS: UN • UNFICYP 3 LEBANON: UN • UNIFIL 172; 1 log coy MALI: EU • EUTM Mali 21; UN • MINUSMA 2 MIDDLE EAST: UN • UNTSO 4 SERBIA: NATO • KFOR 338; 1 recce coy; 1 mech inf coy; 1 log coy; UN • UNMIK 1 WESTERN SAHARA: UN • MINURSO 6

Euro EUR

2020

2021

451bn

487bn

GDP

EUR USD

515bn

582bn

per capita

USD

44,688

50,413

Growth

-6.3

5.6

Inflation

0.4

2.4

Def exp [a] Def bdgt [b]

EUR

4.76bn

5.34bn

USD

5.43bn

6.37bn

EUR

4.66bn

5.36bn

USD

5.32bn

6.40bn

0.88

0.84

USD1=EUR

2022

5.99bn

[b] Includes military pensions Real-terms defence budget trend (USDbn, constant 2015) 5.37 3.80 2008

Population

2015

2021

11,778,842

Age

0–14

15–19

20–24

25–29

Male

8.8%

2.8%

2.9%

3.2%

30–64 65 plus 23.1%

8.5%

Female

8.4%

2.7%

2.8%

3.1%

22.9%

10.8%

Capabilities In July 2016, the government published its Strategic Vision for Defence for 2030. This envisaged a reduced personnel component of around 25,000. However, a large number of impending service retirements means that a gradual increase in recruitment is planned. Belgium also continues to pursue high readiness levels and deployable niche capabilities. NATO, EU and UN membership are central to defence policy. Due to its limited force size, Belgium often collaborates with neighbours and has committed with Denmark and the Netherlands to form a composite combined special-operations command. Belgium can deploy forces for a small-scale overseas operation and maintains overseas deployments on EU and UN missions. It has withdrawn its aircraft from the Middle East. The six-year domestic deployment in support of the federal police officially ended in September 2021, though mid-year saw the armed forces deployed to assist in domestic flood responses. The government is investing in short-term requirements related to aircraft readiness, personal equipment and land-forces vehicles. As part of the defence plan, the government envisages launching five investment projects for fighter aircraft, frigates, mine-countermeasures vessels (being procured jointly with the Netherlands), UAVs and land-combat vehicles. The army has ordered French Griffon and Jaguar wheeled armoured vehicles for its mechanised brigade as well as the US JLTV. It is forming a multinational unit of A400M transport aircraft with Luxembourg. The air force has selected the F-35 to replace its F-16s and is procuring MQ-9B Sky Guardian UAVs. An upgraded, and resited, airspace monitoring centre began operations in October 2020. Belgium has an advanced, export-focused defence industry, focusing on components and subcontracting, though in FN Herstal it has one of the world’s largest manufacturers of small arms.

ACTIVE 24,450 (Army 9,600 Navy 1,500 Air 4,950 Medical Service 1,450 Joint Service 6,950)

RESERVE 5,900

Europe

Land Component 9,600 FORCES BY ROLE SPECIAL FORCES 1 spec ops regt (1 SF gp, 1 cdo bn, 1 para bn, 1 sigs gp) MANOEUVRE Mechanised 1 mech bde (1 ISR bn; 3 mech bn; 2 lt inf bn; 1 arty bn; 2 engr bn; 2 sigs gp; 2 log bn) COMBAT SUPPORT 1 CIMIC gp 1 EOD unit 1 MP coy COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT 1 log bn EQUIPMENT BY TYPE ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES ASLT 18 Piranha III-C DF90 RECCE 30 Pandur Recce IFV 19 Piranha III-C DF30 APC • APC (W) 78: 64 Piranha III-C; 14 Piranha III-PC (CP) AUV 655: 219 Dingo 2 (inc 52 CP); 436 IVECO LMV ENGINEERING & MAINTENANCE VEHICLES AEV 14: 6 Pionierpanzer 2 Dachs; 8 Piranha III-C ARV 13: 4 Pandur; 9 Piranha III-C VLB 4 Leguan ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE MSL • MANPATS Spike-MR ARTILLERY 60 TOWED 105mm 14 LG1 MkII MOR 46: 81mm 14 Expal; 120mm 32 RT-61

Naval Component 1,500 EQUIPMENT BY TYPE PRINCIPAL SURFACE COMBATANTS • FRIGATES 2 FFGHM 2 Leopold I (ex-NLD Karel Doorman) with 2 quad lnchr with RGM-84 Harpoon AShM, 1 16-cell Mk 48 mod 1 VLS with RIM-7P Sea Sparrow SAM, 2 twin 324mm SVTT Mk 32 ASTT with Mk 46 LWT, 1 Goalkeeper CIWS, 1 76mm gun (capacity 1 med hel) PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS PCC 2 Castor (FRA Kermorvan mod) MINE WARFARE • MINE COUNTERMEASURES MHC 5 Flower (Tripartite) LOGISTICS AND SUPPORT 2 AGOR 1 Belgica (owned by BELSPO, managed by RBINS) AXS 1 Zenobe Gramme

Air Component 4,950 FORCES BY ROLE FIGHTER/GROUND ATTACK/ISR 4 sqn with F-16AM/BM Fighting Falcon SEARCH & RESCUE 1 sqn with NH90 NFH TRANSPORT 1 sqn with Falcon 7X (VIP) 1 sqn (BEL/LUX) with A400M; C-130H Hercules

TRAINING 1 OCU sqn with F-16AM/BM Fighting Falcon 1 sqn with SF-260D/M 1 OCU unit with AW109 TRANSPORT HELICOPTER 2 sqn with AW109 (ISR) EQUIPMENT BY TYPE AIRCRAFT 53 combat capable FTR 53: 44 F-16AM Fighting Falcon; 9 F-16BM Fighting Falcon TPT 10: Heavy 4 A400M; Medium 4 C-130H Hercules; PAX 2 Falcon 7X (VIP, leased) TRG 32: 9 SF-260D; 23 SF-260M HELICOPTERS ASW 4 NH90 NFH (opcon Navy) TPT 11: Medium 4 NH90 TTH; Light 7 AW109 (ISR) (7 more in store) AIR-LAUNCHED MISSILES AAM • IR AIM-9M Sidewinder; IIR AIM-9X Sidewinder II; ARH AIM-120B AMRAAM BOMBS Laser-guided: GBU-10/GBU-12 Paveway II; GBU-24 Paveway III INS/GPS guided: GBU-31 JDAM; GBU-38 JDAM; GBU54 Laser JDAM (dual-mode)

Medical Service 1,450 FORCES BY ROLE COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT 4 med unit 1 fd hospital EQUIPMENT BY TYPE ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES APC • APC (W) 10: 4 Pandur (amb); 6 Piranha III-C (amb) AUV 10 Dingo 2 (amb)

DEPLOYMENT BALTIC SEA: NATO • SNMCMG 1: 1 MHC CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC: EU • EUTM RCA 60 DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO: UN • MONUSCO 1 IRAQ: Operation Inherent Resolve 6; NATO • NATO Mission Iraq 7 LITHUANIA: NATO • Enhanced Forward Presence 198; 1 mot inf coy MALI: Operation Barkhane 3; EU • EUTM Mali 15; UN • MINUSMA 53 MIDDLE EAST: UN • UNTSO 1 NIGER: METT 130 NORTH SEA: NATO • SNMG 1: 1 FFGHM

FOREIGN FORCES United States US European Command: 1,150

Europe

ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE

THE MILITARY BALANCE 2022 COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT 1 log comd (5 log bn)

Bosnia-Herzegovina BIH Convertible Mark BAM GDP per capita

2020

2021

BAM

34.0bn

35.5bn

USD

19.8bn

21.7bn 6,648

USD

6,035

Growth

-4.3

2.8

Inflation

-1.1

1.8

Def bdgt

BAM

288m

318m

USD

168m

194m

1.72

1.64

USD1=BAM

2022

313m

Real-terms defence budget trend (USDm, constant 2015) 229 149 2008

Population

2015

2021

3,824,782

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES MBT 45 M60A3 APC • APC (T) 20 M113A2 ENGINEERING & MAINTENANCE VEHICLES VLB MTU MW Bozena ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE • MSL SP 60: 8 9P122 Malyutka; 9 9P133 Malyutka; 32 BOV-1; 11 M-92 MANPATS 9K11 Malyutka (RS-AT-3 Sagger); 9K111 Fagot (RS-AT-4 Spigot); 9K115 Metis (RS-AT-7 Saxhorn); HJ-8; Milan ARTILLERY 224 TOWED 122mm 100 D-30 MRL 122mm 24 APRA-40 MOR 120mm 100 M-75

Age

0–14

15–19

20–24

25–29

30–64 65 plus

Air Force and Air Defence Brigade 800

Male

6.8%

2.4%

3.1%

3.2%

26.6%

6.7%

Female

6.4%

2.2%

2.9%

3.0%

26.9%

9.9%

FORCES BY ROLE HELICOPTER 1 sqn with Bell 205; Mi-8MTV Hip; Mi-17 Hip H 1 sqn with Mi-8 Hip; SA-341H/SA-342L Gazelle (HN42/45M) AIR DEFENCE 1 AD bn

Capabilities The armed forces’ primary goals are to defend territorial integrity and contribute to peacekeeping missions and civilian-support operations. Bosnia-Herzegovina joined NATO’s Partnership for Peace in 2006 and a Membership Action Plan was presented in 2010. Its aspiration to join NATO has been delayed due to unresolved defence-property issues, and continuing ethnic tensions have seen the ethnic Serb community threaten to withdraw from national structures including the armed forces. The country is reforming its armed forces and modernising its equipment in accordance with its Defence Review, Development and Modernisation Plan for 2017–27 and its NATO aspirations. The armed forces are professional and represent all three ethnic groups. However, low salaries may negatively affect recruitment and retention. Bosnia-Herzegovina contributes to EU, NATO and UN missions, but the armed forces have no capacity to deploy independently and self-sustain beyond national borders. The inventory comprises mainly ageing Soviet-era equipment, though some new helicopters have been procured from the US. Bosnia-Herzegovina has little in the way of a domestic defence industry, with only the capability to produce small arms, ammunition and explosives.

ACTIVE 10,500 (Armed Forces 10,500) RESERVE 6,000 (Armed Forces 6,000)

ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE Armed Forces 10,500 1 ops comd; 1 spt comd FORCES BY ROLE MANOEUVRE Light 3 inf bde (1 recce coy, 3 inf bn, 1 arty bn) COMBAT SUPPORT 1 cbt spt bde (1 tk bn, 1 engr bn, 1 EOD bn, 1 int bn, 1 MP bn, 1 CBRN coy, 1 sigs bn)

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE AIRCRAFT FGA (7 J-22 Orao in store) ATK (6 J-1 (J-21) Jastreb; 3 TJ-1(NJ-21) Jastreb all in store) ISR (2 RJ-1 (IJ-21) Jastreb* in store) TRG (1 G-4 Super Galeb (N-62)* in store) HELICOPTERS MRH 13: 4 Mi-8MTV Hip; 1 Mi-17 Hip H; 1 SA-341H Gazelle (HN-42); 7 SA-342L Gazelle (HN-45M) TPT 21: Medium 8 Mi-8 Hip Light 13 Bell 205 (UH-1H Iroquois) TRG 1 Mi-34 Hermit AIR DEFENCE SAM Short-range 20 2K12 Kub (RS-SA-6 Gainful) Point-defence 9K34 Strela-3 (RS-SA-14 Gremlin); 9K310 Igla-1 (RS-SA-16 Gimlet) GUNS • TOWED 40mm 47: 31 L/60, 16 L/70

DEPLOYMENT CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC: EU • EUTM RCA 3 DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO: UN • MONUSCO 3 MALI: UN • MINUSMA 2

FOREIGN FORCES Part of EUFOR – Operation Althea unless otherwise stated Albania 1 Austria 258; 1 inf bn HQ; 1 inf coy; 1 hel unit

Bulgaria 12 Chile 8 Czech Republic 2 Greece 6 Hungary 174; 1 inf coy Ireland 5 Italy 50; 1 ISR coy Macedonia, North 1 Poland 38 Romania 40 Slovakia 40 Slovenia 10 Spain 2 Switzerland 20 Turkey 242; 1 inf coy

tary retirement age and salaries have been increased. Training is prioritised for units intended for international operations and those with certain readiness levels declared to NATO and the EU. Bulgaria regularly trains and exercises with NATO partners and regional allies. The country contributes to NATO and EU missions but has little logistics-support capability. Despite long-term plans for reform, there is still much ageing Soviet-era equipment. In April 2020, a contract was signed for eight F-16 Block 70 fighter aircraft, to replace MiG-29s, with the intention also to acquire another eight. There are also plans for acquisitions to enable the formation of battalion battlegroups within its mechanised brigades. The navy is prioritising the procurement of a multi-purpose patrol vessel and the modernisation of its frigates to boost its presence in the Black Sea. However, there are concerns over the affordability of some of these ambitions. Bulgaria’s defence industry exports small arms but has limited capacity to design and manufacture platforms.

Bulgaria BLG

RESERVE 3,000 (Joint 3,000)

Bulgarian Lev BGN GDP per capita Growth Inflation

ACTIVE 36,950 (Army 17,000 Navy 4,450 Air 8,500 Central Staff 7,000)

2020

2021

BGN

119bn

128bn

USD

69.2bn

77.9bn

USD

10,006

11,332

-4.2

4.5

1.2

2.1

Def exp [a]

BGN

1.84bn

2.01bn

USD

1.08bn

1.23bn

Def bdgt [b]

BGN

2.14bn

2.10bn

USD

1.25bn

1.28bn

FMA (US)

USD

USD1=BGN

1.71

1.64

2022

Army 17,000

2.23bn 0m

[a] NATO figure [b] Excludes military pensions Real-terms defence budget trend (USDm, constant 2015) 1762 565 2008

Population

2015

ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE

2021

6,919,180

Age

0–14

15–19

20–24

25–29

Male

7.4%

2.5%

2.4%

2.8%

30–64 65 plus 25.5%

8.2%

Female

7.0%

2.3%

2.2%

2.5%

25.0%

12.1%

Capabilities The armed forces’ main priority is defending state sovereignty and territorial integrity. Following a strategic defence review in 2019–20, the national assembly in February 2021 endorsed the Programme 2032 long-term development plan involving significant re-equipment and modernisation and a focus on artificial intelligence and cyber capability. There is also a long-term commitment to spend at least 2% of GDP on defence. Bulgaria signed a ten-year Defence Cooperation Roadmap with the US in 2020 to assist force development, including meeting NATO capability targets. There are several bilateral defence-cooperation agreements with regional states. Bulgaria’s airspace is protected by NATO’s Air Policing Mission, due to its limited numbers of combat aircraft. In an attempt to cope with personnel shortfalls, the mili-

FORCES BY ROLE MANOEUVRE Reconnaissance 1 recce bn Mechanised 2 mech bde (4 mech inf bn, 1 SP arty bn, 1 cbt engr bn, 1 log bn, 1 SAM bn) Light 1 mtn inf regt COMBAT SUPPORT 1 arty regt (1 fd arty bn, 1 MRL bn) 1 engr regt (1 cbt engr bn, 1 ptn br bn, 1 engr spt bn) 1 NBC bn COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT 1 log regt EQUIPMENT BY TYPE ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES MBT 90 T-72M1/M2† IFV 160: 90 BMP-1; 70 BMP-23 APC 120 APC (T) 100 MT-LB APC (W) 20 BTR-60 AUV 44: 17 M1117 ASV; 27 Plasan SandCat ENGINEERING & MAINTENANCE VEHICLES AEV MT-LB ARV T-54/T-55; MTP-1; MT-LB VLB BLG67; TMM ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE MSL SP 29 9P148 Konkurs (RS-AT-5 Spandrel) MANPATS 9K111 Fagot (RS-AT-4 Spigot); 9K111-1 Konkurs (RS-AT-5 Spandrel); (9K11 Malyutka (RS-AT-3 Sagger) in store) GUNS 126: 85mm (150 D-44 in store); 100mm 126 MT-12 ARTILLERY 176 SP 122mm 48 2S1 TOWED 152mm 24 D-20

Europe

THE MILITARY BALANCE 2022

MRL 122mm 24 BM-21 MOR 120mm ε80 Tundza/Tundza Sani SURFACE-TO-SURFACE MISSILE LAUNCHERS SRBM • Conventional 9K79 Tochka (RS-SS-21 Scarab) AIR DEFENCE SAM • Point-defence 9K32 Strela (RS-SA-7 Grail)‡; 24 9K33 Osa (RS-SA-8 Gecko) GUNS 400 SP 23mm ZSU-23-4 TOWED 23mm ZU-23-2; 57mm S-60

Navy 4,450 EQUIPMENT BY TYPE PRINCIPAL SURFACE COMBATANTS • FRIGATES 3 FFM 3 Drazki (ex-BEL Wielingen) (of which 2†) with 1 octuple Mk 29 GMLS with RIM-7P Sea Sparrow SAM, 2 single 533mm ASTT with L5 mod 4 HWT, 1 sextuple Bofors ASW Rocket Launcher System 375mm A/S mor, 1 100mm gun (Fitted for but not with 2 twin lnchr with MM38 Exocet AShM) PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 4 CORVETTES • FS 1 Smeli (ex-FSU Koni) with 2 RBU 6000 Smerch 2 A/S mor, 2 twin 76mm guns PCF 1 Molnya† (ex-FSU Tarantul II) with 2 AK630M CIWS, 1 76mm gun PCT 2 Reshitelni (ex-FSU Pauk I) with 4 single 406mm TT, 2 RBU 1200 Uragan A/S mor, 1 76mm gun MINE COUNTERMEASURES 9 MHC 3: 2 Mesta (ex-NLD Alkmaar); 1 Tsibar (Tripartite – ex-BEL Flower) MSC 3 Briz (ex-FSU Sonya) (of which 1†) MSI 3 Olya (ex-FSU) (3 more non-operational) AMPHIBIOUS • LANDING CRAFT LCM 1 Vydra† (capacity either 3 MBT or 200 troops) LOGISTICS AND SUPPORT 9: 3 AGS; 2 AOL; 1 ARS; 2 ATF; 1 AX

Naval Aviation EQUIPMENT BY TYPE HELICOPTERS ASW 2 AS565MB Panther MRH 1 AS365N3+ Dauphin 2

Air Force 8,500 FORCES BY ROLE FIGHTER/ISR 1 sqn with MiG-29/MiG-29UB Fulcrum TRANSPORT 1 sqn with An-30 Clank; C-27J Spartan; L-410UVP-E; PC-12M TRAINING 1 sqn with L-39ZA Albatros* 1 sqn with PC-9M ATTACK HELICOPTER 1 sqn with Mi-24D/V Hind D/E TRANSPORT HELICOPTER 1 sqn with AS532AL Cougar; Bell 206 Jet Ranger; Mi-17 Hip H EQUIPMENT BY TYPE AIRCRAFT 23 combat capable

FTR 14: 11 MiG-29 Fulcrum; 3 MiG-29UB Fulcrum† FGA (Some MiG-21bis Fishbed/MiG-21UM Mongol B in store) ATK 3: 2 Su-25K Frogfoot K; 1 Su-25UBK Frogfoot B ISR 1 An-30 Clank TPT 7: Medium 3 C-27J Spartan; Light 4: 1 An-2T Colt; 2 L-410UVP-E; 1 PC-12M TRG 12: 6 L-39ZA Albatros*; 6 PC-9M (basic) HELICOPTERS ATK 6 Mi-24V Hind E (6 Mi-24D Hind D in store) MRH 5 Mi-17 Hip H TPT 18: Medium 12 AS532AL Cougar; Light 6 Bell 206 Jet Ranger UNINHABITED AERIAL VEHICLES • EW Yastreb-2S AIR DEFENCE SAM 20 Long-range 20: 12 S-200 (RS-SA-5 Gammon); 8 S-300PMU (RS-SA-10 Grumble) Short-range S-125M Neva-M (RS-SA-3 Goa); 2K12 Kub (RS-SA-6 Gainful) AIR-LAUNCHED MISSILES AAM • IR R-3 (RS-AA-2 Atoll)‡ R-73 (RS-AA-11A Archer) SARH R-27R (RS-AA-10 Alamo A) ASM Kh-29 (RS-AS-14 Kedge); Kh-25 (RS-AS-10 Karen)

Special Forces FORCES BY ROLE SPECIAL FORCES 1 spec ops bde (1 SF bn, 1 para bn)

DEPLOYMENT BOSNIA-HERZEGOVINA: EU • EUFOR • Operation Althea 12 IRAQ: NATO • NATO Mission Iraq 2 MALI: EU • EUTM Mali 4 SERBIA: NATO • KFOR 26

Europe

Croatia CRO 2020

2021

HRK

372bn

398bn

USD

56.2bn

63.4bn

USD

13,896

15,808

Growth

-8.0

6.3

Inflation

0.1

2.0

HRK

6.70bn

11.1bn

USD

1.01bn

1.77bn

HRK

6.59bn

6.72bn

USD

997m

1.07bn

6.61

6.27

per capita

Def exp [a] Def bdgt [b] USD1=HRK

2022

Army 11,100

6.77bn

[a] NATO figure [b] Includes military pensions Real-terms defence budget trend (USDm, constant 2015) 967 620 2008

Population

2015

2021

4,208,973

Age

0–14

15–19

20–24

25–29

Male

7.3%

2.5%

2.9%

3.0%

23.7%

8.9%

Female

6.8%

2.3%

2.8%

2.9%

24.2%

12.7%

30–64 65 plus

Capabilities Principal tasks for the armed forces include defending national sovereignty and territorial integrity as well as tackling terrorism and contributing to international peacekeeping missions. Croatia joined NATO in 2009, having reformed its armed forces to create a small professional force. There have been recent moves to improve conditions of service. Despite economic challenges, the 2021 defence budget exceeded 2% of GDP, with a significant proportion of the budget going to equipment investment. Zagreb has defence-cooperation agreements with Bosnia-Herzegovina, Hungary and Romania, and personnel frequently train with regional and international allies. Croatia hosts the NATO Multinational Special Aviation Programme and training centre and participates in EU and NATO missions, including NATO’s Enhanced Forward Presence in Poland. The inventory is almost entirely composed of ageing Soviet-era equipment. Modernisation objectives include the acquisition of UH-60M helicopters from the US. In May 2021, Croatia announced the purchase of second-hand Rafale F3-R fighters from France, after earlier US objections to the proposed sale of second-hand, upgraded Israeli F-16s to replace Croatia’s ageing MiG-21s. Croatia has a small defence industry, focused on small arms, ammunition, explosives and naval systems.

ACTIVE 16,700 (Army 11,100 Navy 1,650 Air 1,600 Joint 2,350) Gendarmerie & Paramilitary 3,000 Conscript liability Voluntary conscription, 8 weeks

RESERVE 21,000 (Army 21,000)

ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE Joint 2,350 (General Staff )

FORCES BY ROLE SPECIAL FORCES 5 SF gp

FORCES BY ROLE MANOEUVRE Armoured 1 armd bde (1 tk bn, 1 armd bn, 2 armd inf bn, 1 SP arty bn, 1 ADA bn, 1 cbt engr bn) Mechanised 1 mech bde (3 mech inf bn, 1 lt mech inf bn, 1 fd arty bn, 1 ADA bn, 1 cbt engr bn) Other 1 inf trg regt COMBAT SUPPORT 1 arty/MRL regt 1 engr regt 1 NBC bn 1 sigs bn COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT 1 log regt AIR DEFENCE 1 ADA regt EQUIPMENT BY TYPE ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES MBT 75 M-84 IFV 100 M-80 APC 188 APC (T) 15: 11 BTR-50; 4 OT M-60 APC (W) 132: 6 BOV-VP; 126 Patria AMV (incl variants) PPV 41: 21 Maxxpro Plus; 20 RG-33 HAGA (amb) AUV 172: 10 IVECO LMV; 162 M-ATV ENGINEERING & MAINTENANCE VEHICLES ARV 22: 12 JVBT-55A; 1 M-84AI; 1 WZT-2; 2 WZT-3; 6 Maxxpro Recovery VLB 6 MT-55A MW 4 MV-4 ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE • MSL SP 20 BOV-1 MANPATS 9K11 Malyutka (RS-AT-3 Sagger); 9K111 Fagot (RS-AT-4 Spigot); 9K111-1 Konkurs (RS-AT-5 Spandrel); 9K115 Metis (RS-AT-7 Saxhorn) ARTILLERY 168 SP 21: 122mm 8 2S1 Gvozdika; 155mm 13 PzH 2000 TOWED 122mm 20 D-30 MRL 122mm 27: 6 M91 Vulkan; 21 BM-21 Grad MOR 100: 82mm 54 LMB M96; 120mm 46 M-75/UBM 52 AIR DEFENCE SAM • Point-defence 9+: 9 9K35 Strela-10M3 (RS-SA-13 Gopher); 9K310 Igla-1 (RS-SA-16 Gimlet) GUNS SP 20mm 10 BOV-3 SP

Navy 1,650 Navy HQ at Split EQUIPMENT BY TYPE PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 5 PCFG 1 Končar with 2 twin lnchr with RBS15B Mk I AShM, 1 AK630 CIWS, 1 57mm gun

Europe

Croatian Kuna HRK GDP

THE MILITARY BALANCE 2022

PCG 4: 2 Kralj with 4 single lnchr with RBS15B Mk I AShM, 1 AK630 CIWS, 1 57mm gun (with minelaying capability) 2 Vukovar (ex-FIN Helsinki) with 4 single lnchr with RBS15B Mk I AShM, 1 57mm gun MINE WARFARE • MINE COUNTERMEASURES 1 MHI 1 Korcula AMPHIBIOUS • LANDING CRAFT 5: LCT 2 Cetina (with minelaying capability) LCVP 3: 2 Type-21; 1 Type-22 LOGISTICS AND SUPPORT • AKL 1 PDS 713 COASTAL DEFENCE • AShM 3 RBS15K

Marines

Special Forces Command FORCES BY ROLE SPECIAL FORCES 2 SF gp

Gendarmerie & Paramilitary 3,000 Police 3,000 armed

DEPLOYMENT INDIA/PAKISTAN: UN • UNMOGIP 8 IRAQ: NATO • NATO Mission Iraq 10 LEBANON: UN • UNIFIL 1

FORCES BY ROLE MANOEUVRE Amphibious 1 indep mne coy

POLAND: NATO • Enhanced Forward Presence 80; 1 MRL bty with M91 Vulkan

Coast Guard

WESTERN SAHARA: UN • MINURSO 9

FORCES BY ROLE Two divisions, headquartered in Split (1st div) and Pula (2nd div)

Cyprus CYP

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS • PB 5: 4 Mirna; 1 Omiš LOGISTICS AND SUPPORT 3: AAR 1 Faust Vrancic (YUG Spasilac) AKL 1 PT-71† AX 1 Andrija Mohorovicic (POL Project 861)

Air Force and Air Defence 1,600 FORCES BY ROLE FIGHTER/GROUND ATTACK 1 (mixed) sqn with MiG-21bis/UMD Fishbed TRAINING 1 sqn with PC-9M; Z-242L ISR HELICOPTER 1 hel sqn with Bell 206B Jet Ranger II; OH-58D Kiowa Warrior TRANSPORT HELICOPTER 2 sqn with Mi-8MTV Hip H; Mi-8T Hip C; Mi-171Sh EQUIPMENT BY TYPE AIRCRAFT 8 combat capable FGA 8: 4 MiG-21bis Fishbed; 4 MiG-21UMD Fishbed TPT • Light (2 An-32 Cline in store) TRG 21: 17 PC-9M; 4 Z-242L HELICOPTERS MRH 25: 10 Mi-8MTV Hip H; 15 OH-58D Kiowa Warrior TPT 21: Medium 13: 3 Mi-8T Hip C; 10 Mi-171Sh; Light 8 Bell 206B Jet Ranger II AIR DEFENCE • SAM Point-defence 9K31 Strela-1 (RS-SA-9 Gaskin); 9K34 Strela-3 (RS-SA-14 Gremlin); 9K310 Igla-1 (RS-SA-16 Gimlet) AIR-LAUNCHED MISSILES AAM • IR R-60; R-60MK (RS-AA-8 Aphid) ASM AGM-114R Hellfire

SERBIA: NATO • KFOR 142; 1 inf coy; 1 hel unit with Mi-8 Hip

2020

2021

GDP

Euro EUR EUR

20.8bn

22.2bn

USD

23.8bn

26.5bn

per capita

USD

26,785

29,486

Growth

-5.1

4.8

Inflation

-1.1

1.7

Def bdgt

EUR

367m

438m

USD

419m

523m

0.88

0.84

USD1=EUR

2022

465m

Real-terms defence budget trend (USDm, constant 2015) 472 328 2008

Population

2015

2021

1,281,506

Age

0–14

15–19

20–24

25–29

Male

8.0%

2.8%

3.7%

4.6%

30–64 65 plus 26.3%

5.8%

Female

7.6%

2.4%

3.0%

3.8%

24.6%

7.5%

Capabilities The National Guard is focused on protecting the island’s territorial integrity and sovereignty, and safeguarding Cyprus’s EEZ. Its main objective is to deter any Turkish incursion, and to provide enough opposition until military support can be provided by Greece, its primary ally. Cyprus has been enhancing its defence cooperation with Greece, including on cyber defence. Nicosia has also pledged deeper military ties with Israel, while France has renewed and enhanced its defence-cooperation agreement with Cyprus. In 2018 Cyprus also signed a memorandum of understanding on enhancing defence and security cooperation with the UK. Having reduced conscript liability in 2016, Nicosia began recruiting additional contract-service personnel, as part of the effort to modernise and professionalise its forces. Cyprus exercises with several international partners, most notably France, Greece and Israel. External deployments have been limited to some officers joining EU and

Europe

ACTIVE 12,000 (National Guard 12,000) Gendarmerie & Paramilitary 750

Conscript liability 15 months

RESERVE 50,000 (National Guard 50,000)

Reserve service to age 50 (officers dependent on rank; military doctors to age 60)

ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE National Guard 12,000 (incl conscripts) FORCES BY ROLE SPECIAL FORCES 1 comd (regt) (1 SF bn) MANOEUVRE Armoured 1 armd bde (2 armd bn, 1 armd inf bn) Mechanised 4 (1st, 2nd, 6th & 7th) mech bde Light 1 (4th) lt inf bde 2 (2nd & 8th) lt inf regt COMBAT SUPPORT 1 arty comd (8 arty bn) COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT 1 (3rd) spt bde EQUIPMENT BY TYPE ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES MBT 134: 82 T-80U; 52 AMX-30B2 RECCE 72 EE-9 Cascavel IFV 43 BMP-3 APC 295 APC (T) 168 Leonidas APC (W) 127 VAB (incl variants) AUV 8 BOV M16 Milos ENGINEERING & MAINTENANCE VEHICLES ARV 2+: 2 AMX-30D; BREM-80U ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE MSL SP 33: 15 EE-3 Jararaca with Milan; 18 VAB with HOT MANPATS Milan RCL 106mm 144 M40A1 GUNS • TOWED 100mm 20 M-1944 ARTILLERY 456 SP 155mm 48: 24 NORA B-52; 12 Mk F3; 12 Zuzana TOWED 84: 105mm 72 M-56; 155mm 12 TR-F-1 MRL 22: 122mm 4 BM-21; 128mm 18 M-63 Plamen MOR 302: 81mm 170 E-44 (70+ M1/M9 in store); 107mm 20 M2/M30; 120mm 112 RT61

AIR DEFENCE SAM 22+ Medium-range 4 9K37M1 Buk M1-2 (RS-SA-11 Gadfly) Short-range 18: 12 Aspide; 6 9K331 Tor-M1 (RS-SA-15 Gauntlet) Point-defence Mistral GUNS • TOWED 60: 20mm 36 M-55; 35mm 24 GDF-003 (with Skyguard)

Maritime Wing FORCES BY ROLE COMBAT SUPPORT 1 (coastal defence) AShM bty with MM40 Exocet AShM EQUIPMENT BY TYPE PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 6 PCC 2: 1 Alasia (ex-OMN Al Mabrukha) with 1 hel landing platform; 1 OPV 62 (ISR Sa’ar 4.5 derivative) PBF 4: 2 Rodman 55; 2 Vittoria COASTAL DEFENCE • AShM 3 MM40 Exocet

Air Wing EQUIPMENT BY TYPE HELICOPTERS ATK 11 Mi-35P Hind E (offered for sale) MRH 7: 3 AW139 (SAR); 4 SA342L1 Gazelle (with HOT for anti-armour role) TPT • Light 2 Bell 206L3 Long Ranger

Paramilitary 750+ Armed Police 500+ FORCES BY ROLE MANOEUVRE Other 1 (rapid-reaction) paramilitary unit EQUIPMENT BY TYPE ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES APC • APC (W) 2 VAB VTT HELICOPTERS • MRH 4: 2 AW139; 2 Bell 412SP

Maritime Police 250 EQUIPMENT BY TYPE PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 10 PBF 5: 2 Poseidon; 1 Shaldag; 2 Vittoria PB 5 SAB-12

DEPLOYMENT LEBANON: UN • UNIFIL 2

FOREIGN FORCES Argentina UNFICYP 249; 2 inf coy; 1 hel flt Austria UNFICYP 3 Brazil UNFICYP 2 Canada UNFICYP 1 Chile UNFICYP 6 Ghana UNFICYP 1 Greece Army: 950

Europe

UN missions. Cyprus has little logistics capability to support operations abroad. Equipment comprises a mix of Soviet-era and modern European systems. The defence minister announced in 2019 the intention to introduce an eight-year military-modernisation programme that would also involve a higher defence budget. Cyprus has little in the way of a domestic defence industry, with no ability to design and manufacture modern equipment. However, the government is looking for opportunities to cooperate with defence firms in Greece.

THE MILITARY BALANCE 2022

Hungary UNFICYP 12 India UNFICYP 1 Norway UNFICYP 2 Pakistan UNFICYP 2 Paraguay UNFICYP 12 Russia UNFICYP 4 Serbia UNFICYP 8 Slovakia UNFICYP 289; 2 inf coy; 1 engr pl United Kingdom 2,260; 2 inf bn; 1 hel sqn with 4 Bell 412 Twin Huey • Operation Inherent Resolve (Shader) 500: 1 FGA sqn with 6 Typhoon FGR4; 1 Sentinel R1; 1 A330 MRTT Voyager KC3; 2 C-130J-30 Hercules • UNFICYP (Operation Tosca) 327: 2 inf coy

TERRITORY WHERE THE GOVERNMENT DOES NOT EXERCISE EFFECTIVE CONTROL Data here represents the de facto situation on the northern section of the island. This does not imply international recognition as a sovereign state.

Capabilities ACTIVE 3,000 (Army 3,000) Gendarmerie & Paramilitary 150 Conscript liability 15 months

RESERVE 15,000

Reserve liability to age 50

ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE Army ε3,000 FORCES BY ROLE MANOEUVRE Light 5 inf bn 7 inf bn (reserve) EQUIPMENT BY TYPE ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE MSL • MANPATS Milan RCL • 106mm 36 ARTILLERY • MOR • 120mm 73

Gendarmerie & Paramilitary Armed Police ε150 FORCES BY ROLE SPECIAL FORCES 1 (police) SF unit

FORCES BY ROLE 1 corps HQ; 1 SF regt; 1 armd bde; 2 mech inf div; 1 mech inf regt; 1 arty regt; 1 avn comd EQUIPMENT BY TYPE ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES MBT 287 M48A5T1 IFV 145 ACV AIFV APC • APC (T) 488: 70 ACV AAPC (incl variants); 418 M113 (incl variants) ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE MSL SP 66 ACV TOW MANPATS Milan RCL 106mm 219 M40A1 ARTILLERY 656 SP 155mm 178: 30 M44T; 144 M52T1; 4 T-155 Firtina TOWED 84: 105mm 36 M101A1; 155mm 36 M114A2; 203mm 12 M115 MRL 122mm 18 T-122 MOR 376: 81mm 171; 107mm 70 M30; 120mm 135 HY-12 PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS • PB 1 AIRCRAFT • TPT • Light 3 Cessna 185 (U-17) HELICOPTERS • TPT 3: Medium 2 AS532UL Cougar Light 1 Bell 205 (UH-1H Iroquois) AIR DEFENCE SAM Point-defence FIM-92 Stinger GUNS • TOWED 150: 20mm 122: 44 Rh 202; 78 GAI-D01; 35mm 28 GDF-003

Czech Republic CZE Czech Koruna CZK GDP per capita

2020

2021

CZK

5.69tr

5.95tr

USD

245bn

277bn 25,806

USD

22,943

Growth

-5.8

3.8

Inflation

3.2

2.7

Def exp [a] Def bdgt [b]

CZK

74.3bn

85.3bn

USD

3.20bn

3.97bn

CZK

75.5bn

85.4bn

USD

3.25bn

3.97bn

23.21

21.49

USD1=CZK

2022

93.5bn

[a] NATO figure [b] Includes military pensions Real-terms defence budget trend (USDbn, constant 2015) 3.02

Coast Guard

PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 6 PCC 5: 2 SG45/SG46; 1 Rauf Denktash; 2 US Mk 5 PB 1

1.73 2008

Population

2015

2021

10,702,596

FOREIGN FORCES

Age

0–14

15–19

20–24

25–29

TURKEY Army ε33,800

Male

7.8%

2.4%

3.0%

25.1%

8.6%

Female

7.3%

2.3%

2.2%

2.8%

24.2%

11.9%

30–64 65 plus

Europe

The 2015 national-security strategy states that NATO is central to Czech security, while the 2017 defence strategy points to Russian assertiveness, an arc of instability to the south and southeast of Europe and information warfare, including cyber attacks, as core security challenges. The evolving security environment is discussed in the ‘Long Term Perspective for Defence 2035’ and the ‘Czech Armed Forces Development Concept 2030’, both published in 2019. Modernisation priorities include infantry fighting vehicles (IFVs), self-propelled howitzers, multi-role helicopters, transport aircraft, short-range air-defence systems and UAVs. With the lease agreement for the Czech Republic’s Gripen fleet currently running through to 2027, the government began to explore follow-on solutions in 2020 and 2021. In September 2021, the defence ministry received final offers from three shortlisted companies for an IFV requirement. At the end of September 2021, the ministry signed a contract to procure CAESAR self-propelled howitzers. In February 2017, the Czech Republic signed a letter of intent with Germany to affiliate the 4th Czech Rapid Reaction Brigade with the 10th German Armoured Division under NATO’s Framework Nations Concept. Recruitment and retention remains a challenge: in May 2020, the air-force chief outlined shortfalls in specialised trades such as engineers and pilots. The armed forces are able to deploy on a variety of international crisis-management operations, including NATO’s Enhanced Forward Presence, Baltic Air Policing and contributing to NATO’s Very High Readiness Joint Task Force. There are plans to upgrade military training and simulation facilities by 2025. The government is trying to replace legacy equipment to modernise the armed forces and reduce dependence on foreign sources for spares for its Soviet-era systems. The defence-industrial base includes development and manufacturing capability, in particular small arms, vehicles, and training and light attack aircraft. The holding company Czechoslovak Group brings together several companies across the munitions, vehicles and aerospace sectors. In 2020, the government set up an agency to support the defence industry in government-to-government procurement activities.

ACTIVE 26,600 (Army 14,700 Air 5,850 Other 6,050)

ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE Army 14,700 FORCES BY ROLE MANOEUVRE Reconnaissance 1 ISR/EW regt (1 recce bn, 1 EW bn, 1 ISR UAV bn) Armoured 1 (7th) mech bde (1 tk bn, 2 armd inf bn, 1 mot inf bn) Mechanised 1 (4th) rapid reaction bde (2 mech inf bn, 1 mot inf bn, 1 AB bn) COMBAT SUPPORT 1 (13th) arty regt (2 arty bn) 1 engr regt (2 engr bn, 1 EOD bn) 1 CBRN regt (2 CBRN bn) COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT 1 log regt (2 log bn, 1 maint bn)

Active Reserve FORCES BY ROLE COMMAND 14 (territorial defence) comd

MANOEUVRE Armoured 1 armd coy Light 14 inf coy (1 per territorial comd) (3 inf pl, 1 cbt spt pl, 1 log pl) EQUIPMENT BY TYPE ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES MBT 30 T-72M4CZ (89 T-72M1 in store) RECCE 50: 34 BPzV Svatava; 8 Pandur II (KBV-PZ); 8 Pandur II (KBV-PZLOK) IFV 227: 120 BMP-2; 107 Pandur II (incl 17 CP, 14 comms, 4 amb); (98 BMP-1; 65 BMP-2 all in store) APC • PPV 1 Titus AUV 141: 21 Dingo 2; 120 IVECO LMV ENGINEERING & MAINTENANCE VEHICLES AEV 4 Pandur II (KOT-Z) ARV 13+: 10 VPV-ARV (12 more in store); VT-55A; 3 VT72M4 VLB 6 MT-55A (3 more in store) MW Bozena 5; UOS-155 Belarty NBC VEHICLES BRDM-2RCH ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE MSL • MANPATS 9K111-1 Konkurs (RS-AT-5 Spandrel); FGM-148 Javelin; Spike-LR RCL 84mm Carl Gustaf ARTILLERY 96 SP 152mm 48 M-77 Dana (38 more in store) MOR 48: 81mm Expal; 120mm 40 M-1982; (45 more in store); SP 120mm 8 SPM-85

Air Force 5,850 Principal task is to secure Czech airspace. This mission is fulfilled within NATO Integrated Extended Air Defence System (NATINADS) and, if necessary, by means of the Czech national reinforced air-defence system. The air force also provides CAS for army SAR, and performs a tpt role FORCES BY ROLE FIGHTER/GROUND ATTACK 1 sqn with Gripen C/D 1 sqn with L-159 ALCA; L-159T1* TRANSPORT 2 sqn with A319CJ; C295M/MW; CL-601 Challenger; L410FG/UVP-E Turbolet TRAINING 1 sqn with L-159 ALCA; L-159T1*; L-159T2* ATTACK HELICOPTER 1 sqn with Mi-24/Mi-35 Hind D/E TRANSPORT HELICOPTER 1 sqn with Mi-17 Hip H; Mi-171Sh 1 sqn with Mi-8 Hip; Mi-17 Hip H; PZL W-3A Sokol AIR DEFENCE 1 (25th) SAM regt (2 AD gp) EQUIPMENT BY TYPE AIRCRAFT 38 combat capable FGA 14: 12 Gripen C; 2 Gripen D ATK 16 L-159 ALCA

Europe

Capabilities

THE MILITARY BALANCE 2022

TPT 15: Light 12: 4 C295M; 2 C295MW; 2 L-410FG Turbolet; 4 L-410UVP-E Turbolet; PAX 3: 2 A319CJ; 1 CL601 Challenger TRG 8: 5 L-159T1*; 3 L-159T2* HELICOPTERS ATK 17: 7 Mi-24 Hind D; 10 Mi-35 Hind E MRH 5 Mi-17 Hip H TPT • Medium 30: 4 Mi-8 Hip; 16 Mi-171Sh; 10 PZL W3A Sokol AIR DEFENCE • SAM Point-defence 9K35 Strela-10 (RS-SA-13 Gopher); 9K32 Strela-2‡ (RS-SA-7 Grail) (available for trg RBS-70 gunners); RBS-70 AIR-LAUNCHED MISSILES AAM • IR AIM-9M Sidewinder; ARH AIM-120C-5 AMRAAM BOMBS Laser-guided: GBU Paveway

Denmark DNK Danish Krone DKK

2020

2021

2.33tr

2.47tr

GDP

DKK USD

356bn

397bn

per capita

USD

61,154

67,920

Growth

-2.1

3.8

Inflation

0.3

1.4

Def exp [a] Def bdgt [b]

DKK

32.6bn

33.9bn

USD

4.98bn

5.44bn

DKK

32.2bn

33.8bn

USD

4.92bn

5.42bn

6.54

6.23

USD1=DKK

2022

34.5bn

[a] NATO figure [b] Includes military pensions Real-terms defence budget trend (USDbn, constant 2015) 4.65

Other Forces 6,050 FORCES BY ROLE SPECIAL FORCES 1 SF gp MANOEUVRE Other 1 (presidential) gd bde (2 bn) 1 (honour guard) gd bn (2 coy) COMBAT SUPPORT 1 int gp 1 (central) MP comd 3 (regional) MP comd 1 (protection service) MP comd

DEPLOYMENT BOSNIA-HERZEGOVINA: EU • EUFOR • Operation Althea 2 CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC: UN • MINUSCA 3 DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO: UN • MONUSCO 2 EGYPT: MFO 18; 1 C295M IRAQ: Operation Inherent Resolve 30; NATO • NATO Mission Iraq LATVIA: NATO • Enhanced Forward Presence 56; 1 mor pl LITHUANIA: NATO • Enhanced Forward Presence 35; 1 EW unit MALI: Operation Barkhane 60; 1 SF unit; EU • EUTM Mali 120; UN • MINUSMA 4 SERBIA: NATO • KFOR 9; UN • UNMIK 2 SYRIA/ISRAEL: UN • UNDOF 3

3.36 2008

Population

2015

2021

5,894,687

Age

0–14

15–19

20–24

25–29

Male

8.4%

3.0%

3.2%

3.5%

30–64 65 plus 22.4%

9.3%

Female

8.0%

2.9%

3.1%

3.4%

22.1%

10.9%

Capabilities Denmark maintains a compact but effective force, with a focus on contributing to larger NATO operations. Ties to NATO, NORDEFCO and other regional neighbours have increased. A joint declaration was signed in 2015 with other Nordic states, aimed at deterring Russia. Denmark has opted out of EU military cooperation under CSDP, but in late 2019 the government agreed an action plan to ensure the promotion of Danish interests in the EU’s European Defence Fund, which launched in mid-2021. In the foreign- and security-policy strategy 2019–20, released at the end of 2018, the government expressed concerns about Russia, instability in the Middle East and cyber attacks. Current defence-modernisation priorities include the acquisition of the F-35A to replace the air force’s F-16 fleet, and the upgrade of armoured vehicles within the mechanised brigades. Other acquisition priorities include EW equipment, UAVs and ASW capabilities. The defence agreement for 2018–23 envisages increased defence spending to deal with a deteriorating security environment. In particular, it is intended to strengthen deterrence, cyber defence and Denmark’s role in international operations, as well as support to civilian authorities. The Danish armed forces consist primarily of professional personnel, supplemented by a substantial number of conscripts. The new defence agreement foresees retaining national service and that the annual conscript intake should rise modestly. Denmark is largely reliant on imported equipment for defence, but maintains a small defence industry focused on exports to Europe and North America. The Danish defence industry is mainly active in defence electronics and the design and manufacture of components and subsystems, including subcomponents for the F-35. The Danish armed forces have little ability to deploy independently but have contributed forces to a number of larger multinational deployments.

ACTIVE 15,400 (Army 8,000 Navy 2,250 Air 3,000 Joint 2,150)

Conscript liability 4–12 months, most voluntary

RESERVES 44,200 (Army 34,400 Navy 5,300 Air

Force 4,500)

ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE Army 8,000 Div and a bde HQ transforming into operational formations FORCES BY ROLE COMMAND 1 (MND-N) div HQ MANOEUVRE Mechanised 1 (1st) mech bde (1 ISR bn, 3 mech inf bn, 1 SP arty bn, 1 cbt engr bn, 1 sigs bn, 1 log bn) 1 (2nd) mech bde (1 recce bn, 1 tk bn, 1 lt inf bn) COMBAT SUPPORT 1 CBRN/construction bn 1 EOD bn 1 int bn 1 MP bn 2 sigs bn COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT 1 log bn 1 maint bn 1 spt bn AIR DEFENCE 1 AD bn EQUIPMENT BY TYPE ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES MBT 44: 18 Leopard 2A5 (to be upgraded to 2A7V); 26 Leopard 2A7V IFV 44 CV9035 MkIII APC 287 APC (T) 30 M113 (incl variants) APC (W) 257: 83 Piranha III (incl variants); 174 Piranha V AUV 140: 84 Eagle IV; 56 Eagle V ENGINEERING & MAINTENANCE VEHICLES AEV 6 Wisent ARV 10 BPZ-2 VLB 6 BRP-1 Biber ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE RCL 84mm Carl Gustaf ARTILLERY 50 SP 155mm 15 CAESAR 8×8 MOR 35: TOWED 120mm 20 Soltam K6B1; SP 120mm 15 Piranha V with Cardom-10 AIR DEFENCE • SAM • Point-defence FIM-92 Stinger

Navy 2,250 Three naval squadrons, headquartered at naval bases in Frederikshavn and Korsør EQUIPMENT BY TYPE PRINCIPAL SURFACE COMBATANTS 5 DESTROYERS • DDGHM 3 Iver Huitfeldt with 4 quad lnchr with RGM-84L Harpoon Block II AShM, 4 8-cell Mk

41 VLS (to be fitted with SAM), 2 12-cell Mk 56 VLS with RIM-162B ESSM SAM, 2 twin 324mm TT with MU90 LWT, 1 Millennium CIWS, 2 76mm guns (capacity 1 med hel) FRIGATES • FFGHM 2 Absalon (flexible support ships) with 4 quad lnchr with RGM-84L Harpoon Block II AShM, 3 12-cell Mk 56 VLS with RIM-162B ESSM SAM, 2 twin 324mm TT with MU90 LWT, 2 Millennium CIWS, 1 127mm gun (capacity 2 AW101 Merlin; 2 LCP, 7 MBT or 40 vehicles; 130 troops) PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 12 PSOH 4 Thetis 1 76mm gun (capacity 1 MH-60R Seahawk) PSO 3 Knud Rasmussen with 1 76mm gun, 1 hel landing platform (ice-strengthened hull) PCC 5 Diana (1 other non-operational) MINE WARFARE • MINE COUNTERMEASURES 6 MCI 4 MSF Mk I MSD 2 Holm LOGISTICS AND SUPPORT 12 ABU 2 Gunnar Thorson (primarily used for MARPOL duties) AE 1 Sleipner AGS 2 Holm AKL 2 Seatruck AX 1 Søløven (DNK Flyvefisken) AXL 2 Holm AXS 2 Svanen

Air Force 3,000 Tactical Air Command FORCES BY ROLE FIGHTER/GROUND ATTACK 2 sqn with F-16AM/BM Fighting Falcon ANTI-SUBMARINE WARFARE 1 sqn with MH-60R Seahawk SEARCH & RESCUE/TRANSPORT HELICOPTER 1 sqn with AW101 Merlin 1 sqn with AS550 Fennec (ISR) TRANSPORT 1 sqn with C-130J-30 Hercules; CL-604 Challenger (MP/ VIP) TRAINING 1 unit with MFI-17 Supporter (T-17) EQUIPMENT BY TYPE AIRCRAFT 48 combat capable FTR 48: 34 F-16AM Fighting Falcon; 10 F-16BM Fighting Falcon (30 operational) FGA 4 F-35A Lightning II TPT 8: Medium 4 C-130J-30 Hercules; PAX 4 CL-604 Challenger (MP/VIP) TRG 27 MFI-17 Supporter (T-17) HELICOPTERS ASW 9 MH-60R Seahawk SAR 8 AW101 Merlin MRH 8 AS550 Fennec (ISR) (4 more non-operational) TPT • Medium 6 AW101 Merlin AIR-LAUNCHED MISSILES AAM • IR AIM-9L Sidewinder; IIR AIM-9X Sidewinder II; ARH AIM-120B AMRAAM

Europe

100 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2022 BOMBS Laser-guided EGBU-12/GBU-24 Paveway II/III INS/GPS guided GBU-31 JDAM

Estonia EST 2020

2021

Control and Air Defence Group

GDP

EUR

26.8bn

30.2bn

USD

30.6bn

36.0bn

per capita

USD

23,036

27,101

Growth

-3.0

8.5

Inflation

-0.6

3.8

1 Control and Reporting Centre, 1 Mobile Control and Reporting Centre. 4 Radar sites

Special Operations Command FORCES BY ROLE SPECIAL FORCES 1 SF unit 1 diving unit

Reserves Home Guard (Army) 34,400 reservists (to age 50)

2 (local) def region

Home Guard (Navy) 5,300 reservists (to age 50)

Euro EUR

Def Exp [a] Def bdgt [b] FMA (US)

EUR

630m

646m

USD

719m

772m

EUR

627m

658m

USD

716m

786m

USD

USD1=EUR

0.88

0.84

2022

738m 9m

[a] NATO figure [b] Includes military pensions Real-terms defence budget trend (USDm, constant 2015) 627

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 30 PB 30: 18 MHV800; 12 MHV900

328 2008

2015

2021

Home Guard (Air Force) 4,500 reservists (to age 50)

Population

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE AIRCRAFT • TPT • Light 2 BN-2A Islander

Age

0–14

15–19

20–24

25–29

Male

8.2%

2.5%

2.2%

2.6%

24.0%

7.5%

Female

7.9%

2.3%

2.0%

2.3%

24.6%

13.9%

DEPLOYMENT GULF OF GUNIEA: Navy 170; 1 FFGHM IRAQ: NATO • NATO Mission Iraq 210; 1 SF gp; 1 trg team LITHUANIA: NATO • Baltic Air Policing 150; 4 F-16AM Fighting Falcon MALI: UN • MINUSMA 2 MIDDLE EAST: UN • UNTSO 10 SERBIA: NATO • KFOR 35

1,220,042 30–64 65 plus

Capabilities Estonia has small active armed forces and is reliant on NATO membership as a security guarantor. Security policy is predicated on the goals of ensuring sovereignty and territorial integrity, and there is concern over Russian security policy and military activity. The government’s 2017–26 National Defence Development Plan (NDDP) reflects the worsening security environment in the Baltic region. The MoD publishes medium-term development plans on an annual basis. Covering a four-year period, these are intended to ensure that the NDDP’s goals will be achieved within the planned time frame. The active armed forces are supplemented by a reserve component. In June 2018, Estonia joined the French-inspired European Intervention Force. A NATO battlegroup based in Estonia became operational in mid-2017 as part of the Alliance’s Enhanced Forward Presence. Amari air base hosts a NATO Baltic Air Policing detachment. Estonia is also a member of the UK-led multinational Joint Expeditionary Force. Tallinn hosts NATO’s Cybersecurity Centre of Excellence. The NDDP notes a desire to increase the annual conscript intake and active personnel numbers. There is limited organic capability to deploy beyond borders, though Estonian forces take part in EU, NATO and UN missions abroad on a small scale. The NDDP identifies the need for additional armoured mobility and armoured firepower, anti-armour weapons and increased munitions stocks. The country has a niche defenceindustrial capability, including ship repair and digital systems.

ACTIVE 7,200 (Army 4,100 Navy 300 Air 500 Other

2,300)

Conscript liability 8 or 11 months (depending on specialisation; conscripts cannot be deployed)

RESERVE 17,500 (Joint 12,000; Territorial Defence

5,500)

Europe 101

Army 1,500; 2,600 conscript (total 4,100) 4 def region. All units except one inf bn are reserve based FORCES BY ROLE MANOEUVRE Mechanised 1 (1st) bde (1 recce coy, 1 armd inf bn; 2 mech inf bn, 1 arty bn, 1 AT coy, 1 cbt engr bn, 1 spt bn, 1 AD bn) Light 1 (2nd) inf bde (1 recce coy, 4 inf bn, 2 arty bn, 1 AT coy, 1 cbt engr bn, 1 spt bn, 1 AD bn) 4 (territorial) inf bn EQUIPMENT BY TYPE ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES IFV 44 CV9035EE (incl 2 CP) APC • APC (W) 136: 56 XA-180 Sisu; 80 XA-188 Sisu ENGINEERING & MAINTENANCE VEHICLES AEV 2 Pionierpanzer 2 Dachs ARV 2 BPz-2 VLB 2 Biber ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE MSL • MANPATS FGM-148 Javelin; Milan; Spike-LR RCL 84mm Carl Gustaf; 90mm PV-1110 ARTILLERY 192 SP 155mm 6 K9 Thunder TOWED 60: 122mm 36 D-30 (H 63); 155mm 24 FH-70 MOR 126: 81mm 60 B455/NM 95/M252; 120mm 66 2B11/ M/41D AIR DEFENCE SAM • Point-defence Mistral GUNS • TOWED 23mm ZU-23-2

Navy 200; 100 conscript (total 300) EQUIPMENT BY TYPE MINE WARFARE • MINE COUNTERMEASURES 4: MCCS 1 Tasuja (ex-DNK Lindormen) MHC 3 Admiral Cowan (ex-UK Sandown) (1 in refit)

Air Force 500 FORCES BY ROLE TRANSPORT 1 sqn with M-28 Skytruck TRANSPORT HELICOPTER 1 sqn with R-44 Raven II EQUIPMENT BY TYPE AIRCRAFT TPT • Light 2 M-28 Skytruck TRG 1+ L-39C Albatros (leased) HELICOPTERS • TPT • Light 2 R-44 Raven II

Other 1,300; 800 conscript (total 2,100) Includes Cyber Command, Support Command and Special Operations Forces FORCES BY ROLE SPECIAL FORCES 1 spec ops bn

COMBAT SUPPORT 2 MP coy COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT 1 log bn

Gendarmerie & Paramilitary Border Guard

Subordinate to the Ministry of the Interior EQUIPMENT BY TYPE PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 6 PCO 1 Kindral Kurvits (FIN Tursas derivative) PB 5: 1 Pikker; 1 Raju (Baltic 4500WP); 2 Risto; 1 Valve AMPHIBIOUS • LANDING CRAFT • LCU 3 AIRCRAFT • TPT • Light 2: 1 Beech 305ER King Air; 1 Cessna 172R HELICOPTERS • MRH 3 AW139 UNINHABITED AERIAL VEHICLES • ISR • Light some S-100 Camcopter

DEPLOYMENT IRAQ: Operation Inherent Resolve 10 • NATO Mission Iraq 40 LEBANON: UN • UNIFIL 1 MALI: Operation Barkhane 75; 1 SF unit; EU • EUTM Mali 10; UN • MINUSMA 2 MIDDLE EAST: UN • UNTSO 3

FOREIGN FORCES All NATO Enhanced Forward Presence unless stated France 300; 1 tk sqn Italy NATO • Baltic Air Policing 150; 4 Eurofighter Typhoon United Kingdom 828; 1 armd regt HQ; 1 tk sqn; 1 armd inf coy(+); 1 cbt engr coy

Europe

ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE

102 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2022

Finland FIN

ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE

Euro EUR GDP per capita

2020

2021

EUR

236bn

248bn

USD

270bn

296bn 53,523

USD

48,786

Growth

-2.9

3.0

Inflation

0.4

1.9

Def bdgt [a]

EUR

3.64bn

4.99bn

USD

4.15bn

5.96bn

0.88

0.84

USD1=EUR

2022

5.50bn

[a] Includes military pensions 5.14 3.07

Population

2015

FORCES BY ROLE Finland’s army maintains a mobilisation strength of about 285,000. In support of this requirement, two conscription cycles, each for about 9,000 conscripts, take place each year. After conscript training, reservist commitment is to the age of 60. Reservists are usually assigned to units within their local geographical area. All service appointments or deployments outside Finnish borders are voluntary for all members of the armed services. All brigades are reserve based

Reserve Organisations 185,000

Real-terms defence budget trend (USDbn, constant 2015)

2008

Army 4,400; 9,000 conscript (total 13,400)

2021

5,587,442

Age

0–14

15–19

20–24

25–29

Male

8.4%

2.8%

3.2%

30–64 65 plus 22.2%

9.9%

Female

8.0%

2.6%

2.7%

3.1%

21.7%

12.7%

Capabilities Finland’s armed forces are primarily focused on territorial defence. The country’s long border with Russia has focused attention on Russia’s military capabilities and plans. The 2021 Defence Report notes that financial constraints have presented challenges to maintaining operational readiness. In October 2020, the government’s report on foreign and security policy assessed a security environment that is rapidly changing and deteriorating. An EU member state, Finland’s principal multilateral defence relationships include NORDEFCO and the Northern Group, as well as strong bilateral cooperation with Sweden and the US; it is building close ties with NATO short of membership. The country participates in UN peacekeeping missions and contributes to NATO operations. Legislation limits the number of personnel deployed on international crisis-management operations to an upper ceiling of 2,000 troops. Finland maintains a largely conscript-based force and intends to increase the number of personnel in the defence forces over the coming years. In 2015, the air force launched the HX Fighter Program to replace its F/A-18s. A request for quotations was issued in April 2018 and the selection was expected to be announced in 2021. Under the Squadron 2020 programme, the navy will replace patrol boats and minelayers with corvette-sized vessels. Finland’s defence industry consists largely of privately owned SMEs, concentrating on niche products for international markets, but it also features some internationally competitive larger companies producing wheeled armoured vehicles and turreted mortar systems.

ACTIVE 19,250 (Army 13,400 Navy 3,150 Air 2,700) Gendarmerie & Paramilitary 2,700 Conscript liability 165, 255 or 347 days (latter for NCOs, officers or those on ‘especially demanding’ duties)

RESERVE 238,000 (Army 185,000 Navy 24,000 Air 29,000) Gendarmerie & Paramilitary 12,000 18,000 reservists a year conduct refresher training: total obligation 80 days (150 for NCOs, 200 for officers) between conscript service and age 50 (NCOs and officers to age 60)

FORCES BY ROLE SPECIAL FORCES 1 SF bn MANOEUVRE Armoured 2 armd BG (regt) Mechanised 2 (Karelia & Pori Jaeger) mech bde Light 3 (Jaeger) bde 6 lt inf bde COMBAT SUPPORT 1 arty bde 1 AD regt 7 engr regt 3 sigs bn COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT 3 log regt HELICOPTER 1 hel bn EQUIPMENT BY TYPE ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES MBT 100 Leopard 2A6; (100 Leopard 2A4 in store) IFV 212: 110 BMP-2/-2MD; 102 CV9030FIN APC 613 APC (T) 142: 40 MT-LBu; 102 MT-LBV APC (W) 471: 260 XA-180/185 Sisu; 101 XA-202 Sisu (CP); 48 XA-203 Sisu; 62 AMV (XA-360) AUV 6 SISU GTP (in test) ENGINEERING & MAINTENANCE VEHICLES AEV 5 Dachs ARV 36: 9 BPz-2; 15 MTP-LB; 12 VT-55A VLB 27: 12 BLG-60M2; 6 Leopard 2S; 9 SISU Leguan MW 6+: Aardvark Mk 2; KMT T-55; 6 Leopard 2R CEV; RA-140 DS ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE MSL • MANPATS NLAW; Spike-MR; Spike-LR ARTILLERY 672 SP 122mm 49: 13 K9 Thunder; 36 2S1 Gvozdika (PsH 74) TOWED 288: 122mm 234 D-30 (H 63); 155mm 54 K 83/ GH-52 (K 98) MRL 56: 122mm 34 RM-70; 227mm 22 M270 MLRS MOR 279+: 81mm Krh/71; 120mm 261 Krh/92; SP 120mm 18 XA-361 AMOS HELICOPTERS MRH 7: 5 Hughes 500D; 2 Hughes 500E TPT • Medium 20 NH90 TTH

Europe 103

Navy 1,400; 1,750 conscript (total 3,150) FORCES BY ROLE Naval Command HQ located at Turku; with two subordinate Naval Commands (Gulf of Finland and Archipelago Sea); 1 Naval bde; 3 spt elm (Naval Materiel Cmd, Naval Academy, Naval Research Institute) EQUIPMENT BY TYPE PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 20 PCGM 4 Hamina with 4 RBS15 Mk3 (MTO-85M) AShM, 1 8-cell VLS with Umkhonto-IR (ITO2004) SAM, 1 57mm gun PBG 4 Rauma with 6 RBS15 Mk3 (MTO-85M) AShM PBF 12 Jehu (U-700) (capacity 24 troops) MINE WARFARE 8 MINE COUNTERMEASURES 3 MCC 3 Katanpää (ITA Gaeta mod) MINELAYERS • ML 5: 2 Hameenmaa with 1 8-cell VLS with Umkhonto-IR (ITO2004) SAM, 2 RBU 1200 Uragan A/S mor, 1 57mm gun (can carry up to 120 mines) 3 Pansio with 50 mines AMPHIBIOUS • LANDING CRAFT 51 LCM 1 Kampela LCP ε50 LOGISTICS AND SUPPORT 7 AG 3: 1 Louhi; 2 Hylje AX 4: 3 Fabian Wrede; 1 Lokki

Coastal Defence FORCES BY ROLE MANOEUVRE Amphibious 1 mne bde COMBAT SUPPORT 1 cbt spt bde (1 AShM bty) EQUIPMENT BY TYPE COASTAL DEFENCE AShM 4 RBS15K ARTY • 130mm 30 K-53tk (static) ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE MSL • MANPATS Spike (used in AShM role)

Air Force 2,050; 1,000 conscript (total 3,050) 3 Air Comds: Satakunta (West), Karelia (East), Lapland (North) FORCES BY ROLE FIGHTER/GROUND ATTACK 2 sqn with F/A-18C/D Hornet

ISR 1 (survey) sqn with Learjet 35A TRANSPORT 1 flt with C295M 4 (liaison) flt with PC-12NG TRAINING 1 sqn with Hawk Mk50/51A/66* (air-defence and ground-attack trg) 1 unit with G-115EA; L-70 Vinka EQUIPMENT BY TYPE AIRCRAFT 107 combat capable FGA 62: 55 F/A-18C Hornet; 7 F/A-18D Hornet ELINT 1 C295M TPT • Light 11: 2 C295M; 3 Learjet 35A (survey; ECM trg; tgt-tow); 6 PC-12NG TRG 99: 28 G-115EA; 29 Hawk Mk50/51A*; 16 Hawk Mk66*; 26 L-70 Vinka AIR-LAUNCHED MISSILES AAM • IR AIM-9 Sidewinder; IIR AIM-9X Sidewinder ARH AIM-120C AMRAAM LACM Conventional AGM-158 JASSM BOMBS INS/GPS-guided GBU-31 JDAM; AGM-154C JSOW

Gendarmerie & Paramilitary Border Guard 2,700 Ministry of Interior. 4 Border Guard Districts and 2 Coast Guard Districts FORCES BY ROLE MARITIME PATROL 1 sqn with Do-228 (maritime surv); AS332 Super Puma; Bell 412 (AB-412) Twin Huey; Bell 412EP (AB-412EP) Twin Huey;AW119KE Koala EQUIPMENT BY TYPE PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 43 PSO 1 Turva with 1 hel landing platform PCC 2 Tursas PB 40 AMPHIBIOUS • LANDING CRAFT 6 UCAC 6 AIRCRAFT • TPT • Light 2 Do-228 HELICOPTERS MRH 3: 1 Bell 412 (AB-412) Twin Huey; 2 Bell 412EP (AB-412EP) Twin Huey TPT 9: Medium 5 AS332 Super Puma; Light 4 AW119KE Koala

Reserve 12,000 reservists on mobilisation

DEPLOYMENT IRAQ: Operation Inherent Resolve 75; 1 trg team; NATO • NATO Mission Iraq 5 LEBANON: UN • UNIFIL 162; 1 inf coy MALI: EU • EUTM Mali 12; UN • MINUSMA 4 MIDDLE EAST: UN • UNTSO 15 SERBIA: NATO • KFOR 20 SOMALIA: EU • EUTM Somalia 10

Europe

UNINHABITED AERIAL VEHICLES ISR Medium 11 ADS-95 Ranger AIR DEFENCE SAM 60+ Short-range 44: 20 Crotale NG (ITO 90); 24 NASAMS II FIN (ITO 12) Point-defence 16+: 16 ASRAD (ITO 05); FIM-92 Stinger (ITO 15); RBS 70 (ITO 05/05M) GUNS 407+: 23mm ItK 95/ZU-23-2 (ItK 61); 35mm GDF005 (ItK 88); SP 35mm 7 Leopard 2 ITK Marksman

104 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2022

France FRA Euro EUR GDP per capita

2020

2021

EUR

2.30tr

2.46tr

USD

2.62tr

2.94tr

USD

40,299

45,028

Growth

-8.0

6.3

Inflation

0.5

2.0

EUR

46.2bn

48.2bn

USD

52.7bn

57.6bn

EUR

48.1bn

49.7bn

USD

54.9bn

59.3bn

0.88

0.84

Def exp [a] Def bdgt [b] USD1=EUR

2022

RESERVE 41,050 (Army 24,900 Navy 6,250 Air 5,750 Other Staffs 4,150) Gendarmerie & Paramilitary 30,300

ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE Strategic Nuclear Forces 51.5bn

[a] NATO figure [b] Includes pensions Real-terms defence budget trend (USDbn, constant 2015) 51.7

2008

Population

44.0 2021

2015

ACTIVE 203,250 (Army 114,700 Navy 34,700 Air 40,450, Other Staffs 13,400) Gendarmerie & Paramilitary 100,500

68,084,217

Age

0–14

15–19

20–24

25–29

30–64 65 plus

Male

9.3%

3.1%

3.0%

2.9%

21.6%

9.1%

Female

8.9%

3.0%

2.9%

2.8%

21.7%

11.7%

Capabilities France maintains globally deployed forces that are also engaged on enduring operations in Africa. The 2017 Strategic Review reiterated operational commitments in sub-Saharan Africa and the Middle East, as well as a continued presence in the Asia-Pacific. The Programme Budget Law for 2019–25 set out defence-budget increases to support these goals. France plays a leading military role in the EU, NATO and the UN. In 2018, Paris launched the European Intervention Initiative, joined by 11 other European countries, intended to foster a common strategic culture and develop the ability to jointly deploy quickly in case of crises. France is also expanding its capabilities in non-traditional domains, having set up a space command, developed a space strategy and formalised an offensive cyber doctrine. Deployments abroad have demonstrated the ability to support expeditionary forces independently. In mid-2020, the army issued a strategy document, ‘Operational Superiority 2030’, which called for improved readiness in light of the risk of high-intensity conflict. Domestic deployments persist under Opération SentinelIe, with troops deployed on high-visibility patrols. Some strategic military air-transport requirements are dependent on allies and external contractors. The high operational tempo has increased the stress on equipment. The Programme Budget Law seeks to remedy this with a budget increase for maintenance and accelerated modernisation of multirole tanker-transport and refuelling aircraft. France is also in the process of reducing its footprint in the Sahel and scaling down Opération Barkhane; it will focus on the Takuba task force. France has a sophisticated defence industry, exemplified by companies such as Dassault, MBDA and Nexter. Most French defence procurements are addressed by domestic firms, and many of these firms export globally. France has called for increased European defenceindustrial cooperation and aims to increase its exports to Europe. It is also seeking to invest in future technologies and supports startups and innovation in the defence domain.

Navy 2,200 EQUIPMENT BY TYPE SUBMARINES • STRATEGIC 4 SSBN 4 Le Triomphant with 16 M51 SLBM with 6 TN75 nuclear warheads, 4 single 533mm TT with SM39 Exocet AShM/F17 mod 2 HWT AIRCRAFT • FGA 20 Rafale M F3 with ASMPA msl

Air Force 1,800 Air Strategic Forces Command FORCES BY ROLE STRIKE 1 sqn with Rafale B with ASMPA msl 1 sqn with Rafale B with ASMPA msl (forming) TANKER 2 sqn with A330 MRTT; C-135FR; KC-135 Stratotanker EQUIPMENT BY TYPE AIRCRAFT 20 combat capable FGA 20 Rafale B TKR/TPT 15: 5 A330 MRTT; 10 C-135FR TKR 3 KC-135 Stratotanker

Paramilitary Gendarmerie 40 Space EQUIPMENT BY TYPE SATELLITES 13 COMMUNICATIONS 4: 2 Syracuse-3 (designed to integrate with UK Skynet & ITA Sicral); 1 Syracuse-4; 1 Athena-Fidus (also used by ITA) ISR 6: 1 CSO-1; 1 CSO-2; 1 Helios 2A; 1 Helios 2B; 2 Pleiades ELINT/SIGINT 3 CERES

Army 114,700 Regt and BG normally bn size FORCES BY ROLE COMMAND 1 corps HQ (CRR-FR) 2 div HQ MANOEUVRE Reconnaissance 1 recce regt

Armoured 1 (2nd) armd bde (2 tk regt, 3 armd inf regt, 1 SP arty regt, 1 engr regt) 1 (7th) armd bde (1 tk regt, 1 armd BG, 3 armd inf regt, 1 SP arty regt, 1 engr regt) 1 armd BG HQ (UAE) Mechanised 1 (6th) lt armd bde (2 armd cav regt, 1 armd inf regt, 1 mech inf regt, 1 mech inf regt, 1 SP arty regt, 1 engr regt) 1 (FRA/GER) mech bde (1 armd cav regt, 1 mech inf regt) 1 mech regt HQ (Djibouti) Light 1 (27th) mtn bde (1 armd cav regt, 3 mtn inf regt, 1 arty regt, 1 engr regt) 3 inf regt (French Guiana & French West Indies) 1 inf regt HQ (New Caledonia) 2 inf bn HQ (Côte d’Ivoire & Gabon) Air Manoeuvre 1 (11th) AB bde (1 armd cav regt, 4 para regt, 1 arty regt, 1 engr regt, 1 spt regt) 1 AB regt (La Réunion) Amphibious 1 (9th) amph bde (2 armd cav regt, 1 armd inf regt, 2 mech inf regt, 1 SP arty regt, 1 engr regt) Other 4 SMA regt (French Guiana, French West Indies & Indian Ocean) 3 SMA coy (French Polynesia, Indian Ocean & New Caledonia) COMBAT SUPPORT 1 MRL regt 2 engr regt 2 EW regt 1 int bn 1 CBRN regt 5 sigs regt COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT 5 tpt regt 1 log regt 1 med regt 3 trg regt HELICOPTER 1 (4th) hel bde (3 hel regt) ISR UAV 1 UAV regt AIR DEFENCE 1 SAM regt

Special Operation Forces 2,200 FORCES BY ROLE SPECIAL FORCES 2 SF regt HELICOPTER 1 hel regt

Reserves 22,750 reservists Reservists form 79 UIR (Reserve Intervention Units) of about 75 to 152 troops, for ‘Proterre’ – combined land projection forces bn, and 23 USR (Reserve Specialised Units) of about 160 troops, in specialised regt

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES MBT 222 Leclerc ASLT 245 AMX-10RC RECCE 1,456: 40 ERC-90D Sagaie; 1,416 VBL/VB2L IFV 706: 599 VBCI VCI; 107 VBCI VPC (CP) APC 2,616 APC (T) 49 BvS-10 APC (W) 2,547: 339 VBMR Griffon; 2,151 VAB; 57 VAB VOA (OP) PPV 20 Aravis ENGINEERING & MAINTENANCE VEHICLES AEV 110: 38 AMX-30EBG; 72 VAB GE ARV 44: 27 AMX-30D; 17 Leclerc DNG; VAB-EHC VLB 48: 20 EFA; 18 PTA; 10 SPRAT MW 16+: AMX-30B/B2; 4 Buffalo; 12 Minotaur NBC VEHICLES 26 VAB NRBC ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE • MSL SP 177: 64 VAB Milan; 113 VAB with MMP MANPATS Eryx; FGM-148 Javelin; Milan; MMP ARTILLERY 265+ SP 155mm 108: 32 AU-F-1; 76 CAESAR TOWED 155mm 12 TR-F-1 MRL 227mm 13 M270 MLRS MOR 132+: 81mm LLR 81mm; 120mm 132 RT-F-1 AIRCRAFT • TPT • Light 13: 5 PC-6B Turbo Porter; 5 TBM700; 3 TBM-700B HELICOPTERS ATK 67: 29 Tiger HAP; 38 Tiger HAD MRH 104: 18 AS555UN Fennec; 86 SA341F/342M Gazelle (all variants) TPT 154: Heavy 8 H225M Caracal (CSAR); Medium 111: 24 AS532UL Cougar; 2 EC225LP Super Puma; 39 NH90 TTH; 46 SA330 Puma; Light 35 H120 Colibri (leased) AIR DEFENCE • SAM • Point-defence Mistral AIR-LAUNCHED MISSILES ASM AGM-114 Hellfire II; HOT

Navy 35,100 EQUIPMENT BY TYPE SUBMARINES 8 STRATEGIC • SSBN 4 Le Triomphant opcon Strategic Nuclear Forces with 16 M51 SLBM with 6 TN-75 nuclear warheads, 4 single 533mm TT with SM39 Exocet AShM/ F17 mod 2 HWT TACTICAL • SSN 4 Rubis (1 more severely damaged by fire) with 4 single 533mm TT with SM39 Exocet AShM/ F17 mod 2 HWT PRINCIPAL SURFACE COMBATANTS 22 AIRCRAFT CARRIERS • CVN 1 Charles de Gaulle with 4 8-cell Sylver A43 VLS with Aster 15 SAM, 2 sextuple Sadral lnchr with Mistral SAM (capacity 30 Rafale M FGA ac, 2 E-2C Hawkeye AEW&C ac, 8 AS365 Dauphin/NH90 NFH hel) DESTROYERS • DDGHM 3 1 Aquitaine (FREMM FREDA) with 2 quad lnchr with MM40 Exocet Block 3 AShM, 4 8-cell Sylver A50 VLS with Aster 15 SAM/Aster 30 SAM, 2 twin 324mm B-515 ASTT with MU90 LWT, 1 76mm gun (capacity 1 NH90 NFH hel)

Europe

Europe 105

106 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2022 2 Forbin with 2 quad lnchr with MM40 Exocet Block 3 AShM, 4 8-cell Sylver A50 VLS with Aster 30 SAM, 2 8-cell Sylver A50 VLS with Aster 15 SAM, 2 twin 324mm ASTT with MU90 LWT, 2 76mm gun (capacity 1 NH90 NFH hel) FRIGATES 18 FFGHM 12: 4 Aquitaine (FREMM ASM) with 2 8-cell Sylver A70 VLS with MdCN (SCALP Naval) LACM, 2 quad lnchr with MM40 Exocet Block 3 AShM, 2 8-cell Sylver A43 VLS with Aster 15 SAM, 2 twin 324mm B-515 ASTT with MU90 LWT, 1 76mm gun (capacity 1 NH90 NFH hel) 2 Aquitaine (FREMM ASM) with 2 8-cell Sylver A70 VLS with MdCN (SCALP Naval) LACM, 2 quad lnchr with MM40 Exocet Block 3 AShM, 2 8-cell Sylver A50 VLS with Aster 15 SAM/Aster 30 SAM, 2 twin 324mm B-515 ASTT with MU90 LWT, 1 76mm gun (capacity 1 NH90 NFH hel) 1 Georges Leygues (mod) with 2 quad lnchr with MM40 Exocet AShM, 1 octuple lnchr with Crotale SAM, 2 twin Simbad lnchr with Mistral SAM, 2 single 324mm ASTT with MU90 LWT, 1 100mm gun (capacity 2 hels) 4 La Fayette with 2 quad lnchr with MM40 Exocet Block 3 AShM, 1 octuple lnchr with Crotale SAM, 1 100mm gun (capacity 1 AS565SA Panther hel) 1 La Fayette with 2 quad lnchr with MM40 Exocet Block 3 AShM, 2 sextuple Sadral lnchr with Mistral 3 SAM, 1 100mm gun (capacity 1 AS565SA Panther hel) FFH 6 Floreal with 1 100mm gun (fitted for but not with 1 twin Simbad lnchr with Mistral SAM) (capacity 1 AS565SA Panther hel) PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 20 FSM 6 D’Estienne d’Orves with 1 twin Simbad lnchr with Mistral SAM, 2 twin 533mm ASTT, 1 100mm gun PSO 4 d’Entrecasteaux (BSAOM) with 1 hel landing platform PCO 6: 3 La Confiance, 1 Lapérouse; 1 Le Malin; 1 Fulmar PCC 4: 1 L’Audacieuse; 3 Flamant MINE WARFARE • MINE COUNTERMEASURES 17 MCD 4 Vulcain MHC 3 Antarès MHO 10 Éridan AMPHIBIOUS PRINCIPAL AMPHIBIOUS SHIPS 3 LHD 3 Mistral with 2 twin Simbad lnchr with Mistral SAM (capacity up to 16 NH90/SA330 Puma/AS532 Cougar/Tiger hel; 2 LCT or 4 LCM; 13 MBTs; 50 AFVs; 450 troops) LANDING CRAFT 40 LCT 4 EDA-R LCM 11 CTM LCVP 25 LOGISTICS AND SUPPORT 33 ABU 1 Telenn Mor AG 2 Chamois AGB 1 Astrolabe with 1 hel landing platform AGE 2: 1 Corraline; 1 Thetis (Lapérouse mod) (used as trials ships for mines and divers)

AGI 1 Dupuy de Lome AGM 1 Monge AGOR 2: 1 Pourquoi pas? (used 150 days per year by Ministry of Defence; operated by Ministry of Research and Education otherwise); 1 Beautemps-beaupré AGS 3 Lapérouse AORH 2 Durance with 3 twin Simbad lnchr with Mistral SAM (capacity 1 SA319 Alouette III/AS365 Dauphin/ Lynx) ATS 4 Loire (BSAM) AXL 10: 8 Léopard; 2 Glycine AXS 4: 2 La Belle Poule; 1 La Grand Hermine; 1 Mutin

Naval Aviation 6,500 FORCES BY ROLE STRIKE/FIGHTER/GROUND ATTACK 2 sqn with Rafale M F3 1 sqn with Rafale M F3/F3-R ANTI-SURFACE WARFARE 1 sqn with AS565SA Panther ANTI-SUBMARINE WARFARE 2 sqn with NH90 NFH MARITIME PATROL 2 sqn with Atlantique 2 1 sqn with Falcon 20H Gardian 1 sqn with Falcon 50MI AIRBORNE EARLY WARNING & CONTROL 1 sqn with E-2C Hawkeye SEARCH & RESCUE 1 sqn with AS365N/F Dauphin 2 TRAINING 1 sqn with EMB 121 Xingu 1 unit with SA319B Alouette III 1 unit with Falcon 10MER 1 unit with CAP 10M EQUIPMENT BY TYPE AIRCRAFT 54 combat capable FGA 42 Rafale M F3-R ASW 12 Atlantique-2 (10 more in store) AEW&C 3 E-2C Hawkeye SAR 4 Falcon 50MS TPT 25: Light 10 EMB-121 Xingu; PAX 15: 6 Falcon 10MER; 5 Falcon 20H Gardian; 4 Falcon 50MI TRG 6 CAP 10M HELICOPTERS ASW 26 NH90 NFH MRH 39: 3 AS365F Dauphin 2; 6 AS365N Dauphin 2; 2 AS365N3; 16 AS565SA Panther; 12 SA319B Alouette III UNINHABITED AERIAL VEHICLES ISR • Light 4 S-100 Camcopter AIR-LAUNCHED MISSILES AAM • IIR Mica IR; ARH Mica RF ASM AASM AShM AM39 Exocet LACM Nuclear ASMPA BOMBS Laser-guided: GBU-12/16 Paveway II

Marines 2,200 Commando Units 750 FORCES BY ROLE MANOEUVRE Reconnaissance 1 recce gp Amphibious 2 aslt gp 1 atk swimmer gp 1 raiding gp COMBAT SUPPORT 1 cbt spt gp COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT 1 spt gp

Fusiliers-Marin 1,450 FORCES BY ROLE MANOEUVRE Other 2 sy gp 7 sy coy

Reserves 6,000 reservists Air and Space Force 40,450 FORCES BY ROLE STRIKE 1 sqn with Rafale B with ASMPA msl 1 sqn with Rafale B with ASMPA msl (forming) SPACE 1 (satellite obs) sqn FIGHTER 1 sqn with Mirage 2000-5 1 sqn with Mirage 2000B/C FIGHTER/GROUND ATTACK 3 sqn with Mirage 2000D 1 (composite) sqn with Mirage 2000-5/D (Djibouti) 2 sqn with Rafale B/C 1 sqn with Rafale B/C (UAE) ELECTRONIC WARFARE 1 flt with C-160G Gabriel (ESM); Beech 350ER King Air AIRBORNE EARLY WARNING & CONTROL 1 (Surveillance & Control) sqn with E-3F Sentry SEARCH & RESCUE/TRANSPORT 5 sqn with CN235M; SA330 Puma; AS555 Fennec (Djibouti, French Guiana, French Polynesia, Indian Ocean & New Caledonia) TANKER 1 sqn with A330 MRTT TANKER/TRANSPORT 1 sqn with C-135FR; KC-135 Stratotanker TRANSPORT 1 VIP sqn with A310-300; A330 2 sqn with A400M 1 sqn with C-130H/H-30 Hercules; C-160R Transall 1 sqn with C-130H/H-30/J-30 Hercules; KC-130J Hercules 2 sqn with CN235M 1 sqn with Falcon 7X (VIP); Falcon 900 (VIP); Falcon 2000 3 flt with TBM-700A 1 (mixed) gp with C-160 Transall; DHC-6-300 Twin Otter

TRAINING 1 OCU sqn with Mirage 2000D 1 OCU sqn with Rafale B/C 1 OCU sqn with SA330 Puma; AS555 Fennec 1 OCU unit with C-160 Transall 1 (aggressor) sqn with Alpha Jet* 4 sqn with Alpha Jet* 1 sqn with Grob G120A-F 2 sqn with Grob G120A-F; PC-21 1 sqn with EMB-121 TRANSPORT HELICOPTER 2 sqn with AS555 Fennec 2 sqn with AS332C/L Super Puma; SA330 Puma; H225M ISR UAV 1 sqn with MQ-9A Reaper AIR DEFENCE 3 sqn with Crotale NG; SAMP/T 1 sqn with SAMP/T EQUIPMENT BY TYPE SATELLITES see Space AIRCRAFT 280 combat capable FTR 47: 12 Mirage 2000-5; 28 Mirage 2000C; 7 Mirage 2000B FGA 161: 65 Mirage 2000D; 53 Rafale B; 43 Rafale C (Rafale being upgraded to F3-R standard) ISR 2 Beech 350ER King Air ELINT 2 C-160G Gabriel (ESM) AEW&C 4 E-3F Sentry TKR 3 KC-135 Stratotanker TKR/TPT 17: 5 A330 MRTT; 10 C-135FR; 2 KC-130J Hercules TPT 119: Heavy 18 A400M; Medium 22: 5 C-130H Hercules; 9 C-130H-30 Hercules; 2 C-130J-30 Hercules; 6 C-160R Transall; Light 70: 1 Beech 350i King Air; 19 CN235M-100; 8 CN235M-300; 5 DHC-6-300 Twin Otter; 22 EMB-121 Xingu; 15 TBM-700; PAX 9: 2 A310-300; 1 A330; 2 Falcon 7X; 2 Falcon 900 (VIP); 2 Falcon 2000 (2 A340-200 in store) TRG 127: 72 Alpha Jet*; 18 Grob G120A-F (leased); 17 PC-21; 13 SR20 (leased); 7 SR22 (leased) HELICOPTERS MRH 37 AS555 Fennec TPT 35: Heavy 10 H225M Caracal; Medium 25: 1 AS332C Super Puma; 4 AS332L Super Puma; 20 SA330B Puma UNINHABITED AERIAL VEHICLES CISR • Heavy 8 MQ-9A Reaper AIR DEFENCE • SAM 64: Long-range 40 SAMP/T; Short-range 24 Crotale NG AIR-LAUNCHED MISSILES AAM • IR R-550 Magic 2; IIR Mica IR; ARH Meteor; Mica RF ASM AASM; Apache LACM Nuclear ASMPA Conventional SCALP EG BOMBS • Laser-guided: GBU-12/-16 Paveway II; GBU-49 Enhanced Paveway II

Europe

Europe 107

108 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2022

Security and Intervention Brigade FORCES BY ROLE SPECIAL FORCES 3 SF gp MANOEUVRE Other 24 protection units 30 (fire fighting and rescue) unit

Reserves 5,700 reservists Gendarmerie & Paramilitary 100,500 Gendarmerie 100,500; 30,300 reservists EQUIPMENT BY TYPE ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES APC • APC (W) 80: 60 VXB-170 (VBRG-170); 20 VAB ARTILLERY • MOR 81mm some PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 39 PB 39: 2 Athos; 4 Géranium; 24 VCSM; 9 VSMP HELICOPTERS • TPT • Light 60: 25 AS350BA Ecureuil; 20 H135; 15 H145

DEPLOYMENT BOSNIA-HERZEGOVINA: EU • EUFOR • Operation Althea 5 BURKINA FASO: Operation Barkhane 400; 1 SF gp; 1 C-130H; 1 DHC-6-300; 2 Tiger; 3 AS532UL Cougar; 2 H225M; 2 SA342 Gazelle CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC: 160; EU • EUTM RCA 100 UN • MINUSCA 8 CHAD: Operation Barkhane 1,500; 1 mech inf BG; 1 FGA det with 4 Mirage 2000D; 1 tpt det with 1 C-130H; 2 CN235M CÔTE D’IVOIRE: 950; 1 (Marine) inf bn; 1 hel unit with 1 AS555 Fennec; 2 SA330 Puma; 2 SA342 Gazelle CYPRUS: Operation Inherent Resolve 30: 1 Atlantique-2 DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO: UN • MONUSCO 2 DJIBOUTI: 1,450; 1 (Marine) combined arms regt with (2 recce sqn, 2 inf coy, 1 arty bty, 1 engr coy); 1 hel det with 2 SA330 Puma; 2 SA342 Gazelle; 1 LCM; 1 FGA sqn with 4 Mirage 2000-5; 1 SAR/tpt sqn with 1 CN235M; 2 SA330 Puma EGYPT: MFO 1 ESTONIA: NATO • Enhanced Forward Presence (Operation Lynx) 300; 1 tk sqn FRENCH GUIANA: 2,100: 1 (Foreign Legion) inf regt; 1 (Marine) inf regt; 1 SMA regt; 2 PCO; 1 tpt sqn with 3 CN235M; 5 SA330 Puma; 4 AS555 Fennec; 3 gendarmerie coy; 1 AS350BA Ecureuil; 1 H145 FRENCH POLYNESIA: 900: 1 inf bn; 1 SMA coy; 1 naval HQ at Papeete; 1 FFGHM; 1 PSO; 1 PCO; 1 AFS; 3 Falcon 200 Gardian; 1 SAR/tpt sqn with 2 CN235M FRENCH WEST INDIES: 1,000; 1 (Marine) inf regt; 2 SMA regt; 2 FFGHM; 1 AS565SA Panther; 1 SA319 Alouette III; 1

naval base at Fort de France (Martinique); 4 gendarmerie coy; 1 PCO; 1 PB; 2 AS350BA Ecureuil GABON: 350; 1 inf bn GERMANY: 2,000 (incl elm Eurocorps and FRA/GER bde); 1 (FRA/GER) mech bde (1 armd cav regt, 1 mech inf regt) GULF OF GUINEA: Operation Corymbe 1 FFH IRAQ: Operation Inherent Resolve 6; NATO • NATO Mission Iraq 3 JORDAN: Operation Inherent Resolve (Chammal) 300: 4 Rafale F3 LA REUNION/MAYOTTE: 1,700; 1 (Marine) para regt; 1 (Foreign Legion) inf coy; 1 SMA regt; 1 SMA coy; 2 FFGHM; 1 PCO; 1 LCM; 1 naval HQ at Port-des-Galets (La Réunion); 1 naval base at Dzaoudzi (Mayotte); 1 Falcon 50M; 1 SAR/tpt sqn with 2 CN235M; 5 gendarmerie coy; 1 SA319 Alouette III LEBANON: UN • UNIFIL 567; 1 mech inf bn(-); 1 maint coy; 1 tpt coy; VBL; VBCI; VAB; Mistral MALI: Operation Barkhane 2,500; 1 mech inf BG; 1 log bn; 1 tpt unit with 1 CN235M; 1 PC-6B; 1 hel unit with 5 Tiger; 2 AS532 UL Cougar; 5 NH90 TTH; 4 SA342 Gazelle; EU • EUTM Mali 13; UN • MINUSMA 21 MEDITERRANEAN: Operation Inherent Resolve 100: 1 DDGHM NEW CALEDONIA: 1,450; 1 (Marine) mech inf regt; 1 SMA coy; 6 ERC-90F1 Lynx; 1 FFGHM; 1 PSO; 1 PCO; 1 base with 2 Falcon 200 Gardian at Nouméa; 1 tpt unit with 2 CN235 MPA; 2 SA330 Puma; 4 gendarmerie coy; 2 AS350BA Ecureuil NIGER: Operation Barkhane 1,000; 1 FGA det with 4 Mirage 2000C/D; 1 tkr/tpt det with 1 C-135FR; 1 C-130J-30 Hercules; 1 UAV det with 6 MQ-9A Reaper; 1 ISR det with 1 Atlantique-2 PERSIAN GULF: EMASOH 100; 1 DDGHM QATAR: Operation Inherent Resolve (Chammal) 70; 1 E-3F Sentry SAUDI ARABIA: 50 (radar det) SENEGAL: 350; 1 Falcon 50MI UNITED ARAB EMIRATES: 650: 1 armd BG (1 tk coy, 1 arty bty); Leclerc; CAESAR; • Operation Inherent Resolve (Chammal); 1 FGA sqn with 7 Rafale F3 • EMASOH; 1 Atlantique-2 Western Sahara: UN • MINURSO 2

FOREIGN FORCES Germany 400 (GER elm Eurocorps) Singapore 200; 1 trg sqn with 12 M-346 Master

Europe 109

Euro EUR GDP

EUR

2020

2021

3.37tr

3.54tr

USD

3.84tr

4.23tr

USD

46,216

50,788

Growth

-4.6

3.1

Inflation

0.4

2.9

per capita

Def exp [a] Def bdgt [b]

EUR

51.6bn

53.2bn

USD

58.9bn

63.5bn

EUR

45.6bn

46.9bn

USD

52.1bn

56.1bn

0.88

0.84

USD1=EUR

2022

ACTIVE 183,400 (Army 62,650 Navy 16,250 Air 27,100 Joint Support Service 27,600 Joint Medical Service 19,950 Cyber 14,350 Other 15,500) 50.3bn

[b] Includes military pensions Real-terms defence budget trend (USDbn, constant 2015) 46.9

Population

36.2 2021

2015

Conscript liability Voluntary conscription only. Voluntary conscripts can serve up to 23 months

RESERVE 30,050 (Army 6,850 Navy 1,200 Air 3,400 Joint Support Service 11,950 Joint Medical Service 3,650 Cyber 1,150 Other 1,850)

[a] NATO figure

2008

component and is scheduled to provide this role again in 2023, with the earmarked units prioritised for modernisation and upgrades. Shortages of spare parts and maintenance problems are reported in all three services. Germany’s defence-industrial base is able to design and manufacture equipment to meet requirements across all military domains, with strengths in land and naval systems. The government is pursuing a policy of closer defenceindustrial cooperation in Europe.

79,903,481

Age

0–14

15–19

20–24

25–29

Male

6.6%

2.3%

2.6%

2.8%

30–64 65 plus 24.3%

10.3%

Female

6.3%

2.2%

2.6%

2.7%

24.2%

12.9%

Capabilities The 2016 defence White Paper committed Germany to a leadership role in European defence. It also emphasised the importance of NATO and the need for the armed forces to contribute to collective-defence tasks. The 2018 Konzeption der Bundeswehr underlines that collective- and territorial-defence tasks will drive militarymodernisation efforts and are of equal standing with international crisis-management operations. The key implication for defence modernisation is that Germany will need to invest in readiness and return to fully equipping operational units, after having experimented in recent years with rotating equipment among units depending on their deployment or training demands. In May 2021, the Federal Ministry of Defence published a paper entitled ‘Key Elements of the Bundeswehr of the Future’, which outlined organisational measures intended to strengthen the modernisation agenda. Germany is aligning its defence-planning process with capability goals derived from multinational guidance. Berlin has been a key sponsor of the NATO Framework Nations Concept and led the drive to implement Permanent Structured Cooperation on defence in the EU. Close military cooperation has been established with the Czech Republic, France, the Netherlands and Romania, including the affiliation of units. The defence ministry has announced its objective to increase authorised active force numbers. In July 2020, the government launched a new voluntary conscript initiative focused on homeland-security tasks with 1,000 posts. Volunteers will serve for seven months plus five months as reservists over the course of six years. The first recruits, part of a one-year pilot phase, started training in April 2021. This is in addition to the existing voluntary conscript model that requires between seven and 23 months of military service, and which has seen declining numbers of applications in recent years. The armed forces are struggling to improve readiness levels in light of increasing demands on NATO’s eastern flank. In 2019, Germany was the lead nation for NATO’s Very High Readiness Joint Task Force land

ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE Space EQUIPMENT BY TYPE SATELLITES 7 COMMUNICATIONS 2 COMSATBw (1 & 2) ISR 5 SAR-Lupe

Army 62,650 FORCES BY ROLE COMMAND elm 2 (1 GNC & MNC NE) corps HQ MANOEUVRE Armoured 1 (1st) armd div (1 (9th) armd bde (1 armd recce bn, 1 tk bn, 2 armd inf bn, 1 mech inf bn, 1 cbt engr bn, 1 spt bn); 1 (21st) armd bde (1 armd recce bn, 1 tk bn, 1 armd inf bn, 1 mech inf bn, 1 cbt engr bn, 1 spt bn); 1 (41st) mech inf bde (1 armd recce bn, 2 armd inf bn, 1 mech inf bn, 1 cbt engr bn, 1 sigs coy, 1 spt bn); 1 tk bn (for NLD 43rd Bde); 1 SP arty bn; 1 sigs coy) 1 (10th) armd div (1 (12th) armd bde (1 armd recce bn, 1 tk bn, 2 armd inf bn, 1 cbt engr bn, 1 sigs coy, 1 spt bn); 1 (37th) mech inf bde (1 armd recce bn, 2 tk bn, 2 armd inf bn, 1 engr bn, 1 sigs coy, 1 spt bn); 1 (23rd) mtn inf bde (1 recce bn, 3 mtn inf bn, 1 cbt engr bn, 1 spt bn); 1 SP arty bn; 1 SP arty trg bn; 2 mech inf bn (GER/FRA bde); 1 arty bn (GER/FRA bde); 1 cbt engr coy (GER/FRA bde); 1 spt bn (GER/FRA bde)) Air Manoeuvre 1 (rapid reaction) AB div (1 SOF bde (3 SOF bn); 1 AB bde (2 recce coy, 2 para regt, 2 cbt engr coy); 1 atk hel regt; 2 tpt hel regt; 1 sigs coy) COMBAT SUPPORT 1 engr bn(-) (Joint GER-UK unit) EQUIPMENT BY TYPE ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES MBT 284: 225 Leopard 2A5/A6; 59 Leopard 2A7/2A7V (55 Leopard 2A4 in store) RECCE 169 Fennek (incl 14 engr recce, 14 fires spt) IFV 674: 253 Marder 1A3/A4; 71 Marder 1A5; 350 Puma

Europe

Germany GER

110 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2022 APC 728 APC (T) 112: 75 Bv-206S; 37 M113 (inc variants) APC (W) 616: 257 Boxer (inc variants); 359 TPz-1 Fuchs (inc variants) AUV 683: 247 Dingo 2; 363 Eagle IV/V; 73 Wiesel 1 Mk20 (with 20mm gun) ENGINEERING & MAINTENANCE VEHICLES AEV 51 Dachs ARV 170: 95 BPz-2 1; 75 BPz-3 Büffel VLB 59: 22 Biber; 7 Leopard 2 with Leguan; 30 M3 MW 30: 6 Fuchs KAI; 24 Keiler NBC VEHICLES 8 TPz-1 Fuchs NBC ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE • MSL SP 102 Wiesel ATGM with TOW or MELLS MANPATS Milan; Spike-LR (MELLS) ARTILLERY 296 SP 155mm 121 PzH 2000 MRL 227mm 41 M270 MLRS MOR 134: 120mm 94 Tampella; SP 120mm 40 M113 with Tampella HELICOPTERS ATK 51 Tiger TPT 101: Medium 81 NH90; Light 20: 13 H135; 7 H145 (SAR) UNINHABITED AERIAL VEHICLES ISR 127: Medium 39 KZO; Light 87 LUNA AIR-LAUNCHED MISSILES • ASM HOT; PARS 3 LR

Navy 16,250 EQUIPMENT BY TYPE SUBMARINES 6 SSK 6 Type-212A (fitted with AIP) with 6 single 533mm TT with DM2A4 HWT PRINCIPAL SURFACE COMBATANTS 11 DESTROYERS • DDGHM 3 Sachsen (F124) with 2 quad lnchr with RGM-84C Harpoon Block 1B AShM, 4 8-cell Mk 41 VLS with SM-2 Block IIIA SAM/RIM-162B ESSM SAM, 2 21-cell Mk 49 GMLS with RIM-116 RAM SAM, 2 triple 324mm SVTT Mk 32 ASTT with MU90 LWT, 1 76mm gun (capacity 2 Sea Lynx Mk88A hel) FRIGATES • FFGHM 8: 3 Baden-Württemberg (F125) with 2 quad lnchr with RGM-84C Harpoon Block 1B AShM, 2 21-cell Mk 49 GMLS with RIM-116C RAM Block 2 SAM, 1 127mm gun (capacity 2 NH90 hel) 4 Brandenburg (F123) with 2 twin lnchr with MM38 Exocet AShM, 2 8-cell Mk 41 VLS with RIM-7P Sea Sparrow SAM, 2 Mk 49 GMLS with RIM-116 RAM SAM, 2 twin 324mm SVTT Mk 32 ASTT with Mk 46 LWT, 1 76mm gun (capacity 2 Sea Lynx Mk88A hel) 1 Bremen (F122) with 2 quad lnchr with RGM-84C Harpoon Block 1B AShM, 1 octuple Mk 29 GMLS with RIM-7P Sea Sparrow SAM, 2 21-cell Mk 49 GMLS with RIM-116 RAM SAM, 2 twin 324mm SVTT Mk 32 ASTT with Mk 46 LWT, 1 76mm gun (capacity 2 Sea Lynx Mk88A hel) PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS • CORVETTES 5 FSGM 5 Braunschweig (K130) with 2 twin lnchr with RBS15 Mk3 AShM, 2 21-cell Mk 49 GMLS with RIM-116 RAM SAM, 1 76mm gun, 1 hel landing platform

MINE WARFARE • MINE COUNTERMEASURES 23 MHO 10: 7 Frankenthal (2 used as diving support); 3 Frankenthal (mod. MJ332CL) MSO 1 Ensdorf MSD 12 Seehund AMPHIBIOUS • LANDING CRAFT 1 LCU 1 Type-520 LOGISTICS AND SUPPORT 23 AG 4: 2 Schwedeneck (Type-748); 2 Stollergrund (Type745) AGI 3 Oste (Type-423) AGOR 1 Planet (Type-751) AOR 2 Rhön (Type-704) AORH 3 Berlin (Type-702) (fitted for but not with RIM116 RAM SAM) (capacity 2 Sea King Mk41 hel) AORL 6 Elbe (Type-404) with 1 hel landing platform (2 specified for PFM support; 1 specified for SSK support; 3 specified for MHO/MSO support); ATF 3: 1 Helgoland; 2 Wangerooge AXS 1 Gorch Fock

Naval Aviation 2,000 EQUIPMENT BY TYPE AIRCRAFT 8 combat capable ASW 8 AP-3C Orion TPT • Light 2 Do-228 (pollution control) HELICOPTERS ASW 22 Lynx Mk88A SAR 21: 11 Sea King Mk41; 10 NH90 NFH (Sea Lion)

Naval Special Forces Command FORCES BY ROLE SPECIAL FORCES 1 SF coy

Sea Battalion FORCES BY ROLE MANOEUVRE Amphibious 1 mne bn

Air Force 27,100 FORCES BY ROLE FIGHTER 3 wg (2 sqn with Eurofighter Typhoon) FIGHTER/GROUND ATTACK 1 wg (2 sqn with Tornado IDS) 1 wg (2 sqn with Eurofighter Typhoon (multi-role)) ISR 1 wg (1 ISR sqn with Tornado ECR/IDS; 2 UAV sqn with Heron) TANKER/TRANSPORT 1 (special air mission) wg (3 sqn with A310 MRTT; A319; A321; A340; A350; AS532U2 Cougar II; Global 5000; Global 6000) TRANSPORT 1 wg (total: 1 sqn with C-160D Transall) 1 wg (3 sqn (forming) with A400M Atlas) TRAINING 1 sqn located at Holloman AFB (US) with Tornado IDS

Europe 111

Air Force Regiment FORCES BY ROLE MANOEUVRE Other 1 sy regt EQUIPMENT BY TYPE AIRCRAFT 226 combat capable FTR 138 Eurofighter Typhoon ATK 68 Tornado IDS ATK/EW 20 Tornado ECR* ISR 1 A319CJ (Open Skies) TKR/TPT 3 A310 MRTT TPT 56: Heavy 35 A400M; Medium 8 C-160D Transall; PAX 13: 1 A321; 2 A340 (VIP); 1 A350 (VIP); 2 A319; 4 Global 5000; 3 Global 6000 TRG 109: 69 T-6A Texan II, 40 T-38C Talon HELICOPTERS MRH 15 H145M TPT 73: Heavy 70 CH-53G/GA/GS/GE Stallion; Medium 3 AS532U2 Cougar II (VIP) UNINHABITED AERIAL VEHICLES • ISR • Heavy 6 Heron 1 AIR DEFENCE SAM 50 Long-range 30 M902 Patriot PAC-3 Point-defence 20 ASRAD Ozelot (with FIM-92 Stinger) GUNS 35mm 12 C-RAM Mantis AIR-LAUNCHED MISSILES AAM • IR AIM-9L/Li Sidewinder; IIR IRIS-T; ARH AIM-120B AMRAAM LACM Taurus KEPD 350 ARM AGM-88B HARM BOMBS Laser-guided GBU-24 Paveway III; GBU-48 Enhanced Paveway II; GBU-54 JDAM

Joint Support Service 27,600 FORCES BY ROLE COMBAT SUPPORT 3 MP regt 2 NBC bn COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT 6 log bn 1 spt regt EQUIPMENT BY TYPE ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES AUV 451: 206 Dingo 2; 245 Eagle IV/V

ENGINEERING & MAINTENANCE VEHICLES ARV 35: 23 BPz-2; 12 BPz-3 Büffel NBC VEHICLES 35 TPz-1 Fuchs A6/A7/A8 NBC

Joint Medical Services 19,950 FORCES BY ROLE COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT 4 med regt EQUIPMENT BY TYPE ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES APC • APC (W) 109: 72 Boxer (amb); 37 TPz-1 Fuchs (amb) AUV 42 Eagle IV/V (amb)

Cyber & Information Command 14,350 FORCES BY ROLE COMBAT SUPPORT 4 EW bn 6 sigs bn

DEPLOYMENT BALTIC SEA: NATO • SNMCMG 1: 1 MHO; 1 AOR FRANCE: 400 (incl GER elm Eurocorps) IRAQ: Operation Inherent Resolve 80; NATO • NATO Mission Iraq 10 JORDAN: Operation Inherent Resolve 150; 1 A400M LEBANON: UN • UNIFIL 103; 1 FFGM LITHUANIA: NATO • Enhanced Forward Presence 558; 1 armd inf bn HQ; 1 armd inf coy(+) with Leopard 2A6; Marder 1A3 MALI: EU • EUTM Mali 120; UN • MINUSMA 426; 1 sy coy; 1 int coy; 1 UAV sqn MEDITERRANEAN SEA: EU • EU NAVFOR MED • Operation Irini 1 AORH; NATO • SNMG 2: 1 AOT POLAND: 95 (GER elm MNC-NE) SERBIA: NATO • KFOR 70 SOUTH SUDAN: UN • UNMISS 14 UNITED STATES: Trg units with 40 T-38 Talon; 69 T-6A Texan II at Goodyear AFB (AZ)/Sheppard AFB (TX); NAS Pensacola (FL); Fort Rucker (AL); Missile trg at Fort Bliss (TX) WESTERN SAHARA: UN • MINURSO 3

FOREIGN FORCES France 2,000; 1 (FRA/GER) mech bde (1 armd cav regt, 1 mech inf regt) United Kingdom 185 United States US Africa Command: Army; 1 HQ at Stuttgart US European Command: 36,950; 1 combined service HQ (EUCOM) at Stuttgart-Vaihingen Army 22,650; 1 HQ (US Army Europe & Africa (USAREUR-AF) at Wiesbaden; 1 arty comd; 1 SF gp; 1 recce bn; 1 mech bde(-); 1 fd arty bn; 1 MRL bde (2 MRL bn); 1 (cbt avn) hel bde; 1 (cbt avn) hel bde HQ; 1 int bde; 1 MP bde; 1 sigs bde; 1 spt bde; 1 (MDTF) cbt

Europe

1 unit (ENJJPT) located at Sheppard AFB (US) with T-6A Texan II; T-38C Talon 1 hel unit located at Fassberg TRANSPORT HELICOPTER 1 tpt hel wg (3 sqn with CH-53G/GA/GE/GS Stallion; 1 sqn with H145M) AIR DEFENCE 1 wg (3 SAM gp) with M902 Patriot PAC-3 1 AD gp with ASRAD Ozelot; C-RAM Mantis and trg unit 1 AD trg unit located at Fort Bliss (US) with MIM104C/F Patriot PAC-2/3 3 (tac air ctrl) radar gp

112 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2022 spt bde(-); 1 SAM bn; 1 ARNG SAM bde(-); 2 (APS) armd bde eqpt set; M1A2 SEPv2/v3 Abrams; M3A3 Bradley; M2A3 Bradley; M1296 Stryker Dragoon; M109A6; M119A3; M777A2; M270A1; AH-64D/E Apache; CH-47F Chinook; UH-60L/M Black Hawk; HH-60M Black Hawk; M902 Patriot PAC-3; M1097 Avenger; M-SHORAD Navy 450 USAF 13,300; 1 HQ (US Air Forces Europe & Africa (USAFE)) at Ramstein AB; 1 HQ (3rd Air Force) at Ramstein AB; 1 FGA wg at Spangdahlem AB with (1 FGA sqn with 24 F-16C Fighting Falcon); 1 tpt wg at Ramstein AB with 14 C-130J-30 Hercules; 2 Gulfstream V (C-37A); 5 Learjet 35A (C-21A); 1 B-737-700 (C-40B) USMC 550

Euro EUR EUR

2020

2021

166bn

177bn

USD

189bn

212bn

USD

17,657

19,827

Growth

-8.2

6.5

Inflation

-1.3

-0.1

per capita

Def exp [a] Def bdgt [b]

EUR

4.40bn

6.58bn

USD

5.02bn

7.86bn

EUR

4.36bn

6.47bn

USD

4.98bn

7.73bn

0.88

0.84

USD1=EUR

2022

6.15bn

[a] NATO figure [b] Includes military pensions Real-terms defence budget trend (USDbn, constant 2015) 7.96 4.58 2008

Population

ACTIVE 143,300 (Army 93,500 Navy 16,400 Air 21,800 Joint 11,600) Gendarmerie & Paramilitary 4,000 Conscript liability 9 months for all services

RESERVE 221,350 (Army 181,500 Navy 5,850 Air 34,000)

ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE

Greece GRC GDP

deployments involve limited numbers of personnel and focus on the near abroad, although the country contributes to EU, NATO and UN missions. Athens is now in the process of acquiring Rafale combat aircraft and frigates from France as part of a newly announced strategic partnership that includes a mutual-assistance clause. Greece has an extensive defence industry focused on the domestic market, capable of manufacturing and developing naval vessels, subsystems, ammunition and small arms.

2015

2021

10,569,703

Age

0–14

15–19

20–24

25–29

Male

7.4%

2.7%

2.8%

2.7%

30–64 65 plus 23.0%

10.1%

Female

7.0%

2.4%

2.5%

24.2%

12.6%

Capabilities Greece’s 2014 National Military Strategy identifies safeguarding sovereignty and territorial integrity as principal defence objectives. The armed forces would also be expected to support Cyprus in the event of a conflict. The Force Structure 2013–27 document set out plans to make the armed forces more flexible, rapidly deployable and cost-effective. Greece is a NATO member and has led the EU’s Balkan Battlegroup. In recent years, defence-cooperation agreements have been signed with Cyprus, Egypt and Israel while ties are developing with the UAE and Saudi Arabia. There is close cooperation with the US. The Mutual Defense Cooperation Agreement is the cornerstone of US–Greece defence cooperation and provides for a naval-support facility and an airfield at Souda Bay in Crete. The armed forces still contain conscripts but most personnel are regulars and Athens is looking to move to a fully professional force. A force-structure review (2020–34) was approved by the National Security Council in April 2021. Training levels are reportedly good, with a focus on joint operational training. Greece’s

Army 48,500; 45,000 conscripts (total 93,500) FORCES BY ROLE COMMAND 2 corps HQ (incl NRDC-GR) 1 armd div HQ 3 mech inf div HQ 1 inf div HQ SPECIAL FORCES 1 SF comd 1 cdo/para bde MANOEUVRE Reconnaissance 4 recce bn Armoured 4 armd bde (2 armd bn, 1 mech inf bn, 1 SP arty bn) Mechanised 10 mech inf bde (1 armd bn, 2 mech bn, 1 SP arty bn) Light 2 inf regt Air Manoeuvre 1 air mob bde 1 air aslt bde Amphibious 1 mne bde COMBAT SUPPORT 2 MRL bn 3 AD bn (2 with I-Hawk, 1 with Tor M1) 3 engr regt 2 engr bn 1 EW regt 10 sigs bn COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT 1 log corps HQ 1 log div (3 log bde) HELICOPTER 1 hel bde (1 hel regt with (2 atk hel bn), 2 tpt hel bn, 4 hel bn) EQUIPMENT BY TYPE ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES MBT 1,228: 170 Leopard 2A6HEL; 183 Leopard 2A4; 500 Leopard 1A4/5; 375 M48A5 RECCE 242 VBL IFV 169 BMP-1 APC • APC (T) 2,130: 91 Leonidas Mk1/2; 1,852 M113A1/ A2; 187 M577 (CP)

ENGINEERING & MAINTENANCE VEHICLES ARV 262: 12 Büffel; 43 BPz-2; 94 M88A1; 113 M578 VLB 52: 34 M48/M60 AVLB; 10 Biber; 8 Leopard 1 with Leguan MW Giant Viper ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE MSL SP 558: 195 HMMWV with 9K135 Kornet-E (RS-AT-14 Spriggan); 363 M901 MANPATS 9K111 Fagot (RS-AT-4 Spigot); Milan; TOW RCL 687+: 84mm Carl Gustaf; 90mm EM-67; SP 106mm 687 M40A1 ARTILLERY 3,518 SP 594: 155mm 442: 418 M109A1B/A2/A3GEA1/A5; 24 PzH 2000; 175mm 12 M107; 203mm 140 M110A2 TOWED 459: 105mm 229: 211 M101; 18 M-56; 155mm 230 M114 MRL 145: 122mm 109 RM-70; 227mm 36 M270 MLRS MOR 2,320: 81mm 1,700; 107mm 620 M30 (incl 231 SP) SURFACE-TO-SURFACE MISSILE LAUNCHERS SRBM • Conventional MGM-140A ATACMS (launched from M270 MLRS) AIRCRAFT • TPT • Light 18: 1 Beech 200 King Air (C-12C) 2 Beech 200 King Air (C-12R/AP Huron); 15 Cessna 185 (U-17A/B) HELICOPTERS ATK 28: 19 AH-64A Apache; 9 AH-64D Apache MRH 60 OH-58D Kiowa Warrior TPT 135: Heavy 25: 19 CH-47D Chinook; 6 CH-47SD Chinook; Medium 14 NH90 TTH; Light 96: 84 Bell 205 (UH-1H Iroquois); 14 Bell 206 (AB-206) Jet Ranger UNINHABITED AERIAL VEHICLES ISR • Medium 4 Sperwer AIR DEFENCE SAM 155+ Medium-range 42 MIM-23B I-Hawk Short-range 21 9K331 Tor-M1 (RS-SA-15 Gauntlet) Point-range 92+: 38 9K33 Osa-M (RS-SA-8B Gecko); 54 ASRAD HMMWV; FIM-92 Stinger GUNS • TOWED 727: 20mm 204 Rh 202; 23mm 523 ZU23-2

National Guard 38,000 reservists Internal security role FORCES BY ROLE MANOEUVRE Light 1 inf div Air Manoeuvre 1 para regt COMBAT SUPPORT 8 arty bn 4 AD bn HELICOPTER 1 hel bn

Navy 14,100; 2,300 conscript (total 16,400) EQUIPMENT BY TYPE SUBMARINES • SSK 11: 3 Poseidon (GER Type-209/1200) with 8 single 533mm TT with SUT HWT

1 Poseidon (GER Type-209/1200) (fitted with AIP technology) with 8 single 533mm TT with UGM-84C Harpoon Block 1B AShM/SUT HWT 3 Glavkos (GER Type-209/1100) with 8 single 533mm TT with UGM-84C Harpoon Block 1B AShM/SUT HWT 4 Papanikolis (GER Type-214) (fitted with AIP) with 8 single 533mm TT with UGM-84C Harpoon Block 1B AShM/SUT HWT PRINCIPAL SURFACE COMBATANTS 13 FRIGATES • FFGHM 13: 4 Elli Batch I (ex-NLD Kortenaer Batch 2) with 2 quad lnchr with RGM-84C/G Harpoon Block 1B/G AShM, 1 octuple Mk 29 GMLS with RIM-7M/P Sea Sparrow SAM, 2 twin 324mm SVTT Mk 32 mod 9 ASTT with Mk 46 mod 5 LWT, 1 Mk 15 Phalanx CIWS, 1 76mm gun (capacity 2 Bell 212 (AB-212) hel or 1 S-70B Seahawk hel) 2 Elli Batch II (ex-NLD Kortenaer Batch 2) with 2 quad lnchr with RGM-84C/G Harpoon Block 1B/G AShM, 1 octuple Mk 29 GMLS with RIM-7M/P Sea Sparrow SAM, 2 twin 324mm SVTT Mk 32 mod 9 ASTT with Mk 46 mod 5 LWT, 1 Mk 15 Phalanx CIWS, 2 76mm gun (capacity 2 Bell 212 (AB-212) hel or 1 S-70B Seahawk hel) 3 Elli Batch III (ex-NLD Kortenaer Batch 2) with 2 quad lnchr with RGM-84C/G Harpoon Block 1B/G AShM, 1 octuple Mk 29 lnchr with RIM-7P Sea Sparrow SAM, 2 twin 324mm SVTT Mk 32 mod 9 ASTT with Mk 46 LWT, 1 Mk 15 Phalanx CIWS, 1 76mm gun (capacity 2 Bell 212 (AB-212) hel) 4 Hydra (GER MEKO 200) with 2 quad lnchr with RGM-84G Harpoon Block 1G AShM, 1 16-cell Mk 48 mod 2 VLS with RIM-162C ESSM SAM, 2 triple 324mm SVTT Mk 32 mod 5 ASTT with Mk 46 LWT, 2 Mk 15 Phalanx CIWS, 1 127mm gun (capacity 1 S-70B Seahawk ASW hel) PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 37 PCGM 6 Roussen (Super Vita) with 2 quad lnchr with MM40 Exocet Block 3 AShM (of which 2 still fitted with Block 2), 1 21-cell Mk 49 GMLS with RIM-116 RAM SAM, 1 76mm gun PCFG 8: 3 Kavaloudis (FRA La Combattante IIIB) with 2 twin lnchr with RGM-84C Harpoon Block 1B AShM, 2 single 533mm TT with SST-4 HWT, 2 76mm gun 4 Laskos (FRA La Combattante III) with 2 twin lnchr with RGM-84C Harpoon Block 1B AShM, 2 single 533mm TT with SST-4 HWT, 2 76mm gun 1 Votsis (ex-GER Tiger) with 2 twin lnchr with RGM84C Harpoon AShM, 1 76mm gun PCF 4 Votsis (ex-GER Tiger) with 1 76mm gun PCO 8: 2 Armatolos (DNK Osprey) with 1 76mm gun 2 Kasos (DNK Osprey derivative) with 1 76mm gun 4 Machitis with 1 76mm gun PBF 4 Aeolos (ex-US Mk V FPB) PB 7: 4 Andromeda (NOR Nasty); 2 Stamou; 1 Tolmi MINE WARFARE • MINE COUNTERMEASURES 3 MHO 3: 1 Evropi (ex-UK Hunt); 2 Evniki (ex-US Osprey) AMPHIBIOUS LANDING SHIPS • LST 5 Chios (capacity 4 LCVP; 300 troops) with 1 76mm gun, 1 hel landing platform

Europe

Europe 113

114 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2022 LANDING CRAFT 15 LCU 5 LCA 7 LCAC 3 Kefallinia (Zubr) with 2 AK630 CIWS (capacity either 3 MBT or 10 APC (T); 230 troops) LOGISTICS AND SUPPORT 28 ABU 2 AG 5: 3 Atlas I; 2 Pandora AGOR 1 Naftilos AGS 2: 1 Stravon; 1 Pytheas AORH 1 Prometheus (ITA Etna) with 1 Mk 15 Phalanx CIWS AORL 2 Axios (ex-GER Luneburg) AOT 4 Ouranos AWT 6 Kerkini AXS 5

Coastal Defence EQUIPMENT BY TYPE COASTAL DEFENCE • AShM 2 MM40 Exocet

Naval Aviation FORCES BY ROLE ANTI-SUBMARINE WARFARE 1 div with S-70B Seahawk; Bell 212 (AB-212) ASW EQUIPMENT BY TYPE AIRCRAFT 1 combat capable ASW 1 P-3B Orion (4 P-3B Orion in store undergoing modernisation) HELICOPTERS ASW 18: 7 Bell 212 (AB-212) ASW; 11 S-70B Seahawk AIR-LAUNCHED MISSILES ASM AGM-114 Hellfire AShM AGM-119 Penguin

Air Force 18,800; 3,000 conscripts (total 21,800) Tactical Air Force FORCES BY ROLE FIGHTER/GROUND ATTACK 1 sqn with F-4E Phantom II 3 sqn with F-16CG/DG Block 30/50 Fighting Falcon 3 sqn with F-16CG/DG Block 52+ Fighting Falcon 2 sqn with F-16C/D Block 52+ ADV Fighting Falcon 1 sqn with Mirage 2000-5EG/BG Mk2 1 sqn with Mirage 2000EG/BG AIRBORNE EARLY WARNING 1 sqn with EMB-145H Erieye EQUIPMENT BY TYPE AIRCRAFT 231 combat capable FGA 231: 34 F-4E Phantom II; 69 F-16CG/DG Block 30/50 Fighting Falcon; 55 F-16CG/DG Block 52+; 30 F16 C/D Block 52+ ADV Fighting Falcon; 19 Mirage 20005EG Mk2; 5 Mirage 2000-5BG Mk2; 16 Mirage 2000EG; 2 Mirage 2000BG; 1 Rafale F3-R AEW 4 EMB-145AEW (EMB-145H) Erieye AIR-LAUNCHED MISSILES AAM • IR AIM-9L/P Sidewinder; R-550 Magic 2; IIR IRIS-T; Mica IR; ARH AIM-120B/C AMRAAM; Mica RF ASM AGM-65A/B/G Maverick

LACM SCALP EG AShM AM39 Exocet ARM AGM-88 HARM BOMBS Electro-optical guided: GBU-8B HOBOS Laser-guided: GBU-10/12/16 Paveway II; GBU-24 Paveway III; GBU-50 Enhanced Paveway II INS/GPS-guided GBU-31 JDAM; AGM-154C JSOW

Air Defence FORCES BY ROLE AIR DEFENCE 6 sqn/bty with M901 Patriot PAC-2 2 sqn/bty with S-300PMU1 (RS-SA-20 Gargoyle) 12 bty with Skyguard/RIM-7 Sparrow/guns; Crotale NG/ GR; Tor-M1 (RS-SA-15 Gauntlet) EQUIPMENT BY TYPE AIR DEFENCE SAM 81 Long-range 48: 36 M901 Patriot PAC-2; 12 S-300PMU1 (RS-SA-20 Gargoyle) Short-range 33: 9 Crotale NG/GR; 4 9K331 Tor-M1 (RSSA-15 Gauntlet); 20 RIM-7M Sparrow with Skygaurd GUNS 59: 20mm some Rh-202; 30mm 35+ Artemis-30; 35mm 24 GDF-005 with Skyguard

Air Support Command FORCES BY ROLE SEARCH & RESCUE/TRANSPORT HELICOPTER 1 sqn with AS332C Super Puma (SAR/CSAR) 1 sqn with AW109; Bell 205A (AB-205A) (SAR); Bell 212 (AB-212 - VIP, tpt) TRANSPORT 1 sqn with C-27J Spartan 1 sqn with C-130B/H Hercules 1 sqn with EMB-135BJ Legacy; ERJ-135LR; Falcon 7X; Gulfstream V EQUIPMENT BY TYPE AIRCRAFT TPT 27: Medium 23: 8 C-27J Spartan; 5 C-130B Hercules; 10 C-130H Hercules; Light 2: 1 EMB-135BJ Legacy; 1 ERJ-135LR; PAX 2: 1 Falcon 7X (VIP); 1 Gulfstream V HELICOPTERS TPT 31: Medium 12 AS332C Super Puma; Light 19: 12 Bell 205A (AB-205A) (SAR); 4 Bell 212 (AB-212) (VIP, Tpt); 3 AW109

Air Training Command FORCES BY ROLE TRAINING 2 sqn with T-2C/E Buckeye 2 sqn with T-6A/B Texan II 1 sqn with P2002JF; T-41D EQUIPMENT BY TYPE AIRCRAFT • TRG 103: 12 P2002JF; 28 T-2C/E Buckeye; 20 T-6A Texan II; 25 T-6B Texan II; 18 T-41D

Gendarmerie & Paramilitary Coast Guard and Customs 4,000

Europe 115

DEPLOYMENT BOSNIA-HERZEGOVINA: EU • EUFOR • Operation Althea 6 CYPRUS: Army 950; 1 mech bde (1 armd bn, 2 mech inf bn, 1 arty bn); 61 M48A5 MOLF MBT; 80 Leonidas APC; 12 M114 arty; 6 M110A2 arty IRAQ: NATO • NATO Mission Iraq 1 LEBANON: UN • UNIFIL 111; 1 FFGHM MALI: EU • EUTM Mali 2 MEDITERRANEAN SEA: EU • EUNAVFOR MED • Operation Irini; 1 FFGHM SAUDI ARABIA: Air Force 100; 1 SAM bty with M901 Patriot PAC-2 SERBIA: NATO • KFOR 114; 1 inf coy

FOREIGN FORCES United States US European Command: 400; 1 ELINT flt with 1 EP-3E Aries II; 1 naval base at Makri; 1 naval base at Souda Bay; 1 air base at Iraklion

GDP per capita

2020

2021

HUF

47.7tr

53.5tr

USD

155bn

181bn

USD

15,866

18,528

Growth

-5.0

7.6

Inflation

3.3

4.5

Def exp [a] Def bdgt [b]

HUF

853bn

842bn

USD

2.77bn

2.85bn

HUF

616bn

778bn

USD

2.00bn

2.63bn

308.00

295.53

USD1=HUF

2022

Gendarmerie & Paramilitary 12,000

1.00tr

Real-terms defence budget trend (USDbn, constant 2015) 2.19 0.98 2015

ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE Land Component 10,450 (incl riverine element)

[b] Includes military pensions

Population

ACTIVE 34,200 (Army 11,900 Air 5,950 Joint 16,350)

Hungary’s armed forces have reorganised into a joint force

[a] NATO figure

2008

Hungary published a new National Security Strategy in April 2020 and a new National Military Strategy in June 2021. The strategy documents speak of a deteriorating security environment, marked by great-power competition and an increasing military component. The security strategy also characterises mass migration as a key concern for Hungary. Hungary is implementing the Zrínyi 2026 national-defence and armed-forces modernisation plan. Hungary coordinates policy with the other member states of the Visegrád Group, including on defence, and hosts the NATO Centre of Excellence for Military Medicine. The armed forces participate in international crisis-management missions, notably in the Balkans and Iraq, but have very limited organic capacity to deploy forces beyond national borders. Increasing migration pressure has involved the armed forces in internal border-control operations, assisting national police forces. Announced equipmentmodernisation priorities focus on individual-soldier equipment and fixed- and rotary-wing aircraft. In 2019, the government announced that it had raised the level of ambition for the maximum number of Hungarian soldiers deployed on international missions from 1,000 to 1,200. While the air-force-related elements of Zrínyi 2026 had been a focus of attention, at the end of 2018 the ministry also initiated land procurements, including for main battle tanks and self-propelled artillery. In September 2020, a contract for KF41 Lynx infantry fighting vehicles was signed and delivery is scheduled to begin in 2022. Hungary’s defence-industrial base is limited, though the defence ministry has set up an interministerial working group to boost domestic capacity in the small-arms sector. In 2020, a new defence procurement agency, reporting to the national armaments director, began its work and is intended to coordinate defence and security acquisitions.

RESERVE 20,000

Hungary HUN Hungarian Forint HUF

Capabilities

2021

9,728,337

Age

0–14

15–19

20–24

25–29

Male

7.4%

2.7%

3.1%

30–64 65 plus 23.6%

8.1%

Female

7.0%

2.5%

3.0%

24.3%

13.0%

FORCES BY ROLE SPECIAL FORCES 1 SF bde (1 SF bn; 1 AB bn) MANOEUVRE Reconnaissance 1 ISR regt Mechanised 1 (5th) mech inf bde (3 mech inf bn, 1 cbt engr coy, 1 sigs coy, 1 log bn) 1 (25th) mech inf bde (1 tk bn; 2 mech inf bn, 1 arty bn, 1 AT bn, 1 log bn) COMBAT SUPPORT 1 engr regt 1 EOD/rvn regt 1 CBRN bn 1 sigs regt COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT 1 log regtN EQUIPMENT NBY TYPE ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES MBT 48: 4 Leopard 2A4HU; 44 T-72M1

Europe

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 124 PCO 1 Gavdos (Damen 5009) PCC 3 PBF 54 PB 66 AIRCRAFT • TPT • Light 4: 2 Cessna 172RG Cutlass; 2 TB-20 Trinidad HELICOPTERS • SAR 3 AS365N3

116 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2022 IFV 120 BTR-80A/AM APC 282 APC (W) 260 BTR-80 PPV 22: 10 Ejder Yalcin 4×4 (Gidran); 12 MaxxPro Plus ENGINEERING & MAINTENANCE VEHICLES AEV 5 BAT-2 ARV 8 VT-55A VLB 8 BLG-60; MTU; TMM NBC VEHICLES 14 BTR-80M-NBC ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE MSL • MANPATS 9K111 Fagot (RS-AT-4 Spigot); 9K1111 Konkurs (RS-AT-5 Spandrel) ARTILLERY 31 TOWED 152mm 31 D-20 MOR 82mm PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS • PBR 2 MINE COUNTERMEASURES • MSR 3 Nestin

Air Component 5,750 FORCES BY ROLE FIGHTER/GROUND ATTACK 1 sqn with Gripen C/D TRANSPORT 1 sqn with A319; Falcon 7X TRAINING 1 sqn with Z-143LSi; Z-242L; AS350 Ecureuil ATTACK HELICOPTER 1 sqn with Mi-24V/P Hind E/F TRANSPORT HELICOPTER 1 sqn with Mi-8 Hip; Mi-17 Hip H; H145M AIR DEFENCE 1 SAM regt (9 bty with Mistral; 3 bty with 2K12 Kub (RSSA-6 Gainful)) 1 radar regt EQUIPMENT BY TYPE AIRCRAFT 14 combat capable FGA 14: 12 Gripen C; 2 Gripen D TPT • PAX 4: 2 A319; 2 Falcon 7X TRG 8: 2 Z-143LSi; 6 Z-242L HELICOPTERS ATK 8: 6 Mi-24V Hind E; 2 Mi-24P Hind F MRH 25: 20 H145M (incl 2 SAR); 5 Mi-17 Hip H TPT 5: Medium 3 Mi-8 Hip (10 in store); Light 2 AS350 Ecureuil AIR DEFENCE SAM • Point-defence 16 2K12 Kub (RS-SA-6 Gainful); Mistral AIR-LAUNCHED MISSILES AAM • IR AIM-9 Sidewinder; SARH R-27 (RS-AA-10 Alamo A); ARH AIM-120C AMRAAM ASM AGM-65 Maverick; 3M11 Falanga (RS-AT-2 Swatter); 9K114 Shturm-V (RS-AT-6 Spiral) BOMBS • Laser-guided Paveway II

Gendarmerie & Paramilitary 12,000 Border Guards 12,000 (to reduce) Ministry of Interior

FORCES BY ROLE MANOEUVRE Other 1 (Budapest) paramilitary district (7 rapid reaction coy) 11 (regt/district) paramilitary regt EQUIPMENT BY TYPE ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES APC • APC (W) 68 BTR-80

DEPLOYMENT BOSNIA-HERZEGOVINA: EU • Operation Althea 174; 1 inf coy CYPRUS: UN • UNFICYP 12 IRAQ: Operation Inherent Resolve 138; NATO • NATO Mission Iraq 19 LEBANON: UN • UNIFIL 16 MALI: EU • EUTM Mali 20 SERBIA: NATO • KFOR 472; 1 inf coy (KTM) WESTERN SAHARA: UN • MINURSO 6

Iceland ISL Icelandic Krona ISK

2020

GDP per capita

2021

ISK

2.94tr

3.20tr

USD

21.7bn

25.5bn 68,844

USD

59,643

Growth

-6.5

3.7

Inflation

2.9

4.3

ISK

7.07bn

5.53bn

USD

52.2m

44.0m

135.42

125.71

Sy Bdgt [a] USD1=ISK

2022

[a] Coast Guard budget Real-terms defence budget trend (USDm, constant 2015) 47

2008

Population

28 2021

2015

354,234

Age

0–14

15–19

20–24

25–29

Male

10.3%

3.2%

3.3%

3.5%

30–64 65 plus 22.4%

7.5%

Female

9.9%

3.1%

3.2%

3.4%

21.9%

8.3%

Capabilities Iceland is a NATO member but maintains only a coastguard service. In 2016, the country established a National Security Council to implement and monitor security policy. The coastguard controls the NATO Iceland Air Defence System, as well as a NATO Control and Reporting Centre that feeds into NATO air- and missile defence and air-operations centres. Increased Russian air and naval activities in the Atlantic and close to NATO airspace have led to complaints from Iceland. Iceland considers its bilateral defence agreement with the US as an important pillar of its security policy and also participates in the security-policy dialogue of NORDEFCO. Iceland joined the UK-led Joint Expeditionary Force in 2021. Iceland hosts

NATO and regional partners for exercises, transits and naval task groups, as well as the Icelandic Air Policing mission. Despite there being no standing armed forces, Iceland makes financial contributions and on occasion deploys civilian personnel to NATO missions. In late 2016, following a joint declaration in June that year, the US Navy began operating P-8 Poseidon maritime-patrol aircraft from Keflavik air base. In summer 2019, it was reported that upgrades would include accommodation, dangerous-cargo handling facilities and runway extensions to enable tanker operations. The work is due to be completed in 2023.

ACTIVE NIL Gendarmerie & Paramilitary 250

ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE Gendarmerie & Paramilitary Iceland Coast Guard 250

ACTIVE 8,550 (Army 6,950 Navy 900 Air 700)

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 3 PSOH 2 Aegir PSO 1 Thor LOGISTICS AND SUPPORT • AGS 1 Baldur AIRCRAFT • TPT • Light 1 DHC-8-300 (MP) HELICOPTERS • TPT • Medium 3 H225 (leased)

RESERVE 1,150 (Army 1,400 Navy 150)

ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE Army 6,950

FOREIGN FORCES Icelandic Air Policing: Aircraft and personnel from various NATO members on a rotating basis United States 100; 2 P-8A Poseidon

Ireland IRL Euro EUR GDP

EUR

per capita

2020

2021

373bn

432bn

USD

426bn

516bn

USD

85,206

102,394

Growth

5.9

13.0

Inflation

-0.5

1.9

Def bdgt [a]

EUR

1.04bn

1.07bn

USD

1.19bn

1.28bn

0.88

0.84

USD1=EUR

2022

1.11bn

[a] Includes military pensions and capital expenditure Real-terms defence budget trend (USDbn, constant 2015) 1.21 0.99 2008

Population

2015

ditional military and paramilitary threats. It listed inter- and intra-state conflict, cyber attacks, terrorism, emergencies and natural disasters, among others. The army maintains substantial EOD capabilities. Ireland is active in EU defence cooperation and continues to contribute to multinational operations. Its forces are well trained for their roles. Ireland is also working to establish a specialist reserve with relevant professional qualifications. It has sufficient logistic capability to sustain its UN deployments but has no strategic-airlift capacity. After the 2015 white paper, Dublin identified a large number of defence projects to be completed over a ten-year period. Key priorities include a mid-life upgrade for the army’s Piranha armoured personnel carriers, EOD robots and UAVs. Other stated priorities include new armoured vehicles, new aircraft, naval-vessel refits, training facilities and upgrades to military facilities. A 3% rise in the 2020 defence budget is intended to boost military staffing by improving pay and allowances, bases and infrastructure. Ireland has a small, specialist defence industry focused on areas including drivetrain technologies for land systems.

2021

5,224,884

Age

0–14

15–19

20–24

25–29

Male

10.7%

3.2%

3.0%

2.9%

30–64 65 plus 23.6%

6.5%

Female

10.2%

3.1%

2.9%

23.4%

7.5%

Capabilities The armed forces’ core mission is defending the state against armed aggression, although a 2015 white paper broadened the scope of the national-security risk assessment beyond tra-

FORCES BY ROLE SPECIAL FORCES 1 ranger coy MANOEUVRE Reconnaissance 1 armd recce sqn Mechanised 1 mech inf coy Light 1 inf bde (1 cav recce sqn, 4 inf bn, 1 arty regt (3 fd arty bty, 1 AD bty), 1 fd engr coy, 1 sigs coy, 1 MP coy, 1 tpt coy) 1 inf bde (1 cav recce sqn, 3 inf bn, 1 arty regt (3 fd arty bty, 1 AD bty), 1 fd engr coy, 1 sigs coy, 1 MP coy, l tpt coy) EQUIPMENT BY TYPE ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES RECCE 6 Piranha IIIH 30mm APC 101 APC (W) 74: 56 Piranha III; 18 Piranha IIIH PPV 27 RG-32M ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTURCTURE MSL • MANPATS FGM-148 Javelin RCL 84mm Carl Gustaf ARTILLERY 131 TOWED • 105mm 23: 17 L118 Light Gun; 6 L119 Light Gun MOR 108: 81mm 84 Brandt; 120mm 24 Ruag M87 AIR DEFENCE SAM • Point-defence RBS-70

Reserves 1,400 reservists FORCES BY ROLE MANOEUVRE Reconnaissance 1 (integrated) armd recce sqn 2 (integrated) cav sqn

Europe

Europe 117

118 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2022 Mechanised 1 (integrated) mech inf coy Light 14 (integrated) inf coy COMBAT SUPPORT 4 (integrated) arty bty 2 engr gp 2 MP coy 3 sigs coy COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT 2 med det 2 tpt coy

Naval Service 900 EQUIPMENT BY TYPE PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 7 PSOH 1 Eithne with 1 57mm gun PSO 6: 2 Roisin (of which 1 in refit) with 1 76mm gun; 4 Samuel Beckett with 1 76mm gun PCO (2 Orla (ex-UK Peacock) (in reserve since mid-2019 due to crew shortage) with 1 76mm gun) LOGISTICS AND SUPPORT • AXS 2

Air Corps 700

2 ops wg; 2 spt wg; 1 trg wg; 1 comms and info sqn EQUIPMENT BY TYPE AIRCRAFT MP 2 CN235 MPA TPT • Light 5: 1 Learjet 45 (VIP); 4 PC-12NG TRG 8 PC-9M HELICOPTERS: MRH 6 AW139 TPT • Light 2 H135 (incl trg/medevac)

DEPLOYMENT BOSNIA-HERZEGOVINA: EU • EUFOR • Operation Althea 5 DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO: UN • MONUSCO 3 LEBANON: UN • UNIFIL 338; 1 mech inf bn(-) MALI: EU • EUTM Mali 20; UN • MINUMSA 12 MIDDLE EAST: UN • UNTSO 11 SERBIA: NATO • KFOR 13 SYRIA/ISRAEL: UN • UNDOF 130; 1 inf coy

Italy ITA Euro EUR

2020

2021

1.65tr

1.78tr

GDP

EUR USD

1.88tr

2.12tr

per capita

USD

31,604

35,585

Growth

-8.9

5.8

Inflation

-0.1

1.7

Def exp [a] Def bdgt [b]

EUR

22.8bn

24.4bn

USD

26.1bn

29.2bn

EUR

26.0bn

28.3bn

USD

29.7bn

33.8bn

0.88

0.84

USD1=EUR

2022

28.6bn

[a] NATO figure [b] Includes military pensions Real-terms defence budget trend (USDbn, constant 2015) 29.4 24.9 2008

Population

2015

2021

62,390,364

Age

0–14

15–19

20–24

25–29

30–64 65 plus

Male

6.8%

2.4%

2.6%

24.3%

9.6%

Female

6.5%

2.4%

2.7%

25.2%

12.6%

Capabilities Italy is concerned by security challenges in the Euro-Atlantic environment, as well as from Europe’s southern flank. A defence white paper was issued in 2015. The latest three-year defence plan for 2020–22 outlined modernisation goals. The 2012 law governing personnel structures will remain but a changed strategic environment meant it needed to be updated. For instance, more personnel were needed in the defence industry. Italy has taken part in NATO’s air-policing missions in the Baltic states, Iceland and Romania and since early 2017 has deployed to Latvia as part of the Enhanced Forward Presence. The EUNAVFOR-MED force is headquartered in Rome, while the US Navy 6th Fleet is based in Naples. The country takes part in and hosts NATO and other multinational exercises and continues to support NATO, EU and UN operations abroad. However, Italy is planning to gradually reduce its presence overseas to focus on Europe’s southern flank. Italy’s logistics capability is enabled by a fleet of medium transport aircraft and tankers. The white paper detailed capabilityenhancement programmes including upgrades to main battle tanks and procurement of armoured fighting vehicles, counter-UAV systems and electronic-warfare capabilities. The expected retirement of much of the naval fleet has triggered a long-term replacement plan which includes the potential acquisition of two next-generation destroyers to replace the ageing Luigi Durand de la Penne-class vessels. F-35As have been ordered for the air force (and F-35Bs for both the air force and naval aviation). Italy has an advanced defence industry, producing equipment across all the domains, with particular strengths in shipbuilding and aircraft and helicopter manufacturing. The country hosts Europe’s F-35 final assembly and check-out facility at Cameri. Italy takes part in European defenceindustrial cooperation activities, including PESCO projects.

ACTIVE 161,550 (Army 93,600 Navy 28,700 Air 39,250) Gendarmerie & Paramilitary 176,350 RESERVES 17,900 (Army 13,400 Navy 4,500)

ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE Space EQUIPMENT BY TYPE SATELLITES 9 COMMUNICATIONS 4: 1 Athena-Fidus (also used by FRA); 3 Sicral ISR 5: 4 Cosmo (Skymed); 1 OPTSAT-3000

Army 96,700 Regt are bn sized FORCES BY ROLE COMMAND 1 (NRDC-ITA) corps HQ (1 spt bde, 1 sigs regt, 1 spt regt) MANOEUVRE Mechanised 1 (Vittorio Veneto) div (1 (Ariete) armd bde (1 cav regt, 2 tk regt, 1 armd inf regt, 1 SP arty regt, 1 cbt engr regt, 1 log regt); 1 (Pozzuolo del Friuli) cav bde (1 cav regt, 1 amph regt, 1 arty regt, 1 cbt engr regt, 1 log regt); 1 (Folgore) AB bde (1 cav regt, 3 para regt, 1 arty regt, 1 cbt engr regt, 1 log regt); 1 (Friuli) air mob bde (1 air mob regt, 2 atk hel regt)) 1 (Acqui) div (1 (Pinerolo) mech bde (1 cav regt, 3 armd inf regt, 1 fd arty regt, 1 cbt engr regt, 1 log regt); 1 (Granatieri) mech bde (1 cav regt, 1 mech inf regt); 1 (Garibaldi Bersaglieri) mech bde (1 cav regt, 1 tk regt, 2 armd inf regt, 1 SP arty regt, 1 cbt engr regt, 1 log regt); 1 (Aosta) mech bde (1 cav regt, 1 armd inf regt, 2 mech inf regt, 1 fd arty regt, 1 cbt engr regt, 1 log regt); 1 (Sassari) lt mech bde (1 armd inf regt, 2 mech inf regt, 1 cbt engr regt, 1 log regt)) Mountain 1 (Tridentina) mtn div (2 mtn bde (1 cav regt, 3 mtn inf regt, 1 arty regt, 1 mtn cbt engr regt, 1 spt bn, 1 log regt)) COMBAT SUPPORT 1 arty comd (1 arty regt, 1 MRL regt, 1 NBC regt) 1 AD comd (3 SAM regt) 1 engr comd (2 engr regt, 1 ptn br regt, 1 CIMIC regt) 1 EW/sigs comd (1 EW/ISR bde (1 EW regt, 1 int regt, 1 STA regt); 1 sigs bde with (7 sigs regt)) COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT 1 log comd (3 log regt, 4 med unit) HELICOPTER 1 hel bde (3 hel regt) EQUIPMENT BY TYPE ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES MBT 150 C1 Ariete ASLT 255 B1 Centauro IFV 426: 165 VCC-80 Dardo; 261 VBM 8×8 Freccia (incl 20 CP and 36 with Spike-LR) APC 379 APC (T) 148 Bv-206S APC (W) 198 Puma 6×6 PPV 33 VTMM Orso (incl 16 amb) AUV 1,824: 10 Cougar; 1,798 IVECO LMV (incl 82 amb); 16 IVECO LMV 2 AAV 15: 14 AAVP-7; 1 AAVC-7

ENGINEERING & MAINTENANCE VEHICLES AEV 25 Dachs; M113 ARV 70: 69 BPz-2; 1 AAVR-7 VLB 30 Biber MW 34: 6 Buffalo; 3 Miniflail; 25 VTMM Orso NBC VEHICLES 14: 5 VBR NBC; 9 VBR NBC Plus ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE MSL • MANPATS Spike ARTILLERY 959 SP 155mm 70 PzH 2000 TOWED 188: 105mm 25 Oto Melara Mod 56; 155mm 163 FH-70 MRL 227mm 22 MLRS MOR 679: 81mm 283 Expal; 120mm 325: 183 Brandt; 142 RT-61 (RT-F1) SP 120mm 71: 50 M106A1; 21 VBM 8×8 Freccia AIRCRAFT • TPT • Light 6: 3 Do-228 (ACTL-1); 3 P.180 Avanti HELICOPTERS ATK 35 AW129CBT Mangusta MRH 14 Bell 412 (AB-412) Twin Huey TPT 141: Heavy 16 CH-47F Chinook (1 CH-47C Chinook in store); Medium 53 NH90 TTH (UH-90); Light 72: 2 AW169LUH (UH-169B); 29 Bell 205 (AB-205); 28 Bell 206 Jet Ranger (AB-206); 13 Bell 212 (AB-212) AIR DEFENCE SAM 52+ Long-range 20 SAMP/T Short-range 32 Aspide with Skyguard Point-defence FIM-92 Stinger AIR-LAUNCHED MISSILES ASM Spike-ER

Navy 28,700 EQUIPMENT BY TYPE SUBMARINES • SSK 8: 4 Pelosi (imp Sauro, 3rd and 4th series) with 6 single 533mm TT with A184 mod 3 HWT 4 Salvatore Todaro (Type-212A) (fitted with AIP) with 6 single 533mm TT with Black Shark HWT PRINCIPAL SURFACE COMBATANTS 17 AIRCRAFT CARRIERS • CVS 2: 1 Cavour with 4 8-cell Sylver A43 VLS with Aster 15 SAM, 2 76mm guns (capacity mixed air group of 20 AV-8B Harrier II; F-35B Lightning II; AW101 Merlin; NH90; Bell 212) 1 G. Garibaldi with 2 octuple Albatros lnchr with Aspide SAM, 2 triple 324mm ASTT with Mk 46 LWT (capacity mixed air group of 18 AV-8B Harrier II; AW101 Merlin; NH90; Bell 212) DESTROYERS • DDGHM 4: 2 Andrea Doria with 2 quad lnchr with Otomat (Teseo) Mk2A AShM, 6 8-cell Sylver A50 VLS with Aster 15/Aster 30 SAM, 2 single 324mm B-515 ASTT with MU90 LWT, 3 76mm guns (capacity 1 AW101 Merlin/ NH90 hel) 2 Luigi Durand de la Penne (ex-Animoso) with 2 quad lnchr with Otomat (Teseo) Mk2A AShM/Milas A/S msl, 1 Mk 13 mod 4 GMLS with SM-1MR Block VI SAM, 1 octuple Albatros lnchr with Aspide SAM, 2

Europe

Europe 119

120 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2022 triple 324mm B-515 ASTT with Mk 46 LWT, 1 127mm gun, 3 76mm guns (capacity 1 NH90 or 2 Bell 212 (AB-212) hel) FRIGATES • FFGHM 11: 4 Bergamini (GP) with 2 quad lnchr with Otomat (Teseo) Mk2A AShM, 2 8-cell Sylver A50 VLS with Aster 15/Aster 30 SAM, 2 triple 324mm B-515 ASTT with MU90 LWT, 1 127mm gun, 1 76mm gun (capacity 2 AW101/NH90 hel) 4 Bergamini (ASW) with 2 twin lnchr with Otomat (Teseo) Mk2A AShM, 2 twin lnchr with MILAS A/S msl, 2 8-cell Sylver A50 VLS with Aster 15/Aster 30 SAM, 2 triple 324mm B-515 ASTT with MU90 LWT, 2 76mm gun (capacity 2 AW101/NH90 hel) 3 Maestrale with 4 single lnchr with Otomat (Teseo) Mk2 AShM, 1 octuple Albatros lnchr with Aspide SAM, 2 triple 324mm SVTT Mk 32 ASTT with Mk 46 LWT, 1 127mm gun (capacity 1 NH90 or 2 Bell 212 (AB-212) hel) PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 16 PSOH 10: 4 Cassiopea with 1 76mm gun (capacity 1 Bell 212 (AB212) hel 4 Comandante Cigala Fuligosi with 1 76mm gun (capacity 1 Bell 212 (AB-212)/NH90 hel) 2 Sirio (capacity 1 Bell 212 (AB-212) or NH90 hel) PB 6: 2 Angelo Cabrini; 4 Esploratore MINE WARFARE • MINE COUNTERMEASURES 10 MHO 10: 8 Gaeta; 2 Lerici AMPHIBIOUS PRINCIPAL AMPHIBIOUS SHIPS • LHD 3: 2 San Giorgio (capacity 3-4 AW101/NH90/Bell 212; 3 LCM; 2 LCVP; 30 trucks; 36 APC (T); 350 troops) 1 San Giusto with 1 76mm gun (capacity 2 AW101 Merlin/NH90/Bell 212; 3 LCM; 2 LCVP; 30 trucks; 36 APC (T); 350 troops) LANDING CRAFT 24: 15 LCVP; 9 LCM LOGISTICS AND SUPPORT 53 ABU 5 Ponza AFD 9 AGE 3: 1 Leonardo (coastal); 1 Raffaele Rosseti; 1 Vincenzo Martellota AGI 1 Elettra AGOR 1 Alliance AGS 3: 1 Ammiraglio Magnaghi with 1 hel landing platform; 2 Aretusa (coastal) AKSL 6 Gorgona AORH 1 Etna with 1 76mm gun (capacity 1 AW101/ NH90/Bell 212 hel) AORL 2 Stromboli with 1 76mm gun (capacity 1 AW101/ NH90 hel) AOT 4 Panarea ARSH 1 Anteo (capacity 1 Bell 212 (AB-212) hel) ATS 6 Ciclope AWT 3: 1 Bormida; 2 Simeto AXS 8: 1 Amerigo Vespucci; 5 Caroly; 1 Italia; 1 Palinuro

Naval Aviation 2,000 FORCES BY ROLE FIGHTER/GROUND ATTACK 1 sqn with AV-8B Harrier II; TAV-8B Harrier II

ANTI-SUBMARINE WARFARE/TRANSPORT 5 sqn with AW101 ASW Merlin; Bell 212 ASW (AB212AS); Bell 212 (AB-212); NH90 NFH MARITIME PATROL 1 flt with P-180 AIRBORNE EARLY WANRING & CONTROL 1 flt with AW101 AEW Merlin EQUIPMENT BY TYPE AIRCRAFT 13 combat capable FGA 13: 9 AV-8B Harrier II; 1 TAV-8B Harrier II; 3 F-35B Lightning II MP 3 P.180 Avanti HELICOPTERS ASW 55: 10 AW101 ASW Merlin; 7 Bell 212 ASW; 38 NH90 NFH (SH-90) AEW 4 AW101 AEW Merlin TPT 20: Medium 18: 8 AW101 Merlin; 10 NH90 MITT (MH-90); Light 2 Bell 212 (AB-212) AIR-LAUNCHED MISSILES AAM • IR AIM-9L Sidewinder; ARH AIM-120 AMRAAM ASM AGM-65 Maverick AShM Marte Mk 2/S

Marines 3,000 FORCES BY ROLE MANOEUVRE Amphibious 1 mne regt (1 recce coy, 2 mne bn, 1 log bn) 1 (boarding) mne regt (2 mne bn) 1 landing craft gp Other 1 sy regt (3 sy bn) EQUIPMENT BY TYPE ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES AAV 17: 15 AAVP-7; 2 AAVC-7 AUV 70 IVECO LMV ENGINEERING & MAINTENANCE VEHICLES ARV 1 AAVR-7 ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE MSL• MANPATS Spike ARTILLERY MOR 32: 81mm 10 Expal; 120mm 22 Brandt AIR DEFENCE • SAM • Point-defence FIM-92 Stinger

Air Force 39,950 FORCES BY ROLE FIGHTER 4 sqn with Eurofighter Typhoon FIGHTER/GROUND ATTACK 1 (SEAD/EW) sqn with Tornado ECR 1 sqn with Tornado IDS 1 sqn with F-35A/B Lightning II FIGHTER/GROUND ATTACK/ISR 1 sqn with AMX Ghibli MARITIME PATROL 1 sqn (opcon Navy) with ATR-72MP (P-72A) TANKER/TRANSPORT 1 sqn with KC-767A

Europe 121

Joint Special Forces Command (COFS) Army FORCES BY ROLE SPECIAL FORCES 1 SF regt (9th Assalto paracadutisti) 1 STA regt 1 ranger regt (4th Alpini paracadutisti) COMBAT SUPPORT 1 psyops regt TRANSPORT HELICOPTER 1 spec ops hel regt

Navy (COMSUBIN) FORCES BY ROLE SPECIAL FORCES 1 SF gp (GOI) 1 diving gp (GOS)

Air Force FORCES BY ROLE SPECIAL FORCES 1 wg (sqn) (17th Stormo Incursori)

Paramilitary Carabinieri FORCES BY ROLE SPECIAL FORCES 1 spec ops gp (GIS)

Gendarmerie & Paramilitary 176,350 Carabinieri 108,250

The Carabinieri are organisationally under the MoD. They are a separate service in the Italian Armed Forces as well as a police force with judicial competence

Mobile and Specialised Branch FORCES BY ROLE MANOEUVRE Other 1 (mobile) paramilitary div (1 bde (1st) with (1 horsed cav regt, 11 mobile bn); 1 bde (2nd) with (1 (1st) AB regt, 2 (7th & 13th) mobile regt)) HELICOPTER 1 hel gp EQUIPMENT BY TYPE ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES APC • APC (T) 3 VCC-2 AUV 30 IVECO LMV PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS • PB 69 AIRCRAFT • TPT • Light: 1 P.180 Avanti HELICOPTERS MRH 24 Bell 412 (AB-412) TPT • Light 19 AW109

Customs 68,100

(Servizio Navale Guardia Di Finanza) EQUIPMENT BY TYPE PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 166 PCO 2 Monti (Damen Stan Patrol 5509)

Europe

COMBAT SEARCH & RESCUE 1 sqn with AB-212 ICO; AW101 SAR (HH-101A) SEARCH & RESCUE 1 wg with AW139 (HH-139A); Bell 212 (HH-212) TRANSPORT 2 (VIP) sqn with A319CJ; AW139 (VH-139A); Falcon 50; Falcon 900 Easy; Falcon 900EX 2 sqn with C-130J/C-130J-30/KC-130J Hercules 1 sqn with C-27J Spartan 1 (calibration) sqn with P-180 Avanti/Gulfstream G550 CAEW TRAINING 1 OCU sqn with Eurofighter Typhoon 1 sqn with MB-339PAN (aerobatic team) 1 sqn with MD-500D/E (NH-500D/E) 1 OCU sqn with Tornado 1 OCU sqn with AMX-T Ghibli 1 sqn with MB-339A 1 sqn with M-346 1 sqn with SF-260EA; 3 P2006T (T-2006A) 1 sqn with AW101 SAR (HH-101A); Bell 212 (HH-212) ISR UAV 1 sqn with MQ-9A Reaper; RQ-1B Predator AIR DEFENCE 2 bty with Spada EQUIPMENT BY TYPE AIRCRAFT 225 combat capable FTR 94 Eurofighter Typhoon FGA 54: 31 AMX Ghibli; 8 AMX-T Ghibli; 14 F-35A Lightning II; 1 F-35B Lightning II ATK 34 Tornado IDS ATK/EW 15 Tornado ECR* MP 4 ATR-72MP (P-72A) SIGINT 1 Beech 350 King Air AEW&C 2 Gulfstream G550 CAEW TKR/TPT 4 KC-767A TPT 78: Medium 33: 11 C-130J Hercules (5+ KC-130J tanker pods); 10 C-130J-30 Hercules; 12 C-27J Spartan; Light 37: 17 P-180 Avanti; 20 S-208 (liaison); PAX 8: 3 A319CJ; 2 Falcon 50 (VIP); 2 Falcon 900 Easy; 1 Falcon 900EX (VIP) TRG 115: 21 MB-339A; 28 MB-339CD*; 16 MB-339PAN (aerobatics); 2+ M-345; 22 M-346; 26 SF-260EA HELICOPTERS MRH 54: 13 AW139 (HH-139A/VH-139A); 2 MD-500D (NH-500D); 39 MD-500E (NH-500E) CSAR 12 AW101 (HH-101A) SAR 14 AW139 (HH-139B) TPT • Light 29 Bell 212 (HH-212)/AB-212 ICO UNINHABITED AERIAL VEHICLES • ISR • Heavy 12: 6 MQ-9A Reaper; 6 RQ-1B Predator AIR DEFENCE • SAM • Short-range SPADA AIR-LAUNCHED MISSILES AAM • IR AIM-9L Sidewinder; IIR IRIS-T; ARH AIM120C AMRAAM; Meteor ARM AGM-88 HARM LACM SCALP EG/Storm Shadow BOMBS Laser-guided GBU-54 Laser JDAM; Lizard 2 Laser-guided/GPS Enhanced Paveway II; GBU-31/32/38 JDAM; GBU-39 Small Diameter Bomb

122 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2022 PCF 1 Antonio Zara PBF 140: 19 Bigliani; 5 Corrubia; 9 Mazzei; 79 V-2000; 12 V-5000; 6 V-6000; 10 V-7000 PB 23 Buratti LOGISTICS AND SUPPORT • AX 1 Giorgio Cini AIRCRAFT MP 7: 4 ATR-42-500MP; 3 ATR-72-600 (P-72B) TPT • Light 2 P.180 Avanti HELICOPTERS TPT • Light 53: 10 AW109N; 17 AW139; 6 AW169M; 8 Bell 412HP Twin Huey; 4 MD-500MC (NH-500MC); 8 MD-500MD (NH-500MD)

DEPLOYMENT

Navy 3,600; 1 HQ (US Naval Forces Europe-Africa (NAVEUR-NAVAF)/6th Fleet) at Naples; 1 ASW Sqn with 5 P-8A Poseidon at Sigonella USAF 4,800; 1 FGA wg with (2 FGA sqn with 21 F-16C/D Fighting Falcon at Aviano; 1 CSAR sqn with 8 HH-60G Pave Hawk); 1 CISR UAV sqn with MQ-9A Reaper at Sigonella; 1 ISR UAV flt with RQ-4B Global Hawk at Sigonella USMC 400; 1 tpt sqn with 6 MV-22B Osprey; 2 KC-130J Hercules

Latvia LVA Euro EUR

2020

2021

EUR

29.3bn

31.1bn

USD

33.5bn

37.2bn

USD

17,549

19,539

DJIBOUTI: 147

Growth

-3.6

4.5

EGYPT: MFO 75; 3 PB

Inflation

0.1

2.6

EUR

651m

699m

USD

743m

835m

EUR

663m

699m

USD

757m

835m

BOSNIA-HERZEGOVINA: EU • EUFOR • Operation Althea 50; 1 ISR coy

GDP

CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC: EU • EUTM RCA 2

per capita

ESTONIA: NATO • Baltic Air Policing: 150; 4 Eurofighter Typhoon GULF OF ADEN & INDIAN OCEAN: EU • Operation Atalanta 150; 1 FFGHM GULF OF GUINEA: Navy 150; 1 FFGHM INDIA/PAKISTAN: UN • UNMOGIP 1 IRAQ: Operation Inherent Resolve (Prima Parthica) 600; 1 inf regt; 1 trg unit; 1 hel sqn with 4 NH90; NATO • NATO Mission Iraq 280 KUWAIT: Operation Inherent Resolve (Prima Parthica) 300; 4 Tornado ECR; 1 MQ-9A Reaper; 1 C-27J Spartan; 1 KC-767A; 1 SAM bty with SAMP/T

Def exp [a] Def bdgt [b] FMA (US)

USD

USD1=EUR

0.88

0.84

2022

738m 9m

[a] NATO figure [b] Includes military pensions Real-terms defence budget trend (USDm, constant 2015) 696 231 2008

2015

2021

LATVIA: NATO • Enhanced Forward Presence (Baltic Guardian) 200; 1 armd inf coy with C1 Ariete; Centauro B1; VCC-80 Dardo

Population Age

0–14

15–19

20–24

25–29

LEBANON: MIBIL 315; UN • UNIFIL 906; 1 mech bde HQ; 1 mech inf bn; 1 MP coy; 1 sigs coy; 1 hel sqn

Male

7.9%

2.5%

2.2%

2.8%

23.9%

7.0%

Female

7.4%

2.3%

2.1%

2.6%

25.4%

13.8%

LIBYA: MIASIT 400; 1 inf coy; 1 CRBN unit; 1 trg unit MALI: Operation Barkhane 100; EU • EUTM Mali 14; UN • MINUSMA 2 MEDITERRANEAN SEA: EU • EUNAVFOR MED 1 PSOH; NATO • SNMG 2: 1 FFGHM; NATO • SNMCMG 2: 1 MHO NIGER: MISIN 295; 1 inf coy; 1 engr unit; 1 CRBN unit; 1 med coy; 1 trg unit; 1 ISR unit PERSIAN GULF: EMASOH 150; 1 FFGHM SERBIA: NATO • KFOR 638; 1 arty regt BG HQ; 1 Carabinieri unit SOMALIA: EU • EUTM Somalia 154 WESTERN SAHARA: UN • MINURSO 4

FOREIGN FORCES United States US European Command: 12,900 Army 4,100; 1 AB bde(-)

1,862,687 30–64 65 plus

Capabilities Latvia has small armed forces focused on maintaining national sovereignty and territorial integrity but the country depends on NATO membership as a security guarantor. Russia is Latvia’s overriding security concern. A National Armed Forces Development plan 2016–28 illustrated a capabilities-based planning process. Principal tasks were to improve early warning, detection and situational awareness, to increase combat readiness and to improve the ability to counter hybrid threats. An update to the State Defence Concept was announced in June 2020 to reflect shifts in Latvia’s strategic environment. It identified challenges including new technologies, and low military spending in Europe and the consequent effect on capabilities and crisis response. It emphasised the importance of societal resilience and comprehensive defence as well as the significance of a NATO presence in the region. Latvia has no requirement and therefore no capacity to independently deploy and sustain forces beyond its national boundaries, although the armed forces have taken part in a range of NATO and EU missions. Capabilitydevelopment projects include engineering, special operations, mechanised infantry, air defence, air surveillance and the National

Europe 123

ACTIVE 8,750 (Army 1,700 Navy 550 Air 550 Joint Staff 400 National Guard 1,100 Other 4,450) RESERVE 11,200 (National Guard 7,200 Other 4,000)

ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE Joint 1,900 FORCES BY ROLE SPECIAL FORCES 1 SF unit COMBAT SUPPORT 1 MP bn

Army 1,700 FORCES BY ROLE MANOEUVRE Mechanised 1 mech inf bde (2 mech inf bn, 1 SP arty bn, 1 cbt spt bn HQ, 1 CSS bn HQ)

National Guard 1,100; 7,200 part-time (8,300 total) FORCES BY ROLE SPECIAL FORCES 1 SF unit MANOEUVRE Light 1 (2nd) inf bde (4 inf bn; 1 engr bn) 3 (1st, 3rd & 4th) inf bde (3 inf bn; 1 sy bn; 1 spt bn) COMBAT SUPPORT 1 cyber unit 1 NBC coy 1 psyops pl EQUIPMENT BY TYPE ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES MBT 3 T-55 (trg) RECCE 170 FV107 Scimitar (incl variants) APC • APC(W) 4 Patria 6×6 ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE MANPATS Spike-LR RCL 84mm Carl Gustaf; 90mm Pvpj 1110 ARTILLERY 100 SP 155mm 47 M109A5ÖE TOWED 100mm (23 K-53 in store) MOR 53: 81mm 28 L16; 120mm 25 M120

Navy 550 (incl Coast Guard) Naval Forces Flotilla separated into an MCM squadron and a patrol-boat squadron. LVA, EST and LTU have set up a joint naval unit, BALTRON, with bases at Liepaja, Riga, Ventspils (LVA), Tallinn (EST), Klaipeda (LTU). Each nation contributes 1–2 MCMVs EQUIPMENT BY TYPE PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 5 PB 5 Skrunda (GER Swath)

MINE WARFARE • MINE COUNTERMEASURES 5 MCCS 1 Vidar (ex-NOR) MHO 4 Imanta (ex-NLD Alkmaar/Tripartite) (3 used in MCM role, 1 used for other duties) LOGISTICS AND SUPPORT 1 AXL 1 Varonis (comd and spt ship, ex-NLD)

Coast Guard

Under command of the Latvian Naval Forces EQUIPMENT BY TYPE PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 6 PB 6: 1 Astra; 5 KBV 236 (ex-SWE)

Air Force 550

Main tasks are airspace control and defence, maritime and land SAR and air transportation FORCES BY ROLE TRANSPORT 1 (mixed) tpt sqn with An-2 Colt; Mi-17 Hip H; PZL Mi-2 Hoplite AIR DEFENCE 1 AD bn 1 radar sqn (radar/air ctrl) AIRCRAFT • TPT • Light 4 An-2 Colt HELICOPTERS MRH 4 Mi-17 Hip H TPT • Light 2 PZL Mi-2 Hoplite AIR DEFENCE SAM • Point-defence FIM-92 Stinger; RBS-70 GUNS • TOWED 40mm 24 L/70

Gendarmerie & Paramilitary State Border Guard EQUIPMENT BY TYPE PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 3 PB 3: 1 Valpas (ex-FIN); 1 Lokki (ex-FIN); 1 Randa HELICOPTERS TPT • Light 4: 2 Bell 206B (AB-206B) Jet Ranger II; 2 AW109E Power

DEPLOYMENT IRAQ: Operation Inherent Resolve 1 MALI: EU • EUTM Mali 4; UN • MINUSMA 1 SERBIA: NATO • KFOR 133; 1 inf coy

FOREIGN FORCES All NATO Enhanced Forward Presence unless stated Albania 21; 1 EOD pl Canada 540; 1 mech inf bn HQ; 1 mech inf coy(+); 1 cbt spt coy Czech Republic 56; 1 mor pl Italy 200; 1 armd inf coy Montenegro 10 Poland 175; 1 tk coy Slovakia 97; 1 arty bty Slovenia 40; 1 engr pl Spain 346; 1 armd inf coy(+); 1 cbt engr coy

Europe

Guard. Acquisition requirements include self-propelled howitzers, CVR(T) and ATGW systems. Latvia has only a niche defenceindustrial capability, with cyber security a focus.

124 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2022

Lithuania LTU Euro EUR GDP per capita

ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE 2020

2021

EUR

48.9bn

52.4bn

USD

55.8bn

62.6bn 22,412

USD

19,981

Growth

-0.9

4.7

Inflation

1.1

3.0

Def exp [a] Def bdgt [b] FMA (US)

EUR

1.03bn

1.05bn

USD

1.18bn

1.25bn

EUR

1.02bn

1.05bn

USD

1.16bn

1.25bn

USD

USD1=EUR

0.88

0.84

2022

1.12bn 9m

[a] NATO figure [b] Includes military pensions Real-terms defence budget trend (USDm, constant 2015) 1002 288 2008

Population

2015

2021

2,711,566

Age

0–14

15–19

20–24

25–29

Male

7.9%

2.4%

2.8%

3.1%

30–64 65 plus 22.9%

7.1%

Female

7.5%

2.3%

2.6%

2.8%

25.0%

13.6%

Capabilities Lithuania’s small armed forces focus on maintaining territorial integrity and national sovereignty but the country relies on NATO membership for its security. Like the other Baltic states, it is reliant on NATO’s air-policing deployment for a combat-aircraft capacity. Russia is the country’s predominant security concern, and this shapes Lithuanian defence policy. In January 2017, Lithuania adopted a new National Security Strategy, reflecting the worsening regional security environment. Better combat readiness is an objective and the mobilisation system is being reformed. The government began a security and defence policy review in 2021, which will be reflected in a new national security strategy. Compulsory military service was reintroduced in 2015. Reforms to defence planning and acquisition management came into force in 2018. There is increased attention to communications security. Lithuania has a limited medium-airlift capability, for use in supporting its forces on multinational deployed operations. It takes an active part in NATO and EU operations. The country is taking delivery of the NASAMS SAM system to improve its ground-based air defences. A Regional Cyber Defence Center was set up in 2021, with US cooperation, encompassing defence but also broader resilience concerns. Lithuania has a small defence-industrial base, with niche capabilities, for instance in helicopter support and maintenance.

ACTIVE 23,000 (Army 14,500 Navy 700 Air 1,500 Other 6,300) Gendarmerie & Paramilitary 14,150 Conscript liability 9 months, 18–23 years

RESERVE 7,100 (Army 7,100)

Army 8,850; 5,650 active reserves (total 14,500) FORCES BY ROLE MANOEUVRE Mechanised 1 (1st) mech bde (4 mech inf bn, 1 arty bn, 1 log bn) Light 1 (2nd) mot inf bde (3 mot inf bn, 1 arty bn) COMBAT SUPPORT 1 engr bn COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT 1 trg regt EQUIPMENT BY TYPE ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES IFV 30 Boxer (Vilkas) (in test; incl 2 trg) APC • APC (T) 256: 234 M113A1; 22 M577 (CP) APC 50 JLTV ENGINEERING & MAINTENANCE VEHICLES AEV 8 MT-LB AEV ARV 6: 2 BPz-2; 4 M113 ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE MSL SP 10 M1025A2 HMMWV with FGM-148 Javelin MANPATS FGM-148 Javelin RCL 84mm Carl Gustaf ARTILLERY 91 SP 16 PzH 2000 TOWED 105mm 18 M101 MOR 57: 120mm 42: 20 2B11; 22 M/41D; SP 120mm 15 M113 with Tampella AIR DEFENCE • SAM • Point-defence GROM

Reserves National Defence Voluntary Forces 5,650 active reservists FORCES BY ROLE MANOEUVRE Other 6 (territorial) def unit

Navy 700 LVA, EST and LTU established a joint naval unit, BALTRON, with bases at Liepaja, Riga, Ventpils (LVA), Tallinn (EST), Klaipeda (LTU) EQUIPMENT BY TYPE PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 4 PCC 4 Zemaitis (ex-DNK Flyvefisken) with 1 76mm gun MINE WARFARE • MINE COUNTERMEASURES 4 MHC 2 Skalvis (ex-UK Hunt) MCCS 1 Jotvingis (ex-NOR Vidar) LOGISTICS AND SUPPORT • AAR 1 Šakiai

Air Force 1,500 FORCES BY ROLE AIR DEFENCE 1 AD bn

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE AIRCRAFT TPT 6: Medium 3 C-27J Spartan; Light 3: 1 Cessna 172RG; 2 L-410 Turbolet HELICOPTERS MRH 3 AS365M3 Dauphin (SAR) TPT • Medium 3 Mi-8 Hip (tpt/SAR) AIR DEFENCE • SAM 4+ Short-range 4 NASAMS III Point-defence FIM-92 Stinger; RBS-70

Czech Republic 36; 1 EW unit Denmark NATO Baltic Air Policing: 150; 4 F-16AM Fighting Falcon Germany 558; 1 armd inf bn HQ; 1 armd inf coy(+) Luxembourg 4 Netherlands 270; 1 armd inf coy Norway 195; 1 armd inf coy Portugal NATO Baltic Air Policing: 150; 4 F-16AM Fighting Falcon

Special Operation Force

Luxembourg LUX

FORCES BY ROLE SPECIAL FORCES 1 SF gp (1 CT unit; 1 Jaeger bn, 1 cbt diver unit)

Logistics Support Command 1,400 FORCES BY ROLE COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT 1 log bn

Training and Doctrine Command 1,500 FORCES BY ROLE COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT 1 trg regt

Other Units 2,600 FORCES BY ROLE COMBAT SUPPORT 1 MP bn

Gendarmerie & Paramilitary 14,150

Euro EUR GDP

EUR

2020

2021

64.1bn

70.1bn

USD

73.2bn

83.8bn

USD

116,921

131,302

Growth

-1.3

5.5

Inflation

0.0

2.7

EUR

356m

389m

USD

406m

465m

EUR

341m

348m

USD

390m

416m

0.88

0.84

per capita

Def exp [a] Def bdgt USD1=EUR

Europe

Europe 125

2022

420m

[a] NATO figure Real-terms defence budget trend (USDm, constant 2015) 360 151 2008

Population

2015

2021

639,589

Riflemen Union 10,600

Age

0–14

15–19

20–24

25–29

30–64 65 plus

State Border Guard Service 3,550

Male

8.6%

2.8%

3.2%

3.6%

25.2%

7.0%

Ministry of Interior

Female

8.1%

2.7%

3.0%

3.5%

23.9%

8.5%

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS • PB 3: 1 Lokki (ex-FIN); 1 KBV 041 (ex-SWE); 1 Bakauskas (Baltic Patrol 2700) AMPHIBIOUS • LANDING CRAFT • UCAC 2 Christina (Griffon 2000) AIRCRAFT • TPT • Light 1 Cessna 172RG HELICOPTERS • TPT • Light 5: 1 BK-117 (SAR); 2 H120 Colibri; 2 H135

DEPLOYMENT CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC: EU • EUTM RCA 2 IRAQ: NATO • NATO Mission Iraq 2 MALI: EU • EUTM Mali 2; UN • MINUSMA 45 SERBIA: NATO • KFOR 1 UKRAINE: JMTG-U 30

FOREIGN FORCES All NATO Enhanced Forward Presence unless stated Belgium 198; 1 mot inf coy

Capabilities Luxembourg maintains a limited military capability to participate in European collective security and crisis management. The ‘Defence Guidelines for 2025 and Beyond’ were published at the end of 2017. They contain strong statements of support for NATO and EU security policy and contributions to international missions. They also outline ambitious modernisation plans, including a reorganisation of the army, which will take on joint responsibilities, including for ISR, a new air component and a military-cyber cell. Luxembourg has contributed troops to the multinational battlegroup in Lithuania as part of NATO’s Enhanced Forward Presence. It is part of the European Multi-Role Tanker Transport Fleet programme, partially funding one A330 MRTT, and has contributed its A400M to a multinational airlift squadron formed jointly with Belgium. The Belgian and Dutch air forces are responsible for policing Luxembourg’s airspace. Sustaining the army’s personnel strength depends on better recruiting and retention. A review is examining a specialised reserve of civilian experts. The defence guidelines envisage considerable equipment improvements and cooperative development of UAV capabilities with Belgium and the Netherlands. Ambitions for the new air component include tactical-airlift and medical-evacuation capabilities. There is a small but advanced space industry and some foreign defence firms have

126 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2022 a presence, but the country is otherwise reliant on imports. A strategy for defence industry, innovation and research is to be developed as part of the new defence guidelines.

ACTIVE 410 (Army 410) Gendarmerie & Paramilitary 600

ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE Army 410

Macedonia, North MKD 2020

2021

GDP

Macedonian Denar MKD MKD

664bn

717bn

USD

12.3bn

13.9bn

per capita

USD

5,939

6,712

Growth

-4.5

4.0

Inflation

1.2

3.1 11.1bn

Def exp [a]

EUR

8.30bn

USD

154m

214m

MKD

10.1bn

10.8bn

USD

188m

209m

2022

FORCES BY ROLE MANOEUVRE Reconnaissance 2 recce coy (1 to Eurocorps/BEL div, 1 to NATO pool of deployable forces) EQUIPMENT BY TYPE ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES AUV 48 Dingo 2 ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE MSL • MANPATS NLAW; TOW ARTILLERY • MOR 81mm 6+ AIRCRAFT • TPT • Heavy 1 A400M HELICOPTERS • MRH 2 H145M (jointly operated with Police)

[a] NATO figure

Gendarmerie & Paramilitary 600

Age

0–14

15–19

20–24

25–29

Male

8.3%

2.8%

3.5%

3.7%

25.1%

6.4%

Female

7.8%

2.7%

3.2%

3.5%

24.8%

8.1%

Gendarmerie 600

Def bdgt FMA (US)

USD

USD1=MKD

54.04

51.64

13.3bn 0m

Real-terms defence budget trend (USDm, constant 2015) 170 106 2008

Population

2015

2021

2,128,262 30–64 65 plus

DEPLOYMENT

Capabilities

IRAQ: NATO • NATO Mission Iraq 1

The armed forces’ primary goals are safeguarding the state’s territorial integrity and sovereignty, as well as contributing to operations under the EU, NATO and UN umbrellas. North Macedonia formally became NATO’s 30th member on 27 March 2020. In the same month, it enacted a new Defence Strategy with a focus on capability development, and improved planning based on NATO and EU standards, among other areas. A 2019–2028 Defence Capability Development Plan (DCDP) consolidated long-term development goals aimed at developing collective defence, cooperative security and crisis-management capabilities. A Mid-Term Defence Capabilities Development Plan, adopted in January 2020, is intended to help implement the DCDP. Work on MoD restructuring is under way. The armed forces are fully professional and the country aims to train all units, particularly those with deployable capability, to NATO standards. A number of units are earmarked for participation in NATO-led operations, and troops were deployed to KFOR in November 2020. The armed forces have increased their participation in NATO joint exercises since joining the Alliance. Participation in international peacekeeping missions has increased logistics capability. The country has modest maritime and air wings, and relies on Soviet-era equipment. Acquisition priorities include indirect fire-support, light armoured vehicles, cyber defence and multi-role helicopters. There is little in the way of a domestic defence industry, with no ability to design and manufacture modern equipment.

LITHUANIA: NATO • Enhanced Forward Presence 4 MALI: EU • EUTM Mali 15; UN • MINUSMA 2 MEDITERRANEAN SEA: EU • EUNAVFOR MED 2 Merlin IIIC (leased)

ACTIVE 8,000 (Army 8,000) Gendarmerie & Paramilitary 7,600 RESERVE 4,850

Europe 127

Army 8,000 FORCES BY ROLE SPECIAL FORCES 1 SF regt (1 SF bn, 1 ranger bn) MANOEUVRE Mechanised 1 mech inf bde (1 tk bn, 4 mech inf bn, 1 arty bn, 1 NBC coy, 1 sigs coy) COMBAT SUPPORT 1 engr bn 1 MP bn 1 sigs bn COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT 1 log bde (3 log bn)

Reserves FORCES BY ROLE MANOEUVRE Light 1 inf bde EQUIPMENT BY TYPE ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES MBT 31 T-72A IFV 11: 10 BMP-2; 1 BMP-2K (CP) APC 200 APC (T) 46: 9 Leonidas; 27 M113; 10 MT-LB APC (W) 154: 56 BTR-70; 12 BTR-80; 2 Cobra; 84 TM170 Hermelin ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE MSL • MANPATS Milan RCL 82mm M60A ARTILLERY 131 TOWED 70: 105mm 14 M-56; 122mm 56 M-30 M-1938 MRL 17: 122mm 6 BM-21; 128mm 11 MOR 44: 120mm 44

Marine Wing EQUIPMENT BY TYPE PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 2 PB 2 Botica†

Aviation Brigade FORCES BY ROLE TRAINING 1 flt with Z-242; Bell 205 (UH-1H Iroquois); Bell 206B ATTACK HELICOPTER 1 sqn with Mi-24V Hind E TRANSPORT HELICOPTER 1 sqn with Mi-8MTV Hip; Mi-17 Hip H AIR DEFENCE 1 AD bn EQUIPMENT BY TYPE AIRCRAFT TPT • Light 1 An-2 Colt TRG 5 Z-242 HELICOPTERS ATK 2 Mi-24V Hind E (8: 2 Mi-24K Hind G2; 6 Mi-24V Hind E in store)

MRH 6: 4 Mi-8MTV Hip; 2 Mi-17 Hip H TPT • Light 6: 2 Bell 205 (UH-1H Iroquois); 4 Bell 206B Jet Ranger AIR DEFENCE SAM • Point-defence 8+: 8 9K35 Strela-10 (RS-SA-13 Gopher); 9K310 Igla-1 (RS-SA-16 Gimlet) GUNS 40mm 36 L/60

Gendarmerie & Paramilitary 7,600 Europe

ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE

Police 7,600 (some 5,000 armed) incl 2 SF units EQUIPMENT BY TYPE ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES APC • APC (T) M113; APC (W) BTR-80; TM-170 Heimlin AUV Ze’ev HELICOPTERS MRH 1 Bell 412EP Twin Huey TPT 3: Medium 1 Mi-171; Light 2: 1 Bell 206B (AB206B) Jet Ranger II; 1 Bell 212 (AB-212)

DEPLOYMENT BOSNIA-HERZEGOVINA: EU • EUFOR • Operation Althea 1 CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC: EU • EUTM RCA 2 IRAQ: NATO • NATO Mission Iraq 4 LEBANON: UN • UNIFIL 3 SERBIA: NATO • KFOR 64

Malta MLT Euro EUR

2020

GDP per capita

2021

EUR

13.1bn

14.0bn

USD

14.9bn

16.7bn

USD

28,955

31,997

Growth

-8.3

5.7

Inflation

0.8

0.7

EUR

70.7m

71.8m

USD

80.7m

85.8m

0.88

0.84

Def bdgt [a] USD1=EUR

2022

82.7m

[a] Excludes military pensions Real-terms defence budget trend (USDm, constant 2015) 76 47 2008

Population

2015

2021

460,891

Age

0–14

15–19

20–24

25–29

Male

7.4%

2.3%

2.8%

3.6%

30–64 65 plus 24.2%

10.0%

Female

7.0%

2.2%

2.6%

3.2%

22.9%

11.8%

Capabilities The principal roles for the armed forces are maintaining external security and support for civil emergencies and the police. There is also focus on maritime security in the Mediterranean. The Armed

128 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2022 Forces of Malta Strategy Paper 2016–2026 laid out defence-policy objectives, including operational and organisational reforms. Malta is neutral but is a member of NATO’s Partnership for Peace programme. The country also participates in bilateral and multilateral exercises. Although deployment capacity is limited, Malta has contributed to European missions. Italy has assisted Malta in meeting some security requirements, including air surveillance, while the European Internal Security Fund is funding some modernisation. Although there is some shipbuilding and ship-repair activity and a small aviation-maintenance industry, these are not defence-specific and Malta relies on imports to equip its armed forces.

DEPLOYMENT LEBANON: UN • UNIFIL 11

Montenegro MNE 2020

2021

EUR

4.19bn

4.60bn

USD

4.79bn

5.49bn

USD

7,703

8,838

Growth

-15.2

7.0

ACTIVE 1,700 (Armed Forces 1,700)

Inflation

-0.2

2.0

RESERVE 260 (Volunteer Reserve Force 110 Individual Reserve 150)

Def exp [a]

EUR

72.0m

79.0m

USD

82.0m

94.0m

EUR

64.7m

72.5m

USD

73.8m

86.6m

ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE Armed Forces of Malta 1,700 FORCES BY ROLE SPECIAL FORCES 1 SF unit MANOEUVRE Light 1 (1st) inf regt (3 inf coy, 1 cbt spt coy) COMBAT SUPPORT 1 (3rd) cbt spt regt (1 cbt engr sqn, 1 EOD sqn, 1 maint sqn) COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT 1 (4th) CSS regt (1 CIS coy, 1 sy coy) EQUIPMENT BY TYPE ARTILLERY • MOR 81mm L16 AIR DEFENCE • GUNS 14.5mm 1 ZPU-4

Maritime Squadron 500 Organised into 5 divisions: offshore patrol; inshore patrol; rapid deployment and training; marine engineering; and logistics EQUIPMENT BY TYPE PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 8 PCO 1 Emer PCC 1 Diciotti (ITA Saettia mod) with 1 hel landing platform PB 6: 4 Austal 21m; 2 Marine Protector LOGISTICS AND SUPPORT • AAR 2 Cantiere Vittoria

Air Wing 1 base party. 1 flt ops div; 1 maint div; 1 integrated log div; 1 rescue section EQUIPMENT BY TYPE AIRCRAFT TPT • Light 5: 3 Beech 200 King Air (maritime patrol); 2 BN-2B Islander TRG 3 Bulldog T MK1 HELICOPTERS MRH 6: 3 AW139 (SAR); 3 SA316B Alouette III

Euro EUR GDP per capita

Def bdgt [b] FMA (US)

USD

USD1=EUR

0.88

0.84

2022

[a] NATO figure [b] Includes military pensions Real-terms defence budget trend (USDm, constant 2015) 69 44 2008

Population

2015

2021

607,414

Age

0–14

15–19

20–24

25–29

Male

9.4%

3.2%

3.3%

3.1%

30–64 65 plus 23.1%

7.2%

Female

8.7%

2.9%

3.1%

3.0%

23.7%

9.3%

Capabilities According to its defence strategy, Montenegro intends to develop an integrated defence system, capable of defending and preserving independence, sovereignty and national territory. However, the principal concern of the authorities is integrating Montenegro into the collective security system of NATO as well as the EU. A NATO member since 2017, Montenegro has accepted NATO’s capability targets and has been aligning its defence-planning process with NATO standards. Reform and professionalisation of the armed forces have been slow, and developments have been focused on structural issues around improving recruitment, outflow and professional development. The armed forces are not designed to have an expeditionary capability, and as such have little logistics capability to support deployments beyond national borders. Personnel have deployed to EU-, UN- and NATO-led operations, although a planned increase in Montenegro’s small contribution to KFOR stalled due to internal opposition. Podgorica intends to replace ageing Soviet-era equipment. Procurement priorities include light and medium helicopters and light armoured vehicles, as well as improved communications capacities in accordance with NATO standards. Future plans include the formation of a special-forces unit and an intelligence unit in the land forces. The country’s defence industry is capable of producing small arms and ammunition.

ACTIVE 2,350 (Army 1,275 Navy 350 Air Force 225 Other 500) Gendarmerie & Paramilitary 10,100 RESERVE 2,800

Europe 129

Army 1,275 FORCES BY ROLE MANOEUVRE Reconnaissance 1 recce coy Light 1 mot inf bn COMBAT SUPPORT 1 cbt spt bn 1 sigs coy COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT 1 med bn 1 spt bn EQUIPMENT BY TYPE ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES APC • APC (W) 8 BOV-VP M-86 AUV 20 JLTV ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE SP 9 BOV-1 MSL • MANPATS 9K111 Fagot (RS-AT-4 Spigot); 9K111-1 Konkurs (RS-AT-5 Spandrel) ARTILLERY 135 TOWED 122mm 12 D-30 MRL 128mm 18 M-63/M-94 Plamen MOR 105: 82mm 73; 120mm 32

Reserve FORCES BY ROLE MANOEUVRE Light 2 inf bn COMBAT SUPPORT 1 arty bn

Navy 350

1 Naval Cmd HQ with 4 operational naval units (patrol boat; coastal surveillance; maritime detachment; and SAR) with additional sigs, log and trg units with a separate coastguard element. Some listed units are in the process of decommissioning EQUIPMENT BY TYPE PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 4 PCF 2 Rade Končar† PB 2 Mirna (Type-140) (Police units) LOGISTICS AND SUPPORT 1 AXS 1 Jadran†

Air Force 225

Golubovci (Podgorica) air base under army command FORCES BY ROLE TRAINING 1 (mixed) sqn with G-4 Super Galeb; Utva-75 (none operational) TRANSPORT HELICOPTER 1 sqn with SA341/SA342L Gazelle EQUIPMENT BY TYPE AIRCRAFT • TRG (4 G-4 Super Galeb non-operational; 4 Utva-75 non-operational)

HELICOPTERS MRH 16: 1 Bell 412EP Twin Huey; 2 Bell 412EPI Twin Huey; 13 SA341/SA342L (HN-45M) Gazelle TPT • Light 2 Bell 505 Jet Ranger X

Gendarmerie & Paramilitary ε10,100 Montenegrin Ministry of Interior Personnel ε6,000 Special Police Units ε4,100

DEPLOYMENT LATVIA: NATO • Enhanced Forward Presence 10 MALI: EU • EUTM Mali 2 SERBIA: NATO • KFOR 2 WESTERN SAHARA: UN • MINURSO 1

Multinational Organisations Capabilities The following represent shared capabilities held by contributors collectively rather than as part of national inventories

ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE NATO AEW&C Force Based at Geilenkirchen (GER). Original participating countries (BEL, CAN, DNK, GER, GRC, ITA, NLD, NOR, PRT, TUR, US) have been subsequently joined by five more (CZE, ESP, HUN, POL, ROM) FORCES BY ROLE AIRBORNE EARLY WARNING & CONTROL 1 sqn with B-757 (trg); E-3A Sentry (NATO standard) EQUIPMENT BY TYPE AIRCRAFT AEW&C 16 E-3A Sentry (NATO standard) TPT • PAX 1 B-757 (trg)

NATO Alliance Ground Surveillance Based at Sigonella (ITA) EQUIPMENT BY TYPE UNINHABITED AERIAL VEHICLES ISR • Heavy 5 RQ-4D Phoenix

NATO Multinational Multi-Role Tanker Transport Fleet (MMF) Based at Eindhoven (NLD). Six participating countries (BEL, CZE, GER, NLD, NOR & LUX) EQUIPMENT BY TYPE AIRCRAFT • TKR/TPT 5 A330 MRTT

Europe

ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE

130 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2022

Strategic Airlift Capability Heavy Airlift Wing based at Papa air base (HUN). 12 participating countries (BLG, EST, FIN, HUN, LTU, NLD, NOR, POL, ROM, SVN, SWE, US) EQUIPMENT BY TYPE AIRCRAFT • TPT • Heavy 3 C-17A Globemaster III

Strategic Airlift Interim Solution Intended to provide strategic-airlift capacity pending the delivery of A400M aircraft by leasing An-124s. 11 participating countries (BEL, CZE, FIN, FRA, GER, HUN, NOR, POL, SVK, SVN, SWE) EQUIPMENT BY TYPE AIRCRAFT • TPT • Heavy 2 An-124-100 (3 more available on 6–9 days’ notice)

Netherlands NLD Euro EUR

2020

2021

EUR

800bn

844bn

USD

913bn

1.01tr

USD

52,456

57,715

Growth

-3.8

3.8

Inflation

1.1

1.9

GDP per capita

Def exp [a] Def bdgt [b]

EUR

11.5bn

11.8bn

USD

13.1bn

14.1bn

EUR

11.0bn

12.4bn

USD

12.6bn

14.8bn

0.88

0.84

USD1=EUR

2022

RESERVE 6,000 (Army 3,900 Navy 1,100 Air 800 Other 200) Military Constabulary 300 Reserve liability to age 35 for soldiers/sailors, 40 for NCOs, 45 for officers 12.2bn

Real-terms defence budget trend (USDbn, constant 2015) 12.3

Population

ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE Army 15,350

[b] Includes military pensions

8.73 2021

2015

ACTIVE 33,600 (Army 15,350 Navy 7,350 Air 6,400 Other 4,500) Military Constabulary 6,500

[a] NATO figure

2008

from November 2021 to May 2022. The Netherlands, Belgium and Denmark have committed to forming a composite specialoperations command. Dutch forces are fully professional and well trained and the Netherlands can deploy and sustain a mediumscale force for a single operation, or a small-scale joint force for an extended period. The Netherlands makes significant contributions to NATO and EU military operations globally. The country has a modern European- and US-sourced equipment inventory. An agreement is in place with Belgium on the joint acquisition of new frigates and minehunters, while the air force is upgrading its Patriot missiles and Apache helicopters and acquiring F-35 combat aircraft and MQ-9 Reaper UAVs. The Netherlands is part of the programme for a multinational NATO unit of A330 transport/tanker aircraft. The country has an advanced domestic defence industry focusing on armoured vehicles, naval ships and air-defence systems, but also hosts a range of subsidiaries of international aerospace firms. Damen Schelde Naval Shipbuilding exports frigates, corvettes and fast-attack craft, while DutchAero manufactures engine components for the F-35. The country also collaborates with Germany on the Boxer and Fennek armoured vehicles.

17,337,403

Age

0–14

15–19

20–24

25–29

30–64 65 plus

Male

8.2%

2.9%

3.1%

3.2%

22.8%

9.2%

Female

7.9%

2.8%

3.0%

3.1%

22.8%

11.0%

Capabilities The 2018 defence review tasks the armed forces with territorial defence and supporting national civil authorities with law enforcement, disaster relief and humanitarian assistance. The Defence Vision 2035 document was published in October 2020. It assessed the future security environment and highlighted ten principles to guide the armed forces’ development until 2035. Dutch forces are increasingly integrated with NATO allies, particularly Germany. The army contributes to a Dutch–German tank battalion and its mechanised and air-mobile brigades are integral formations within German divisions. There is also cooperation and integration with the German armed forces in the air and naval domains. The Netherlands has air-policing agreements with France, Belgium and Luxembourg and is a member of the UK-led Joint Expeditionary Force. In October 2021, the government announced that it would deploy a C-130 plus support personnel to Mali (to the UN mission)

FORCES BY ROLE COMMAND elm 1 (1 GNC) corps HQ SPECIAL FORCES 4 SF coy MANOEUVRE Reconnaissance 1 ISR bn (2 armd recce sqn, 1 EW coy, 2 int sqn, 1 UAV bty) Mechanised 1 (43rd) mech bde (1 armd recce sqn, 2 armd inf bn, 1 engr bn, 1 maint coy, 1 med coy) 1 (13th) mech bde (1 recce sqn, 2 mech inf bn, 1 engr bn, 1 maint coy, 1 med coy) Air Manoeuvre 1 (11th) air mob bde (3 air mob inf bn, 1 engr coy, 1 med coy, 1 supply coy, 1 maint coy) COMBAT SUPPORT 1 SP arty bn (3 SP arty bty) 1 AD comd (1 AD sqn; 1 AD bty) 1 CIMIC bn 1 engr bn 2 EOD coy 1 (CIS) sigs bn 1 CBRN coy COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT 1 med bn 5 fd hospital 3 maint coy 2 tpt bn

Reserves 3,900 reservists National Command

Cadre bde and corps tps completed by call-up of reservists (incl Territorial Comd) FORCES BY ROLE MANOEUVRE Light 3 inf bn (could be mobilised for territorial def) EQUIPMENT BY TYPE ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES RECCE 197 Fennek IFV 117 CV9035NL (32 more in store) APC • APC (W) 200 Boxer (8 driver trg; 52 amb; 36 CP; 92 engr; 12 log) AUV 248: 98 Bushmaster IMV; 150 Fennek ENGINEERING & MAINTENANCE VEHICLES AEV 10+: Dachs; 10 Kodiak ARV 25+: BPz-2; 25 BPz-3 Büffel VLB 22: 16 Leopard 1 with Legaun; 2 Leopard 2 with Leguan; 4 MLC70 with Leguan MW Bozena NBC VEHICLES 6 TPz-1 Fuchs NBC ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE MSL • MANPATS Spike-MR ARTILLERY 119: SP 155mm 18 PzH 2000 (38 more in store) MOR 101: 81mm 83 L16/M1; 120mm 18 Brandt AIR DEFENCE • SAM 42+ Long-range 18 M902 Patriot PAC-3 (TMD capable) Short-range 6 NASAMS II Point-defence 18+: FIM-92 Stinger; 18 Fennek with FIM92 Stinger

Navy 7,350 (incl Marines) EQUIPMENT BY TYPE SUBMARINES 4 SSK 4 Walrus with 4 single 533mm TT with Mk 48 ADCAP mod 7 HWT PRINCIPAL SURFACE COMBATANTS 6 DESTROYERS • DDGHM 4: 3 De Zeven Provinciën with 2 quad lnchr with RGM84C Harpoon Block 1B AShM, 5 8-cell Mk 41 VLS with SM-2 Block IIIA/RIM-162B ESSM SAM, 2 twin 324mm SVTT Mk 32 ASTT with Mk 46 LWT, 1 Goalkeeper CIWS, 1 127mm gun (capacity 1 NH90 hel) 1 De Zeven Provinciën with 2 quad lnchr with RGM84C Harpoon Block 1B AShM, 5 8-cell Mk 41 VLS with SM-2 Block IIIA/RIM-162B ESSM SAM, 2 twin 324mm SVTT Mk 32 ASTT with Mk 46 LWT, 2 Goalkeeper CIWS, 1 127mm gun (capacity 1 NH90 hel) FRIGATES • FFGHM 2 Karel Doorman with 2 quad lnchr with RGM-84C Harpoon Block 1B AShM, 1 16-cell Mk 48 mod 1 VLS with RIM-7P Sea Sparrow SAM, 2 twin 324mm SVTT Mk 32 ASTT with Mk 46 LWT, 1 Goalkeeper CIWS, 1 76mm gun (capacity 1 NH90 hel) PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS PSOH 4 Holland with 1 76mm gun (capacity 1 NH90 hel)

MINE WARFARE • MINE COUNTERMEASURES 6 MHO 6 Alkmaar (Tripartite) AMPHIBIOUS PRINCIPAL AMPHIBIOUS SHIPS • LPD 2: 1 Rotterdam with 2 Goalkeeper CIWS (capacity 6 NH90/ AS532 Cougar hel; either 6 LCVP or 2 LCM and 3 LCVP; either 170 APC or 33 MBT; 538 troops) 1 Johan de Witt with 2 Goalkeeper CIWS (capacity 6 NH90 hel or 4 AS532 Cougar hel; either 6 LCVP or 2 LCM and 3 LCVP; either 170 APC or 33 MBT; 700 troops) LANDING CRAFT 17 LCU 5 LCU Mk II LCVP 12 Mk5 LOGISTICS AND SUPPORT 8 AGS 3: 1 Hydrograaf; 2 Snellius AK 1 Pelikaan AORH 1 Karel Doorman with 2 Goalkeeper CIWS (capacity 6 NH90/AS532 Cougar or 2 CH-47F Chinook hel; 2 LCVP) AS 1 Mercuur AXL 1 Van Kingsbergen AXS 1 Urania

Marines 2,650 FORCES BY ROLE SPECIAL FORCES 1 SF gp (1 SF sqn, 1 CT sqn) MANOEUVRE Amphibious 2 mne bn 1 amph aslt gp COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT 1 spt gp (coy) EQUIPMENT BY TYPE ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES APC • APC (T) 65 BvS-10 Viking (incl 20 CP) ENGINEERING & MAINTENANCE VEHICLES ARV 8: 4 BvS-10; 4 BPz-2 MED 4 BvS-10 ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE MSL • MANPATS Spike-MR ARTILLERY • MOR 81mm 12 L16/M1 AIR DEFENCE • SAM • Point-defence FIM-92 Stinger

Air Force 6,400 FORCES BY ROLE FIGHTER/GROUND ATTACK 2 sqn with F-16AM/BM Fighting Falcon 1 sqn with F-16AM/BM Fighting Falcon; F-35A Lightning II ANTI-SUBMARINE WARFARE/SEARCH & RESCUE 1 sqn with NH90 NFH TANKER/TRANSPORT 1 sqn with C-130H/H-30 Hercules 1 sqn with Gulfstream IV TRAINING 1 OEU sqn with F-35A Lightning II 1 sqn with PC-7 Turbo Trainer

Europe

Europe 131

132 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2022 1 hel sqn with AH-64D Apache; CH-47D Chinook (based at Fort Hood, TX) ATTACK HELICOPTER 1 sqn with AH-64D Apache TRANSPORT HELICOPTER 1 sqn with AS532U2 Cougar II; NH90 NFH 1 sqn with CH-47D/F Chinook EQUIPMENT BY TYPE AIRCRAFT 82 combat capable FTR 61 F-16AM/BM Fighting Falcon FGA 21 F-35A Lightning II TPT 5: Medium 4: 2 C-130H Hercules; 2 C-130H-30 Hercules; PAX 1 Gulfstream IV TRG 13 PC-7 Turbo Trainer HELICOPTERS ATK 28 AH-64D Apache ASW 19 NH90 NFH (of which 8 not fitted with sonar) TPT 33: Heavy 25: up to 8 CH-47D Chinook (of which 3 to be upgraded to CH-47F, remainder to be retired); 17 CH47F Chinook; Medium 8 AS532U2 Cougar II AIR-LAUNCHED MISSILES AAM • IR AIM-9L/M Sidewinder; IIR AIM-9X Sidewinder II; ARH AIM-120B AMRAAM ASM AGM-114K Hellfire; AGM-65D/G Maverick BOMBS Laser-guided GBU-10/GBU-12 Paveway II; GBU-24 Paveway III (all supported by LANTIRN) INS/GPS guided GBU-39 Small Diameter Bomb

Gendarmerie & Paramilitary 6,500 Royal Military Constabulary 6,500 Subordinate to the Ministry of Defence, but performs most of its work under the authority of other ministries FORCES BY ROLE MANOEUVRE Other 1 paramilitary comd (total: 28 paramilitary unit) EQUIPMENT BY TYPE ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES APC • APC (W) 24 YPR-KMar

DEPLOYMENT BALTIC SEA: NATO • SNMCMG 1: 1 MHO IRAQ: Operation Inherent Resolve 150; 2 trg unit; NATO • NATO Mission Iraq 2 LEBANON: UN • UNIFIL 1 LITHUANIA: NATO • Enhanced Forward Presence 270; 1 mech inf coy MALI: Operation Barkhane 4; EU • EUTM Mali 6; UN • MINUSMA 5 MIDDLE EAST: UN • UNTSO 11 NORTH SEA: NATO • SNMG 1: 1 FFGHM SYRIA/ISRAEL: UN • UNDOF 1 UNITED STATES: 1 hel trg sqn with AH-64D Apache; CH47D Chinook based at Fort Hood (TX)

FOREIGN FORCES United States US European Command: 450

Norway NOR Norwegian Kroner NOK

2020

2021

GDP

NOK

3.41tr

3.85tr

USD

363bn

446bn

per capita

USD

67,326

82,244

Growth

-0.8

3.0

Inflation

1.3

2.6

Def exp [a] Def bdgt [b]

NOK

68.5bn

70.9bn

USD

7.27bn

8.20bn

NOK

61.0bn

64.5bn

USD

6.48bn

7.46bn

9.42

8.64

USD1=NOK

2022

69.0bn

[a] NATO figure [b] Includes military pensions Real-terms defence budget trend (USDbn, constant 2015) 7.21 4.33 2008

Population

2015

2021

5,509,591

Age

0–14

15–19

20–24

25–29

Male

9.2%

2.9%

3.1%

3.5%

30–64 65 plus 23.6%

8.2%

Female

8.7%

2.8%

3.0%

3.3%

22.2%

9.4%

Capabilities Norway sustains small but well-equipped and highly trained armed forces. Territorial defence is at the heart of security policy. A new Long Term Defence Plan was published in October 2020, arguing that the security environment had deteriorated faster than expected. It envisages a gradual increase in personnel numbers and further measures to strengthen readiness and capability in the High North. A US Marine Corps contingent has deployed to Vaernes, on a rotational basis, since January 2017. In August 2018, this was extended for up to five years and a second location added at Setermoen. In April 2021 Norway and the US signed a Supplementary Defense Cooperation Agreement which, among other things, provides authority for US forces to access specific Norwegian facilities and conduct mutual defence activities. Four locations were mentioned as ‘focal points’ for increased cooperation: Evenes, Rygge and Sola air stations and Ramsund naval station. Norway is not an EU member, but signed a cooperation agreement with the European Defence Agency in 2006. At any one time, around onethird of troops are conscripts. Senior officers reportedly expressed concerns in 2019 that Norway’s force structure was too small for defence requirements. A report by the Norwegian chief of defence published in October 2019 argued that in order to address the challenging security situation, the number of combat units in all services should increase. Norway maintains a small presence in a range of international crisis-management missions. Equipment recapitalisation is ongoing. In 2017, the government announced that it would procure four submarines as part of a strategic partnership with Germany. Large procurements will stretch budgets, with the F-35 alone reportedly taking up 27% of all procurement spending between 2019 and 2026. Norway’s first P-8 maritime

Europe 133

ACTIVE 25,400 (Army 8,300 Navy 4,600 Air 4,300 Central Support 7,400 Home Guard 800) Conscript liability 19 months maximum. Conscripts first serve 12 months from 19–28, and then up to 4–5 refresher training periods until age 35, 44, 55 or 60 depending on rank and function. Conscription was extended to women in 2015

RESERVE 40,000 (Home Guard 40,000) Readiness varies from a few hours to several days

ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE Army 3,900; 4,400 conscript (total 8,300) The armoured infantry brigade – Brigade North – trains new personnel of all categories and provides units for international operations. At any time around one-third of the brigade will be trained and ready to conduct operations. The brigade includes one high-readiness armoured battalion (Telemark Battalion) with combat-support and combat-service-support units on high readiness FORCES BY ROLE MANOEUVRE Reconnaissance 1 armd recce bn (forming) 1 ISR bn 1 (GSV) bn (1 (border) recce coy, 1 ranger coy, 1 spt coy, 1 trg coy) Armoured 1 armd inf bde (2 armd bn, 1 lt inf bn, 1 arty bn, 1 engr bn, 1 MP coy, 1 CIS bn, 1 spt bn, 1 med bn) Light 1 lt inf bn (His Majesty The King’s Guards) EQUIPMENT BY TYPE ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES MBT 36 Leopard 2A4 (16 more in store) RECCE 46: 21 CV9030; 25 HMT Extenda IFV 91: 76 CV9030N; 15 CV9030N (CP) APC 390 APC (T) 315 M113 (incl variants) APC (W) 75 XA-186 Sisu/XA-200 Sisu/XA-203 (amb) AUV 140: 20 Dingo 2; 120 IVECO LMV (50 more in store) ENGINEERING & MAINTENANCE VEHICLES AEV 27+: 16 CV90 STING; 8 M113 AEV; NM109; 3 Wisent-2 ARV 12: 6 BPz-2; 6 Wisent-2 VLB 36: 26 Leguan; 1 Leopard 2 with Leguan; 9 Leopard 1 MW 9 910 MCV-2 NBC VEHICLES 6 TPz-1 Fuchs NBC ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE MANPATS FGM-148 Javelin RCL 84mm Carl Gustaf

ARTILLERY 191 SP 155mm 48: 24 K9 Thunder; 24 M109A3GN (being withdrawn) MOR 143: 81mm 115 L16; SP 81mm 28: 16 CV9030; 12 M125A2 AIR DEFENCE SAM • Medium-range NASAMS III

Navy 2,350; 2,250 conscripts (total 4,600) Joint Command – Norwegian National Joint Headquarters. The Royal Norwegian Navy is organised into five elements under the command of the Chief of the Navy: the fleet (Marinen), the Coast Guard (Kystvakten), the recruit training school (KNM Harald Haarfagre), the naval medical branch and the naval bases (Haakonsvern and Ramsund) FORCES BY ROLE MANOEUVRE Reconnaissance 1 ISR coy (Coastal Rangers) COMBAT SUPPORT 1 EOD pl EQUIPMENT BY TYPE SUBMARINES 6 SSK 6 Ula with 8 single 533mm TT with SeaHake (DM2A3) HWT PRINCIPAL SURFACE COMBATANTS • FRIGATES 4 FFGHM 4 Fridtjof Nansen with Aegis C2 (mod), 2 quad lnchr with NSM AShM, 1 8-cell Mk 41 VLS with RIM162A ESSM SAM, 2 twin 324mm ASTT with Sting Ray mod 1 LWT, 1 76mm gun (capacity 1 NH90 hel) PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 12 PCFG 6 Skjold with 8 single lnchr with NSM AShM, 1 76mm gun PBF 6 CB90N (capacity 20 troops) MINE WARFARE • MINE COUNTERMEASURES 4 MSC 2 Alta with 1 twin Simbad lnchr with Mistral SAM MHC 2 Oksoy with 1 twin Simbad lnchr with Mistral SAM LOGISTICS AND SUPPORT 6 AGI 1 Marjata IV AGS 2: 1 HU Sverdrup II; 1 Eger (Marjata III) with 1 hel landing platform AORH 1 Maud (BMT Aegir) (capacity 2 med hel) AXL 2 Reine

Coast Guard EQUIPMENT BY TYPE PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 13 PSOH 3 Nordkapp with 1 57mm gun (capacity 1 med tpt hel) PSO 5: 3 Barentshav; 1 Harstad; 1 Svalbard with 1 57mm gun, 1 hel landing platform PCC 5 Nornen LOGISTICS AND SUPPORT • ATF 2 Jarl (leased)

Air Force 2,900; 1,400 conscript (total 4,300) Joint Command – Norwegian National HQ FORCES BY ROLE FIGHTER/GROUND ATTACK 1 sqn with F-16AM/BM Fighting Falcon 1 sqn with F-35A Lightning II

Europe

patrol aircraft flew in 2021; deliveries are expected from 2022. In June 2018, it was announced that a planned upgrade to Norway’s main-battle-tank fleet would be pushed to the mid2020s; current budget forecasts foresee funding being made available for this purpose in 2025–26. Norway has an advanced and diverse defence-industrial base with a high percentage of SMEs and a mix of private and state-owned companies.

134 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2022 MARITIME PATROL 1 sqn with P-3C Orion; P-3N Orion (pilot trg) ELECTRONIC WARFARE 1 sqn with Falcon 20C (EW, Flight Inspection Service) SEARCH & RESCUE 1 sqn with Sea King Mk43B; AW101 TRANSPORT 1 sqn with C-130J-30 Hercules TRAINING 1 sqn with MFI-15 Safari TRANSPORT HELICOPTER 2 sqn with Bell 412SP Twin Huey 1 sqn with NH90 (forming) AIR DEFENCE 2 bn with NASAMS III EQUIPMENT BY TYPE AIRCRAFT 71 combat capable FTR 35: 30 F-16AM Fighting Falcon; 5 F-16BM Fighting Falcon (F-16AM/BM to be retired end of 2021) FGA 31 F-35A Lightning II ASW 5: 4 P-3C Orion; 1 P-3N Orion (pilot trg) EW 2 Falcon 20C TPT • Medium 4 C-130J-30 Hercules TRG 16 MFI-15 Safari HELICOPTERS ASW 12 NH90 NFH SAR 19: 9 AW101; 10 Sea King Mk43B MRH 18: 6 Bell 412HP; 12 Bell 412SP AIR DEFENCE SAM • Medium-range NASAMS III AIR-LAUNCHED MISSILES AAM • IR AIM-9L Sidewinder; IIR AIM-9X Sidewinder II; IRIS-T; ARH AIM-120B AMRAAM; AIM-120C AMRAAM BOMBS Laser-guided EGBU-12 Paveway II INS/GPS guided JDAM

Special Operations Command (NORSOCOM) FORCES BY ROLE SPECIAL FORCES 1 (armed forces) SF comd (2 SF gp) 1 (navy) SF comd (1 SF gp)

Central Support, Administration and Command 5,850; 1,550 conscripts (total 7,400) Central Support, Administration and Command includes military personnel in all joint elements and they are responsible for logistics and CIS in support of all forces in Norway and abroad

Home Guard 400; 400 conscripts (40,000 reserves) The Home Guard is a separate organisation, but closely cooperates with all services. The Home Guard is organised in 11 Districts with mobile Rapid Reaction Forces (3,000 troops in total) as well as reinforcements and follow-on forces (37,000 troops in total) EQUIPMENT BY TYPE PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS • PB 11: 4 Harek; 2 Gyda; 5 Alusafe 1290

DEPLOYMENT BALTIC SEA: NATO • SNMCMG 1: 1 AXL CYPRUS: UN • UNFICYP 2 EGYPT: MFO 3 IRAQ: Operation Inherent Resolve 60; 1 trg unit; NATO • NATO Mission Iraq 2 JORDAN: Operation Inherent Resolve 20 LITHUANIA: NATO • Enhanced Forward Presence 195; 1 armd inf coy; CV9030 MALI: UN • MINUSMA 13; 1 tpt flt with C-130J-30 MIDDLE EAST: UN • UNTSO 12 BALTIC SEA: NATO • SNMG 1: 1 AORH SOUTH SUDAN: UN • UNMISS 14

FOREIGN FORCES United States US European Command: 1,100; 1 (USMC) MEU eqpt set; 1 (APS) 155mm SP Arty bn eqpt set

Poland POL Polish Zloty PLN GDP per capita

2020

2021

PLN

2.32tr

2.53tr

USD

596bn

655bn 17,319

USD

15,699

Growth

-2.7

5.1

Inflation

3.4

4.4

Def exp [a] Def bdgt [b]

PLN

53.0bn

51.8bn

USD

13.6bn

13.4bn

PLN

49.8bn

51.8bn

USD

12.8bn

13.4bn

3.90

3.86

USD1=PLN

2022

57.8bn

[a] NATO figure [b] Includes military pensions Real-terms defence budget trend (USDbn, constant 2015) 11.9

2008

Population

6.80 2021

2015

38,185,913

Age

0–14

15–19

20–24

25–29

30–64 65 plus

Male

7.6%

2.4%

2.6%

3.1%

24.9%

7.8%

Female

7.2%

2.2%

2.5%

3.0%

25.2%

11.6%

Capabilities Territorial defence and NATO membership are central pillars of Poland’s defence policy. The primary focus of the 2017–32 defence concept is to prepare the armed forces to deter Russian aggression. Russia is characterised as a direct threat to Poland and to a stable international order. The government continues to pursue a goal of permanently stationing US troops in the country. A bilateral defence cooperation agreement signed with the US in August 2020 provides for an increased enduring rotational presence of about 1,000 US personnel. The US Army’s V Corps Headquarters

(Forward) was established in Poznań at the end of 2020. Security and defence cooperation also takes place through the Visegrad Group. There are also defence ties through the Bucharest Nine, which brings together NATO’s eastern-flank countries. The 2017–32 defence concept defines an ambition to restore divisions as tactical combat units, rather than administrative units. Recruitment is under way for the Territorial Defence Force, which was launched in 2017 and is intended to reach an end-strength of 53,000 by 2026. Poland has some capacity to independently deploy forces beyond national borders. Defence-acquisition reform has been under way for some time and a central armaments agency is due to begin operating in 2022. Poland intends to build up its own anti-access/ area-denial capacity and in the 2017 Defence Concept expressed an interest in research into emerging technologies. A technicalmodernisation plan, covering the period 2021–35, was released in October 2019, which extended the planning horizon from ten to 15 years. Warsaw continues plans to strengthen its domestic defence-industrial base, much of which is now consolidated in the state-owned holding company PGZ, using technology transfers and international partnering. Beyond PGZ, several international defence primes have subsidiaries in Poland.

ACTIVE 114,050 (Army 58,500 Navy 6,000 Air Force 14,300 Special Forces 3,150 Territorial 3,800 Joint 28,300) Gendarmerie & Paramilitary 75,400

ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE Army 58,500 FORCES BY ROLE COMMAND elm 1 (MNC NE) corps HQ MANOEUVRE Reconnaissance 3 recce regt Armoured 1 (11th) armd cav div (2 armd bde, 1 mech bde, 1 arty regt) Mechanised 1 (12th) mech div (2 mech bde, 1 (coastal) mech bde, 1 arty regt) 1 (16th) mech div (1 armd bde, 2 mech bde, 1 arty regt, 1 AT regt) 1 (18th) mech div (1 armd bde, 2 mech bde, 1 log regt) Air Manoeuvre 1 (6th) AB bde (3 para bn) 1 (25th) air cav bde (2 air cav bn, 2 tpt hel bn, 1 (casevac) med unit) COMBAT SUPPORT 2 engr regt 2 ptn br regt 2 chem def regt COMBAT SUPPORT 2 log bde HELICOPTER 1 (1st) hel bde (2 atk hel sqn with Mi-24D/V Hind D/E, 1 CSAR sqn with Mi-24V Hind E; PZL W-3PL Gluszec; 2 ISR hel sqn with Mi-2URP; 2 hel sqn with Mi-2) AIR DEFENCE 3 AD regt

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES MBT 797: 126 Leopard 2A4 (being upgraded to 2PL); 105 Leopard 2A5; 16 Leopard 2PL (in test); 232 PT-91 Twardy; 318 T-72A/T-72M1/M1R RECCE 407: 282 BRDM-2; 38 BWR-1 (being upgraded); 87 BRDM-2 R5 IFV 1,611: 1,252 BMP-1; 359 Rosomak IFV APC 372 APC (T) 6 WDSz (OP) APC (W) 336: 300 Rosomak APC (incl variants); 36 AWD RAK (arty CP) PPV 30 Maxxpro AUV 85: 40 Cougar (on loan from US); 45 M-ATV ENGINEERING & MAINTENANCE VEHICLES AEV 94+: IWT; 65 MT-LB AEV; 21 Rosomak WRT; 8 MID Bizon ARV 122: 28 BPz-2; 68 MT-LB ARV; 26 WZT-3M VLB 119: 4 Biber; 103 BLG67M2; 12 MS-20 Daglezja MW 27: 17 Bozena 4; 6 ISM Kroton; 4 Kalina SUM ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE MSL • MANPATS 9K11 Malyutka (RS-AT-3 Sagger); 9K111 Fagot (RS-AT-4 Spigot); Spike-LR ARTILLERY 751 SP 410: 122mm 227 2S1 Gvozdika; 152mm 111 M-77 Dana; 155mm 72 Krab MRL 122mm 179: 75 BM-21; 29 RM-70; 75 WR-40 Langusta MOR 162: 120mm 80: 15 2B11; 65 M120; SP 120mm 82 SMK120 RAK HELICOPTERS ATK 28 Mi-24D/V Hind D/E MRH 64: 7 Mi-8MT Hip; 3 Mi-17 Hip H; 1 Mi-17AE Hip (aeromedical); 5 Mi-17-1V Hip; 16 PZL Mi-2URP Hoplite; 24 PZL W-3W/WA Sokol; 8 PZL W-3PL Gluszec (CSAR) TPT 37: Medium 12: 6 Mi-8T Hip; 2 PZL W-3AE Sokol (aeromedical); 4 S-70i Black Hawk; Light 25 PZL Mi-2 Hoplite AIR DEFENCE SAM 248+ Short-range 20 2K12 Kub (RS-SA-6 Gainful) Point-defence 228+: 64 9K33 Osa-AK (RS-SA-8 Gecko); 20 ZSU-23-4MP Biala; GROM; 75 ZUR-23-2KG Jodek-G; 6 Pilica; Piorun; 63 Poprad GUNS 270 SP 23mm 2 ZSU-23-4 TOWED 23mm 268 ZU-23-2

Navy 6,000 EQUIPMENT BY TYPE SUBMARINES • SSK 1 Orzeł (ex-FSU Kilo) with 6 single 533mm TT each with 53-65KE HWT/TEST-71ME PRINCIPAL SURFACE COMBATANTS • FRIGATES 2 FFH 2 Pułaski (ex-US Oliver Hazard Perry) (of which 1 used as training ship) with 2 triple 324mm SVTT Mk 32 ASTT with MU90 LWT, 1 Mk 15 Phalanx CIWS, 1 76mm gun (capacity 2 SH-2G Super Seasprite ASW hel) PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 5 CORVETTES • FSM 1 Kaszub with 2 quad lnchr with 9K32 Strela-2 (RS-SA-N-5 Grail) SAM, 2 twin 533mm

Europe

Europe 135

136 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2022 ASTT with SET-53 HWT, 2 RBU 6000 Smerch 2 A/S mor, 1 76mm gun PSO 1 Ślązak (MEKO A-100) with 1 76mm gun, 1 hel landing platform PCFGM 3 Orkan (ex-GDR Sassnitz) with 1 quad lnchr with RBS15 Mk3 AShM, 1 quad lnchr (manual aiming) with 9K32 Strela-2M (RS-SA-N-5 Grail) SAM, 1 AK630 CIWS, 1 76mm gun MINE WARFARE • MINE COUNTERMEASURES 20 MCCS 1 Kontradmiral Xawery Czernicki MCO 1 Kormoran II MHO 1 Krogulec MSI 17: 1 Gopło; 12 Gardno; 4 Mamry AMPHIBIOUS 8 LANDING SHIPS • LSM 5 Lublin (capacity 9 tanks; 135 troops) LANDING CRAFT • LCU 3 Deba (capacity 50 troops) LOGISTICS AND SUPPORT 26 AGI 2 Moma AGS 8: 2 Heweliusz; 4 Wildcat 40; 2 (coastal) AORL 1 Bałtyk AOL 1 Moskit ARS 4: 2 Piast; 2 Zbyszko ATF 8: 6 Bolko (B860); 2 H960 AX 1 Wodnik with 1 twin AK230 CIWS AXS 1 Iskra COASTAL DEFENCE • AShM 12 NSM

Naval Aviation 1,300 FORCES BY ROLE ANTI SUBMARINE WARFARE/SEARCH & RESCUE 1 sqn with Mi-14PL Haze A; Mi-14PL/R Haze C 1 sqn with PZL W-3RM Anakonda; SH-2G Super Seasprite MARITIME PATROL 1 sqn with An-28E/RM Bryza TRANSPORT 1 sqn with An-28TD; M-28B TD Bryza 1 sqn with An-28TD; M-28B; PZL Mi-2 Hoplite; PZL W-3T/A EQUIPMENT BY TYPE AIRCRAFT MP 10: 8 An-28RM Bryza; 2 An-28E Bryza TPT • Light 4: 2 An-28TD Bryza; 2 M-28B TD Bryza HELICOPTERS ASW 8: 6 Mi-14PL Haze; 2 SH-2G Super Seasprite SAR 8: 2 Mi-14PL/R Haze C; 4 PZL W-3RM Anakonda; 2 PZL W-3WA RM Anakonda TPT • Light 7: 4 PZL Mi-2 Hoplite; 1 PZL W-3A; 2 PZLW-3T

Air Force 14,300 FORCES BY ROLE FIGHTER 2 sqn with MiG-29A/UB Fulcrum FIGHTER/GROUND ATTACK 3 sqn with F-16C/D Block 52+ Fighting Falcon FIGHTER/GROUND ATTACK/ISR 2 sqn with Su-22M-4 Fitter

SEARCH AND RESCUE 1 sqn with Mi-2; PZL W-3 Sokol TRANSPORT 1 sqn with C-130E; M-28 Bryza 1 sqn with C295M; M-28 Bryza TRAINING 1 sqn with PZL-130 Orlik 1 sqn with M-346 1 hel sqn with SW-4 Puszczyk TRANSPORT HELICOPTER 1 (Spec Ops) sqn with Mi-17 Hip H 1 (VIP) sqn with Mi-8 Hip; W-3WA Sokol AIR DEFENCE 1 bde with S-125 Newa SC; S-200C Vega (RS-SA-5 Gammon) EQUIPMENT BY TYPE AIRCRAFT 94 combat capable FTR 28: 22 MiG-29A Fulcrum; 6 MiG-29UB Fulcrum FGA 66: 36 F-16C Block 52+ Fighting Falcon; 12 F-16D Block 52+ Fighting Falcon; 12 Su-22M4 Fitter; 6 Su22UM3K Fitter TPT 48: Medium 5 C-130E Hercules; Light 39: 16 C295M; 10 M-28 Bryza TD; 13 M-28 Bryza PT; PAX 4: 2 Gulfstream G550; 2 B-737-800 (VIP) TRG 40: 12 M-346; 28 PZL-130 Orlik HELICOPTERS MRH 8 Mi-17 Hip H TPT 65: Medium 29: 9 Mi-8 Hip; 10 PZL W-3 Sokol; 10 PZL W-3WA Sokol (VIP); Light 36: 14 PZL Mi-2 Hoplite; 22 SW-4 Puszczyk (trg) AIR DEFENCE • SAM 18 Long-range 1 S-200C Vega (RS-SA-5 Gammon) Short-range 17 S-125 Newa SC AIR-LAUNCHED MISSILES AAM • IR AIM-9 Sidewinder; R-60 (RS-AA-8 Aphid); R-73 (RS-AA-11A Archer); R-27T (RS-AA-10B Alamo); IIR AIM-9X Sidwinder II; ARH AIM-120C AMRAAM ASM AGM-65J/G Maverick; Kh-25 (RS-AS-10 Karen); Kh29 (RS-AS-14 Kedge) LACM Conventional AGM-158 JASSM

Special Forces 3,150 FORCES BY ROLE SPECIAL FORCES 3 SF units (GROM, FORMOZA & cdo) COMBAT SUPPORT/ 1 cbt spt unit (AGAT) COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT 1 spt unit (NIL)

Territorial Defence Forces 3,800 (plus 20,000 reservists) FORCES BY ROLE MANOEUVRE Other 15 sy bde 2 sy bde (forming)

Gendarmerie & Paramilitary 75,400 Border Guards 14,300 Ministry of Interior

Europe 137

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 18 PCC 2 Kaper PBF 6: 2 Strażnik; 4 IC16M PB 10: 2 Wisłoka; 2 Baltic 24; 1 Project MI-6 AMPHIBIOUS • LANDING CRAFT UCAC 2 Griffon 2000TDX

Prevention Units (Police) 61,100 Anti-terrorist Operations Bureau n.k.

Ministry of Interior

DEPLOYMENT BOSNIA-HERZEGOVINA: EU • EUFOR • Operation Althea 38 CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC: EU • EUTM RCA 1 DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO: UN • MONUSCO 2 IRAQ: Operation Inherent Resolve 150; NATO • NATO Mission Iraq 30 LATVIA: NATO • Enhanced Forward Presence 175; 1 tk coy LEBANON: UN • UNIFIL 192; 1 mech inf coy MIDDLE EAST: UN • UNTSO 3

Portugal PRT Euro EUR GDP

EUR

2020

2021

200bn

211bn

USD

228bn

252bn

USD

22,149

24,457

Growth

-8.4

4.4

Inflation

-0.1

1.2

EUR

2.90bn

3.26bn

USD

3.31bn

3.90bn

EUR

2.50bn

2.48bn

USD

2.85bn

2.96bn

0.88

0.84

per capita

Def exp [a] Def bdgt USD1=EUR

2022

Europe

Maritime Border Guard 2,000

2.45bn

[a] NATO figure Real-terms defence budget trend (USDbn, constant 2015) 2.84 2.30 2008

2015

Population

2021

10,263,850

Age

0–14

15–19

20–24

25–29

Male

6.8%

2.8%

2.9%

2.7%

30–64 65 plus 23.7%

8.5%

Female

6.5%

2.6%

2.7%

25.4%

12.8%

ROMANIA: NATO • MNB-SE 220; 1 mech inf coy; Rosomak

Capabilities

SERBIA: NATO • KFOR 230; 1 inf coy; UN • UNMIK 1

Principal tasks for Portugal’s all-volunteer armed forces are homeland defence, maritime security, multinational operations and responding to humanitarian disasters. The 2013 strategic review set out key defence tasks and envisaged a reduction in army strength and organisational changes to divide the services into immediate reaction forces, permanent defence forces and modular forces. Investment plans support Portugal’s ambition to field rapid-reaction and maritime-surveillance capabilities for territorial defence and multinational operations. A new military programme law for 2019–30 was approved by parliament, funding the acquisition of five KC-390 aircraft, six offshore-patrol vessels, a replenishment tanker and a multi-purpose logistics ship, as well as cyber-defence and soldier-combat systems. Portugal hosts NATO’s cyber-security academy and the country also contributes to EU military structures. There is a close relationship with former dependencies and with the US, which operates out of Lajes air base. All three services have programmes to modernise and sustain existing equipment platforms. There is an active defence industry, though principally in relation to shipbuilding, broader maintenance tasks and the manufacture of components, and small arms and light weapons.

SOUTH SUDAN: UN • UNMISS 1 UKRAINE: JMTG-U 40 WESTERN SAHARA: UN • MINURSO 1

FOREIGN FORCES All NATO Enhanced Forward Presence unless stated Croatia 80; 1 MRL bty with M91 Vulkan Germany MNC-NE corps HQ: 95 Romania 102; 1 SP ADA bty United Kingdom 140; 1 recce sqn United States: 691; 1 mech bn with M1296 Stryker Dragoon; M777A2 • Operation Atlantic Resolve 4,500; 1 corps HQ (fwd); 1 div HQ (fwd); 1 armd bde; M1A2 SEPv2 Abrams; M3A3 Bradley; M2A3 Bradley; M109A7; 1 CISR UAV sqn with MQ-9A Reaper

ACTIVE 27,250 (Army 13,700 Navy 7,650 Air 5,900) Gendarmerie & Paramilitary 24,700

RESERVE 211,700 (Army 210,000 Navy 1,000, Air Force 700)

Reserve obligation to age 35

ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE Army 13,700 5 territorial comd (2 mil region, 1 mil district, 2 mil zone)

138 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2022 FORCES BY ROLE SPECIAL FORCES 1 SF bn MANOEUVRE Mechanised 1 mech bde (1 recce sqn, 1 tk regt, 1 mech inf bn, 1 arty bn, 1 AD bty, 1 engr coy, 1 sigs coy, 1 spt bn) 1 (intervention) bde (1 recce regt, 2 mech inf bn, 1 arty bn, 1 AD bty, 1 engr coy, 1 sigs coy, 1 spt bn) Air Manoeuvre 1 (rapid reaction) bde (1 cdo bn, 1 ISR bn, 2 para bn, 1 arty bn, 1 AD bty, 1 engr coy, 1 sigs coy, 1 spt bn) Other 1 (Azores) inf gp (2 inf bn, 1 AD bty) 1 (Madeira) inf gp (1 inf bn, 1 AD bty) COMBAT SUPPORT 1 STA bty 1 engr bn (1 construction coy; 1 EOD unit; 1 ptn br coy; 1 CBRN coy) 1 EW coy 1 MP bn 1 psyops unit 1 CIMIC coy (joint) 1 sigs bn COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT 1 maint coy 1 log coy 1 tpt coy 1 med unit AIR DEFENCE 1 AD bn

Reserves 210,000 FORCES BY ROLE MANOEUVRE Light 3 (territorial) def bde (on mobilisation) EQUIPMENT BY TYPE ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES MBT 37 Leopard 2A6 RECCE 16 VBL IFV 30 Pandur II MK 30mm APC 406 APC (T) 239: 176 M113A1; 14 M113A2; 49 M577A2 (CP) APC (W) 167: 9 V-150 Commando; 12 V-200 Chaimite; 146 Pandur II (incl variants) ENGINEERING & MAINTENANCE VEHICLES AEV M728 ARV 13: 6 M88A1, 7 Pandur II ARV VLB M48 ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE MSL SP 26: 17 M113 with TOW; 4 M901 with TOW; 5 Pandur II with TOW MANPATS Milan; TOW RCL • 84mm Carl Gustaf; 106mm 45 M40A1 ARTILLERY 320 SP 155mm 24: 6 M109A2; 18 M109A5 TOWED 62: 105mm 39: 17 L119 Light Gun; 21 M101A1; 155mm 24 M114A1

MOR 234: 81mm 143; SP 81mm 12: 2 M125A1; 10 M125A2; 107mm 11 M30; SP 107mm 18: 3 M106A1; 15 M106A2; 120mm 50 Tampella AIR DEFENCE SAM • Point-defence 20+: 1 M48A2 Chaparral; 19 M48A3 Chaparral; FIM-92 Stinger GUNS • TOWED 20mm 20 Rh 202

Navy 7,600 (incl 950 Marines) EQUIPMENT BY TYPE SUBMARINES 2 SSK 2 Tridente (GER Type-214) (fitted with AIP) with 8 533mm TT with UGM-84L Harpoon Block II AShM/Black Shark HWT PRINCIPAL SURFACE COMBATANTS • FRIGATES 5 FFGHM 5: 1 Bartolomeu Dias (ex-NLD Karel Doorman) (MLU ongoing) with 2 quad lnchr with RGM-84C Harpoon Block 1B AShM, 1 16-cell Mk 48 mod 1 VLS with RIM-7M Sea Sparrow SAM, 2 twin 324mm SVTT Mk 32 ASTT with Mk 46 LWT, 1 Goalkeeper CIWS, 1 76mm gun (capacity 1 Lynx Mk95 (Super Lynx) hel) 1 Bartolomeu Dias (ex-NLD Karel Doorman) with 2 quad lnchr with RGM-84C Harpoon Block 1B AShM, 1 16cell Mk 48 mod 1 VLS with RIM-162 ESSM SAM, 2 twin 324mm SVTT Mk 32 ASTT with Mk 46 LWT, 1 Goalkeeper CIWS, 1 76mm gun (capacity 1 Lynx Mk95 (Super Lynx) hel) 3 Vasco Da Gama with 2 quad lnchr with RGM-84C Harpoon Block 1B AShM, 1 octuple Mk 29 GMLS with RIM-7M Sea Sparrow SAM, 2 triple 324mm SVTT Mk 32 ASTT with Mk 46 LWT, 1 Mk 15 Phalanx Block 1B CIWS, 1 100mm gun (capacity 2 Lynx Mk95 (Super Lynx) hel) PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 21 CORVETTES • FS 2: 1 Baptista de Andrade with 1 100mm gun, 1 hel landing platform 1 Joao Coutinho with 1 twin 76mm gun, 1 hel landing platform PSO 4 Viana do Castelo with 1 hel landing platform PCC 5: 1 Cacine; 4 Tejo (ex-DNK Flyvisken) PBR 10: 5 Argos; 4 Centauro; 1 Rio Minho LOGISTICS AND SUPPORT 10 AGS 4: 2 D Carlos I (ex-US Stalwart); 2 Andromeda AXS 6: 1 Sagres; 1 Creoula; 1 Polar; 2 Belatrix; 1 Zarco

Marines 950 FORCES BY ROLE SPECIAL FORCES 1 SF det MANOEUVRE Light 1 lt inf bn COMBAT SUPPORT 1 mor coy 1 MP coy

Europe 139

Naval Aviation EQUIPMENT BY TYPE HELICOPTERS • ASW 5: 4 Lynx Mk95 (Super Lynx); 1 Lynx Mk95A (Super Lynx)

Air Force 5,900 FORCES BY ROLE FIGHTER/GROUND ATTACK 2 sqn with F-16AM/BM Fighting Falcon MARITIME PATROL 1 sqn with P-3C Orion ISR/TRANSPORT 1 sqn with C295M COMBAT SEARCH & RESCUE 1 sqn with with AW101 Merlin TRANSPORT 1 sqn with C-130H/C-130H-30 Hercules 1 sqn with Falcon 50 TRAINING 1 sqn with AW119 Koala 1 sqn with TB-30 Epsilon EQUIPMENT BY TYPE AIRCRAFT 35 combat capable FTR 30: 26 F-16AM Fighting Falcon; 4 F-16BM Fighting Falcon ASW 5 P-3C Orion ISR: 7: 5 C295M (maritime surveillance), 2 C295M (photo recce) TPT 13: Medium 5: 2 C-130H Hercules; 3 C-130H-30 Hercules (tpt/SAR); Light 5 C295M; PAX 3 Falcon 50 (tpt/ VIP) TRG 16 TB-30 Epsilon HELICOPTERS TPT 17: Medium 12 AW101 Merlin (6 SAR, 4 CSAR, 2 fishery protection); Light 5 AW119 Koala AIR-LAUNCHED MISSILES AAM • IR AIM-9L/I Sidewinder; ARH AIM-120C AMRAAM ASM AGM-65A Maverick AShM AGM-84A Harpoon BOMBS Laser-guided/GPS GBU-49 Enhanced Paveway II INS/GPS guided GBU-31 JDAM

Gendarmerie & Paramilitary 24,700 National Republican Guard 24,700 EQUIPMENT BY TYPE PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 32 PBF 12 PB 20 HELICOPTERS • MRH 7 SA315 Lama

DEPLOYMENT CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC: EU • EUTM RCA 55; UN • MINUSCA 189; 1 AB coy IRAQ: Operation Inherent Resolve 30 LITHUANIA: NATO • Baltic Air Policing 150; 4 F-16AM Fighting Falcon MALI: Operation Barkhane 2; EU • EUTM Mali 11; UN • MINUSMA 67; 1 tpt flt with 1 C295M MOZAMBIQUE: EU • EUTM Mozambique 120 NORTH SEA: NATO • SNMG 1: 1 FFGHM SOMALIA: EU • EUTM Somalia 2

FOREIGN FORCES United States US European Command: 500; 1 ASW sqn with 5 P-8A Poseidon; 1 spt facility at Lajes

Romania ROM Romanian Leu RON GDP per capita

2020

2021

RON

1.06tr

1.18tr

USD

249bn

287bn

USD

12,868

14,864

Growth

-3.9

7.0

Inflation

2.6

4.3

Def exp [a]

RON

21.4bn

23.1bn

USD

5.05bn

5.61bn

Def bdgt [b]

RON

22.0bn

23.1bn

USD

5.18bn

5.61bn

USD

5.6m

4.24

4.12

FMA (US) USD1=RON

2022

24.3bn 0m

[a] NATO figure [b] Includes military pensions Real-terms defence budget trend (USDbn, constant 2015) 4.37 2.00 2008

Population

2015

2021

21,230,362

Age

0–14

15–19

20–24

25–29

30–64 65 plus

Male

7.2%

2.6%

2.7%

2.9%

26.0%

7.4%

Female

6.8%

2.4%

2.6%

2.7%

26.1%

10.7%

Capabilities Romania’s armed forces are structured around territorial defence, support to NATO and EU missions, and contributing to regional and global stability and security. According to the National Defence Strategy 2020–2024, principal security threats include Russia’s increased presence in the Black Sea, hybrid warfare, cyber attacks, terrorism and the economic impact of the coronavirus pandemic. The 2021 Military Strategy highlights the need to improve readiness and to focus on strike capability and manoeuvrability. The government has stated the intention to strengthen operational capabilities and improve cooperation with other NATO

Europe

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE MSL • MANPATS Milan; TOW RCL • 84mm Carl Gustaf ARTILLERY • MOR 30+: 81mm some; 120mm 30

140 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2022 and EU members. There is an ongoing programme to modernise and upgrade the armed forces to NATO standards. Bucharest has signed defence-cooperation agreements with regional allies. There is a strategic partnership with the US. Romania hosts the Aegis Ashore ballistic-missile-defence system at Deveselu. There is broad training with NATO and regional allies, and Romania contributes to EU and NATO missions. The inventory is mainly composed of Soviet-era equipment, which is seen as a factor limiting capability. Acquisition plans include armoured vehicles, air-defence radars, surface-to-air missiles (including an upgraded version of Patriot from 2022) and corvettes. The Naval Strike Missile will be procured for coastal defence from 2024, while Bucharest has received the first elements of the HIMARS system ordered in 2018. Romania has received second-hand F-16 fighters from Portugal and is considering the acquisition of up to 48 more from the US. The country’s defence industry has struggled since 1989. Current production focuses on small arms and ammunition. However, Bucharest is looking to boost the industry through offset agreements and technology transfers.

ACTIVE 71,500 (Army 35,500 Navy 6,800 Air 11,700 Joint 17,500) Gendarmerie & Paramilitary 57,000

RESERVE 55,000 (Joint 55,000)

ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE Army 35,500 Readiness is reported as 70–90% for NATO-designated forces (1 div HQ, 1 mech bde, 1 inf bde & 1 mtn inf bde) and 40–70% for other forces FORCES BY ROLE COMMAND 2 div HQ (2nd & 4th) elm 1 div HQ (MND-SE) SPECIAL FORCES 1 SF bde (2 SF bn, 1 para bn, 1 log bn) MANOEUVRE Reconnaissance 1 recce bde 2 recce regt Mechanised 5 mech bde (1 tk bn, 2 mech inf bn, 1 arty bn, 1 AD bn, 1 log bn) Light 1 (MNB-SE) inf bde (3 inf bn, 1 arty bn, 1 AD bn, 1 log bn) 2 mtn inf bde (3 mtn inf bn, 1 arty bn, 1 AD bn, 1 log bn) COMBAT SUPPORT 1 MRL bde (3 MRL bn, 1 STA bn, 1 log bn) 2 arty regt 1 engr bde (4 engr bn, 1 ptn br bn, 1 log bn) 2 engr bn 3 sigs bn 1 CIMIC bn 1 MP bn 3 CBRN bn COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT 3 spt bn AIR DEFENCE 3 AD regt

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES MBT 377: 220 T-55AM; 103 TR-85; 54 TR-85 M1 IFV 191: 41 MLI-84 (incl CP); 101 MLI-84M Jderul; 49 Piranha V APC 785 APC (T) 76 MLVM APC (W) 649: 69 B33 TAB Zimbru; 37 Piranha IIIC; 354 TAB-71 (incl variants); 153 TAB-77 (incl variants) PPV 60 Maxxpro AUV 480 TABC-79 (incl variants) ENGINEERING & MAINTENANCE VEHICLES ARV 55: 3 MLI-84M TEHEVAC; 8 TERA-71L; 44 TERA77L VLB 43 BLG-67 NBC VEHICLES 109 RCH-84 ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE MSL SP 158: 12 9P122 Malyutka (RS-AT-3 Sagger); 98 9P133 Malyutka (RS-AT-3 Sagger); 48 9P148 Konkurs (RS-AT-5 Spandrel) MANPATS Spike-LR GUNS SP 100mm (23 SU-100 in store) TOWED 100mm 218 M-1977 ARTILLERY 1,118 SP 122mm 40: 6 2S1 Gvodzika; 34 Model 89 TOWED 447: 122mm 96 (M-30) M-1938 (A-19); 152mm 351: 247 M-1981; 104 M-1985 MRL 188: 122mm 170: 134 APR-40; 36 LAROM; 227mm 18 M142 HIMARS MOR 443: SP 82mm 177: 92 TAB-71AR; 85 TABC-79AR; 120mm 266 M-1982 AIR DEFENCE SAM 96 Short-range 48: 32 2K12 Kub (RS-SA-6 Gainful); 16 9K33 Osa (RS-SA-8 Gecko) Point-defence 48 CA-95 GUNS 65+ SP 35mm 41 Gepard TOWED 24+: 14.5mm ZPU-2; 35mm 24 GDF-003; 57mm S-60

Navy 6,800 EQUIPMENT BY TYPE PRINCIPAL SURFACE COMBATANTS • FRIGATES 3 FFGH 1 Marasesti with 4 twin lnchr with P-22 (RS-SS-N2C Styx) AShM, 2 triple 533mm ASTT with 53–65 HWT, 2 RBU 6000 Smerch 2 A/S mor, 4 AK630M CIWS, 2 twin 76mm guns (capacity 2 SA-316 (IAR-316) Alouette III hel) FFH 2 Regele Ferdinand (ex-UK Type-22), with 2 triple STWS Mk.2 324mm TT, 1 76mm gun (capacity 1 SA330 (IAR-330) Puma) PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 24 CORVETTES 4 FSH 2 Tetal II with 2 twin 533mm ASTT with SET-53M HWT, 2 RBU 6000 Smerch 2 A/S mor, 2 AK630 CIWS, 1 76mm gun (capacity 1 SA316 (IAR-316) Alouette III hel)

FS 2 Tetal I with 2 twin 533mm ASTT with SET-53M HWT, 2 RBU 2500 Smerch 1 A/S mor, 2 AK230 CIWS, 2 twin 76mm guns PCFG 3 Zborul with 2 twin lnchr with P-22 (RS-SS-N-2C Styx) AShM, 2 AK630 CIWS, 1 76mm gun PCFT 3 Naluca with 4 single 533mm ASTT PCR 8: 5 Brutar II with 2 BM-21 MRL, 1 100mm gun; 3 Kogalniceanu with 2 BM-21 MRL, 2 100mm guns PBR 6 VD141 (ex-MSR now used for river patrol) MINE WARFARE 11 MINE COUNTERMEASURES 10 MSO 4 Musca with 2 RBU 1200 Uragan A/S mor, 2 AK230 CIWS MSR 6 VD141 MINELAYERS • ML 1 Corsar with up to 120 mines, 2 RBU 1200 Uragan A/S mor, 2 AK230 CIWS LOGISTICS AND SUPPORT 8 AE 2 Constanta with 2 RBU 1200 Uragan A/S mor, 2 AK230 CIWS, 2 twin 57mm guns AGOR 1 Corsar AGS 2: 1 Emil Racovita; 1 Catuneanu AOL 1 Tulcea ATF 1 Grozavu AXS 1 Mircea

Naval Infantry FORCES BY ROLE MANOEUVRE Light 1 naval inf regt EQUIPMENT BY TYPE ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES AUV 14: 11 ABC-79M; 3 TABC-79M

Air Force 11,700 FORCES BY ROLE FIGHTER 2 sqn with MiG-21 Lancer C FIGHTER/GROUND ATTACK 1 sqn with with F-16AM/BM Fighting Falcon GROUND ATTACK 1 sqn with IAR-99 Soim* TRANSPORT 1 sqn with An-30 Clank; C-27J Spartan 1 sqn with C-130B/H Hercules TRAINING 1 sqn with IAR-99 Soim* 1 sqn with SA316B Alouette III (IAR-316B); Yak-52 (Iak52) TRANSPORT HELICOPTER 2 (multi-role) sqn with IAR-330 SOCAT Puma 2 sqn with SA330L/M Puma (IAR-330L/M) AIR DEFENCE 1 AD bde COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT 1 engr spt regt EQUIPMENT BY TYPE AIRCRAFT 59 combat capable FTR 16: 13 F-16AM Fighting Falcon; 3 F-16BM Fighting Falcon

FGA 23: 6 MiG-21 Lancer B; 17 MiG-21 Lancer C ISR 2 An-30 Clank TPT • Medium 12: 7 C-27J Spartan; 4 C-130B Hercules; 1 C-130H Hercules TRG 32: 10 IAR-99*; 10 IAR-99C Soim*; 12 Yak-52 (Iak-52) HELICOPTERS MRH 30: 22 IAR-330 SOCAT Puma; 8 SA316B Alouette III (IAR-316B) TPT • Medium 24: 12 SA330L Puma (IAR-330L); 12 SA330M Puma (IAR-330M) AIR DEFENCE • SAM 17 Long-range 4 MIM-104E/F Patriot PAC-2 GEM-T/PAC-3 MSE Medium-range 13: 5 S-75M3 Volkhov (RS-SA-2 Guideline); 8 MIM-23 Hawk PIP III AIR-LAUNCHED MISSILES AAM • IR AIM-9M Sidewinder; R-73 (RS-AA-11A Archer); R-550 Magic 2; Python 3 IIR AIM-9X Sidewinder II; ARH AIM-120C AMRAAM ASM Spike-ER BOMBS Laser-guided GBU-12 Paveway; GBU-54 Laser JDAM INS/GPS guided GBU-38 JDAM

Gendarmerie & Paramilitary ε57,000 Gendarmerie ε57,000 Ministry of Interior

DEPLOYMENT BOSNIA-HERZEGOVINA: EU • EUFOR • Operation Althea 40 CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC: EU • EUTM RCA 13 DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO: UN • MONUSCO 6 INDIA/PAKISTAN: UN • UNMOGIP 1 IRAQ: Operation Inherent Resolve 1; NATO • NATO Mission Iraq 4 MALI: EU • EUTM Mali 1; UN • MINUSMA 5 MEDITERRANEAN: EU • EU NAVFOR MED • Operation Irini 1 ML POLAND: NATO • Enhanced Forward Presence 102; 1 SP ADA bty with Gepard SERBIA: NATO • KFOR 63; UN • UNMIK 1 SOMALIA: EU • EUTM Somalia 1 SOUTH SUDAN: UN • UNMISS 6

FOREIGN FORCES Canada NATO Air Policing: 135; 6 F/A-18A Hornet (CF-18) Poland NATO MNB-SE 220; 1 mech inf coy; Rosomak United States US European Command: 120; 1 Aegis Ashore BMD unit with 3 8-cell Mk 41 VLS with SM-3

Europe

Europe 141

142 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2022

Serbia SER Serbian Dinar RSD

2020

2021

RSD

5.46tr

5.99tr

USD

53.0bn

60.7bn

USD

7,646

8,794

Growth

-1.0

6.5

Inflation

1.6

3.0

Def bdgt

RSD

92.4bn

103bn

896m

1.04bn

103.16

98.67

GDP per capita

USD USD1=RSD

2022

Real-terms defence budget trend (USDm, constant 2015) 829 507 2008

Population

2015

2021

6,974,289

Age

0–14

15–19

20–24

25–29

Male

7.2%

2.8%

3.2%

30–64 65 plus 24.3%

8.5%

Female

6.8%

2.6%

3.0%

24.4%

11.8%

Capabilities Serbia’s armed forces focus on territorial defence, internal security and limited support to peacekeeping missions. According to the 2019 national-security strategy, key threats include separatism, ethnic and religious extremism, climate change and further international recognition of Kosovo. The armed forces are modernising to address long-term capability shortfalls and personnel shortages. Priorities include procurements; improving availability, maintenance and readiness levels; and bolstering air-defence systems. Serbia has agreed to deepen cooperation with NATO through an Individual Partnership Action Plan. Belgrade aspires to join the EU but not NATO. Serbia also maintains a close relationship with Russia, from which it has received transfers of military equipment in recent years. The armed forces have reduced in size over the last decade, though annual recruitment goals are not met. The armed forces also lack skilled technicians to operate and maintain advanced systems and suffer from a shortage of pilots. However, a number of items of new equipment were on display in its Lightning Strike 2021 exercise, including new or improved versions of various armoured vehicles. Serbia mostly trains with its Balkan neighbours, Russia and NATO countries. It contributes to EU, OSCE and UN peacekeeping missions. Serbia’s defence industry focuses on missile and artillery systems, and small arms and ammunition, but the country is reliant on external suppliers for major platforms. Serbia continues to develop its defence industry, with a focus on the aerospace industry.

ACTIVE 28,150 (Army 13,250 Air Force and Air

Defence 5,100 Training Command 3,000 Guards 1,600 Other MoD 5,200) Gendarmerie & Paramilitary 3,700

Conscript liability 6 months (voluntary)

RESERVE 50,150

ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE Army 13,250

FORCES BY ROLE SPECIAL FORCES 1 SF bde (1 CT bn, 1 cdo bn, 1 para bn) MANOEUVRE Mechanised 1 (1st) bde (1 tk bn, 2 mech inf bn, 1 inf bn, 1 SP arty bn, 1 MRL bn, 1 AD bn, 1 engr bn, 1 log bn) 3 (2nd, 3rd & 4th) bde (1 tk bn, 2 mech inf bn, 2 inf bn, 1 SP arty bn, 1 MRL bn, 1 AD bn, 1 engr bn, 1 log bn) COMBAT SUPPORT 1 (mixed) arty bde (4 arty bn, 1 MRL bn, 1 spt bn) 2 ptn bridging bn 1 NBC bn 1 sigs bn 2 MP bn

Reserve Organisations FORCES BY ROLE MANOEUVRE Light 8 (territorial) inf bde EQUIPMENT BY TYPE ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES MBT 229: 199 M-84; 30 T-72MS RECCE 76: 46 BRDM-2; 30 BRDM-2M IFV 335: 320 M-80; 3 M80AB1; 12 Lazar-3 IFV APC 95 APC(T) 44: 12 BTR-50 (CP); 32 MT-LB (CP) APC (W) 51: 39 BOV-VP M-86; 12 Lazar-3 APC AUV 25 BOV M16 Milos ENGINEERING & MAINTENANCE VEHICLES AEV IWT ARV M84A1; T-54/T-55 VLB MT-55; TMM ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE MSL SP 48 BOV-1 (M-83) with 9K11 Malyutka (RS-AT-3 Sagger) MANPATS 9K11 Malyutka (RS-AT-3 Sagger); 9K111 Fagot (RS-AT-4 Spigot) RCL 90mm M-79 ARTILLERY 449 SP 73+: 122mm 67 2S1 Gvozdika; 155mm 6+ B-52 NORA TOWED 132: 122mm 78 D-30; 130mm 18 M-46; 152mm 36 M-84 NORA-A MRL 81: 128mm 78: 18 M-63 Plamen; 60 M-77 Organj; 262mm 3 M-87 Orkan MOR 163: 82mm 106 M-69; 120mm 57 M-74/M-75 AIR DEFENCE SAM 94+ Short-range 77 2K12 Kub (RS-SA-6 Gainful); Point-defence 17+: 12 9K31M Strela-1M (RS-SA-9 Gaskin); 5 9K35M Strela-10M; 9K32M Strela-2M (RSSA-7B Grail)‡; Šilo (RS-SA-16 Gimlet) GUNS SP 40mm 8+ Pasars-16 TOWED 40mm 36 Bofors L/70 UNINHABITED AERIAL VEHICLES CISR • Medium 6 CH-92A AIR-LAUNCHED MISSILES ASM FT-8C

River Flotilla The Serbian–Montenegrin navy was transferred to Montenegro upon independence in 2006, but the Danube flotilla remained in Serbian control. The flotilla is subordinate to the Land Forces EQUIPMENT BY TYPE PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 5 PBR 5: 3 Type-20; 2 Jadar MINE WARFARE • MINE COUNTERMEASURES 4 MSI 4 Nestin with 1 quad lnchr with 9K32 Strela-2M (RS-SA-N-5 Grail) SAM AMPHIBIOUS • LANDING CRAFT LCVP 4 Type-22 (1 more non-operational) LOGISTICS AND SUPPORT 3 AG 1 Šabac (deguassing vessel also used for patrol and troop transport) (capacity 80 troops) AGF 1 Kozara AOL 1

Air Force and Air Defence 5,100 FORCES BY ROLE FIGHTER 1 sqn with MiG-29 Fulcrum; MiG-29UB Fulcrum B; MiG29SE Fulcrum C FIGHTER/GROUND ATTACK 1 sqn with IJ-22 Orao 1*; J-22 Orao 1 TRANSPORT 1 sqn with An-2; An-26; Yak-40 (Jak-40); 1 PA-34 Seneca V TRAINING 1 sqn with G-4 Super Galeb* (adv trg/light atk); SA341/342 Gazelle; Lasta 95; Utva-75 (basic trg) ATTACK HELICOPTER 1 sqn with SA341H/342L Gazelle; (HN-42/45); Mi-24 Hind; Mi-35M Hind TRANSPORT HELICOPTER 2 sqn with H145M; Mi-8 Hip; Mi-17 Hip H; Mi-17V-5 Hip AIR DEFENCE 1 bde (5 bn (2 msl, 3 SP msl) with S-125M Neva-M (RSSA-3 Goa); 2K12 Kub (RS-SA-6 Gainful); 9K32 Strela-2 (RS-SA-7 Grail); 9K310 Igla-1 (RS-SA-16 Gimlet)) 2 radar bn (for early warning and reporting) COMBAT SUPPORT 1 sigs bn COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT 1 maint bn EQUIPMENT BY TYPE AIRCRAFT 60 combat capable FTR 14: 3 MiG-29 Fulcrum; 3 MiG-29UB Fulcrum B; 8 MiG-29SE Fulcrum C FGA 17 J-22 Orao 1 ISR 10 IJ-22R Orao 1* TPT • Light 8: 1 An-2 Colt; 4 An-26 Curl; 2 Yak-40 (Jak40); 1 PA-34 Seneca V TRG 44: 19 G-4 Super Galeb*; 11 Utva-75; 14 Lasta 95 HELICOPTERS ATK 6: 2 Mi-24 Hind†; 4 Mi-35M Hind MRH 52: 5 H145M; 1 Mi-17 Hip H; 5 Mi-17V-5 Hip; 2 SA341H Gazelle (HI-42); 26 SA341H Gazelle (HN-42)/

SA342L Gazelle (HN-45); 13 SA341H Gazelle (HO-42)/ SA342L1 Gazelle (HO-45) TPT • Medium 8 Mi-8T Hip (HT-40) AIR DEFENCE SAM 21+ Short-range 21: 6 S-125M Neva-M (RS-SA-3 Goa); 9 2K12 Kub (RS-SA-6 Gainful); 6 96K6 Pantsir-S1 (RSSA-22 Greyhound) Point-defence 9K32 Strela-2 (RS-SA-7 Grail)‡; 9K310 Igla-1 (RS-SA-16 Gimlet) GUNS • TOWED 40mm 24 Bofors L/70 AIR-LAUNCHED MISSILES AAM • IR R-60 (RS-AA-8 Aphid) ASM AGM-65 Maverick; A-77 Thunder

Guards 1,600 FORCES BY ROLE MANOEUVRE Other 1 (ceremonial) gd bde (1 gd bn, 1 MP bn, 1 spt bn)

Gendarmerie & Paramilitary 3,700 Gendarmerie 3,700 EQUIPMENT BY TYPE ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES APC • APC (W) 18: 6 Lazar-3; 12 BOV-VP M-86 AUV BOV M16 Milos

DEPLOYMENT CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC: EU • EUTM RCA 7; UN • MINUSCA 76; 1 med coy CYPRUS: UN • UNFICYP 8 DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO: UN • MONUSCO 1 LEBANON: UN • UNIFIL 177; 1 mech inf coy MALI: EU • EUTM Mali 3 MIDDLE EAST: UN • UNTSO 1 SOMALIA: EU • EUTM Somalia 6

TERRITORY WHERE THE GOVERNMENT DOES NOT EXERCISE EFFECTIVE CONTROL In February 2008, Kosovo declared itself independent. Serbia remains opposed to this, and while Kosovo has not been admitted to the United Nations, a number of states have recognised Kosovo’s self-declared status.

Kosovo Security Force 2,500; reserves 800

The Kosovo Security Force (KSF) was formed in January 2009 as a non-military organisation with responsibility for crisis response, civil protection and EOD. The new president has reaffirmed the ambition to develop a regular army following NATO standards and to join the Alliance, although NATO members are divided on this and the Alliance is formally against such a development. The KSF has been upgrading its capabilities to some extent, includ-

Europe

Europe 143

144 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2022 ing the acquisition of light armoured security vehicles from the United States starting in 2021. NATO has said that should the KSF’s mandate evolve, it would have to examine its level of engagement with the force. The KSF is armed with small arms and light vehicles only. The NATO peacesupport mission, KFOR, continues to maintain a presence in Kosovo. In March 2021 Kosovo deployed a platoon to Kuwait, where it will reportedly be under the command of the US Iowa National Guard. Data here represents the de facto situation in Kosovo. This does not imply international recognition as a sovereign state.

FOREIGN FORCES All under Kosovo Force (KFOR) command unless otherwise specified Albania 29 Armenia 40 Austria 338; 1 recce coy; 1 mech inf coy; 1 log coy • UNMIK 1 obs Bulgaria 26 Canada 5 Croatia 142; 1 inf coy; 1 hel flt with Mi-8 Czech Republic 9 • UNMIK 2 obs Denmark 35 Finland 20 Germany 70 Greece 114; 1 inf coy Hungary 472; 1 inf coy (KTM) Ireland 13 Italy 638; 1 arty regt BG HQ; 1 Carabinieri unit Latvia 133; 1 inf coy Lithuania 1 Moldova 41 • UNMIK 1 obs Montenegro 2 Poland 230; 1 inf coy • UNMIK 1 obs Romania 63 • UNMIK 1 obs Slovenia 219; 1 mot inf coy; 1 MP unit; 1 hel unit Sweden 2 Switzerland 165; 1 inf coy; 1 engr pl; 1 hel flt with AS332 Turkey 321; 1 inf coy • UNMIK 1 obs Ukraine 40 • UNMIK 2 obs United Kingdom 35 United States 660; elm 1 ARNG inf bde HQ; 1 ARNG recce bn; 1 hel flt with UH-60

Slovakia SVK Euro EUR

2020

2021

91.6bn

97.8bn

GDP

EUR USD

104bn

117bn

per capita

USD

19,145

21,383

Growth

-4.8

4.4

Inflation

2.0

2.4

Def exp [a] Def bdgt

EUR

1.80bn

1.68bn

USD

2.05bn

2.00bn

EUR

1.62bn

1.68bn

USD

1.85bn

2.01bn

0.88

0.84

USD1=EUR

2022

1.86bn

[a] NATO figure Real-terms defence budget trend (USDm, constant 2015) 1761 748 2008

Population

2015

2021

5,436,066

Age

0–14

15–19

20–24

25–29

Male

7.7%

2.5%

2.6%

3.2%

30–64 65 plus 25.5%

7.0%

Female

7.3%

2.3%

2.5%

3.0%

25.7%

10.6%

Capabilities Slovakia is trying to modernise its armed forces and replace obsolete equipment while contributing to international crisismanagement missions. A defence white paper in September 2016 set out security priorities and a plan to increase defence capabilities. In 2017, the government approved a new defence strategy, a military strategy and a Long-Term Defence Development Plan. Work on a new security strategy and a new defence strategy began in July 2020 and was due to be completed by the end of the year. A NATO and EU member state, Slovakia cooperates closely with the Visegrád Group framework. Bratislava has signed an agreement to enable air policing and closer integration of air-defence capabilities. After amending the law on conscription in 2017, Slovakia began to implement its Active Reserves pilot project in order to help address shortfalls in specialist capacities, including in engineering. Results of the pilot project fell short of expectations, and Slovakia passed legislation in early 2018 to improve the training conditions for active reservists from mid-2018 onwards. Slovakia has committed to deploying a company-sized unit to NATO’s Enhanced Forward Presence, serving with the Canadian-led battlegroup in Latvia, and has also contributed to EU operations and UN peacekeeping missions. Bratislava has begun to replace its small fighter and rotary-wing-transport fleets. Coinciding with the July 2018 NATO summit, the government announced it had selected the F-16, with delivery due between 2022 and 2024. There are also ambitions to replace land equipment and improve the level of technology in the armed forces. Part of Slovakia’s defence-industrial base is organised within the state-controlled holding company DMD Group, including KONSTRUKTA Defence, which produces land systems. Other companies focus on maintenance, repair and overhaul services.

ACTIVE 17,950 (Army 10,300 Air 4,000 Central Staff 3,650)

ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE Central Staff 3,650 FORCES BY ROLE SPECIAL FORCES 1 (5th) spec ops bn

Army 10,300 FORCES BY ROLE MANOEUVRE Armoured 1 (2nd) armd bde (1 recce bn, 1 tk bn, 2 armd inf bn, 1 mixed SP arty bn) Mechanised 1 (1st) mech bde (3 armd inf bn, 1 MRL bn, 1 engr bn, 1 NBC bn) COMBAT SUPPORT 1 MP bn COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT 1 spt bde (2 log bn, 1 maint bn, 1 spt bn) EQUIPMENT BY TYPE ARMOURED FIGHITING VEHICLES MBT 30 T-72M RECCE 18 BPsVI IFV 256: 148 BMP-1; 91 BMP-2; 17 BVP-M APC 101+ APC (T) 72 OT-90 APC (W) 22: 7 OT-64; 15 Tatrapan (6×6) PPV 7+ RG-32M AUV IVECO LMV ENGINEERING & MAINTENANCE VEHICLES ARV MT-55; VT-55A; VT-72B; WPT-TOPAS VLB AM-50; MT-55A MW Bozena; UOS-155 Belarty ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE SP 9S428 with Malyutka (RS-AT-3 Sagger) on BMP-1; 9P135 Fagot (RS-AT-4 Spigot) on BMP-2; 9P148 Konkurs (RS-AT-5 Spandrel) on BRDM-2 MANPATS 9K11 Malyutka (RS-AT-3 Sagger); 9K111-1 Konkurs (RS-AT-5 Spandrel) RCL 84mm Carl Gustaf ARTILLERY 57 SP 27: 152mm 3 M-77 Dana; 155mm 24: 16 M-2000 Zuzana; 8 Zuzana-2 MRL 30: 122mm 4 RM-70; 122/227mm 26 RM-70/85 MODULAR AIR DEFENCE SAM • Point-defence 9K310 Igla-1 (RS-SA-16 Gimlet)

Air Force 4,000 FORCES BY ROLE FIGHTER 1 sqn with MiG-29AS/UBS Fulcrum TRANSPORT 1 flt with C-27J Spartan 1 flt with L-410FG/T Turbolet TRANSPORT HELICOPTER 1 sqn with Mi-17 Hip H 1 sqn with UH-60M Black Hawk

TRAINING 1 sqn with L-39CM/ZAM Albatros* AIR DEFENCE 1 bde with 2K12 Kub (RS-SA-6 Gainful); S-300PMU (RSSA-10 Grumble) EQUIPMENT BY TYPE AIRCRAFT 19 combat capable FTR 11: 9 MiG-29AS Fulcrum; 2 MiG-29UBS Fulcrum; TPT 5: Medium 2 C-27J Spartan; Light 3: 1 L-410FG Turbolet; 2 L-410T Turbolet; (4 L-410UVP Turbolet in store) TRG 8: 6 L-39CM Albatros*; 2 L-39ZAM Albatros* (1 more in store) HELICOPTERS ATK (15: 5 Mi-24D Hind D; 10 Mi-24V Hind E all in store) MRH 13 Mi-17 Hip H (incl 4 SAR) TPT • Medium 9 UH-60M Black Hawk AIR DEFENCE • SAM Long-range S-300PMU (RS-SA-10 Grumble) Short-range 2K12 Kub (RS-SA-6 Gainful) AIR-LAUNCHED MISSILES AAM • IR R-60 (RS-AA-8 Aphid); R-73 (RS-AA-11A Archer); SARH R-27R (RS-AA-10A Alamo)

DEPLOYMENT BOSNIA-HERZEGOVINA: EU • EUFOR • Operation Althea 40 CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC: EU • EUTM RCA 2 CYPRUS: UN • UNFICYP 289; 2 inf coy; 1 engr pl IRAQ: NATO • NATO Mission Iraq 5 LATVIA: NATO • Enhanced Forward Presence 97; 1 arty bty with M-2000 Zuzana MALI: EU • EUTM Mali 4 MIDDLE EAST: UN • UNTSO 3

Europe

Europe 145

146 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2022

Slovenia SVN Euro EUR GDP per capita

ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE 2020

2021

EUR

46.9bn

51.0bn

USD

53.5bn

60.9bn 28,939

USD

25,549

Growth

-4.2

6.3

Inflation

-0.1

1.4

Def exp [a] Def bdgt [b]

EUR

498m

624m

USD

568m

745m

EUR

530m

561m

USD

605m

670m

0.88

0.84

USD1=EUR

2022

Army 6,950

688m

FORCES BY ROLE Regt are bn sized SPECIAL FORCES 1 SF unit (1 spec ops coy, 1 CSS coy) MANOEUVRE Mechanised 1 (1st) mech inf bde (1 mech inf regt, 1 mtn inf regt, 1 cbt spt bn (1 ISR coy, 1 arty bty, 1 engr coy, 1 MP coy, 1 CBRN coy, 1 sigs coy, 1 SAM bty)) 1 (72nd) mech inf bde (2 mech inf regt, 1 cbt spt bn (1 ISR coy, 1 arty bty, 1 engr coy, 1 MP coy, 1 CBRN coy, 1 sigs coy, 1 SAM bty)) COMBAT SUPPORT 1 EW coy COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT 1 log bde (1 log regt, 1 maint regt (1 tk coy), 1 med regt)

[a] NATO figure [b] Includes military pensions Real-terms defence budget trend (USDm, constant 2015) 677 396 2008

Population

2015

2021

2,102,106

Age

0–14

15–19

20–24

25–29

Male

7.6%

2.3%

2.4%

2.6%

30–64 65 plus 25.6%

9.4%

Female

7.2%

2.2%

2.4%

23.8%

12.3%

Capabilities Since joining NATO and the EU in 2004, territorial defence and the ability to take part in peace-support operations have been central to Slovenia’s defence strategy. In January 2020, the defence ministry published a white paper that built on the Strategic Defence Review (SDR) of 2016 and the 2019 national-security strategy and acknowledged a deteriorating security environment in Europe. The white paper described mechanised battalion-sized battle groups as the core of Slovenia’s future combat capabilities, with the goal of forming the first of these by 2027 and a second by 2030. The 2016 SDR had already defined the formation and equipping of two battalion-sized battlegroups by 2023 as its main goal. By 2035, active forces and the contract reserve are to grow to 8,000 and 2,000 personnel respectively. The white paper indicated that a higher level of defence expenditure would be required to meet modernisation goals. Procurement priorities were defined as wheeled armoured vehicles, self-propelled artillery, short- and medium-range air defence, and helicopters. In January 2021, Slovenia announced that it would procure up to two C-27J Spartan transport aircraft. Slovenia acts as the framework nation for the NATO Mountain Warfare Centre of Excellence. Because its small air wing is not equipped to provide air policing, Italy and Hungary currently provide this capability under NATO arrangements. The country contributes to EU, NATO and UN operations and exercises with other member states. Recruitment and retention continue to be a challenge. Slovenia participates in NATO’s Enhanced Forward Presence, where it contributes to the Canadian-led battlegroup in Latvia. Its defence industry relies heavily on exports for its revenue and focuses on personal equipment, small arms and ammunition, and CBRN protection and detection.

ACTIVE 6,950 (Army 6,950) RESERVE 1,200 (Army 1,200)

Reserves FORCES BY ROLE MANOEUVRE Mountain 2 inf regt (territorial – 1 allocated to each inf bde) EQUIPMENT BY TYPE ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES MBT 14 M-84 (trg role) (32 more in store) APC 115+: APC (W) 115: 85 Pandur 6×6 (Valuk); 30 Patria 8×8 (Svarun) PPV Cougar 6×6 JERRV AUV 24 JLTV ENGINEERING & MAINTENANCE VEHICLES ARV VT-55A VLB MT-55A NBC VEHICLES 10 Cobra CBRN ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE MSL • MANPATS Spike MR/LR ARTILLERY 68 TOWED • 155mm 18 TN-90 MOR 50+: 82mm M-69; 120mm 50 MN-9/M-74 AIR DEFENCE • SAM • Point-defence 9K338 Igla-S (RSSA-24 Grinch)

Army Maritime Element 130 FORCES BY ROLE SPECIAL FORCES 1 SF unit EQUIPMENT BY TYPE PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 2 PCC 1 Triglav III (RUS Svetlyak) PBF 1 Super Dvora MkII

Air Element 590 FORCES BY ROLE TRANSPORT 1 sqn with Falcon 2000EX; L-410 Turbolet; PC-6B Turbo Porter

Europe 147

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE AIRCRAFT 9 combat capable TPT 4: Light 3: 1 L-410 Turbolet; 2 PC-6B Turbo Porter PAX 1 Falcon 2000EX TRG 19: 9 PC-9M*; 2 Z-143L; 8 Z-242L HELICOPTERS MRH 8: 5 Bell 412EP Twin Huey; 2 Bell 412HP Twin Huey; 1 Bell 412SP Twin Huey (some armed) TPT 8: Medium 4 AS532AL Cougar; Light 4 Bell 206 Jet Ranger (AB-206)

DEPLOYMENT

The 2017 National Security Strategy indicated that Spain’s defence policy was global in scope, though concerned with threats emanating from the Middle East and sub-Saharan Africa. The army reviewed its force structure in 2015, which resulted in a reorganisation into multipurpose brigades with heavy, medium and light capabilities, optimised for deployable operations. Spain is a member of NATO, continues to support NATO, EU and UN operations abroad, and hosts one of NATO’s two Combined Air Operations Centres. The armed forces are well trained and there is a routine exercise programme for both domestic and multinational exercises. The country’s equipment and logistic-support capability appears to be sufficient to meet its national commitments and contribution to NATO operations and exercises. In early 2018, Spain launched an equipment-modernisation plan, with funding for the modernisation of army Chinook helicopters, for the S-80 submarine programme and for military-communications satellites. Spain’s defence industry manufactures across all domains and exports globally. Navantia is the principal, state-owned, shipbuilding firm. The industry is largely integrated within the European defence-industrial manufacturing base.

IRAQ: Operation Inherent Resolve 6

ACTIVE 122,850 (Army 71,300 Navy 20,350 Air 19,750 Joint 11,450) Gendarmerie & Paramilitary 75,800

LATVIA: NATO • Enhanced Forward Presence 40; 1 engr pl

Other 600)

BOSNIA-HERZEGOVINA: EU • EUFOR • Operation Althea 10

MALI: EU • EUTM Mali 8

RESERVE 14,900 (Army 8,800 Navy 3,150 Air 2,350

MIDDLE EAST: UN • UNTSO 2

ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE

SERBIA: NATO • KFOR 219; 1 mot inf coy; 1 MP unit; 1 hel unit

Space

Spain ESP

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE SATELLITES 3 COMMUNICATIONS 2: 1 Spainsat; 1 Xtar-Eur ISR 1 Paz

Euro EUR GDP per capita

2020

2021

EUR

1.12tr

1.21tr

USD

1.28tr

1.44tr

USD

27,179

30,537

Growth

-10.8

5.7

Inflation

-0.3

2.2

Def exp [a] Def bdgt [b]

EUR

11.2bn

12.2bn

USD

12.8bn

14.6bn

EUR

11.2bn

11.5bn

USD

12.7bn

13.8bn

0.88

0.84

USD1=EUR

2022

Army 71,300 The Land Forces High Readiness HQ Spain provides one NATO Rapid Deployment Corps HQ (NRDC-ESP)

[a] NATO figure [b] Includes military pensions Real-terms defence budget trend (USDbn, constant 2015) 14.3

2008

Population

10.0 2021

2015

47,260,584

Age

0–14

15–19

20–24

25–29

Male

7.5%

2.6%

2.4%

2.5%

30–64 65 plus 25.9%

8.4%

Female

7.1%

2.5%

2.3%

25.3%

11.1%

FORCES BY ROLE COMMAND 1 corps HQ (CGTAD/NRDC-ESP) (1 int regt, 1 MP bn) 2 div HQ SPECIAL FORCES 1 comd (3 spec ops bn, 1 int coy, 1 sigs coy, 1 log bn) MANOEUVRE Reconnaissance 1 armd cav regt (2 armd recce bn) Mechanised 2 (10th & 11th) mech bde (1 armd regt (1 armd recce bn, 1 tk bn), 1 mech inf regt (1 armd inf bn, 1 mech inf bn), 1 lt inf bn, 1 SP arty bn, 1 AT coy, 1 AD coy, 1 engr bn, 1 int coy, 1 NBC coy, 1 sigs coy, 1 log bn) 1 (12th) mech bde (1 armd regt (1 armd recce bn, 1 tk bn), 1 mech inf regt (1 armd inf bn, 1 mech inf bn), 1 mtn inf bn, 1 SP arty bn, 1 AT coy, 1 AD coy, 1 engr bn, 1 int coy, 1 NBC coy, 1 sigs coy, 1 log bn) 1 (1st) mech bde (1 armd regt (1 armd recce bn, 1 tk bn), 1 mech inf regt (1 armd inf bn, 1 mtn inf bn), 1 mtn inf

Europe

Capabilities

TRAINING 1 unit with Bell 206 Jet Ranger (AB-206); PC-9M*; Z-143L; Z-242L TRANSPORT HELICOPTER 1 sqn with AS532AL Cougar; Bell 412 Twin Huey COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT 1 maint sqn

148 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2022 bn, 1 SP arty bn, 1 AT coy, 1 AD coy, 1 engr bn, 1 int coy, 1 NBC coy, 1 sigs coy, 1 log bn) 2 (2nd/La Legion & 7th) lt mech bde (1 armd recce bn, 1 mech inf regt (2 mech inf bn), 1 lt inf bn, 1 fd arty bn, 1 AT coy, 1 AD coy, 1 engr bn, 1 int coy, 1 NBC coy, 1 sigs coy, 1 log bn) Air Manoeuvre 1 (6th) bde (1 recce bn, 2 para bn, 1 lt inf bn, 1 fd arty bn, 1 AT coy, 1 AD coy, 1 engr bn, 1 int coy, 1 NBC coy, 1 sigs coy, 1 log bn) Other 1 (Canary Islands) comd (1 lt inf bde (2 mech inf regt (1 mech inf bn), 1 lt inf regt (1 lt inf bn), 1 fd arty regt, 1 AT coy, 1 engr bn, 1 int coy, 1 NBC coy, 1 sigs coy, 1 log bn); 1 spt hel bn; 1 AD regt) 1 (Balearic Islands) comd (1 inf regt) 2 (Ceuta and Melilla) comd (1 recce regt, 1 mech inf bn, 1 inf bn, 1 arty regt, 1 engr bn, 1 sigs coy, 1 log bn) COMBAT SUPPORT 1 arty comd (1 arty regt; 1 MRL regt; 1 coastal arty regt) 1 engr comd (2 engr regt, 1 bridging regt) 1 EW/sigs bde (2 EW regt, 3 sigs regt) 1 NBC regt 1 info ops regt (1 CIMIC bn; 1 Psyops bn) 1 int regt COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT 1 log bde (5 log regt; 1 tpt regt; 1 med gp (1 log unit, 2 med regt, 1 fd hospital unit)) HELICOPTER 1 hel comd (1 atk hel bn, 2 spt hel bn, 1 tpt hel bn, 1 sigs bn, 1 log unit (1 spt coy, 1 supply coy)) AIR DEFENCE 1 AD comd (3 SAM regt, 1 sigs unit) EQUIPMENT BY TYPE ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES MBT 327: 108 Leopard 2A4; 219 Leopard 2E ASLT 84 B1 Centauro RECCE 187 VEC-M1 IFV 225: 204 Pizarro; 21 Pizarro (CP) APC 903 APC (T) 473: 20 Bv-206S; 453 M113 (incl variants) APC (W) 320 BMR-600/BMR-600M1 PPV 110 RG-31 AUV 260 IVECO LMV ENGINEERING & MAINTENANCE VEHICLES AEV 27 CZ-10/25E; 1 Pizarro CEV (Castor) (in test) ARV 51: 16 Leopard REC; 5 BMR REC; 4 Centauro REC; 14 Maxxpro MRV; 12 M113 VLB 15 M60 AVLB MW 6 Husky 2G ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE MSL • MANPATS Spike-LR; TOW ARTILLERY 1,571 SP 155mm 95 M109A5 TOWED 287: 105mm 223: 56 L118 Light Gun; 167 Model 56 pack howitzer; 155mm 64 SBT 155/52 SIAC MOR 1,189: 81mm 777; SP 81mm 10 VAMTAC with Cardom 81mm; 120mm 402 COASTAL DEFENCE • ARTY 155mm 19 SBT 155/52 APU SBT V07

HELICOPTERS ATK 24: 6 Tiger HAP-E; 18 Tiger HAD-E TPT 85: Heavy 17 CH-47D Chinook (HT-17D); Medium 47: 16 AS332B Super Puma (HU-21); 12 AS532UL Cougar; 6 AS532AL Cougar; 13 NH90 TTH; Light 21: 5 Bell 212 (HU.18); 16 H135 (HE.26/HU.26) UAV • ISR • Medium 6: 2 Searcher MkII-J (PASI); 4 Searcher MkIII (PASI) AIR DEFENCE SAM 77+ Long-range 18 M901 Patriot PAC-2 Medium-range 38 MIM-23B I-Hawk Phase III Short-range 21: 8 NASAMS; 13 Skyguard/Aspide Point-defence Mistral GUNS • TOWED 35mm 67: 19 GDF-005; 48 GDF-007 AIR-LAUNCHED MISSILES • ASM Spike-ER

Navy 20,350 (incl Naval Aviation and Marines) EQUIPMENT BY TYPE SUBMARINES 2 SSK 2 Galerna with 4 single 533mm TT with F17 mod 2 HWT PRINCIPAL SURFACE COMBATANTS 11 DESTROYERS • DDGHM 5 Alvaro de Bazan with Aegis Baseline 5 C2, 2 quad lnchr with RGM-84F Harpoon Block 1D AShM, 6 8-cell Mk 41 VLS with SM-2 Block IIIA/ RIM-162B ESSM SAM, 2 twin 324mm SVTT Mk 32 mod 9 ASTT with Mk 46 mod 5 LWT, 1 127mm gun (capacity 1 SH-60B Seahawk ASW hel) FRIGATES • FFGH 6 Santa Maria with 1 Mk 13 GMLS with RGM-84C Harpoon Block 1B AShM, 2 triple 324mm SVTT Mk 32 ASTT with Mk 46 mod 5 LWT, 1 Meroka mod 2B CIWS, 1 76mm gun (capacity 2 SH-60B Seahawk ASW hel) AMPHIBIOUS PRINCIPAL AMPHIBIOUS SHIPS 3: LHD 1 Juan Carlos I (capacity 18 hel or 10 AV-8B FGA ac; 4 LCM-1E; 42 APC; 46 MBT; 900 troops) LPD 2 Galicia (capacity 6 Bell 212 or 4 SH-3D Sea King hel; 4 LCM or 2 LCM & 8 AAV; 130 APC or 33 MBT; 540 troops) LANDING CRAFT • LCM 12 LCM 1E LOGISTICS AND SUPPORT 2 AORH 2: 1 Patino (capacity 3 Bell 212 or 2 SH-3D Sea King hel); 1 Cantabria (capacity 3 Bell 212 or 2 SH-3D Sea King hel)

Maritime Action Force EQUIPMENT BY TYPE PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 23 PSOH 6 Meteoro (Buques de Accion Maritima) with 1 76mm gun PSO 5: 3 Alboran each with 1 hel landing platform; 2 Descubierta with 1 76mm gun PCO 4 Serviola with 1 76mm gun PCC 3 Anaga with 1 76mm gun PB 4: 2 P-101; 2 Toralla PBR 1 Cabo Fradera MINE WARFARE • MINE COUNTERMEASURES 6 MHO 6 Segura

Europe 149

Naval Aviation 850 FORCES BY ROLE FIGHTER/GROUND ATTACK 1 sqn with AV-8B Harrier II Plus ANTI-SUBMARINE WARFARE 1 sqn with SH-60B/F Seahawk TRANSPORT 1 (liaison) sqn with Cessna 550 Citation II; Cessna 650 Citation VII TRAINING 1 sqn with Hughes 500MD8 1 flt with TAV-8B Harrier TRANSPORT HELICOPTER 1 sqn with Bell 212 (HU-18) 1 sqn with SH-3D Sea King EQUIPMENT BY TYPE AIRCRAFT 13 combat capable FGA 13: 12 AV-8B Harrier II Plus; 1 TAV-8B Harrier (on lease from USMC) TPT • Light 4: 3 Cessna 550 Citation II; 1 Cessna 650 Citation VII HELICOPTERS ASW 20: 4 SH-3D Sea King (tpt); 12 SH-60B Seahawk; 4 SH-60F Seahawk MRH 9 Hughes 500MD TPT • Light 7 Bell 212 (HA-18) AIR-LAUNCHED MISSILES AAM • IR AIM-9L Sidewinder; ARH AIM-120 AMRAAM ASM AGM-65G Maverick; AGM-114K/R Hellfire II AShM AGM-119 Penguin

Marines 5,350 FORCES BY ROLE SPECIAL FORCES 1 spec ops bn MANOEUVRE Amphibious 1 mne bde (1 recce unit, 1 mech inf bn, 2 inf bn, 1 arty bn, 1 log bn) Other 1 sy bde (5 mne garrison gp) EQUIPMENT BY TYPE ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES APC • APC (W) 34: 32 Piranha IIIC; 1 Piranha IIIC (amb); 1 Piranha IIIC EW (EW) AAV 18: 16 AAV-7A1/AAVP-7A1; 2 AAVC-7A1 (CP)

ENGINEERING & MAINTENANCE VEHICLES AEV 4 Piranha IIIC ARV 3: 1 AAVR-7A1; 1 M88; 1 Piranha IIIC ARTILLERY 30 SP 155mm 6 M109A2 TOWED 105mm 24 Model 56 pack howitzer ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE MSL • MANPATS Spike-LR; TOW-2 AIR DEFENCE • SAM • Point-defence Mistral

Air Force 19,750 The Spanish Air Force is organised in 3 commands – General Air Command, Combat Air Command and Canary Islands Air Command FORCES BY ROLE FIGHTER 2 sqn with Eurofighter Typhoon FIGHTER/GROUND ATTACK 5 sqn with F/A-18A/B MLU Hornet (EF-18A/B MLU) MARITIME PATROL 1 sqn with P-3A/M Orion ISR 1 sqn with Beech C90 King Air 1 sqn with Cessna 550 Citation V; CN235 (TR-19A) ELECTRONIC WARFARE 1 sqn with C-212 Aviocar; Falcon 20D SEARCH & RESCUE 1 sqn with AS332B/B1 Super Puma; CN235 VIGMA 1 sqn with AS332B Super Puma; CN235 VIGMA; H215 (AS332C1) Super Puma 1 sqn with C-212 Aviocar; CN235 VIGMA TANKER/TRANSPORT 1 sqn with A400M TRANSPORT 1 VIP sqn with A310; Falcon 900 1 sqn with A400M 1 sqn with C-212 Aviocar 2 sqn with C295 1 sqn with CN235 TRAINING 1 OCU sqn with Eurofighter Typhoon 1 OCU sqn with F/A-18A/B (EF-18A/B MLU) Hornet 1 sqn with Beech F33C Bonanza 2 sqn with C-101 Aviojet 1 sqn with C-212 Aviocar 1 sqn with PC-21 1 sqn with T-35 Pillan (E-26) 2 (LIFT) sqn with F-5B Freedom Fighter 1 hel sqn with H120 Colibri 1 hel sqn with S-76C TRANSPORT HELICOPTER 1 sqn with AS332M1 Super Puma; AS532UL Cougar (VIP) ISR UAV 1 sqn with MQ-9A Reaper (forming) EQUIPMENT BY TYPE AIRCRAFT 175 combat capable FTR 88: 69 Eurofighter Typhoon; 19 F-5B Freedom Fighter FGA 84: 20 F/A-18A Hornet (EF-18A); 52 EF-18A MLU; 12 EF-18B MLU ASW 3 P-3M Orion

Europe

LOGISTICS AND SUPPORT 30 AGI 1 Alerta AGOR 2 (with ice-strengthened hull, for polar research duties in Antarctica) AGS 3: 2 Malaspina; 1 Castor AKR 1 Ysabel AP 1 Contramaestre Casado with 1 hel landing platform ASR 1 Neptuno ATF 3: 1 Mar Caribe; 1 Mahon; 1 La Grana AXL 10: 6 Contramaestre; 4 Guardiamarina AXS 8

150 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2022 MP 8 CN235 VIGMA ISR 2 CN235 (TR-19A) EW 3: 1 C-212 Aviocar (TM.12D); 2 Falcon 20D TPT 69: Heavy 10 A400M; Light 51: 3 Beech C90 King Air; 15 Beech F33C Bonanza; 10 C-212 Aviocar (incl 9 trg); 12 C295; 8 CN235; 3 Cessna 560 Citation V (ISR); PAX 8: 2 A310; 1 A330 (to be converted to MRTT tkt/tpt configuration); 5 Falcon 900 (VIP) TRG 97: 59 C-101 Aviojet; 2 PC-21; 36 T-35 Pillan (E-26) HELICOPTERS TPT 41: Medium 19: 5 AS332B/B1 Super Puma; 4 AS332M1 Super Puma; 4 H215 (AS332C1) Super Puma; 2 AS532UL Cougar (VIP); 4 NH90 TTH; Light 22: 14 H120 Colibri; 8 S-76C UNINHABITED AERIAL VEHICLES • CISR • Heavy 4 MQ-9A Reaper (unarmed) AIR DEFENCE • SAM Short-range Skyguard/Aspide Point-defence Mistral AIR-LAUNCHED MISSILES AAM • IR AIM-9L/JULI Sidewinder; IIR IRIS-T; SARH AIM-7P Sparrow; ARH AIM-120B/C AMRAAM ARM AGM-88B HARM ASM AGM-65G Maverick AShM AGM-84D Harpoon LACM Taurus KEPD 350 BOMBS Laser-guided: GBU-10/12/16 Paveway II; GBU-24 Paveway III; EGBU-16 Paveway II; BPG-2000 INS/GPS guided: GBU-38 JDAM

Emergencies Military Unit (UME) 3,500 FORCES BY ROLE COMMAND 1 div HQ MANOEUVRE Other 5 Emergency Intervention bn 1 Emergency Support and Intervention regt COMBAT SUPPORT 1 sigs bn HELICOPTER 1 hel bn opcon Army

Gendarmerie & Paramilitary 75,800 Guardia Civil 75,800 17 regions, 54 Rural Comds FORCES BY ROLE SPECIAL FORCES 8 (rural) gp MANOEUVRE Other 15 (traffic) sy gp 1 (Special) sy bn EQUIPMENT BY TYPE PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 64 PSO 1 with 1 hel landing platform PCC 2

PBF 34 PB 27 AIRCRAFT • TPT • Light 3: 2 CN235-300; 1 King Air 350i HELICOPTERS MRH 20: 2 AS653N3 Dauphin; 18 Bo-105ATH TPT • Light 21: 8 BK-117; 13 H135

DEPLOYMENT BOSNIA-HERZEGOVINA: EU • EUFOR • Operation Althea 2 CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC: EU • EUTM RCA 8 DJIBOUTI: EU • Operation Atalanta 1 P-3M Orion GULF OF ADEN & INDIAN OCEAN: EU • Operation Atalanta 1 FFGHM GULF OF GUINEA: Navy 50; 1 PCO IRAQ: Operation Inherent Resolve 150; 1 trg unit; 1 hel unit with CH-47D Chinook; AS532 Cougar; NATO • NATO Mission Iraq 115 LATVIA: NATO • Enhanced Forward Presence 346; 1 armd inf coy(+); 1 cbt engr coy LEBANON: UN • UNIFIL 625; 1 mech bde HQ; 1 mech inf bn(-); 1 engr coy; 1 sigs coy; 1 log coy MALI: EU • EUTM Mali 540; 1 hel unit with 3 NH90 TTH; UN • MINUSMA 1 MEDITERRANEAN SEA: NATO • SNMCMG 2: 1 PSOH NORTH SEA: NATO • SNMG 1: 1 DDGHM SENEGAL: Operation Barkhane 65; 2 C295M SOMALIA: EU • EUTM Somalia 20 TURKEY: NATO • Operation Active Fence 150; 1 SAM bty with M901 Patriot PAC-2

FOREIGN FORCES United States US European Command: 3,250; 4 DDGM; 1 air base at Morón; 1 naval base at Rota

Europe 151

Sweden SWE

ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE 2020

2021

SEK

4.98tr

5.30tr

USD

541bn

622bn

per capita

USD

52,129

58,639

-2.8

4.0

Growth Inflation

0.7

2.0

Def bdgt

SEK

64.8bn

71.2bn

USD

7.04bn

8.36bn

9.21

8.51

USD1=SEK

2022

The army has been transformed to provide brigade-sized task forces depending on the operational requirement

76.5bn

Real-terms defence budget trend (USDbn, constant 2015) 7.47 5.40 2008

Population

2015

2021

10,261,767

Age

0–14

15–19

20–24

25–29

Male

9.1%

2.8%

2.7%

3.4%

22.3%

9.6%

Female

8.6%

2.7%

2.6%

3.2%

21.9%

11.1%

30–64 65 plus

Capabilities Sweden’s armed forces remain configured for territorial defence and there has been growing concern at Russian military activity in the Baltic area. There has also been a focus on increasing cooperation with neighbours and NATO in recent years. The 2021–25 defence bill, presented in October 2020, envisages increased spending and an expanded force structure with the re-establishment of five regiments and one air wing. Sweden has also announced measures to enhance societal resilience and the ability to deal with civil emergencies. There are plans to increase defence ties with the UK and the US. In July 2019, Sweden joined the UK-led Tempest future-combat-aircraft programme. Concerns over readiness levels have led to greater cooperation with NATO and NORDEFCO. In May 2018, Sweden, Finland and the US signed a statement of intent to develop closer cooperation on exercises and interoperability. Readiness, exercises and training, as well as cyber defence, are spending priorities. Amid recruitment challenges, Sweden announced in March 2017 that it would reinstate conscription from January 2018. Sweden has started to re-garrison the island of Gotland. Readiness challenges in the air force triggered a discussion about extending the service life of the JAS-39C Gripens beyond their intended 2026 retirement date, not least since the air force was slated to receive a lower number of JAS-39Es than requested. In August 2018, Sweden proceeded with the acquisition of the Patriot air-defence system. The country’s export-oriented defence industry is privately owned and capable of meeting most of the armed forces’ equipment needs, including for advanced combat aircraft and conventional submarines.

ACTIVE 14,600 (Army 6,850 Navy 2,100 Air 2,700 Other 2,950) Voluntary Auxiliary Organisations 21,200 Conscript liability 4–11 months, depending on branch (selective conscription; 4,000 in total, gender neutral)

RESERVE 10,000

Army 6,850 FORCES BY ROLE COMMAND 2 bde HQ MANOEUVRE Reconnaissance 1 recce bn Armoured 5 armd bn 1 armd BG Mechanised 1 mech bn Light 1 mot inf bn 1 lt inf bn Air Manoeuvre 1 AB bn Other 1 sy bn COMBAT SUPPORT 2 arty bn 2 engr bn 2 MP coy 1 CBRN coy COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT 1 tpt coy AIR DEFENCE 2 AD bn

Reserves FORCES BY ROLE MANOEUVRE Other 40 Home Guard bn EQUIPMENT BY TYPE ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES MBT 120 Leopard 2A5 (Strv 122) IFV 411: 369 CV9040 (Strf 9040; incl 54 CP); 42 Epbv 90 (OP) APC 1,064 APC (T) 389: 239 Pbv 302 (incl variants); 150 BvS-10 MkII APC (W) 315+: some Bastion APC; 34 XA-180 Sisu (Patgb 180); 20 XA-202 Sisu (Patgb 202); 148 XA-203 Sisu (Patgb 203); 113 Patria AMV (XA-360/Patgb 360) PPV 360 RG-32M ENGINEERING & MAINTENANCE VEHICLES AEV 6 Pionierpanzer-3 Kodiak (Ingbv 120) ARV 40: 14 Bgbv 120; 26 Bgbv 90 VLB 3 Brobv 120 MW 33+: Aardvark Mk2; 33 Area Clearing System ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE MSL • MANPATS NLAW; RBS-55 RCL 84mm Carl Gustaf

Europe

Swedish Krona SEK GDP

152 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2022 ARTILLERY 357 SP 155mm 35 Archer MOR 322: 81mm 201 M/86; 120mm 81 M/41D SP 120mm 40 CV90 Mjolnir (Gkpbv 90) AIR DEFENCE SAM 11+ Long-range 3 M903 Patriot PAC-3 MSE Medium-range MIM-23B Hawk (RBS-97) Short-range 8 IRIS-T SLS (RBS-98); RBS-23 BAMSE Point-defence RBS-70 GUNS • SP 40mm 30 Lvkv 90

Navy 1,250; 850 Amphibious (total 2,100) EQUIPMENT BY TYPE SUBMARINE • SSK 5: 1 Gotland (fitted with AIP) with 2 single 400mm TT with Torped 431 LWT/Torped 451 LWT, 4 single 533mm TT with Torped 613 HWT/Torped 62 HWT 2 Gotland mod (fitted with AIP) with 2 single 400mm TT with Torped 431 LWT/Torped 451 LWT, 4 single 533mm TT with Torped 613 HWT/Torped 62 HWT 2 Södermanland (fitted with AIP) with 3 single 400mm TT with Torped 431 LWT/Torped 451 LWT, 6 single 533mm TT with Torped 613 HWT/Torped 62 HWT PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 150 CORVETTES • FSG 5 Visby with 8 RBS15 Mk2 AShM, 4 single 400mm ASTT with Torped 45 LWT, 1 57mm gun, 1 hel landing platform PCGT 4: 2 Göteborg with 4 twin lnchr with RBS15 Mk2 AShM, 4 single 400mm ASTT with Torped 431 LWT, 1 57mm gun 2 Stockholm with 4 twin lnchr with RBS15 Mk2 AShM, 4 single 400mm ASTT with Torped 431 LWT, 1 57mm gun PBF 133: 100+ Combat Boat 90H (capacity 18 troops); 27 Combat Boat HS (capacity 18 troops); 6 Combat Boat 90HSM (capacity 18 troops) PB 8 Tapper (Type 80) MINE WARFARE • MINE COUNTERMEASURES 7 MCC 5 Koster (SWE Landsort mod) MCD 2 Spårö (Styrsö mod) AMPHIBIOUS • LANDING CRAFT 11 LCVP 8 Trossbat LCAC 3 Griffon 8100TD LOGISTICS AND SUPPORT 15 AG 2: 1 Carlskrona with 1 hel landing platform (former ML); 1 Trosso (spt ship for corvettes and patrol vessels but can also be used as HQ ship) AGF 2 Ledningsbåt 2000 AGI 1 Orion AKL 1 Loke ARS 2: 1 Belos III; 1 Furusund (former ML) AX 5 Altair AXS 2: 1 Falken; 1 Gladan

Amphibious 850 FORCES BY ROLE MANOEUVRE Amphibious 1 amph bn

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE ARTILLERY • MOR 81mm 12 M/86 COASTAL DEFENCE • AShM 8 RBS-17 Hellfire

Coastal Defence FORCES BY ROLE COASTAL DEFENCE 1 AShM bty with RBS-15 EQUIPMENT BY TYPE COASTAL DEFENCE • AShM RBS-15

Air Force 2,700 FORCES BY ROLE FIGHTER/GROUND ATTACK/ISR 6 sqn with JAS 39C/D Gripen TRANSPORT/ISR/AEW&C 1 sqn with C-130H Hercules (Tp-84); KC-130H Hercules (Tp-84); Gulfstream IV SRA-4 (S-102B); S-100B/D Argus TRAINING 1 unit with Sk-60 AIR DEFENCE 1 (fighter control and air surv) bn EQUIPMENT BY TYPE AIRCRAFT 96 combat capable FGA 96 JAS 39C/D Gripen ELINT 2 Gulfstream IV SRA-4 (S-102B) AEW&C 3: 1 S-100B Argus; 2 S-100D Argus TKR/TPT 1 KC-130H Hercules (Tp-84) TPT 8: Medium 5 C-130H Hercules (Tp-84); Light 2 Saab 340 (OS-100A/Tp-100C); PAX 1 Gulfstream 550 (Tp102D) TRG 67 Sk-60W UNINHABITED AERIAL VEHICLES ISR • Medium 8 RQ-7 Shadow (AUV 3 Örnen) AIR-LAUNCHED MISSILES ASM AGM-65 Maverick (RB-75) AShM RB-15F AAM • IR AIM-9L Sidewinder (RB-74); IIR IRIS-T (RB98); ARH AIM-120B AMRAAM (RB-99); Meteor BOMBS Laser-Guided GBU-12 Paveway II INS/GPS guided GBU-39 Small Diameter Bomb

Armed Forces Hel Wing FORCES BY ROLE TRANSPORT HELICOPTER 3 sqn with AW109 (Hkp 15A); AW109M (Hkp-15B); NH90 TTH (Hkp-14) (SAR/ASW); UH-60M Black Hawk (Hkp-16) EQUIPMENT BY TYPE HELICOPTERS TPT 53: Medium 33: 15 UH-60M Black Hawk (Hkp16); 18 NH90 TTH (Hkp-14) (of which 9 configured for ASW); Light 20: 12 AW109 (Hkp-15A); 8 AW109M (Hkp-15B)

Special Forces FORCES BY ROLE SPECIAL FORCES 1 spec ops gp

Europe 153

Other 2,950 Includes staff, logisitics and intelligence personnel FORCES BY ROLE COMBAT SUPPORT 1 EW bn 1 psyops unit COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT 2 log bn 1 maint bn 4 med coy 1 tpt coy

DEPLOYMENT CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC: EU • EUTM RCA 9 INDIA/PAKISTAN: UN • UNMOGIP 4 IRAQ: Operation Inherent Resolve 2; NATO • NATO Mission Iraq 1 KOREA, REPUBLIC OF: NNSC • 5 MALI: Operation Barkhane 150; 1 SF unit; 1 hel unit with 3 UH-60M; EU • EUTM Mali 8; UN • MINUSMA 187; 1 int coy MIDDLE EAST: UN • UNTSO 6

ACTIVE 19,550 (Armed Forces 19,550)

SERBIA: NATO • KFOR 2

Conscript liability 260–600 compulsory service days depending on rank. 18 or 23 weeks’ training (depending on branch) generally at age 20, followed by 6 refresher trg courses (3 weeks each). Alternative service available

SOMALIA: EU • EUTM Somalia 9 WESTERN SAHARA: UN • MINURSO 2

RESERVE 123,450

Switzerland CHE Swiss Franc CHF GDP per capita

2021

CHF

706bn

737bn

USD

752bn

811bn

USD

87,367

93,515

-2.5

3.7

Inflation Def bdgt [a]

Civil Defence 73,000 (51,000 Reserve) 2020

Growth

-0.7

0.4

CHF

5.37bn

5.20bn

USD

5.72bn

0.94

0.91

USD1=CHF

2022

ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE Armed Forces 3,100 active; 16,450 conscript (19,550 total) 5.33bn

Real-terms defence budget trend (USDbn, constant 2015) 5.63 4.62

Population

2015

Operations Command 72,600 on mobilisation 4 Territorial Regions. With the exception of military police all units are non-active

[a] Includes military pensions

2008

The conscript-based armed forces are postured for territorial defence and limited participation in international peace-support operations. The government has begun to reduce its armed forces, reflecting an assessment that in the militia-based system not all personnel would realistically be available for active service. With permanent neutrality a core feature of foreign and security policy, Switzerland is not a member of any alliances, although it joined NATO’s Partnership for Peace programme in 1996 and on occasion contributes to NATO- and EU-led operations alongside its engagement in UN or OSCE missions. Switzerland does not participate in combat operations for peace-enforcement purposes and its deployments are limited in size. The 2016 armed-forces development plan emphasises improvements in readiness, training and equipment, and is meant to be implemented by the end of 2022. The approach to readiness is changing to a flexible model in which different units are called up for active service gradually and on different timelines. Plans to replace F-5 Tiger II combat aircraft with the Gripen were scrapped after a national referendum rejected the proposal in May 2014. With Switzerland’s air-policing capabilities diminished, in July 2018 the government relaunched its attempt to procure a new combat aircraft to now also replace the F/A-18 Hornet, which will have its life extended until 2030. The multi-stage selection process was completed in June 2021 and the F-35A was chosen. Parliamentary approval is planned for 2022. The fighteracquisition programme was capped at CHF6 billion in May 2019 and has been separated from the ground-based air-defence procurement. Previously both programmes were linked. Other priorities include upgrades to Switzerland’s air-surveillance systems and to transport helicopters. Switzerland’s defence industry has limited design and manufacturing capabilities, with recognised capacity in the land-vehicles sector, which has links to North American firms.

2021

8,453,550

Age

0–14

15–19

20–24

25–29

Male

7.9%

2.5%

2.8%

3.1%

30–64 65 plus 24.7%

8.4%

Female

7.5%

2.4%

2.7%

3.1%

24.6%

10.4%

FORCES BY ROLE COMMAND 4 regional comd SPECIAL FORCES 2 SF bn MANOEUVRE Armoured 2 (1st & 11th) bde (1 recce bn, 1 tk bn, 2 armd inf bn, 1 SP arty bn, 1 engr bn, 1 sigs bn) Mechanised 1 (4th) bde (2 recce bn, 2 SP arty bn, 1 ptn br bn) Light

Europe

Capabilities

COMBAT SUPPORT 1 cbt spt gp

154 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2022 10 inf bn 7 mtn inf bn 1 mtn inf unit COMBAT SUPPORT 4 engr bn 4 MP bn 1 NBC bn 1 int unit COMBAT SUPPORT 4 engr rescue bn EQUIPMENT BY TYPE ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES MBT 134 Leopard 2 (Pz-87 Leo) IFV 186: 154 CV9030CH; 32 CV9030 (CP) APC 1,235 APC (T) 311 M113A2 (incl variants) APC (W) 924 Piranha I/II/IIIC AUV 441 Eagle I/II/III (incl 119 CP) ENGINEERING & MAINTENANCE VEHICLES AEV 12 Kodiak ARV 25 Büffel VLB 9 Leopard 2 with Leguan MW 46: 26 Area Clearing System; 20 M113A2 NBC VEHICLES 12 Piranha IIIC CBRN ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE MSL • SP 106 Piranha I TOW-2 ARTILLERY 355 SP 155mm 133 M109 KAWEST MOR • 81mm 222 Mw-72 PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 14 PB 14 Watercat 1250 AIR DEFENCE • SAM • Point-defence FIM-92 Stinger

Air Force 18,900 on mobilisation FORCES BY ROLE FIGHTER 2 sqn with F-5E/F Tiger II 3 sqn with F/A-18C/D Hornet TRANSPORT 1 sqn with Beech 350 King Air; DHC-6 Twin Otter; PC-6 Turbo Porter; PC-12 1 VIP Flt with Beech 1900D; Cessna 560XL Citation; CL-604 Challenger; Falcon 900EX; PC-24 TRAINING 1 sqn with PC-7CH Turbo Trainer; PC-21 1 sqn with PC-9 (tgt towing) 1 OCU Sqn with F-5E/F Tiger II TRANSPORT HELICOPTER 6 sqn with AS332M Super Puma; AS532UL Cougar; H135M ISR UAV 1 sqn with Hermes 900 EQUIPMENT BY TYPE AIRCRAFT 55 combat capable FTR 25: 20 F-5E Tiger II; 5 F-5F Tiger II FGA 30: 25 F/A-18C Hornet; 5 F/A-18D Hornet TPT 24: Light 20: 1 Beech 350 King Air; 1 Beech 1900D; 1 Cessna 560XL Citation; 1 DHC-6 Twin Otter; 14 PC-6 Turbo Porter; 1 PC-6 (owned by armasuisse, civil registration); 1 PC-12 (owned by armasuisse,

civil registration); PAX 4: 2 CL-604 Challenger; 1 Falcon 900EX; 1 PC-24 (VIP) TRG 40: 27 PC-7CH Turbo Trainer; 5 PC-9; 8 PC-21 HELICOPTERS MRH 20 H135M TPT • Medium 25: 15 AS332M Super Puma; 10 AS532UL Cougar UNINHABITED AERIAL VEHICLES ISR • Medium 1 Hermes 900 AIR-LAUNCHED MISSILES • AAM • IR AIM-9P Sidewinder; IIR AIM-9X Sidewinder II; ARH AIM120B/C-7 AMRAAM

Ground Based Air Defence (GBAD) GBAD assets can be used to form AD clusters to be deployed independently as task forces within Swiss territory EQUIPMENT BY TYPE AIR DEFENCE SAM • Point-defence 56+: 56 Rapier; FIM-92 Stinger GUNS 35mm 27 GDF-003/-005 with Skyguard

Armed Forces Logistic Organisation 9,650 on mobilisation FORCES BY ROLE COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT 1 log bde (6 log bn; 1 tpt bn; 6 med bn)

Command Support Organisation 11,150 on mobilisation FORCES BY ROLE COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT 1 spt bde

Training Command 37,350 on mobilisation

COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT 5 trg unit

Civil Defence 73,000 (51,000 Reserve) (not part of armed forces)

DEPLOYMENT BOSNIA-HERZEGOVINA: EU • EUFOR • Operation Althea 20 DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO: UN • MONUSCO 1 INDIA/PAKISTAN: UN • UNMOGIP 3 KOREA, REPUBLIC OF: NNSC • 5 MALI: UN • MINUSMA 6 MIDDLE EAST: UN • UNTSO 13 SERBIA: NATO • KFOR 165 (military volunteers); 1 inf coy; 1 engr pl; 1 hel flt with AS332M Super Puma SOUTH SUDAN: UN • UNMISS 1 WESTERN SAHARA: UN • MINURSO 2

Europe 155

ACTIVE 355,200 (Army 260,200 Navy 45,000 Air 50,000) Gendarmerie & Paramilitary 156,800

Turkey TUR GDP per capita

2020

2021

TRY

5.05tr

6.63tr

USD

720bn

796bn

USD

8,610

9,407

Growth

1.8

9.0

Inflation

12.3

17.0

TRY

93.9bn

99.0bn

Def exp [a] Def bdgt [b]

USD

13.4bn

11.9bn

TRY

76.3bn

84.6bn

USD

10.9bn

10.2bn

7.01

8.33

USD1=TRY

2022

RESERVE 378,700 (Army 258,700 Navy 55,000 Air 65,000)

Reserve service to age 41 for all services

ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE 104bn

[a] NATO figure [b] Includes funding for Undersecretariat of Defence Industries; Defence Industry Support Fund; TUBITAK Defense Industries R&D Institute (SAGE); and military pensions Real-terms defence budget trend (USDbn, constant 2015) 16.3

2008

Population

10.8 2021

2015

Conscript liability 12 months (5.5 months for university graduates; 21 days for graduates with exemption) (reducing to 6 months)

82,482,383

Age

0–14

15–19

20–24

25–29

30–64 65 plus

Male

11.7%

4.1%

3.9%

3.8%

22.9%

3.9%

Female

11.2%

3.9%

3.7%

3.6%

22.5%

4.8%

Capabilities Turkey has large, generally well-equipped armed forces that are primarily structured for national defence. Much recent activity has focused on internal security and cross-border operations in response to the continuing wars in Syria and Libya. The conflict with Kurdish armed groups continues. The armed forces’ 2033 strategic plan aims to modernise military equipment and force structures. Turkey is a NATO member and has provided access to its airspace and facilities for operations in Iraq and Syria. However, relationships with NATO allies have come under pressure after Ankara’s decision to procure the Russian-made S-400 air-defence system, its operations in northern Syria, rising tensions with Greece in the eastern Mediterranean Sea, its role in Libya and its position regarding the late-2020 Armenia–Azerbaijan conflict. Following an attempted coup in July 2016, Ankara dismissed large numbers of officers from the armed forces. The armed forces train regularly, including with NATO allies. While key subcomponents are still often imported, a number of locally developed equipment designs are in production. Efforts are under way to increase military exports and Turkey has secured markets in Azerbaijan, Pakistan and Ukraine, successfully offering cost-effective assets in specific sectors. Deliveries on the S-400 contract began in 2019, and as a result the US government terminated Turkey’s participation in the F-35 programme. Turkey is also developing a domestic fighter aircraft but is dependent on collaboration with external defence companies. The president has authority over defence procurement and control over Turkey’s top defence companies. Turkey has signed defence-cooperation agreements with a focus on exports and technology transfer, in an effort to boost its national defence industry and achieve defence-industrial autonomy.

Space EQUIPMENT BY TYPE SATELLITES • ISR 2 Gokturk-1/2

Army ε260,200 (incl conscripts) FORCES BY ROLE COMMAND 4 army HQ 9 corps HQ SPECIAL FORCES 8 cdo bde 1 mtn cdo bde 1 cdo regt MANOEUVRE Armoured 1 (52nd) armd div (2 armd bde, 1 mech bde) 7 armd bde Mechanised 2 (28th & 29th) mech div 14 mech inf bde Light 1 (23rd) mot inf div (3 mot inf regt) 7 mot inf bde COMBAT SUPPORT 2 arty bde 1 trg arty bde 6 arty regt 2 engr regt AVIATION 4 avn regt 4 avn bn EQUIPMENT BY TYPE ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES MBT 2,378: 316 Leopard 2A4; 170 Leopard 1A4; 227 Leopard 1A3; 100 M60A1; 650 M60A3 TTS; 165 M60TM Firat; 750 M48A5 T2 (2,000 M48A5 T1 in store) RECCE ε250 Akrep IFV 645 ACV AIFV APC 5,266 APC (T) 3,636: 823 ACV AAPC; 2,813 M113/M113A1/ M113A2 PPV 1,630: 360 Edjer Yalcin 4×4; ε650 Kirpi; 320 Kirpi-II; ε300 Vuran AUV 1,200: 800+ Cobra; ε400 Cobra II ENGINEERING & MAINTENANCE VEHICLES AEV 12+: AZMIM; 12 M48 AEV; M113A2T2 ARV 150: 12 BPz-2; 105 M48T5; 33 M88A1 VLB 88: 36 Leguan; 52 Mobile Floating Assault Bridge MW 4+: 4 Husky 2G; Tamkar; Bozena

Europe

Turkish Lira TRY

156 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2022 ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE MSL SP 415: 365 ACV TOW; ε50 Kaplan STA; Pars STA 4×4 MANPATS 9K135 Kornet-E (RS-AT-14 Spriggan); Eryx; FGM-148 Javelin; Milan; OMTAS RCL 106mm M40A1 ARTILLERY 7,836+ SP 1,080: 155mm 828: ε150 M44T1; 365 M52T (mod); ε310 T-155 Firtina; 3 T-155 Firtina II; 175mm 36 M107; 203mm 219 M110A2 TOWED 794+: 105mm 75+ M101A1; 155mm 557: 517 M114A1/M114A2; 40 Panter; 203mm 162 M115 MRL 146+: 107mm 48; 122mm ε36 T-122; 227mm 12 M270 MLRS; 302mm 50+ TR-300 Kasirga (WS-1) MOR 5,813+ SP 1,443+: 81mm; 107mm 1,264 M106; 120mm 179 TOWED 4,370: 81mm 3,792; 120mm 578 SURFACE-TO-SURFACE MISSILE LAUNCHERS SRBM • Conventional Bora; MGM-140A ATACMS (launched from M270 MLRS); J-600T Yildrim (B-611/CHSS-9 mod 1) AIRCRAFT ISR 5 Beech 350 King Air TPT • Light 8: 5 Beech 200 King Air; 3 Cessna 421 TRG 49: 45 Cessna T182; 4 T-42A Cochise HELICOPTERS ATK 94: 18 AH-1P Cobra; 12 AH-1S Cobra; 5 AH-1W Cobra; 4 TAH-1P Cobra; 9 T129A; 46 T129B MRH 28 Hughes 300C TPT 226+: Heavy 11 CH-47F Chinook; Medium 76+: 28 AS532UL Cougar; 48+ S-70A Black Hawk; Light 139: 12 Bell 204B (AB-204B); ε43 Bell 205 (UH-1H Iroquois); 64 Bell 205A (AB-205A); 20 Bell 206 Jet Ranger UNINHABITED AERIAL VEHICLES CISR • Medium 33 Bayraktar TB2 ISR • Heavy Falcon 600/Firebee; Medium CL-89; Gnat LOITERING MUNITIONS Harpy AIR-LAUNCHED MISSILES ASM Mizrak-U (UMTAS) BOMBS Laser-guided MAM-L; MAM-C AIR DEFENCE SAM Short-range HISAR-A/A+; HISAR-O Point-defence 148+: 70 Altigan PMADS octuple Stinger lnchr, 78 Zipkin PMADS quad Stinger lnchr; FIM-92 Stinger GUNS 1,402 SP 35mm ε40 Korkut TOWED 1,362: 20mm 439 GAI-D01/Rh-202; 35mm 120 GDF-001/-003; 40mm 803 L/60/L/70

Navy ε45,000 (incl conscripts) EQUIPMENT BY TYPE SUBMARINES • SSK 12 4 Atilay (GER Type-209/1200) with 8 single 533mm TT with SST-4 HWT 4 Gür (GER Type-209/1400) with 8 single 533mm TT with UGM-84 Harpoon AShM/Mk 24 Tigerfish mod 2 HWT/ SeaHake mod 4 (DM2A4) HWT

4 Preveze (GER Type-209/1400) (MLU ongoing) with 8 single 533mm TT with UGM-84 Harpoon AShM/Mk 24 Tigerfish mod 2 HWT/SeaHake mod 4 (DM2A4) HWT PRINCIPAL SURFACE COMBATANTS • FRIGATES 16 FFGHM 16: 4 Barbaros (GER MEKO 200 mod) with 2 quad lnchr with RGM-84C Harpoon Block 1B AShM, 2 8-cell Mk 41 VLS with RIM-162B ESSM SAM, 2 triple 324mm SVTT Mk 32 ASTT with Mk 46 LWT, 3 Sea Zenith CIWS, 1 127mm gun (capacity 1 Bell 212 (AB-212) hel) 4 Gabya (ex-US Oliver Hazard Perry) with 1 Mk 13 GMLS with RGM-84C Harpoon Block 1B AShM/SM-1MR Block VI SAM, 1 8-cell Mk 41 VLS with RIM-162B ESSM SAM, 2 triple 324mm SVTT Mk 32 ASTT with Mk 46 LWT, 1 Mk 15 Phalanx Block 1B CIWS, 1 76mm gun (capacity 1 S-70B Seahawk/AB-212 ASW hel) 4 Gabya (ex-US Oliver Hazard Perry) with 1 Mk 13 GMLS with RGM-84C Harpoon Block 1B AShM/SM1MR Block VI SAM, 2 triple 324mm SVTT Mk 32 ASTT with Mk 46 LWT, 1 Mk 15 Phalanx Block 1B CIWS, 1 76mm gun (capacity 1 S-70B Seahawk/AB212 ASW hel) 4 Yavuz (GER MEKO 200TN) with 2 quad lnchr with RGM-84C Harpoon Block 1B AShM, 1 octuple Mk 29 GMLS with RIM-7M Sea Sparrow SAM, 2 triple 324mm SVTT Mk 32 ASTT with Mk 46 LWT, 3 Sea Zenith CIWS, 1 127mm gun (capacity 1 Bell 212 (AB212) hel) PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 45 CORVETTES 10: FSGHM 4 Ada with 2 quad lnchr with RGM-84C Harpoon Block 1B AShM, 1 Mk 49 21-cell lnchr with RIM-116 SAM, 2 twin 324mm SVTT Mk 32 ASTT with Mk 46 LWT, 1 76mm gun (capacity 1 S-70B Seahawk hel) FSG 6 Burak (ex-FRA d’Estienne d’Orves) with 2 single lnchr with MM38 Exocet AShM, 4 single 324mm ASTT with Mk 46 LWT, 1 Creusot-Loire Mk 54 A/S mor, 1 100mm gun (1 vessel with 1 76mm gun instead) PCFG 19: 4 Dogan (GER Lurssen-57) with 2 quad lnchr with RGM-84C Harpoon Block 1B AShM, 1 76mm gun 9 Kilic with 2 quad lnchr with RGM-84C Harpoon Block 1B AShM, 1 76mm gun 4 Rüzgar (GER Lurssen-57) with 2 quad lnchr with RGM-84C Harpoon Block 1B AShM, 1 76mm gun 2 Yildiz with 2 quad lnchr with RGM-84C Harpoon Block 1B AShM, 1 76mm gun PCC 16 Tuzla MINE WARFARE • MINE COUNTERMEASURES 15 MHO 11: 5 Engin (FRA Circe); 6 Aydin MSC 4 Seydi (US Adjutant) AMPHIBIOUS LANDING SHIPS • LST 5: 2 Bayraktar with 2 Mk 15 Phalanx Block 1B CIWS, 1 hel landing platform (capacity 20 MBT; 250 troops) 1 Osmangazi with 1 Mk 15 Phalanx CIWS (capacity 4 LCVP; 17 tanks; 980 troops; 1 hel landing platform) 2 Sarucabey with 1 Mk 15 Phalanx CIWS (capacity 11 tanks; 600 troops; 1 hel landing platform)

LANDING CRAFT 30 LCT 21: 2 C-120/130; 11 C-140; 8 C-151 LCM 9: 1 C-310; 8 LCM 8 LOGISTICS AND SUPPORT 35 ABU 2: 1 AG5; 1 AG6 with 1 76mm gun AGS 2: 1 Cesme (ex-US Silas Bent); 1 Cubuklu AOR 2 Akar with 1 Mk 15 Phalanx CIWS, 1 hel landing platform AOT 2 Burak AOL 1 Gurcan AP 1 Iskenderun ASR 3: 1 Alemdar with 1 hel landing platform; 2 Isin II ATF 9: 1 Akbas; 1 Degirmendere; 1 Gazal; 1 Inebolu; 5 Onder AWT 3 Sogut AXL 8 AX 2 Pasa (ex-GER Rhein)

Marines 3,000 FORCES BY ROLE MANOEUVRE Amphibious 1 mne bde (3 mne bn; 1 arty bn)

Naval Aviation FORCES BY ROLE ANTI-SUBMARINE WARFARE 2 sqn with Bell 212 ASW (AB-212 ASW); S-70B Seahawk 1 sqn with ATR-72-600; CN235M-100; TB-20 Trinidad EQUIPMENT BY TYPE AIRCRAFT 4 combat capable ASW 4 ATR-72-600 MP 6 CN235M-100 TPT • Light 7: 2 ATR-72-600; 5 TB-20 Trinidad HELICOPTERS ASW 29: 11 Bell 212 ASW (AB-212 ASW); 18 S-70B Seahawk UNINHABITED AERIAL VEHICLES 7 CISR 8: Heavy 4: 1 Aksungur; 3 ANKA-S; Medium 4 Bayraktar TB2 AIR-LAUNCHED MISSILES ASM AGM-114M Hellfire II

Air Force ε50,000

2 tac air forces (divided between east and west) FORCES BY ROLE FIGHTER/GROUND ATTACK 1 sqn with F-4E Phantom 2020 8 sqn with F-16C/D Fighting Falcon ISR 1 sqn with F-16C/D Fighting Falcon 1 unit with King Air 350 AIRBORNE EARLY WARNING & CONTROL 1 sqn (forming) with B-737 AEW&C EW 1 unit with CN235M EW SEARCH & RESCUE 1 sqn with AS532AL/UL Cougar TANKER 1 sqn with KC-135R Stratotanker

TRANSPORT 1 sqn with A400M; C-160D Transall 1 sqn with C-130B/E Hercules 1 (VIP) sqn with Cessna 550 Citation II (UC-35); Cessna 650 Citation VII; CN235M; Gulfstream 550 3 sqn with CN235M 10 (liaison) flt with Bell 205 (UH-1H Iroquois); CN235M TRAINING 1 sqn with F-16C/D Fighting Falcon 1 sqn with F-5A/B Freedom Fighter; NF-5A/B Freedom Fighter 1 sqn with SF-260D 1 sqn with Hurkus-B; KT-IT 1 sqn with T-38A/M Talon 1 sqn with T-41D Mescalero AIR DEFENCE 4 bn with S-400 (RS-SA-21 Growler) 4 sqn with MIM-14 Nike Hercules 2 sqn with Rapier 8 (firing) unit with MIM-23 Hawk MANOEUVRE Air Manoeuvre 1 AB bde EQUIPMENT BY TYPE AIRCRAFT 306 combat capable FTR 27: 17 NF-5A Freedom Fighter; 10 NF-5B Freedom Fighter (48 F-5s being upgraded as LIFT) FGA 279: 19 F-4E Phantom 2020; 27 F-16C Fighting Falcon Block 30; 162 F-16C Fighting Falcon Block 50; 14 F-16C Fighting Falcon Block 50+; 8 F-16D Block 30 Fighting Falcon; 33 F-16D Fighting Falcon Block 50; 16 F-16D Fighting Falcon Block 50+ ISR 9: 5 Beech 350 King Air; 3 C-160D Transall; 1 CN235M (Open Skies) EW 2 C-160D Transall SIGINT 3 CN235M AEW&C 4 B-737 AEW&C TKR 7 KC-135R Stratotanker TPT 83: Heavy 9 A400M; Medium 24: 6 C-130B Hercules; 13 C-130E Hercules; 5 C-160D Transall; Light 49: 2 Cessna 550 Citation II (UC-35 - VIP); 2 Cessna 650 Citation VII; 45 CN235M; PAX 1 Gulfstream 550 TRG 171: 4 Hurkus-B; 33 SF-260D; 70 T-38A/M Talon; 25 T-41D Mescalero; 39 KT-IT HELICOPTERS TPT 35: Medium 20: 6 AS532AL Cougar (CSAR); 14 AS532UL Cougar (SAR); Light 15 Bell 205 (UH-1H Iroquois) UNINHABITED AERIAL VEHICLES CISR • Heavy 19 ANKA-S ISR 27: Heavy 9: 9 Heron; Medium 18 Gnat 750 AIR DEFENCE • SAM 32+ Long-range 32+: MIM-14 Nike Hercules; 32 S-400 (RSSA-21 Growler) Medium-range MIM-23 Hawk Point-defence Rapier AIR-LAUNCHED MISSILES AAM • IR AIM-9S Sidewinder; Shafrir 2(‡); IIR AIM9X Sidewinder II; SARH AIM-7E Sparrow; ARH AIM120A/B AMRAAM ARM AGM-88A HARM

Europe

Europe 157

158 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2022 ASM AGM-65A/G Maverick; Popeye I LACM Coventional AGM-84K SLAM-ER BOMBS Electro-optical guided GBU-8B HOBOS (GBU-15) INS/GPS guided AGM-154A JSOW; AGM-154C JSOW Laser-guided MAM-C; MAM-L; Paveway I; Paveway II

GAI-D01; 16 GDF-003; 3 Cessna 185 (U-17); 2 AS532UL Cougar; 1 Bell 205 (UH-1H Iroquois); 1 PB

Gendarmerie & Paramilitary 156,800

LIBYA: ε500; ACV-AAPC; Kirpi; 1 arty unit with T-155 Firtina; 1 AD unit with MIM-23B Hawk; Korkut; GDF-003; 1 CISR UAV unit with Bayraktar TB2

Gendarmerie 152,100 Ministry of Interior; Ministry of Defence in war FORCES BY ROLE SPECIAL FORCES 1 cdo bde MANOEUVRE Other 1 (border) paramilitary div 2 paramilitary bde

IRAQ: Army: 1,000; 1 cdo unit; NATO • NATO Mission Iraq 86 LEBANON: UN • UNIFIL 112; 1 PCFG

MEDITERRANEAN SEA: NATO • SNMG 2: 1 PCC • SNMCMG 2: 1 MHO QATAR: Army: 300 (trg team); 1 mech inf coy; 1 arty unit; 12+ ACV AIFV/AAPC; 2 T-155 Firtina SERBIA: NATO • KFOR 321; 1 inf coy; UN • UNMIK 1 SOMALIA: 200 (trg team)

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES RECCE 57+: Akrep; 57 Ates APC 760+ APC (W) 560: 535 BTR-60/BTR-80; 25 Condor PPV 200+: Edjer Yaclin 4×4; Kirpi; 200 Kirpi II AUV Cobra; Cobra II; Otokar Ural AIRCRAFT ISR Some O-1E Bird Dog TPT • Light 2 Do-28D HELICOPTERS ATK 9 T129B MRH 19 Mi-17 Hip H TPT 35: Medium 12 S-70A Black Hawk; Light 23: 8 Bell 204B (AB-204B); 6 Bell 205A (AB-205A); 8 Bell 206A (AB-206A) Jet Ranger; 1 Bell 212 (AB-212) UNINHABITED AERIAL VEHICLES CISR 24: Heavy 6 ANKA-S; Medium 18 Bayraktar TB2 BOMBS Laser-guided MAM-C; MAM-L

SYRIA: ε3,000; some cdo units; 3 armd BG; 1 SAM unit; 1 gendarmerie unit

Coast Guard 4,700 EQUIPMENT BY TYPE PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 108 PSOH 4 Dost PBF 60 PB 44 AIRCRAFT • MP 3 CN235 MPA HELICOPTERS • MRH 8 Bell 412EP (AB-412EP – SAR)

DEPLOYMENT AZERBAIJAN: Army 170; 1 EOD unit

FOREIGN FORCES Spain Active Fence: 150; 1 SAM bty with M901 Patriot PAC-2 United States US European Command: 1,800; 1 tkr sqn with 14 KC-135; 1 spt facility at Izmir; 1 spt facility at Ankara; 1 air base at Incirlik • US Strategic Command: 1 AN/TPY-2 X-band radar at Kürecik

United Kingdom UK Pound Sterling GBP GDP

GBP

2020

2021

2.11tr

2.24tr

USD

2.71tr

3.11tr

USD

40,394

46,200

Growth

-9.8

6.8

Inflation

0.9

2.2

GBP

48.3bn

52.3bn

USD

61.9bn

72.8bn

GBP

47.9bn

51.5bn

USD

61.5bn

71.6bn

0.78

0.72

per capita

Def exp [a] Def bdgt [b] USD1=GBP

2022

53.4bn

[a] NATO figure [b] Includes total departmental expenditure limits; costs of military operations; Armed Forces Pension Service; and external income earned by the MoD Real-terms defence budget trend (USDbn, constant 2015) 74.4

BOSNIA-HERZEGOVINA: EU • EUFOR • Operation Althea 242; 1 inf coy CYPRUS (NORTHERN): ε33,800; 1 army corps HQ; 1 SF regt; 1 armd bde; 2 mech inf div; 1 mech inf regt; 1 arty regt; 1 avn comd; 287 M48A5T2; 145 ACV AIFV; 70 ACV AAPC (incl variants); 418 M113 (incl variants); 36 M101A1; 36 M114A2; 12 M115; 30 M44T; 144 M52T1; 4 T-155; 18 T-122; 171 81mm mor; 70 M30; 135 HY-12; Milan; 66 ACV TOW; 219 M40A1; FIM-92 Stinger; 44 Rh 202; 78

60.4 2008

Population

2015

2021

66,052,076

Age

0–14

15–19

20–24

25–29

Male

9.0%

2.8%

3.0%

3.3%

30–64 65 plus 23.2%

8.4%

Female

8.6%

2.7%

2.9%

3.2%

22.6%

10.2%

Europe 159

UK defence policy is based on the armed forces providing credible nuclear and conventional deterrence. The armed forces are relatively well trained with a strong combat ethos and a wide range of combat, combat-support and logistic capabilities. They also have a role in supporting the management of domestic civil emergencies. Defence activity includes maintaining the nuclear force, sustaining a broad range of conventional capabilities, counter-terrorism and contributing to the counterISIS coalition and to NATO tasks, including in Eastern Europe, as well as international missions in Africa. In March 2021, the Integrated Review of Security, Defence, Development and Foreign Policy was followed by a Defence Command Paper that set out modernisation and restructuring plans. Russia is seen as the greatest direct threat to the UK and Europe. The documents underscored the intent to still play a leading role in NATO but with an increased focus also on the Indo-Pacific. The UK’s Carrier Strike Group carried out a series of exercises in the Indo-Pacific in mid-year and in September the UK signed the AUKUS defence and security partnership with Australia and the US. The government has indicated it will raise the ceiling on the number of nuclear warheads for the Trident submarine-launched ballistic missile. Base and support facilities in Germany, Cyprus, Kenya and Oman are to be expanded, with more forces using them as hubs. The Defence Command Paper indicated that frigate numbers will increase, while platform numbers will reduce in the army and air force. All three services’ personnel strength will be reduced, while reserves will remain at their current size. Strategic Command comprises key joint-force elements, such as special forces, defence intelligence and the military component of the civil/military National Cyber Force. A new Space Command was set up within the air force in early 2021 and spending on military space capabilities is increasing. Expeditionary logistic capability meets policy requirements, but peacetime logistic support within the UK is dependent on contractors. A new Defence and Security Industrial Strategy, issued in March 2021, set out navalbut not air- or land-procurement policy. Weaknesses in defence procurement persist. The UK’s sophisticated defence industry is globally competitive in some areas of defence exports but cannot meet all of the UK’s requirements.

ACTIVE 153,200 (Army 85,800 Navy 34,050 Air 33,350)

RESERVE 75,450 (Regular Reserve 36,050 (Army 23,950, Navy 5,600, Air 6,500); Volunteer Reserve 37,350 (Army 29,900, Navy 4,150, Air 3,300); Sponsored Reserve 2,050)

Includes both trained and those currently under training within the Regular Forces, excluding university cadet units

ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE Strategic Forces 1,000 Royal Navy EQUIPMENT BY TYPE SUBMARINES • STRATEGIC SSBN 4 Vanguard with 16 UGM-133A Trident II D-5/ D-5LE nuclear SLBM, 4 533mm TT with Spearfish HWT (recent deployment practice of no more than 8 missiles/40 warheads per boat; each missile could

carry up to 12 MIRV; some Trident D-5 capable of being configured for sub-strategic role) MSL • SLBM • Nuclear 48 UGM-133A Trident II D-5 (fewer than 160 declared operational warheads)

Royal Air Force EQUIPMENT BY TYPE RADAR • STRATEGIC 1 Ballistic Missile Early Warning System (BMEWS) at Fylingdales Moor

Space EQUIPMENT BY TYPE SATELLITES • COMMUNICATIONS 8: 1 NATO-4B; 3 Skynet-4; 4 Skynet-5

Army 81,800; 4,000 Gurkhas (total 85,800) Regt normally bn size. Many cbt spt and CSS regt and bn have reservist sub-units FORCES BY ROLE COMMAND 1 (ARRC) corps HQ MANOEUVRE Armoured 1 (3rd) armd div (3 armd inf bde (1 armd recce regt, 1 tk regt, 2 armd inf bn, 1 mech inf bn); 1 arty bde (2 SP arty regt, 1 MRL regt, 2 fd arty regt); 3 cbt engr regt; 1 sigs regt; 1 log bde (3 MP regt; 5 log regt; 3 maint regt; 3 med regt); 2 AD regt) Light 1 (1st) lt inf div (2 (4th & 51st) inf bde (1 recce regt, 1 lt mech inf bn; 1 lt inf bn); 1 (7th) inf bde (1 recce regt, 3 lt inf bn); 1 (11th) inf bde (2 lt inf bn); 1 engr bde (1 cbt engr regt, 1 CBRN regt, 2 EOD regt, 1 (MWD) EOD search regt, 1 engr regt, 1 (air spt) engr regt, 1 log regt); 1 log bde (2 log regt; 2 maint bn; 1 med regt); 1 med bde (3 fd hospital)) 1 (38th) inf bde (1 lt inf bn) 1 (160th) inf bde (2 lt inf bn) 2 inf bn (London) 1 inf bn (Brunei) Air Manoeuvre 1 (16th) air aslt bde (1 recce pl, 2 para bn, 1 air aslt bn, 1 fd arty regt, 1 cbt engr regt, 1 log regt, 1 med regt) COMBAT SUPPORT 1 (6th) cbt spt div (1 (Spec Inf Gp) inf bde(-) (4 inf bn(-)); 1 ISR bde (1 STA regt, 2 EW regt, 3 int bn, 1 ISR UAV regt); 1 (77th) info ops bde (3 info ops gp, 1 spt gp, 1 engr spt/log gp); 1 sigs bde (6 sigs regt)) 1 (geographic) engr regt 1 engr bn(-) (joint GER-UK unit) 1 sigs bde (2 sigs regt; 1 (ARRC) sigs bn) COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT 1 log bde (3 log regt; 1 maint regt)

Europe

Capabilities

160 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2022

Reserves Army Reserve 26,550 reservists

The Army Reserve (AR) generates individuals, sub-units and some full units. The majority of units are subordinate to regular-formation headquarters and paired with one or more regular units FORCES BY ROLE MANOEUVRE Reconnaissance 3 recce regt Armoured 1 armd regt Light 15 lt inf bn Air Manoeuvre 1 para bn COMBAT SUPPORT 3 arty regt 1 STA regt 1 MRL regt 3 engr regt 1 EOD regt 4 int bn 4 sigs regt COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT 11 log regt 3 maint regt 3 med regt 9 fd hospital AIR DEFENCE 1 AD regt EQUIPMENT BY TYPE ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES MBT 227 Challenger 2 RECCE 613: 197 Jackal; 110 Jackal 2; 130 Jackal 2A; 145 FV107 Scimitar; 31 Scimitar Mk2 IFV 388+: 388 FV510 Warrior; FV511 Warrior (CP); FV514 Warrior (OP); FV515 Warrior (CP) APC 805 APC (T) 409 FV430 Bulldog (incl variants) PPV 396 Mastiff (6×6) AUV 1,238: 399 Foxhound; 252 FV103 Spartan (incl variants); 23 Spartan Mk2 (incl variants); 396 Panther CLV; 168 Ridgback ENGINEERING & MAINTENANCE VEHICLES AEV 88: 56 Terrier; 32 Trojan ARV 284: 80 Challenger ARRV; 30 FV106 Samson; 28 Samson Mk2; 105 FV512 Warrior; 41 FV513 Warrior MW 64 Aardvark VLB 68: 35 M3; 33 Titan NBC VEHICLES 8 TPz-1 Fuchs NBC ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE • MSL SP Exactor-2 (Spike NLOS) MANPATS FGM-148 Javelin; NLAW ARTILLERY 598 SP 155mm 89 AS90 TOWED 105mm 114 L118 Light Gun MRL 227mm 35 M270B1 MLRS MOR 81mm 360 L16A1

AMPHIBIOUS • LCM 3 Ramped Craft Logistic AIR DEFENCE • SAM 74+ Short-range Land Ceptor Point-defence 74: 60 FV4333 Stormer with Starstreak; 14 Rapier FSC; Starstreak (LML)

Joint Helicopter Command Tri-service joint organisation including Royal Navy, Army and RAF units

Army FORCES BY ROLE HELICOPTER 1 bde (1 atk hel regt (2 sqn with AH-64D Apache; 1 trg sqn with AH-64D Apache); 1 atk hel regt (2 sqn with AH-64D Apache); 1 regt (2 sqn with AW159 Wildcat AH1; 1 trg sqn with AW159 Wildcat AH1); 1 regt (1 sqn with SA341B Gazelle AH1); 1 (spec ops) sqn with AS365N3; SA341B Gazelle AH1; 1 sqn with Bell 212 (Brunei); 1 flt with SA341B Gazelle AH1 (Canada); 1 ISR UAV regt; 1 maint regt) TRAINING 1 hel regt (1 sqn with AH-64D Apache; 1 sqn with AS350B Ecureuil; 1 sqn with Bell 212; Lynx AH9A; SA341B Gazelle AH1)

Army Reserve FORCES BY ROLE HELICOPTER 1 hel regt (4 sqn personnel only)

Royal Navy FORCES BY ROLE ATTACK HELICOPTER 1 lt sqn with AW159 Wildcat AH1 TRANSPORT HELICOPTER 2 sqn with AW101 Merlin HC4/4A

Royal Air Force FORCES BY ROLE TRANSPORT HELICOPTER 3 sqn with CH-47D/SD/F Chinook HC3/4/4A/6 2 sqn with SA330 Puma HC2 TRAINING 1 OCU sqn with CH-47D/SD/F Chinook HC3/4/4A/6; SA330 Puma HC2 EQUIPMENT BY TYPE HELICOPTERS ATK 50: 40 AH-64D Apache; 10 AH-64E Apache; MRH 66: 5 AS365N3; 34 AW159 Wildcat AH1; 27 SA341B Gazelle AH1 TPT 122: Heavy 60: 38 CH-47D Chinook HC6A; 8 CH47SD Chinook HC5; 14 CH-47F Chinook HC6; Medium 48: 25 AW101 Merlin HC4/4A; 23 SA330 Puma HC2; Light 14: 9 AS350B Ecureuil; 5 Bell 212 UNINHABITED AERIAL VEHICLES • ISR • Medium 7 Watchkeeper (37+ more in store)

Royal Navy 34,050

Royal Fleet Auxiliary

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE SUBMARINES 10 STRATEGIC • SSBN 4 Vanguard, opcon Strategic Forces with 16 UGM-133A Trident II D-5/D-5LE nuclear SLBM, 4 single 533mm TT with Spearfish HWT (recent deployment practice of no more than 8 missiles/40 warheads per boat; each each missile could carry up to 12 MIRV; some Trident D-5 capable of being configured for sub-strategic role) TACTICAL • SSN 6 2 Trafalgar with 5 single 533mm TT with UGM-109E Tomahawk Block IV LACM/Spearfish HWT 4 Astute with 6 single 533mm TT with UGM-109E Tomahawk Block IV LACM/Spearfish HWT PRINCIPAL SURFACE COMBATANTS 20 AIRCRAFT CARRIERS 2: CV 2 Queen Elizabeth with up to 3 Mk 15 Phalanx Block 1B CIWS (future capacity 24 F-35B Lightning II, 14 Merlin HM2/Wildcat HMA2/CH-47 Chinook hel) DESTROYERS 6: DDGHM 3 Daring (Type-45) with 2 quad lnchr with RGM-84D Harpoon Block 1C AShM, 6 8-cell Sylver A50 VLS with Aster 15/30 (Sea Viper) SAM, 2 Mk 15 Phalanx Block 1B CIWS, 1 114mm gun (capacity 1 AW159 Wildcat/AW101 Merlin hel) DDHM 3 Daring (Type-45) with 6 8-cell Sylver A50 VLS with Aster 15/30 (Sea Viper) SAM, 2 Mk 15 Phalanx Block 1B CIWS, 1 114mm gun (capacity 1 AW159 Wildcat/AW101 Merlin hel) FRIGATES • FFGHM 12: 6 Duke (Type-23) with 2 quad lnchr with RGM-84D Harpoon Block 1C AShM, 1 32-cell VLS with Sea Wolf SAM, 2 twin 324mm ASTT with Sting Ray LWT, 1 114mm gun (capacity either 2 AW159 Wildcat or 1 AW101 Merlin hel) 6 Duke (Type-23) with 2 quad lnchr with RGM-84D Harpoon Block 1C AShM, 1 32-cell VLS with Sea Ceptor SAM, 2 twin 324mm ASTT with Sting Ray LWT, 1 114mm gun (capacity either 2 AW159 Wildcat or 1 AW101 Merlin hel) PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 26 PSO 8: 3 River Batch 1; 5 River Batch 2 with 1 hel landing platform PBI 18: 16 Archer (14 in trg role, 2 deployed to Gibraltar sqn); 2 Scimitar MINE WARFARE • MINE COUNTERMEASURES 11 MCO 6 Hunt (incl 4 mod Hunt) MHC 5 Sandown AMPHIBIOUS PRINCIPAL AMPHIBIOUS SHIPS 2 LPD 2 Albion with 2 Mk 15 Phalanx Block 1B CIWS (capacity 2 med hel; 4 LCU or 2 LCAC; 4 LCVP; 6 MBT; 300 troops) (of which 1 at extended readiness) LOGISTICS AND SUPPORT 5 AGB 1 Protector with 1 hel landing platform AGS 4: 1 Scott; 2 Echo (all with 1 hel landing platform); 1 Magpie

Support and miscellaneous vessels are mostly manned and maintained by the Royal Fleet Auxiliary (RFA), a civilian fleet owned by the UK MoD, which has approximately 1,900 personnel with type comd under Fleet Commander AMPHIBIOUS • PRINCIPAL AMPHIBIOUS SHIPS 3: LSD 3 Bay (capacity 4 LCU; 2 LCVP; 24 CR2 Challenger 2 MBT; 350 troops) LOGISTICS AND SUPPORT 12 AOEH 4 Tide (capacity 1 AW159 Wildcat/AW101 Merlin hel) AORH 3: 2 Wave; 1 Fort Victoria with 2 Mk 15 Phalanx Block 1B CIWS AG 1 Argus (primary casualty-receiving ship with secondary aviation trg ship role) AKR 4 Point (not RFA manned)

Naval Aviation (Fleet Air Arm) 4,900 FORCES BY ROLE ANTI-SUBMARINE WARFARE 3 sqn with AW101 ASW Merlin HM2 2 sqn with AW159 Wildcat HMA2 TRAINING 1 sqn with Beech 350ER King Air 1 sqn with G-115 1 sqn with Hawk T1 EQUIPMENT BY TYPE AIRCRAFT TPT • Light 4 Beech 350ER King Air (Avenger) TRG 16: 5 G-115; 11 Hawk T1 HELICOPTERS ASW 58: 28 AW159 Wildcat HMA2; 30 AW101 ASW Merlin HM2 AIR-LAUNCHED MISSILES • ASM Martlet

Royal Marines 6,600 FORCES BY ROLE MANOEUVRE Amphibious 1 (3rd Cdo) mne bde (2 mne bn; 2 sy bn; 1 amph gp; 1 amph aslt sqn; 1 (army) arty regt; 1 (army) engr regt; 1 ISR gp (1 EW sqn; 1 cbt spt sqn; 1 sigs sqn; 1 log sqn), 1 log regt) 2 amph sqn EQUIPMENT BY TYPE ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES APC (T) 99 BvS-10 Mk2 Viking (incl 19 cabs with 81mm mor) ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTUCTURE MSL • MANPATS FGM-148 Javelin ARTILLERY 39 TOWED 105mm 12 L118 Light Gun MOR 81mm 27 L16A1 PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS • PB 2 Island AMPHIBIOUS • LANDING CRAFT 26 LCU 10 LCU Mk10 (capacity 4 Viking APC or 120 troops) LCVP 16 LCVP Mk5B (capacity 35 troops) AIR DEFENCE • SAM • Point-defence Starstreak

Europe

Europe 161

162 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2022

Royal Air Force 33,350 FORCES BY ROLE FIGHTER 2 sqn with Typhoon FGR4/T3 FIGHTER/GROUND ATTACK 4 sqn with Typhoon FGR4/T3 (including one joint QTRUK sqn) 1 sqn with Typhoon FGR4/T3 (aggressor) 1 sqn with F-35B Lightning II ANTI-SUBMARINE WARFARE 1 sqn with P-8A Poseidon (MRA Mk1) ISR 1 sqn with Shadow R1 ELINT 1 sqn with RC-135W Rivet Joint SEARCH & RESCUE 1 sqn with Bell 412EP Griffin HAR-2 TANKER/TRANSPORT 2 sqn with A330 MRTT Voyager KC2/3 TRANSPORT 1 (comms) sqn with AW109E/SP; BAe-146 2 sqn with A400M Atlas 1 sqn with C-17A Globemaster 1 sqn with C-130J/J-30 Hercules TRAINING 1 OCU sqn with A400M Atlas; C-17A Globemaster; C130J/J-30 Hercules 1 OCU sqn with F-35B Lightning II (forming) 1 OCU sqn with Typhoon FGR4/T3 1 OCU sqn with RC-135W Rivet Joint 1 sqn with EMB-500 Phenom 100 1 sqn with Hawk T1/1A/1W* 2 sqn with Hawk T2 1 sqn with T-6C Texan II 2 sqn with G-115E Tutor COMBAT/ISR UAV 2 sqn with MQ-9A Reaper EQUIPMENT BY TYPE AIRCRAFT 234 combat capable FGA 167: 23 F-35B Lightning II; 138 Typhoon FGR4; 6 Typhoon T3 ASW 8 P-8A Poseidon (MRA Mk1) ISR 6 Shadow R1 ELINT 3 RC-135W Rivet Joint AEW&C 3 E-3D Sentry TKR/TPT 10: 3 A330 MRTT Voyager KC2; 7 A330 MRTT Voyager KC3 TPT 46: Heavy 28: 20 A400M Atlas; 8 C-17A Globemaster; Medium 14: 1 C-130J Hercules; 13 C-130J-30 Hercules; PAX 4 BAe-146 CC2/C3 TRG 164: 5 EMB-500 Phenom 100; 86 G-115E Tutor; 28 Hawk T2*; 31 Hawk T1/1A/1W* (ε34 more in store); 14 T-6C Texan II HELICOPTERS MRH 5: 1 AW139; 4 Bell 412EP Griffin HAR-2 TPT • Light 3: 2 AW109E; 1 AW109SP UNINHABITED AERIAL VEHICLES CISR • Heavy 10 MQ-9A Reaper

AIR-LAUNCHED MISSILES AAM • IR AIM-9L/L(I) Sidewinder; IIR ASRAAM; ARH AIM-120C-5 AMRAAM; Meteor ASM AGM-114 Hellfire; Brimstone; Dual-Mode Brimstone; Brimstone II LACM Storm Shadow BOMBS Laser/GPS-guided GBU-10 Paveway II; GBU-24 Paveway III; Enhanced Paveway II/III; Paveway IV

Royal Air Force Regiment FORCES BY ROLE MANOEUVRE Other 6 sy sqn

Tri-Service Defence Helicopter School FORCES BY ROLE TRAINING 1 hel sqn with Bell 412EP Griffin HT1 2 hel sqn with AS350B Ecureuil EQUIPMENT BY TYPE HELICOPTERS MRH 3 Bell 412EP Griffin HT1 TPT • Light 27: 25 AS350B Ecureuil; 2 AW109E

Volunteer Reserve Air Forces (Royal Auxiliary Air Force/RAF Reserve) MANOEUVRE Other 5 sy sqn COMBAT SUPPORT 2 int sqn COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT 1 med sqn 1 (air movements) sqn 1 (HQ augmentation) sqn 1 (C-130 Reserve Aircrew) flt

UK Special Forces Includes Royal Navy, Army and RAF units FORCES BY ROLE SPECIAL FORCES 1 (SAS) SF regt 1 (SBS) SF regt 1 (Special Reconnaissance) SF regt 1 SF BG (based on 1 para bn) AVIATION 1 wg (includes assets drawn from 3 Army hel sqn, 1 RAF tpt sqn and 1 RAF hel sqn) COMBAT SUPPORT 1 sigs regt

Reserve FORCES BY ROLE SPECIAL FORCES 2 (SAS) SF regt

Europe 163

DEPLOYMENT ASCENSION ISLAND: 20 ATLANTIC (NORTH)/CARIBBEAN: 1 PSO; 1 AORH ATLANTIC (SOUTH): 1 PSO BAHRAIN: Operation Kipion 1,000; 1 FFGHM; 2 MCO; 2 MHC; 1 LSD 1 naval base

GULF OF GUINEA: 40; 1 PSO IRAQ: Operation Shader/NATO Mission Iraq 100 KENYA: BATUK 350; 1 trg unit KUWAIT: Operation Shader 50; 1 CISR UAV sqn with 8 MQ9A Reaper LIBYA: UN • UNSMIL (Operation Tramal) 1 MALI: Operation Barkhane 90; 1 hel flt with 3 Chinook HC5; UN • MINUSMA (Operation Newcombe) 256; 1 recce sqn NEPAL: 60 (Gurkha trg org) NIGERIA: 80 (trg team) OMAN: 90

BELIZE: BATSUB 12

PACIFIC OCEAN: 2 PSO

BRITISH INDIAN OCEAN TERRITORY: 40; 1 navy/marine det

POLAND: NATO • Enhanced Forward Presence 140; 1 recce sqn

BRUNEI: 2,000; 1 (Gurkha) lt inf bn; 1 jungle trg centre; 1 hel sqn with 3 Bell 212

SAUDI ARABIA: 50 (radar det)

CANADA: BATUS 370; 1 trg unit; 1 hel flt with SA341 Gazelle AH1

SOMALIA: 65 (trg team); UN • UNSOM (Operation Praiser) 2; UN • UNSOS (Operation Catan) 10

CYPRUS: 2,260; 2 inf bn; 1 SAR sqn with 4 Bell 412 Griffin HAR-2; 1 radar (on det); Operation Shader 450: 1 FGA sqn with 6 Typhoon FGR4; 1 A330 MRTT Voyager; 2 C-130J-30 Hercules; UN • UNFICYP (Operation Tosca) 327; 1 inf coy

SOUTH SUDAN: UN • UNMISS (Operation Vogul) 4

DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO: UN • MONUSCO 3 EGYPT: MFO 2 ESTONIA: NATO • Enhanced Forward Presence (Operation Cabrit) 828; 1 armd regt HQ; 1 tk sqn; 1 armd inf coy(+); 1 cbt engr coy FALKLAND ISLANDS: 1,200: 1 inf coy(+); 1 sigs unit; 1 AD det with Land Ceptor; 1 PSO; 1 ftr flt with 4 Typhoon FGR4; 1 tkr/tpt flt with 1 A330 MRTT Voyager; 1 A400M; 1 hel flt with 2 Chinook GERMANY: 185 GIBRALTAR: 570 (incl Royal Gibraltar regt); 2 PBI

SERBIA: NATO • KFOR 35

UKRAINE: Operation Orbital 53 (trg team) UNITED ARAB EMIRATES: 200; 1 tpt/tkr flt with C-17A Globemaster; A400M Atlas; A330 MRTT Voyager (on rotation)

FOREIGN FORCES United States US European Command: 9,500; 1 ftr wg at RAF Lakenheath (1 ftr sqn with 24 F-15C/D Eagle, 2 FGA sqn with 23 F-15E Strike Eagle, 1 FGA sqn with F-35 Lightning II (forming); 1 ISR sqn at RAF Mildenhall with OC-135/RC-135; 1 tkr wg at RAF Mildenhall with 15 KC-135R/T Stratotanker; 1 spec ops gp at RAF Mildenhall (1 sqn with 8 CV-22B Osprey; 1 sqn with 8 MC-130J Commando II) • US Strategic Command: 1 AN/FPS-132 Upgraded Early Warning Radar and 1 Spacetrack radar at Fylingdales Moor

Europe

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES AUV 24 Bushmaster IMV ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE • MSL MANPATS FGM-148 Javelin; NLAW

164 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2022

Chapter Five

Russia and Eurasia Russia’s core defence budget saw a mild nominal increase in 2021 but fell by 1.8% in real terms as the inflation rate reached 5.9%. Similarly, while total military expenditure is estimated to have reached RUB4.59 trillion (USD62.2 billion) in 2021, up from RUB4.46trn (USD61.6bn) the year before, this also constitutes a reduction in real terms of 5.2% down to USD55.7bn (constant 2015 USD). In late 2021, attention was again focused on Russia’s build-up of forces on the border with Ukraine and in Crimea. Russia’s April 2021 deployments in the same areas, under the pretext of conducting surprise exercises, involved between 25% and 33% of Russia’s total deployable ground forces. The November buildup again highlighted not just the resources Moscow could mobilise as part of its deployments, but also the supporting civilian – as well as military – infrastructure that enabled it to do so. Against the background of the continuing delay in developing and delivering armoured vehicles based on the new Armata, Kurganets-25 and Bumerang platforms, the MoD continues to modernise the current armoured-

The Aerospace Forces has begun taking delivery of the first of up to 24 upgraded Su-34 Fullback bombers, which include a broader set of weapons and the ability to be fitted with expanded weapons and reconnaissance pods. The first aircraft are assigned to the 2nd Regiment at Chelyabinsk in the Central Military District, with the type likely replacing the Su-24MR Fencer E.

Global total 19,605,000

Russia 900,000 Ukraine 196,600

Azerbaijan 66,950

40 5 30 0 20 -5

Year-on-year % change

USDbn, constant 2015

The navy continued testing sea-launched 3M22 Tsirkon hypersonic missiles, including the first surface and submerged firings from a submarine, the Yasen (Project 885) vessel Severodvinsk, in October. The first serial-production Tsirkon weapons are scheduled to go into service in 2022.

(25,000 per unit)

There was particular attention on the Airborne Forces (VDV) in exercise Zapad 2021. For the first time, the VDV practised a full battalion landing with BMD-4M airborne combat vehicles. During the same exercise a full battalion also carried out a night airborne assault.

Active military personnel – top 10

Russia real-terms total military expenditure, 2011–21 (USDbn, constant 2015)

vehicle fleet. The MoD signed an additional contract for an undeclared quantity of T-90M main battle tanks; some of these will be again upgraded from T-90As.

Uzbekistan 48,000 Belarus 47,950 Armenia 42,900 Kazakhstan 39,000 Turkmenistan 36,500 Georgia 20,650

-10 2011

2013

2015

2017

2019

2021

Kyrgyzstan 10,900

7.2%

Regional total 1,422,800

Russia and Eurasia 165

Regional defence policy and economics

166 ►

Arms procurements and deliveries

178 ►

Armed forces data section

181 ►

St Petersburg

Russia and Eurasia

Russia’s Military Districts

Northern Fleet Military District (stood up in January 2021) Joint Strategic Command of the Northern Fleet

Western Military District (Western Strategic Command) Joint Strategic Command of the Western Military District

Eastern Military District Joint Strategic Command of the Eastern Military District

Central Military District Joint Strategic Command of the Central Military District Yekaterinburg

Rostov-on-Don

Khabarovsk

Southern Military District Joint Strategic Command of the Southern Military District

Russia: Self-propelled gun/howitzers, 2007–21 2,875

250

1,618

2S1 2S3 2S5 2S19/2S19M1 2S19M1

1,500

1,000

Russia: Su-34 and Su-35 numbers, 2014–21

Su-34 Fullback Su-35 Flanker M

2S33/2S19M2 2S7 2S7M 2S35

200 94 150

950 850

52 100

550

500

350

245 130

100

2008

2021

50 60

112

122

124

2018

2020

2021

86 46

2014

2016

166 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2022

Russia and Eurasia Policy and strategy

In July 2021, President Vladimir Putin approved Russia’s revised National Security Strategy (NSS), updating the previous document from December 2015. The principal changes in the new version do not relate only to military issues, with attention paid to what some Russian analysts have termed ‘ideological issues’ concerned with confronting Western influence. The argument offered is that some states were apparently looking to ‘isolate Russia’ and ‘destroy its internal unity’. Indeed, there was a greater focus on Russia itself than before. Among the main non-military threats mentioned in the strategy was alleged activity in the information and psychological space directed at Russia from abroad, which aims to undermine traditional customs and beliefs and includes the ‘westernisation’ of Russian culture, indicating a concern about population security. Information security, meanwhile, was identified as a ‘separate national strategic priority’, according to Interfax (reporting after the NSS emerged) due to ‘growing threats in the digital environment’. If anything, these factors reinforce the view that one of the strategy’s key features was that it served to highlight Russia’s persistently broad conception of security. The United States is the only country named in the document within the context of military challenges to Russia (under the ‘National Defence’ section), notably the prospect of the US deploying mediumand short-range missiles to Europe and the AsiaPacific – which were considered a ‘threat to strategic stability and international security’ – and also, as in previous strategies, US missile defence. The NSS also criticised the ‘build-up’ of NATO military infrastructure near Russia’s borders. Reflecting the general state of relations, in October 2021 Moscow said that it would suspend Russia’s mission to NATO and withdraw the accreditation of the NATO Information Office in Moscow and the Alliance’s liaison mission at the Belgian embassy. Earlier that month, NATO had withdrawn the accreditation of eight members of Russia’s NATO mission, asserting that they were undeclared intelligence officers. The NATO–Russia Council remains, though this body has

not met since 2019. The NSS indicated, according to Interfax, Moscow’s view that ‘the desire of Western states to retain their hegemony’ increases ‘inter-state differences … and makes the global security system less efficient’. The document reflected, according to some Western analysts, a ‘more transactional view of international relations’. Russia’s new Defence Plan until 2025 also came into force in 2021 (it was signed by the president in November 2020). As before, this document – which sets out threat perceptions and outlines force dispositions and weapons programmes – is classified but, while there is little information available on its content, analysts understand that it addresses non-military as well as military threats.

Structural changes

On 1 January 2021, the Northern Fleet became Russia’s fifth military district. However, the Fleet has for several years held an independent status only slightly lower than that of a district, meaning that its reclassification did not bring significant structural changes. This upgrade nonetheless reflects the increased prominence given to the Arctic and the Northern Sea Route in Russia’s strategic plans. There has for some time been an aspiration to improve Russia’s military infrastructure and deployments in the Arctic. The region featured in the NSS, with the document indicating that Moscow considered that efforts focused on climate change and environmental factors could be used as an excuse to hinder Russian development of the Arctic. January 2021 saw MiG-31BM Foxhound C fighters begin patrols over the Arctic archipelago of Novaya Zemlya (flying from Rogachevo air base on Novaya Zemlya). Aircraft also conducted a test landing on Alexandra Land in the Franz Josef Land archipelago, even further north. The hard-surface airfield, opened in 2020 at Nagurskoye air base on Alexandra Land, is intended to enable the year-round deployment of aircraft. There are also plans to build heated hangars for storing and servicing aircraft. In March 2021 a pair of MiG-31BMs conducted a demonstration flight from Nagurskoye to the North Pole and back.

This was part of the ‘integrated Arctic expedition’ Umka 2021, which featured three ballistic missile submarines surfacing from under the ice in close proximity and also, according to the Ministry of Defence (MoD), an exercise involving elements of a motor-rifle brigade. Subsequently, some of the Northern Fleet’s Su-33 Flanker D fighters were also sent on rotation to the Arctic islands. The group of forces in northeastern Russia is another reflection of Moscow’s military focus on the region; these troops are mainly drawn from the Pacific Fleet and operate to the east of the Severnaya Zemlya archipelago up to the Kamchatka Peninsula. To the east, a flight of navy MiG-31BM fighters from Kamchatka was despatched to Anadyr on the Chukotka Peninsula bordering Alaska; the plan was to ultimately deploy Su-35S Flanker M fighters to Kamchatka. Aerospace and Ground Forces air-defence units have been moved to islands in the Russian Far East. The 1724th SAM Regiment of the Eastern Military District was redeployed to Sakhalin in 2021, and one of its two battalions was re-equipped with the S-400 (RS-SA-21 Growler) as part of the move. At the end of 2020, an S-300V4 (RS-SA-23) battalion from the Eastern Military District’s Ground Forces was noted on the Kuril Islands. In European Russia, while changes continue to take place in the Southern Military District, there has been emphasis also on structural reforms in the west and northwest. Defence Minister Sergei Shoigu stated that threats to Russia from NATO in the west had intensified and that the plan was to create 20 new formations and military units in the Western Military District by the end of 2021. Kaliningrad has been a focus of these moves. In late 2020, the 18th Motor-Rifle Division was stood up there as part of the Baltic Fleet’s 11th Army Corps, formed out of the Corps’ existing tank regiment and motor-rifle brigade. Although the 18th Division was therefore initially drawn from personnel already deployed in Kaliningrad, fully staffing the division will have the effect of increasing the number of military personnel permanently stationed in the Russian exclave. It has already begun receiving new equipment, such as T-72B3M main battle tanks (MBTs). Two more divisions are also now being established in the Southern Military District. The 19th MotorRifle Division and the 20th Motor-Rifle Division were created in 2020 and 2021 respectively by converting the existing 19th and 20th Motor-Rifle Brigades.

Unlike previous Southern Military District divisions, which were formed near to Russia’s borders with Georgia and Ukraine, the 20th is currently based deep inside the country in the Volga region, though it is understood to be assigned to the 8th Combined Arms Army (CAA) based at Novocherkassk. The longheld ambition to permanently base an additional Airborne Forces (VDV) regiment in Crimea seems to have been achieved and is in effect the re-scaling of the former 56th Air Assault Brigade to regimental size and its posting to Crimea under the 7th Air Assault Division. That such a move ultimately required the cannibalisation of an important existing formation suggests that tension remains between Russia’s ambitions in terms of force structure and the personnel available to meet them. Having in recent years established a permanent set of forces near the borders of Ukraine, with 28 Battalion Tactical Groups (BTGs) under the command of the 8th and 20th CAAs and the 22nd Army Corps, in April 2021 Russia demonstrated that these could be further strengthened. To exert political pressure on Ukraine, under the pretext of conducting surprise exercises, around 20 additional BTGs from the Ground Forces and the VDV with 15,000–18,000 personnel deployed from across the country to its borders and to Crimea. These reinforcements were primarily drawn from formations of the 58th CAA from the North Caucasus (Southern Military District) and the 41st CAA from the Central Military District, as well as elements from the VDV’s 7th and 76th Air Assault Divisions and were further bolstered when elements of the 98th Air Assault Division participated in a parachute drop in the exercises. Forces began to pull back a month later, though an increased presence was maintained at the border in field camps in the summer, supporting the elements of the 41st CAA later deployed in the Zapad 2021 exercise. In August, Shoigu announced that there was a total of 168 BTGs distributed between the Ground Forces, Naval Infantry and Airborne Forces, suggesting that the Ukraine build-up involved between 25% and 33% of Russia’s total deployable ground forces. A subsequent build-up in November aroused concern over Russia’s intentions, with some US sources positing that Russia was planning an invasion of Ukraine. However, this again highlighted not just the resources Russia could mobilise in its deployments but also the supporting civilian and military facilities and structures that enabled it to do so, not least the infrastructure it has in recent years built up in areas close to the border with Ukraine.

Russia and Eurasia

Russia and Eurasia 167

168 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2022

Personnel

According to the MoD, in the spring of 2021 the proportion of conscripts had fallen to about 30% of force strength. In the spring conscription campaign, 134,000 people were recruited and the plan was to call up 128,500 people in autumn. These figures have remained virtually unchanged for three years, though of course not all of these conscripts go to the armed forces, with some assigned to other organisations such as the National Guard or the Emergencies Ministry. A year earlier, it was reported that, in total, 405,000 contract soldiers and 225,000 conscripts were serving in the armed forces and, with the MoD claiming in January 2021 that the ratio of contract to conscript personnel was 1.8 to 1, these figures were still, officially, broadly accurate. At that time, the MoD said that contractors had increased by 30,000 in 2020 and had more than doubled in number since 2012 (the year Shoigu was appointed). A trial began in August, in the Southern Military District, to create a high-readiness mobilisation reserve force, called the National Army Combat Reserve (BARS). Civilians are being encouraged to sign a contract for three years as reserve soldiers, sergeants and officers, and they are then posted to a specific military unit and to a position within it. Once a year, the reservists will attend military-training camps for three weeks with two to three training days per month. In total, it is planned to recruit 38,000 of these reservists in the Southern Military District. The overall intent would seem to be not only to bolster overall reserve numbers but also to create a mobilisation reserve that addresses one of the concerns relating to skill fade that accompanied the old mobilisation model.

Ground and Airborne forces

Against the background of the continuing delay in developing and delivering armoured vehicles based on the new Armata, Kurganets-25 and Bumerang platforms, the MoD continues to modernise the current armoured-vehicle fleet. It signed an additional contract for an undeclared quantity of T-90M MBTs; some of these will be again upgraded from T-90As. Based on experience of the war in Syria, the army’s most numerous tank – the T-72B3 – has started to receive additional protection for urban operations. For the first time, this includes removable cage or lattice armour covering the top part of the turret, likely intended to protect not only against fire directed from the upper floors of buildings, but

also against top attack from some types of anti-tank missile or uninhabited aerial vehicles (UAVs). It was announced at the Army 2021 exhibition that BMP-3 infantry fighting vehicles would also receive cage armour sets and explosive reactive armour during a modernisation programme. In early 2021, the Ground Forces received the first batch of 20 Uran-9 uninhabited ground vehicles (UGVs). The 13-tonne armoured vehicles are equipped with a 30mm autocannon, an anti-tank guided-missile system and a launcher capable of firing thermobaric grenades. The contract has been ongoing for several years, though Russian analysts report that tests in urban combat in Syria left mixed impressions and that a final decision has yet to be made on the programme’s future. Meanwhile, a contract was signed for an experimental batch of Shturm UGVs. These have been developed from the T-72B3 main battle tank and are intended for urbancombat operations. It is understood that they will receive a shortened 125mm main gun and secondary weapons such as autocannons and unguided rockets. The Ground Forces are developing several small armed UAVs and have tested some on exercise. Russian analysts also report that a range of guided munitions has been developed (weights of 100kg, 50kg and 20kg were noted), and that loitering munitions were under development. Small UAVs with laser designators were tested during the Zapad 2021 exercise as well as in Syria. Although they do not carry weapons themselves, they illuminate targets that are then engaged by artillery units firing guided 152mm artillery shells and 120mm mortar rounds. There was particular attention on the VDV in Zapad 2021. For the first time, they practised a full battalion-landing with BMD-4M airborne combat vehicles. During the same exercise a full battalion also carried out a night airborne assault with associated equipment; the troops were equipped with night vision devices. Meanwhile, the Railway Troops have begun building a 340 km-section of the second line of the Baikal–Amur railway in Eastern Siberia; this is scheduled for completion in 2024.

Aerospace Forces

Several multi-year contracts were completed in 2020, which meant that there were fewer deliveries of new combat aircraft and helicopters in 2021 than in recent years. That said, Russia’s defence industry continues to experience problems in the serial production of new types of aircraft.

The first series-production Su-57 Felon joined the flight-test programme in December 2020. However, it was not delivered to a front-line unit, but was instead sent to the 929th State Flight Test Centre at Akhtubinsk. Perhaps up to three more of these aircraft are planned to be delivered by the end of 2021, with entry into service still some way off. According to the procurement plan, the first deliveries of the ‘tranche two’ Su-57, with a new, more powerful engine and improved avionics, will begin no earlier than 2024. One new system has attracted publicity but no interest so far from customers, the Checkmate singleengine fighter, a full-scale model of which was exhibited in July 2021 and shown to the president. However, as a number of journalists observed, he was not accompanied by armed forces personnel, perhaps indicating not just that there may be little MoD interest in the project, but also that it may be aimed at export markets. The Aerospace Forces has begun taking delivery of the first of up to 24 upgraded Su-34 Fullback bombers, which include a broader set of weapons and the ability to be fitted with expanded weapons- and reconnaissance-pods. The first aircraft are assigned to the 2nd Regiment at Chelyabinsk in the Central Military District, with the type likely replacing the Su-24MR Fencer E. The fatal crash of the prototype of the Il-112V light military transport aircraft in August 2021 dealt a serious blow to plans to update the Aerospace Forces’ transport aviation. The Il-112V is intended to replace the ageing An-26 Curl. The MoD admitted that the crash was a further setback in its effort to replace the An-26. Delivery of an upgraded version of the Il-76 Candid, the Il-76MD-90A, is also progressing more slowly than desired, which has prompted a new production line to be developed for the aircraft at Ulyanovsk. The aim is to be able to manufacture 10–12 aircraft a year. There has been some progress in army aviation. Even though tests of the upgraded Ka-52M Hokum were not complete, a contract was signed in August 2021 for the supply of 30 production aircraft in 2022–23. The Ka-52M and the Mi-28NM Havoc (which was combat tested in Syria) will be able to carry the KBM Item 305 air-to-surface missile, providing both types with a longer-range air-to-surface weapon. The missile has a range of 15 km.

UAV progress Up to 21 Inokhodets (also known as Orion) mediumaltitude, long-endurance UAVs are planned to be

delivered to the defence ministry by the end of 2023. Each system consists of three air vehicles and ground station and datalink equipment. The UAV is intended for air-to-surface attack as well as for intelligence surveillance and reconnaissance. Until Inokhodets enters service, Russia’s most capable UAV remains the Forpost, a version of the Israel Aircraft Industries’ Searcher II. An improved UAV, the Forpost-R, has been developed domestically and is reportedly capable of carrying small munitions. The most ambitious project remains in development: Sukhoi’s S-70 Okhotnik uninhabited combat aerial vehicle. In order to complete development work, the prototype will be joined by three more airframes that are under construction. The MoD has asked industry to accelerate development and start delivery of pre-production vehicles in 2024 rather than 2025. After a long delay, the first radar-equipped Pion-NKS satellite for the Liana space-reconnaissance system was launched in June 2021. The system is designed to detect warships and provide targeting information for long-range anti-ship missiles. The system already has three satellites in orbit for passive electronic reconnaissance. To provide global coverage, it will be necessary to significantly expand the number of satellites in the constellation, particularly those with active radars. A key development in air defence remains the roll-out of the S-500 ballistic-missile-defence surface-to-air missile system. Meanwhile, deliveries of S-400 systems continue. Four regiments were delivered in 2020, and two more were due before the end of 2021.

Navy

In 2021, the Caspian Sea Flotilla finished relocating its ships and headquarters from Astrakhan on the Volga River to newly built ice-free bases on the Caspian Sea in the cities of Makhachkala and Kaspiysk. This transfer was agreed in 2018, and the Flotilla now has much quicker access to the Caspian Sea than before. Despite industry presenting the MoD with several versions of the proposed Lider nuclear-powered destroyer, and an aircraft carrier, the navy remains sceptical about the capacity of Russia’s defence industry to build such large and complex warship designs. As a result, Russian analysts consider that the MoD is in no hurry to order larger units and that no major announcements can be expected before the adoption of the State Armament Programme (SAP) for 2024–33.

Russia and Eurasia

Russia and Eurasia 169

Kalibr Complex

Not to scale *dimensions unknown

3M22 Tsirkon* (In test)[4]

3M14K Kalibr-PL (SS-N-30A Sagaris) Dual Capable

LACM

1997

1996

1995

1994

1998

2000

1999

2002

1993

3M54K1 (SS-N-27)

2008

2007

2012

2010

2009

2013

2016

2015

2004

2003

3M54K (SS-N-27B Sizzler)

3M55 Oniks (SS-N-26 Strobile)

AShM

Spherical bow sonar array

08851

885

The Yasen is Russia’s first operational nuclear submarine class to feature a spherical bow sonar array which can provide a wider field of view particularly in the vertical (depth) axis compared to previous cylindrical arrays. Its comparatively larger size led to the repositioning of the torpedo tubes aft of the sonar, slanted outwards either side of the centreline.

Bow configuration

2018

Voronezh

2019

Vladivostok

Ulyanovsk

Perm

2014

Arkhangelsk[2]

Krasnoyarsk

Novosibirsk[1]

2011

2006

2005

Crew escape capsule

Kazan

2017

Up to 10 x 533mm torpedo tubes[3] Exact position, size and number remains unconfirmed

Possible reserve propulsion unit

Operational Service

Fitting Out/Sea Trials

Construction

Severodvinsk

2001

Procurement timeline 2020

In 2019, Malakhit showed a model of what could be a successor design, designated Laika (Project 545). The model indicated that this may be a slightly smaller design, with an apparent reversion to a cylindrical bow sonar, though accompanied by what appeared to be a conformal array running along almost the entire flank of the hull.

2021

Sources: IISS; Izvestia [1] Novosibirsk reportedly to be commissioned by end 2021 [2] Arkhangelsk reportedly to be launched by end 2021 [3] Some sources indicate torpedo tubes reduced to 8 for Yasen-M [4] Initial surface and subsurface test launches of 3M22 Tsirkon conducted from Kazan in October 2021

The VLS is dedicated to launching a range of guided cruise missiles, with eight payload tubes each typically configured as a 4-cell launcher allowing up to 32 Kalibrfamily missiles to be carried or an unknown unconfirmed number Oniks or Tsirkon missiles.

Vertical launch system (VLS)

Towed sonar array

Yasen-M (Severodvinsk II)

The Yasen/Yasen-M Project 885/08851 (Severodvinsk I/II)) SSGN class heralds a longawaited capability increase for Russia’s nuclear-powered attack submarine fleet. Hailed as a ‘multi-role platform’, the class is able to engage land targets in addition to surface and sub-surface vessels. Key to this is the inclusion of a vertical launch system (VLS) – a first for a Russian submarine not designed to carry submarine-launched ballistic missiles – likely permitting a greater number of embarked guided missiles than previous designs. Designed by the Malakhit Design Bureau, these boats are a further significant departure from Soviet-era design convention, featuring a spherical sonar array in the bow – common in US boats from the 1960s – instead of cylindrical array, and a ‘one-and-a-half’ hull design as opposed to the double hull seen in earlier Russian boats. Construction of the lead Yasen (Project 885 (Severodvinsk I)) was hampered by financial constraints, but procurement of subsequent Yasen-M (Project 08851 (Severodvinsk II)) boats is now proceeding at a steady tempo. These slightly shortened ‘serial production’ submarines are believed to incorporate further design improvements and refinements, with US officials describing them as now ‘on par’ with their current Virginia-class SSGN in terms of acoustic detectability. Despite the Yasen-M’s greater displacement, when compared to the Virginia-class, it reportedly requires less than half the crew compliment with only 64 personnel – suggesting reliance on a much higher degree of automation.

170 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2022

▼ Figure 10 Russia Yasen/Yasen-M (Project 885/08851 (Severodvinsk I/II)) SSGN

Due to delays in the supply of propulsion components, the completion of repairs to the aircraft carrier Admiral Kuznetsov has been postponed to 2023. For similar reasons, the long-running overhaul and modernisation of the Admiral Nakhimov nuclearpowered cruiser has also been further delayed. Otherwise, much attention was focused on the navy’s continued testing of sea-launched 3M22 Tsirkon hypersonic missiles, including in October the first surface and submerged firings from a submarine, the Yasen (Project 885) vessel Severodvinsk. The special-mission submarine Belgorod, designed among other reasons to deploy the Poseidon nuclearpowered and potentially nuclear-tipped large uninhabited underwater vehicle, also began sea trials in June. In August 2021, contracts were signed for the delivery of the final version of Tsirkon and an additional batch of air-launched Kinzhal (RS-AS-24 Killjoy) missiles. The quantity was not disclosed. The first serial-production Tsirkon weapons are scheduled to go into service in 2022. On 23 August, two Project 955A Borey-A nuclearpowered ballistic-missile submarines (SSBNs) were laid down – the ninth and tenth so far of the type, including the original three Project 955 Boreyclass (Dolgorukiy) SSBNs. They are scheduled to be commissioned in 2026 and 2027. The plan is that by that time all versions of the Soviet-era Kalmar (Delta III) and Delfin (Delta IV) SSBNs will be withdrawn from service. It is possible that a decision will be made to build additional Boreys or upgraded versions of them. There are continued reports that design work has started on a fifth-generation SSBN, but there is no information on the proposed design. The third improved Yasen-M (Project 08851 (Severodvinsk II)) nuclear-powered submarine, Krasnoyarsk, was launched at the end of July. These boats have been developed from the prototype, the Severodvinsk. The first submarine of the improved design, the Kazan, was accepted in May 2021 after lengthy sea trials and weapons tests. In March 2021, the launch took place of the third of six non-nuclear submarines of the Varshavyanka-class (Project 06363 (Improved Kilo)) intended for the Pacific Fleet. Construction of all this batch is planned to end in 2024. There are reports of plans to equip the Baltic Fleet with a further improved version of the design. Serious problems continue to trouble the alternative Lada (Project 677 (Petersburg)) non-nuclear submarine design. Completion is more than three years overdue, according to the latest schedule revi-

sion, and difficulty in developing an air-independent propulsion (AIP) system has meant plans to fit AIP to this class have so far been abortive. Nonetheless, it has been announced that two more of these submarines are expected to be laid down – the fourth and fifth so far, with a sixth reportedly also on order – although whether any of these will receive AIP remains uncertain. At the time of writing, only the prototype of the class was in service. Procurement continues of the Project 22350 (Gorshkov) frigates that will be the mainstay of the navy’s modern blue-water surface capability for the foreseeable future. The third vessel, the Admiral Golovko, is being fitted out and has received the first Russian-made gas turbines intended for the class in place of Ukrainian engines; these supply problems contributed to delays in the programme. According to Russian media reports, a further substantially more modified and enlarged design, the Project 22350M, is planned, with the first vessel to be laid down in 2023. Full-load displacement would increase from some 5,400 to 8,000 tonnes. At the end of 2020, the Baltic Fleet accepted the third small missile corvette of the Karakurt (Project 22800 (Uragan)) class, the Odintsovo, which is capable of carrying the 3M14 Kalibr (RS-SS-N-30A Sagaris) landattack cruise missile and the 3M55 Onyx (RS-SS-N-26 Strobile) anti-ship missile. Unlike its predecessors, which had only rudimentary defence against aerial threats, this ship has been fitted with the Pantsir-M air-defence missile system. Subsequent ships in the series will also be equipped with Pantsir-M. Construction has started on two Project 23900 ‘universal landing ships’ or large-deck amphibious assault ships (LHDs) at the Kerch shipyard in Crimea. The first of these LHDs is expected to be built and handed over to the navy by 2028. At the end of 2020, the Baltic Fleet received the second Project 11711 (Gren) tank landing ship (LST), the Pyotr Morgunov. Two more ships are under construction as part of this project, with a much-modified landing platform dock (LPD) design. These LPDs are expected to have increased displacement and improved amphibious landing capability.

Strategic Rocket Forces

According to the MoD, the share of new technology in the Strategic Rocket Forces (RVSN) has grown from 40% to 83% over the past six years. Most progress has been made in recapitalising the mobile RS-12PM Topol and RS-12PM2 Topol-M (RS-SS-27

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Russia and Eurasia 171

172 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2022

mod 1) intercontinental ballistic missiles with the new RS-24 Yars and RS-24 Yars-S. Four of the seven roadmobile intercontinental ballistic-missile divisions, the 14th, 29th, 39th and 42nd, have fully converted to Yars/Yars-S, while one more division (35th) should complete conversion to Yars-S by the end of 2021. Of the other two divisions, the 54th is operating a mix of Yars and Topol-M and only the 7th is still operating the original Topol systems. The plan is to retire both Topol and Topol-M in 2024. It has proven more difficult for the RVSN to replace its silo-based heavy liquid-propellant missiles. The silo version of Yars is being delivered to the 28th Missile Division in the Kaluga region. The rearmament of regiments equipped with the ageing RS-18 and RS-20 designs in three other missile divisions is still on hold due to the delay in testing the RS-28 Sarmat (RS-SS-X-29) intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM). None of the three scheduled Sarmat test launches had taken place by the beginning of October 2021, which means the plan to put into service the first of these missiles in 2022 will likely not be fulfilled. Nevertheless, work to re-equip silos and auxiliary infrastructure for them is already underway at the 62nd Missile Division in Krasnoyarsk Territory. Meanwhile, the 13th Missile Division plans to finish rearming its first silo regiment with the Avangard hypersonic boost-glide vehicle system by the end of 2021. It has already converted four silos to house the interim modified RS-18 launch vehicle, and a final two are expected to be complete by the end of the year. A second regiment of the same type is planned to achieve initial capability by the end of 2023.

from 2.7% to 3.0%. Total military expenditure, which includes elements such as military housing and pensions that are sourced from other budget areas, increased from 3.9% of GDP in 2019 to 4.2% in 2020. The federal budget for 2021 was based on a forecast real GDP growth rate of 3.3% and proposed a mild nominal reduction in defence funding from RUB3.17 trillion (USD43.8 billion) in 2020 to RUB3.12tr (USD42.3bn). However, as the economic outlook improved – the IMF estimate is that 2021 real GDP growth will reach 4.7% in Russia – the budget was amended upwards to RUB3.38tr (USD45.8bn) which meant that it constituted a mild nominal increase over 2020. In real terms, however, the core budget in 2021 fell from USD41.7bn to USD41.0bn (constant 2015 USD). Similarly, while total military expenditure is estimated to have reached RUB4.59tr (USD62.2bn) in 2021, up from RUB4.46tr (USD61.6bn) the year before, this also constitutes a reduction in real terms of 5.2% because of Russia’s 5.9% inflation rate in 2021. The 2021 budget also fell as a proportion of GDP to 3.8%. In 2020 the MoD indicated that the main target of the SAP for 2011–20 – that the inventory should by the end of this period comprise 70% of ‘modern’ weapons and other military equipment – had been achieved. The growth rate of military spending subsequently started to moderate, and this trend is set to continue to 2024. The budget law for 2022–24 indicates mild nominal increases for defence, though as a proportion of GDP, total military spending would fall from 3.8% in 2021 to less than 3.4% by 2024. The scale of the annual state defence order (SDO) for 2021 has not been revealed but analysts estimate

DEFENCE ECONOMICS The Russian economy faced severe headwinds in the wake of the 2014–16 oil-price crash, with economic growth averaging just 0.94% between 2014 and 2019. Military spending grew rapidly from 2012–15, with a surge in spending on the State Armament Programme (SAP), but it declined in both nominal and real terms during 2016–18, and then recovered modestly in 2019, as shown in Table 6. However, the coronavirus pandemic derailed this mild recovery, as the 2020 drop in oil prices, reduction in global economic activity and domestic lockdown restrictions resulted in a 3.1% contraction in real GDP. Despite this, Russia’s core ‘National Defence’ budget increased in 2020 and rose sharply as a percentage of GDP,

▼ Figure 11 Russia: defence expenditure as % of GDP

4.47 4.03

% of GDP

Macroeconomics and defence spending

3.78

3.85

2018

2019

4.17 3.77

3 2 1 0

2016

2017

2020

2021

2021 Defence Spending (USDbn) Russia and Eurasia 173

Real % Change (2020–21) Between 10% and 20% increase Between 3% and 10% increase Between 0% and 3% increase Between 0% and 3% decrease Between 3% and 10% decrease More than 10% decrease Insufficient data © IISS

62.18 2 1 .5 .1 [1] Map illustrating 2021 planned defence-spending levels (in USD at market exchange rates), as well as the annual real percentage change in planned defence spending between 2019 and 2020 (at constant 2015 prices and exchange rates). Percentage changes in defence spending can vary considerably from year to year, as states revise the level of funding allocated to defence. Changes indicated here highlight the short-term trend in planned defence spending between 2019 and 2020. Actual spending changes prior to 2019, and projected spending levels post-2020, are not reflected.

Russia*

* Total defence expenditure

Russia and Eurasia

Belarus

Ukraine Moldova Kazakhstan Uzbekistan

Georgia Armenia

Azerbaijan

Kyrgyzstan

Turkmenistan Tajikistan

▲ Map 3 Russia and Eurasia: regional defence spending1 that it will be approximately RUB1.5tr (USD20.3bn), similar to that of 2020. This means that in real terms it is now declining. Although the coronavirus pandemic has had a serious impact on Russia’s economic performance, defence-industrial output has not been significantly

affected. The recovery in the first nine months of 2021 was aided by an increase in oil price. This boosted budget revenues because, while the 2021 budget was based on a forecast of USD45.3 per barrel, the actual price from January–August averaged USD65 per barrel.

Table 6 Russia: defence expenditure, 2011–21 Year

20215 2020 2019 2018 2017 2016 2015 2014 2013 2012 2011

‘National Defence’

Annual state defence order (SDO)

Total military expenditure1

RUB (trillion)

USD2 (billion)

% of GDP3

RUB (trillion)4

As % ‘ND’

RUB (trillion)

USD2 (billion)

% of GDP3

% change real terms

3.381 3.169 2.997 2.827 2.6667 2.9827 3.181 2.479 2.104 1.812 1.516

41.0 41.7 39.8 38.8 40.2 47.3 51.9 43.4 39.6 35.9 32.7

2.78 2.96 2.74 2.72 2.90 3.48 3.83 3.14 2.89 2.66 2.52

1.500 1.500 1.500 1.450 1.400 1.600 1.800 1.450 0.894 0.677 0.575

48.1 47.3 50.1 51.3 52.5 53.7 56.6 58.5 42.5 37.4 37.9

4.5906 4.460 4.211 3.928 3.7047 3.8317 4.026 3.224 2.787 2.505 2.029

55.7 58.8 56.0 53.8 55.8 60.8 65.7 56.5 52.5 49.7 43.8

3.77 4.17 3.85 3.78 4.03 4.47 4.85 4.08 3.82 3.68 3.38

-5.2 5.0 4.0 -3.6 -8.2 -7.5 16.4 7.6 5.6 13.4 3.6

1. According to the NATO definition. 2. Constant 2015 USD. 3. GDP data from IMF World Economic Outlook database, October 2021. 4. Approximate; the annual SDO is classified but every few years an approximate total is released. 5. As budget listing, 1 September 2021. 6. Estimate based on higher 2021 ‘National Defence’ budget listing on 1 September 2021. 7. Excluding a one-off payment to reduce accumulated debts of defence-industry enterprises under the scheme of state-guaranteed credits. If this debt payment is included, the total GDP share in 2016 rises to 5.4%, and 4.2% in 2017.

174 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2022

However, one issue for the defence industry is that the cost of some weapons has increased, including a 25% increase in the cost of naval ships arising from increased metals prices. Without compensation by the MoD from budget sources, rising costs could further undermine the profitability of many companies, exacerbating the problem of large accumulated debts experienced during recent years.

Weapons procurement

The key objective of SAP 2020 was to increase the share of modern weapons in the inventory to 70%. By the end of 2020 it is reported to have reached 70.1% and 71.9% is forecast for the end of 2021, with a goal to reach 72.9% at the end of 2023. Within the framework of SAP 2020, the rate at which the annual SDO delivery targets have been met has proven to be uneven, with signs that it moderated over time – notably for combat aircraft, with deliveries dipping after 2016. Meanwhile, surface ships saw uneven delivery rates after 2015, though this reflected the problem of replacing power units previously obtained from Ukraine with domestically-sourced alternatives. Unfortunately (and perhaps to conceal the extent of the slowdown) there has been reduced transparency, with less reliable information published on both SDO plans and on its implementation. The annual SDO is now based on the SAP to 2027, which was signed off by President Vladimir Putin in early 2018. Total funding of approximately RUB19tr (USD257bn) is to be allocated over the course of SAP 2027, plus an additional RUB1tr (USD13.5bn) for infrastructure relating to the deployment of new systems. Work has begun on the next SAP, for the years 2024–33, although this is hampered to some extent by the lack of a new long-term economic forecast on which firm funding decisions can be based. Provisionally it is expected to get at least RUB21–22tr (USD284–298bn) – in monetary terms much the same as earlier programmes – but in real terms much less. In preparation, the MoD will produce a document called ‘Basic Directions of Development of Armaments, Military and Special Equipment to 2038’ (‘special equipment’ being the term used for systems intended for the security services). There will also be a report to the president with an analysis and evaluation of security threats out to the year 2053.

Defence industry

The Ministry of Industry and Trade confirmed that defence-industrial output in 2020 was affected by the coronavirus pandemic, contracting by 7.7% compared with a growth of 1.7% in 2019. Output intended for exports, meanwhile, fell by almost 15% in 2020, following a 13.5% increase in 2019. Total employment across the sector remains relatively stable, with around two million working at almost 1,900 enterprises and research and development establishments. There have been no significant new organisational changes across the sector since the United Aviation Corporation (UAC) was absorbed into the Rostec state corporation. UAC is still undergoing internal restructuring, and there is a plan to merge the administrative and management functions of UAC subsidiaries into two new organisations dealing with aircraft manufacturers and design bureaux. However, the Sukhoi and MiG design bureaux will remain independent. The head office of the United Shipbuilding Corporation has now been relocated to St Petersburg, leaving in Moscow some departments that require regular direct contact with central government agencies. In 2017, when it became clear that the rate of growth of the annual SDO was going to moderate, authorities set an ambition for defence industries to diversify into the field of civil-sector high-technology. This process is progressing gradually, but is not without its problems. In 2020, the civil-sector share of total defence-industrial output reached 25.6% compared with 24% in 2019. Efforts are now focused on reaching the 2025 target of 30%. Deputy Prime Minister Yuri Borisov, who is responsible for the defence industry, said at a meeting with Putin in July 2021 that the peak of deliveries under the SDO had been passed, making attention to diversification more important, and that prospects for increasing weapons exports were not favourable. A large role is being played by the main bank serving the defence industry, Promsvyazbank, which has established a separate division to fund the development of new civilian projects and to give advice to companies. According to its head, Anton Drozdov, about one-third of enterprises have a civilian-focused output of less than 5%. In his view, at least RUB2tr (US27.1bn) will be required to finance the diversification programme, but there is a problem in that many of the proposed projects are of low quality, and the top managers of the defence companies are insufficiently motivated

Russia and Eurasia 175

Defence exports

The value of Russian arms exports has in recent years been relatively stable, notwithstanding the imposition of sanctions on some countries that have bought weapons from Russia and also the impact of the coronavirus pandemic. Indeed, the volume of sales increased in 2020. Export volumes are measured as ‘military-industrial cooperation’, which includes the sale of weapons and other military equipment, components, licence sales, repairs, servicing and training. The annual volume reported by the Federal Service for Military-Technical Cooperation (FSVTS) is shown in Table 7. The increase may relate to revenues earned by the widening network of repair facilities organised in recipient countries by Rosoboronexport, the state-owned company responsible for managing over three-quarters of all sales. In June 2021, the director of the FSVTS, Dmitri Shugaev, forecast that total exports in 2021 would reach about USD15bn, with a portfolio of orders at the beginning of the year of more than USD50bn. In July 2021, Aleksandr Mikheev, the general director of Rosoboronexport, claimed that most transactions are not in dollars but in roubles or the currencies of purchasing countries, with the increasing use of offset agreements. However, reaching agreements on terms can be problematic. It has been claimed,

for example, that Indonesia’s purchase of 11 Su-35s, agreed in 2018, has still not been implemented as Jakarta wants to make payment in goods such as palm oil, but the terms offered have not been acceptable to Moscow. But the principle accords with a concerted effort by Russia to reduce the use of dollars in foreign trade in order to minimise the impact of US sanctions.

ARMENIA After its defeat in the 44-day war with Azerbaijan in September–November 2020, Armenia was faced with the task of rebuilding and reforming its armed forces in light of the conflict and a changed strategic environment. There is, according to some Armenian analysts, a perception in the country that Armenia’s lack of a sufficient quantity and quality of attack and reconnaissance uninhabited aerial vehicles (UAVs) in the armed forces, and Azerbaijan’s extensive use of these, played a decisive role in the defeat. UAVs did play an important role, but this can be overstated. The war revealed other significant problems in Armenia’s armed forces, including poor mobility as well as ageing communications and command-and-control and reconnaissance systems. Institutional challenges were also highlighted, including in the threat assessment process, the provision of supplies and logistics support during combat, political management during wartime and staffing decisions in the army, as well as in the mobilisation system. For example, according to several high-ranking officers, by the time hostilities began, many units had not been withdrawn from their permanent bases in a timely manner and deployed. Martial law and mobilisation were declared on 27 September 2020 but the call-up of reservists during hostilities raised questions even at the time. For example, on 21 October, Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan urged citizens to organise them-

Table 7 Russia: Volume of military-technical cooperation and arms exports (USD billion, current) FSVTS military-technical cooperation Rosoboronexport TsAMTO arms sales % of world arms sales

2015

2016

2017

2018

2019

2020

14.5 13.0 11.2 15.0

15.0 13.0 11.4 14.0

15.3 13.4 12.5 14.4

16.0 13.7 15.1 17.8

15.2 11.0 14.1 15.4

15.0 13.0

FSVTS: Federal Service for Military-Technical Cooperation. TsAMTO: Centre for the Analysis of the World Trade in Arms, Moscow. The centre measures all arms exports in terms of current USD.

Russia and Eurasia

to focus on issues other than the implementation of military contracts under the SDO and for export. There is now interest in developing closer relations between companies in the defence sector and civilian firms, encouraging the latter to take on some defence work. There has, for instance, been growing interest in China’s experiences in the area of ‘military-civil fusion’. Overall, according to Minister for Industry and Trade Denis Manturov, defenceindustrial output has increased by 38% and labour productivity by almost 40% since 2014. He forecasts, notwithstanding the pandemic, that output will have increased by 5–6% in 2020.

176 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2022

selves into volunteer platoons of 30 men each, select a commander and apply to the military enlistment office. There was a mobilisation plan, but Armenian sources report that reservist call-ups had faced problems in recent years, with many call-up notices ignored and administrative challenges in posting reservist officers to the right occupation (such as artillery officers being mobilised as motorised infantry officers). Combined with low numbers of major call-up drills, these factors meant that the mobilisation system suffered significant problems during the conflict. Indeed, some Armenian analysts judge that during the war, the country was unable to significantly increase its forces in NagornoKarabakh, neither through regular army units nor through mobilised reservists, while questions were raised about the organisation, preparedness and management of those forces that were mobilised. Pashinyan’s administration was heavily criticised in a letter published by the General Staff in February. It demanded his resignation and was described by Pashinyan as a ‘coup attempt’. (Pashniyan subsequently resigned, prompting a June election, perhaps intended to regain legitimacy in the army.) Meanwhile, it was not clear whether in the aftermath of the war there was significant progress on a lessons-learned process, or a meaningful public or expert debate on this or on the future shape of the armed forces; indeed, it took until August 2021 for reform proposals to be laid before parliament. However, the authorities in Yerevan argue that military reform had already started, as was said by Deputy Minister of Defence Arman Sargsyan on 16 March 2021, when speaking at the session of the Parliamentary Committee on Defence and Security Issues. He said the priority was to create a more capable and professional army. A month later Pashinyan confirmed, during his election campaign, a plan to transition to a professional army. He also said that ‘the conscription system should be changed completely, the period of service should be shortened: there is an idea that every five years there should be a three-month service, so that young people learn basic combat skills’. This was also reflected in his party’s electoral programme for the June elections. It mentioned the ambition to professionalise Armenia’s armed forces. It also said that the Nagorno-Karabakh Defence Army should become fully professional and that the Russian peacekeeping force located in Nagorno-

Karabakh and in the Lachin corridor constituted a security guarantee for Nagorno-Karabakh. The party’s programme also envisaged replacing army units on the Armenia–Azerbaijan border with border guards from Armenia’s National Security Service. Later, on 22 August, Armenia’s Chief of General Staff (CGS) Artak Davtyan confirmed that the army was being replaced by border guards in some areas. (At the same time, Davtyan stressed that the armed forces carry out the tasks set by the political leadership of the country, perhaps with an eye to the events of earlier in 2021.) There have also been references in the Armenian press to the possibility that Russian border guards could be involved in border duties, as well as statements by officials, such as those in June 2021 by the Governor of Gegharkunik region Gnel Sanosyan, the First Deputy Prime Minister Tigran Avinyan and CGS Davtyan. Later, on 30 June, Andranik Kocharyan, Chairman of the Parliamentary Committee on Defence and Security Issues and a member of the ruling party, said in an interview that the reforms underway involve ‘new armaments; new, intelligent command and control; and a professional army’. According to Kocharyan, the professionalisation process will reduce personnel numbers while citizens of conscription age will undergo a training programme leading to recruitment into the army. While Kocharyan did not confirm the duration of this training, analysts consider that this was the same as that mentioned by Pashinyan when he spoke about a three-month period of service once every five years. After months of uncertainty, on 18 August Pashinyan announced the government’s programme for 2021–26. This was later submitted to parliament and approved. The 90-page document devotes three pages to defence. It confirmed the intention to cease conscription and gradually shift to a contract-based army, and also said that a new military doctrine and a national defence plan would be developed. Other plans included the intention to introduce an automated command-and-control system; to establish territorial defence, active reserve and militia training systems; to generate mobile formations and units with heavy weapons and the ability to conduct independent combat operations; and to improve military-technical cooperation with Russia to help the recapitalisation process. Some practical steps emerged in August. The government amended the regulations of the General Staff, adding to its structure a Territorial Defence

and Reserve Forces Command and an Armed Forces Unmanned Aerial Vehicles Department. In addition, plans appeared to set up a new Special Army Corps, which, according to Armenian specialists, included the remnants of the 1st Army Corps (which suffered heavy losses in the conflict) and the 4th Army Corps. The new corps appears to be engaged on border protection tasks. Meanwhile, the creation of a territorial-defence system was envisaged in a pre-war draft law that was submitted for public discussion on 24 August 2020 but was not adopted. Nevertheless, the creation of the separate UAV directorate seems to reflect the view that UAVs played a decisive role in the defeat. However, it is not clear how a separate UAV directorate will cooperate with the air force and air defence forces, not least as these forces already faced challenges in cooperating during the conflict, exemplified by reported ‘friendly-fire’ incidents that led to the loss of some aircraft. Nevertheless, the published programme indicates that while there may have been little discussion in public, there has been an internal debate within Armenian military circles, not least about the importance of mobility and the problems with mobilisation and command and control. But

other questions remain. One concerns the degree to which a downsized army, even if it is composed of contract personnel, can control a front line with Azerbaijan which has increased in length because of the war. Another relates to whether the envisaged three-month training system would be capable of producing an adequate combat-ready reserve and what reforms will be needed to produce an effective training regime for professional personnel. There are also questions about planned procurements. Some contracts were signed with Russia at the Army 2021 show at Kubinka, near Moscow, but there was no information on these contracts at the time of writing. Prior to the 2018 revolution, Armenia adopted a seven-year procurement programme. This was later revised by Pashinyan’s government and its fate is now unclear. It is likely that military defeat and equipment losses will change Yerevan’s priorities and that a new procurement programme will be developed. Russia will be Armenia’s principal partner in this process and on 11 August, Russian Defence Minister Sergei Shoigu – while hosting his Armenian counterpart Arshak Karapetyan in Moscow – said that Russia is ready to continue assisting the modernisation of Armenia’s armed forces.

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178 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2022

Arms procurements and deliveries – Russia and Eurasia Significant events in 2021

MARCH

UKRAINE SEIZES CONTROL OF MOTOR SICH

A Ukrainian court ruled that 100% of Motor Sich shares would be transferred to the state in a move that the head of the Security Service said concerned protecting ‘national security’. For several years previously, the privately owned company had been seeking Chinese investment. This caused concern in the US, because Motor Sich produces engines for cruise missiles, large transport aircraft and helicopters. In September 2021, President Zelensky spoke about the need for ‘state control’ rather than ‘state ownership’, suggesting that a ‘golden share’ arrangement might be the ultimate outcome. Media reports in Ukraine have suggested that the government may be looking for Turkish investment in Motor Sich.

MARCH

UAC REORGANISATION

Rostec announced that it planned to merge the administrative and management functions of United Aircraft Corporation (UAC) subsidiaries into two new organisations. The first will deal with aircraft manufacturers and the second, which will be based in Moscow, design bureaux. The company hopes that the move, which is expected to take several years, will achieve RUB130bn (USD1.87bn) in efficiency savings and transform the prospects of some of its companies, some of which are close to bankruptcy. Although it has often been suggested that Sukhoi and MiG would be merged, not least after Sukhoi won most of the recent large combat-aircraft deals in Russia, the plan so far seems to have had a limited impact on them, as these firms’ design bureaux will remain independent and engineering jobs will not be relocated. Several companies in UAC have recently experienced financial difficulties to fulfil some Russian aerospace programmes as they look to balance the economic viability of deals with affordability for the armed forces. Whether this restructure will be sufficient to improve the situation remains to be seen.

JULY

UKRAINE TO CONSOLIDATE DEFENCE INDUSTRY

Following plans announced in 2020, the Ukrainian parliament approved the reform of UkrOboronProm. This will see UkrOboronProm and its 137 subsidiaries split into six divisions (missiles, aviation, aircraft repair, armoured vehicles, radar and marine systems), while some enterprises will be privatised or wound up. A number of anti-corruption measures were also included in the second reading of the bill. Twenty-eight of the 137 firms generate 98% of UkrOboronProm’s revenue and the government hopes that the reorganisation, due to be completed by the end of 2022, will improve efficiency and competitiveness. UkrOboronProm performed above expectations in 2020, with a 74% increase in profits over 2019, but suffered in 2021 due to the pandemic and problems in securing funding for contracted work.

JULY

SUKHOI UNVEILS CHECKMATE DESIGN

Sukhoi unveiled what appeared to be an engineering mock-up of a fighter called The Checkmate at the MAKS air show outside Moscow. A single-engine model that shares some design characteristics with the larger Su-57, the aircraft is intended ‘primarily’ for export, according to local media. The Su-30, Sukhoi’s greatest export success of the past two decades, has seen over 260 Su-30MKI variants sold to India alone, while a domestic variant is also in service in significant numbers. It is unclear whether Checkmate will be able to emulate the Su-30’s success. Its development timeline is ambitious, with a first flight slated for 2023 and production in 2026, at a time when generally the international marketplace for combat aircraft is becoming increasingly crowded. As of November 2021, no customers had been announced for the project.

Russia and Eurasia 179

Belarus: defence procurement since 2010

The defence industry in Belarus is oriented more to providing subsystems to Russia’s defence industry, and maintenance and overhaul services for a range of customers, than it is towards developing and building complete platforms. Because of this, and the close political and political-military relationship between the two countries, Belarus acquires the vast majority of its defence equipment from Russia; this enables members of its industry to benefit from their position as subcontractors. At the same time, Minsk mostly procures

equipment that is already being acquired for the Russian armed forces. This has the advantages of ensuring relatively rapid delivery (for instance the first batch of Yak-130 Mitten training aircraft was delivered within 12 months) and greater interoperability with its neighbour’s forces. However, budget pressures mean that equipment is typically acquired in small batches. This has had the effect of limiting recapitalisation, with the majority of the inventory still consisting of platforms from the Cold War era.

Contract Equipment date

Type

Quantity

c. 2010

9K331ME TorM2E (RS-SA-15 Gauntlet) Dec 2012 Yak-130 Mitten

Short-range self-propelled surface-to-air missile system

Training aircraft

Jan 2013 9K331ME TorM2E (RS-SA-15 Gauntlet) c. 2014 Tigr

Short-range self-propelled surface-to-air missile system

Armoured utility vehicle

Jul 2014

Long-range self-propelled surface-to-air missile system

300mm multiple-rocket launcher

Jun 2015 Mi-8MTV-5 Hip

Medium transport helicopter

Aug 2015 Yak-130 Mitten

Training aircraft

Aug 2015 9K331ME TorM2E (RS-SA-15 Gauntlet) c. 2016 T-73B3 mod

Short-range self-propelled surface-to-air missile system

Main battle tank upgrade

c. 2016

CS/VN3B mod

Armoured utility vehicle

c. 2017

BTR-70MB1

Armoured personnel carrier (wheeled) upgrade Main battle tank upgrade

c. 2015

S-300PS (RS-SA-10B Grumble) Polonez

May T-73B3 mod 2017 Jun 2017 Su-30SM Flanker H Oct 2017 9K331ME TorM2E (RS-SA-15 Gauntlet) c. 2018 Cayman BRDM

Prime contractor Izhevsk Electromechanical Plant ‘Kupol’ Irkut Corporation

Deliveries Notes 2011–12 2015

2014 Izhevsk Electromechanical Plant ‘Kupol’ Minsk Wheeled Tractor 2015 Plant (MZKT) Russian government 2015–16 surplus Precision Electromechanics Plant (ZDEM) Kazan Helicopter Plant (KVZ) Irkut Corporation

2016

Izhevsk Electromechanical Plant ‘Kupol’ Uralvagonzavod (UVZ)

2016

ε64

Chongqing Dajiang Industrial Company 140 Repair Plant

2017– ongoing 2018–19

Uralvagonzavod (UVZ)

2018

Fighter ground-attack aircraft

Irkut Corporation

Short-range self-propelled surface-to-air missile system

4 ε18

Izhevsk Electromechanical Plant ‘Kupol’ 140 Repair Plant

2019– ongoing 2018

Uralvagonzavod (UVZ)

Donation

2016–17 2016

2017

c. 2018

T-73B3 mod

Armoured reconnaissance vehicle Main battle tank upgrade

c. 2018

Yak-130 Mitten

Training aircraft

Irkut Corporation

2020– ongoing 2019

Jun 2019 T-73B3 mod

Main battle tank upgrade

Uralvagonzavod (UVZ)

n.k.

c. 2018

Infantry fighting vehicle

31+

Arzamas MachineBuilding Plant (AMZ

2021– ongoing

BTR-82A

Russia and Eurasia

Table 8

2019

Donation

180 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2022

Figure 12

Russia: Airborne Forces (VDV) armoured-vehicle modernisation

Russia’s Airborne Forces (VDV) has been spared organisational upheavals of the kind experienced by the Ground Forces since 2008. Divided into Airborne and Air Assault forces, the VDV has kept its largely division-based structure. It fulfils several traditional airborne roles and is also earmarked for rapid-reaction tasks. It is with this last role in mind that several Air Assault formations have now been equipped with at least a company, and in some cases a battalion, of T-72B3 main battle tanks. While this limits the overall formations’ air deployability, the recent Russian practice of deploying Battalion Tactical Groups may mean this is less of an issue in reality. Meanwhile, at least 11 battalion sets of BMD-4M/

BTR-MDM airborne combat vehicles (ABCV) have now been delivered to replace BMD-1s and BMD-2s. These have been designed with significant commonality with the Ground Forces’ and Naval Infantry’s BMP-3 to reduce maintenance and production costs. BTR-82AM infantry fighting vehicles, widely utilised across the Russian armed forces, are being delivered to VDV reconnaissance units. BMD-2s are still being upgraded, however, perhaps as a budgetary compromise similar to the Ground Forces’ choice to modernise T-72s instead of mass producing new-build T-90s. Meanwhile, a new light tank, the Sprut-SDM1, is based on the BMD-4M chassis and is expected to complete state trials in 2022.

T-72B3 main battle tank Prime contractor: Uralvagonzavod (UVZ) Replacing: New capability. Since 2016, most of the air-assault divisions and brigades have been equipped with at least a company set.

BTR-82AM infantry fighting vehicle Prime contractor: Arzamas Machine-Building Plant (AMZ) Key subcontractors: KAMAZ Tulamashzavod Zavod Korpusov

Replacing: BMD-2 and BTR-D. Batches delivered to reconnaissance units of at least four brigades.

BMD-4M airborne combat vehicle Prime contractor: Kurganmashzavod (KMZ) Key subcontractors: Barnaultransmash Motovilikha Plants (MZ) Tulamashzavod Volgograd Tractor Plant (VgTZ)

BTR-MDM tracked armoured personnel carrier

Replacing: BMD-4M: BMD-2 BTR-MDM: BTR-D At least 11 battalion sets delivered since production began in 2015 as well as batches to training centres.

Russia and Eurasia 181

Armenia ARM

ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE 2020

2021

AMD

6.18tr

7.03tr

USD

12.6bn

13.6bn 4,595

per capita

USD

4,267

Growth

-7.4

6.5

Inflation

1.2

6.9

AMD

307bn

312bn

USD

628m

603m

489.02

516.54

Def bdgt [a] USD1=AMD

2022

[a] Includes imported military equipment, excludes military pensions Real-terms defence budget trend (USDm, constant 2015) 609 344 2008

Population

2015

2021

3,011,609

Age

0–14

15–19

20–24

25–29

30–64 65 plus

Male

9.7%

2.9%

3.1%

3.6%

24.1%

5.4%

Female

8.7%

2.6%

2.8%

3.6%

25.7%

7.8%

Capabilities The armed forces’ main focus is territorial defence, and a resumption of armed conflict with Azerbaijan over NagornoKarabakh after September 2020 saw forces mobilised and losses of both personnel and equipment. A government plan for 2021– 26, approved in August, indicated an aspiration to move to a contract-based force, improve reserve structures and produce new defence plans and doctrines. A new UAV department was created in August. In the wake of the 2020 conflict, Armenia is looking to improve its UAV inventory, and likely its ground-based air defence. Coordination between the services reportedly remains a problem. Armenia is a member of the CSTO and maintains close defence ties with Russia, centred on equipment procurement, technical advice and personnel-training programmes. Military doctrine remains influenced by Russian thinking. Relations with Iran are also developing. Armenia is also engaged in a NATO Individual Partnership Action Plan. Conscription continues, but there is a growing cohort of professional officers. Personnel train regularly and take part in annual CSTO exercises and in bilateral drills with Russia. Equipment is mainly of Russian origin. Agreements have been reached in recent years to purchase modern Russian systems, though only in small quantities to date. Serviceability and maintenance of mainly ageing aircraft have been a problem for the air force. There is some capacity to manufacture defence equipment for the domestic market, including electro-optics, light weapons and UAVs, but Armenia is reliant on Russia for other equipment platforms and military systems.

ACTIVE 42,900 (Army 40,000 Air/AD Aviation Forces (Joint) 1,100 other Air Defence Forces 1,800) Paramilitary 4,300 Conscript liability 24 months

RESERVE Some mobilisation reported, possibly 210,000 with military service within 15 years

Army ε40,000 FORCES BY ROLE SPECIAL FORCES 1 SF bde MANOEUVRE Mechanised 1 (Special) corps (1 recce bn, 1 tk bn(-), 5 MR regt, 1 sigs bn, 1 maint bn) 1 (2nd) corps (1 recce bn, 1 tk bn, 2 MR regt, 1 lt inf regt, 1 arty bn) 1 (3rd) corps (1 recce bn, 1 tk bn, 5 MR regt, 1 arty bn, 1 MRL bn, 1 sigs bn, 1 maint bn) 1 (5th) corps (2 MR regt) Other 1 indep MR trg bde COMBAT SUPPORT 1 arty bde 1 MRL bde 1 AT regt 1 AD bde 2 AD regt 2 (radiotech) AD regt 1 engr regt SURFACE-TO-SURFACE MISSILE 1 SRBM regt EQUIPMENT BY TYPE Available estimates should be treated with caution following losses suffered in the fighting in late 2020 in Nagorno-Karabakh ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES MBT 109: 3 T-54; 5 T-55; ε100 T-72A/B; 1 T-90A RECCE 12 BRM-1K (CP) IFV 140: 100 BMP-1; 25 BMP-1K (CP); 15 BMP-2 APC 150 APC (T) 20 MT-LB APC (W) 130: 108 BTR-60 (incl variants); 18 BTR-70; 4 BTR-80 AUV Tigr ENGINEERING & MAINTENANCE VEHICLES AEV MT-LB ARV BREhM-D; BREM-1 ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE MSL • SP 22+: 9 9P148 Konkurs (RS-AT-5 Spandrel); 13 9P149 Shturm (RS-AT-6 Spiral); 9K129 Kornet-E (RSAT-14 Spriggan) ARTILLERY 225 SP 37: 122mm 9 2S1 Gvozdika; 152mm 28 2S3 Akatsiya TOWED 122: 122mm 60 D-30; 152mm 62: 26 2A36 Giatsint-B; 2 D-1; 34 D-20 MRL 54: 122mm up to 50 BM-21 Grad; 273mm 2 WM-80; 300mm 2 9A52 Smerch MOR 120mm 12 M120 SURFACE-TO-SURFACE MISSILE LAUNCHERS SRBM • Conventional 14: 7+ 9K72 Elbrus (RS-SS-1C Scud B); 3+ 9K79 Tochka (RS-SS-21 Scarab); 4 9K720 Iskander-E

Russia and Eurasia

Armenian Dram AMD GDP

182 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2022 UNINHABITED AERIAL VEHICLES ISR • Light Krunk AIR DEFENCE SAM Medium-range 2K11 Krug (RS-SA-4 Ganef); S-75 Dvina (RS-SA-2 Guideline); 9K37M Buk-M1 (RS-SA-11 Gadfly) Short-range 2K12 Kub (RS-SA-6 Gainful); S-125 Pechora (RS-SA-3 Goa); 9K331MKM Tor-M2KM Point-defence 9K33 Osa (RS-SA-8 Gecko); 9K35M Strela-10 (RS-SA-13 Gopher); 9K310 Igla-1 (RS-SA-16 Gimlet); 9K38 Igla (RS-SA-18 Grouse); 9K333 Verba (RSSA-29 Gizmo); 9K338 Igla-S (RS-SA-24 Grinch) GUNS SP 23mm ZSU-23-4 Shilka TOWED 23mm ZU-23-2

Air and Air Defence Aviation Forces 1,100 1 Air & AD Joint Command FORCES BY ROLE GROUND ATTACK 1 sqn with Su-25/Su-25UBK Frogfoot EQUIPMENT BY TYPE AIRCRAFT 17 combat capable FGA 4 Su-30SM Flanker H ATK 13: up to 12 Su-25 Frogfoot; 1 Su-25UBK Frogfoot TPT 4: Heavy 3 Il-76 Candid; PAX 1 A319CJ TRG 14: 4 L-39 Albatros; 10 Yak-52 HELICOPTERS ATK 7 Mi-24P Hind ISR 4: 2 Mi-24K Hind; 2 Mi-24R Hind (cbt spt) MRH 10 Mi-8MT (cbt spt) C2 2 Mi-9 Hip G (cbt spt) TPT • Light 7 PZL Mi-2 Hoplite AIR DEFENCE • SAM • Long-range S-300PT (RS-SA-10 Grumble); S-300PS (RS-SA-10B Grumble)

DEPLOYMENT LEBANON: UN • UNIFIL 32 MALI: UN • MINUSMA 1 SERBIA: NATO • KFOR 40

FOREIGN FORCES Russia 3,500: 1 mil base with (1 MR bde; 74 T-72; 80 BMP1; 80 BMP-2; 12 2S1; 12 BM-21); 1 ftr sqn with 18 MiG-29 Fulcrum; 4 Su-30SM Flanker H; 1 hel sqn with 11 Mi-24P Hind; 4 Mi-8AMTSh Hip; 4 Mi-8MT Hip; 2 SAM bty with S-300V (RS-SA-12 Gladiator/Giant); 1 SAM bty with Buk-M1-2 (RS-SA-11 Gadfly)

Azerbaijan AZE Azerbaijani Manat AZN

2020

2021

AZN

72.4bn

89.5bn

USD

42.6bn

52.6bn

USD

4,232

5,167

Growth

-4.3

3.0

Inflation

2.8

4.4

AZN

3.85bn

4.59bn

USD

2.27bn

2.70bn

1.70

GDP per capita

Def bdgt [a] USD1=AZN

2022

[a] Official defence budget. Excludes a significant proportion of procurement outlays. Real-terms defence budget trend (USDbn, constant 2015) 2.61 1.15 2008

Population

2015

2021

10,282,283

Age

0–14

15–19

20–24

25–29

Male

11.9%

3.5%

4.4%

23.3%

3.0%

Police

Female

10.6%

3.0%

3.1%

4.1%

24.9%

4.7%

FORCES BY ROLE MANOEUVRE Other 4 paramilitary bn

Capabilities

Gendarmerie & Paramilitary 4,300

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES RECCE 5 BRM-1K (CP) IFV 45: 44 BMP-1; 1 BMP-1K (CP) APC • APC (W) 24 BTR-60/BTR-70/BTR-152 ABCV 5 BMD-1

Border Troops Ministry of National Security EQUIPMENT BY TYPE ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES RECCE 3 BRM-1K (CP) IFV 35 BMP-1 APC • APC (W) 23: 5 BTR-60; 18 BTR-70 ABCV 5 BMD-1

30–64 65 plus

The armed forces’ principal focus is territorial defence, and there was a resumption of armed conflict with Armenia over NagornoKarabakh after September 2020. This ended in Baku’s favour after six weeks, though tensions between the two remain, with sporadic exchanges of fire continuing in late 2020 and in 2021. Defence cooperation persists with Russia and has developed more recently with Turkey. In June 2021 Baku and Ankara signed the ‘Shusha Declaration’, including what appears to be a mutual defence accord. Azerbaijan maintains a defence relationship with NATO, concluding in 2019 a fifth cycle of its NATO Individual Partnership Action Plan. Readiness within Azerbaijan’s conscriptbased armed services varies between units. Azerbaijan has taken part in multilateral exercises and its forces have trained with Turkish troops in bilateral drills including 2021’s ‘Indestructible Brotherhood’. The armed forces have little expeditionary capability, though they contributed to NATO’s Resolute Support mission in Afghanistan. Defence modernisation and procurement has been a focus in the past decade, intended to replace the ageing inventory of mainly Soviet-era equipment. Recent orders include for air-

defence and artillery systems and wheeled and tracked armoured vehicles, predominantly of Russian origin. In recent years there has been significant procurement and industrial cooperation with Israel, focused on UAVs and guided weapons, and increasingly with Turkey as a key defence partner. Azerbaijan’s limited but growing defence-industrial capabilities are centred on the Ministry of Defence Industry, which manages and oversees the production of small arms and light weapons. While the country is reliant on external suppliers for major defence-equipment platforms and systems, some defence companies have started to export to foreign markets.

ACTIVE 66,950 (Army 56,850 Navy 2,200 Air 7,900) Gendarmerie & Paramilitary 15,000

Conscript liability 18 months (12 for graduates)

RESERVE 300,000 Some mobilisation reported; 300,000 with military service within 15 years

ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE Army 56,850 FORCES BY ROLE COMMAND 5 corps HQ MANOEUVRE Mechanised 4 MR bde Light 19 MR bde Other 1 sy bde COMBAT SUPPORT 1 arty bde 1 arty trg bde 1 MRL bde 1 AT bde 1 engr bde 1 sigs bde COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT 1 log bde EQUIPMENT BY TYPE Fighting in and around Nagorno-Karabakh in late 2020 resulted in some combat losses as well as the capture of some equipment from Armenian and Nagorno-Karabakh forces ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES MBT 437: 95 T-55; 244 T-72A/AV/B/SIM2; 98 T-90S RECCE 15 BRM-1 IFV 215: 43 BMP-1; 33 BMP-2; 88 BMP-3; 7 BTR-80A; 44+ BTR-82A APC 568 APC (T) 336 MT-LB APC (W) 142: 10 BTR-60; 132 BTR-70 PPV 90: 45 Marauder; 45 Matador AUV 64+: 35 Cobra; 29+ Sand Cat ABCV 20 BMD-1 ENGINEERING & MAINTENANCE VEHICLES AEV IMR-2; MT-LB ARV BREM-L Brelianka MW Bozena; GW-3 (minelayer)

ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE MSL SP 10 9P157-2 Khrizantema-S (RS-AT-15 Springer); Cobra with Skif; Sand Cat with Spike-ER MANPATS 9K11 Malyutka (RS-AT-3 Sagger); 9K111 Fagot (RS-AT-4 Spigot); 9K111-1 Konkurs (RS-AT-5 Spandrel); 9K115 Metis (RS-AT-7 Saxhorn); 9K135 Kornet (RS-AT-14 Spriggan) (reported); Spike-LR GUNS • TOWED 85mm some D-44 ARTILLERY 630 SP 102: 122mm 46 2S1 Gvozdika; 152mm 39: 6 2S3 Akatsiya; 18 2S19 Msta-S; 15 Dana-M1M; 155mm 5 ATMOS 2000; 203mm 12 2S7 Pion TOWED 233: 122mm 129 D-30; 130mm 36 M-46; 152mm 68: 44 2A36 Giatsint-B; 24 D-20 GUN/MOR 120mm 36: 18 2S9 NONA-S; 18 2S31 Vena MRL 147: 107mm some T-107; 122mm 60+: 43 BM-21 Grad; 9+ IMI Lynx; 8 RM-70 Vampir; 128mm 12 RAK12; 220mm 18 TOS-1A; 300mm 36: 30 9A52 Smerch; 6+ Polonez; 302mm 21 T-300 Kasirga MOR 120mm 112: 5 Cardom; 107 M-1938 (PM-38) SP 120mm Sand Cat with Spear SURFACE-TO-SURFACE MISSILE LAUNCHERS SRBM • Conventional 6: 2 IAI LORA; ε4 9K79 Tochka (RS-SS-21 Scarab) AIR DEFENCE SAM Short-range 9K33-1T Osa-1T (RS-SA-8 Gecko) Point-defence 9K35 Strela-10 (RS-SA-13 Gopher); 9K32 Strela (RS-SA-7 Grail)‡; 9K34 Strela-3 (RS-SA-14 Gremlin); 9K310 Igla-1 (RS-SA-16 Gimlet); 9K338 Igla-S (RS-SA-24 Grinch) GUNS SP 23mm ZSU-23-4 TOWED 23mm ZU-23-2

Navy 2,200 EQUIPMENT BY TYPE PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 11 CORVETTES • FS 1 Kusar (ex-FSU Petya II) with 2 RBU 6000 Smerch 2 A/S mor, 2 twin 76mm gun PSO 1 Luga (Wodnik 2) (FSU Project 888; additional trg role) PCC 3: 2 Petrushka (FSU UK-3; additional trg role); 1 Shelon (ex-FSU Project 1388M) PB 3: 1 Araz (ex-TUR AB 25); 1 Bryza (ex-FSU Project 722); 1 Poluchat (ex-FSU Project 368) PBF 3 Stenka MINE WARFARE • MINE COUNTERMEASURES 4 MHC 4: 2 Korund (Project 1258 (Yevgenya)); 2 Yakhont (FSU Sonya) AMPHIBIOUS 6 LSM 3: 1 Project 770 (FSU Polnochny A) (capacity 6 MBT; 180 troops); 2 Project 771 (Polnochny B) (capacity 6 MBT; 180 troops) LCM 3: 2 T-4 (FSU); 1 Vydra† (FSU) (capacity either 3 MBT or 200 troops) LOGISTICS AND SUPPORT 3 AGS 1 (FSU Project 10470) ATF 2 Neftegaz (Project B-92) (ex-Coast Guard)

Russia and Eurasia

Russia and Eurasia 183

184 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2022

Marines FORCES BY ROLE MANOEUVRE Amphibious 1 mne bn

Air Force and Air Defence 7,900 FORCES BY ROLE FIGHTER 1 sqn with MiG-29 Fulcrum A; MiG-29UB Fulcrum B FIGHTER/GROUND ATTACK 1 regt with Su-24 Fencer; Su-25 Frogfoot; Su-25UB Frogfoot B TRANSPORT 1 sqn with An-12 Cub; Yak-40 Codling TRAINING 1 sqn with L-39 Albatros ATTACK/TRANSPORT HELICOPTER 1 regt with Ka-32 Helix C; Mi-8 Hip; Mi-24 Hind; PZL Mi-2 Hoplite EQUIPMENT BY TYPE AIRCRAFT 36 combat capable FTR 15: 13 MiG-29 Fulcrum A; 2 MiG-29UB Fulcrum B ATK 21: 2 Su-24 Fencer†; 16 Su-25 Frogfoot; 3 Su-25UB Frogfoot B TPT 4: Medium 1 An-12 Cub; Light 3 Yak-40 Codling TRG 15: 12 L-39 Albatros; 3+ Super Mushshak HELICOPTERS ATK 26 Mi-24 Hind MRH: 20+ Mi-17-IV Hip TPT 24: Medium 17: 1 Bell 412; 3 Ka-32 Helix C; 13 Mi-8 Hip Light 7 PZL Mi-2 Hoplite UNINHABITED AERIAL VEHICLES CISR • Medium Bayraktar TB2 ISR 7+: Heavy 3+ Heron; Medium 4+ Aerostar AIR DEFENCE • SAM Long-range S-200 Vega (RS-SA-5 Gammon); S-300PMU2 (RS-SA-20 Gargoyle); Medium-range S-75 Dvina (RSSA-2 Guideline); 9K37M Buk-M1 (RS-SA-11 Gadfly); BukMB; ε24 S-125-2TM Pechora-2TM; Barak-LRAD Short-range Abisr (Barak-MRAD) AIR-LAUNCHED MISSILES AAM • IR R-60 (RS-AA-8 Aphid); R-73 (RS-AA-11A Archer) IR/SARH R-27 (RS-AA-10 Alamo) ASM Barrier-V BOMBS Laser-guided MAM-L

Gendarmerie & Paramilitary ε15,000 State Border Service ε5,000 Ministry of Internal Affairs EQUIPMENT BY TYPE ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES IFV 168 BMP-1/BMP-2 APC • APC (W) 19 BTR-60/70/80 ARTILLERY • MRL 122mm 3 T-122 AIRCRAFT • TPT • Light 40 An-2 Colt (modified for use as decoys)

HELICOPTERS • ATK 24 Mi-35M Hind UNINHABITED AERIAL VEHICLES ISR • Medium 7+: 4+ Hermes 450; 3+ Hermes 900 LOITERING MUNITIONS Harop; Skystriker (two variants)

Coast Guard The Coast Guard was established in 2005 as part of the State Border Service EQUIPMENT BY TYPE PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 19 PCG 6 Sa’ar 62 with 1 8-cell Typhoon MLS-NLOS lnchr with Spike NLOS SSM, 1 hel landing platform PBF 9: 1 Project 205 (FSU Osa II); 6 Shaldag V; 2 Silver Ships 48ft PB 4: 2 Baltic 150; 1 Point (US); 1 Grif (FSU Zhuk) LOGISTICS AND SUPPORT 4 ARS 1 Iva (FSU Vikhr) ATF 3 Neftegaz (Project B-92) (also used for patrol duties)

Internal Troops 10,000+ Ministry of Internal Affairs EQUIPMENT BY TYPE ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES APC • APC (W) 7 BTR-60/BTR-70/BTR-80

DEPLOYMENT SOUTH SUDAN: UN • UNMISS 2

FOREIGN FORCES Turkey 170; 1 EOD unit

TERRITORY WHERE THE GOVERNMENT DOES NOT EXERCISE EFFECTIVE CONTROL Nagorno-Karabakh was part of Azerbaijan, but mostly populated by ethnic Armenians. In 1988, when interethnic clashes between Armenians and Azeris erupted in Azerbaijan, the local authorities declared their intention to secede and join Armenia. Baku rejected this and armed conflict erupted. A ceasefire was brokered in 1994; since then, Armenia controlled most of Nagorno-Karabakh. While Armenia provides political, economic and military support to Nagorno-Karabakh, the region has declared itself independent – although this has not been recognised by any other state, including Armenia. Baku claims Nagorno-Karabakh and the occupied territories as part of Azerbaijan. Following a period of sustained fighting in September–November 2020, Azerbaijani forces regained most of the territory lost prior to the 1994 ceasefire. Data presented here represents an assessment of the de facto situation. Available estimates vary with reference to military holdings in Nagorno-Karabakh and must be treated with caution due to the heavy levels of attrition in the 2020 conflict. Some of the equipment listed may belong to Armenian forces.

Nagorno-Karabakh ε5,000

Available estimates of military holdings in NagornoKarabakh have to be treated with caution due to the heavy level of attrition in the 2020 conflict FORCES BY ROLE MANOEUVRE Mechanised 1 MR div(-) 1 mtn div(-) EQUIPMENT BY TYPE ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES MBT 22: ε20 T-72AV/B; 1 T-72 SIM2; 1 T-90S RECCE BRDM-2 IFV 150: ε50 BMP-1; ε100 BMP-2 ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE MSL • MANPATS 9K111-1 Konkurs (RS-AT-5 Spandrel) RCL 73mm SPG-9 ARTILLERY TOWED 122mm some D-30 MRL 122mm some BM-21 Grad AIR DEFENCE SAM Short-range 9K331 Tor-M1 (RS-SA-15 Gauntlet) Point-defence 9K33 Osa (RS-SA-8 Gecko); 9K310 Igla-1 (RS-SA-16 Gimlet); 9K38 Igla (RS-SA-18 Grouse) GUNS SP 23mm ZSU-23-4 TOWED 23mm ZU-23-2

FOREIGN FORCES

Belarusian Ruble BYN

2020

2021

BYN

147bn

168bn

USD

60.2bn

65.8bn

USD

6,398

7,032

Growth

-0.9

2.1

Inflation

5.5

9.2

Def bdgt

BYN

1.47bn

1.63bn

USD

601m

638m

2.44

2.55

USD1=BYN

2022

Real-terms defence budget trend (USDm, constant 2015) 668 383 2008

Population

Operations Forces 6,150 Joint 18,800) Gendarmerie & Paramilitary 110,000

Conscript liability 18 months; 12 months for graduates (alternative service option)

RESERVE 289,500 (Joint 289,500 with mil service within last 5 years)

Army 11,700

Belarus BLR

per capita

ACTIVE 47,950 (Army 11,700 Air 11,300 Special

ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE

Russia 1,960; 1 MR bde(-) (peacekeeping)

GDP

of widespread civil protests during the latter part of 2020. The country’s latest military doctrine was approved in July 2016 and identified as security challenges ‘hybrid methods’ and ‘colour revolutions’. A new plan for the development of the armed forces until 2030 was approved in late 2019. Belarus is a member of the CSTO. Russia remains the country’s principal defence partner, with the relations growing closer during 2021, including setting up joint training centres for air-force and air-defence personnel. The forces remain conscript-based and train regularly with other CSTO partners. There has been increased emphasis on the training of territorial-defence troops to allow them to better operate with the regular forces. There is a small heavy-airlift fleet that could be supplemented by civil transport aircraft, and Minsk has a special-forces brigade trained for the air-assault role. There is no requirement to independently deploy and sustain the armed forces, but it could be possible for elements assigned to the CSTO. Russia continues to be Minsk’s main defence-equipment supplier. There is a renewed emphasis on air defence, with Minsk expressing interest in 2021 in acquiring additional systems from Russia. The local defence industry manufactures vehicles, guided weapons and electronic-warfare systems, among other equipment. However, there is no capacity to design or manufacture modern combat aircraft. The sector also undertakes upgrade work for foreign customers.

2015

2021

9,441,842

Age

0–14

15–19

20–24

25–29

Male

8.3%

2.4%

2.5%

3.1%

30–64 65 plus 24.9%

5.4%

Female

7.8%

2.3%

2.4%

2.9%

27.2%

10.9%

Capabilities Located between Russia and NATO European members, the main task of Belarus’s armed forces is maintaining territorial integrity, though army units were visible in the government’s curbing

FORCES BY ROLE COMMAND 2 comd HQ (West & North West) MANOEUVRE Mechanised 4 mech bde COMBAT SUPPORT 2 arty bde 1 engr bde 1 engr regt 2 sigs regt EQUIPMENT BY TYPE ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES MBT 497: 477 T-72B; 20 T-72B3 mod RECCE 132 BRM-1 IFV 957: 926 BMP-2; 31+ BTR-82A APC • APC (T) 58 MT-LB AUV Tigr ENGINEERING & MAINTENANCE VEHICLES AEV BAT-2; IMR-2; MT-LB ARV 2 BREM-K VLB 24: 20 MTU-20; 4 MT-55A MW UR-77 NBC VEHICLES BRDM-2RKhB; Cayman NRBC Chimera; RKhM-4; RKhM-K ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE • MSL SP 160: 75 9P148 Konkurs (RS-AT-5 Spandrel); 85 9P149 Shturm (RS-AT-6 Spiral)

Russia and Eurasia

Russia and Eurasia 185

186 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2022 MANPATS 9K111 Fagot (RS-AT-4 Spigot); 9K111-1 Konkurs (RS-AT-5 Spandrel); 9K115 Metis (RS-AT-7 Saxhorn) ARTILLERY 583 SP 333: 122mm 125 2S1 Gvozdika; 152mm 208: 125 2S3 Akatsiya; 71 2S5; 12 2S19 Msta-S TOWED 152mm 72 2A65 Msta-B MRL 164: 122mm 128 BM-21 Grad; 220mm 36 9P140 Uragan MOR 120mm 14 2S12 AIR DEFENCE SAM Point-defence 2K22 Tunguska (RS-SA-19 Grison) GUNS • SP 23mm ZU-23-2 (tch)

Air Force and Air Defence Forces 11,300 FORCES BY ROLE FIGHTER 2 sqn with MiG-29/S/UB Fulcrum GROUND ATTACK 2 sqn with Su-25K/UBK Frogfoot A/B TRANSPORT 1 base with An-24 Coke; An-26 Curl; Il-76 Candid; Tu-134 Crusty TRAINING Some sqn with L-39 Albatros ATTACK HELICOPTER Some sqn with Mi-24 Hind TRANSPORT HELICOPTER Some (cbt spt) sqn with Mi-8 Hip; Mi-8MTV-5 Hip; Mi26 Halo EQUIPMENT BY TYPE AIRCRAFT 71 combat capable FTR 34: 28 MiG-29 Fulcrum A/MiG-29S Fulcrum C; 6 MiG-29UB Fulcrum B FGA 4 Su-30SM Flanker H; (21 Su-27/UB Flanker B/C non-operational/stored) ATK 22 Su-25K/UBK Frogfoot A/B TPT 8: Heavy 2 Il-76 Candid (+9 civ Il-76 available for mil use); Light 6: 1 An-24 Coke; 4 An-26 Curl; 1 Tu-134 Crusty TRG 11+: Some L-39 Albatros; 11 Yak-130 Mitten* HELICOPTERS ATK 12 Mi-24 Hind TPT 26: Heavy 6 Mi-26 Halo; Medium 20: 8 Mi-8 Hip; 12 Mi-8MTV-5 Hip AIR-LAUNCHED MISSILES AAM • IR R-60 (RS-AA-8 Aphid); R-73 (RS-AA-11A Archer) SARH R-27R (RS-AA-10 Alamo A) ASM Kh-25 (RS-AS-10 Karen); Kh-29 (RS-AS-14 Kedge) ARM Kh-58 (RS-AS-11 Kilter) (likely WFU)

Air Defence AD data from Uzal Baranovichi EW radar FORCES BY ROLE AIR DEFENCE 1 bde S-300PS (RS-SA-10B Grumble) 3 regt with S-300PS (RS-SA-10B Grumble) 1 bde with 9K37 Buk (RS-SA-11 Gadfly); 9K331ME TorM2E (RS-SA-15 Gauntlet) 1 regt with 9K331ME Tor-M2E (RS-SA-15 Gauntlet) 2 regt with 9K33 Osa (RS-SA-8 Gecko)

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE AIR DEFENCE • SAM Long-range S-300PS (RS-SA-10B Grumble) Medium-range 9K37 Buk (RS-SA-11 Gadfly) Short-range 21 9K331ME Tor-M2E (RS-SA-15 Gauntlet) Point-defence 9K33 Osa (RS-SA-8 Gecko); 9K35 Strela-10 (RS-SA-13 Gopher)

Special Operations Command 6,150 FORCES BY ROLE SPECIAL FORCES 1 SF bde MANOEUVRE Mechanised 2 mech bde EQUIPMENT BY TYPE ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES RECCE 13+ Cayman BRDM APC • APC (W) 217: ε64 BTR-70M1; 153 BTR-80 AUV 12 CS/VN3B mod ARTILLERY 114 TOWED 122mm 24 D-30 GUN/MOR • TOWED 120mm 18 2B23 NONA-M1 ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE • MSL MANPATS 9K111 Fagot (RS-AT-4 Spigot); 9K111-1 Konkurs (RS-AT-5 Spandrel); 9K115 Metis (RS-AT-7 Saxhorn)

Joint 18,800 (Centrally controlled units and MoD staff ) FORCES BY ROLE SURFACE-TO-SURFACE MISSILE 1 SRBM bde COMBAT SUPPORT 1 arty bde 1 MRL bde 2 engr bde 1 EW unit 1 NBC regt 1 ptn bridging regt 2 sigs bde EQUIPMENT BY TYPE ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES APC • APC (T) 20 MT-LB NBC VEHICLES BRDM-2RKhB; RKhM-4; RKhM-K ARTILLERY 112 SP 152mm 36 2S5 Giatsint-S TOWED 152mm 36 2A65 Msta-B MRL 300mm 42: 36 9A52 Smerch; 6 Polonez SURFACE-TO-SURFACE MISSILE LAUNCHERS SRBM • Conventional 96: 36 9K79 Tochka (RS-SS-21 Scarab); 60 9K72 Elbrus (RS-SS-1C Scud B)

Gendarmerie & Paramilitary 110,000 State Border Troops 12,000 Ministry of Interior

Militia 87,000

Ministry of Interior

Internal Troops 11,000

DEPLOYMENT

ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE

LEBANON: UN • UNIFIL 9

Army 15,000; 4,050 conscript (total 19,050)

Georgia GEO 2020

2021

GDP

Georgian Lari GEL GEL

49.4bn

57.5bn

USD

15.9bn

17.8bn

per capita

USD

4,275

4,808

Growth

-6.2

7.7

Inflation

5.2

9.3

Def bdgt FMA (US)

GEL

880m

900m

USD

283m

279m

USD

40m

20m

3.11

3.22

USD1=GEL

2022

918m 25m

Real-terms defence budget trend (USDm, constant 2015) 914 301 2008

Population

2015

2021

4,933,674

Age

0–14

15–19

20–24

25–29

Male

9.6%

2.7%

3.0%

3.6%

30–64 65 plus 22.2%

6.8%

Female

8.9%

2.4%

2.6%

3.4%

24.5%

10.4%

Capabilities Georgia’s main security preoccupations concern Russian military deployments and the breakaway regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. A Strategic Defence Review 2017–20 was published in April 2017. This aimed at improving personnel structures, training facilities and equipment, and stressed a ‘total defence’ approach. It highlighted the importance of Georgia’s reserves, and a ministerial document in 2020 indicated there may be more reliance on active and mobilised reserves. A National Security Strategy 2020–30 has been drafted. Security cooperation with the US includes the Georgia Defence Readiness Program (due to end in 2021). A combat training centre is being developed under the NATO–Georgia Joint Training and Evaluation Centre. Conscription was reinstated with revised terms and increased pay in early 2017. Forces take part in several NATO multinational exercises. Georgia’s armed forces have limited expeditionary logistic capability. The backbone of the armed forces’ military equipment is legacy Soviet-era systems with varying degrees of obsolescence. The Major Systems Acquisitions Strategy 2019–25 outlines efforts to procure new equipment in several areas, though funding availability will be key to meeting aspirations. There were plans to boost special-forces capacity in 2020 and there is a focus on boosting anti-armour and air-defence capability. The country has begun to develop a defence-industrial base, and this is intended mainly to support the armed forces. The State Military Scientific-Technical Center has demonstrated some maintenance, repair, overhaul and design capabilities for the production of light armoured vehicles.

ACTIVE 20,650 (Army 19,050 National Guard 1,600) Gendarmerie & Paramilitary 5,400 Conscript liability 12 months

FORCES BY ROLE SPECIAL FORCES 1 SF bde MANOEUVRE Mechanised 1 (4th) mech inf bde (1 armd bn, 2 mech inf bn, 1 SP arty bn) Light 1 (1st) inf bde (1 mech inf bn, 3 inf bn) 1 (2nd) inf bde (3 inf bn, 1 fd arty bn) 1 (3rd) inf bde (3 inf bn, 1 SP arty bn) Amphibious 2 mne bn (1 cadre) COMBAT SUPPORT 1 (5th) arty bde (1 fd arty bn; 1 MRL bn) 1 (6th) arty bde (1 SP arty bn; 1 MRL bn) 1 engr bde 1 engr bn 1 sigs bn 1 SIGINT bn 1 MP bn COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT 1 med bn EQUIPMENT BY TYPE ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES MBT 123: 23 T-55AM2; 100 T-72B/SIM1 RECCE 41: 1 BRM-1K; 40+ Didgori-2 IFV 71: 25 BMP-1; 46 BMP-2 APC 221 APC (T) 69+: 3+ Lazika; 66 MT-LB APC (W) 152+: 25 BTR-70; 19 BTR-80; 40+ Didgori-1; 3+ Didgori-3; 65 Ejder AUV 10+: ATF Dingo; Cobra; 10 Cougar ENGINEERING & MAINTENANCE VEHICLES ARV IMR-2 ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE MSL • MANPATS 9K111 Fagot (RS-AT-4 Spigot); 9K111-1 Konkurs (RS-AT-5 Spandrel); FGM-148 Javelin GUNS • TOWED ε40: 85mm D-44; 100mm T-12 ARTILLERY 240 SP 67: 122mm 20 2S1 Gvozdika; 152mm 46: 32 M-77 Dana; 13 2S3 Akatsiya; 1 2S19 Msta-S; 203mm 1 2S7 Pion TOWED 71: 122mm 58 D-30; 152mm 13: 3 2A36 Giatsint-B; 10 2A65 Msta-B MRL 122mm 37: 13 BM-21 Grad; 6 GradLAR; 18 RM-70 MOR 120mm 65: 14 2S12 Sani; 33 M-75; 18 M120 AIR DEFENCE • SAM Short-range Spyder-SR Point-defence Grom; Mistral-2; 9K32 Strela-2 (RS-SA-7 Grail)‡; 9K35 Strela-10 (RS-SA-13 Gopher); 9K36 Strela-3 (RS-SA-14 Gremlin); 9K310 Igla-1 (RS-SA-16 Gimlet)

Aviation and Air Defence Command 1,300 (incl 300 conscript) 1 avn base, 1 hel air base EQUIPMENT BY TYPE AIRCRAFT 3 combat capable ATK 3 Su-25KM Frogfoot (6 Su-25 Frogfoot in store)

Russia and Eurasia

Russia and Eurasia 187

188 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2022 TPT • Light 9: 6 An-2 Colt; 1 Tu-134A Crusty (VIP); 2 Yak-40 Codling TRG 9 L-29 Delfin HELICOPTERS ATK 6 Mi-24 Hind TPT 29: Medium 17 Mi-8T Hip; Light 12 Bell 205 (UH-1H Iroquois) UNINHABITED AERIAL VEHICLES ISR • Medium 1+ Hermes 450 AIR DEFENCE • SAM Medium-range 9K37 Buk-M1 (RS-SA-11 Gadfly) (1–2 bn) Point-defence 8 9K33 Osa-AK (RS-SA-8B Gecko) (two bty); 9K33 Osa-AKM (6–10 updated SAM systems)

National Guard 1,600 active reservists opcon Army FORCES BY ROLE MANOEUVRE Light 2 inf bde

Gendarmerie & Paramilitary 5,400 Border Police 5,400 EQUIPMENT BY TYPE HELICOPTERS TPT • Medium 3 Mi-8MTV-1 Hip

Coast Guard HQ at Poti. The Navy was merged with the Coast Guard in 2009 under the auspices of the Georgian Border Police, within the Ministry of the Interior EQUIPMENT BY TYPE PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 24 PCC 2 Ochamchira (ex-US Island) PBF 7: 4 Ares 43m; 1 Kaan 33; 1 Kaan 20; 1 Project 205P (Stenka) PB 15: 1 Akhmeta; 2 Dauntless; 2 Dilos (ex-GRC); 1 Kutaisi (ex-TUR AB 25); 2 Point; 7 Zhuk (3 ex-UKR)

DEPLOYMENT CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC: EU • EUTM RCA 35 MALI: EU • EUTM Mali 1

TERRITORY WHERE THE GOVERNMENT DOES NOT EXERCISE EFFECTIVE CONTROL Following the August 2008 war between Russia and Georgia, the areas of Abkhazia and South Ossetia declared themselves independent. Data presented here represents the de facto situation and does not imply international recognition as sovereign states.

Kazakhstan KAZ Kazakhstani Tenge KZT

2020

2021

GDP

KZT

70.7tr

82.5tr

USD

171bn

194bn

per capita

USD

9,071

10,145

Growth

-2.6

3.3

Inflation

6.8

7.5

Def bdgt

KZT

591bn

655bn

USD

1.43bn

1.54bn

412.95

425.44

USD1=KZT

Real-terms defence budget trend (USDbn, constant 2015) 1.85 1.11 2008

Population

2015

2021

19,245,793

Age

0–14

15–19

20–24

25–29

Male

12.6%

3.4%

3.2%

3.9%

30–64 65 plus 21.3%

3.1%

Female

13.3%

3.3%

3.0%

3.8%

23.4%

5.7%

Capabilities Kazakhstan’s October 2017 military doctrine indicates a change in focus from countering violent extremism towards a wider concern for border security and hybrid threats. A military agreement was signed with Uzbekistan in September 2017 for cooperation on training and education and countering violent extremism. In late 2021, the bilateral relationship has focused on jointly addressing security challenges from Afghanistan after the Taliban’s return to power. There is a close defence relationship with Russia, reinforced by CSTO and SCO membership, and Moscow operates a radar station at Balkash. Kazakhstan takes part in regional and CSTO exercises, including anti-terror drills. In October 2019, in Saint Petersburg, Kazakhstan and four other Caspian littoral states signed a memorandum of understanding on military cooperation, among other discussions including on maritime security. By regional standards, the armed forces are relatively sizeable and well equipped. In the army, air-mobile units are held at the highest level of readiness. Significant amounts of new and upgraded materiel have been acquired in recent years, primarily from Russia. Russia has supplied Kazakhstan with S-300PS self-propelled surface-to-air missile systems as part of a Joint Air-Defence Agreement, boosting its long-range air-defence capability. Kazakhstan is expanding its indigenous defence industry, and joint ventures and the production of rotary-wing and medium-lift fixed-wing aircraft are envisaged with European companies. In 2021, following a two-day summit of the CSTO and in light of instability in Taliban-led Afghanistan, it was announced that Kazakhstan’s defence-industrial base will be used to help expand the CSTO’s defence capabilities.

ACTIVE 39,000 (Army 20,000 Navy 3,000 Air 12,000 MoD 4,000) Gendarmerie & Paramilitary 31,500

Conscript liability 12 months (due to be abolished)

FOREIGN FORCES Russia 7,000; 1 mil base at Gudauta (Abkhazia) with (1 MR bde; 40 T-72B3; 120 BTR-82A; 18 2S3; 12 2S12; 18 BM21; 16 S-300PS); 1 mil base at Djava/Tskhinvali (S. Ossetia) with (1 MR bde; 40 T-72BA; 120 BMP-2; 36 2S3; 12 2S12)

2022

ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE Army 20,000 4 regional comd: Astana, East, West and Southern

Russia and Eurasia 189

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES MBT 350 T-72BA RECCE 100: 40 BRDM-2; 60 BRM-1 IFV 413: 280 BMP-2; 70 BTR-80A; 63 BTR-82A APC 303 APC (T) 50 MT-LB APC (W) 152: 2 BTR-3E; 150 BTR-80 PPV 101 Arlan AUV 11+: 11 Cobra; SandCat ENGINEERING & MAINTENANCE VEHICLES AEV MT-LB ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE MSL SP 9+: 3 BMP-T; HMMWV with 9K111-1 Konkurs (RSAT-5 Spandrel); 6 9P149 Shturm (MT-LB with RS-AT-6 Spiral) MANPATS 9K111 Fagot (RS-AT-4 Spigot); 9K111-1 Konkurs (RS-AT-5 Spandrel); 9K115 Metis (RS-AT-7 Saxhorn) GUNS 100mm 20 MT-12 ARTILLERY 490 SP 126: 122mm 66: 60 2S1 Gvozdika; 6 Semser; 152mm 60 2S3M Akatsiya TOWED 194: 122mm 100 D-30; 152mm 94: 70 2A65 Msta-B; 24 D-20 MRL 107: 122mm 80 BM-21 Grad; 220mm 3 TOS-1A; 300mm 24: 6 BM-30 Smerch; 18 IMI Lynx (with 50 msl) MOR 63+: 82mm some; SP 120mm 18 Cardom; 120mm 45 2B11 Sani/M120 SURFACE-TO-SURFACE MISSILE LAUNCHERS SRBM • Conventional 12 9K79 Tochka (RS-SS-21 Scarab)

Navy 3,000 EQUIPMENT BY TYPE PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 14 PCGM 3 Kazakhstan with 1 4-cell lnchr with 4 BarrierVK SSM, 1 Arbalet-K lnchr with 4 9K38 Igla (RS-SA-18 Grouse) PCC 1 Kazakhstan with 1 122mm MRL PBF 3 Sea Dolphin PB 7: 3 Archangel; 1 Dauntless; 1 Lashyn; 1 Turk (AB 25); 1 Other

MINE WARFARE • MINE COUNTERMEASURES 1 MCC 1 Alatau (Project 10750E) LOGISTICS AND SUPPORT • AGS 1 Zhaik

Air Force 12,000 (incl Air Defence) FORCES BY ROLE FIGHTER 1 sqn with MiG-29/MiG-29UB Fulcrum A/B 2 sqn with MiG-31B/MiG-31BM Foxhound A/C FIGHTER/GROUND ATTACK 1 sqn with MiG-27 Flogger D; MiG-23UB Flogger C 1 sqn with Su-27/Su-27UB Flanker B/C 1 sqn with Su-27/Su-30SM Flanker B/H GROUND ATTACK 1 sqn with Su-25 Frogfoot TRANSPORT 1 unit with Tu-134 Crusty; Tu-154 Careless 1 sqn with An-12 Cub, An-26 Curl, An-30 Clank, An-72 Coaler, C295M TRAINING 1 sqn with L-39 Albatros ATTACK HELICOPTER 5 sqn with Mi-24V Hind TRANSPORT HELICOPTER Some sqn with Bell 205 (UH-1H Iroquois); H145; Mi-8 Hip; Mi-17V-5 Hip; Mi-171Sh Hip; Mi-26 Halo AIR DEFENCE 1 bty with 9K317M2 Buk-M2E (RS-SA-17 Grizzly) 2 bty with S-75M Volkhov (RS-SA-2 Guideline) 1 bty with S-125-1T 1 bty with S-200 Angara (RS-SA-5 Gammon) 10 bty with S-300PS (RS-SA-10 Grumble) Some regt with 2K12 Kub (RS-SA-6 Gainful) EQUIPMENT BY TYPE AIRCRAFT 120 combat capable FTR 45: 12 MiG-29 Fulcrum A; 2 MiG-29UB Fulcrum B; 31 MiG-31/MiG-31BM Foxhound FGA 61: 12 MiG-27 Flogger D; 2 MiG-23UB Flogger C; 20 Su-27 Flanker; 4 Su-27UB Flanker; 23 Su-30SM Flanker H ATK 14: 12 Su-25 Frogfoot; 2 Su-25UB Frogfoot ISR 1 An-30 Clank TPT 21: Medium 2 An-12 Cub; Light 18: 6 An-26 Curl, 2 An-72 Coaler; 8 C295; 2 Tu-134 Crusty; PAX 1 Tu-154 Careless TRG 19: 17 L-39 Albatros; 2 Z-242L HELICOPTERS ATK 32: 20 Mi-24V Hind (some upgraded); 12 Mi-35M Hind MRH 26: 20 Mi-17V-5 Hip; 6 Mi-171Sh Hip TPT 16: Heavy 4 Mi-26 Halo; Light 12: 4 Bell 205 (UH1H Iroquois); 8 H145 UNINHABITED AERIAL VEHICLES CISR • Heavy 2 Wing Loong (GJ-1) AIR DEFENCE • SAM Long-range 43+: 3 S-200 Angara (RS-SA-5 Gammon); 40+ S-300PS (RS-SA-10B Grumble) Medium-range 15: 3 9K317M2 Buk-M2E (RS-SA-17 Grizzly); 12 S-75M Volkhov (RS-SA-2 Guideline) Short-range 3+: some 2K12 Kub (RS-SA-6 Gainful); 3 S-125-1T Point-defence 9K35 Strela-10 (RS-SA-13 Gopher)

Russia and Eurasia

FORCES BY ROLE MANOEUVRE Armoured 2 tk bde 2 mech bde 1 aslt bde Mechanised 1 naval inf bde 1 (peacekeeping) inf regt Air Manoeuvre 4 air aslt bde COMBAT SUPPORT 3 arty bde 1 SSM unit 3 cbt engr regt

190 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2022 AIR-LAUNCHED MISSILES AAM • IR R-60 (RS-AA-8 Aphid); R-73 (RS-AA-11A Archer); IR/SARH R-27 (RS-AA-10 Alamo); SARH R-33 (RS-AA-9A Amos); ARH R-77 (RS-AA-12A Adder – on MiG-31BM) ASM Kh-25 (RS-AS-10 Karen); Kh-29 (RS-AS-14 Kedge) ARM Kh-27 (RS-AS-12 Kegler); Kh-58 (RS-AS-11 Kilter)

Gendarmerie & Paramilitary 31,500 National Guard ε20,000 Ministry of Interior AIRCRAFT TPT • Medium 1 Y-8F-200WA

State Security Service 2,500 Border Service ε9,000 Ministry of Interior EQUIPMENT BY TYPE AIRCRAFT 6: Light 5: 3 An-26 Curl; 1 An-74T; 1 An74TK; PAX 1 SSJ-100 HELICOPTERS • TPT • Medium 15: 1 Mi-171; 14 Mi171Sh

Coast Guard EQUIPMENT BY TYPE PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 22 PBF 11: 1 Aibar (Project 0210); 8 FC-19; 2 Saygak PB 11: 4 Almaty; 5 Sardar; 2 Zhuk (of which 1 may be non-operational)

DEPLOYMENT LEBANON: UN • UNIFIL 37 WESTERN SAHARA: UN • MINURSO 7

Kyrgyzstan KGZ Kyrgyzstani Som KGS GDP per capita

2020

2021

KGS

598bn

690bn

USD

7.75bn

8.15bn 1,225

USD

1,189

Growth

-8.6

2.1

Inflation

6.3

13.0

Def bdgt

KGS

n.k

USD

n.k

77.24

84.70

USD1=KGS Population

2022

6,018,789

Age

0–14

15–19

20–24

25–29

Male

15.5%

4.1%

3.8%

4.3%

30–64 65 plus 19.0%

2.3%

Female

14.7%

3.9%

3.7%

4.2%

20.8%

3.7%

Capabilities Kyrgyzstan is increasing its ties with neighbouring countries on issues including defence-industrial cooperation, though it remains generally dependent on Russian assistance. Kyrgyzstan is a member of both the CSTO and the SCO. Moscow maintains

a military presence, including a squadron of Su-25SM groundattack aircraft at Kant air base, which it has leased since 2003. In 2020, plans were reported to add air-defence systems and UAVs to Russia’s air base. In 2020, Kyrgyzstan increased its annual fees, reportedly because Russian forces are using more land than outlined in the 2003 agreement. Talks are ongoing over a possible second Russian base. Joint training is held with regional countries, including on anti-terror drills, but combat readiness remains an issue. In 2021, Indian and Kyrgyz special forces held the eighth iteration of bilateral Khanjar exercises, focusing on mountain warfare in the broader context of counter-terrorism missions. Kyrgyzstan has a limited capability to deploy externally, and personnel have been deployed to OSCE and UN missions. The armed forces possess generally ageing land equipment and limited air capabilities, relying instead on Russian support, training and deployments. There is little local defence industry. Defence ties with India have increased and a joint working group has been formed on defence cooperation. Reports in 2020 indicated discussions with Russia over the transfer of air-defence equipment and helicopters.

ACTIVE 10,900 (Army 8,500 Air 2,400) Gendarmerie & Paramilitary 9,500

Conscript liability 18 months

ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE Army 8,500 FORCES BY ROLE SPECIAL FORCES 1 SF bde MANOEUVRE Mechanised 2 MR bde 1 (mtn) MR bde COMBAT SUPPORT 1 arty bde 1 AD bde EQUIPMENT BY TYPE ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES MBT 150 T-72 RECCE 39: 30 BRDM-2; 9 BRDM-2M IFV 320: 230 BMP-1; 90 BMP-2 APC • APC (W) 55: 25 BTR-70; 20 BTR-70M; 10 BTR-80 ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE MSL • MANPATS 9K11 Malyutka (RS-AT-3 Sagger); 9K111 Fagot (RS-AT-4 Spigot); 9K111-1 Konkurs (RS-AT-5 Spandrel) RCL 73mm SPG-9 GUNS 100mm 36: 18 MT-12/T-12; 18 M-1944 ARTILLERY 228 SP 122mm 18 2S1 Gvozdika TOWED 123: 122mm 107: 72 D-30; 35 M-30 (M-1938); 152mm 16 D-1 GUN/MOR 120mm 12 2S9 NONA-S MRL 21: 122mm 15 BM-21; 220mm 6 9P140 Uragan MOR 120mm 54: 6 2S12; 48 M-120 AIR DEFENCE SAM • Point-defence 9K32 Strela-2 (RS-SA-7 Grail)‡; 9K35 Strela-10 (RS-SA-13 Gopher) GUNS 48 SP 23mm 24 ZSU-23-4 TOWED 57mm 24 S-60

Russia and Eurasia 191

FORCES BY ROLE FIGHTER 1 regt with L-39 Albatros* TRANSPORT 1 regt with An-2 Colt; An-26 Curl ATTACK/TRANSPORT HELICOPTER 1 regt with Mi-24 Hind; Mi-8 Hip AIR DEFENCE 2 bty with S-125 Neva-M1 (RS-SA-3 Goa) 1 bty with S-75M3 Dvina (RS-SA-2 Guideline) EQUIPMENT BY TYPE AIRCRAFT 4 combat capable TPT • Light 6: 4 An-2 Colt; 2 An-26 Curl TRG 4 L-39 Albatros* HELICOPTERS ATK 2 Mi-24 Hind MRH 4 Mi-8MT Hip TPT • Medium 8 Mi-8 Hip AIR DEFENCE • SAM Medium-range 6 S-75M3 Dvina (RS-SA-2 Guideline) Short-range 8 S-125M1 Neva-M1 (RS-SA-3 Goa)

Gendarmerie & Paramilitary 9,500 Border Guards 5,000 (KGZ conscript, RUS officers) Internal Troops 3,500 National Guard 1,000

DEPLOYMENT SOUTH SUDAN: UN • UNMISS 2 SUDAN: UN • UNISFA 1

FOREIGN FORCES Russia ε500 Military Air Forces: 13 Su-25SM Frogfoot; 2 Mi-8 Hip

Moldova MDA 2020

2021

GDP

Moldovan Leu MDL MDL

206bn

223bn

USD

11.9bn

12.4bn

per capita

USD

4,523

4,792

Growth

-7.0

4.5

Inflation

4.4

3.0

Def bdgt

MDL

770m

914m

USD

44.4m

50.8m

17.32

18.00

USD1=MDL

2022

Real-terms defence budget trend (USDm, constant 2015) 42 15 2008

Population

2015

2021

3,323,875

Age

0–14

15–19

20–24

25–29

30–64 65 plus

Male

9.4%

2.9%

3.5%

24.5%

5.7%

Female

8.9%

2.7%

3.2%

24.9%

8.7%

Capabilities The primary role of Moldova’s armed forces is to maintain territorial integrity, though their size means they would be unable to offer more than token resistance to a determined adversary. The forces are constitutionally neutral. A National Defence Strategy for 2017–21 included plans to strengthen border defence and airspace control and protection, and to improve the military-training system. Moldova continues to build relations with European states and with NATO. Relations with Russia deteriorated following the election of a pro-European Union president in November 2020. The armed forces are receiving modest amounts of equipment as part of NATO’s Defence and Related Security Capacity Building Initiative. The country signed up to the NATO initiative in September 2014. With NATO support, a Moldovan cyber incident response capability was set up in January 2021. Moldova is aiming to end mandatory conscription and develop professional armed forces. The Professional Army 2018–2021 programme was approved in June 2018. A draft government action plan (2019–20), circulated in August 2019, reportedly included closer ties with NATO and a continuing emphasis on professionalisation. A Long-Term Military Capabilities Development Plan was approved in March 2020, covering the period to 2030. The services exercise regularly with NATO states. Moldova has no requirement or capability to independently deploy and support its forces overseas. However, service members continued to deploy as part of KFOR in 2021. The country has no defence-industrial capabilities beyond the basic maintenance of front-line equipment. A solution to the issue of the breakaway region of Transdniestr has yet to be agreed.

ACTIVE 5,150 (Army 3,250 Air 600 Logistic Support 1,300) Gendarmerie & Paramilitary 900 Conscript liability 12 months (3 months for university graduates)

RESERVE 58,000 (Joint 58,000)

ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE Army 1,300; 1,950 conscript (total 3,250)

Russia and Eurasia

Air Force 2,400

192 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2022 FORCES BY ROLE SPECIAL FORCES 1 SF bn MANOEUVRE Light 3 mot inf bde 1 lt inf bn Other 1 gd bn COMBAT SUPPORT 1 arty bn 1 engr bn 1 NBC coy 1 sigs bn EQUIPMENT BY TYPE ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES APC 153 APC (T) 61: 9 BTR-D; 52 MT-LB (variants) APC (W) 92: 12 BTR-80; 80 TAB-71 ABCV 44 BMD-1 ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE MSL • MANPATS 9K111 Fagot (RS-AT-4 Spigot); 9K111-1 Konkurs (RS-AT-5 Spandrel) RCL 73mm SPG-9 GUNS 100mm 31 MT-12 ARTILLERY 219 TOWED 67: 122mm 16 M-30 (M-1938); 152mm 51: 20 2A36 Giatsint-B; 31 D-20 GUN/MOR • SP 120mm 9 2S9 NONA-S MRL 220mm 11 9P140 Uragan MOR 132: 82mm 75 BM-37; 120mm 57: 50 M-1989; 7 PM-38 AIR DEFENCE • GUNS • TOWED 39: 23mm 28 ZU-23; 57mm 11 S-60

Air Force 600 (incl 250 conscripts) FORCES BY ROLE TRANSPORT 1 sqn with An-2 Colt; Mi-8MTV-1/PS Hip; Yak-18 AIR DEFENCE 1 regt with S-125M1 Neva-M1 (RS-SA-3 Goa) EQUIPMENT BY TYPE AIRCRAFT TPT • Light 3: 2 An-2 Colt; 1 Yak-18 Max HELICOPTERS TPT • Medium 6: 2 Mi-8PS Hip; 4 Mi-8MTV-1 Hip AIR DEFENCE • SAM • Short-range 3 S-125M1 Neva-M1 (RS-SA-3 Goa)

Gendarmerie & Paramilitary 900 OPON 900 (riot police) Ministry of Interior

DEPLOYMENT CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC: UN • MINUSCA 4 MALI: EU • EUTM Mali 1 SERBIA: NATO • KFOR 41; UN • UNMIK 1 SOUTH SUDAN: UN • UNMISS 5

FOREIGN FORCES Russia ε1,500 (including 400 peacekeepers); 7 Mi-24 Hind/ Mi-8 Hip Ukraine 10 mil obs (Joint Peacekeeping Force)

Russia RUS Russian Rouble RUB

2020

2021

107tr

122tr

GDP

RUB USD

1.48tr

1.65tr

per capita

USD

10,115

11,273

Growth

-3.0

4.7

Inflation

3.4

5.9

Def exp [a] Def bdgt

RUB

4.46tr

4.59tr

USD

61.6bn

62.2bn

RUB

3.17tr

3.38tr

USD

43.8bn

45.8bn

72.35

73.82

USD1=RUB

2022

3.51tr

[a] Calculated to be comparable with the NATO definition of defence expenditure Real-terms defence budget trend (USDbn, constant 2015) 51.9

2008

Population

30.2 2021

2015

142,320,790

Age

0–14

15–19

20–24

25–29

30–64 65 plus

Male

8.8%

2.6%

2.3%

2.7%

24.6%

5.3%

Female

8.3%

2.5%

2.2%

2.6%

27.2%

10.9%

Capabilities Russia supports capable conventional military forces and retains the world’s second-largest nuclear arsenal. The armed forces underpin an assertive foreign policy. Military aims are guaranteeing sovereignty and territorial integrity and maintaining and increasing Russia’s influence in its near abroad and further afield. An updated National Security Policy was adopted in June 2021 extending beyond core military concerns to include countering the influence of the US and its allies. The 2021–2025 Defence Plan was also agreed, though this remains classified. Russia is a leading member of both the CSTO and the SCO. Volunteers now outweigh conscripts in the armed forces. Defence reforms launched in 2008 emphasised the shift from a conscript-based mass-mobilisation army to smaller, more professional ground forces. Morale has improved because of better pay, terms and conditions, and greater prestige associated with military service. The armed forces can independently deploy and sustain forces on a global scale, although likely only in modest size at extended distances. Its air-led intervention in Syria indicated that Russia was able to deploy, sustain and maintain a high operational tempo for a fixed- and rotary-wing air component, along with the required force-protection package for its main operating base. Russia continues to modernise its nuclear and conventional weapons. The 2020 State Armament Programme (SAP) has been broadly successful, although several of the more ambitious procurement goals were not met. The follow-on programme, SAP 2027, continues the emphasis on modernisation, though some aims are more modest. Russia can design, develop and manufacture advanced nuclear and conventional weaponry. Its defence-industrial base suffered

from a lack of investment in the 1990s, and more recently from the loss of access to Ukrainian components. The defence-aerospace sector has been notably successful in terms of exports, particularly of combat aircraft and surface-to-air missile systems.

ACTIVE 900,000 (Army 280,000 Navy 150,000 Air 165,000 Strategic Rocket Force 50,000 Airborne 45,000 Special Operations Forces 1,000 Railway Forces 29,000 Command and Support 180,000) Gendarmerie & Paramilitary 554,000 Conscript liability 12 months (conscripts now can opt for contract service immediately, which entails a 24-month contract)

RESERVE 2,000,000 (all arms) Some 2,000,000 with service within last 5 years; reserve obligation to age 50

ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE Strategic Deterrent Forces ε80,000 (incl personnel assigned from the Navy and Aerospace Forces) Navy EQUIPMENT BY TYPE SUBMARINES • STRATEGIC • SSBN 11: 1 Kalmar (Project 667BDR (Delta III)) with 16 R-29RKU-02 Stantsia-02 (RS-SS-N-18 Stingray) nuclear SLBM, 2 single 400mm TT with SET-72 LWT, 4 single 533mm TT with 53-65K HWT/SET-65K HWT/USET-80K Keramika HWT 6 Delfin (Project 667BDRM (Delta IV)) with 16 R-29RMU2 Sineva/R-29RMU2.1 Layner (RS-SS-N-23 Skiff) nuclear SLBM, 4 single 533mm TT with 53-65K HWT/SET-65K HWT/USET-80K Keramika HWT 3 Borey (Project 955 (Dolgorukiy)) with 16 Bulava (RSSS-N-32) nuclear SLBM, 6 single 533mm TT with USET-80K Keramika HWT/UGST Fizik HWT 1 Borey-A (Project 955A) with 6 Bulava (RS-SS-N-32) nuclear SLBM, 6 single 533mm TT with USET-80K Keramika HWT/UGST Fizik HWT (1 Akula (Project 941UM (Typhoon)) in reserve for training and SLBM trials with capacity for 20 Bulava (RS-SS-N-32) nuclear SLBM, 6 single 533mm TT with 53-65K HWT/SET-65K HWT/USET-80K Keramika HWT)

Strategic Rocket Forces 50,000 3 Rocket Armies operating silo and mobile launchers organised in 12 divs. Regt normally with 6 to 10 silos or 9 mobile launchers, and one control centre FORCES BY ROLE SURFACE-TO-SURFACE MISSILE 2 ICBM regt with RS-12M Topol (RS-SS-25 Sickle) 8 ICBM regt with RS-12M2 Topol-M (RS-SS-27 mod 1) 2 ICBM regt with RS-18 (RS-SS-19 Stiletto) 1 ICBM regt with RS-18 with Avangard HGV (RS-SS-19 mod 4 Stiletto) 8 ICBM regt with RS-20 (RS-SS-18 Satan) 14 ICBM regt with RS-24 Yars (RS-SS-27 mod 2) 6 ICBM regt with Yars-S

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE SURFACE-TO-SURFACE MISSILE LAUNCHERS ICBM • Nuclear 339: 18 RS-12M Topol (RS-SS-25 Sickle) (mobile single warhead); 60 RS-12M2 Topol-M (RS-SS-27 mod 1) silo-based (single warhead); 18 RS12M2 Topol-M (RS-SS-27 mod 1) road mobile (single warhead); up to 20 RS-18 (RS-SS-19 Stiletto) (mostly mod 3, 6 MIRV per msl) (being withdrawn); ε6 RS-18 with Avangard HGV (RS-SS-19 mod 4 Stiletto); 46 RS-20 (RS-SS-18 Satan) (mostly mod 5, 10 MIRV per msl); ε99 RS-24 Yars (RS-SS-27 mod 2; ε3 MIRV per msl) road mobile; ε18 RS-24 Yars (RS-SS-27 mod 2; ε3 MIRV per msl) silo-based; ε54 Yars-S (ε3 MIRV per msl) road mobile COUNTERSPACE • DE • Laser Peresvet

Long-Range Aviation Command FORCES BY ROLE BOMBER 1 sqn with Tu-160/Tu-160 mod Blackjack 3 sqn with Tu-95MS/MS mod Bear EQUIPMENT BY TYPE AIRCRAFT BBR 76: 9 Tu-160 Blackjack with Kh-55SM (RS-AS-15B Kent) nuclear LACM; 7 Tu-160 mod Blackjack with Kh55SM (RS-AS-15B Kent)/Kh-102 (RS-AS-23B Kodiak) nuclear LACM; 42 Tu-95MS Bear H with Kh-55SM (RSAS-15B Kent) nuclear LACM; 18 Tu-95MS mod Bear H with Kh-55SM (RS-AS-15B Kent)/Kh-102 (RS-AS-23B Kodiak) nuclear LACM

Space Command EQUIPMENT BY TYPE SATELLITES 113 COMMUNICATIONS 64: 4 Blagovest; 2 Garpun; 21 Gonets-M/M1 (dual-use); 3 Mod Globus (Raduga-1M); 5 Meridian; 21 Rodnik (Strela-3M); 8 Strela-3 NAVIGATION/POSITIONING/TIMING 26: 24 GLONASS; 2 Parus ISR 11: 2 Bars-M; 2 GEO-IK-2; 1 Kondor; 1 Kosmos-2519; 2 Persona; 3 Resurs-P ELINT/SIGINT 7: 5 Lotos-S; 1 Pion-NKS; 1 Tselina-2 EARLY WARNING 5 Tundra MISSILE DEFENCE some S-500 (entering service) RADAR 12; Russia leases ground-based radar stations in Baranovichi (Belarus) and Balkhash (Kazakhstan). It also has radars on its own territory at Lekhtusi (St Petersburg); Armavir (Krasnodar); Olenegorsk (Murmansk); Mishelevka (Irkutsk); Kaliningrad; Pechora (Komi); Yeniseysk (Krasnoyarsk); Baranul (Altayskiy); Orsk (Orenburg); and Gorodets/Kovylkino (OTH)

Aerospace Defence Command FORCES BY ROLE AIR DEFENCE 2 AD div HQ 4 SAM regt with S-300PM1/PM2 (RS-SA-20 Gargoyle) 5 SAM regt with S-400 (RS-SA-21 Growler); 96K6 Pantsir-S1 (RS-SA-22 Greyhound)

Russia and Eurasia

Russia and Eurasia 193

194 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2022 EQUIPMENT BY TYPE AIR DEFENCE • SAM 222 Long-range 186: 90 S-300PM1/PM2 (RS-SA-20 Gargoyle); 96 S-400 (RS-SA-21 Growler) Short-range 36 96K6 Pantsir-S1 (RS-SA-22 Greyhound) MISSILE DEFENCE 68 53T6 (RS-AB-4A Gazelle) RADAR 1 ABM engagement system located at Sofrino (Moscow)

Army ε280,000 (incl conscripts) 4 military districts (West (HQ St Petersburg), Centre (HQ Yekaterinburg), South (HQ Rostov-on-Don) & East (HQ Khabarovsk)), each with a unified Joint Strategic Command FORCES BY ROLE COMMAND 12 army HQ 1 corps HQ SPECIAL FORCES 8 (Spetsnaz) SF bde 1 (Spetsnaz) SF regt MANOEUVRE Reconnaissance 2 recce bde Armoured 1 (4th) tk div (1 armd recce bn, 2 tk regt, 1 MR regt, 1 arty regt, 1 AD regt) 1 (90th) tk div (1 armd recce bn, 2 tk regt, 1 MR regt, 1 arty regt) 2 tk bde (1 armd recce bn, 3 tk bn, 1 MR bn, 1 arty bn, 1 MRL bn, 2 AD bn, 1 engr bn, 1 EW coy, 1 NBC coy) 2 (3rd & 144th) MR div (1 armd recce bn, 1 tk regt, 2 MR regt, 1 arty regt) 1 (19th) MR div (2 MR regt, 1 arty regt) 1 (20th) MR div (1 MR regt, 1 arty regt) 1 (127th) MR div (1 tk regt, 2 MR regt, 1 arty regt, 1 AD regt) 1 (150th) MR div (1 armd recce bn, 2 tk regt, 2 MR regt; 1 arty regt, 1 AD regt) 11 (BMP) MR bde (1 armd recce bn, 1 tk bn, 3 armd inf bn, 2 arty bn, 1 MRL bn, 1 AT bn, 2 AD bn, 1 engr bn, 1 EW coy, 1 NBC coy) Mechanised 1 (2nd) MR div (1 armd recce bn, 1 tk regt, 2 MR regt, 1 arty regt, 1 AD regt) 1 (42nd) MR div (1 armd recce bn, 3 MR regt, 1 arty regt) 8 (BTR/MT-LB) MR bde (1 recce bn, 1 tk bn, 3 mech inf bn, 2 arty bn, 1 MRL bn, 1 AT bn, 2 AD bn, 1 engr bn,1 EW coy, 1 NBC coy) 2 MR bde (4–5 mech inf bn, 1 arty bn, 1 AD bn, 1 engr bn) 3 (lt/mtn) MR bde (1 recce bn, 2 mech inf bn, 1 arty bn) 1 (18th) MGA div (1 tk bn, 2 MGA regt, 1 arty regt, 2 AD bn) SURFACE-TO-SURFACE MISSILE 12 SRBM/GLCM bde with 9K720 Iskander-M (RS-SS-26 Stone/RS-SSC-7 Southpaw) (3+ brigades also with 9M729 (RS-SSC-8 Screwdriver)) COMBAT SUPPORT 9 arty bde 1 hy arty bde 4 MRL bde

4 engr bde 7 engr regt 1 ptn br bde 5 EW bde 5 NBC bde 10 NBC regt COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT 11 log bde AIR DEFENCE 15 AD bde EQUIPMENT BY TYPE ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES MBT 2,927: 650 T-72B/BA; 850 T-72B3; 530 T-72B3M; 310 T-80BV/U; 170 T-80BVM; 350 T-90A; 67 T-90M; (10,200 in store: 7,000 T-72/T-72A/B; 3,000 T-80B/BV/U; 200 T-90) RECCE 1,700: 1,000 BRDM-2/2A; 700 BRM-1K (CP); (1,000+ BRDM-2 in store) IFV 5,180: 450 BMP-1; ε20 BMP-1AM; 2,900 BMP-2; 70+ BMP-2M; 640 BMP-3/-3M; 100 BTR-80A; 1,000 BTR-82A/ AM; (8,500 in store: 7,000 BMP-1; 1,500 BMP-2) APC 6,050+ APC (T) 3,550+: some BMO-T; 3,500 MT-LB; 50+ MTLB VM1K; (2,000 MT-LB in store) APC (W) 2,500: 800 BTR-60 (all variants); 200 BTR-70 (all variants); 1,500 BTR-80; (4,000 BTR-60/70 in store) PPV Typhoon-K 4×4; Typhoon-K 6×6 AUV IVECO LMV; Linza; Tigr; Tigr-M; Tigr-M SpN; Vystrel ENGINEERING & MAINTENANCE VEHICLES AEV BAT-2; IMR; IMR-2; IMR-3; IRM; MT-LB ARV BMP-1; BREM-1/64/K/L; BTR-50PK(B); M1977; MTP-LB; RM-G; T-54/55; VT-72A VLB KMM; MT-55A; MTU; MTU-20; MTU-72; PMM-2 MW BMR-3M; GMX-3; MCV-2 (reported); MTK; MTK-2; UR-77 ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE MSL SP 9+: ε9 BMP-T with 9K120 Ataka (RS-AT-9 Spiral 2); 9P149 with 9K114 Shturm (RS-AT-6 Spiral); 9P149M with 9K132 Shturm-SM (RS-AT-9 Spiral-2); 9P157-2 with 9K123 Khrizantema (RS-AT-15 Springer); 9P1633 with 9M133 Kornet (RS-AT-14 Spriggan); 9K128-1 Kornet-T (RS-AT-14 Spriggan) MANPATS 9K111M Fagot (RS-AT-4 Spigot); 9K1111 Konkurs (RS-AT-5 Spandrel); 9K115 Metis (RS-AT-7 Saxhorn); 9K115-1 Metis-M (RS-AT-13); 9K1152 Metis-M1 (RS-AT-13); 9K135 Kornet (RS-AT-14 Spriggan) RCL 73mm SPG-9 GUNS • TOWED 100mm 526 MT-12 (100mm 2,000 T-12/MT-12 in store) ARTILLERY 4,894+ SP 1,968: 122mm 150 2S1 Gvozdika; 152mm 1,758: 800 2S3/2S3M Akatsiya; 100 2S5 Giatsint-S; 500 2S19/2S19M1 Msta-S; 350 2S19M2/2S33 Msta-SM; 8 2S35 Koalitsiya-SV (in test); 203mm 60 2S7M Malka (4,260 in store: 122mm 2,000 2S1 Gvozdika; 152mm 2,000: 1,000 2S3 Akatsiya; 850 2S5 Giatsint-S; 150 2S19 Msta-S; 203mm 260 2S7 Pion) TOWED 150: 152mm 150 2A65 Msta-B (12,415 in store: 122mm 8,150: 4,400 D-30; 3,750 M-30 (M-1938); 130mm 650 M-46; 152mm 3,575: 1,100 2A36 Giatsint-B; 600 2A65

Msta-B; 1,075 D-20; 700 D-1 (M-1943); 100 M-1937 (ML20); 203mm 40 B-4M) GUN/MOR 180+ SP 120mm 80+: 30 2S23 NONA-SVK; 50+ 2S34 TOWED 120mm 100 2B16 NONA-K MRL 1,056: 122mm 730: 550 BM-21 Grad; 180 9K51M Tornado-G; 220mm 206+: 200 9P140 Uragan; 6 9K512 Uragan-1M; some TOS-1A; 300mm 120: 100 9A52 Smerch; 20 9K515 Tornado-S; (3,220 in store: 122mm 2,420: 2,000 BM-21 Grad; 420 9P138; 132mm 100 BM-13; 220mm 700 9P140 Uragan) MOR 1,540+: 82mm 800+ 2B14; 120mm 700 2S12 Sani; 240mm 40 2S4 Tulpan (2,590 in store: 120mm 1,900: 1,000 2S12 Sani; 900 M-1938 (PM-38); 160mm 300 M-160; SP 240mm 390 2S4 Tulpan) SURFACE-TO-SURFACE MISSILE LAUNCHERS SRBM 150: Dual-capable 150 9K720 Iskander-M (RS-SS-26 Stone) GLCM • Dual-capable Some 9M728 (RS-SSC-7 Southpaw); some 9M729 (RS-SSC-8 Screwdriver) UNINHABITED AERIAL VEHICLES ISR • Heavy Tu-243 Reys/Tu-243 Reys D (service status unclear); Light BLA-07; Pchela-1; Pchela-2 AIR DEFENCE SAM 1,520+ Long-range S-300V (RS-SA-12A/B Gladiator/Giant); S-300V4 (RS-SA-23) Medium-range 350: ε200 9K37M1-2 Buk-M1-2 (RSSA-11 Gadfly); ε90 9K317 Buk-M2 (RS-SA-17 Grizzly); ε60 9K317M Buk-M3 (RS-SA-27) Short-range 120+ 9K331/9K331M/9K331MU Tor-M1/ M2/M2U (RS-SA-15 Gauntlet) (9M338 msl entering service) Point-defence 1,050+: 250+ 2K22M Tunguska (RS-SA-19 Grison); 400 9K33M3 Osa-AKM (RS-SA-8B Gecko); 400 9K35M3 Strela-10 (RS-SA-13 Gopher); 9K310 Igla-1 (RSSA-16 Gimlet); 9K34 Strela-3 (RS-SA-14 Gremlin); 9K38 Igla (RS-SA-18 Grouse); 9K333 Verba (RS-SA-29 Gizmo); 9K338 Igla-S (RS-SA-24 Grinch) GUNS SP 23mm ZSU-23-4 TOWED 23mm ZU-23-2; 57mm S-60

Reserves Cadre formations FORCES BY ROLE MANOEUVRE Mechanised 13 MR bde

Navy ε150,000 (incl conscripts) 4 major fleet organisations (Northern Fleet, Pacific Fleet, Baltic Fleet, Black Sea Fleet) and Caspian Sea Flotilla EQUIPMENT BY TYPE SUBMARINES 49 STRATEGIC • SSBN 11: 1 Kalmar (Project 667BDR (Delta III)) with 16 R-29RKU-02 Stantsia-02 (RS-SS-N-18 Stingray) nuclear SLBM, 2 single 400mm TT with SET-72 LWT,

4 single 533mm TT with 53-65K HWT/SET-65K HWT/USET-80K Keramika HWT 6 Delfin (Project 667BDRM (Delta IV)) with 16 R-29RMU2 Sineva/R-29RMU2.1 Layner (RS-SS-N-23 Skiff) nuclear SLBM, 4 single 533mm TT with 53-65K HWT/SET-65K HWT/USET-80K Keramika HWT 3 Borey (Project 955 (Dolgorukiy)) with 16 Bulava (RSSS-N-32) nuclear SLBM, 6 single 533mm TT with USET-80K Keramika HWT/UGST Fizik HWT 1 Borey-A (Project 955A) with 6 Bulava (RS-SS-N-32) nuclear SLBM, 6 single 533mm TT with USET-80K Keramika HWT/UGST Fizik HWT (1 Akula (Project 941UM (Typhoon)) in reserve for training and SLBM trials with capacity for 20 Bulava (RS-SS-N-32) nuclear SLBM, 6 single 533mm TT with 53-65K HWT/SET-65K HWT/USET-80K Keramika HWT) TACTICAL 38 SSGN 8: 6 Antey (Project 949A (Oscar II)) (2 more nonoperational, in long-term refit) with 24 single SM-225A lnchr with 3M45 Granit (RS-SS-N-19 Shipwreck) dual-capable AShM, 2 single 650mm TT each with T-65 HWT/RPK-7 (RS-SS-N-16 Stallion) ASW msl, 4 single 553mm TT with 53-65K HWT/ SET-65K HWT/USET-80K Keramika HWT 1 Yasen (Project 885 (Severodvinsk I)) with 8 4-cell SM-346 VLS with 3M14K (RS-SS-N-30A Sagaris) dual-capable LACM/3M54K1 (RS-SS-N-27) AShM/3M54K (RS-SS-N-27B Sizzler) AShM/3M55 Oniks (RS-SS-N-26 Strobile) AShM (3M54K/K1 operational status unclear); 10 single 533mm TT with USET-80K Keramika HWT/UGST Fizik HWT 1 Yasen-M (Project 08851 (Severodvinsk II)) with 8 4-cell SM-346 VLS with 3M14K (RS-SS-N-30A Sagaris) dual-capable LACM/3M54K1 (RSSS-N-27) AShM/3M54K (RS-SS-N-27B Sizzler) AShM/3M55 Oniks (RS-SS-N-26 Strobile) AShM (3M54K/K1 operational status unclear); up to 10 single 533mm TT with UGST Fizik HWT SSN 10: 2 Kondor (Project 945A (Sierra II)) with 4 single 533mm TT with TEST-71M HWT/USET-80K Keramika HWT (unclear if dual-capable 3M14 (RSSS-N-30A Sagaris) has replaced 3M10 Granat (RSSS-N-21 Sampson) nuclear LACM which is possibly withdrawn; AShM capability unconfirmed), 4 single 650mm TT with 65-73 HWT 3 Schuka (Project 671RTMK (Victor III)) with 4 single 533mm TT with 53-65K HWT/SET-65K HWT/ USET-80K Keramika HWT (unclear if dual-capable 3M14 (RS-SS-N-30A Sagaris) has replaced 3M10 Granat (RS-SS-N-21 Sampson) nuclear LACM which is possibly withdrawn; AShM capability unconfirmed), 2 single 650mm TT with 65-73 HWT 3 Schuka-B (Project 971 (Akula I)) (5 more nonoperational, return to service significantly delayed) with 4 single 533mm TT with 53-65K HWT/TEST71M HWT/USET-80K Keramika HWT (unclear if dual-capable 3M14 (RS-SS-N-30A Sagaris) has replaced 3M10 Granat (RS-SS-N-21 Sampson)

Russia and Eurasia

Russia and Eurasia 195

196 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2022 nuclear LACM which is possibly withdrawn; AShM capability unconfirmed), 4 single 650mm TT with 65-73 HWT/RPK-7 (RS-SS-N-16 Stallion) ASW msl 2 Schuka-B (Project 971/09711 (Akula II)) with 4 single 533mm TT with 53-65K HWT/TEST-71M HWT/USET-80K Keramika HWT (unclear if dualcapable 3M14 (RS-SS-N-30A Sagaris) has replaced 3M10 Granat (RS-SS-N-21 Sampson) nuclear LACM which is possibly withdrawn; AShM capability unconfirmed), 4 single 650mm TT with 65-73 HWT/RPK-7 (RS-SS-N-16 Stallion) ASW msl (1 Barracuda (Project 945 (Sierra I)) (in reserve) with 6 single 533mm TT with TEST-71M HWT/USET-80K Keramika HWT (unclear if dual-capable 3M14 (RSSS-N-30A Sagaris) has replaced 3M10 Granat (RSSS-N-21 Sampson) nuclear LACM which is possibly withdrawn; AShM capability unconfirmed)) SSK 20: 10 Paltus (Project 877 (Kilo)) (1 more non-operational, in long-term refit) with 6 single 533mm TT with 5365K HWT/TEST-71M HWT/USET-80K Keramika HWT 9 Varshavyanka (Project 06363 (Improved Kilo)) with 6 single 533mm TT with 3M14K Kalibr-PL (RS-SSN-30A Sagaris) dual-capable LACM/3M54K (RSSS-N-27B Sizzler) AShM/3M54K1 (RS-SS-N-27) AShM/53-65K HWT/TEST-71M HWT/USET-80K Keramika HWT (3M54K/K1 operational status unclear) 1 Lada (Project 677 (Petersburg)) (in test) with 6 single 533mm TT with 3M14K Kalibr-PL (RS-SS-N-30A Sagaris) dual-capable LACM/3M54K (RS-SS-N27B Sizzler) AShM/3M54K1 (RS-SS-N-27) AShM/ USET-80K Keramika HWT (3M54K/K1 operational status unclear) PRINCIPAL SURFACE COMBATANTS 32 AIRCRAFT CARRIERS • CV 1 Admiral Kuznetsov (in extended refit) with 12 single SM-233A lnchr with 3M45 Granit (RS-SS-N-19 Shipwreck) AShM, 24 8-cell 3S95 VLS with 3K95 Kinzhal (RS-SA-N-9 Gauntlet) SAM, 2 RBU 12000 Udav 1 A/S mor, 8 3M87 Kortik CIWS with 9M311 SAM (RS-CADS-N-1), 6 AK630M CIWS (capacity 18–24 Su-33 Flanker D/MiG-29KR/KUBR Ftr/FGA ac; 15 Ka-27 Helix ASW hel, 2 Ka-31R Helix AEW hel) CRUISERS 4: CGHMN 1 Orlan (Project 11442 (Kirov I)) (1 other nonoperational; undergoing extensive refit and planned to return to service in 2023) with 20 single SM-233 lnchr with 3M45 Granit (RS-SS-N-19 Shipwreck) AShM, 6 6-cell B-203A VLS with S-300F Fort (RS-SA-N-6 Grumble) SAM, 6 6-cell B-203A VLS with S-300FM Fort-M (RS-SA-N-20 Gargoyle) SAM, 16 8-cell 3S95 VLS with 3K95 Kinzhal (RS-SA-N-9 Gauntlet) SAM, 2 quintuple 533mm TT with RPK-6M Vodopad-NK (RSSS-N-16 Stallion) A/S msl, 1 RBU 6000 Smerch 2 A/S mor, 2 RBU 1000 Smerch 3 A/S mor, 6 3M87 Kortik CIWS with 9M311 SAM (RS-CADS-N-1), 1 twin 130mm gun (capacity 3 Ka-27 Helix ASW hel) CGHM 3 Atlant (Project 1164 (Slava)) with 8 twin SM-248 lnchr with 3M70 Vulkan (RS-SS-N-12 mod 2

Sandbox) AShM, 8 octuple VLS with S-300F Fort (RSSA-N-6 Grumble) SAM/S-300FM Fort M (RS-SA-N-20 Gargoyle) SAM, 2 twin ZIF-122 lnchr with 4K33 Osa-M (RS-SA-N-4 Gecko) SAM, 2 quintuple 533mm PTA-531164 ASTT with SET-65K HWT, 2 RBU 6000 Smerch 2 A/S mor, 6 AK630 CIWS, 1 twin 130mm gun (capacity 1 Ka-27 Helix ASW hel) DESTROYERS • DDGHM 11: 3 Sarych (Project 956 (Sovremenny I)) with 2 quad lnchr with 3M80 Moskit (RS-SS-N-22 Sunburn) AShM, 2 twin 3S90 lnchr with 9M317 Yezh (RS-SA-N-7B) SAM, 2 twin DTA-53-956 533mm TT with 53-65K HWT/SET-65K HWT, 2 RBU 1000 Smerch 3 A/S mor, 4 AK630 CIWS, 2 twin 130mm guns (capacity 1 Ka27 Helix ASW hel) 6 Fregat (Project 1155 (Udaloy I)) with 2 quad lnchr with URK-5 Rastrub-B (RS-SS-N-14 Silex) AShM/ASW, 8 8-cell 3S95 VLS with 3K95 Kinzhal (RS-SA-N-9 Gauntlet) SAM, 2 quad 533mm ChTA-53-1155 ASTT with 53-65K HWT/SET-65K HWT, 2 RBU 6000 Smerch 2 A/S mor, 4 AK630 CIWS, 2 100mm guns (capacity 2 Ka-27 Helix ASW hel) 1 Fregat (Project 1155 (Udaloy I)) with 2 8-cell 3S14 UKSK VLS with with 3M14T Kalibr-NK (RS-SSN-30A Sagaris) dual-capable LACM/3M54T (RSSS-N-27B Sizzler) AShM/3M54T1 (RS-SS-N-27) AShM/3M55 Oniks (RS-SS-N-26 Strobile) AShM (3M54T/T1 operational status unclear), 2 quad lnchr with 3M24 Uran (RS-SS-N-25 Switchblade) AShM, 2 quad 533mm ChTA-53-1155 ASTT with 53-65K HWT/SET-65K HWT, 2 RBU 6000 Smerch 2 A/S mor, 4 AK630 CIWS, 1 100mm gun (capacity 2 Ka-27 Helix ASW hel) 1 Fregat (Project 11551 (Udaloy II)) (in refit) with 2 quad lnchr with 3M80 Moskit (RS-SS-N-22 Sunburn) AShM, 8 8-cell 3S95 VLS with 3K95 Kinzhal (RSSA-N-9 Gauntlet) SAM, 2 3M87 Kortik CIWS with 9M311 SAM (RS-CADS-N-1), 2 RBU 6000 Smerch 2 A/S mor, 1 twin 130mm gun (capacity 2 Ka-27 Helix ASW hel) FRIGATES 16 FFGHM 14: 3 Project 11356 (Grigorovich) with 1 8-cell 3S14 UKSK VLS with 3M14T Kalibr-NK (RS-SS-N-30A Sagaris) dual-capable LACM/3M54T (RS-SS-N-27B Sizzler) AShM/3M54T1 (RS-SS-N-27) AShM/3M55 Oniks (RS-SS-N-26 Strobile) AShM/91RT2 A/S msl (3M54T/T1 operational status unclear), 2 12cell 3S90.1 VLS with 9M317 Yezh (RS-SA-N-7B) SAM/9M317M Yezh (RS-SA-N-7C) SAM, 2 twin DTA-53-11356 533mm TT with 53-65K HWT/SET65K HWT, 1 RBU 6000 A/S mor, 2 AK630 CIWS, 1 100mm gun (capacity 1 Ka-27 Helix ASW hel) 1 Jastreb (Project 11540 (Neustrashimyy)) (1 other non-operational, in long-term refit) with 2 quad lnchr with 3M24 Uran (RS-SS-N-25 Switchblade) AShM, 4 8-cell 3S95 VLS with 3K95 Kinzhal (RS-SA-N-9 Gauntlet), 6 single 533mm ASTT with RPK-6M Vodopad-NK (RS-SS-N-16 Stallion) A/S msl, 1 RBU 6000 Smerch 2 A/S mor, 2 3M87 Kortik

CIWS with 9M311 SAM (RS-CADS-N-1), 1 100mm gun (capacity 1 Ka-27 Helix ASW hel) 1 Project 20380 (Steregushchiy I) with 2 quad lnchr with 3M24 Uran (RS-SS-N-25 Switchblade) AShM, 2 quad 324mm SM-588 ASTT with MTT LWT, 1 3M87 Kortik-M CIWS with 9M311 SAM (RS-CADS-N-1), 2 AK630 CIWS, 1 100mm gun (capacity 1 Ka-27 Helix ASW hel) 6 Project 20380 (Steregushchiy II) with 2 quad lnchr with 3M24 Uran (RS-SS-N-25 Switchblade) AShM, 3 4-cell 3S97 VLS with 3K96-3 Redut (RS-SA-N-28) SAM, 2 quad 324mm SM-588 ASTT with MTT LWT, 2 AK630 CIWS, 1 100mm gun (capacity 1 Ka-27 Helix ASW hel) 1 Project 20385 (Gremyashchiy) with 1 8-cell 3S14 UKSK VLS with 3M14T Kalibr-NK (RS-SS-N-30A Sagaris) dual-capable LACM/3M54T (RS-SS-N-27B Sizzler) AShM/3M54T1 (RS-SS-N-27) AShM/3M55 Oniks (RS-SS-N-26 Strobile) AShM (3M54T/T1 operational status unclear), 4 4-cell 3S97 VLS with 3K96-2 Poliment-Redut (RS-SA-N-28) SAM, 2 quad 324mm TT with MTT LWT, 2 AK630 CIWS, 1 100mm gun (capacity 1 Ka-27 Helix ASW hel) 2 Project 22350 (Gorshkov) with 2 8-cell 3S14 UKSK VLS with 3M14T Kalibr-NK (RS-SS-N-30A Sagaris) dual-capable LACM/3M54T (RS-SS-N-27B Sizzler) AShM/3M54T1 (RS-SS-N-27) AShM/3M55 Oniks (RS-SS-N-26 Strobile) AShM (3M54T/T1 operational status unclear), 4 8-cell 3S97 VLS with 3K96-2 Poliment-Redut (RS-SA-N-28) SAM, 2 quad 324mm TT with MTT LWT, 2 3M89 Palash CIWS (RSCADS-N-2), 1 130mm gun (capacity 1 Ka-27 Helix ASW hel) FFGM 2: 1 Burevestnik (Project 1135 (Krivak I))† with 1 quad lnchr with URK-5 Rastrub-B (RS-SS-N-14 Silex) AShM/ASW, 1 twin ZIF-122 lnchr with Osa-M (RSSA-N-4 Gecko) SAM, 2 quad 533mm ChTA-53-1135 ASTT with 53-65K HWT/SET-65K HWT, 2 RBU 6000 Smerch 2 A/S mor, 2 twin 76mm guns 1 Burevestnik M (Project 1135M (Krivak II)) with 1 quad lnchr with URK-5 Rastrub-B (RS-SS-N-14 Silex) AShM/ASW, 2 twin ZIF-122 lnchr with 4K33 Osa-M (RS-SA-N-4 Gecko SAM), 2 quad 533mm ChTA-53-1135 ASTT with 53-65K HWT/SET-65K HWT, 2 RBU 6000 Smerch 2 A/S mor, 2 100mm guns PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 129 CORVETTES 42 FSGM 14 9 Buyan-M (Project 21631 (Sviyazhsk)) with 1 8-cell 3S14 UKSK VLS with 3M14T Kalibr-NK (RS-SSN-30A Sagaris) dual-capable LACM/3M54T (RSSS-N-27B Sizzler) AShM/3M54T1 (RS-SS-N-27) AShM/3M55 Oniks (RS-SS-N-26 Strobile) AShM (3M54T/T1 operational status unclear), 2 sextuple 3M47 Gibka lnchr with Igla-1M (RS-SA-N-10 Grouse) SAM, 1 AK630M-2 CIWS, 1 100mm gun 1 Karakurt (Project 22800 (Uragan)) with 1 8-cell 3S14 UKSK VLS with 3M14T Kalibr-NK (RS-SS-N-30A Sagaris) dual-capable LACM/3M54T (RS-SS-N-27B

Sizzler) AShM/3M54T1 (RS-SS-N-27) AShM/3M55 Oniks (RS-SS-N-26 Strobile) AShM (3M54T/T1 operational status unclear), 2 Pantsir-M with 57E6 SAM, 1 76mm gun 1 Project 11661K (Gepard I) with 2 quad lnchr with 3M24 Uran (RS-SS-N-25 Switchblade) AShM, 1 twin ZIF-122 lnchr with 4K33 Osa-M (RS-SA-N-4 Gecko) SAM, 2 AK630 CIWS, 1 76mm gun 1 Project 11661K (Gepard II) with 1 8-cell VLS with 3M14T Kalibr-NK (RS-SS-N-30A Sagaris) dualcapable LACM/3M54T (RS-SS-N-27B Sizzler) AShM/3M54T1 (RS-SS-N-27) AShM/3M55 Oniks (RS-SS-N-26 Strobile) AShM (3M54T/T1 operational status unclear), 1 3M89 Palash CIWS with 9M337 Sosna-R SAM (RS-CADS-N-2), 1 76mm gun 2 Sivuch (Project 1239 (Dergach)) with 2 quad lnchr with 3M80 Moskit (RS-SS-N-22 Sunburn) AShM, 1 twin ZIF-122 lnchr with 4K33AM Osa-MA2 (RSSA-N-4 Gecko) SAM, 2 AK630M CIWS, 1 76mm gun FSG 2 Karakurt (Project 22800 (Uragan)) with 1 8-cell 3S14 VLS with 3M14T Kalibr-NK (RS-SS-N-30A Sagaris) dual-capable LACM/3M54T (RS-SS-N-27B Sizzler) AShM/3M54T1 (RS-SS-N-27) AShM/3M55 Oniks (RS-SS-N-26 Strobile) AShM (3M54T/T1 operational status unclear), 2 AK630M CIWS, 1 76mm gun FSM 26: 2 Albatros (Project 1124 (Grisha III)) with 1 twin ZIF122 lnchr with 4K33 Osa-M (RS-SA-N-4 Gecko) SAM, 2 twin 533mm DTA-53-1124 ASTT, 2 RBU 6000 Smerch 2 A/S mor, 1 twin 57mm gun 18 Albatros (Project 1124M (Grisha V)) with 1 twin ZIF-122 lnchr with 4K33 Osa-M (RS-SA-N-4 Gecko) SAM, 2 twin 533mm DTA-53-1124 ASTT, 1 RBU 6000 Smerch 2 A/S mor, 1 AK630 CIWS, 1 76mm gun 6 Project 1331M (Parchim II) with 2 quad lnchr with 9K32 Strela-2 (RS-SA-N-5 Grail) SAM, 2 twin 533mm ASTT, 2 RBU 6000 Smerch 2 A/S mor, 1 AK630 CIWS, 1 76mm gun PSOH 3 Project 22160 (Bykov) with 1 76mm gun (capacity 1 Ka-27 Helix ASW hel) PCGM 10: 9 Ovod-1 (Project 1234.1 (Nanuchka III)) with 2 triple lnchr with P-120 Malakhit (RS-SS-N-9 Siren) AShM, 1 twin ZIF-122 lnchr with 4K33 Osa-M (RS-SA-N-4 Gecko) SAM, 1 AK630 CIWS, 1 76mm gun 1 Ovod-1 (Project 1234.1 (Nanuchka III)) with 4 quad lnchr with 3M24 Uran (RS-SS-N-25 Switchblade) AShM, 1 twin lnchr with 4K33 Osa-M (RS-SA-N-4 Gecko) SAM, 1 AK630 CIWS, 1 76mm gun PCFG 23: 5 Molnya (Tarantul II) with 2 twin lnchr with P-22 Termit-R (RS-SS-N-2D Styx) AShM, 2 AK630M CIWS, 1 76mm gun 17 Molnya (Tarantul III) with 2 twin lnchr with 3M80 Moskit (RS-SS-N-22 Sunburn) AShM, 2 AK630M CIWS, 1 76mm gun

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198 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2022 1 Molnya (Tarantul III) with 2 twin lnchr with 3M80 Moskit (RS-SS-N-22 Sunburn) AShM, 1 3K89 Palash (RS-CADS-N-2) CIWS, 1 76mm gun PCM 3 Buyan (Project 21630 (Astrakhan)) with 1 sextuple lnchr with 3M47 Gibka lnchr with Igla-1M (RS-SA-N-10 Grouse) SAM, 1 A-215 Grad-M 122mm MRL, 1 100mm gun PCF 1 Molnya (Tarantul III) with 2 AK630M CIWS, 1 76mm gun PBF 19: 17 Raptor (capacity 20 troops); 2 Mangust PBR 4 Shmel with 1 17-cell BM-14 MRL, 1 76mm gun PB 24 Grachonok MINE WARFARE • MINE COUNTERMEASURES 42 MCC 5 Alexandrit (Project 12700) MHI 7 Sapfir (Project 10750 (Lida)) with 1 AK630 CIWS MHO 2 Rubin (Project 12660 (Gorya)) with 2 quad lnchr with 9K32 Strela-2 (RS-SA-N-5 Grail) SAM, 1 AK630 CIWS, 1 76mm gun MSC 20: 19 Yakhont (Project 1265 (Sonya)) with 4 AK630 CIWS (some with 2 quad lnchr with 9K32 Strela-2 (RS-SA-N-5 Grail) SAM); 1 Korund-E (Project 1258E (Yevgenya)) MSO 8: 7 Akvamaren-M (Project 266M (Natya)); 1 Agat (Project 02668 (Natya II)) (all with 2 quad lnchr (manual aiming) with 9K32 Strela-2 (RS-SA-N-5 Grail) SAM, 2 RBU 1200 Uragan A/S mor, 2 twin AK230 CIWS AMPHIBIOUS LANDING SHIPS • LST 21: 12 Project 775 (Ropucha I/II) with 2 twin 57mm guns (capacity either 10 MBT and 190 troops or 24 APC (T) and 170 troops) 3 Project 775M (Ropucha III) with 2 AK630 CIWS, 1 76mm gun (capacity either 10 MBT and 190 troops or 24 APC (T) and 170 troops) 4 Tapir (Project 1171 (Alligator)) with at least 2 twin lnchr with 9K32 Strela-2 (RS-SA-N-5 Grail) SAM, 2 twin 57mm guns (capacity 20 tanks; 300 troops) 2 Project 11711 (Gren) with 1 AK630M-2 CIWS, 2 AK630M CIWS (capacity 1 Ka-29 Helix B hel; 13 MBT/36 AFV; 300 troops) LANDING CRAFT 28 LCM 26: 9 Akula (Project 1176 (Ondatra)) (capacity 1 MBT); 5 Dyugon (Project 21820) (capacity 5 APC or 100 troops); 12 Serna (Project 11770) (capacity 2 APC or 100 troops) LCAC 2 Zubr (Project 12322 (Pomornik)) with 2 22-cell 140mm MS-227 Ogon’ MRL, 2 AK630 CIWS (capacity 230 troops; either 3 MBT or 10 APC(T)) LOGISTICS AND SUPPORT 278 SSAN 8: 2 Halibut (Project 18511 (Paltus)) 3 Kashalot (Project 1910 (Uniform)) 1 Nelma (Project 1851 (X-Ray)) 1 Orenburg (Delta III Stretch) 1 Podmoskovye (Project 09787) (1 non-operational Losharik (Project 10831 (Norsub-5)) reportedly damaged by fire in 2019) SSA 1 Sarov (Project 20120) ABU 12: 8 Kashtan; 4 Project 419 (Sura) AE 9: 6 Muna; 1 Dubnyak; 2 Akademik Kovalev (Project 20181) with 1 hel landing platform

AEM 2: 1 Kalma-3 (Project 1791R); 1 Lama AFS 2 Longvinik (Project 23120) AG 1 Potok AGB 5: 1 Dobrynya Mikitich; 1 Ilya Muromets; 2 Ivan Susanin; 1 Vladimir Kavraisky AGE 3: 2 Seliger; 1 Tchusovoy AGHS 4 Project 23040G AGI 14: 2 Alpinist; 2 Dubridium (Project 1826); 1 Moma; 7 Vishnya; 2 Yuri Ivanov AGM 1 Marshal Nedelin AGOR 7: 1 Akademik Alexandrov (Project 20183); 1 Akademik Krylov; 2 Sibiriyakov; 2 Vinograd; 1 Yantar AGS 67: 8 Biya; 16+ Finik; 7 Kamenka; 5 Moma; 8+ Onega; 6 Baklan (Project 19920); 4 Baklan (Project 19920B); 4 Vaygach; 9+ Yug AGSH 1 Samara AH 3 Ob† AK 3: 2 Irgiz; 1 Pevek AOL 8: 2+ Dubna; 3 Uda; 3+ Altay (mod) AOR 4: 3 Boris Chilikin; 1 Akademik Pashin (Project 23130) AORL 2: 1 Kaliningradneft; 1 Olekma AOS 1 Luza AOTL 1 Platforma-Arktika (Project 03182) with 1 hel landing plaftorm AR ε7 Amur ARC 5: 4 Emba; 1 Improved Klasma ARS 33: 1 Kommuna; 5 Goryn; 4 Mikhail Rudnitsky; 22 Project 23040; 1 Zvezdochka (Project 20180) AS 3 Project 2020 (Malina) ASR 2: 1 Elbrus; 1 Igor Belousov ATF 53: 1 Okhotsk; 1 Baklan; ε3 Katun; 3 Ingul; 1 Neftegaz; 10 Okhtensky; 13 Prometey; 2 Project 23470 with 1 hel landing platform; 1 Prut; 4 Sliva; 14 Sorum ATS 6 Project 22870 AWT 1 Manych AXL 9: 7 Petrushka; 2 Smolny with 2 RBU 2500 Smerch 1 A/S mor, 2 twin 76mm guns

Naval Aviation ε31,000 FORCES BY ROLE FIGHTER 1 regt with MiG-31B/BS/BM Foxhound 1 regt with Su-27/Su-27UB Flanker 1 regt with Su-33 Flanker D; Su-25UTG Frogfoot FIGHTER/GROUND ATTACK 1 regt with MiG-29KR/KUBR Fulcrum 1 regt with MiG-31BM Foxhound; Su-24M/M2/MR Fencer ANTI-SURFACE WARFARE/ISR 2 regt with Su-24M/MR Fencer; Su-30SM ANTI-SUBMARINE WARFARE 1 regt with Il-38/Il-38N May*; Il-18D; Il-20RT Coot A; Il-22 Coot B 2 sqn with Il-38/Il-38N May*; Il-18D; Il-20RT Coot A; Il-22 Coot B 1 regt with Ka-27/Ka-29 Helix 1 sqn with Ka-27/Ka-29 Helix 2 sqn with Tu-142MK/MZ/MR Bear F/J* 1 unit with Ka-31R Helix

Russia and Eurasia 199 AIR-LAUNCHED MISSILES AAM • IR R-27T/ET (RS-AA-10B/D Alamo); R-60 (RS-AA-8 Aphid); R-73 (RS-AA-11A Archer); R-74M (RS-AA-11B Archer); ARH R-77-1 (RS-AA-12B Adder); SARH R-27R/ER (RS-AA-10A/C Alamo); R-33 (RS-AA9A Amos) ARM Kh-25MP (RS-AS-12A Kegler); Kh-31P (RS-AS17A Krypton); Kh-58 (RS-AS-11 Kilter) ASM Kh-59 (RS-AS-13 Kingbolt); Kh-59M (RS-AS-18 Kazoo); Kh-29T (RS-AS-14 Kedge) AShM Kh-31A (RS-AS-17B Krypton)

Naval Infantry (Marines) ε35,000 FORCES BY ROLE COMMAND 3 corps HQ SPECIAL FORCES 4 (OMRP) SF unit 11 (PDSS) cbt diver unit MANOEUVRE Reconnaissance 1 recce bde Mechanised 1 MR div (1 tk regt, 2 MR regt; 1 SAM regt) 2 MR bde 1 MR regt 6 naval inf bde 1 naval inf regt SURFACE-TO-SURFACE MISSILE 1 SRBM/GLCM bde with 9K720 Iskander-M (RS-SS-26 Stone/RS-SSC-7 Southpaw) COMBAT SUPPORT 2 arty bde 2 engr regt AIR DEFENCE 1 SAM regt with 9K33 Osa (RS-SA-8 Gecko); Strela-1/ Strela-10 (RS-SA-9 Gaskin/RS-SA-13 Gopher) EQUIPMENT BY TYPE ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES MBT 330: 50 T-72B; 150 T-72B3; 30 T-72B3M; 50 T-80BV; 50 T-80BVM IFV 1,260: 400 BMP-2; 80 BMP-3; 40 BMP-3F; 740 BTR82A APC 400 APC (T) 300 MT-LB APC (W) 100 BTR-80 AUV Vystrel ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE MSL SP 60+: 60 9P148 with 9K111-1 Konkurs (RS-AT-5 Spandrel); 9P149 with 9K114 Shturm (RS-AT-6 Spiral); 9P157-2 with 9K123 Khrisantema (RS-AT-15 Springer) MANPATS 9K111-1 Konkurs (RS-AT-5 Spandrel); 9K135 Kornet (RS-AT-14 Spriggan) GUNS 100mm T-12 ARTILLERY 405 SP 181: 122mm 95 2S1 Gvozdika; 152mm 86: 50 2S3 Akatsiya; 36 2S19M1 Msta-S TOWED 152mm 100: 50 2A36 Giatsint-B; 50 2A65 Msta-B

Russia and Eurasia

MARITIME PATROL/TRANSPORT 1 regt with An-26 Curl; Be-12 Mail*; Ka-27 Helix; Mi-8 Hip SEARCH & RESCUE/TRANSPORT 1 sqn with An-12PS Cub; An-26 Curl; Tu-134 TRANSPORT 1 sqn with An-12BK Cub; An-24RV Coke; An-26 Curl; An-72 Coaler; An-140 2 sqn with An-26 Curl; Tu-134 TRAINING 1 sqn with L-39 Albatros; Su-25UTG Frogfoot 1 sqn with An-140; Tu-134; Tu-154, Il-38 May ATTACK/TRANSPORT HELICOPTER 1 sqn with Mi-24P Hind; Mi-8 Hip TRANSPORT HELICOPTER 1 sqn with Mi-8 Hip AIR DEFENCE 4 AD div HQ 1 SAM regt with S-300PM1 (RS-SA-20 Gargoyle); S-300PS (RS-SA-10B Grumble) 1 SAM regt with S-300PM1 (RS-SA-20 Gargoyle); S-400 (RS-SA-21 Growler); 96K6 Pantsir-S1 (RS-SA-22 Greyhound) 1 SAM regt with S-300PS (RS-SA-10B Grumble) 1 SAM regt with S-300PS (RS-SA-10B Grumble); S-400 (RS-SA-21 Growler); 96K6 Pantsir-S1 (RS-SA-22 Greyhound) 4 SAM regt with S-400 (RS-SA-21 Growler); 96K6 Pantsir-S1 (RS-SA-22 Greyhound) EQUIPMENT BY TYPE AIRCRAFT 219 combat capable FTR 67: 10 MiG-31B/BS Foxhound; 22 MiG-31BM Foxhound C; 17 Su-33 Flanker D; 18 Su-27/Su-27UB Flanker FGA 44: 19 MiG-29KR Fulcrum; 3 MiG-29KUBR Fulcrum; 22 Su-30SM ATK 46: 41 Su-24M Fencer; 5 Su-25UTG Frogfoot (trg role) ASW 44: 12 Tu-142MK/MZ Bear F; 10 Tu-142MR Bear J (comms); 15 Il-38 May; 7 Il-38N May MP 7: 6 Be-12PS Mail*; 1 Il-18D ISR 12 Su-24MR Fencer E* SAR 4: 3 An-12PS Cub; 1 Be-200ES ELINT 4: 2 Il-20RT Coot A; 2 Il-22 Coot B TPT 49: Medium 2 An-12BK Cub; Light 45: 1 An-24RV Coke; 24 An-26 Curl; 6 An-72 Coaler; 4 An-140; 9 Tu-134; 1 Tu-134UBL; PAX 2 Tu-154M Careless TRG 4 L-39 Albatros HELICOPTERS ATK 8 Mi-24P Hind ASW 52: 30 Ka-27PL Helix; 22 Ka-27M Helix EW 8 Mi-8 Hip J AEW 2 Ka-31R Helix SAR 16 Ka-27PS Helix D TPT 41: Medium 35: 27 Ka-29 Helix; 4 Mi-8T Hip; 4 Mi8MT Hip; Light 6 Ka-226T AIR DEFENCE • SAM Long-range 200: 56 S-300PM1 (RS-SA-20 Gargoyle); 40 S-300PS (RS-SA-10B Grumble); 104 S-400 (RS-SA-21 Growler) Short-range 30 96K6 Pantsir-S1 (RS-SA-22 Greyhound)

200 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2022 GUN/MOR 66 SP 120mm 42: 12 2S23 NONA-SVK; 30 2S9 NONA-S TOWED 120mm 24 2B16 NONA-K MRL 58: 122mm 36 BM-21 Grad/Tornado-G; 220mm 18 9P140 Uragan; 300mm 4+ 9A52 Smerch SURFACE-TO-SURFACE MISSILE LAUNCHER SRBM • Dual-capable 12 9K720 Iskander-M (RS-SS-26 Stone) GLCM • Dual-capable Some 9M728 (RS-SSC-7 Southpaw) AIR DEFENCE SAM Short-range 12+ Tor-M2DT Point-defence 70+: 20 9K33 Osa (RS-SA-8 Gecko); 50 9K31 Strela-1/9K35 Strela-10 (RS-SA-9 Gaskin/RSSA-13 Gopher); 9K338 Igla-S (RS-SA-24 Grinch) GUNS • SP 23mm 60 ZSU-23-4

Coastal Missile and Artillery Forces 2,000 FORCES BY ROLE COASTAL DEFENCE 5 AShM bde 1 AShM regt EQUIPMENT BY TYPE COASTAL DEFENCE ARTY • SP 130mm ε36 A-222 Bereg AShM 96+: 40 3K60 Bal (RS-SSC-6 Sennight); 56 3K55 Bastion (RS-SSC-5 Stooge); some 4K44 Redut (RS-SSC-1 Sepal); some 4K51 Rubezh (RS-SSC-3 Styx)

Aerospace Forces ε165,000 (incl conscripts)

A joint CIS Unified Air Defence System covers RUS, ARM, BLR, KAZ, KGZ, TJK, TKM and UZB FORCES BY ROLE BOMBER 3 regt with Tu-22M3 Backfire C 3 sqn with Tu-95MS/MS mod Bear 1 sqn with Tu-160/Tu-160 mod Blackjack FIGHTER 1 sqn with MiG-29/MiG-29UB Fulcrum (Armenia) 2 regt with MiG-31BM Foxhound C 1 regt with MiG-31BM Foxhound C; Su-35S Flanker M 1 regt with Su-27/Su-27SM/Su-27UB Flanker B/J/C; Su30M2 Flanker G 2 regt with Su-30SM Flanker H FIGHTER/GROUND ATTACK 1 regt with MiG-31BM Foxhound C; Su-27SM Flanker J; Su-30M2 Flanker G; Su-30SM Flanker H; Su-35S Flanker M 1 regt with Su-27SM Flanker J; Su-35S Flanker M 1 regt with Su-35S Flanker M; Su-30SM Flanker H 1 regt with Su-27SM3 Flanker; Su-30M2 Flanker G 1 regt with Su-25 Frogfoot; Su-30SM Flanker H GROUND ATTACK 1 regt with Su-24M/M2 Fencer; Su-34 Fullback 1 regt with Su-24M Fencer; Su-25SM Frogfoot 3 regt with Su-25SM/SM3 Frogfoot 1 sqn with Su-25SM Frogfoot (Kyrgyzstan) 3 regt with Su-34 Fullback

GROUND ATTACK/ISR 1 regt with Su-24M/MR Fencer ISR 3 sqn with Su-24MR Fencer 1 flt with An-30 Clank AIRBORNE EARLY WARNING & CONTROL 1 sqn with A-50/A-50U Mainstay TANKER 1 sqn with Il-78/Il-78M Midas TRANSPORT 6 regt/sqn with An-12BK Cub; An-148-100E; An-26 Curl; Tu-134 Crusty; Tu-154 Careless; Mi-8 Hip 1 regt with An-124 Condor; Il-76MD Candid 1 regt with An-124 Condor; Il-76MD Candid; Il-76MD90A Candid 1 regt with An-12BK Cub; Il-76MD Candid 1 sqn with An-22 Cock 3 regt with Il-76MD Candid ATTACK/TRANSPORT HELICOPTER 1 bde with Ka-52A Hokum B; Mi-28N Havoc B; Mi-35 Hind; Mi-26 Halo; Mi-8MTV-5 Hip 1 bde with Ka-52A Hokum B; Mi-26 Halo; Mi-8 Hip 1 bde with Mi-28N Havoc B; Mi-35 Hind; Mi-26 Halo; Mi-8 Hip 2 regt with Ka-52A Hokum B; Mi-28N Havoc B; Mi-35 Hind; Mi-8 Hip 1 regt with Ka-52A Hokum B; Mi-24P Hind; Mi-8MTPR-1 Hip; Mi-8 Hip 1 regt with Ka-52A Hokum B; Mi-8 Hip 1 regt with Mi-28N Havoc B; Mi-35 Hind; Mi-8 Hip 1 regt with Mi-28N Havoc B; Mi-24P Hind; Mi-35 Hind; Mi-8 Hip 2 regt with Mi-24P Hind; Mi-8 Hip 2 sqn with Mi-24P Hind; Mi-8 Hip AIR DEFENCE 9 AD div HQ 4 regt with 9K37M1-2 Buk-M1-2 (RS-SA-11 Gadfly); 9K317 Buk-M2 (RS-SA-17 Grizzly); S-300V (RS-SA-12 Gladiator/Giant) 1 bde with S-300PS (RS-SA-10B Grumble) 2 regt with S-300PS (RS-SA-10B Grumble) 6 regt with S-300PM1/PM2 (RS-SA-20 Gargoyle) 12 regt with S-400 (RS-SA-21 Growler); 96K6 Pantsir-S1 (RS-SA-22 Greyhound) EQUIPMENT BY TYPE AIRCRAFT 1,172 combat capable BBR 137: 60 Tu-22M3 Backfire C; 1 Tu-22MR Backfire† (1 in overhaul); 42 Tu-95MS Bear; 18 Tu-95MS mod Bear; 7 Tu160 Blackjack; 7 Tu-160 mod Blackjack; 2 Tu-160M Blackjack (in test) FTR 185: 70 MiG-29/MiG-29UB Fulcrum; 85 MiG-31BM Foxhound C; 12 Su-27 Flanker B; 18 Su-27UB Flanker C FGA 427+: 15 MiG-29SMT Fulcrum; 2 MiG-29UBT Fulcrum; 6 MiG-35S/UB Fulcrum (in test); 47 Su-27SM Flanker J; 24 Su-27SM3 Flanker; 19 Su-30M2 Flanker G; 91 Su-30SM Flanker H; 124 Su-34 Fullback; 1+ Su-34 mod Fullback; 97 Su-35S Flanker M; 1 Su-57 Felon (in test) ATK 264: 70 Su-24M/M2 Fencer; 40 Su-25 Frogfoot; 139 Su25SM/SM3 Frogfoot; 15 Su-25UB Frogfoot ISR 58: 4 An-30 Clank; up to 50 Su-24MR Fencer*; 2 Tu214ON; 2 Tu-214R

Russia and Eurasia 201

Airborne Forces ε45,000 FORCES BY ROLE SPECIAL FORCES 1 (AB Recce) SF bde MANOEUVRE Air Manoeuvre 2 AB div (1 tk bn, 3 para/air aslt regt, 1 arty regt, 1 AD regt) 2 AB div (2 para/air aslt regt, 1 arty regt, 1 AD regt) 1 indep AB bde 2 air aslt bde EQUIPMENT BY TYPE ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES MBT 160: 150 T-72B3; 10 T-72B3M IFV 130 BTR-82AM APC 822+ APC (T) 822: 700 BTR-D; 122 BTR-MDM PPV Typhoon-VDV ABCV 1,351: 1,000 BMD-2; 351 BMD-4M AUV GAZ Tigr; UAMZ Toros ENGINEERING & MAINTENANCE VEHICLES ARV BREM-D; BREhM-D ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE MSL SP 100 BTR-RD MANPATS 9K111 Fagot (RS-AT-4 Spigot); 9K113 Konkurs (RS-AT-5 Spandrel); 9K115 Metis (RS-AT-7 Saxhorn); 9K115-1 Metis-M (RS-AT-13); 9K135 Kornet (RS-AT-14 Spriggan) RCL 73mm SPG-9 GUNS • SP 125mm 36+ 2S25 Sprut-SD ARTILLERY 600+ TOWED 122mm 150 D-30 GUN/MOR • SP 120mm 250: 220 2S9 NONA-S; 30 2S9 NONA-SM; (500 2S9 NONA-S in store) MOR • TOWED 200+ 82mm 150 2B14; 120mm 50+ 2B23 NONA-M1 AIR DEFENCE SAM • Point-defence 30+: 30 Strela-10MN (RS-SA-13 Gopher); 9K310 Igla-1 (RS-SA-16 Gimlet); 9K38 Igla (RSSA-18 Grouse); 9K333 Verba (RS-SA-29 Gizmo); 9K338 Igla-S (RS-SA-24 Grinch); 9K34 Strela-3 (RS-SA-14 Gremlin) GUNS • SP 23mm 150 BTR-ZD

Special Operations Forces ε1,000 FORCES BY ROLE SPECIAL FORCES 2 SF unit

Railway Forces ε29,000 4 regional commands FORCES BY ROLE COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT 10 (railway) tpt bde

Russia and Eurasia

EW 3 Il-22PP Mute ELINT 31: 14 Il-20M Coot A; 5 Il-22 Coot B; 12 Il-22M Coot B AEW&C 9: 3 A-50 Mainstay; 6 A-50U Mainstay C2 8: 2 Il-80 Maxdome; 1 Il-82; 4 Tu-214SR; 1 Tu-214PUSBUS TKR 15: 5 Il-78 Midas; 10 Il-78M Midas TPT 448: Heavy 126: 11 An-124 Condor; 4 An-22 Cock; 99 Il-76MD Candid; 3 Il-76MD-M Candid; 9 Il-76MD-90A Candid; Medium 65 An-12BK Cub; Light 225: 114 An26 Curl; 25 An-72 Coaler; 5 An-140; 27 L-410; 54 Tu-134 Crusty; PAX 32: 15 An-148-100E; 17 Tu-154 Careless TRG 262: 35 DA42T; 118 L-39 Albatros; 109 Yak-130 Mitten* HELICOPTERS ATK 399+: 133 Ka-52A Hokum B; 100 Mi-24D/V/P Hind; 90+ Mi-28N Havoc B; 13 Mi-28UB Havoc; 63+ Mi-35 Hind EW ε20 Mi-8MTPR-1 Hip TPT 333: Heavy 33 Mi-26/Mi-26T Halo; Medium 300: 100 Mi-8/Mi-8MT Hip; 60 Mi-8AMTSh Hip; 5 Mi-8AMTShVA Hip; 135 Mi-8MTV-5-1 H ip TRG 69: 19 Ka-226U; 50 Ansat-U UNINHABITED AERIAL VEHICLES CISR • Heavy some Inokhodets ISR • Medium Forpost (Searcher II) AIR DEFENCE SAM 714: Long-range 584: 160 S-300PS (RS-SA-10B Grumble); 150 S-300PM1/PM2 (RS-SA-20 Gargoyle); 20 S-300V (RSSA-12 Gladiator/Giant); 6 S-350 Vityaz (RS-SA-28); 248 S-400 (RS-SA-21 Growler) Medium-range 80 9K37M1-2 Buk-M1-2/9K317 Buk-M2 (RS-SA-11 Gadfly/RS-SA-17 Grizzly) Short-range 50 96K6 Pantsir-S1/S2 (RS-SA-22 Greyhound) AIR-LAUNCHED MISSILES AAM • IR R-27T/ET (RS-AA-10B/D Alamo); R-73 (RSAA-11A Archer); R-74M (RS-AA-11B Archer); R-60T (RSAA-8 Aphid); SARH R-27R/ER (RS-AA-10A/C Alamo); R-33 (RS-AA-9A Amos); ARH R-77-1 (RS-AA-12B Adder); R-37M (RS-AA-13A Axehead); PRH R-27P/EP (RS-AA10E/F Alamo) ARM Kh-25MP (RS-AS-12A Kegler); Kh-25M (RS-AS-12B Kegler); Kh-31P/PM (RS-AS-17A/C Krypton); Kh-58 (RSAS-11 Kilter) ASM Kh-29 (RS-AS-14 Kedge); Kh-38; Kh-59 (RS-AS-13 Kingbolt) Kh-59M (RS-AS-18 Kazoo); Kinzhal (RS-AS-24 Killjoy); 9M114 Kokon (RS-AT-6 Spiral); 9M120 Ataka (RSAT-9 Spiral 2); 9M120-1 Vikhr (RS-AT-16 Scallion) AShM Kh-22 (RS-AS-4 Kitchen); Kh-31A/AM (RS-AS17B/D Krypton); Kh-32 (RS-AS-4A mod); Kh-35U (RSAS-20 Kayak) LACM Nuclear Kh-55SM (RS-AS-15B Kent); Kh-102 (RS-AS23B Kodiak) Conventional Kh-101 (RS-AS-23A Kodiak); Kh-555 (RSAS-22 Kluge) BOMBS Laser-guided KAB-500; KAB-1500L TV-guided KAB-500KR; KAB-1500KR; KAB-500OD; UPAB 1500 INS/GLONASS-guided KAB-500S

202 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2022

Russian Military Districts Western Military District HQ at St Petersburg

Army FORCES BY ROLE COMMAND 3 army HQ SPECIAL FORCES 2 (Spetsnaz) SF bde MANOEUVRE Reconnaissance 1 recce bde Armoured 1 tk div 1 tk bde 3 MR div Mechanised 1 MR div 3 MR bde SURFACE-TO-SURFACE MISSILE 3 SRBM/GLCM bde with Iskander-M COMBAT SUPPORT 2 arty bde 1 (hy) arty bde 1 MRL bde 1 engr bde 3 engr regt 1 ptn br bde 1 EW bde 1 NBC bde 2 NBC regt COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT 3 log bde AIR DEFENCE 4 AD bde

Reserves FORCES BY ROLE MANOEUVRE Mechanised 2 MR bde

Northern Fleet EQUIPMENT BY TYPE SUBMARINES 27 STRATEGIC 8 SSBN (of which 2 in refit) (1 additional in reserve) TACTICAL 19: 5 SSGN; 9 SSN; 5 SSK PRINCIPAL SURFACE COMBATANTS 10: 1 CV (in refit); 1 CGHMN; 1 CGHM; 5 DDGHM (1 more in reserve); 2 FFGHM PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 16: 6 FSM; 2 PCGM; 8 PB MINE WARFARE • MINE COUNTERMEASURES 8: 1 MHO; 1 MSO; 6 MSC AMPHIBIOUS 8: 6 LST; 2 LCM

Naval Aviation FORCES BY ROLE FIGHTER 1 regt with Su-33 Flanker D; Su-25UTG Frogfoot FIGHTER/GROUND ATTACK 1 regt with MiG-29KR/KUBR Fulcrum FIGHTER/GROUND ATTACK/ISR 1 regt with MiG-31BM Foxhound C; Su-24M/M2/ MR Fencer ANTI-SUBMARINE WARFARE 1 regt with Il-38/Il-38N May; Il-20RT Coot A; Tu-134 1 regt with Ka-27/Ka-29 Helix 1 sqn with Tu-142MK/MZ/MR Bear F/J AIR DEFENCE 5 SAM regt with S-300PS (RS-SA-10B Grumble); S-300PM1 (RS-SA-20 Gargoyle); S-400 (RS-SA-21 Growler); 96K6 Pantsir-S1 (RS-SA-22 Greyhound) EQUIPMENT BY TYPE AIRCRAFT FTR 38: 20 MiG-31BM Foxhound C; 18 Su-33 Flanker D FGA 25: 19 MiG-29KR Fulcrum; 4 MiG-29KUBR Fulcrum; 2 Su-30SM Flanker H ATK 18: 13 Su-24M Fencer; 5 Su-25UTG Frogfoot (trg role) ASW 17: 5 Il-38 May; 1 Il-38N May; 11 Tu-142MK/ MZ/MR Bear F/J ISR 4 Su-24MR Fencer ELINT 3: 2 Il-20RT Coot A; 1 Il-22 Coot B TPT 9: 8 An-26 Curl; 1 Tu-134 HELICOPTERS ASW Ka-27 Helix A TPT • Medium Ka-29 Helix B; Mi-8 Hip AIR DEFENCE • SAM Long-range S-300PS (RS-SA-10B Grumble); S-300PM1 (RS-SA-20 Gargoyle); S-400 (RS-SA-21 Growler) Short-range 96K6 Pantsir-S1 (RS-SA-22 Greyhound)

Naval Infantry FORCES BY ROLE COMMAND 1 corps HQ MANOEUVRE Mechanised 2 MR bde 1 naval inf bde COMMAND 1 engr regt

Coastal Artillery and Missile Forces FORCES BY ROLE COASTAL DEFENCE 1 AShM bde

Baltic Fleet EQUIPMENT BY TYPE SUBMARINES • TACTICAL • SSK 1 PRINCIPAL SURFACE COMBATANTS 6: 1 DDGHM; 5 FFGHM (1 more non-operational, in longterm refit)

PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 34: 3 FSGM; 2 FSG; 6 FSM; 4 PCGM; 7 PCFG; 11 PBF; 1 PB MINE WARFARE • MINE COUNTERMEASURES 11: 1 MCC; 4 MSC; 6 MHI AMPHIBIOUS 13: 4 LST; 7 LCM; 2 LCAC

Naval Aviation FORCES BY ROLE FIGHTER 1 regt with Su-27 Flanker B ANTI-SURFACE WARFARE/ISR 1 regt with Su-24M/MR Fencer; Su-30SM Flanker H TRANSPORT 1 sqn with An-26 Curl; Tu-134 Crusty ATTACK/TRANSPORT HELICOPTER 1 regt with Ka-27/Ka-29 Helix; Mi-24P Hind; Mi-8 Hip AIR DEFENCE 2 SAM regt with S-400 (RS-SA-21 Growler); 96K6 Pantsir-S1 (RS-SA-22 Greyhound) EQUIPMENT BY TYPE AIRCRAFT FTR 18 Su-27/Su-27UB Flanker B/C FGA 8 Su-30SM Flanker H ATK 10 Su-24M Fencer ISR 4 Su-24MR Fencer TPT 8: 6 An-26 Curl; 2 Tu-134 Crusty HELICOPTERS ATK Mi-24P Hind ASW Ka-27 Helix TPT • Medium Ka-29 Helix; Mi-8 Hip AIR DEFENCE • SAM Long-range S-400 (RS-SA-21 Growler) Short-range 96K6 Pantsir-S1 (RS-SA-22 Greyhound)

Naval Infantry FORCES BY ROLE COMMAND 1 corps HQ MANOEUVRE Mechanised 1 MR div 1 MR regt 1 naval inf bde SURFACE-TO-SURFACE MISSILE 1 SRBM/GLCM bde with Iskander-M COMBAT SUPPORT 1 arty bde

Coastal Artillery and Missile Forces FORCES BY ROLE COASTAL DEFENCE 1 AShM regt

Military Air Force 6th Air Force & Air Defence Army FORCES BY ROLE FIGHTER 1 regt with Su-30SM Flanker H

1 regt with MiG-31BM Foxhound C; Su-35S Flanker M 1 regt with Su-27SM Flanker J; Su-35S Flanker M GROUND ATTACK 1 regt with Su-34 Fullback ISR 1 sqn with Su-24MR Fencer E; An-30 Clank TRANSPORT 1 regt with An-12 Cub; An-26 Curl; Tu-134 Crusty ATTACK HELICOPTER 1 bde with Ka-52A Hokum B; Mi-28N Havoc B; Mi-35 Hind; Mi-26 Halo; Mi-8MTV-5 Hip 1 regt with Mi-24P/Mi-35 Hind; Mi-28N Havoc B; Mi-8 Hip 1 regt with Mi-24P Hind; Ka-52A Hokum B; Mi-8 Hip; Mi-8PPA Hip AIR DEFENCE 3 SAM regt with S-300PM1/PM2 (RS-SA-20 Gargoyle) 4 SAM regt with S-400 (RS-SA-21 Growler); 96K6 Pantsir-S1 (RS-SA-22 Greyhound) EQUIPMENT BY TYPE AIRCRAFT FTR 30 MiG-31BM Foxhound C FGA 98: 12 Su-27SM Flanker J; 24 Su-30SM Flanker H; 24 Su-34 Fullback; 38 Su-35S Flanker M ISR 19: 4 An-30 Clank; 15 Su-24MR Fencer E* TPT 12 An-12/An-26/Tu-134 HELICOPTERS ATK 76+: 24 Ka-52A Hokum B; 16 Mi-24P Hind; 24 Mi-28N Havoc B; 12+ Mi-35 Hind EW 8 Mi-8MTPR-1 Hip TPT • Medium 50 Mi-8 Hip AIR DEFENCE SAM Long-range S-300PM1/PM2 (RS-SA-20 Gargoyle); S-400 (RS-SA-21 Growler) Short-range 96K6 Pantsir-S1 (RS-SA-22 Greyhound)

Airborne Forces FORCES BY ROLE SPECIAL FORCES 1 (AB Recce) SF bde MANOEUVRE Air Manoeuvre 3 AB div

Central Military District

HQ at Yekaterinburg

Army FORCES BY ROLE COMMAND 2 army HQ SPECIAL FORCES 2 (Spetsnaz) SF bde MANOEUVRE Armoured 1 tk div 3 MR bde

Russia and Eurasia

Russia and Eurasia 203

204 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2022 Mechanised 3 (lt/mtn) MR bde SURFACE-TO-SURFACE MISSILE 2 SRBM/GLCM bde with Iskander-M COMBAT SUPPORT 2 arty bde 1 MRL bde 1 engr bde 3 engr regt 1 EW bde 2 NBC bde 2 NBC regt COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT 2 log bde AIR DEFENCE 3 AD bde

Reserves FORCES BY ROLE MANOEUVRE Mechanised 3 MR bde

Military Air Force 14th Air Force & Air Defence Army FORCES BY ROLE FIGHTER 2 regt with MiG-31BM Foxhound C GROUND ATTACK 1 regt with Su-34 Fullback 1 sqn with Su-25SM Frogfoot (Kyrgyzstan) ISR 1 sqn with Su-24MR Fencer E TRANSPORT 1 regt with An-12 Cub; An-26 Curl; Tu-134 Crusty; Tu-154; Mi-8 Hip ATTACK/TRANSPORT HELICOPTER 1 bde with Mi-24P Hind; Mi-8 Hip 1 regt with Mi-24P Hind; Mi-8 Hip 1 sqn with Mi-24P Hind; Mi-8 Hip (Tajikistan) AIR DEFENCE 1 regt with S-300PS (RS-SA-10B Grumble) 1 bde with S-300PS (RS-SA-10B Grumble) 1 regt with S-300PM2 (RS-SA-20 Gargoyle) 4 regt with S-400 (RS-SA-21 Growler); 96K6 Pantsir-S1 (RS-SA-22 Greyhound) EQUIPMENT BY TYPE AIRCRAFT FTR 40 MiG-31BM Foxhound C FGA 25: 24 Su-34 Fullback; 1+ Su-34 mod Fullback ATK 13 Su-25SM Frogfoot ISR 9 Su-24MR Fencer E TPT 36 An-12 Cub/An-26 Curl/Tu-134 Crusty/Tu154 Careless HELICOPTERS ATK 24 Mi-24 Hind TPT 46: 6 Mi-26 Halo; 40 Mi-8 Hip

AIR DEFENCE SAM Long-range S-300PS (RS-SA-10B Grumble); S-300PM2 (RS-SA-20 Gargoyle); S-400 (RS-SA-21 Growler) Short-range 96K6 Pantsir-S1 (RS-SA-22 Greyhound)

Airborne Troops FORCES BY ROLE MANOEUVRE Air Manoeuvre 1 AB bde

Southern Military District

HQ located at Rostov-on-Don

Army FORCES BY ROLE COMMAND 3 army HQ SPECIAL FORCES 3 (Spetsnaz) SF bde 1 (Spetsnaz) SF regt MANOEUVRE Reconnaissance 1 recce bde Armoured 3 MR div 1 MR bde 1 MR bde (Armenia) 1 MR bde (South Ossetia) Mechanised 1 MR div 1 MR bde 1 MR bde (Abkhazia) 1 (lt/mtn) MR bde SURFACE-TO-SURFACE MISSILE 3 SRBM/GLCM bde with Iskander-M COMBAT SUPPORT 3 arty bde 1 MRL bde 1 engr bde 1 EW bde 1 NBC bde 2 NBC regt COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT 2 log bde AIR DEFENCE 3 AD bde

Black Sea Fleet

The Black Sea Fleet is primarily based in Crimea, at Sevastopol, Karantinnaya Bay and Streletskaya Bay EQUIPMENT BY TYPE SUBMARINES • TACTICAL 6 SSK PRINCIPAL SURFACE COMBATANTS 6: 1 CGHM; 3 FFGHM; 2 FFGM PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 36: 8 FSGM; 6 FSM; 3 PSOH; 5 PCFG; 6 PB; 8 PBF MINE WARFARE • MINE COUNTERMEASURES 10: 3 MCC; 1 MHO; 5 MSO; 1 MSC AMPHIBIOUS 10: 7 LST; 3 LCM

Naval Aviation FORCES BY ROLE FIGHTER ANTI-SURFACE WARFARE/ISR 1 regt with Su-24M/MR Fencer; Su-30SM Flanker H MARITIME PATROL/TRANSPORT 1 regt with Ka-27 Helix; An-26 Curl; Be-12PS Mail; Mi-8 Hip EQUIPMENT BY TYPE AIRCRAFT FGA 12 Su-30SM Flanker H ATK 13 Su-24M Fencer D ISR 4 Su-24MR Fencer E MP 3 Be-12PS Mail TPT 6 An-26 HELICOPTERS ASW Ka-27 Helix TPT • Medium Mi-8 Hip

Naval Infantry FORCES BY ROLE COMMAND 1 corps HQ MANOEUVRE Mechanised 2 naval inf bde COMBAT SUPPORT 1 arty regt 1 engr regt AIR DEFENCE 1 SAM regt

Coastal Artillery and Missile Forces FORCES BY ROLE COASTAL DEFENCE 2 AShM bde

Caspian Sea Flotilla EQUIPMENT BY TYPE PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 15: 3 FSGM; 1 PCFG; 3 PCM; 3 PB; 1 PBF; 4 PBR MINE WARFARE • MINE COUNTERMEASURES 3: 2 MSC; 1 MHI AMPHIBIOUS 9 LCM

Naval Infantry FORCES BY ROLE MANOEUVRE Mechanised 1 naval inf regt

Military Air Force 4th Air Force & Air Defence Army FORCES BY ROLE FIGHTER 1 regt with Su-30SM Flanker H 1 sqn with MiG-29 Fulcrum; Su-30SM Flanker H (Armenia)

FIGHTER/GROUND ATTACK 1 regt with Su-27/Su-27SM Flanker B/J; Su-30M2 Flanker G 1 regt with Su-27SM3 Flanker; Su-30M2 Flanker G GROUND ATTACK 1 regt with Su-24M Fencer; Su-25SM Frogfoot 2 regt with Su-25SM/SM3 Frogfoot 1 regt with Su-34 Fullback GROUND ATTACK/ISR 1 regt with Su-24M/MR Fencer D/E TRANSPORT 1 regt with An-12 Cub/Mi-8 Hip ATTACK/TRANSPORT HELICOPTER 1 bde with Mi-28N Havoc B; Mi-35 Hind; Mi-8 Hip; Mi-26 Halo 1 regt with Mi-28N Havoc B; Mi-35 Hind; Mi-8 Hip 2 regt with Ka-52A Hokum B; Mi-28N Havoc B; Mi-35 Hind; Mi-8AMTSh Hip 1 sqn with Mi-24P Hind; Mi-8 Hip (Armenia) AIR DEFENCE 1 SAM regt with 9K317 Buk-M2 (RS-SA-17 Grizzly) 1 SAM regt with S-300PM1 (RS-SA-20 Gargoyle) 3 SAM regt with S-400 (RS-SA-21 Growler); 96K6 Pantsir-S1 (RS-SA-22 Greyhound) EQUIPMENT BY TYPE AIRCRAFT FTR 26: 12 MiG-29 Fulcrum; 14 Su-27 Flanker B FGA 95: 12 Su-27SM Flanker J; 24 Su-27SM3 Flanker; 14 Su-30M2 Flanker G; 21 Su-30SM Flanker H; 24 Su-34 Fullback ATK 109: 24 Su-24M Fencer D; 85 Su-25SM/SM3 Frogfoot ISR 12 Su-24MR Fencer E TPT 12 An-12 Cub HELICOPTERS ATK 117: 25 Ka-52A Hokum B; 44 Mi-28N Havoc B; 8 Mi-24P Hind; 40 Mi-35 Hind EW 3+ Mi-8MTPR-1 Hip TPT 72: Heavy 10 Mi-26 Halo; Medium 62 Mi-8 Hip AIR DEFENCE • SAM Long-range S-300PM1 (RS-SA-20 Gargoyle); S-400 (RS-SA-21 Growler) Medium-range 9K317 Buk-M2 (RS-SA-17 Grizzly) Short-range 96K6 Pantsir-S1 (RS-SA-22 Greyhound)

Airborne Forces FORCES BY ROLE MANOEUVRE Air Manoeuvre 1 AB div

Eastern Military District

HQ located at Khabarovsk

Army FORCES BY ROLE COMMAND 4 army HQ SPECIAL FORCES 1 (Spetsnaz) SF bde

Russia and Eurasia

Russia and Eurasia 205

206 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2022 MANOEUVRE Armoured 1 tk bde 1 MR div 6 MR bde Mechanised 2 MR bde 1 MGA div SURFACE-TO-SURFACE MISSILE 4 SRBM/GLCM bde with Iskander-M COMBAT SUPPORT 4 arty bde 1 MRL bde 1 engr bde 1 EW bde 1 NBC bde 4 NBC regt COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT 4 log bde AIR DEFENCE 5 AD bde

Reserves FORCES BY ROLE MANOEUVRE Mechanised 8 MR bde

Pacific Fleet EQUIPMENT BY TYPE SUBMARINES 15 STRATEGIC 3 SSBN TACTICAL 12: 3 SSGN (2 more non-operational in long-term refit); 1 SSN (3 more non-operational in long-term refit; 8 SSK PRINCIPAL SURFACE COMBATANTS 10: 1 CGHM; 5 DDGHM; 4 FFGHM PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 28: 8 FSM; 4 PCGM; 10 PCFG; 6 PB MINE WARFARE 10: 1 MCC; 2 MSO; 7 MSC AMPHIBIOUS 9: 4 LST; 5 LCM

Naval Aviation FORCES BY ROLE FIGHTER 1 sqn with MiG-31BS/BM Foxhound A/C ANTI-SUBMARINE WARFARE 1 sqn with Ka-27/Ka-29 Helix 2 sqn with Il-38/Il-38N May; Il-18D; Il-22 Coot B 1 sqn with Tu-142MK/MZ/MR Bear F/J TRANSPORT 1 sqn with An-12BK Cub; An-26 Curl; Tu-134 AIR DEFENCE 1 SAM regt with S-400 (RS-SA-21 Growler); 96K6 Pantsir-S1 (RS-SA-22 Greyhound) EQUIPMENT BY TYPE AIRCRAFT FTR 12 MiG-31B/BS/BM Foxhound A/C ASW 23: 11 Tu-142MK/MZ/MR Bear F/J; 8 Il-38 May; 4 Il-38N May

MP 1 Il-18D EW • ELINT 1 Il-22 Coot B TPT 6: 2 An-12BK Cub; 3 An-26 Curl; 1 Tu-134 HELICOPTERS ASW Ka-27 Helix TPT • Medium Ka-29 Helix; Mi-8 Hip AIR DEFENCE SAM Long-range S-400 (RS-SA-21 Growler) Short-range 96K6 Pantsir-S1 (RS-SA-22 Greyhound)

Naval Infantry FORCES BY ROLE MANOEUVRE Mechanised 2 naval inf bde

Coastal Artillery and Missile Forces FORCES BY ROLE COASTAL DEFENCE 2 AShM bde

Military Air Force 11th Air Force & Air Defence Army FORCES BY ROLE FIGHTER/GROUND ATTACK 1 regt with MiG-31BM Foxhound C; Su-27SM Flanker J; Su-30M2 Flanker G; Su-30SM Flanker H; Su-35S Flanker M 1 regt with Su-35S Flanker M; Su-30SM Flanker H 1 regt with Su-25 Frogfoot; Su-30SM Flanker H GROUND ATTACK 1 regt with Su-24M/M2 Fencer D/D mod; Su-34 Fullback 1 regt with Su-25SM Frogfoot ISR 1 sqn with Su-24MR Fencer E TRANSPORT 1 regt with An-12 Cub; An-26 Curl; Tu-134 Crusty/ Tu-154 Careless ATTACK/TRANSPORT HELICOPTER 1 bde with Ka-52A Hokum B; Mi-8 Hip; Mi-26 Halo 1 regt with Ka-52A Hokum B; Mi-8 Hip; Mi-26 Halo 1 regt with Mi-24P Hind; Mi-8 Hip AIR DEFENCE 1 regt with 9K37M Buk-M1-2 (RS-SA-11 Gadfly); 1 regt with S-300V (RS-SA-12 Gladiator/Giant); S-400 (RS-SA-21 Growler) 4 regt with S-300PS (RS-SA-10B Grumble); S-400 (RS-SA-21 Growler); 96K6 Pantsir-S1 (RS-SA-22 Greyhound) EQUIPMENT BY TYPE AIRCRAFT FTR 20 MiG-31BM Foxhound C FGA 120: 23 Su-27SM Flanker J; 6 Su-30M2 Flanker G; 31 Su-30SM Flanker H; 26 Su-34 Fullback; 34 Su-35S Flanker M ATK 102: 20 Su-24M Fencer D; 10 Su-24M2 Fencer; 72 Su-25/Su-25SM Frogfoot ISR 12 Su-24MR Fencer E

Russia and Eurasia 207

Airborne Forces FORCES BY ROLE MANOEUVRE Air Manoeuvre 2 air aslt bde

Gendarmerie & Paramilitary 554,000 Border Guard Service ε160,000 Subordinate to Federal Security Service FORCES BY ROLE 10 regional directorates MANOEUVRE Other 7 frontier gp EQUIPMENT BY TYPE ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES IFV/APC (W) 1,000 BMP/BTR/ AUV BPM-97 ARTILLERY 90 SP 122mm 2S1 Gvozdika GUN/MOR • SP 120mm 2S9 NONA-S MOR 120mm 2S12 Sani PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 201 PSOHM 2 Nerey (Krivak III) with 1 twin ZIF-122 lnchr with 4K33 Osa-M (RS-SA-N-4 Gecko) SAM, 2 quad PTA-53-1135 533mm TT lnchr, 2 RBU 6000 Smerch 2 A/S mor, 1 100mm gun (capacity 1 Ka-27 Helix A ASW hel) PSO 6: 4 Komandor; 2 Okean (Project 22100) with 1 76mm gun, 1 hel landing platform PCO 27: 8 Alpinist (Project 503); 1 Sprut; 12 Okhotnik (Project 22460) with 1 AK630M CIWS, 1 hel landing platform; 6 Purga with 1 hel landing platform PCC 33: 4 Molnya II (Pauk II); 6 Svetlyak (Project 10410); 13 Svetlyak (Project 10410) with 1 AK630M CIWS, 1 76mm gun; 8 Svetlyak (Project 10410) with 2 AK630M CIWS; 1 Svetlyak (Project 10410) with 1 AK630M CIWS; 1 Yakhont PCR 1 Slepen (Yaz) with 1 AK630 CIWS, 2 100mm guns PBF 87: 57 Mangust; 3 Mirazh (Project 14310); 4 Mustang-2 (Project 18623); 21 Sobol; 2 Sokzhoi PBR 27: 4 Ogonek; 8 Piyavka with 1 AK630 CIWS; 15 Moskit (Vosh) with 1 AK630 CIWS, 1 100mm gun PB 18: 6 Gyuys (Project 03050); 2 Morzh (Project 1496M; 10 Lamantin (Project 1496M1)

LOGISTICS AND SUPPORT 34 AE 1 Muna AGB 2 Ivan Susanin (primarily used as patrol ships) with 2 AK630 CIWS, 1 76mm gun, 1 hel landing platform AK 8 Pevek AKSL 5 Kanin AO 3: 1 Ishim (Project 15010); 2 Envoron ATF 15: 14 Sorum (primarily used as patrol ships) with 2 AK230M CIWS; 1 Sorum (primarily used as patrol ship) AIRCRAFT • TPT ε86: 70 An-24 Coke/An-26 Curl/An-72 Coaler/Il-76 Candid/Tu-134 Crusty/Yak-40 Codling; 16 SM-92 HELICOPTERS: ε200 Ka-27PS Helix/Mi-24 Hind/Mi-26 Halo/Mi-8 Hip

Federal Guard Service ε40,000–50,000 Org include elm of ground forces (mech inf bde and AB regt) FORCES BY ROLE MANOEUVRE Mechanised 1 mech inf regt Air Manoeuvre 1 AB regt Other 1 (Presidential) gd regt

Federal Security Service Special Purpose Centre ε4,000 FORCES BY ROLE SPECIAL FORCES 2 SF unit (Alfa and Vympel units)

National Guard ε340,000 FORCES BY ROLE MANOEUVRE Other 10 paramilitary div (2–5 paramilitary regt) 17 paramilitary bde (3 mech bn, 1 mor bn) 36 indep paramilitary rgt 90 paramilitary bn (incl special motorised units) Aviation 8 sqn COMBAT SUPPORT 1 arty regt EQUIPMENT BY TYPE ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES RECCE some BRDM-2A IFV/APC (W) 1,650 BMP-2/BTR-70M/BTR-80/BTR82A/BTR-82AM PPV Ural-VV AUV Patrol-A; Tigr ARTILLERY 35 TOWED 122mm 20 D-30 MOR 120mm 15 M-1938 (PM-38) PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 5 PBF 3 BK-16 (Project 02510) PB 2+ Grachonok AIRCRAFT TPT 29: Heavy 9 Il-76 Candid; Medium 2 An-12 Cub; Light 18: 12 An-26 Curl; 6 An-72 Coaler

Russia and Eurasia

TPT 24: 22 An-12 Cub/An-26 Curl; 1 Tu-134 Crusty; 1 Tu-154 Careless HELICOPTERS ATK 36: 24 Ka-52A Hokum B; 12 Mi-24P Hind EW 2+ Mi-8MTPR-1 Hip TPT 60: Heavy 4 Mi-26 Halo; Medium 56 Mi-8 Hip AIR DEFENCE • SAM Long-range S-300PS (RS-SA-10B Grumble); S-300V (RS-SA-12 Gladiator/Giant); S-400 (RS-SA-21 Growler) Medium-range 9K317 Buk-M1-2 (RS-SA-11 Gadfly) Short-range 96K6 Pantsir-S1 (RS-SA-22 Greyhound)

208 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2022 HELICOPTERS TPT 71: Heavy 10 Mi-26 Halo; Medium 60+: 60 Mi-8 Hip; some Mi-8AMTSh Hip; Light 1 Ka-226T

DEPLOYMENT ARMENIA: 3,500: 1 mil base with (1 MR bde; 74 T-72; 80 BMP-1; 80 BMP-2; 12 2S1; 12 BM-21); 1 ftr sqn with 18 MiG-29 Fulcrum; 4 Su-30SM Flanker H; 1 hel sqn with 11 Mi-24P Hind; 4 Mi-8AMTSh Hip; 4 Mi-8MT Hip; 2 AD bty with S-300V; 1 AD bty with Buk-M1-2) AZERBAIJAN: 1,960; 1 MR bde(-) (peacekeeping) BELARUS: 1 radar station at Baranovichi (Volga system; leased); 1 naval comms site CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC: UN • MINUSCA 8 CYPRUS: UN • UNFICYP 4 DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO: UN • MONUSCO 10

Tajikistan TJK Tajikistani Somoni TJS GDP

8.00bn

8.10bn

844

839

Growth

4.5

5.0

Inflation

8.6

8.0

TJS

ε917m

ε1.06bn

USD

ε88.8m

ε93.5m

10.32

11.37

Def bdgt [a] USD1=TJS

MOLDOVA/TRANSDNIESTR: ε1,500 (including 400 peacekeepers); 2 MR bn; 7 Mi-24 Hind; some Mi-8 Hip SOUTH SUDAN: UN • UNMISS 2 SUDAN: UN • UNISFA 2 SYRIA: 4,000: 1 inf BG; 3 MP bn; 1 engr unit; ε10 T-72B3; ε20 BTR-82A; BPM-97; Typhoon-K; Tigr; 12 2A65; 4 9A52 Smerch; 10 Su-24M Fencer D; 6 Su-34; 6 Su-35S Flanker M; 1 A-50U Mainstay; 1 Il-20M; 12 Mi-24P/Mi-35M Hind; 4 Mi-8AMTSh Hip; 1 AShM bty with 3K55 Bastion; 1 SAM bty with S-400; 1 SAM bty with Pantsir-S1/S2; air base at Latakia; naval facility at Tartus TAJIKISTAN: 5,000; 1 (201st) mil base with (40 T-72B1; 60 BMP-2; 17 BMP-2M; 80 BTR-82A; 40 MT-LB; Tigr; 18 2S1; 36 2S3; 6 2S12; 12 9P140 Uragan); 1 hel sqn with 4 Mi-24P Hind; 4 Mi-8MTV Hip; 2 Mi-8MTV-5-1 Hip; 1 SAM bn with 8 S-300PS UKRAINE: Crimea: 30,000; 1 recce bde, 2 naval inf bde; 1 air aslt regt; 1 arty bde; 1 NBC regt; 40 T-72B3; 80 BMP-2; 200 BTR-82A; 20 BTR-80: 150 MT-LB; 18 2S1; 18 2A65; 12 BM-21; 8 9P140 Uragan; 1 AShM bde with 3K60 Bal; 3K55 Bastion; 1 FGA regt with Su-24M/MR; Su-30SM; 1 FGA regt with Su-27SM/SM3; Su-30M2; 1 atk regt with Su-24M/ Su-25SM; 1 atk/tpt hel regt; 1 ASW hel regt; 2 AD regt with S-400; Pantsir-S1; 1 Fleet HQ located at Sevastopol; 2 radar stations located at Sevastopol (Dnepr system) and Mukachevo (Dnepr system); Donetsk/Luhansk: 3,000 (reported) WESTERN SAHARA: UN • MINURSO 10

2022

[a] Excludes budget for law enforcement Real-terms defence budget trend (USDm, constant 2015) 131 n.k. n.k.

2008

KAZAKHSTAN: 1 radar station at Balkash (Dnepr system; leased)

MIDDLE EAST: UN • UNTSO 4

92.1bn

USD

Population

MEDITERRANEAN SEA: 2 SSK; 1 FFGHM; 1 FFGM; 1 AGI

2021

82.5bn

USD

per capita

GEORGIA: 7,000; Abkhazia 1 mil base with (1 MR bde; 40 T-72B3; 120 BTR-82A; 18 2S3; 12 2S12; 18 BM-21; 16 S-300PS); South Ossetia 1 mil base with (1 MR bde; 40 T-72BA; 120 BMP-2; 36 2S3; 12 2S12)

KYRGYZSTAN: ε500; 13 Su-25SM Frogfoot; 2 Mi-8 Hip

2020 TJS

2015

2021

8,990,874

Age

0–14

15–19

20–24

25–29

Male

15.7%

4.7%

4.5%

4.3%

30–64 65 plus 18.9%

1.6%

Female

15.1%

4.5%

4.4%

4.2%

19.7%

2.2%

Capabilities The Tajik armed forces have little capacity to deploy other than token forces and most equipment is of Soviet-era origin. Regional security and terrorism remain key security concerns, given the border with Afghanistan. Tajikistan has been building its capability by hosting CSTO counter-terrorism exercises and by taking part in exercises, organised by US CENTCOM, focused on scenarios including counter-terrorism. Tajikistan is a member of the CSTO and the SCO, and the armed forces also conduct exercises with Russian troops based at Russia’s 201st military base. In 2021, bilateral military exercises and CSTO joint drills concerned scenarios focused on the border with Afghanistan. Reports in early 2019 indicated that there may be a Chinese military facility in eastern Tajikistan, though this remains unconfirmed by either Beijing or Dushanbe. In 2021, reports indicated that China was to fund an outpost for Tajikistan’s police special forces near to the border with Afghanistan. Though the pre-existing base is still officially denied by Beijing and Dushanbe, there were reports that full control of the facility would be transferred to Beijing and future rent will be waived in exchange for military aid from China. In 2018, India and Tajikistan agreed to strengthen defence cooperation, in particular on counter-terrorism, and there were reports in 2021 of agreements on security cooperation with Iran. Border deployments have been stepped up in response to concerns about regional and border security and terrorism. In late 2016, a Military Cooperation Plan was signed with Russia. Moscow has indicated that Tajikistan is to receive military equipment, including aircraft. Some personal equipment has been donated by the US. Barring maintenance facilities, Tajikistan only has minimal defence-industrial capacity.

ACTIVE 8,800 (Army 7,300 Air Force/Air Defence 1,500) Gendarmerie & Paramilitary 7,500 Conscript liability 24 months

RESERVE 20,000 (Army 20,000)

Russia and Eurasia 209

Army 7,300 FORCES BY ROLE MANOEUVRE Mechanised 3 MR bde Air Manoeuvre 1 air aslt bde COMBAT SUPPORT 1 arty bde AIR DEFENCE 1 SAM regt EQUIPMENT BY TYPE ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES MBT 40: 30 T-72 Ural/T-72A/T-72AV/T-72B; 3 T-72B1; 7 T-62/T-62AV/T-62AM RECCE 31: 9 BRDM-2; 22 BRDM-2M IFV 23: 8 BMP-1; 15 BMP-2 APC 36 APC (W) 23 BTR-60/BTR-70/BTR-80 PPV 13 VP11 AUV 24 CS/VN3B mod; Tigr ARTILLERY 41 SP 122mm 3 2S1 Gvozdika TOWED 122mm 13 D-30 MRL 122mm 15 BM-21 Grad MOR 10+: SP 82mm CS/SS4; 120mm 10 AIR DEFENCE SAM Medium-range 3 S-125 Pechora-2M (RS-SA-26) Short-range 5 S-125M1 Neva-M1 (RS-SA-3 Goa) Point-defence 9K32 Strela-2 (RS-SA-7 Grail)‡ GUNS SP 23mm 8 BTR-ZD TOWED 23mm ZU-23M1

Air Force/Air Defence 1,500 FORCES BY ROLE TRANSPORT 1 sqn with Tu-134A Crusty ATTACK/TRANSPORT HELICOPTER 1 sqn with Mi-24 Hind; Mi-8 Hip; Mi-17TM Hip H EQUIPMENT BY TYPE AIRCRAFT TPT • Light 1 Tu-134A Crusty TRG 4+: 4 L-39 Albatros; some Yak-52 HELICOPTERS ATK 4 Mi-24 Hind TPT • Medium 11 Mi-8 Hip/Mi-17TM Hip H

Gendarmerie & Paramilitary 7,500 Internal Troops 3,800 National Guard 1,200

FOREIGN FORCES China ε300 (trg) Russia 5,000; 1 (201st) mil base with (40 T-72B1; 60 BMP-2; 17 BMP-2M; 80 BTR-82A; 40 MT-LB; Tigr; 18 2S1; 36 2S3; 6 2S12; 12 9P140 Uragan); 1 hel sqn with 4 Mi-24P Hind; 4 Mi-8MTV Hip; 2 Mi-8MTV-5-1 Hip; 1 SAM bn with 8 S-300PS

Turkmenistan TKM Turkmen New Manat TMT

2020

2021

GDP

TMT

160bn

186bn

USD

45.6bn

53.1bn

per capita

USD

7,674

8,844

Growth

-3.4

4.5

Inflation

7.6

12.5

Def bdgt

TMT

n.k

USD

n.k

3.50

USD1=TMT Population

2022 Russia and Eurasia

ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE

5,579,889

Age

0–14

15–19

20–24

25–29

30–64 65 plus

Male

12.6%

3.9%

4.1%

4.7%

21.6%

2.6%

Female

12.3%

3.8%

4.1%

4.7%

22.3%

3.3%

Capabilities Turkmenistan has concerns over potential spillover from security challenges in Afghanistan, but its armed forces lack significant capabilities and equipment. Ashgabat has maintained a policy of neutrality since 1995 and confirmed this commitment in its 2016 military doctrine. This aimed to increase the armed forces’ defensive capability in order to safeguard national interests and territorial integrity. Turkmenistan is not a member of the CSTO or the SCO. Progress remains slow in changing from a Soviet-era divisional structure to a brigade structure. The armed forces are largely conscript-based and reliant on Soviet-era equipment and doctrine, and the government has stated a requirement to improve conditions of service. Turkmenistan has participated in multinational exercises and is reported to have restarted joint exercises with Russia and Uzbekistan, but has limited capacity to deploy externally. In October 2019, in Saint Petersburg, Turkmenistan and four other Caspian littoral states signed a memorandum of understanding on military cooperation, among other discussions including on maritime security. There are plans to strengthen the border guard’s equipment and facilities. Plans to bolster naval capabilities have resulted in some procurements, leading to a modest improvement in the naval presence in the Caspian Sea. UAVs have been acquired, including from China. In 2021, Turkmenistan confirmed the procurement of the Bayraktar TB2 UAV from Turkey in its Independence Day parade. The parade also featured new military equipment including the A-29 Super Tucano, C-27J Spartan and M-346 jet trainer. Apart from maintenance facilities, Turkmenistan has little domestic defence industry, but is building a number of patrol vessels of Turkish design under licence.

Emergencies Ministry 2,500

ACTIVE 36,500 (Army 33,000 Navy 500 Air 3,000)

Border Guards

Conscript liability 24 months

Gendarmerie & Paramilitary 20,000

210 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2022

ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE Army 33,000 5 Mil Districts FORCES BY ROLE SPECIAL FORCES 1 spec ops regt MANOEUVRE Armoured 1 tk bde Mechanised 1 (3rd) MR div (1 tk regt; 3 MR regt, 1 arty regt) 1 (22nd) MR div (1 tk regt; 1 MR regt, 1 arty regt) 4 MR bde 1 naval inf bde Other 1 MR trg div SURFACE-TO-SURFACE MISSILE 1 SRBM bde with 9K72 Elbrus (RS-SS-1C Scud B) COMBAT SUPPORT 1 arty bde 1 (mixed) arty/AT regt 1 MRL bde 1 AT regt 1 engr regt AIR DEFENCE 2 SAM bde EQUIPMENT BY TYPE† ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES MBT 654: 4 T-90S; 650 T-72/T-72UMG RECCE 260+: 200 BRDM-2; 60 BRM-1; Nimr Ajban IFV 1,050: 600 BMP-1/BMP-1M; 4 BMP-1UM; 430 BMP-2; 4 BMP-2D; 4 BMP-3; 4 BTR-80A; 4 BTR-80 Grom APC 907+ APC (W) 870+: 120 BTR-60 (all variants); 300 BTR-70; 450 BTR-80 PPV 37+: 28+ Kirpi; 9+ Titan-DS; some Typhoon-K AUV 12+: 8 Nimr Ajban 440A; 4+ Cobra ABCV 8 BMD-1 ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE MSL SP 58+: 8 9P122 Malyutka-M (RS-AT-3 Sagger on BRDM2); 8 9P133 Malyutka-P (RS-AT-3 Sagger on BRDM-2); 2 9P148 Konkurs (RS-AT-5 Spandrel on BRDM-2); 36 9P149 Shturm (RS-AT-6 Spiral on MT-LB); 4+ Baryer (on Karakal) MANPATS 9K11 Malyutka (RS-AT-3 Sagger); 9K111 Fagot (RS-AT-4 Spigot); 9K111-1 Konkurs (RS-AT-5 Spandrel); 9K115 Metis (RS-AT-7 Saxhorn) GUNS 100mm 60 MT-12/T-12 ARTILLERY 769 SP 122mm 40 2S1 TOWED 457: 122mm 350 D-30; 130mm 6 M-46; 152mm 101: 17 D-1; 72 D-20; 6 2A36 Giatsint-B; 6 2A65 Msta-B GUN/MOR 120mm 17 2S9 NONA-S MRL 158: 122mm 92: 18 9P138; 70 BM-21 Grad; 4 BM21A; RM-70; 220mm 60 9P140 Uragan; 300mm 6 9A52 Smerch MOR 97: 82mm 31; 120mm 66 M-1938 (PM-38)

SURFACE-TO-SURFACE MISSILE LAUNCHERS SRBM • Conventional 16 9K72 Elbrus (RS-SS-1C Scud B) AIR DEFENCE SAM Short-range: FM-90 (CH-SA-4); 2K12 Kub (RS-SA-6 Gainful) Point-defence 53+: 40 9K33 Osa (RS-SA-8 Gecko); 13 9K35 Strela-10 mod (RS-SA-13 Gopher); 9K38 Igla (RSSA-18 Grouse); 9K32M Strela-2M (RS-SA-7 Grail)‡; 9K34 Strela-3 (RS-SA-14 Gremlin); Mistral (reported); QW-2 (CH-SA-8) GUNS 70 SP 23mm 48 ZSU-23-4 TOWED 22+: 23mm ZU-23-2; 57mm 22 S-60 AIR-LAUNCHED MISSILES ASM CM-502KG; AR-1

Navy 500 EQUIPMENT BY TYPE PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 5 CORVETTES • FSGM 1 Deňiz Han with 4 twin lnchr with Otomat AShM, 1 16-cell CLA VLS with VL MICA, 1 Roketsan ASW Rocket Launcher System A/S mor, 1 Gokdeniz CIWS, 1 76mm gun, 1 hel landing platform PCFG 2 Edermen (RUS Molnya) with 4 quad lnchr with 3M24E Uran-E (RS-SS-N-25 Switchblade) AShM, 2 AK630 CIWS, 1 76mm gun PCGM 2 Arkadag (TUR Tuzla) with 2 twin lnchr with Otomat AShM, 2 twin Simbad-RC lnchr with Mistral SAM, 1 Roketsan ASW Rocket Launcher System A/S mor LOGISTICS AND SUPPORT• AGHS 1 (Dearsan 41m)

Air Force 3,000 FORCES BY ROLE FIGHTER 2 sqn with MiG-29A/S/UB Fulcrum GROUND ATTACK 1 sqn with Su-25 Frogfoot 1 sqn with Su-25MK Frogfoot 1 sqn with M346FA* TRANSPORT 1 sqn with An-26 Curl; Mi-8 Hip; Mi-24 Hind TRAINING 1 unit with EMB-314 Super Tucano* 1 unit with L-39 Albatros AIR DEFENCE 1 bty with FD-2000 (CH-SA-9) 1 bty with KS-1C (CH-SA-12) 3 bty with S-125 Neva-M1 (RS-SA-3 Goa) 1 bty with S-125 Pechora-2M (RS-SA-26) 2 bty with S-200 Angara (RS-SA-5 Gammon) EQUIPMENT BY TYPE AIRCRAFT 66 combat capable FTR 24: 22 MiG-29A/S Fulcrum; 2 MiG-29UB Fulcrum ATK 31: 19 Su-25 Frogfoot; 12 Su-25MK Frogfoot TPT 5: Medium 2 C-27J Spartan Light 3: 1 An-26 Curl; 2 An-74TK Coaler TRG 13: 5 EMB-314 Super Tucano*; 6 M346FA*; 2 L-39 Albatros

Russia and Eurasia 211 HELICOPTERS ATK 10 Mi-24P Hind F MRH 2+ AW139 TPT 11+: Medium 8: 6 Mi-8 Hip; 2 Mi-17V-V Hip; Light 3+ AW109 UNINHABITED AERIAL VEHICLES CISR 3+: Heavy CH-3A; WJ-600; Medium 3+ Bayraktar TB2 ISR 3+: Medium 3+ Falco Light Orbiter-2 LOITERING MUNITIONS Skystriker AIR DEFENCE • SAM Long-range 18: 2 2K11 Krug (RS-SA-4 Ganef); 4 FD-2000 (CH-SA-9); 12 S-200 Angara (RS-SA-5 Gammon); Medium-range 8: 4 S-125 Pechora-2M (RS-SA-26); 4 KS1A (CH-SA-12) Short-range 12: 12 S-125M1 Neva-M1 (RS-SA-3 Goa); some S-125-2BM Pechora AIR-LAUNCHED MISSILES AAM • IR R-60 (RS-AA-8 Aphid); R-73 (RS-AA-11A Archer) BOMBS Laser-guided MAM-C; MAM-L

Ukraine UKR

Gendarmerie & Paramilitary 20,000

Age

0–14

15–19

20–24

25–29

Male

8.3%

2.4%

2.3%

3.0%

24.4%

5.9%

Female

7.8%

2.3%

2.2%

2.9%

26.9%

11.5%

Internal Troops ε15,000 EQUIPMENT BY TYPE ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES IFV 2+ Lazar-3 APC • PPV 9: 4+ Survivor II; 5 Titan-DS AUV 4+ Plasan Stormrider

Federal Border Guard Service ε5,000 EQUIPMENT BY TYPE ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES APC • PPV 8: 4+ Kirpi; 4+ Survivor II AUV 6+ Cobra ARTILLERY • MRL 122mm 4 BM-21A AIR DEFENCE GUNS • TOWED • 23mm ZU-23-2 PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 33 PCGM 8 Arkadag (TUR Tuzla) with 2 twin lnchr with Otomat AShM, 2 twin Simbad-RC lnchr with Mistral SAM, 1 Roketsan ASW Rocket Launcher System A/S mor PBFG 6 Nazya (Dearsan 33) with 2 single lnchr with Marte Mk2/N AShM PBF 18: 10 Bars-12; 5 Grif-T; 3 Sobol PB 1 Point AMPHIBIOUS • LCM 1 Dearsan LCM-1 HELICOPTERS MRH 2 AW139 TPT 3+: Medium some Mi-8 Hip; Light 3 AW109

2020

2021

UAH

4.19tr

4.98tr

USD

155bn

181bn

USD

3,741

4,384

Growth

-4.0

3.5

Inflation

2.7

9.5

UAH

118bn

USD

4.35bn

4.27bn

20m

115m

26.99

27.52

per capita

Def bdgt [a] FMA (US)

USD

USD1=UAH

2022

131bn 115m

[a] Including military pensions Real-terms defence budget trend (USDbn, constant 2015) 2.74 0.94 2008

Population

2015

2021

43,745,640 30–64 65 plus

Capabilities Ukraine’s overriding security concern is Russia’s support for separatists in the east of the country and occupation of Crimea. During 2021 exchanges of fire continued along the line of contact, with a marked increase in the second quarter of the year. Defence policy is based on maintaining sovereignty and territorial integrity. The country continues to aspire to membership of NATO, with an ongoing reform programme intended to align its armed forces with Alliance standards. In line with these aims it replaced its Military Doctrine in 2021 with a new Military Security Strategy which built on the 2020 National Security Strategy. Part of the reform programme included separating the position of chief of the general staff from that of commander in chief of the armed forces, and establishing several new commands, including a Joint Forces Command. The armed forces participate in bilateral and multinational exercises. The equipment inventory still consists predominantly of Soviet-era weaponry. Sustaining and in some cases upgrading these systems is a near-term concern, and equipment replacements will be required over the coming decade in order to forestall potential problems with obsolescence. Alongside an aspiration to re-equip the air force with Western combat aircraft by the mid-2030s, there is now a near-term focus on improving its limited naval capability. This includes the acquisition of ex-UK minehunters in 2022 as well as two new-build corvettes on order from Turkey, the first of which is due for delivery by the end of 2023. The country has a broad defence industrial base, operating in all sectors, though its capability remains shaped, and limited, by its Soviet heritage. Ukraine was a key provider of guided-weapons technologies in the Soviet Union. It retains the capability to build Soviet-era land systems and can maintain and modestly upgrade Soviet-era tactical combat aircraft.

ACTIVE 196,600 (Army 125,600 Navy 15,000 Air Force 35,000 Airborne 20,000 Special Operations Forces 1,000) Gendarmerie & Paramilitary 102,000 Conscript liability Army, Air Force 18 months, Navy 2 years. Minimum age for conscription raised from 18 to 20 in 2015

Russia and Eurasia

Ukrainian Hryvnia UAH GDP

212 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2022

RESERVE 900,000 (Joint 900,000) Military service within 5 years

ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE Army ε125,600 4 regional HQ FORCES BY ROLE MANOEUVRE Reconnaissance 5 recce bn Armoured 4 tk bde Mechanised 9 mech bde 2 mtn bde Light 4 mot inf bde 1 lt inf bde SURFACE-TO-SURFACE MISSILES 1 SSM bde COMBAT SUPPORT 5 arty bde 1 MRL bde 2 MRL regt 1 engr regt 1 EW regt 1 EW bn 2 EW coy 1 CBRN regt 4 sigs regt COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT 3 maint regt 1 maint coy HELICOPTERS 4 avn bde AIR DEFENCE 4 AD regt

Reserves FORCES BY ROLE MANOEUVRE Armoured 2 tk bde Mechanised 2 mech bde Other 23 (territorial def) sy bde(-) COMBAT SUPPORT 2 arty bde EQUIPMENT BY TYPE ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES MBT 858: 385 T-64BV; 235 T-64BV mod 2017; 100 T-64BM Bulat; 82 T-72AV/B1; 4 T-72AV mod 2021; 47 T-72AMT; 5 T-84 Oplot; (34 T-80; 500 T-72; 578 T-64; 20 T-55 all in store) RECCE 547: 327 BRDM-2; 80 BRDM-2L1; 25 BRDM-2T; 115 BRM-1K (CP)

IFV 1,212: 213 BMP-1/BMP-1AK; 890 BMP-2; 4 BMP-3; 54+ BTR-3DA; 6+ BTR-3E1; 45 BTR-4E APC 622 APC (T) 60: 15 BTR-D; 45 MT-LB APC (W) 322: 5 BTR-60; 215 BTR-70; 102 BTR-80 PPV 240: 40 Kozak-2 /-2M; 200 Varta ABCV 30: 15 BMD-1, 15 BMD-2 AUV 40 Novator ENGINEERING & MAINTENANCE VEHICLES AEV 53 BAT-2; MT-LB ARV 34+: 10 BREM-1; 2 BREM-M; BREM-2; BREM-64; 22+ BTS-4 VLB MTU-20 ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE MSL SP 9P149 with 9K114 Shturm (RS-AT-6 Spiral) MANPATS 9K111 Fagot (RS-AT-4 Spigot); 9K113 Konkurs (RS-AT-5 Spandrel); FGM-148 Javelin; Stugna-P; Corsar GUNS 100mm ε500 MT-12/T-12 ARTILLERY 1,818 SP 607+: 122mm 292 2S1 Gvozdika; 152mm 302: 249 2S3 Akatsiya; 18 2S5 Giatsint-S; 35 2S19 Msta-S; 203mm 13+ 2S7 Pion (up to 83 2S7 Pion in store) TOWED 515+: 122mm 75 D-30; 152mm 440: 180 2A36 Giatsint-B; 130 2A65 Msta-B; 130+ D-20 GUN/MOR • 120mm • TOWED 2 2B16 NONA-K MRL 354: 122mm 203: 18 9P138; 185 BM-21 Grad; 220mm 70 9P140 Uragan; 300mm 81+: Adler; 81 9A52 Smerch MOR 120mm 340: 190 2S12 Sani; 30 M-1938 (PM-38); 120 M120-15 SURFACE-TO-SURFACE MISSILE LAUNCHERS SRBM • Conventional 90 9K79 Tochka (RS-SS-21 Scarab) HELICOPTERS ATK ε35 Mi-24 Hind MRH 1 Lev-1 TPT • Medium ε23 Mi-8 Hip AIR DEFENCE SAM 81+ Long-range Some S-300V (RS-SA-12A Gladiator) Short-range 6 9K330 Tor-M (RS-SA-15 Gauntlet) Point-defence 75+: 9K35 Strela-10 (RS-SA-13 Gopher); 9K33 Osa-AKM (RS-SA-8 Gecko); 75 2K22 Tunguska (RS-SA-19 Grison) GUNS SP 23mm ZSU-23-4 Shilka TOWED 23mm ZU-23-2; 57mm S-60 AIR-LAUNCHED MISSILES • ASM Barrier-V

Navy ε15,000 (incl Naval Aviation and Naval Infantry) After Russia’s annexation of Crimea, HQ shifted to Odessa. Several additional vessels remain in Russian possession in Crimea 2 Regional HQ EQUIPMENT BY TYPE PRINCIPAL SURFACE COMBATANTS • FRIGATES 1 FFHM 1 Hetman Sagaidachny (RUS Krivak III) with 1 twin lnchr with 4K33 Osa-M (RS-SA-N-4 Gecko) SAM, 2 quad

Russia and Eurasia 213

Naval Aviation ε1,000 EQUIPMENT BY TYPE FIXED-WING AIRCRAFT ASW (2 Be-12 Mail non-operational) TPT • Light (2 An-26 Curl in store) HELICOPTERS ASW 7+: 4+ Ka-27 Helix A; 1 Mi-14PS Haze A; 2 Mi14PL Haze C TPT • Medium 1 Ka-29 Helix-B TRG 1 Ka-226 UNINHABITED AERIAL VEHICLES CISR • Medium 1+ Bayraktar TB2

Naval Infantry ε6,000 FORCES BY ROLE MANOEUVRE Reconnaissance 1 recce bn Light 2 nav inf bde EQUIPMENT BY TYPE ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES MBT 69: 41 T-64BV; 28 T-80BV mod IFV BMP-1 APC APC (T) MT-LB APC (W) BTR-60; BTR-80 PPV Varta ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE GUNS 100mm MT-12 ARTILLERY SP 122mm 2S1 Gvozdika TOWED 152mm 2A36 Giatsint-B

AIR DEFENCE GUNS • SP 23mm ZSU-23-4

Coastal Defence ε1,500 FORCES BY ROLE COASTAL DEFENCE 1 arty bde 1 MRL regt EQUIPMENT BY TYPE ARTILLERY TOWED 152mm some D-20 MRL 220mm some 9P140 Uragan COASTAL DEFENCE AShM 1 RK-360MC Neptun

Air Forces 45,000 3 Regional HQ FORCES BY ROLE FIGHTER 4 bde with MiG-29 Fulcrum; Su-27 Flanker B; L-39 Albatros FIGHTER/GROUND ATTACK 2 bde with Su-24M Fencer; Su-25 Frogfoot ISR 2 sqn with Su-24MR Fencer E* TRANSPORT 3 bde with An-24 Curl; An-26 Coke; An-30 Clank; Il-76 Candid; Tu-134 Crusty TRAINING Some sqn with L-39 Albatros TRANSPORT HELICOPTER Some sqn with Mi-8 Hip; Mi-9 Hip; PZL Mi-2 Hoplite AIR DEFENCE 6 bde with 9K37M Buk-M1 (RS-SA-11 Gadfly); S-300PS/ PT (RS-SA-10 Grumble) 4 regt with 9K37M Buk-M1 (RS-SA-11); S-300PS/PT (RSSA-10 Grumble) EQUIPMENT BY TYPE AIRCRAFT ε124 combat capable FTR 70: ε36 MiG-29 Fulcrum; ε34 Su-27 Flanker B FGA ε14 Su-24M Fencer D ATK ε31 Su-25 Frogfoot ISR 12: 3 An-30 Clank; ε9 Su-24MR Fencer E* TPT 29: Heavy 5 Il-76 Candid; Medium 1 An-70; Light ε23: 3 An-24 Coke; ε19 An-26 Curl; 1 Tu-134 Crusty TRG ε31 L-39 Albatros HELICOPTERS C2 ε14 Mi-9 Hip TPT 32: Medium ε30 Mi-8 Hip; Light 2 PZL Mi-2 Hoplite UNINHABITED AERIAL VEHICLES CISR • Medium 6 Bayraktar TB2 AIR DEFENCE SAM 322+: Long-range 250 S-300PS/PT (RS-SA-10 Grumble) Medium-range 72 9K37M Buk-M1 (RS-SA-11 Gadfly) Short-range some S-125 Pechora (RS-SA-3 Goa) GUNS • TOWED 23mm some ZU-23-2 AIR-LAUNCHED MISSILES AAM • IR R-60 (RS-AA-8 Aphid); R-73 (RS-AA-11A Archer) SARH R-27 (RS-AA-10A Alamo)

Russia and Eurasia

533mm ASTT with SET-65 HWT/53-65K HWT, 2 RBU 6000 Smerch 2 A/S mor, 2 AK630M CIWS, 1 100mm gun (capacity 1 Ka-27 Helix ASW hel) PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 12 CORVETTES • FS 1 Albatros (Project 1124P (Grisha II)) with 2 twin 533mm ASTT with SAET-60 HWT, 2 RBU 6000 Smerch 2 A/S mor, 2 57mm guns PCC 2 Slavyansk (ex-US Island) PHG 1 Vekhr (FSU Matka) with 2 single lnchr with P-15M/R Termit-M/R (RS-SS-N-2C/D Styx) AShM, 1 AK630M CIWS, 1 76mm gun PBG 7 Gyurza-M (Project 51855) with 2 Katran-M RWS with Barrier SSM PB 1 Grif-M (FSU Zhuk) MINE WARFARE • MINE COUNTERMEASURES 1 MHI 1 Korund (Project 1258 (Yevgenya)) AMPHIBIOUS LANDING SHIPS • LSM 1 Project 773I (Polnochny C) (capacity 6 MBT; 180 troops) LANDING CRAFT • LCM 1 Akula (Ondatra) LOGISTICS AND SUPPORT 8 ABU 1 Project 419 (Sura) AG 1 Bereza AGI 1 Muna AKL 1 AWT 1 Sudak AXL 3 Petrushka

214 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2022 ASM Kh-25 (RS-AS-10 Karen); Kh-29 (RS-AS-14 Kedge); MAM-L ARM Kh-25MP (RS-AS-12A Kegler); Kh-58 (RS-AS-11 Kilter); Kh-28 (RS-AS-9 Kyle) (likely WFU)

Airborne Assault Troops ε20,000 FORCES BY ROLE MANOEUVRE Air Manoeuvre 1 AB bde 5 air aslt bde 1 air mob bde COMBAT SUPPORT 1 SP arty bn EQUIPMENT BY TYPE ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES MBT 60 T-80BV mod IFV some BTR-3E1; some BTR-4 Bucephalus APC 187+ APC (T) 25 BTR-D APC (W) 162+: 1 BTR-60; 2 BTR-70; 122 BTR-80; 10 Dozor-B; 27+ Oncilla ABCV 75: 30 BMD-1; 45 BMD-2 AUV 30+: some KrAZ Spartan; ε30 Novator ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE MSL • MANPATS 9K111 Fagot (RS-AT-4 Spigot); 9K111-1 Konkurs (RS-AT-5 Spandrel) ARTILLERY 142 SP 18+: 122mm 2S1 Gvozdika; 152mm 18 2S3 Akatsiya TOWED • 122mm 54 D-30 MRL 122mm 6 BM-21 Grad GUN/MOR • SP • 120mm 40 2S9 NONA-S MOR 120mm 24 2S12 Sani AIR DEFENCE SAM • Point-defence 9K35M Strela-10M GUNS • SP 23mm some ZU-23-2 (truck mounted)

Special Operations Forces ε1,000 FORCES BY ROLE SPECIAL FORCES 2 SF regt

Gendarmerie & Paramilitary 102,000

APC 22+ APC (W) BTR-70; BTR-80 PPV 22+: Streit Cougar; Streit Spartan; 22 Kozak-2; Varta AUV Novator ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE RCL 73mm some SPG-9 ARTILLERY TOWED 122mm some D-30 MOR 120mm some AIRCRAFT TPT • Light 24: 20 An-26 Curl; 2 An-72 Coaler; 2 Tu134 Crusty HELICOPTERS • TPT 14: Medium 11: 4 H225M; 7 Mi-8 Hip; Light 3: 2 H125; 1 Mi-2MSB AIR DEFENCE SAM • Point-defence 9K38 Igla (RS-SA-18 Grouse) GUNS • SP 23mm some ZU-23-2 (truck mounted)

Border Guard ε42,000 FORCES BY ROLE MANOEUVRE Light some mot inf gp EQUIPMENT BY TYPE ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES APC • PPV 17 Kozak-2

Maritime Border Guard The Maritime Border Guard is an independent subdivision of the State Commission for Border Guards and is not part of the navy EQUIPMENT BY TYPE PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 21 PCT 1 Molnya (Pauk I) with 4 single 406mm TT, 2 RBU 1200 Uragan A/S mor, 1 76mm gun PCC 4 Tarantul (Stenka) PB 12: 11 Zhuk; 1 Orlan PBR 4 Shmel with 1 76mm gun LOGISTICS AND SUPPORT • AGF 1 AIRCRAFT • TPT Medium An-8 Camp; Light An-24 Coke; An-26 Curl; An-72 Coaler HELICOPTERS • ASW: Ka-27 Helix A

National Guard ε60,000

DEPLOYMENT

Ministry of Internal Affairs; 5 territorial comd

CYPRUS: UN • UNFICYP 1

FORCES BY ROLE MANOEUVRE Armoured Some tk bn Mechanised Some mech bn Light Some lt inf bn

DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO: UN • MONUSCO 260; 1 atk hel sqn

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES MBT T-64; T-64BV; T-64BM; T-72 IFV 93: BTR-3; 32+ BTR-3E1; ε50 BTR-4 Bucephalus; 10+ BTR-4E; 1 BMP-2

MALI: UN • MINUSMA 12 MOLDOVA: 10 (Joint Peacekeeping Force) SERBIA: NATO • KFOR 40; UN • UNMIK 2 SOUTH SUDAN: UN • UNMISS 4 SUDAN: UN • UNISFA 6

FOREIGN FORCES Canada Operation Unifier 200 Lithuania JMTG-U 30

Poland JMTG-U 40 United Kingdom Operation Orbital 53 United States JMTG-U 150

TERRITORY WHERE THE GOVERNMENT DOES NOT EXERCISE EFFECTIVE CONTROL In late February 2014, Russian forces occupied Crimea. The region then requested to join the Russian Federation after a referendum in March, regarded as unconstitutional by the government in Kyiv. Following the annexation, fighting broke out in Ukraine’s Donetsk and Luhansk regions, with separatist forces receiving support from Russia. The conflict has continued since 2014, with a July 2020 ceasefire being broken repeatedly during 2021. Data presented here represents the de facto situation and does not imply international recognition.

EASTERN UKRAINE SEPARATIST FORCES

ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE Donetsk People’s Republic ε20,000 FORCES BY ROLE SPECIAL FORCES 2 (Spetsnaz) SF bn MANOEUVRE Reconnaissance 1 recce bn Armoured 1 tk bn Light 6 mot inf bde COMBAT SUPPORT 1 arty bde 1 engr coy 1 EW coy COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT 1 log bn AIR DEFENCE 1 AD bn

Luhansk People’s Republic ε14,000 FORCES BY ROLE MANOEUVRE Reconnaissance 1 recce bn Armoured 1 tk bn Light 4 mot inf bde COMBAT SUPPORT 1 arty bde 1 engr coy 1 EW coy COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT 1 log bn AIR DEFENCE 1 AD bn

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES MBT T-64BV; T-64B; T-64BM†; T-72B1; T-72BA RECCE BDRM-2 IFV BMP-1; BMP-2; BTR-4 APC APC (T) BTR-D; MT-LB; GT-MU APC (W) BTR-60; BTR-70; BTR-80 ABCV BMD-1, BMD-2 ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE MSL 9K115 Metis (RS-AT-7 Saxhorn); 9K135 Kornet (RSAT-14 Spriggan) RCL 73mm SPG-9 GUNS 100mm MT-12 ARTILLERY SP 122mm 2S1 Gvozdika; 152mm 2S3 Akatsiya; 2S19 Msta-S†; 203mm 2S7 Pion TOWED 122mm D-30; 152mm 2A65 Msta-B GUN/MOR SP 120mm 2S9 NONA-S TOWED 120mm 2B16 NONA-K MRL 122mm BM-21 Grad MOR 82mm 2B14; 120mm 2B11 Sani AIR DEFENCE SAM Short-range 9K331M Tor-M2 (RS-SA-15 Gauntlet) Point-defence 2K22 Tunguska (RS-SA-19 Grison); 9K32M Strela-2M (RS-SA-7B Grail); 9K33 Osa (RS-SA-8 Gecko); 9K35 Strela-10 (RS-SA-13 Gopher); 9K38 Igla (RS-SA-18 Grouse); GROM GUNS SP 23mm ZU-23-2 (tch/on MT-LB) TOWED 14.5mm ZPU-2; 57mm S-60

FOREIGN FORCES Russia Crimea: 30,000; 1 recce bde, 2 naval inf bde; 1 air aslt regt; 1 arty bde; 1 NBC bde; 40 T-72B3; 80 BMP-2; 200 BTR-82A; 20 BTR-80: 150 MT-LB; 18 2S1; 18 2A65; 12 BM21; 8 9P140; 1 AShM bde with 3K60 Bal; 3K55 Bastion; 1 FGA regt with Su-24M/MR; Su-30SM; 1 FGA regt with Su27SM/SM3; Su-30M2; 1 atk regt with Su-24M/Su-25SM; 1 atk/tpt hel regt; 1 ASW hel regt; 1 AD regt with S-300PM; 1 AD regt with S-400; 1 Fleet HQ located at Sevastopol; 2 radar stations located at Sevastopol (Dnepr system) and Mukachevo (Dnepr system) • Donetsk/Luhansk: 3,000 (reported)

Russia and Eurasia

Russia and Eurasia 215

216 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2022

Uzbekistan UZB Uzbekistani Som UZS

2020

2021

GDP

UZS

603tr

703tr

USD

59.9bn

65.5bn

per capita

USD

1,767

1,901

Growth

1.7

6.1

Inflation

12.9

11.0

UZS

n.k

Def exp

USD USS1=UZS Population

n.k

10054.59

10736.33

2022

30,842,796

Age

0–14

15–19

20–24

25–29

Male

11.7%

4.0%

4.3%

4.9%

30–64 65 plus 22.2%

2.7%

Female

11.2%

3.7%

4.1%

4.9%

22.9%

3.5%

Capabilities Uzbekistan introduced a new military doctrine in early 2018, which highlighted increased concern over terrorism and the potential impact of conflicts including in Afghanistan. It noted a requirement for military modernisation. The doctrine also focuses on border security and hybrid-warfare concerns. Uzbekistan is a member of the SCO, but suspended its CSTO membership in 2012. Uzbekistan maintains bilateral defence ties with Russia and in late 2018 a defence-cooperation agreement was reported with India. Military cooperation is developing with Turkey, and exercises were held in 2021. The armed forces are army-dominated and conscript-based. Uzbekistan has a limited capacity to deploy its forces externally. A sizeable air fleet was inherited from the Soviet Union, but minimal recapitalisation in the intervening period has substantially reduced the active inventory. Logistical and maintenance shortcomings hinder aircraft availability. Uzbekistan is reliant on foreign suppliers for advanced military equipment; military helicopters and armoured personnel carriers were procured from Russia in 2019. Meetings took place with India in 2020 to advance defence cooperation (three defence-related MOUs were signed in 2019) and in 2021 the leaders of Pakistan and Uzbekistan signed an agreement on defence cooperation. A State Committee for the Defence Industry was established in late 2017 to organise domestic industry and defence orders. The 2018 doctrine calls for improvements to the domestic defence industry. In recent years, Uzbekistan’s defence industry has showcased domestically produced light armoured vehicles.

ACTIVE 48,000 (Army 24,500 Air 7,500 Joint 16,000) Gendarmerie & Paramilitary 20,000

Conscript liability 12 months

ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE Army 24,500 4 Mil Districts; 2 op comd; 1 Tashkent Comd FORCES BY ROLE SPECIAL FORCES 1 SF bde MANOEUVRE Armoured 1 tk bde

Mechanised 11 MR bde Air Manoeuvre 1 air aslt bde 1 AB bde Mountain 1 lt mtn inf bde COMBAT SUPPORT 3 arty bde 1 MRL bde EQUIPMENT BY TYPE ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES MBT 340: 70 T-72; 100 T-64B/MV; 170 T-62 RECCE 19: 13 BRDM-2; 6 BRM-1 IFV 370: 270 BMP-2; ε100 BTR-82A APC 388 APC (T) 50 BTR-D APC (W) 259: 24 BTR-60; 25 BTR-70; 210 BTR-80 PPV 79: 50 Maxxpro+; 24 Ejder Yalcin; 5 Typhoon-K 4×4 ABCV 129: 120 BMD-1; 9 BMD-2 AUV 11+: 7 Cougar; 4+ M-ATV; some Tigr-M ENGINEERING & MAINTENANCE VEHICLES ARV 20 Maxxpro ARV ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE MSL • MANPATS 9K11 Malyutka (RS-AT-3 Sagger); 9K111 Fagot (RS-AT-4 Spigot) GUNS 100mm 36 MT-12/T-12 ARTILLERY 487+ SP 83+: 122mm 18 2S1 Gvozdika; 152mm 17+: 17 2S3 Akatsiya; 2S5 Giatsint-S (reported); 203mm 48 2S7 Pion TOWED 200: 122mm 60 D-30; 152mm 140 2A36 Giatsint-B GUN/MOR 120mm 54 2S9 NONA-S MRL 108: 122mm 60: 36 BM-21 Grad; 24 9P138; 220mm 48 9P140 Uragan MOR 120mm 42: 5 2B11 Sani; 19 2S12 Sani; 18 M-120 AIR DEFENCE • SAM Point-defence QW-18 (CH-SA-11)

Air Force 7,500 FORCES BY ROLE FIGHTER 1 sqn with MiG-29/MiG-29UB Fulcrum A/B GROUND ATTACK 1 sqn with Su-25/Su-25BM Frogfoot TRANSPORT 1 regt with Il-76 Candid; An-12 Cub; An-26 Curl; C295W; Tu-134 Crusty TRAINING 1 sqn with L-39 Albatros ATTACK/TRANSPORT HELICOPTER 1 regt with Mi-24 Hind; Mi-26 Halo; Mi-35M Hind; Mi-8 Hip AIR DEFENCE 1 bty with FD-2000 (CH-SA-9) 1 bty with S-125-2M Pechora-2M (RS-SA-26) 2 bty with S-125M1 Neva-M1 (RA-SA-3 Goa) EQUIPMENT BY TYPE AIRCRAFT 24 combat capable FTR 12 MiG-29/MiG-29UB Fulcrum A/B; (18 more in store); (26 Su-27/Su-27UB Flanker B/C in store)

Russia and Eurasia 217 AIR-LAUNCHED MISSILES AAM • IR R-60 (RS-AA-8 Aphid); R-73 (RS-AA-11A Archer); IR/SARH R-27 (RS-AA-10 Alamo) ASM Kh-25 (RS-AS-10 Karen) ARM Kh-25MP (RS-AS-12A Kegler); Kh-28 (RS-AS-9 Kyle); Kh-58 (RS-AS-11 Kilter)

Gendarmerie & Paramilitary up to 20,000 Internal Security Troops up to 19,000 Ministry of Interior

National Guard 1,000

Ministry of Defence

Russia and Eurasia

ATK 12: 12 Su-25/Su-25BM Frogfoot; (15 Su-24 Fencer in store) TPT 11: Heavy 2 Il-76 Candid; Medium 2 An-12 Cub; Light 7: 2 An-26 Curl; 4 C295W; 1 Tu-134 Crusty TRG 6 L-39 Albatros HELICOPTERS ATK 41: 29 Mi-24 Hind; 12 Mi-35M Hind TPT 69: Heavy 9: 8 H225M Caracal; 1 Mi-26 Halo; Medium 52 Mi-8 Hip; Light 8 AS350 Ecureuil AIR DEFENCE • SAM 18 Long-range 4 FD-2000 (CH-SA-9) Medium-range 4 S-125-2M Pechora-2M (RS-SA-26) Short-range 10 S-125M1 Neva-M1 (RS-SA-3 Goa)

218 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2022

Chapter Six

Asia Regional defence spending maintained momentum in 2021 with real growth reaching 2.8%. This indicates the resilience of defence spending against wider economic pressures. Total regional spending came to USD488 billion in 2021, more than double the 2008 total of USD226bn. China accounted for 43% of total regional spending in 2021 with a defence budget of USD207bn. Using a PPP rate brings China’s 2021 defence budget closer to USD332bn. The revelation by analysts, using open-source satellite imagery, that several large apparent ICBM silo fields were under construction in northwestern China, focused attention on the scale and pace of Beijing’s nuclear force expansion and modernisation. The Pentagon’s allegation that China has tested hypersonic boost-glide systems in 2021 further highlighted not just the scale of Beijing’s military efforts, but also the technical sophistication it appears to have achieved in some areas. While there remains much attention on Chinese military activity near Taiwan, Southeast Asian countries are also feeling Chinese military pressure. From late 2019, Indonesia’s government and armed forces have become increasingly

Asia defence spending, 2021 – top 5

concerned about Chinese activities inside its EEZ near the Natuna Islands. Meanwhile, in June Malaysia’s government issued a tender for a new long-range air-surveillance radar, intended to improve coverage of east Malaysia, a month after the air force intercepted a formation of PLA transport aircraft 60 nautical miles off the coast of Sarawak state. The AUKUS partnership, signed in September, is not only related to the development of a nuclear-powered submarine capability for Australia, but also concerns broader collaboration with the UK and US on cyber, AI, quantum and ‘additional undersea’ capabilities. Australia has also announced plans to establish a ‘sovereign guided weapons enterprise’. The Quad remains an informal arrangement, introducing an additional layer to buttress the bilateral (US-centred) and multilateral (ASEAN-centred) regional security architecture. While there is much focus on the annual Malabar naval exercises, arguably of greater significance are the various bilateral agreements on logistics, visiting forces and information-sharing between its members which could smooth interoperability and coordinated military activities.

Active military personnel – top 10 (25,000 per unit)

United States USD754bn

China 2,035,000

Total Asian spending USD488bn

India 1,460,350

Global total 19,605,000

North Korea 1,280,000 China

Pakistan 651,800 South Korea 555,000

India

Vietnam 482,000 USD65.1bn

Indonesia 395,500

USD207.3bn Japan

South Korea

Australia

Thailand 360,850 Myanmar 356,000

USD49.3bn

USD46.7bn

USD34.3bn

Sri Lanka 255,000

47%

Regional total 9,231,000

Asia 219

Regional defence policy and economics

220 ►

Armed forces data section

244 ►

Arms procurements and deliveries

247 ►

The Quad: selected ‘cross-bracing’ arrangements

Australia – India 2006 Memorandum on Defence Cooperation 2009 Joint Declaration on Security Cooperation 2014 Bilateral Framework for Security Cooperation 2020 Secretaries’ 2+2 Dialogue upgraded to ministerial level 2020 Mutual Logistic Support Arrangement 2020 Defence Science and Technology Implementing Arrangement

India – US 2002 General Security of Military Information Agreement (GSOMIA) 2016 India designated Major Defence Partner by the US 2016 Logistics Exchange Memorandum of Agreement (LEMOA) 2018 India elevated to Strategic Trade Authorization tier 1 status

2018 Communications, Compatibility and Security Agreement (COMCASA) 2019 Industrial Security Annex/ Agreement (part of GSOMIA) 2020 Basic Exchange and Cooperation Agreement for Geo-Spatial Cooperation

Japan – US 1954 Mutual Defense Assistance Agreement 1960 Japan–US Security Treaty 1960 Status of Forces Agreement 2004 ACSA 2007 GSOMIA 2014 Agreement on Preventing and Combating Serious Crime

Australia – Japan 2007 Joint Declaration on Security 2013 Information Security Agreement 2014 Bilateral relationship elevated to ‘Special Strategic Partnership’ 2017 ACSA 2020 Memorandum of Cooperation between the Australian Space Agency and the Japan Aerospace Exploration Agency 2020 Reciprocal Access Agreement (agreed in principle)

Australia – US 1951 ANZUS Treaty 1963 Status of Forces Agreement 1989 Logistics Support Agreement 1999 Acquisition and Cross-Servicing Agreement (ACSA) (signed 1998) 2010 ACSA 2013 Defence Trade Cooperation Treaty 2015 Force Posture Agreement 2021 AUKUS partnership

Conventionally-powered attack submarines, by country, 2014–21 70

Australia Bangladesh China

India Indonesia Japan

North Korea South Korea Malaysia

Myanmar Pakistan Singapore

Taiwan Vietnam

50 40 30 20 10 0

2014

2016

2018

2020

2021

Asia

India – Japan 1985 Agreement on Cooperation in the field of Science and Technology 2008 Joint Declaration on Security Cooperation 2015 Agreement Concerning the Transfer of Defence Equipment and Technology 2015 Agreement Concerning Security Measures for the Protection of Classified Military Information 2020 Acquisition and Cross-Servicing Agreement (ACSA)

220 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2022

Asia Many governments in Asia continued to use their armed forces in support of efforts to control the impact of the coronavirus pandemic. In September 2020, Indonesia’s government increased the armed forces’ role alongside that of the police, in attempts to enforce compliance with health protocols in badly afflicted provinces. In February 2021, Malaysia’s armed forces – which had been helping to enforce the country’s Movement Control Order (MCO) restricting domestic travel – were granted police powers so that they could arrest MCO offenders. During August, the Vietnam People’s Army was deployed to deliver food supplies in heavily infected areas of Ho Chi Minh City, where a strict lockdown was in force. In May, the Japan Self-Defense Force (JSDF) established two large-scale vaccination centres to support efforts to vaccinate the general population against COVID-19. In late June, Bangladesh’s government again deployed troops, this time to back up police enforcement of a lockdown intended to control the spread of the highly infectious Delta variant. The Australian government took similar measures in July, with up to 300 unarmed troops patrolling the streets of Sydney as part of the Australian Defence Force’s Operation COVID-19 Assist. Armed forces also participated in some regional states’ efforts to assist others: for example, in July, two Singapore air force C-130 aircraft transported medical supplies including ventilators and personal protective equipment to Indonesia. On a larger scale, during 2021, China’s People’s Liberation Army (PLA) organised deliveries to friendly countries to bolster their pandemic responses. Notably, at the start of the year, the PLA provided its military counterparts in Cambodia and Pakistan with early access to vaccines.

Strategic tensions: China, Japan, Taiwan

Although military resources continued to be employed to respond to the pandemic, it was evident that this would not seriously affect the region’s overall security landscape. While the need for governments to prioritise COVID-19 responses continued to affect defence budgets in some Asian countries (for example, Thailand, where defence spending for the 2022 financial year starting in October 2021 was

reduced by 5% in real terms compared with the previous year), in most cases it had no more than a marginal impact. Meanwhile, strategic tensions continued to confront governments across the region, leading to increased spending on their armed forces and focused efforts to improve military capabilities. China’s continued drive to improve its capabilities, combined with Beijing’s assertive foreign policy, provided grounds for other Asian governments’ defence establishments to maintain or step-up efforts to improve their military capabilities. Taiwan emerged more strongly than ever as a potential flashpoint. In March, the outgoing Commander of United States Indo-Pacific Command, Admiral Philip S. Davidson, told the US Senate Armed Services Committee that China might attempt to take control of Taiwan ‘in the next six years’ using force. In the meantime, the PLA Air Force continued to probe Taiwan’s Air Defence Identification Zone with mixed formations of fast-jet, bomber and special-mission aircraft. During August, the PLA staged live-fire exercises south of Taiwan involving warships, fast jets and anti-submarine warfare (ASW) aircraft, supposedly in response to ‘external interference and provocations by Taiwan independence forces’. Reflecting a shared perception of the growing military challenge, the US and Taiwan moved towards closer defence coordination. Delivering an IISS Fullerton Lecture in Singapore in July, US Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin said that his country would ‘stay focused on helping Taiwan to defend itself’. In early August, the Biden administration approved its first defence-equipment sale to Taiwan. The package, reportedly valued at USD750 million, included 40 M109A6 self-propelled howitzers and nearly 1,700 kits for converting artillery shells into GPS-guided projectiles. Other major procurements from the US included M142 HIMARS launchers with ATACMs and RGM-84L Harpoon Block II coastal-defence systems. In late August, Taiwan’s Executive Yuan proposed a slightly higher defence budget for 2022, including the ‘special budget’ to support the acquisition of 66 F-16V combat aircraft for delivery from 2023–28. Meanwhile, in November 2020, Taiwan’s CSBC Corporation began building the first of eight indigenously designed

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Japan’s Amphibious Rapid Deployment Brigade In the post-war period, Japan's Self Defense Force (JSDF) eschewed the development of amphibious capabilities. The association with past power-projection efforts of the Imperial Japanese Army and Navy meant that this type of capability was seen to transgress Japan’s ‘exclusively defence-oriented’ policy and was deemed unacceptable domestically and internationally. Moreover, the fact that national defence posture was predicated on denying a Soviet land invasion of the Japanese mainland, rather than retaking territory, also meant an amphibious capability was deemed unnecessary in practice. The Japanese defence establishment expressed a renewed interest in amphibious capabilities as the regional security environment and US–Japan alliance cooperation started to transform. The 1996 Japan–US Joint Declaration on Security and the revision of the Guidelines for Japan–US Defense Cooperation in 1997 initiated the first serious efforts for bilateral contingency planning and military-to-military cooperation, thus raising questions about how the JSDF could engage with the US Marine Corps (USMC), with which it had limited interaction during the Cold War, and how it might consider acquiring its own amphibious capability to complement those operated by US forces. In the late 1990s, the JSDF chief of staff subsequently authorised the Ground Self-Defense Force (GSDF) staff office to begin dialogue with the USMC. For their part, the US side welcomed deeper cooperation with the Japanese and was prepared to share its expertise. Serious impetus was given to Japanese thinking by the increasingly evident rise of China and its expansion of maritime activities in the early 2000s, especially around Japan’s remote southwestern islands, including the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands, which are administered by Japan but claimed by China. In 2002, the GSDF established (under the Western Army) the 640-strong Western Army Infantry Regiment at Camp Ainoura in the city of Sasebo in Nagasaki Prefecture. This unit was to specialise in amphibious operations and to become the core of the eventual Amphibious Rapid Deployment Brigade (ARDB). The GSDF then ventured to undertake joint bilateral amphibious training with the USMC in Exercise Iron Fist, first held off the coast of California in 2006 with the aim of practising amphibious assault operations. Japan’s recognition of the potential value of amphibious capabilities was further reinforced by the events of the Great East Japan Earthquake in March 2011. The USMC’s role in assisting domestic Japanese disaster-relief activities, and the JSDF’s own amphibious limitations by comparison, not only pointed to the need for Japan to fill this operational gap, but also enhanced the legitimacy of procuring these capabilities in the name of humanitarian assistance and disaster relief (HADR).

Japan further advanced its plans for amphibious capabilities by participating, from 2013, in the USMC’s Dawn Blitz exercise series, this time involving not just the GSDF and USMC, but also the Maritime Self-Defense Force (MSDF), as part of a plan to develop true inter-service joint amphibious capability. The JSDF acquired further accumulated expertise and confidence in joint amphibious operations first through the domestic HADR mission in 2013 to relieve storm damage on IzuOshima, in essence a remote island, and then through the HADR mission in the wake of Typhoon Haiyan, which required cooperation with the USMC and Philippines armed forces. These activities prepared the way for Japan’s 2013 National Defense Programme Guidelines to mandate the establishment of the ARDB in March 2018. The unit is planned to eventually reach a total strength of 3,000 personnel, with an order of battle of two amphibious regiments, one amphibious assault battalion, one field artillery battalion, one reconnaissance company, a signal company, an engineer company and a logistics support battalion. The ARDB has procured from the US a total of 52 Amphibious Assault Vehicles (AAV-7); for air transport it deploys the fixedrotor CH-47JA and has started to procure 17 MV-22B Osprey tilt-rotor aircraft from the US. The MSDF’s Osumi-class LHDs can function as ship-to-shore connectors with amphibious landing capabilities and LCACs, and Hyuga-class and Izumoclass helicopter carriers can serve as command-and-control platforms for amphibious operations and for helicopter and tilt-rotor air-support operations. The Izumo-class, once converted to operate Air Self-Defense F-35Bs, will be able to offer fixed-wing air-strike support. Exercises have also taken place with other countries, including France and Australia, but the ARDB is still in its early stages and has a number of shortcomings to overcome. The GSDF has improved its own joint operation capabilities with the formation in March 2018 of the Ground Component Command which is able to direct the ARDB and regional forces. However, the JSDF’s three services have limited experience of joint amphibious operations and, according to analysts, the GSDF does not yet share data link capabilities with the MSDF and Air Self-Defense Force. The MSDF’s current ships may require further modifications to better operate AAVs and the MSDF is likely to need more purposebuilt ships for amphibious assault operations incorporating internal docks. The GSDF will also likely be examining what modifications it still needs to make to its helicopter force to improve operational capability from MSDF ships, including better weather-proofing its helicopters for maritime use. Finally, as the GSDF has indicated, the ARDB is designed purely for retaking Japanese islands and tasks such as HADR; it is not a fully-fledged marine force and as such cannot fulfil the same types of multi-role operations as the USMC.

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Studies in capability generation

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attack submarines, with a prototype vessel scheduled for delivery by 2025. Tokyo’s Defense of Japan 2021 white paper, released in July, emphasised concerns over China’s growing military capabilities, the expanded remit of the China Coast Guard (CCG) under new legislation that took effect in February and intensive CCG operations near the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands (administered by Japan, but claimed by China). However, the white paper assigned unprecedented importance to ‘stabilizing the situation surrounding Taiwan’. A joint statement by Prime Minister Suga Yoshihide and US President Joe Biden in April had underscored their countries’ common interest in maintaining ‘peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait’. However, Suga later stressed that in the event of a Taiwan conflict, Japan would provide only logistical support to US forces and would not deploy its own combat units. In May, Defense Minister Kishi Nobuo said that Japan should increase its military strength at a ‘radically different pace’ in response to China’s

growing military spending and capabilities. Kishi stressed that Japan had a vital stake in Taiwan’s security and asserted that his government would ‘allocate the funding we need to protect our nation’. While it seemed likely that Tokyo’s defence posture would only change incrementally, it was clear that Japan was strengthening its military capabilities. There was continuing emphasis on measures to enhance the security of the remote Senkakus and other southern islands. These measures include acquiring new transport vessels, establishing a new electronic warfare (EW) unit for the region and a decision announced in July to base the Japan Air SelfDefense Force’s (JASDF’s) F-35B combat aircraft at the country’s southernmost air base. Japan’s defence establishment also prioritised the development of intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) and EW capabilities, exemplified by the planned procurement of new EW aircraft for stand-off jamming and interest in contributing to the US National Defense Space Architecture’s ‘tracking layer’ of satellites

Studies in capability generation Vietnam’s procurement of Kilo-class submarines With an inventory of six Hanoi-class (Project 636.1 (Improved Kilo)) submarines, Vietnam currently ranks joint sixth in the region, alongside Australia, in terms of numbers of conventionally-powered attack submarines. The introduction into service of these submarines, and their associated weapons systems, has provided a significant boost to Vietnam’s maritime capabilities. Before acquiring the Kilos, Vietnam already operated two ageing Yugo-class midget submarines, acquired from North Korea (reportedly in a barter deal) in the 1990s. Indeed, Vietnam’s subsurface ambitions predate even this. In 1973, some personnel were sent by the then-North Vietnam’s Ministry of National Defence (MND) to the Soviet Union for training as submarine officers. Analysts have highlighted further Vietnamese interest in acquiring Soviet submarines in the late 1970s, as well as in the mid-to-late 1980s (when some crew were reportedly sent for training in the Soviet Union), but there was little concrete progress until 2006. That year saw the MND begin a strategic-planning process for the modernisation of the navy and air force, with the procurement of submarines once more in focus as Vietnam was coming to terms with an increasingly complex security situation in the South China Sea, within the context of growing Chinese assertiveness and Beijing’s evident intent to improve its own military capabilities. The plan to procure submarines from Russia was

approved by Vietnam’s Central Military Commission (CMC) in September 2006. Russia had long been a key source of Vietnam’s weapons, and the two countries' longstanding defence relationship included the Russian presence from the 1970s to the early 1990s at the Cam Ranh Bay naval base. The CMC (headed by the Communist Party of Vietnam’s General Secretary) is the body that approves the MND’s defence procurement plans. The CMC’s Executive Board includes the party’s general secretary, the prime minister, state president and defence minister, with the defence minister as its deputy head. The National Assembly approved the budget, which comprised a loan from Russia. In 2007, the MND’s weapons import firm, Vaxuco, started negotiations with Russia’s Rosoboronexport over the acquisition of six submarines. Moscow offered six Project 636.1 (Improved Kilo)-class submarines and, after reports of delays in negotiations associated with the price tag (which analysts report at USD4.3bn), an agreement was reached in summer 2009 after a special envoy of Vietnam’s prime minister Nguyen Tan Dung, deputy public security minister Bui Van Nam, flew to Moscow to meet Russia’s prime minister Vladimir Putin to discuss the price of the submarines and other issues. A contract was subsequently signed in Moscow on 15 December 2009 by Rosoboronexport’s CEO Anatoly Isaykin and Vietnam’s navy chief, Vice Admiral Nguyen Van Hien, witnessed by the prime ministers of both countries. Reports indicated that the final agreed price was around

Southeast Asian countries also felt Chinese military pressure. On 31 May, Malaysia’s air force intercepted a formation of 16 PLA Il-76 and Y-20 transport aircraft 60 nautical miles off the coast of Sarawak state in

an incident that it said posed ‘a serious threat to national security and flight safety’. Although Foreign Minister Hishammuddin Hussein’s claim on 1 June that the Chinese aircraft had breached ‘Malaysian airspace and sovereignty’ (rather than airspace over Malaysia’s exclusive economic zone (EEZ)) was inaccurate, and China dismissed the incident as ‘a routine training operation’ that ‘strictly abided by international law’, the Malaysian government and armed forces nonetheless viewed it as disconcerting and unfriendly, particularly because of the number of aircraft involved. It gave almost immediate impetus to the defence ministry’s plans to improve Malaysia’s air defences, which had been delayed by budgetary constraints. In early June, it issued a tender for a single new long-range air-surveillance radar for the air force, intended to improve the coverage of east Malaysia, including Sarawak. Later in the month, it was reported that Japan’s Mitsubishi Electric Corporation was likely to bid for the tender with its J/FPS-3 system, which in August 2020 had been chosen to fulfil a

USD2bn. Russia provided Vietnam with a defence loan for the purchase of these six submarines, including equipment, weapons, maintenance and logistics support, personnel training, base construction and basic rescue facilities. Admiralty Shipyards, based in St Petersburg, was contracted to build the submarines. At the same time, the two countries embarked on the other supporting developments, such as crew training, needed to bring the systems into service. Construction of the first boat began in 2010, and after submarine selection and basic language training in Vietnam, the first batch of 53 officers and sailors travelled to Russia at the end of August 2011 to train in St Petersburg, with this training reported as lasting one and a half years. Vietnamese personnel have also been trained at the Indian Navy’s submarine training centre (reportedly on tactical aspects of underwater warfare), but advanced technical training generally still takes place in Russia. In June 2011, the MND established the navy’s 189th Submarine Brigade to operate the Improved Kilo-class boats. This unit has been focused not only on training, maintenance and weapons-integration, but has looked to develop the necessary supporting infrastructure in Vietnam and, alongside naval command and the MND, will also have been engaged on strategy and doctrinal matters designed to help Vietnam integrate this improved submarine capability into its military plans. A base for the six submarines was built at the Cam Ranh naval base, under the supervision of Russian military engineers, though there is an alternative base at Da Nang.

The first submarine arrived at Cam Ranh on 1 January 2014 and was commissioned two weeks later on 15 January 2014. The last two boats were commissioned in Vietnam on 28 February 2017. According to the navy, when a new boat arrived, the crew was seeded by posting in experienced personnel from earlier boats, and training was also directed by the 189th Brigade’s submarine training centre. There is a support and maintenance agreement between the navy and Russia’s defence industry, but Vietnam has looked to improve domestic maintenance capabilities, providing for complex maintenance at the Cam Ranh Bay naval base and other shipyards. At the same time, Vietnam has begun to develop a submarine-rescue capability, with a domestically built submarine-rescue vessel handed over to the navy in July 2021. A submarine-rescue agreement had earlier been signed with Singapore’s navy in September 2013. A series of exercises have been employed as part of this integration process, developing from navigation and day-today submarine operations and weapons drills, such as torpedo and missile launches (the first missile launch by the first Kilo was reportedly conducted without Russian assistance in mid-2017), to exercises more closely focused on improving overall capability, including anti-submarine warfare, antisurface warfare and joint drills with other services. The livefire drills in 2017 were reported in the media with images of the weapons associated with the platforms, which now include not only torpedoes but also 3M14E Klub-S (RS-SS-N30B) land-attack cruise missiles and, most recently, 3M54E1/E Klub-S (RS-SS-N-27A/B) long-range anti-ship missiles.

intended to detect and track missile threats. Offensive systems also increasingly featured in Japan’s defence ambitions: modifications that will eventually allow the helicopter carriers Izumo and Kaga to operate F-35Bs began during the 2020 financial year, and US Marine Corps F-35Bs conducted trial landings on the Izumo in October; deliveries of an extended-range version of the air-launched ASM-3 anti-ship missile will begin in the middle of the decade; in December 2020, the Japan Ministry of Defense ordered a third batch of Kongsberg long-range, precision-guided joint strike missiles (JSM) for the JASDF’s F-35As; and in October 2020, the first of the new Taigei-class attack submarines was launched, equipped with lithium-ion batteries allowing extended operations.

Southeast Asia: challenges and responses

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similar requirement in the Philippines (making it the most important Japanese defence export since Tokyo ended its ban on international military sales in 2014). While the Malaysian tender announced in June is likely to only partially fulfil a requirement, stated in 2019, for three such systems, the US government’s prospective donation – announced in June 2020 – of up to three long-range radars (possibly AN/TPS-77 systems) to Indonesia and Malaysia could potentially fill the gap. From late 2019, Indonesia’s government and armed forces became increasingly concerned about Chinese activities inside its EEZ near the Natuna islands; Jakarta strengthened its military presence in the area and in November 2020 naval Chief of Staff Admiral Yudo Margono revealed that the first fleet command’s operational headquarters would move permanently from Jakarta to the Natunas. In May, Indonesia’s presidential office revealed the draft of a new long-term military modernisation plan costed at USD125 billion. Covering the period to 2044, the draft plan was subdivided into five-year segments, the first covering 2020–24 and coinciding with the final phase of the current Minimum Essential Force programme. The main emphasis of the new plan is on developing external defence capabilities, particularly those of the air force and navy. Expanding the existing small submarine force will be central to enhancing naval capability, but Indonesia’s plans to possess a force of eight submarines by 2024 suffered a major setback in April when one of the Indonesian Navy’s two 40-year-old Type-209/1300 Cakra-class boats, KRI Nanggala, was lost with all hands 100 kilometres north of Bali during an exercise. The submarine’s age was widely presumed to have played a part in the accident, and Indonesian parliamentarians subsequently called for the immediate retirement of its equally old sister vessel. That would leave in service just three Type 209/1400 Nagapasa-class submarines, supplied by the South Korean company DSME, the third of which was finished locally and commissioned only two weeks before Nanggala was lost. In 2019, Indonesia had signed a contract with DSME for a second batch of three Type 209/1400 boats. However, after Prabowo Subianto replaced Ryamizard Ryacudu as defence minister in October 2019, Indonesia’s defence ministry began reassessing whether the requirement for additional boats would be fulfilled best by DSME or an alternative supplier; this inevitably slowed down the procurement process. The loss of Nanggala, however, provided

new impetus for the government to enhance the submarine force. In August, President Joko Widodo approved a USD89m funding boost for the stateowned naval shipbuilder, PT PAL Indonesia, with the specific aim of providing the infrastructure necessary for the domestic construction of submarines. Then, in September, British firm Babcock signed a contract with PT PAL, under which the Indonesian firm will build two Arrowhead 140 frigates, with local design modifications. Other Southeast Asian states maintained efforts to improve their capabilities to the extent they could afford to do so. Vietnam is facing pressure from China’s activities in the South China Sea and, while Hanoi is constrained from making major equipment purchases by the available budget, it continued to incrementally enhance its maritime forces. In March, a shipyard in Da Nang launched a fourth Dutch-designed roll-on/roll-off cargo ship for the navy. In April, the Hong Ha Shipbuilding Company launched the first of the second batch of 12 highspeed patrol vessels ordered for the Vietnam Coast Guard; deliveries of the first Indian-built tranche (vessels 1–5) are reported to have started. In July, the coast guard brought into service a second ex-US Coast Guard Hamilton-class cutter for use in maritime resource protection. Meanwhile, acquiring new training aircraft promised to help Vietnam’s air force develop more sophisticated capabilities. In February, the Czech defence exporter Omnipol announced the sale of 12 L-39NG advanced trainers to Vietnam, for delivery in 2023–24. In February, the US Air Force issued a request for information relating to a new contract to provide three (and possibly more) training aircraft to Vietnam as part of a wider package also including logistical and technical support. In June, the US Pacific Air Forces command indicated that these would be T-6 basic trainers. This will be Hanoi’s most important military procurement from the US since 2016, when the latter lifted its embargo on arms sales to Vietnam. But Vietnam is also planning to procure more of its military equipment from domestic suppliers. In July, it was reported that the defence ministry’s General Department of Defence Industry was developing a plan for the next decade, envisaging the expansion of national defence-industrial capacity, with particular emphasis on developing uninhabited systems and artificial intelligence (AI) for military purposes. Myanmar’s armed forces, the Tatmadaw, were a focus of international attention following their seizure

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of state power and installation of their commanderin-chief, Senior General Min Aung Hlaing, as head of state on 1 February, and their subsequent violent suppression of widespread popular demonstrations in support of the deposed elected government led by state counsellor Aung San Suu Kyi. Over the following months, the new military government also faced an upsurge in attacks by ethnic-minority insurgent groups, notably the Kachin Independence

Army and the Karen National Liberation Army. In April, seven armed groups that had signed the Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement in 2015 announced that they would join the self-styled National Unity Government in opposition to the military seizure of power. The following month, this umbrella opposition movement announced the establishment of its armed wing, the People’s Defence Force (PDF), as a first step towards a ‘federal union army’. PDF

Afghanistan – the Taliban’s military victory former Northern Alliance to mobilise their militias. The subsequent fall of Kandahar, Afghanistan’s second city, decisively weakened the government’s position; Kabul fell on 15 August. Lessons for the future Factors contributing to the outcome of the war included weaknesses in intelligence and understanding of the country as well as in reconstruction efforts, political strategies, military strategy, operational concepts, tactics and equipment. Combined with failures across government and armed forces to adapt quickly enough to unforeseen circumstances, these provided opportunities that were exploited by insurgents and militias. And the US decision to attack Iraq drew off resources and government energy that could have been applied in Afghanistan. In the aftermath of the collapse the US stressed that it remained concerned about the threat from terrorist activity emanating from Afghanistan, though President Biden said ‘we just don’t need to fight a ground war to do it. We have what’s called over-the-horizon capabilities, which means we can strike terrorists and targets without American boots on the ground – or very few, if needed.’ However, effectively implementing such a strategy has its challenges, not least around basing and targeting. The collapse of government forces led to fears about the fate of the military equipment that had in recent years been transferred to the formergovernment’s security and defence forces, but many of the modern aircraft left the country (with their pilots) while others were disabled. More broadly, keeping modern Western-origin equipment in service will depend on maintenance capability, including the provision of spare parts, neither of which will be straightforward. Perhaps apart from small arms, this means that the Taliban’s ability to effectively operate this equipment may diminish in short order, but the picture may be different for older Sovietera equipment, while the Taliban will likely persist with capabilities that served them well during the war – the pickups, motorbikes and such like effectively suitable for a ‘light infantry’ force.

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The collapse of the government of Afghanistan led by President Ashraf Ghani in August 2021, and the subsequent assumption of power by the Taliban, was a significant shock – particularly for countries in the West and elsewhere that had since 2001 supported attempts to develop governance and security and defence capabilities in Afghanistan. During the war, the Taliban’s offering to the Afghan people in the districts that its forces controlled was twofold: providing security and facilitating dispute resolution in its Sharia courts. It did not pledge to improve agriculture, health, education or infrastructure in the way that international stabilisation efforts did. Since the 2014 withdrawal of US and NATO forces from combat roles, the Taliban had steadily isolated provincial capitals by capturing surrounding rural districts. Up to 2018, this was constrained by the presence of small numbers of US troops, acting as advisers, and by US air support. But concurrently Afghan government forces were weakened by corruption, ‘ghost soldiers’ on payrolls and political disunity in the Kabul government. The 2018 Doha Agreement between the US government and the Taliban was widely interpreted by Afghans as a withdrawal agreement that did not protect the interests of the Kabul government. And new US president Joe Biden’s early 2021 announcement that the US would withdraw by the 20th anniversary of the 9/11 terrorist attacks was a blow to the morale of government forces. In early 2021, the US had urged Ghani to withdraw Afghan troops and police from isolated checkpoints dispersed across rural areas surrounding provincial capitals. They also recommended that Afghan forces concentrate on the defence of key towns, cities and Kabul. This way they hoped that the government could fight the Taliban to a stalemate. However, it is likely that Taliban forces were pre-positioned across the country ready to begin offensive operations in spring 2021. Their opening move was to seize border crossing points in western Afghanistan; attacks then shifted to eastern Afghanistan, rapidly followed by attacks in the north. These offensives pre-empted any attempts by the warlords of the

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units, many of them highly autonomous, were soon employing attacks using improvised explosive devices and targeted assassinations aimed at the Tatmadaw and its supporters in major cities as well as in the countryside. In one major clash in the eastern Kayah State in late May, the Tatmadaw called in substantial close air support from armed uninhabited aerial vehicles (UAVs), attack helicopters and fixedwing aircraft after sustaining substantial casualties. Meanwhile, the ramifications of the military takeover – a substantial economic contraction (owing to the pandemic as well as the coup) and a renewed focus on internal security and counter-insurgency – called into question the future of the Tatmadaw’s efforts to enhance conventional military capabilities, particularly in the naval sphere. At the time of the coup, Myanmar’s navy had been amidst a major expansion programme aimed at enhancing its surface and subsurface combat capabilities: satellite imagery

in December 2020 had revealed domestic construction of a new frigate-sized vessel probably possessing a vertical launch system for air-defence missiles, as well as the second of a new class of offshore patrol vessels. The navy’s capability improvement efforts were evident when the service commissioned its first submarine (a refurbished former Indian Navy Sindhughosh-class (Kilo) boat) in December 2020, and again in February 2021 when a task force comprising the LPD Moattama, a frigate and an auxiliary vessel repatriated 1,000 illegal immigrants from Malaysia back to Myanmar.

India’s expanding defence horizons

Clashes on India’s disputed Himalayan border with China in 2019–20 accentuated perceptions in New Delhi of a growing threat from China. Despite the two sides announcing in February 2021 their agreement to a simultaneous but limited military disengagement in

The Quad The Quadrilateral Security Dialogue, or ‘Quad’, is a forum for promoting intergovernmental security cooperation between Australia, India, Japan and the United States. It is not an alliance or dedicated defence grouping and has no formal agenda or meeting schedule. The Quad has recently begun moving into wider policy areas than defence, including pandemic mitigation, cyber and climate change. Originally established in 2007, it was abruptly discontinued in 2008 under diplomatic pressure from China, which branded it as ‘containment’. The decision to revive the Quad, in 2017, and to elevate its meetings to summit-level in 2021 (virtually in March and in-person in September), signifies a closer alignment of its members’ threat perceptions towards China and a shared, though not necessarily equal, desire to cross-brace defence and security ties among key US allies and partners in the IndoPacific. While it remains an informal arrangement, the Quad can optimally be conceived of as introducing an additional layer to buttress the bilateral (US-centred) and multilateral (ASEAN-centred) security architecture in the Indo-Pacific, in recognition that the regional balance of power has shifted in China’s favour and requires an adjustment. Its future development is contingent in large part on China’s external behaviour: if Beijing pushes more aggressively, the Quad’s drawstrings are likely to tighten further. At a minimum, the Quad provides a channel for information-sharing, coordination and deconfliction among its members. More ambitiously, it has the potential to serve as the foundation of a countervailing coalition, including in the military domain.

The Quad is symbolically associated with the annual Malabar naval exercises, which were reconstituted in quadripartite format in 2020 following a long hiatus triggered by Australia’s decision to withdraw from the drills in 2008 because of concerns about retaliation by China. Arguably of greater significance are the various bilateral agreements on logistics, visiting forces and informationsharing between its members. These could do much to smooth inter-operability and coordinated military activities under crisis or wartime conditions, as well as during military exercises in peacetime. A wide range of bilateral and trilateral defence cooperative arrangements and exercises were already in place before the Quad was revived, especially between the US and its treaty allies Australia and Japan. Canberra and Tokyo concluded an Acquisition and Cross Servicing Agreement (ACSA) in 2013, which was upgraded in 2017, but have yet to finalise a bilateral visiting forces agreement which has been long under negotiation. India’s willingness to strengthen its Quad military connections is more open to question given its history of non-alignment. None of India’s Quad partners has a visiting forces agreement with it, but all have ACSAs or other logisticssupport arrangements, which have been concluded at a conspicuously quickening pace. A Basic Exchange and Cooperation Agreement for Geo-Spatial Cooperation was signed between New Delhi and Washington in late 2020, marking the last of four key bilateral defence agreements now in place. Japan and India concluded an ACSA in 2020, the same year that Australia and India negotiated a Mutual Logistics Support Arrangement.

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Australia steps up

Following the publication of the Defence Strategic Update and 2020 Force Structure Plan in July 2020, efforts to upgrade the Australian Defence Force’s capabilities continued apace, largely in response to Canberra’s perception of a rising threat from China. Important developments included the announcement in May of the Australian defence department’s intent to inaugurate in early 2022 a dedicated tri-service Space Division, led by the air force and tasked with the management, acquisition and operation of relevant capabilities. In March, the government announced plans for Australia to establish a ‘sovereign guided weapons enterprise’ that would allow the country to manufacture its own missiles, and subsequently set

AUKUS: the Indo-Pacific’s new regional security grouping Announced on 15 September in a joint statement by the leaders of Australia, the UK and the US (which are already connected as allies through the UKUSA or ‘Five Eyes’ intelligence-sharing treaty, as well as through NATO in the case of the UK and US, and by ANZUS in the case of Australia and the US), AUKUS is a major new regional security development. Although it is not a treaty alliance, its establishment potentially has significant ramifications for the Indo-Pacific distribution of power. The new arrangement between the three longstanding partners is intended to provide a trilateral intergovernmental context for wider activities, summarised in the three leaders’ statement as a ‘diplomatic, security, and defense cooperation in the Indo-Pacific region’ including ‘deeper information and technology sharing’ and ‘deeper integration of security and defense-related science, technology, industrial bases, and supply chains’, with particular cooperation ‘on a range of security and defense capabilities’. In the first instance, AUKUS will support Australia’s acquisition of nuclear-powered attack submarines. However, it is possible that the new arrangement may also facilitate the expanded use of Australian facilities by UK and US forces.

up the Australian Missile Corporation to facilitate cooperation between industrial partners and other potential stakeholders. In a related development, in August Australia formalised its cooperation with the US Precision Strike Missile programme, potentially to fulfil the requirement for an Australian Army long-range precision strike capability. In July, the revelation that Australia would explore options for developing a ground-based EW capability intended to prevent attempts to interfere with or attack its use of space underlined Canberra’s acute interest in the domain. Australia also continued to enhance its amphibious warfare capabilities. These efforts broadly paralleled Japan’s, in Australia’s case building towards the capacity to deploy up to a 1,500strong Amphibious Ready Group. In June, Exercise Sea Explorer saw troops practise amphibious landings in northern Queensland from the LHD Canberra and LSD Choules, with air support from embarked army CH-47F, NH90 and Tiger helicopters. Australia’s single most important defence procurement programme faced major challenges, but Canberra resolved these decisively. In March,

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one of the four areas where their forces continued to confront each other, India continued to plan stronger defences along its northern border. India also continued a major effort to strengthen its maritime forces. Having commissioned the third from a batch of six locally built Kalvari-class (Scorpène) dieselelectric attack submarines in March, in July India’s Defence Acquisition Council authorised a request for proposals for the local construction of a further six submarines, potentially of a different design. These would support the Indian Navy’s long-term plan to operate 18 conventionally powered as well as six nuclear-powered boats. During August, India’s first locally built aircraft carrier – the future INS Vikrant – began sea trials. It is scheduled to enter service in 2022, six years later than originally expected. In May, the US government approved the sale of an additional six P-8I maritime patrol aircraft to India, opening the way for a likely order from New Delhi. Such defence equipment transfers formed an important element of India’s burgeoning bilateral security relations, in light of New Delhi’s drive to improve its military capabilities and Washington’s intent to enhance the interoperability of Indian and US forces. That said, India has largely been unable to realise the technology transfers and joint ventures promised in the 2012 India–US Defence Technology and Trade Initiative, which cast a cloud over the future of US military sales to the country. Another potential obstacle was the prospect of the US imposing sanctions on India if New Delhi proceeded with a planned purchase of S-400 (SA-21 Growler) air-defence systems from Russia, an issue raised by US Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin when he met Indian Defence Minister Rajnath Singh in New Delhi in March.

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Canberra set a September deadline for France’s Naval Group to submit acceptable revised costings for the next part of the design phase of the Future Submarine Program, which involved building 12 Attack-class boats. However, by mid-2021 the Australian Navy was examining other possible solutions amid questions about the viability of the Attack-class (not due to start entering service until the mid-2030s) and about the risks associated with the proposed life-extension programme that would see the navy’s current six Collins-class submarines rebuilt from 2026 onwards to provide an interim improved capability. In mid-September, the leaders of Australia, the United Kingdom and the US issued a joint statement announcing they were establishing ‘an enhanced trilateral partnership’ called AUKUS, the first initiative of which would be ‘to support Australia in acquiring nuclear-powered submarines’ using UK and US expertise. Simultaneously, Australia cancelled its submarine agreement with France. Nuclear-powered attack submarines, perhaps equipped with land-attack missiles, promised a significant capability boost, though for the time being it was unclear whether Australia’s new boats would be based on the UK Astute-class, the US Virginia-class

or on a future design. However, the three AUKUS governments immediately started ‘a trilateral effort of 18 months to seek an optimal pathway’ to Australia’s new submarine capability. Within days, Australia also announced orders for US-made Tomahawk land-attack cruise missiles to equip its Hobart-class destroyers and AGM-158B JASSM-ER air-launched cruise missiles for its air force, further highlighting Canberra’s emphasis on developing offensive capabilities in the face of what was perceived to be a deteriorating regional security environment.

Korean Peninsula developments

Against the backdrop of deadlocked denuclearisation talks with the US, North Korea continued programmes to develop missiles and nuclear weapons. In October 2020, a military parade displayed what Pyongyang claimed to be a new intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) – possibly with the designation Hwasong-17 – which was notably larger than earlier long-range missiles and may be capable of carrying multiple warheads. The Pukguksong-4, which could be a new and possibly longer-range version of the Pukguksong-3 submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM), was displayed in the same parade. In January 2021, a

North Korea: ballistic missile test launches, 2021 North Korea conducted six ballistic missile test-launches in 2021, all at relatively short ranges of up to 800 km. The tests all highlighted apparent efforts to develop systems that would be potentially less vulnerable than existing systems to ‘left-of-launch’ attack, or to missile defences. Measures included greater mobility and/or presenting a more challenging intercept environment by employing quasi-ballistic trajectories (in the KN-23 short-range ballistic missile (SRBM) series). Pyongyang also claimed an initial test of a hypersonic glide vehicle (HGV).

In addition to a rail-mobile KN-23 SRBM, North Korea also launched an apparently modified KN-23 from a submarine – a contrast to the Pukguksong series of larger medium-range submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBM) also under development. Beyond ballistic missiles, in September 2021 North Korea also conducted tests of what Pyongyang claimed was a land-attack cruise missile with a range of 1,500km, demonstrating further diversification of its potential delivery systems.

Table 9 North Korea: ballistic missile test launches, 2021 Date (local)

Type

19 Oct

Alt

Distance

Assessed Outcome

Comments

KN-23 (mod 2) SLBM / SRBM

60 km

590 km*

Successful

Apparent KN-23 modified for submarine-launch

28 Sep

Hwasong-8 with HGV

Unconfirmed

60 km

200 km

Unconfirmed Claimed HGV with sealed liquid-fuel booster

15 Sep

KN-23

SRBM

60 km

800 km*

Successful

KN-23

SRBM

60 km

800 km*

Successful

KN-23 (mod 1) SRBM

50 km

600 km*

Successful

21 Mar

Classification

KN-23 (mod 1) SRBM *Reportedly flew a quasi-ballistic trajectory with ‘pull-up’ manoeuvre

Successful

Rail-mobile KN-23 Modified KN-23 with claimed 2.5t warhead

Asia 229

DEFENCE ECONOMICS Macroeconomics

Economic expansion was a key factor permitting increased military spending in Asia in recent decades, and the global economic slowdown caused by the coronavirus pandemic has posed perhaps the biggest

Thailand, 1.5% Indonesia, 1.7% Singapore, 2.4%

Other Southeast Asia, 4.1%

Other Australasia, 0.7% Australia, 7.0% Other South Asia 1.6% Pakistan, 2.1% China 42.5%

India, 13.3%

Taiwan, 3.3% South Korea, 9.6%

Japan, 10.1%

Note: analysis excludes North Korea and Laos due to insufficient data.

▲ Figure 13 Asia: defence spending by country and sub-region, 2021 Asia

new missile, the Pukguksong-5, was displayed at a parade and in late March, after reportedly testing two cruise missiles, North Korea resumed ballistic missile tests following a year-long hiatus, launching two short-range ballistic missiles (SRBMs), each of which travelled approximately 600 km. In April, South Korea’s joint chiefs of staff said they were closely monitoring activity at the North’s Sinpo shipyard, amid speculation that Pyongyang might shortly launch a new submarine, test a new SLBM, or both. In August, an International Atomic Energy Agency report revealed ‘deeply troubling’ signs that Pyongyang had restarted a reactor at its Yongbyon nuclear complex during the previous month. Amid these ominous signs, South Korea’s Moon administration maintained its emphasis on the desirability of dialogue with Pyongyang, but simultaneously continued to strengthen its military deterrence. In May, following a summit between President Moon Jae-in and Biden, the US agreed to end ‘missile guidelines’ that, among other things, had prevented Seoul from acquiring or developing ballistic missiles with ranges longer than 800 km. Launching its 2022–26 Mid-Term Defense Plan in September, Seoul’s defence ministry said that it would develop new surfaceto-surface missiles with ‘significantly enhanced destructive power’. This suggested that a reported missile able to deliver a three-ton conventional warhead to North Korean targets, such as underground missile facilities, might be fully-tested and operational by 2026. The defence ministry also said that it would reinforce surveillance capabilities with extra radars and ‘sharply increase’ its deployment of interceptor missiles to protect South Korea against a North Korean missile attack; it would also expand its space-related activities. Enhanced naval capabilities would include additional Chang Bogo III submarines. These will be larger than the Chang Bogo III Batch I boats that were commissioned in 2021, and like the Batch I vessels could carry SLBMs. In September it was reported that Seoul had test-launched, from a Chang Bogo III submarine, an SLBM based on the Hyunmoo-2B ballistic missile.

obstacle to further defence budget growth since the Asian financial crisis of the late 1990s. Regional real GDP contracted by 1.5% in 2020 according to the International Monetary Fund (IMF). This was a strong performance when compared to the global drop of 3.1%, but masks a divergence in economic performance across the region. Buoyed by a 2.3% rise in real GDP growth in China, the region’s emerging economies only contracted by 0.9% in 2020 compared to the 2.9% and 8.9% reduction in the region’s advanced economies (e.g., Australia, Japan, South Korea) and Pacific Island states respectively. Similarly, there have been variable economic recoveries, with emerging regional economies rebounding by 8.5% in 2021, faster than in any other region in the world. While the growth rate for the region’s advanced economies is lower – 3.8% in 2021 – it is sufficient to ensure that the region’s economy ends 2021 larger than it was before the pandemic began. Nevertheless, sporadic outbreaks of the virus and the emergence of new, more infectious variants have highlighted the fragility of the recovery and the speed at which conditions can shift. New lockdowns were imposed in Australia in August 2021 while regional air travel – a useful proxy for wider economic restrictions – declined steadily between April and September 2021. Furthermore, aggregates do not tell the full story, and economic and fiscal conditions have varied significantly from country to country. According to

[1] Map illustrating 2021 planned defence-spending levels (in USD at market exchange rates), as well as the annual real percentage change in planned defence spending between 2020 and 2021 (at constant 2015 prices and exchange rates). Percentage changes in defence spending can vary considerably from year to year, as states revise the level of funding allocated to defence. Changes indicated here highlight the short-term trend in planned defence spending between 2020 and 2021. Actual spending changes prior to 2020, and projected spending levels post-2021, are not reflected.

230 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2022 Mongolia Afghanistan Pakistan

Japan

South t Korea e

China Nepal e a Bhutan Laos

India

Taiwan

Myanmar My Vietnam

Thailand hailan

Bangladesh

Real % Change (2020–21) Between 10% and 20% increase Between 3% and 10% increase Between 0% and 3% increase Between 0% and 3% decrease Between 3% and 10% decrease Between 10% and 20% decrease Insufficient data © IISS

Philippines Cambodia

Brunei

Malaysia

Sri Lanka Singapore

Indonesia Papua New Guinea Timor-Leste 2021 Defence Spending (USD bn) Estimate

207.34 65.08 49.25 46.65

Fiji Australia

34.31 20 10 5 2 1 .25 .05

New Zealand

▲ Map 4 Asia: regional defence spending1 IMF figures, GDP in certain regional economies such as Japan, the Philippines, Singapore and Thailand is expected to be lower at the end of 2021 than it was before the pandemic and, while growth continued in other countries such as India, Indonesia and Korea, it slowed over the past 24 months. Only Bangladesh, China, Taiwan and Vietnam have seen robust economic activity continue throughout the crisis, with real GDP growth of between 4% and 8%. The knock-on fiscal effects of the crisis have had an equally profound impact on the region, as governments across Asia have been forced to reassess their spending priorities. In the face of burgeoning budget deficits, austerity has so far been eschewed by most governments, and resources have been

redirected towards alternative policy areas. Spending on healthcare and economic stimulus have become priorities as regional states have sought to minimise both the human and the economic consequences of the pandemic. The trend was perhaps most pronounced in South Asia where India announced a 137% increase in expenditure on ‘health and wellbeing’ in February – long before the pandemic reached its peak in the country – as the government looked to rapidly expand access to healthcare. In Pakistan, spending on ‘health affairs and services’ rose from PKR12.0 billion (USD87.2 million) under the pre-pandemic 2019–20 budget to PKR28.4bn (USD179m) for fiscal year 2021–22.

3.0 2.5

2.36 2.14

2.09

2.14

2017

2018

2019

2.25

2.11

% of GDP

2.0 1.5 1.0 0.5 0.0

2016

2020

2021

▲ Figure 14 Asia: regional defence spending as % of GDP (average)

Defence spending

Despite this constrained fiscal backdrop, Asian defence budgets have proved resilient, with little evidence to suggest the pandemic has derailed planned investments in the defence sector. Regional defence spending growth slowed from 5.3% in 2019 to 3.4% in 2020, but crucially only a handful of countries implemented cuts, with others choosing to rein in spending plans instead. Indeed, defence budget increases were maintained in 2021, with real growth reaching 2.8%. This is still far below the average 4.9% rate of growth seen between 2008 and 2018 but is an indication of the resilience of defence spending to wider economic pressures. Total regional spending came to USD488bn in 2021, more than double the 2008 total of USD226bn.

With a defence budget of USD207bn (including local militia funding), China accounted for 43% of total regional spending in 2021. As such, Chinese movements dominate regional trends, but growth in other important markets also influences the overall market. China’s 2021 defence budget is more than double the 2011 budget in nominal terms. Cheaper production in China makes it useful to consider the value of the budget using purchasing power parity (PPP) conversion rates. Using this rate rather than the market exchange rate brings China’s 2021 defence budget closer to USD332bn. Australia has continued to increase spending in line with the 2016 Defence White Paper and 2020 Defence Strategic Update. The 2021 budget of AUD45.5bn (USD34.3bn) means that Australian defence spending has increased by 26.3% since 2015. The most recent budget also met the equally ambitious target of increasing investment spending from 29% of the budget to 35% by 2021/22, ensuring that the boost to equipment spending announced five years ago materialises as planned. Japan approved a 0.5% nominal increase in its 2021 defence budget, broadly in line with trends over the last decade. More significantly, the new budget increased spending on equipment acquisition by 7.5% to USD8.6bn, representing a new record high with the share of the budget dedicated to procurement reaching its highest level since 2007. Given the challenging economic and fiscal environment in Japan, the rebalancing of existing resources has been important for the modernisation and expansion of the Japan Self Defense Force’s capabilities. To this end, the Ministry of Defense has also continued attempts to streamline

▼ Figure 15 China: defence budget compared with the rest of Asia (total), 2008–21, USDbn, constant 2015 300

20 15

200

150 5

100

50 0

2008

2009

2010

2011

2012

2013

2014

2015

2016

2017

2018

2019

2020

China defence budget

Rest of Asia total

China defence budget (% change yoy)

Rest of Asia total (% change yoy)

2021

% change year on year

USDbn (constant, 2015)

250

-5

Asia

Asia 231

232 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2022

4.3%

300 200

2.9%

2.8% Asia defencespending growth

4 2

1.0%

100

-2

-100 -200

-5.3% South Asia

East Asia 2020

Southeast Asia 2021

Australasia

-4

Real-terms growth (%)

USDbn (constant, 2015)

400

-6

Real-terms growth

▲ Figure 16 Asia: sub-regional real-terms defence-spending growth, 2020–21 (USDbn, constant 2015) procurement and contracting processes and to foster competition among local suppliers to create a more efficient environment for equipment acquisition. In Taiwan, where the pandemic’s impact has been muted compared to that in many Asian countries, defence spending increased at its fastest rate for a decade in 2021 as funding for the country’s new F-16 purchase ramped up significantly. In 2020, Taipei approved a special TWD247bn (USD7.99bn) budget for the purchase of 66 F-16V combat aircraft, with 2021’s allocation rising from TWD5bn (USD17.9m) to TWD29bn (USD1.03bn). As a result, total defence spending increased by 7.7% to TWD391bn (USD14.0bn). With the Ministry of National Defence’s (MND’s) core budget remaining largely static, an important development in Taiwan has been the return of special budgets to finance major defence procurement projects. In the 1990s and early 2000s this extra-budgetary financing represented a crucial element of Taiwan’s defence spending. However, fiscal constraints and the reluctance of foreign suppliers to approve transfers of military equipment to Taiwan saw such funding largely discontinued. Budget plans for 2022 show the special budget increasing further to TWD40.1bn (USD1.49bn) which will further expand the MND budget. In India, where the pandemic exacerbated existing fiscal constraints, the government has sought to protect modernisation spending. While the defence budget as a whole for 2021–22 saw a marginal cut compared to the previous year, its capital component increased by 18.8% compared to the initial 2020–21 budget – the highest rate of growth for a decade and well above the average 6.8% increase seen over the last ten years. Given the Indian government’s tendency to reduce the capital budget at times of fiscal stress, the

move may mark a recognition that modernisation has been delayed too long – particularly in light of border skirmishes with China in 2020. New Delhi’s approval of a long-delayed USD2.54bn purchase of 56 Airbus C295MW medium transport aircraft in September, some six years after the aircraft was selected, further supports this potential shift in stance. While Indonesia moved to cut its 2021 defence budget from IDR137 trillion (USD9.58bn) to IDR120tr (USD8.39bn) during the course of the fiscal year – a reduction of some 12% – draft legislation proposed by the presidential office in May simultaneously outlined planned investments of almost USD125bn on military modernisation over the next 25 years, including USD79bn on the acquisition of new equipment, to be financed largely through foreign loans. If approved and fully implemented, the plan would ostensibly see an average of USD3.2bn spent on procurement each year over the course of the programme, compared to around USD1.8bn over the last decade.

Defence industry

While security concerns undoubtedly influence some of the region’s military modernisation drives, trends over the past year also suggest that military spending is being protected as states look to utilise their defence budgets as a means of investing in national economic development. Regional states are seeking to increase national self-sufficiency in defence production and focus more defence investment spending on domestic firms. There is nothing inherently new in this, but an increased focus on providing economic stimuli in the wake of the pandemic has seen governments look to increase their efforts in this area. In August, South Korea announced measures designed to incentivise the use of local suppliers,

with the Ministry of Trade, Industry and Energy announcing that foreign-manufactured equipment will become up to 1.5 times more expensive than similar locally produced products. Furthermore, under the new proposals, in instances where foreign imports are deemed necessary, overseas suppliers will be required to partner with local firms. Ultimately, Seoul’s objective is to ensure that by 2026, 80% of the country’s military modernisation budget – some USD14.4bn in 2021 – is spent within the domestic defence sector compared to around 65% at present. Industrial policy measures like these have become so central to wider defence strategy in Asia that measures to develop the local defence sector are now routinely included in wider defence and security policy papers. A cornerstone of Taiwan’s 2021 Quadrennial Defense Review is technological selfreliance, both in terms of providing direct financial support through increased investment in research and development (R&D), and through using offset requirements linked to defence procurement deals to enhance the capabilities of local suppliers. Similarly, Japan’s 2021 defence white paper emphasised the need to increase local capacity in relation to the development of advanced military technologies. To this end, in fiscal year 2021, a Future Capabilities Development Centre and a Technology Collaboration Support Division were set up within the Ministry of Defense’s Acquisition, Technology & Logistics Agency in order to prioritise and coordinate efforts in this area. Similar measures are also being pursued in countries with less developed defence sectors. The economic and budgetary challenges posed by the pandemic prompted Malaysia’s Technology Depository Agency to initiate a series of measures linked to procurement in strategic sectors (including defence) in order to support the economy. The new initiatives will reinforce existing policies designed to ensure that foreign military suppliers work closely with domestic companies in order to enhance the capabilities of the local defence sector and to engage with the country’s wider Economic Enhancement Programme. Similar measures to expand existing industrial collaboration policies are also under review in Indonesia, with the aim of increasing domestic content in major defence projects. In Vietnam, where local defence-industrial capabilities remain relatively limited, the General Department of Defence Industry within the MND announced plans to reform the country’s primarily

state-owned defence sector. The new plan, covering 2021–30, aims to leverage dual-use technologies in key sectors like telecommunications to drive development of the local defence sector. Ultimately, the government hopes that the new strategy will enhance self-sufficiency, increase employment, enable increased defence exports and support wider economic development in the high-tech sector. From the perspective of defence exporters, the key challenge created by the coronavirus pandemic therefore is not that there is a lack of funding for defence investment in the short term, but rather that it has sharpened focus on the role of local suppliers and local industrial development. The requirement for such measures will inevitability increase the complexity of operating in what is likely to remain a high-growth market for defence exports, but holds the promise of ultimately increasing regional selfsufficiency and lowering dependence upon foreign suppliers. However, much depends on the ability of regional defence R&D organisations to keep pace with defence equipment requirements both regionally and perhaps also globally. Nonetheless, in the longer term, the industrial policy measures that are being implemented across the region are likely to accelerate Asia’s shift from being predominantly an importer of defence equipment to being a net exporter.

CHINA China’s Communist Party marked its centenary in July 2021 with a lavish celebration in Beijing and a fly-past of military helicopters and the air force’s latest combat aircraft. The Chinese government had previously set out its intent for the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) to achieve basic mechanisation and make progress towards informatisation by 2020 and by 2035, to ‘basically achieve’ defence and armed forces modernisation. The communiqué issued at the Chinese Communist Party’s Fifth Plenum, in October 2020, continued calls to ‘accelerate mechanisation, informationisation and intelligent integration’. Mechanisation is generally held to refer to ambitions to replace legacy equipment; informationisation to efforts at improving technical sophistication (likened by the Pentagon to ‘net-centric’ capability); while intelligent integration likely refers to the premise that military systems will be improved by the integration of automation, big data and artificial intelligence. Statements have indicated that the 2020 goal has not yet been fully realised, but Beijing is nonetheless

Asia

Asia 233

234 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2022

pushing ahead with the 2035 target. This was reinforced by the release in early 2021 of the 14th Five Year Plan (FYP), which laid out the broad 2035 goal of creating a ‘peaceful and secure China’, but also indicated that defence modernisation would be accelerated. It again mentioned the plan to build a modernised army by 2027 (the centenary of the founding of the PLA’s antecedent) but provided little detail as to how these goals were to be achieved over the next 15 years, or of any shorter-term goals. However, the 2027 objective effectively adds a midway point for military modernisation in the run-up to the 2035 goal and does not replace the timeline set out by President Xi Jinping at the 19th Party Congress in 2017.

Introducing new laws and amending others

This year began with the passing of two new defencerelated laws. On 22 January, the Standing Committee of China’s National People’s Congress passed the China Coast Guard Law. Though the law is new, the China Coast Guard (CCG) was earlier brought into the Central Military Commission’s chain of command. Importantly, Article 83 stipulates that the CCG will ‘carry out defense operations and other missions in accordance with the National Defense Law of the People’s Republic of China, the Armed Police Law of the People’s Republic of China … and other relevant laws, military regulations and orders from the Central Military Commission’. Article 20 authorises the CCG to order or force the suspension or demolition of illegal activities by foreign organisations and individuals, including installing facilities, buildings or fixed or floating devices in the sea areas, islands and reefs under Chinese jurisdiction. Article 17 allows the CCG to expel any ship it encounters within its territorial seas and ‘internal maritime area’ (a term that is probably intentionally vague) through detention, forced removal or forced towing. Meanwhile, Article 25 provides it with the authority to create temporary exclusion zones as needed to stop vessels or personnel from entering. Articles 22, 47 and 48 provide the CCG with the specific authority to use force. The former stipulates that ‘when national sovereignty, sovereign rights, and jurisdiction are being illegally infringed by foreign organizations and individuals at sea or are facing an imminent danger of illegal infringement, the CCG has the right to take measures including: use all necessary measures including weapons to stop the infringement and eliminate danger’. Articles 47 and 48 specify the circumstances under which the CCG

can use personal weapons, or weapons mounted on ships or carried by an aircraft. Under this law, the CCG is allowed to use weapons mounted on ships in circumstances where CCG forces perform maritime anti-terrorism missions, deal with serious incidents of violence at sea, or face attack by weapons or other ‘dangerous methods’ – though the latter is not defined. Earlier, amendments to China’s National Defense Law were rubber-stamped by the National People’s Congress in late December 2020; these were the first amendments since the last revision in 2009, which predated Xi’s rise to power. In explanatory notes submitted to the 22nd Meeting of the Standing Committee of the 13th National People’s Congress on 13 October 2020, the amendments were justified due to the fact that the existing defence law at that time did not ‘fully adapt to the new tasks and requirements of building national defence and the army’ in light of developments and changes in global security as well as in China, the Party and the military. The most significant change is to the National Defense Law’s Article 50. In the latest version, the Central Military Commission is listed as being in charge of war powers and defence mobilisation, whereas previously the State Council and Central Military Commission jointly led mobilisation preparation and implementation. While Premier Li Keqiang remains the chairman of the State National Defense Mobilisation Commission, the State Council is in fact an implementation rather than a defence-related decision-making agency. Xi, as the chairman of the Central Military Commission, now fully holds the reins over the PLA. Another change to the National Defense Law is evident in Chapter 3, Article 2, wherein greater emphasis is now placed on the use of force to protect China’s core interests, including for the purposes of ‘separatism’ and ‘development interests’, which were absent from earlier versions.

Training and exercises

The scale and nature of the PLA’s training and exercises have been closely studied in recent years for signs that they are being used to more directly improve military capability, such as through increased realism and interoperability. At the same time, they can be used for other purposes, such as political signalling. Like other armed forces, the pandemic had an effect in restricting some drills in 2020, but the PLA returned to active training and exercise activity into 2021. From January to November 2021, the PLA conducted 230

Asia 235

▼ Figure 17 People’s Liberation Army (PLA) incursions into Taiwan’s Air Defence Identification Zone Between January and November 2021, the PLA increased the scale and number of air incursions into Taiwan’s Air Defence Identification Zone (ADIZ), conducting 230 incursions involving 886 aircraft of various types. Just under half involved just one type of aircraft, either flying solo or accompanied by other aircraft of the same type. The remainder involved multiple flights by special-mission aircraft, H-6 bombers and combat aircraft, including Su-30s, J-16s, J-11s, J-10s and JH-7s. Most of the aircraft have been fixed-wing types belonging to the PLA Air Force (PLAAF) and PLA Navy Aviation (PLANAF), but in August and November 2021 three separate incursions included WZ-10 attack helicopters (accompanied by a Mi-17 multi-role helicopter) and Z-8 heavy transport helicopters from the PLA Army. Most flights in 2021 were conducted during the day, but there were also night-flights. The flight paths have tended to follow a similar pattern, entering from the west and routing

eastwards between Pratas Island and the southernmost point of Taiwan, though some sorties Sea have a longer route, of followed Japan around the southern tip of the island (Eastand Sea)northward along Taiwan’s southeastern coast. The PLA likely uses these flights to train in areas of current weakness, such as anti-submarine warfare, and also to learn about Taiwan’s responses. Frequent scrambles in JAPAN response to PLA incursions have placed a heavy financial and maintenance burden on Taiwan’s armed forces. Most sorties have avoided the politically sensitive Taiwan Strait Median Line but the incursions have also peaked around politically Tsushima Strait political messages to Taiwan and sensitive dates, signalling the US, as well as Chinese audiences. The largest incursion to date occurred on 4 October 2021, between the national days marked by Beijing and Taipei, when the PLA few 56 aircraft on a single day in two sorties.

Asia

East China Sea

Senkaku/ Diaoyu islands

CHINA

Taiwan Strait Hong Kong

Taipei

General trends of flight paths used by the PLAAF and PLANAF in 2021

TAIWAN

Median line VIETNAM

Taiwan’s ADIZ Pratas Island

LAOS Hainan Sanya

South China Sea

PHILIPPINES

Luzon Strait Bashi Channel

Philippine Sea

PLA incursions into Taiwan’s ADIZ: January–November 2021

Number of incursions

100

Week starting

4 11 18 25 1 8 15 22 1 8 15 22 29 5 12 19 26 3 10 17 24 31 7 14 21 28 5 12 19 26 2 9 16 23 30 6 13 20 27 4 11 18 25 1 8 15 22 29 January February March April May June July August September October November H-6 bbr/tkr ac KJ-500 AEW&C ac Z-8 tpt hel

H-6K bbr ac Su-30MK2 FGA ac Z-9 ASW hel

J-10 FGA ac KQ-200 ASW ac Mi-17 MRH hel

J-11 FGA ac Y-8DZ ELINT ac WZ-10 atk hel

J-16 FGA ac Y-8G EW ac Y-8T C2 ac

J-7 ftr ac Y-9JZ ELINT ac Y-20U tkr/tpt ac

JH-7 atk ac Y-9G EW ac Y-8

236 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2022

incursions into Taiwan’s Air Defence Identification Zone, carried out by 886 PLA aircraft of various types. Although these flights included fighters and bombers, most also included special mission aircraft, particularly KQ-200 ASW aircraft and, in September 2021, ASW helicopters. In official ‘reflections’, it appears that the PLA recognises that ASW remains a significant area of weakness. Moreover, it is likely that these exercises – which Beijing now calls ‘routine’ – are not only intended to develop PLA capability, but also to signal displeasure politically to Taiwan and countries friendly to it. Responding to these sorties has come at high financial and equipment cost to Taiwan’s armed forces, while it has also had the effect of normalising flights (sometimes at high tempo) by PLA aircraft around Taiwan. In addition to incursions around Taiwan, the PLA has continued both single-service and multi-service drills across theatre commands, with a focus on joint operations. In 2021, particular attention was paid to exercises that practised skills related to naval warfare and amphibious assault, such as a month-long series of exercises in the South China Sea in March. However, there seems to be closer attention to informationsecurity relating to the public discussion of exercises and military matters more broadly. For instance, while large-scale annual exercises, such as Stride, are still held, they feature less prominently in Chinese media coverage than in previous years. Moreover, there is less frequent reporting of the outcomes and analysis of such exercises by PLA leaders. In addition to a shift in official media reporting, a number of Chinese ‘PLA-watcher’ social media accounts have been censored.

PLA Rocket Force

In mid-2021, open-source satellite imagery showed several large ICBM silo fields under construction in northwestern China, focusing attention on the scale and pace of Beijing’s nuclear force expansion and modernisation. When complete, these fields could (if fully filled) accommodate hundreds of ICBMs and bring the number of China’s operationally deployed land-based strategic nuclear launchers much closer to parity with those of Russia and the US. Although the People’s Liberation Army Rocket Force (PLARF) was previously understood to be modernising the small number of silos it currently maintains for its liquid-fuelled DF-5 (CH-SS-4) ICBM systems and testing a silo-launched version of its solid-fuelled DF-41 (CH-SS-20) ICBM design, the

scale of this new construction effort surprised many international observers. (The DF-41 itself entered operational service with the PLARF in 2020, although the configuration paraded in 2019 suggests that this is more likely to have been a road-mobile, rather than silo-based, version.) This potential large-scale expansion in ICBMlauncher numbers comes at a time when concern is rising about the potential for China to exploit its civil nuclear sector as a source of fissile material to support an expanding nuclear arsenal. The two fast neutron reactors currently under construction, as well as a new reprocessing plant, could potentially allow the PLA to recover large amounts of weaponsgrade plutonium should it wish. The Pentagon’s 2021 ‘China military power’ report estimated that this expansion could enable the PLA to have at least 1,000 new nuclear warheads by 2030. It is possible, as some analysts have suggested, that the PLA does not intend to fill all of the silos it has under construction, and instead may only occupy a small percentage of the sites (a strategy colloquially known as a ‘shell game’). This approach could still leverage uncertainty over the precise number and location of deployed missiles within the fields to significantly increase targeting complications for adversaries, but with a much smaller outlay of force. Beijing itself has not yet publicly offered an official explanation of the silo-field imagery and maintains that its nuclear-power programme is solely for civilian use. Nonetheless, the combination of the two developments has renewed concerns in some quarters about China’s nuclear ambitions, and there have been questions raised over whether they may indicate a change in China’s previously avowed policies of nuclear no first use and a minimum credible deterrent. In addition to force structure and fissile material, the technical capabilities of Chinese strategic nuclear delivery systems have begun to receive greater public scrutiny. The US alleged that hypersonic boost glide vehicle tests during 2021 had included placing a glide vehicle into a low Earth orbit and then de-orbiting the vehicle into the upper atmosphere where it flew to the target area. Such a development, should it be introduced into service, would complicate the task for defensive forces in that identifying the intended target and the trajectory of the threat system would be more challenging than for a ballistic missile, given the flight characteristics of a glide vehicle. Media reporting suggested that one such delivery system,

utilising a hypersonic glide vehicle (HGV), had been tested in July 2021. Beijing, however, maintained that this was a misidentification of an earlier reusable ‘space vehicle’ mission. As well as the DF-41, the DF-17 medium-range ballistic missile/HGV combination (CH-SS-22) is also believed to have begun operational fielding now with the PLARF’s 61 Base opposite Taiwan. Some reports suggest that the reported test of a ‘new type missile’ by the Shangrao-based 613 Brigade in summer 2021 was DF-17 related. The 613 Brigade retains the historical honorific of China’s first conventional missile brigade; this honorific was associated with the DF-17 at the 2019 parade. By contrast, however, the precise service status of the other new conventional system displayed at that parade, the CJ-100 cruise missile (CH-SSC-X-13), remains unclear.

PLA Army

In early 2021, after a year’s delay as a result of the coronavirus pandemic, the PLA switched its induction of conscript personnel from a single annual intake in August to two smaller intakes in March and September. The PLA generally, and the PLA Army (PLAA) specifically, remain dependent on conscript personnel – estimates suggest that conscripts, each serving a two-year term of enlistment, currently comprise approximately one-third of all active-duty PLA personnel. Under the previous recruitment system, conscript-heavy units and departments across the force effectively experienced a cyclical growth and reduction in unit strength and readiness every year, peaking in late summer before dropping off as conscripts completing their second year of service were demobilised. The revised process is intended to mitigate this somewhat by splitting mobilisation and demobilisation across two windows. This will allow the PLA to retain units at high levels of training and readiness across larger parts of the year, resulting in greater operational flexibility. The army began re-equipping multiple combined arms regiments in the Xinjiang military region in late 2020/early 2021 with modern light and medium armoured vehicles, including the ZBL-08 IFV family and ZTQ-15 light tanks. At the same time, the region’s artillery regiments began receiving new PCL-181 155-millimetre truck-mounted artillery. Xinjiang has long been a relative backwater in terms of army equipment modernisation, and this focused effort probably reflects both the increasing tensions between Beijing and New Delhi, as well as

the relative success of the re-equipment programme elsewhere in the army. Given the long distances they are expected to cover, and the tough and inhospitable local terrain, the emphasis on mediumor light-weight equipment for these formations is logical. However, the decision also suggests growing confidence amongst army leaders in their strategy of reinforcing crisis points from a distance – illustrated by the appearance of ZTZ-99A main battle tanks, most likely drawn from the 76th Group Army, in southern Ladakh. Although India has clearly risen up the army’s list of priorities in recent years, Taiwan remains its key capability driver. During the summer and autumn of 2021, multiple PLA Army and Marine Corps manoeuvre brigades took part in amphibious exercises using civilian ‘ro-ro’ transport vessels. Despite the considerable number of landing craft and ships held by both the PLA Army and Navy, the PLA would probably still depend on a considerable number of requisitioned civilian vessels for a major Taiwan amphibious operation, given the scale of the forces involved. While most of these requisitioned vessels would be expected to transport follow-on waves of forces and supplies to an established lodgement ashore, some appear to have been modified to launch and recover amphibious assault vehicles, suggesting that the PLA may also expect them to take part in any initial landing operations. In addition to recapitalising its traditional combat platforms, such as armoured vehicles and artillery, the army continues to invest in new capabilities. While it has already made considerable use of unarmed small- and medium-sized UAVs for reconnaissance and target acquisition, Army Aviation Brigades have now also reportedly begun using larger CH-4 combat, intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance UAVs – a capability previously restricted to the navy and air force. It is possible that the PLAA is experimenting with pairing the CH-4 with its WZ-10 attack helicopters, in a manner similar to the MQ-1C UAVs and AH-64 attack helicopter pairing seen in US Army attack reconnaissance battalions. The army also continues to experiment with uninhabited ground vehicle (UGV) systems, including in EOD, engineering, patrol and reconnaissance roles.

PLA Navy

During 2021, speculation mounted regarding the likely imminent launch (either by the end of the year or in 2022) of China’s third aircraft carrier, the second

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▼ Figure 18 China Coast Guard (CCG): patrol ships, 2021 The introduction in 2021 of a new China Coast Guard (CCG) Law appears to further reinforce the development of the coast guard as a major arm of Chinese maritime law enforcement and also of power projection to assert maritime influence in China’s near seas and in pursuit of its maritime claims. In this it serves as one component in a three-layered maritime capability alongside the PLA Navy (PLAN) and China’s maritime militia. In 2013, Beijing began consolidating several civilian maritime law-enforcement agencies into a single CCG under the State Ocean Administration (SOA). In 2018, there was a further transformation when the SOA was dissolved and the CCG was transferred to the People’s Armed Police under the country’s Central Military Commission. The CCG’s capabilities have also transformed, not least in its ability to deploy increased numbers of oceangoing assets at greater range and for longer periods than before. The introduction of two 12,000+-tonne full-load displacement Zhaotou-class Selected Asian nations, Russia and US: coastguard and other maritime gendarmerie patrol ships* 100 91 80 66 60

37 28 23

20 11

China Coast Guard: patrol ships* US Designation **Zhaotou Shuoshi II Dalang I Kanjie Xiang Yang Hong 9 Zhaolai Hai Yang Shucha I Shucha II Zhaochang **Zhaoduan Zhaoyu Jiangwei I Shuwu Tuzhong Wolei **Zhaojun Zhongyang 1 Jianghu I Shusheng **Zhaogao Zhaotim

Full-load displacement (tonnes) 1,500–2,000 2,000–3,000 3,000–4,000

4,000–5,000 5,000–6,000 12,000–13,000

Ch in a So Ja ut pa h n Ko re a Un ite Ind d ia St at Ta es iw a Ru n s Vi sia e In tnam do n M esia a Ph lays ilip ia pi ne s

cutters was particularly noteworthy; these are the largest such coast guard vessels in the world. The CCG has also introduced cutters armed with weapons including 76mm guns and other smaller deck-mounted weapons, high-powered water cannons and embarked rotary-wing aircraft. These include former PLAN frigates with reduced armament, or vessels based on PLAN frigate designs. The US Coast Guard, in particular, also employs frigate-sized cutters, and deploys on forward-presence missions in the Indo-Pacific, including transits of the Taiwan Strait. However, the CCG is by far the largest coast guard in the world, with 524 patrol and coastal craft overall, compared to 343 and 383 respectively in the US and Japan, 136 for India, 84 for South Korea and 73 for Vietnam. Beijing’s employment of the CCG in conjunction with the other arms of its maritime power in an incremental, sub-threshold approach to pursuing its maritime ambitions has been presenting an increasing challenge to China’s neighbours and competitors.

* Vessels with a full-load displacement of over 1,500 tonnes; ** Fitted with a naval gun with a calibre of 57mm or more, or a close-in weapons system

US designation: Length (meters): Built:

Zhaotou 175 2014–15

Shuoshi II 129 2014–15

Zhaolai 99 2013–14

Weaponry: Capacity:

1 76mm gun Hangar for 2 hels

Landing platform for 1 hel

Notes: © IISS

Zhaoduan 138 2016–ongoing 1 76mm gun Hangar for 1 hel

Based on navy Type-054A (Jiangkai II) frigate design

Zhaojun 101 Late 2010s–ongoing 1 76mm gun Landing platform for 1 hel

Jiangwei I 112 1990–92

Hangar for 1 hel Ex-Navy, delivered to CCG 2016

to be built domestically. The primary focus of attention has been the greater size and potential capability of the vessel, designated Type-003, compared to its predecessors. Its full-load displacement is estimated at around 80,000-tonnes, with capacity for more than 40 fixedwing aircraft plus helicopters. More significantly, it appears to be equipped with three (apparently electromagnetic) catapult launch systems plus arrester gear, as opposed to the ski-jump ramps which equip the first two ships. This will enable the operation of a greater range of aircraft, including a fixed-wing airborne early warning and control (AEW&C) capability, greater endurance and payload for the combat aircraft, and a higher tempo for air operations. Nevertheless, the challenge of integrating these systems and capabilities, as well as generating a full carrier group based on such a vessel with enhanced features, suggests that the Type-003 is still several years away from being fully operational. Generating an air group for the new ship will present challenges. However, a new batch of the carrier-capable J-15 aircraft appears to be in production; a new fifthgeneration naval fighter based on the FC-31 has begun flight tests; and flight development is said to be continuing on the KJ-600 carrier-borne AEW&C aircraft. The Type-003 represents an overall capability closer to, but still somewhat behind, that of the latest US carriers. Even so, its progress, the expectation that the fourth Chinese carrier (which may already be under construction) will also feature nuclear power, and the indication that further such vessels are still planned, all suggest that China’s carrier power continues to develop and mature and that more ambitious longer-range deployments by existing People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) vessels, which have long been anticipated, may happen sooner rather than later. Likewise, the commissioning in April 2021 of the first Type-075 (Yushen) large-deck amphibious assault ship with floodable well deck (LHD) suggests that a step-change in China’s amphibious capacity is also under way. With the construction in rapid succession of two more of these LHDs, all three could be in service by the end of 2022 or early 2023. The building of follow-on vessels remains uncertain, but two more Type-071 (Yuzhao) landing platform docks (LPDs) apparently joined the fleet in 2021, to make a total of eight. Despite the

power-projection potential of these new platforms, generating and integrating the necessary level of aviation and other specialist requirements will again be a major challenge. The second and third Type-055 (Renhai) cruisers were commissioned in 2021. The lead ship of the class, Nanchang, also took part in several notable deployments, including for the first time joining a carrier strike group deployment (based around the prototype Chinese carrier Liaoning), providing the centrepiece for a deployment off Alaska, and in October joining a high-profile exercise with the Russian Navy. These deployments underscored the probable centrality of these potent vessels to future PLAN blue-water task group deployments. Among other new arrivals during 2021 – adding to the considerable list of modern-design surface combatants – were two Type-052D mod (Luyang III mod) destroyers, making six of this variant now in commission. The number of Type-056A corvettes has now reached 50, with the prospect of more to follow. Among other significant specialist vessels, the PLAN added a fourth Dongjian surveillance vessel. Meanwhile, the retirement of legacy platforms continued, with the only Type-053H1 (Jianghu I) frigate remaining in service likely to soon decommission as well. Even the US Department of Defense, perhaps for its own reasons, now regularly refers to China’s navy as the largest in the world. That depends on a particular approach and perspective to counting hull numbers. By most other yardsticks, the US Navy remains superior in scale and capability, if significantly overstretched relative to its global commitments. Nevertheless, the Chinese navy’s transformation in recent years has, by any measure, been remarkable and rapid, and it continues. It may also be at an important stage in its development of a full range of capabilities. This may be true in Beijing’s eyes as well, a point perhaps highlighted by the unusual high-profile triple commissioning, on 23 April 2021 at Yulin naval base on Hainan Island – and in the presence of Xi – of the first LHD, the third Type055 cruiser, and a Type-094 (Jin) nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarine, of which six are believed to be in service.

PLA Air Force

The People’s Liberation Army Air Force (PLAAF) continued to take delivery of a range of modern multirole combat aircraft during 2021, with Chengdu J-10C

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Firebird, J-20A, and possibly J-20B and Shenyang J-16 Flanker aircraft all handed over. PLAAF activity in Taiwan’s Air Defence Identification Zone also increased. The PLAAF is also returning to the nuclear role it lost around 1995, with the Xian H-6N designed to carry the CH-AS-X-13 air-launched ballistic missile fitted with a conventional or nuclear warhead. Work is also continuing on a successor to the H-6, the Xian H-20, and a low-observable flying wing design is in development. In addition, Xian appears to be working on a smaller tactical strike aircraft. A two-seat variant of the J-20 entered flight testing in the fourth quarter of 2021. While the aircraft could be the conversion trainer equivalent of the J-10S, it is also possible that it is intended for a combat role, with the second seat designed for a weapons system operator. It appears that one brigade is re-equipping with the J-20 approximately every 12 months, suggesting a production rate of at least 24 aircraft per year. A number of J-20s apparently fitted with the domestically-produced WS-10C turbofan have been seen, and this aircraft may be known as the J-20B. Along with the aircraft’s current air-to-air armament of the PL-10 (CH-AA-09) short-range imaging infrared guided missile, and the PL-15 (CH-AA-10) active radar-guided medium- to long-range missile, development work is believed to be continuing on the PL-16. This is in a similar performance class to the PL-15, but six rather than only four can be carried in the J-20’s main internal weapons bay. The PL-15 uses a boost-sustain solid motor configuration, combined with what may well be a high fly-out speed, for medium- to long-range performance and, since introduction into service in 2018, has been a key threat driver for the air arms of the US and its regional allies. Beijing has yet to show the PL-16 design, but it is unlikely to be one of the rocket-ramjet missile configurations that it has also been developing. Given the carriage constraints of a weapons bay and the design requirement to provide air inlets for a rocket-ramjet missile, packaging any more than four of this type of weapon with a performance similar to the PL-15 into the J-20 would appear to be challenging. A dedicated electronic warfare variant of the J-16, the J-16D, was shown in PLAAF colours at the Air Show China 2021 in late September/early October, suggesting that this variant is entering service. The J-16D displayed had wingtip electronic sensing pods and four jamming pods on wing stations.

While Chengdu and Shenyang have been delivering batches of combat aircraft to the PLAAF during 2021, it is harder to discern whether and when these types are being used to replace ageing types, to form new units, or to increase airframe numbers in existing formations (the latter would raise questions over whether the PLAAF may be moving to a larger brigade-size for some of its tactical combat aircraft types). The PLAAF’s airlift capacity continues to benefit from the delivery of the four-engined Xian Y-20, with at least 31 of the A-model of the heavy transport aircraft now in service with two brigades. A tanker variant, possibly designated Y-20U, is now in active service and may in time replace the H-6U. The Y-20A is fitted with the Saturn D-30KP-2 turbofan engine, while a re-engined variant, likely the Y-20B, is fitted with the domestically-produced WS-20 turbofan. Flight testing of the Y-20B began in 2020, with a small number of the re-engined variant visible at the Xian Yanliang manufacturing site by the fourth quarter of 2021. In addition to its aviation branch, the PLAAF has also focused considerable resources on modernising its surface-to-air missile (SAM) forces in recent years. The absorption of the former air defence artillery branch after 2012 has enabled the PLAAF to increase the size of its existing SAM brigades as well as forming new ones. The last of the old HQ-2 systems appear to have been phased out and the bulk of the PLAAF’s long-range SAM inventory is now comprised of a mix of Russian S-300 and S-400 systems, and comparable domestic designs such as HQ-9/-9B and HQ-22.

Defence economics

An ambitious new chapter in China’s defence and national security development planning cycle began in 2021. The goal appears to be to ramp up the construction of a broad and capable defence economic and innovation base amid escalating political, military and economic rivalry with the United States and its allies. In the 2021–25 14th FYP, launched in March 2021, this takes the form not only of focus on the defence and strategic spheres, but also on the rest of the domestic economy and society. The importance of comprehensive securitisation is highlighted in other official plans and policies that have come out in the past several years, such as the 2020 ‘dual circulation’ initiative. This approach is anchored in a steadily worsening assessment of the country’s external threat environ-

ment. The 14th FYP points to ‘profound and complex changes’ that China is facing in the international environment. While the plan does not explicitly identify the chief cause for China’s predicament, speeches given by President Xi Jinping as the 14th FYP was being drafted make clear that the US is the main adversary. In internal remarks to Communist Party officials to explain the geostrategic reasoning behind the 14th FYP, Xi said that ‘the biggest source of chaos in the world today is the United States’ and ‘the United States is the biggest threat to China’s development and security’. The 14th FYP also pointed to other major trends that would profoundly impact China’s development and security in the near to medium term. The most noteworthy is a science and technology revolution happening alongside an industrial transformation and a far-reaching adjustment in the balance of international forces. This has made the existing international order increasingly complex, unstable and uncertain, and brought in an era of ‘turbulent change, unilateralism, protectionism, and hegemonism that poses threats to world peace and development’.

Security imperatives of the 14th FYP

Several major security-related themes are apparent in the 14th FYP. Economic securitisation at both the macro- and micro-levels received prominent attention. Macro-level economic securitisation is set out in the ‘dual circulation’ concept in which ‘China will form a formidably large domestic market and create a new development framework’. Using a combination of supply- and demand-side policies, the intention is to reconfigure and unblock domestic supply chains so they are protected from international disruptions. The plan also stresses the urgent need to achieve technological self-reliance. The rapid tightening of US-led export controls has forced the Chinese authorities into concerted action to prevent what they describe as technological ‘strangulation’. The developmental response has been to place science, technology and innovation at the ‘commanding heights’ of the 14th FYP’s policy agenda. The plan points to the critical importance of ‘adhering to the core position of innovation in China’s modernisation drive’ and taking ‘science and technology independence and self-reliance as the strategic support for national development’.

This is being carried out in several areas: • Resource allocations: the plan calls for a significant boost in basic research spending from around 6% at the end of the 13th FYP to 8% by 2025. This is still around half of what advanced economies such as the US and Japan spend on basic research (17% and 13% respectively in 2017), but in absolute terms means doubling the size of Chinese basic research outlays by the mid-2020s. Moreover, the plan calls for increasing annual R&D expenditures by 7%. No mention is made of defence R&D allocations, but the defence R&D system will likely enjoy growth rates of a similar if not higher level. • Structural reforms: a long-awaited establishment of large-scale national laboratories is finally taking place, with the plan calling for these to be set up in the areas of quantum information, photonics and micronanoelectronics, network communications, AI, biomedicine, and modern energy systems. • Prioritisation of select technology domains: seven areas are expressly identified in the plan: AI; quantum information; integrated circuits; genetics and biotechnology; neuroscience; advanced clinical medicine; and deep space, deep sea and polar exploration.

Military civil fusion

While military civil fusion (MCF) as a term appears to be less prominent in official discourse, the pursuit of the convergence between the civilian and defence economies remains a pressing priority. The general objective outlined in the 14th FYP is to build an overarching integrated strategic system in which the civilian, defence and national security sectors are closely aligned and coordinated. An extensive list of goals has been put forward: • Expand efforts to share resources, which means allowing the defence-industrial sector to increase access to the financial markets through fundraising initiatives such as asset securitisation and government guidance funds. • Encourage the coordinated civil–military development of key regions. A top priority of the 14th FYP is regional and infrastructure development, especially the construction of

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high-speed transportation networks and the building of major urban clusters around the country. Military requirements will feature prominently in these projects. • Deepen civil–military research collaboration. The civilian research and development system will be increasingly leveraged for defence requirements. • Strengthen civil-military joint development in maritime, space, cyber, biotechnology, new energy, AI and quantum technology. • Improve the development of the national defence mobilisation system to ensure that the national economy can be rapidly and effectively repurposed for defence and national security in crisis and wartime conditions. The coronavirus pandemic in 2020 is an example of activating the defence mobilisation system to deal with a health crisis. MCF will become even more important under the new economic securitisation concept, with the emphasis on domestic economic and technological self-sufficiency and safeguarding against external economic threats.

2035 vision and the long-term science and technology plan

A 15-year vision that declares that China will ‘basically realize socialist modernization’ by 2035 is briefly outlined in the 14th FYP. This means that the country’s national strength, of which economic, scientific and technological capabilities are central components, is intended to ‘rise sharply’. Major breakthroughs are planned in key core technologies and China will become a global innovator. A modern economic system will be built that will allow China to reach the per capita income levels of a moderately developed country. China will also reach a higher level of security and stability, of which a key contributing factor is the ‘basic realization’ of defence modernisation. A new 15-year Medium and Long-Term Science and Technology Development Plan (MLP) should have started alongside the 14th FYP, following the conclusion of the 2006–20 MLP. In sharp contrast to its predecessor – which was made public – the Chinese authorities have been tight-lipped about whether to openly disclose the details of the new plan because of foreign, especially US, scrutiny of China’s technological advancements.

Defence industry

China’s defence industry entered 2021 with robust growth momentum, and it looks well placed to capitalise on the pivot to securitisation over the next few years. The impact of the coronavirus pandemic proved to be short lived and appears to have only affected the defence industry in the first half of 2020. Prime contractors in the defence sector posted strong double-digit growth in profits and revenues from the second half of 2020 and into the first half of 2021. Total revenue of the Chinese defence industry for the first six months of 2021 increased by 22.4% over the same period for 2020, while net profits grew by 19.8%. The Chinese government launched a three-year action plan at the end of 2020, intended to overhaul the entire state-owned enterprise system, of which the defence-industrial sector is an important part. A key reform measure is the promotion of mixed privatepublic ownership and defence research institutes, which is the focus of the initial restructuring phase, due for completion in 2023. Defence-industrial enterprises have been given permission to implement an important reform that would enable the establishment of equity incentive mechanisms to allow high-achieving personnel to be rewarded at levels comparable to private-sector counterparts. This will improve the ability of defence enterprises to retain and better incentivise employees; they have to date been hampered from effectively doing this because of restrictions arising from their state-owned status. Another effort is being made to overhaul the pricing system for military products, but deeply entrenched and competing interests between the defence industry and the PLA have meant this issue has proven highly resistant to reform. The existing pricing system dates back to the central planning era of the 1950s and 1960s that was based on a formula of cost plus 5% profit. A chronic lack of market competition for defence products has meant that military procurement officials have found it difficult to obtain accurate pricing information. The consolidation and remaking of the country’s primes (which has been proceeding at a glacial pace) finally reached the defence-electronics sector in 2021. In June, the State Council approved the merger of China Electronics Technology Corp. (CETC) and China Potevio Corp., with the latter becoming a wholly-owned subsidiary of CETC. China Potevio Corp. is a central government-owned enterprise specialising in information and communications

technology. This merger significantly increased the size of CETC, which now has a workforce of more than 200,000 employees. A move towards more closely integrating the defence-electronics industry and the space and missile sector took place in August 2021 with an announcement by China Electronics Corp. (CEC) and China Aerospace Science and Industry Corp. (CASIC) of a strategic cooperation agreement on the joint development of projects in the industrial internet and network security sectors, as well as personnel exchanges. In 2020, CASIC had also entered into a strategic cooperation arrangement with China Aerospace Science Corp. (CASC). This leaves the ordnance sector as the last remaining holdout to corporate consolidation and integration.

Defence spending and investment

The growing importance of defence and national security priorities in leadership pronouncements and policies – such as in the 14th FYP – is not yet reflected in the official core defence budget, which came to CNY1.355 trillion (USD202 billion) in 2021, a 6.8% nominal increase over 2020 levels. While this growth rate is marginally higher than the 6.6% increase seen in 2020, both fall considerably below the 7.6% growth seen during the first four years of the 2016–20 13th FYP. The coronavirus pandemic appears to be principally responsible for this reduced pace of

growth. How long lasting this modest but not inconsequential fall in defence expenditure growth rates will be depends on how quickly China’s economy emerges from the pandemic: increasingly this looks to be sooner rather than later. Total Chinese defence expenditure is estimated to be much higher if foreign-weapons purchases, military R&D funding and the People’s Armed Police central budget are included. Including local militia funding, the 2021 budget is estimated to have reached CNY1.388tr (USD207bn), while total expenditure is likely closer to CNY1.810tr (USD270bn). The official Chinese defence budget is therefore a relatively poor guide for measuring trends and inputs into military research, development and acquisition activities, as it does not contain much of the funding for defence R&D, which is located in other parts of the state budget, extra-budgetary funding allocations, and investment funds raised from the capital markets. A useful proxy indicator of Chinese defence R&D investment is the securitisation of the corporate assets of the country’s principal state-owned defence contractors through stock market listings. These defence primes have raised a combined total of CNY2.55tr (USD370bn) between 2012 and 2020, including CNY143bn (USD20.7bn) in 2020 alone. The reform effort to increase the ratio of private ownership in the defence industry over the next few years could see the rate of asset securitisation of the defence primes increase yet further.

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Arms procurements and deliveries – Asia Significant events in 2021

FEBRUARY

CHINA CUTS DEFENCE-INDUSTRY RED TAPE

China’s defence procurement agency relaxed administrative regulations for dual-use equipment to encourage companies into the defence industry, in line with the government’s ‘military–civil fusion (MCF)’ strategy. Under the new measure, which is still in a trial period, a contractor will undergo a simpler evaluation and licensing process, reducing registration time from months to weeks. In October 2017, the number of licences and certificates that defence contractors required before submitting a defence tender was reduced from four to three. Launched in 2015, the MCF strategy aims to ‘reinvigorate’ the country’s defence-technology industrial base by 2049.

SEPTEMBER

HANJIN HEAVY INDUSTRIES & CONSTRUCTION SOLD

Hanjin Heavy Industries & Construction (HHIC) became majority privately-owned. Initially, 83.45% of shares were put up for sale, though this was later reduced to a 66.85% stake in April 2021, when the Korea Development Bank (KDB) and 11 other major Korean and Filipino shareholders signed a share purchase agreement with a consortium led by the Dongbu Corporation, a Korean civil-engineering and construction group. HHIC has been responsible for several key naval shipbuilding programmes (including the Dokdo/Marado amphibious assault ships) with defence-related revenue accounting for 23.66% of its total revenue in 2020 (down from 29.08% in 2019 and 30.75% in 2018).

SEPTEMBER

INDONESIA DEFENCE INDUSTRY CONSOLIDATIONS

Indonesia announced that before the end of 2021 it will have brought together five state-owned defence companies under a new parent company called industri pertahanan (Defence Industry). The new firm will consist of Dirgantara Indonesia (aerospace), Pindad (armoured vehicles), Dahana (munitions) and Penataran Angkatan Laut (PAL) Indonesia (maritime), with the industry cluster led by Len Industri (electronics). The new company will aim to better support Indonesia’s increasingly ambitious procurement plans. In 2019, the aforementioned five companies had an estimated revenue of IDR5.6tr (USD396.16m) in the defence sector out of a combined estimated revenue of IDR14.47tr (USD1.02bn) and comprised around 8,000 employees.

SEPTEMBER

AUKUS PARTNERSHIP

Australia, the United Kingdom and the United States announced a trilateral security partnership, called AUKUS. Its first objective is, over a period of 18 months, to devise the best way to equip Australia with at least eight nuclear-powered submarines (SSN). The Australian government has said it intends to build the submarines in Adelaide. As a consequence, Australia cancelled the 2016 contract with France’s Naval Group for 12 conventionally powered submarines based on the Barracuda SSN design. This programme had attracted criticism over cost increases. The initial production cost estimate of more than AUD50bn (USD37.19bn) had almost doubled by 2019 to AUD80bn (USD55.63bn), according to testimony given to a parliamentary committee in November 2019. The move damaged relations between the AUKUS nations and France, and also further delays the replacement of Australia’s six Collins-class submarines, which were built in the late 1990s and early 2000s.

OCTOBER

INDIA’S ORDNANCE FACTORY BOARD IS DISSOLVED

The Ordnance Factory Board (OFB), India’s oldest state-owned defence manufacturer, was dissolved, three months after a corporatisation plan was authorised by the government. OFB’s 41 factories across 24 states have been restructured into seven limited companies with around 70,000 staff distributed across these new firms: Munitions India (ammunition and explosives); Armoured Vehicles Nigam (vehicles); Advanced Weapons and Equipment India (weapons and equipment); Troop Comforts (clothing and general stores); Yantra India (ancillary products, such as cartridge cases); India Optel (opto-electronics); and Gliders India (parachutes). The reforms are intended to redress underperformance and inefficiencies but also to promote the exports of OFB companies, which recently accounted for under 4% of India’s defence exports. Although the Indian government has said it has no plans to privatise the new companies, media reports indicate that this may be an option.

THAILAND

LAOS

Figure 19

Ho Chi Minh City

CAMBODIA

Hanoi

Danang

VIETNAM

Haiphong

CHINA

Stateowned

DN2000 (Damen 9014) Offshore patrol ship Damen Stan Lander 5612

2012 n.k.

Offshore patrol ship

Roll-on/Roll-off cargo ship

Coast Guard

Navy

Coast Guard

Oceangoing tug Coast Guard

Damen Salvage Tug

n.k.

Navy

Fast patrol boat Coast Guard

Tran Dai Nia (Damen Survey ship Research Vessel 6613)

Pending* DN4000

Coast Guard

Navy

Fast patrol boat Coast Guard

Oceangoing patrol craft

Patrol boat

Oceangoing patrol craft

Fast patrol craft Navy with surface-tosurface missiles

2007

MS-50S

High Speed Patrol Vessel

2016 2014

TT400TP

TT-200

2010s n.k.

TT-400TP (RUS MTD FC54)

Project 12418 (Tarantul V)

2006

Navy

Coast Guard

Asia

2021

2013

2012

2000s

n.k.

ε160m

n.k.

ε15m

2021– ongoing

2013–16

2007–15

2011

2014–17

2020–22*

2012–16

2010s

2012–15

Netherlands

India

Russia

Netherlands

Deliveries Offset agreement?

Approx. 2007–17 1bn

n.k.

13.09m

12.4m

44.72m

Value (USD)

12*** 99.7m

8**

Service Qty

* Planned; ** Six built by Ba Son Corporation; two built by Russia’s Vympel Shipyard *** Seven to be built by Hong Ha Shipbuilding Company; five built by India’s Larsen & Toubro

Song Thu Corporation

Privatelyowned

Stateowned

Hong Ha Shipbuilding Company

James Boat Technology

Stateowned

Ba Son Corporation

Yet Kieu (Damen RGS Submarine 9316) rescue craft

c.2018

Hospital ship

Transport ship

Khanh Hoa (Truong Sa mod) (K123)

Truong Sa (K122)

2010

Patrol boat

Type

2010

TT-120

Stateowned

189 Shipbuilding Company

2001

Ownership Contract Equipment type date

Company

Selected Vietnamese military and paramilitary maritime procurement from Vietnamese shipyards since 2000

Vietnam: indigenous naval shipbuilding capability

Asia 245

Republic of Korea: K2 Black Panther main battle tank

2005

2007

2009

December 2008 K2 development completes; Doosan DST spins out from Doosan Infracore

July 2008 Export: Technology transfer to Turkey for Altay programme

2008

2010

2013

March 2013 1st Batch: contract amendment (deciding to import German powerpacks)

2012

RENK

MTU Friedrichshafen

2011

Transmission:

2006

Engine:

Initial operational capability

May 1992 August 2005 A project Korean powerpack requirement development begins is confirmed for the XK2 March 2007 programme to Three XK2 develop prototypes Korea's next are unveiled generation MBT November October 1998 2007 Rotem and Rotem ADD begin becomes MBT Hyundai Rotem development

1990s

Batch 1

Total value

2014

2017 December 2017 2nd Batch: 1st contract amendment (delaying the completion date to November 2019)

2016

RENK

Doosan DST

2015

Transmission:

Engine:

Batch 2 amended

Batch 3

2019 November 2018 2nd Batch: 2nd contract amendment (delaying the completion date to December 2021)

2018

2021

2022

RENK

Doosan DST

December 2019 2nd Batch: 3rd contract amendment (total contract value increased by 19.55%)

2020

Transmission:

Engine:

Order date: Dec 2020 Quantity: 54 Planned delivery dates: 2022–23* Powerpack decision: Nov 2020

Batch 3

Unit cost

2023

0 Batch 2

0 Batch 1 amended (estimate)

400 Batch 1 (estimate)

K2 contract values (USD million)

800

1,200

Order date: Dec 2014 Quantity: 106 Planned delivery dates: Late 2015–Dec 2017 Actual delivery dates: May 2019–Dec 2021* Powerpack decision: Feb 2018 Contract amendments: Dec 2017; Nov 2018; Dec 2019

Batch 2

July 2014 The first K2 is introduced into service

Order date: Dec 2010 Quantity: 100 Planned delivery dates: 2011–12 Actual delivery dates: Jun 2014–Nov 2015 Powerpack decision: Dec 2012 Contract amendment: Mar 2013

*Planned

Contract amendment date

Powerpack decision date

Actual delivery dates

Planned delivery dates

Contract signing

In the early 1990s, the K2 Black Panther programme was launched to develop a 3.5 generation main battle tank (MBT), intended to replace South Korea’s ageing M-series MBTs (the M47 and the M48 Patton). The Agency of Defense Development (ADD), the government’s defence research centre, and Rotem (now Hyundai Rotem) have led the Black Panther programme, based on technology acquired from the 1970s M48A5 upgrade programme and the successful development of the K1. This was South Korea’s first indigenous MBT with a 1,200-horsepower engine, and was developed through the Republic of Korea Indigenous Tank (ROKIT) programme, based on Chrysler’s M1 Abrams design in 1987. It was projected that KRW4.22tr (USD5.47bn) would be spent on a research and development phase that lasted 14 years with a ten-year production contract with the plan to introduce the first K2 into service from 2011. However, production has suffered delays due to a series of contract modifications related to the powerpack (engine and transmission system). After 1992, the plan was that the first batch, of 100 vehicles, would be fitted with foreign-supplied powerpacks due to the inability of local industry to produce a suitable engine with 1,500-horsepower and a transmission system. This was changed in June 2003. Local industry was tasked with developing an indigenous powerpack (expected to be completed after five years of R&D). However, significant development delays led to this decision being reversed in 2012, with plans for the local system being pushed to batch 2, which was contracted in December 2014. However, further delays led to another change on the powerpack question in 2018. This time a German transmission was to be imported; the plan remains that local industry develops the powerpack.

Figure 20

246 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2022

Asia 247

ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE

Afghanistan AFG 2020

2021 n.k

GDP [a]

AFN

1.55tr

USD

20.1bn

n.k

per capita

USD

611

n.k

-2.4

n.k

Growth Inflation Def bdgt [b]

5.6

n/a

AFN

155bn

ε172bn

USD

2.01bn

ε1.88bn

76.84

ε91.43

USD1=AFN

2022

The Taliban's military strength is believed to consist of approximately 75,000 full time fighters and 90,000 local militia

[a] IMF economic data unavailable for Afghanistan in 2021 [b] Security expenditure. Includes expenditure on Ministry of Defence, Ministry of Interior, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, National Security Council and the General Directorate of National Security. Also includes donor funding. 3.60 1.41

Population

2015

2021

37,466,414

Age

0–14

15–19

20–24

25–29

Male

20.4%

5.2%

5.4%

4.5%

13.8%

1.3%

Female

19.8%

5.1%

5.2%

4.3%

13.5%

1.5%

30–64 65 plus

Capabilities In August 2021, all government forces and the government itself collapsed under the pressure of the Taliban offensive. The Taliban administration has publicly committed to the undertaking they made to the US in the 2020 Doha Agreement to prevent Afghanistan from being used as a base for terrorist attacks against the US and its interests. Nonetheless, terrorist groups remain active in the country. ISIS has continued to mount attacks on Taliban fighters and Afghan civilians, while ties between the Taliban and al-Qaeda may result in the Taliban tolerating the latter’s presence in the country. The United States has indicated that an ‘over the horizon’ counter-terrorism capability is being developed, but this faces a host of challenges including basing and target selection. Taliban fighters are widely deployed across Afghanistan, particularly in key towns and cities. The Taliban have acquired many foreign-supplied vehicles, weapons and small arms. Some captured aircraft have been flown, though many were taken out of the country or disabled. Although the Taliban has appealed for specialist personnel from the previous government’s forces to join them so that the group can operate such systems, evidence of Taliban revenge killings of former members of the security forces will limit take-up. Moreover, many complex platforms were previously maintained by (now departed) foreign contractors, while spare-parts availability will also limit the ability to operate Western-origin systems. The Taliban’s ability to employ and support the large amount of captured material is unlikely to be high. Moreover, the freezing of the former Afghan government’s funds held overseas has precipitated a fiscal crisis. Although the G20 have agreed to fund humanitarian relief, the rapid release of frozen funds appears very unlikely. These factors are expected to limit the Taliban’s military capability. Its defence priorities are likely to remain internal security, border control and countering ISIS.

ACTIVE 165,000 (Taliban 165,000)

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE ARTILLERY TOWED 122mm D-30 MOR 82mm 2B14 AIRCRAFT • TPT 1 Cessna 208B Grand Caravan HELICOPTERS ATK 1 Mi-35 Hind MRH 2 Mi-17 Hip H

Australia AUS Australian Dollar AUD

Real-terms defence budget trend (USDbn, constant 2015)

2008

Taliban 165,000

GDP per capita

2020

2021

AUD

1.97tr

2.13tr

USD

1.36tr

1.61tr

USD

52,905

62,619

Growth

-2.4

3.5

Inflation

0.9

2.5

AUD

45.5bn

USD

31.4bn

34.3bn

1.45

1.33

Def bdgt [a] USD1=AUD

2022

Asia

Afghan Afghani AFN

47.8bn

[a] Includes pensions Real-terms defence budget trend (USDbn, constant 2015) 30.7

2008

Population

20.1 2021

2015

25,809,973

Age

0–14

15–19

20–24

25–29

Male

9.6%

3.1%

3.6%

3.8%

30–64 65 plus 22.1%

7.5%

Female

9.0%

2.9%

3.2%

3.6%

22.8%

8.7%

Capabilities The Australian Defence Force (ADF) is capable, well trained and well equipped. It also has considerable recent operational experience. In March 2016, the government published Australia’s third defence white paper in seven years. This identified China’s growing regional role, regional military modernisation and inter-state rivalry as among the influences shaping defence policy. A ‘Strategic Update’ to the white paper, published in July 2020, outlined plans to adjust Australia’s defence posture in order to develop a more powerful and self-reliant military deterrent. The document pointed to an increased prospect of war in Australia’s region, claimed that a ten-year ‘strategic warning time’ could no longer be assumed, and highlighted potential threats from ‘grey-zone activities’. The country’s primary ally is the US, but it is also forging closer defence ties with India, Japan, South Korea and the UK, while remaining committed to the Five Power Defence Arrangements and to its close defence relations with New Zealand. The AUKUS partnership, signed in September 2021, will see the UK and US assist Australia in developing a nuclear-powered submarine capability and other defence and security technologies. It led to the cancellation of the existing contract with France for conventionally-powered boats.

248 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2022 The plan is to build the nuclear-powered submarines in Adelaide. Australia is also building frigates and patrol ships, based on European designs. Strategic air- and sea-lift platforms give the ADF considerable capability to move and sustain deployments overseas. Combat-air, maritime-patrol and armoured-vehicle capabilities are also being boosted, and more closely integrating Australia’s armed forces – and their modern platforms – is a priority. Australia imports most of its significant defence equipment but possesses an increasingly capable defence industry. Its largest naval shipbuilders are ASC and Austal, whose US subsidiary, Austal USA, builds vessels for the US Navy.

ACTIVE 59,600 (Army 29,400 Navy 15,300 Air 14,900)

RESERVE 29,750 (Army 20,100 Navy 3,950 Air 5,700) Integrated units are formed from a mix of reserve and regular personnel. All ADF operations are now controlled by Headquarters Joint Operations Command (HQJOC)

ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE Space EQUIPMENT BY TYPE SATELLITES • COMMUNICATIONS 1 Optus C1 (dual use for civil/mil comms)

Army 29,400 FORCES BY ROLE COMMAND 1 (1st) div HQ (1 sigs regt) MANOEUVRE Mechanised 3 mech inf bde (1 armd cav regt, 1 mech inf bn, 1 lt mech inf bn, 1 arty regt, 1 cbt engr regt, 1 sigs regt, 1 CSS bn) Amphibious 1 (2nd RAR) amph bn Aviation 1 (16th) avn bde (1 regt (2 ISR hel sqn), 1 regt (3 tpt hel sqn), 1 regt (2 spec ops hel sqn, 1 avn sqn)) COMBAT SUPPORT 1 (6th) cbt spt bde (1 STA regt (1 STA bty, 2 UAV bty, 1 CSS bty), 1 AD/FAC regt (integrated), 1 engr regt (2 construction sqn, 1 EOD sqn), 1 EW regt, 1 int bn) COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT 1 (17th) CSS bde (3 log bn, 3 med bn, 1 MP bn)

Special Operations Command FORCES BY ROLE SPECIAL FORCES 1 (SAS) SF regt 1 (SF Engr) SF regt 2 cdo regt COMBAT SUPPORT 3 sigs sqn (incl 1 reserve sqn) COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT 1 CSS sqn

Reserve Organisations 20,100 reservists FORCES BY ROLE COMMAND 1 (2nd) div HQ

MANOEUVRE Reconnaissance 3 (regional force) surv unit (integrated) Light 1 (4th) inf bde (1 recce regt, 2 inf bn, 1 engr regt, 1 spt bn) 1 (5th) inf bde (1 recce bn, 4 inf bn, 1 engr regt, 2 spt bn) 1 (9th) inf bde (1 recce sqn, 2 inf bn, 1 spt bn) 1 (11th) inf bde (1 recce regt, 3 inf bn, 1 engr regt, 1 spt bn) 1 (13th) inf bde (1 recce sqn, 2 inf bn, 1 spt bn) COMBAT SUPPORT 1 arty regt 1 sigs regt COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT 1 trg bde EQUIPMENT BY TYPE ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES MBT 59 M1A1 Abrams RECCE 25 Boxer CRV (incl variant) IFV 253 ASLAV-25 (all variants) APC • APC (T) 431 M113AS4 AUV 1,120: 1,020 Bushmaster IMV; 100 Hawkei ENGINEERING & MAINTENANCE VEHICLES ARV 51: 15 ASLAV-F; 17 ASLAV-R; 19 M88A2 VLB 5 Biber MW 20: 12 Husky; 8 MV-10 ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE MSL • MANPATS FGM-148 Javelin RCL • 84mm Carl Gustaf ARTILLERY 239 TOWED 155mm 54 M777A2 MOR 81mm 185 AIR DEFENCE • SAM • Point-defence RBS-70 AMPHIBIOUS 15 LCM 8 (capacity either 1 MBT or 200 troops) HELICOPTERS ATK 22 Tiger MRH 2 AW139 (leased) TPT 87: Heavy 12 CH-47F Chinook; Medium 75: 41 NH90 TTH (MRH90); 34 S-70A Black Hawk UNINHABITED AERIAL VEHICLES ISR • Medium 15 RQ-7B Shadow 200 AIR-LAUNCHED MISSILES ASM AGM-114M Hellfire

Navy 15,300 Fleet Comd HQ located at Sydney. Naval Strategic Comd HQ located at Canberra EQUIPMENT BY TYPE SUBMARINES 6 SSK 6 Collins with 6 single 533mm TT with UGM-84C Harpoon Block 1B AShM/Mk 48 ADCAP mod 7 HWT PRINCIPAL SURFACE COMBATANTS 11 DESTROYERS • DDGHM 3 Hobart with Aegis Baseline 8.1 C2, 2 quad lnchr with RGM-84L Harpoon Block II AShM, 6 8-cell Mk 41 VLS with SM-2 Block IIIB SAM/RIM-162A ESSM SAM, 2 twin 324mm SVTT Mk 32 mod 9 ASTT with MU90 LWT/Mk 54 LWT, 1 MK 15 Phalanx Block 1B CIWS, 1 127mm gun (capacity 1 MH-60R Seahawk)

Asia 249

Naval Aviation 1,450 FORCES BY ROLE ANTI SUBMARINE WARFARE 1 sqn with NH90 TTH (MRH90) 1 sqn with MH-60R Seahawk TRAINING 1 OCU sqn with MH-60R Seahawk 1 sqn with H135 EQUIPMENT BY TYPE HELICOPTERS ASW 24 MH-60R Seahawk TPT 21: Medium 6 NH90 TTH (MRH90) (operated on rotational basis); Light 15 H135 AIR-LAUNCHED MISSILES ASM AGM-114M Hellfire

Clearance Diving Branch FORCES BY ROLE SPECIAL FORCES 2 diving unit

Air Force 14,900 FORCES BY ROLE FIGHTER/GROUND ATTACK 1 sqn with F/A-18F Super Hornet 2 sqn with F-35A Lightning II 1 sqn with F-35A Lightning II (forming) ANTI SUBMARINE WARFARE 1 sqn with P-8A Poseidon ELECTRONIC WARFARE 1 sqn with EA-18G Growler

ISR 1 (FAC) sqn with PC-21 1 sqn with AP-3C Orion AIRBORNE EARLY WARNING & CONTROL 1 sqn with B-737-700 Wedgetail (E-7A) TANKER/TRANSPORT 1 sqn with A330 MRTT (KC-30A) TRANSPORT 1 VIP sqn with B-737BBJ; Falcon 7X 1 sqn with C-17A Globemaster III 1 sqn with C-27J Spartan 1 sqn with C-130J-30 Hercules TRAINING 1 OCU with F-35A Lightning II 1 sqn with Beech 350 King Air 2 sqn with PC-21 2 (LIFT) sqn with Hawk MK127* EQUIPMENT BY TYPE AIRCRAFT 124 combat capable FGA 68: 24 F/A-18F Super Hornet; 44 F-35A Lightning II ASW 12 P-8A Poseidon EW 13: 2 AP-3C Orion mod; 11 EA-18G Growler* AEW&C 6 B-737-700 Wedgetail (E-7A) TKR/TPT 7 A330 MRTT (KC-30A) TPT 47: Heavy 8 C-17A Globemaster III; Medium 22: 10 C-27J Spartan; 12 C-130J-30 Hercules; Light 12 Beech 350 King Air; PAX 5: 2 B-737BBJ (VIP); 3 Falcon 7X (VIP) TRG 82: 33 Hawk Mk127*; 49 PC-21 AIR-LAUNCHED MISSILES AAM • IIR AIM-9X Sidewinder II; ASRAAM; ARH AIM120B/C-5/C-7 AMRAAM ARM AGM-88B HARM; AGM-88E AARGM AShM AGM-84A Harpoon LACM Conventional AGM-158A JASSM BOMBS Laser-guided Paveway II/IV; Laser JDAM INS/GPS-guided AGM-154C JSOW; JDAM; JDAM-ER

DEPLOYMENT EGYPT: MFO (Operation Mazurka) 27 IRAQ: Operation Inherent Resolve (Okra) 110; 1 SF gp; NATO • NATO Mission Iraq 2 MALI: UN • MINUSMA 1 MALAYSIA: 120; 1 inf coy (on 3-month rotational tours); 1 P-8A Poseidon (on rotation) MIDDLE EAST: UN • UNTSO (Operation Paladin) 13 PHILIPPINES: Operation Augury 100 (trg team) SOUTH SUDAN: UN • UNMISS (Operation Aslan) 13 UNITED ARAB EMIRATES: Operation Accordion 400: 1 tpt det with 2 C-130J-30 Hercules

FOREIGN FORCES Singapore 230: 1 trg sqn at Pearce with PC-21 trg ac; 1 trg sqn at Oakey with 12 AS332 Super Puma; AS532 Cougar United States US Pacific Command: 1,700; 1 SEWS at Pine Gap; 1 comms facility at NW Cape; 1 SIGINT stn at Pine Gap • US Strategic Command: 1 detection and tracking radar at Naval Communication Station Harold E. Holt

Asia

FRIGATES • FFGHM 8 Anzac (GER MEKO 200) with 2 quad lnchr with RGM-84L Harpoon Block II AShM, 1 8-cell Mk 41 VLS with RIM-162B ESSM SAM, 2 triple 324mm SVTT Mk 32 mod 5 ASTT with MU90 LWT, 1 127mm gun (capacity 1 MH-60R Seahawk ASW hel) PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 14 PCO 14: 12 Armidale (Bay mod); 2 Cape (leased) MINE WARFARE • MINE COUNTERMEASURES 4 MHC 4 Huon AMPHIBIOUS PRINCIPAL AMPHIBIOUS SHIPS 3 LHD 2 Canberra (capacity 18 hel; 4 LCM-1E; 110 veh; 12 M1 Abrams MBT; 1,000 troops) LSD 1 Choules (ex-UK Bay) (capacity 1 med hel; 24 MBT; 350 troops) LANDING CRAFT • LCM 12 LCM-1E LOGISTICS AND SUPPORT 13 AGHS 2 Leeuwin with 1 hel landing platform AGS 4 Paluma AORH 2 Supply (ESP Cantabria) (capacity 1 MH-60R Seahawk) AX 1 Sycamore (capacity 1 med hel) (operated by private company, Teekay Shipping; multi-role aviation training vessel) AXS 1 Young Endeavour The following vessels are operated by a private company, DMS Maritime: ASR 2: 1 Besant; 1 Stoker AXL 1 Seahorse Mercator

250 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2022

Bangladesh BGD Bangladeshi Taka BDT GDP per capita

2020

2021

BDT

27.4tr

30.2tr

USD

323bn

356bn 2,139

USD

1,962

Growth

3.5

4.6

Inflation

5.6

Def bdgt FMA (US)

BDT

321bn

344bn

USD

3.79bn

4.06bn

USD

USD1=BDT

1.5m

0.0m

84.79

84.81

2022

373bn 0.0m

Real-terms defence budget trend (USDbn, constant 2015) 3.23 1.23 2008

Population

2015

2021

164,098,818

Age

0–14

15–19

20–24

25–29

Male

13.2%

4.5%

4.6%

4.2%

30–64 65 plus 19.2%

3.3%

Female

12.8%

4.4%

4.6%

4.4%

20.9%

3.8%

Capabilities Bangladesh has limited military capability, which is optimised for border and domestic security, including domestic disaster relief. A defence-modernisation plan is under way, called Forces 2030, although acquisitions have been limited. Bangladesh has relied on Chinese and Russian aid and credit to overcome its limited procurement funding. It has increased defence collaboration with India. The country has a long record of UN peacekeeping deployments. A major naval-recapitalisation and -expansion programme, including local manufacture of patrol boats, is under way to better protect the country’s large EEZ. Airlift capability has improved with the addition of ex-UK C-130Js. Substantial efforts have also been made to strengthen the shipbuilding industry and work has begun on a new submarine-support facility. The armed forces reportedly retain extensive commercial interests, including in real estate, banks and other businesses.

ACTIVE 163,050 (Army 132,150 Navy 16,900 Air 14,000) Gendarmerie & Paramilitary 63,900

ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE Army 132,150 FORCES BY ROLE COMMAND 10 inf div HQ SPECIAL FORCES 1 cdo bde (2 cdo bn) MANOEUVRE Armoured 1 armd bde 3 indep armd regt Light 25 inf bde 2 (composite) bde

COMBAT SUPPORT 10 arty bde 1 engr bde 1 sigs bde AVIATION 1 avn regt (1 avn sqn; 1 hel sqn) AIR DEFENCE 1 AD bde EQUIPMENT BY TYPE ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES MBT 276: 174 Type-59/-59G(BD); 58 Type-69/-69G; 44 Type-90-II (MBT-2000) LT TK 8 Type-62 RECCE 8+ BOV M11 APC 545 APC (T) 134 MT-LB APC (W) 330 BTR-80 PPV 81+ Maxxpro AUV 17 Cobra ENGINEERING & MAINTENANCE VEHICLES AEV MT-LB ARV 3+: T-54/T-55; Type-84; 3 Type-654 VLB MTU ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE MSL • MANPATS 9K115-2 Metis M1 (RS-AT-13) RCL 106mm 238 M40A1 ARTILLERY 895+ SP 155mm 18 NORA B-52 TOWED 363+: 105mm 170 Model 56 pack howitzer; 122mm 131: 57 Type-54/54-1 (M-30); 20 Type-83; 54 Type-96 (D-30), 130mm 62 Type-59-1 (M-46) MRL 42: 122mm 36+ WS-22; 302mm 6 T-300 MOR 472: 81mm 11 M29A1; 82mm 366 Type-53/type87/M-31 (M-1937); 120mm 95 AM-50/UBM 52 AMPHIBIOUS • LANDING CRAFT 3: 1 LCT; 2 LCVP AIRCRAFT • TPT • Light 7: 1 C295; 5 Cessna 152; 1 PA31T Cheyenne HELICOPTERS MRH 2 AS365N3 Dauphin TPT 6: Medium 3 Mi-171Sh Light 3 Bell 206L-4 AIR DEFENCE SAM Short-range FM-90 (CH-SA-4) Point-defence FN-16 (CH-SA-14); QW-2 (CH-SA-8) GUNS • TOWED 174: 35mm 8 GDF-009 (with Skyguard-3); 37mm 132 Type-65/74; 57mm 34 Type-59 (S-60)

Navy 16,900 EQUIPMENT BY TYPE SUBMARINES 2 SSK 2 Nabajatra (ex-PRC Type-035G (Ming)) with 8 single 533mm TT PRINCIPAL SURFACE COMBATANTS • FRIGATES 6 FFGHM 3: 1 Bangabandhu (ROK modified Ulsan) with 2 twin lnchr with Otomat Mk2 AShM, 1 octuple FM-90N (CH-SA-N-4) SAM, 2 triple ILAS-3 (B-515) 324mm TT with A244/S LWT, 1 76mm gun (capacity 1 AW109E hel)

Asia 251

Naval Aviation EQUIPMENT BY TYPE AIRCRAFT • TPT • Light 2 Do-228NG (MP) HELICOPTERS • TPT • Light 2 AW109E Power

Special Warfare and Diving Command 300 Air Force 14,000 FORCES BY ROLE FIGHTER 1 sqn with MiG-29/MiG-29UB Fulcrum FIGHTER/GROUND ATTACK 1 sqn with F-7MB/FT-7B Airguard 1 sqn with F-7BG/FT-7BG Airguard 1 sqn with F-7BGI/FT-7BGI Airguard GROUND ATTACK 1 sqn with Yak-130 Mitten* TRANSPORT 1 sqn with An-32 Cline 1 sqn with C-130B/J Hercules 1 sqn with L-410UVP TRAINING 1 sqn with K-8W Karakorum*; L-39ZA Albatros* 1 sqn with PT-6 TRANSPORT HELICOPTER 1 sqn with AW139; Mi-17 Hip H; Mi-17-1V Hip H; Mi171Sh 1 sqn with Mi-17 Hip H; Mi-17-1V Hip H; Mi-171Sh 1 sqn with Bell 212 1 trg sqn with Bell 206L Long Ranger; AW119 Koala EQUIPMENT BY TYPE AIRCRAFT 88 combat capable FTR 53: 9 F-7MB Airguard; 11 F-7BG Airguard; 12 F-7BGI Airguard; 5 FT-7B Airguard; 4 FT-7BG Airguard; 4 FT-7BGI Airguard; 6 MiG-29 Fulcrum; 2 MiG-29UB Fulcrum B TPT 14: Medium 7: 4 C-130B Hercules; 3 C-130J Hercules; Light 7: 3 An-32 Cline†; 3 L-410UVP; 1 C295W TRG 65: 15 K-8W Karakorum*; 7 L-39ZA Albatros*; 30+ PT-6; 13 Yak-130 Mitten* HELICOPTERS MRH 16: 2 AW139 (SAR); 12 Mi-17 Hip H; 2 Mi-17-1V Hip H (VIP) TPT 19: Medium 11 Mi-171Sh; Light 8: 2 Bell 206L Long Ranger; 4 Bell 212; 2 AW119 Koala AIR-LAUNCHED MISSILES AAM • IR R-73 (RS-AA-11A Archer); PL-5; PL-7; SARH R-27R (RS-AA-10A Alamo)

Gendarmerie & Paramilitary 63,900 Ansars 20,000+ Security Guards

Rapid Action Battalions 5,000 Ministry of Home Affairs FORCES BY ROLE MANOEUVRE Other 14 paramilitary bn

Border Guard Bangladesh 38,000 FORCES BY ROLE MANOEUVRE Amphibious 1 rvn coy

Asia

2 Umar Farooq (ex-PRC Type-053H3 (Jiangwei II)) with 2 quad lnchr with YJ-83 AShM, 1 octuple GMLS with HHQ-7 (CH-SA-N-4) SAM, 2 FQF 3200 A/S mor, 1 twin 100mm gun (capacity 1 hel) FFG 3: 2 Abu Bakr (ex-PRC Type-053H2 (Jianghu III)) with 2 twin lnchr with C-802A AShM, 2 RBU 1200 Uragan A/S mor, 2 twin 100mm gun 1 Osman (ex-PRC Type-053H1 (Jianghu I)) with 2 quad lnchr with C-802 (CH-SS-N-6) AShM, 2 RBU 1200 Uragan A/S mor, 2 twin 100mm gun PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 46 CORVETTES 6 FSGM 4 Shadhinota (PRC C13B) with 2 twin lnchr with C-802 (CH-SS-N-6) AShM, 1 octuple lnchr with FL-3000N (HHQ-10) (CH-SA-N-17) SAM, 1 76mm gun, 1 hel landing platform FSG 2 Bijoy (ex-UK Castle) (of which 1 damaged in 2020 Beirut port explosion) with 2 twin lnchr with C-704 AShM, 1 76mm gun, 1 hel landing platform PSOH 2 Somudra Joy (ex-US Hero) with 1 76mm gun, hel landing platform PCFG 4 Durdarsha (ex-PRC Huangfeng) with 4 single lnchr with HY-2 (CH-SS-N-2 Safflower) AShM PCG 2 Durjoy with 2 twin lnchr with C-704 AShM, 1 76MM gun PCO 8: 1 Madhumati (Sea Dragon) with 1 57mm gun; 5 Kapatakhaya (ex-UK Island); 2 Durjoy with 2 triple 324mm ASTT, 1 76mm gun PCC 8: 2 Meghna with 1 57mm gun (fishery protection); 1 Nirbhoy (ex-PRC Hainan) with 4 RBU 1200 Uragan A/S mor; 2 twin 57mm gun; 5 Padma PBFG 5 Durbar (PRC Hegu) with 2 single lnchr with SY-1 (CH-SS-N-1 Scrubbrush) AShM PBF 4 Titas (ROK Sea Dolphin) PB 7: 1 Barkat (ex-PRC Shanghai III); 2 Karnaphuli; 1 Salam (ex-PRC Huangfen); 3 Shaheed Daulat (PRC Shanghai II) MINE WARFARE • MINE COUNTERMEASURES 5 MSO 5: 1 Sagar; 4 Shapla (ex-UK River) AMPHIBIOUS LANDING SHIPS • LSL 1 LANDING CRAFT 14 LCU 4 (of which 2†) LCT 2 LCM 5 Darshak (Yuchin) LCVP 3† LOGISTICS AND SUPPORT 11 AG 1 AGHS 2: 1 Agradoot; 1 Anushandhan AGS 2 Darshak AOR 2 (coastal) AOT 1 Khan Jahangir Ali AR 1† ATF 1† AX 1 Shaheed Ruhul Amin

252 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2022 Other 54 paramilitary bn

Coast Guard 900 EQUIPMENT BY TYPE PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 23 PSO 4 Syed Nazrul (ex-ITA Minerva) with 1 hel landing platform PCC 5 Sobuj Bangla (Padma mod) PB 9: 1 Ruposhi Bangla; 4 Shaheed Daulat; 2 Shetgang; 2 Sonadia PBR 5 Pabna

DEPLOYMENT CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC: UN • MINUSCA 1,301; 1 cdo coy; 1 inf bn; 1 med coy; 1 hel coy DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO: UN • MONUSCO 1,632; 1 inf bn; 1 engr coy; 1 avn sqn; 1 hel coy LEBANON: UN • UNIFIL 229; 1 FSGM MALI: UN • MINUSMA 1,118; 1 mech inf bn; 1 engr coy; 2 sigs coy; 1 tpt coy SOUTH SUDAN: UN • UNMISS 1,623; 1 inf bn; 2 rvn coy; 2 engr coy

relatively small size, and the white paper advocates procurements to strengthen airspace control and harden C4 systems. There are also plans to develop a fully mechanised battalion. Under a long-standing bilateral arrangement, which currently extends to 2025, Brunei continues to host a British military presence including a Gurkha infantry battalion, a helicopter squadron and a jungle-warfare school. Brunei has a close defence relationship with Singapore and hosts a permanent Singapore Armed Forces training facility. There are regular bilateral exercises with Singapore and other Southeast Asian countries. The armed forces also take part in multinational exercises organised by the ADMM-Plus. Brunei has limited capacity to deploy forces abroad without assistance, but has nevertheless maintained a small deployment to the IMT in southern Philippines since 2004 and to UNIFIL in Lebanon since 2008. Brunei has no domestic defence industry and imports all its military equipment. In 2010, the Centre of Science and Technology Research and Development was established to conduct defencetechnology research, and provide engineering and support services to the armed forces.

ACTIVE 7,200 (Army 4,400 Navy 1,200 Air 1,100 Special Forces 500) Gendarmerie & Paramilitary 400–500 RESERVE 700 (Army 700)

ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE

SUDAN: UN • UNISFA 3

Army 4,400

WESTERN SAHARA: UN • MINURSO 27; 1 fd hospital

FORCES BY ROLE MANOEUVRE Light 3 inf bn COMBAT SUPPORT 1 cbt spt bn (1 armd recce sqn, 1 engr sqn)

Brunei BRN Brunei Dollar BND GDP per capita

2020

2021

2022

BND

16.6bn

21.0bn

USD

12.0bn

15.7bn

Reserves 700

USD

26,061

33,979

FORCES BY ROLE MANOEUVRE Light 1 inf bn

Growth

1.1

2.0

Inflation

1.9

2.5

Def bdgt

BND

606m

610m

USD

439m

457m

1.38

1.34

USD1=BND

Real-terms defence budget trend (USDm, constant 2015) 491 290 2008

Population

2015

2021

471,103

Age

0–14

15–19

20–24

25–29

30–64 65 plus

Male

11.4%

3.7%

4.2%

4.5%

22.0%

3.1%

Female

10.7%

3.6%

4.3%

4.8%

24.4%

3.2%

Capabilities The Royal Brunei Armed Forces are professional and well trained. In March 2021, the government’s budget statement set out an acquisition plan including uninhabited aerial and undersea vehicles and tracked armoured reconnaissance platforms. In May 2021, the government published Brunei’s fourth defence white paper in 17 years. C4ISR capabilities are being improved to offset the forces’

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES LT TK 20 FV101 Scorpion (incl FV105 Sultan CP) APC • APC (W) 45 VAB ENGINEERING & MAINTENANCE VEHICLES ARV 2 Samson ARTILLERY • MOR 81mm 24

Navy 1,200 FORCES BY ROLE SPECIAL FORCES 1 SF sqn EQUIPMENT BY TYPE PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 9 CORVETTES • FSG 4 Darussalam with 2 twin lnchr with MM40 Exocet Block 2 AShM, 1 57mm gun, 1 hel landing platform PCC 4 Ijtihad PBF 1 Mustaed AMPHIBIOUS • LANDING CRAFT • LCM 4: 2 Teraban; 2 Cheverton Loadmaster

Asia 253

FORCES BY ROLE MARITIME PATROL 1 sqn with CN235M TRAINING 1 sqn with Bell 206B Jet Ranger II TRANSPORT HELICOPTER 1 sqn with Bell 214 (SAR) 1 sqn with Bo-105 1 sqn with S-70i Black Hawk AIR DEFENCE 1 sqn with Rapier 1 sqn with Mistral EQUIPMENT BY TYPE AIRCRAFT MP 1 CN235M HELICOPTERS TPT 21: Medium 13: 1 Bell 214 (SAR); 12 S-70i Black Hawk; Light 8: 2 Bell 206B Jet Ranger II; 6 Bo-105 (armed, 81mm rockets) AIR DEFENCE • SAM • Point-defence Rapier; Mistral

Special Forces Regiment ε500 FORCES BY ROLE SPECIAL FORCES 1 SF regt

Gendarmerie & Paramilitary 400–500 Gurkha Reserve Unit 400–500 FORCES BY ROLE MANOEUVRE Light 2 inf bn(-)

DEPLOYMENT LEBANON: UN • UNIFIL 31 PHILIPPINES: IMT 8

FOREIGN FORCES Singapore 1 trg camp with infantry units on rotation; 1 trg school; 1 hel det with AS332 Super Puma United Kingdom 2,000; 1 (Gurkha) inf bn; 1 jungle trg centre; 1 hel sqn with 3 Bell 212

Cambodia CAM Cambodian Riel KHR

2020

2021

GDP

KHR

104tr

108tr

USD

25.2bn

26.1bn

per capita

USD

1,607

1,647

Growth

-3.1

1.9

Inflation

2.9

2.5

Def bdgt [a]

KHR

4.24tr

4.25tr

USD

1.03bn

1.02bn

4108.91

4154.20

USD1=KHR

2022

[a] Defence and security budget Real-terms defence budget trend (USDm, constant 2015) 944 260 2008

Population

2015

2021

17,304,363

Age

0–14

15–19

20–24

25–29

Male

15.0%

4.5%

4.1%

4.5%

30–64 65 plus 18.9%

1.7%

Female

14.7%

4.5%

4.2%

4.7%

20.3%

3.0%

Capabilities Despite their name, which reflects Cambodia’s formal status as a constitutional monarchy, the Royal Cambodian Armed Forces (RCAF) are essentially the modern manifestation of the armed forces of the former People’s Republic of Kampuchea, and were established in 1979 following Vietnam’s invasion. Cambodia faces no direct external military threats, besides border clashes with Thailand which last occurred in 2011. Internally, security concerns include civil unrest and transnational threats that can generate instability, such as drug trafficking. Cambodia’s most important international defence links are with the Chinese and Vietnamese armed forces, while relations with Russia also remain strong. Training ties have developed with China in recent years and exercises have grown in scale. Skirmishes on the border with Thailand since 2008 have provided little indication of capacity for high-intensity combat. However, Cambodia has contributed personnel to UN peacekeeping missions, including UNMISS in South Sudan. Cambodia lacks significant resources for personnel training, which is partly financed by Chinese military assistance. The RCAF has a large number of senior officers, while many formations and units appear to be of only nominal status. Funds for equipment purchases are limited, and most recent procurement has been from China. There is no domestic defence industry, with Cambodia possessing no ability to design and manufacture modern equipment for its armed forces.

ACTIVE 124,300 (Army 75,000 Navy 2,800 Air 1,500 Provincial Forces 45,000) Gendarmerie & Paramilitary 67,000 Conscript liability 18 months service authorised but not implemented since 1993

ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE Army ε75,000 6 Military Regions (incl 1 special zone for capital)

Asia

Air Force 1,100

254 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2022 FORCES BY ROLE SPECIAL FORCES 1 (Spec Ops Comd) AB/SF Bde MANOEUVRE Light 2 (2nd & 3rd Intervention) inf div (3 inf bde) 5 (Intervention) indep inf bde 8 indep inf bde Other 1 (70th) sy bde (4 sy bn) 17 (border) sy bn COMBAT SUPPORT 2 arty bn 4 fd engr regt COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT 1 (construction) engr regt 2 tpt bde AIR DEFENCE 1 AD bn EQUIPMENT BY TYPE ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES MBT 200+: 50 Type-59; 150+ T-54/T-55 LT TK 20+: Type-62; 20 Type-63 RECCE 20+ BRDM-2 IFV 70 BMP-1 APC 230+ APC (T) M113 APC (W) 230: 200 BTR-60/BTR-152; 30 OT-64 APC 15 Tiger 4×4 ENGINEERING & MAINTENANCE VEHICLES ARV T-54/T-55 MW Bozena; RA-140 DS ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE RCL 82mm B-10; 107mm B-11 ARTILLERY 468+ TOWED 400+: 76mm ZIS-3 (M-1942)/122mm D-30/ 122mm M-30 (M-1938)/130mm Type-59-I MRL 68+: 107mm Type-63; 122mm 48: 8 BM-21; ε20 PHL-81; 20 RM-70; 132mm BM-13-16 (BM-13); 140mm 20 BM-14-16 (BM-14) MOR 82mm M-37; 120mm M-43; 160mm M-160 AIR DEFENCE SAM • Point-defence FN-6 (CH-SA-10); FN-16 (CHSA-14) (reported) GUNS • TOWED 14.5mm ZPU-1/ZPU-2/ZPU-4; 37mm M-1939; 57mm S-60

Navy ε2,800 (incl 1,500 Naval Infantry) EQUIPMENT BY TYPE PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 13 PBF 4 Project 205P (Stenka) PB 7: 4 (PRC 46m); 3 (PRC 20m) PBR 2 Kaoh Chhlam AMPHIBIOUS • LANDING CRAFT 1 LCU 1 Type-067 (Yunnan) LOGISTICS AND SUPPORT • AFDL 1

Naval Infantry 1,500 FORCES BY ROLE MANOEUVRE Light 1 (31st) nav inf bde COMBAT SUPPORT 1 arty bn

Air Force 1,500 FORCES BY ROLE ISR/TRAINING 1 sqn with P-92 Echo TRANSPORT 1 VIP sqn (reporting to Council of Ministers) with An24RV Coke; AS350 Ecureuil; AS355F2 Ecureuil II 1 sqn with BN-2 Islander; Y-12 (II) TRANSPORT HELICOPTER 1 sqn with Mi-17 Hip H; Mi-8 Hip; Z-9 EQUIPMENT BY TYPE AIRCRAFT TPT • Light 9: 2 MA60; 5 P-92 Echo (pilot trg/recce); 2 Y-12 (II) (2 An-24RV Coke; 1 BN-2 Islander in store) TRG (5 L-39C Albatros* in store) HELICOPTERS MRH 14: 3 Mi-17 Hip H; 11 Z-9 TPT 4: Heavy (2 Mi-26 Halo in store); Light 4: 2 AS350 Ecureuil; 2 AS355F2 Ecureuil II

Provincial Forces 45,000+

Reports of at least 1 inf regt per province, with varying numbers of inf bn (with lt wpn)

Gendarmerie & Paramilitary 67,000 Police 67,000 (including gendarmerie)

DEPLOYMENT CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC: UN • MINUSCA 210; 1 engr coy LEBANON: UN • UNIFIL 179; 1 EOD coy MALI: UN • MINUSMA 289: 2 engr coy(-); 1 EOD coy SOUTH SUDAN: UN • UNMISS 86; 1 MP coy SUDAN: UN • UNISFA 1

Asia 255

China, People’s Republic of PRC 2020

2021

103tr

113tr

USD

14.9tr

16.9tr

USD

10,511

11,891

Growth

2.3

8.0

Inflation

2.4

1.1

per capita

Def exp Def bdgt [a]

CNY

ε1.72tr

ε1.81tr

USD

ε256bn

ε270bn

CNY

1.30tr

1.39tr

USD

189bn

207bn

6.90

6.70

USD1=CNY

2022

ACTIVE 2,035,000 (Ground Forces 965,000 Navy 260,000 Air Force 395,000 Strategic Missile Forces 120,000 Strategic Support Force 145,000 Other 150,000) Gendarmerie & Paramilitary 500,000 Conscript liability Selective conscription; all services 24 months

RESERVE ε510,000

ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE

[a] Central Expenditure budget including local militia funding Real-terms defence budget trend (USDbn, constant 2015) 195

2008

Population

82.4 2021

2015

1,405,791,350

Age

0–14

15–19

20–24

25–29

30–64 65 plus

Male

9.2%

2.9%

3.1%

3.7%

26.3%

6.1%

Female

8.0%

2.4%

2.7%

3.3%

25.5%

6.8%

Capabilities China’s People’s Liberation Army (PLA) is the world’s largest armed force, with an increasingly advanced equipment inventory. Its operational effectiveness, however, remains hampered by training and doctrine issues. China’s 2019 defence white paper did not significantly alter the strategic direction laid out in the 2015 edition and was focused more on updating the progress of PLA modernisation efforts. In 2021, amendments to the National Defence Law were passed, which handed decision-making powers fully to the Central Military Commission and removed the role of the State Council. A major restructuring process is now mostly complete and the Strategic Support Force continues to develop China’s cyber, space and information-dominance capabilities. China does not maintain any formal alliances, but it does have a number of key defence relationships with regional states and through its membership of the SCO. In 2021, Xi emphasised that the SCO should play a special role in Afghanistan following the United States’ withdrawal, though a military role for the PLA remains unlikely. China has also worked to develop defence ties with several African and Middle Eastern states. In 2021, the PLA’s conscription pattern changed from once to twice a year, with a particular focus of recruiting university graduates and those skilled in science and engineering. Improving readiness for combat operations is a key objective of the current reforms; the PLA currently lacks any significant recent combat experience and its training has traditionally suffered from over-scripted and unrealistic exercises. Though these weaknesses are acknowledged and possibly being addressed, it is unclear how effective the newly established structures will be at generating and controlling high-intensity combined-arms capabilities. In the short term, changes to roles and requirements for officers may have had a detrimental effect on morale within the PLA, as well as on its overall level of readiness. The requirement for out-of-area operations is relatively new for the PLA; the navy is the only service to have experience in extended deployments, assisted by its

Strategic Missile Forces 120,000+ People’s Liberation Army Rocket Force The People’s Liberation Army Rocket Force (formerly the Second Artillery Force) organises and commands its own troops to launch nuclear counter-attacks with strategic missiles and to conduct operations with conventional missiles. Organised as launch bdes subordinate to 6 army-level msl bases. Org varies by msl type FORCES BY ROLE SURFACE-TO-SURFACE MISSILE 1 ICBM bde with DF-4 3 ICBM bde with DF-5A/B 1 ICBM bde with DF-31 1 ICBM bde with DF-31A 3 ICBM bde with DF-31A(G) 2 ICBM bde with DF-41 (forming) 6 IRBM bde with DF-26 2 MRBM bde with DF-16 2 MRBM bde with DF-17 with HGV (forming) 6 MRBM bde with DF-21A/E 2 MRBM bde with DF-21C/D 3 SRBM bde with DF-11A/DF-15B 2 GLCM bde with CJ-10/CJ-10A/CJ-100 5 SSM bde (forming) EQUIPMENT BY TYPE SURFACE-TO-SURFACE MISSILE LAUNCHERS ICBM • Nuclear 116: ε10 DF-4 (CH-SS-3); ε20 DF5A/B (CH-SS-4 Mod 2/3); ε8 DF-31 (CH-SS-10 Mod 1); ε24 DF-31A (CH-SS-10 Mod 2); ε30 DF-31A(G) (CHSS-10 Mod 3); ε24 DF-41 (CH-SS-20) IRBM • Dual-capable 110+ DF-26 (CH-SS-18) MRBM 194: Nuclear ε80 DF-21A/E (CH-SS-5 Mod 2/6); Conventional 114: ε36 DF-16 (CH-SS-11 Mod 1/2); ε24 DF-17 with HGV (CH-SS-22); ε24 DF-21C (CH-SS-5 Mod 4); ε30 DF-21D (CH-SS-5 Mod 5 – ASBM) SRBM • Conventional 189: ε108 DF-11A (CH-SS-7 Mod 2); ε81 DF-15B (CH-SS-6 Mod 3) GLCM • Conventional 108: ε54 CJ-10/CJ-10A (CHSSC-9 mod 1/2); ε54 CJ-100 (CH-SSC-X-13 Splinter) (entering service)

Asia

Chinese Yuan Renminbi CNY GDP CNY

support base in Djibouti. Major platform inventories in all the services comprise a mix of modern, older and obsolescent designs. The reduction in overall force size as part of the restructuring process has seen some older equipment designs withdrawn from service. China has an extensive defence-industrial base, capable of producing advanced equipment across all domains, although questions persist over quality and reliability.

256 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2022

Navy EQUIPMENT BY TYPE SUBMARINES • STRATEGIC 6 SSBN 6 Type-094 (Jin) with up to 12 JL-2 (CH-SS-N-14) strategic SLBM, 6 single 533mm TT with Yu-6 HWT

Defensive EQUIPMENT BY TYPE RADAR • STRATEGIC: 4+ large phased array radars; some detection and tracking radars

Space EQUIPMENT BY TYPE SATELLITES 161 COMMUNICATIONS 9: 2 Shen Tong-1; 3 Shen Tong-2; 2 Feng Huo-1; 2 Feng Huo-2 NAVIGATION/POSITIONING/TIMING 45: 3 Beidou2(M); 5 Beidou-2(G); 7 Beidou-2(IGSO); 24 Beidou-3(M); 3 Beidou-3(G); 3 Beidou-3(ISGO) METEOROLOGY/OCEANOGRAPHY 8: 2 Yunhai-1; 6 Yunhai-2 ISR 32: 2 Jianbing-5; 4 Jianbing-6; 3 Jianbing-7; 5 Jianbing-9; 4 Jianbing-10; 3 Jianbing-11/-12; 4 LKW; 2 Tianhui-2; 2 Yaogan-29; 1 Yaogan-34; 2 ZY-1 ELINT/SIGINT 67: 30 Chuangxin-5 (Yaogan-30); 18 Jianbing-8; 8 Shijian-6 (4 pairs – reported ELINT/SIGINT role); 7 Shijian-11 (reported ELINT/SIGINT role); 4 Yaogan-32 COUNTERSPACE • MSL SC-19 (reported)

Army ε965,000 FORCES BY ROLE COMMAND 13 (Group) army HQ SPECIAL FORCES 15 spec ops bde MANOEUVRE Armoured 34 (cbd arms) armd bde Mechanised 3 (high alt) mech inf div (3 (cbd arms) mech regt, 1 arty regt, 1 AD regt) 16 (cbd arms) mech inf bde 2 indep mech inf regt Light 1 (high alt) inf div (3 (cbd arms) inf regt, 1 arty regt, 1 AD regt) 25 (cbd arms) inf bde Air Manoeuvre 2 air aslt bde Amphibious 6 amph aslt bde Other 1 (OPFOR) armd bde 1 mech gd div (1 armd regt, 2 mech inf regt, 1 arty regt, 1 AD regt) 1 sy gd div (4 sy regt) 16 (border) sy bde 15 (border) sy regt 1 (border) sy gp

COMBAT SUPPORT 15 arty bde 9 engr/NBC bde 5 engr bde 5 NBC bde 1 engr regt COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT 13 spt bde COASTAL DEFENCE 19 coastal arty/AShM bde AVIATION 1 mixed avn bde HELICOPTER 12 hel bde TRAINING 4 hel trg bde AIR DEFENCE 15 AD bde

Reserves The People’s Liberation Army Reserve Force is being restructured, and the army component reduced. As a result some of the units below may have been re-roled or disbanded FORCES BY ROLE MANOEUVRE Armoured 2 armd regt Light 18 inf div 4 inf bde 3 indep inf regt COMBAT SUPPORT 3 arty div 7 arty bde 15 engr regt 1 ptn br bde 3 ptn br regt 10 chem regt 10 sigs regt COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT 9 log bde 1 log regt AIR DEFENCE 17 AD div 8 AD bde 8 AD regt EQUIPMENT BY TYPE ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES MBT 5,400: 600 ZTZ-59/-59-II; 600 ZTZ-59D; 200 ZTZ-79; 300 ZTZ-88A/B; 1,000 ZTZ-96; 1,500 ZTZ-96A; 600 ZTZ99; 600 ZTZ-99A LT TK 750: 250 ZTD-05; 400 ZTQ-15; 100 ZTS-63A ASLT 1,000 ZTL-11 IFV 7,200: 400 ZBD-04; 1,900 ZBD-04A; 2,500 ZBL-08; 600 ZBD-86; 650 ZBD-86A; 550 ZSL-92; 600 ZSL-92B APC 4,350 APC (T) 2,700: 750 ZSD-63; 200 ZSD-63C; 1,750 ZSD89 APC (W) 1,650: 700 ZSL-92A; 900 ZSL-10; 50 ZSL-93

Asia 257 LOITERING MUNITIONS Harpy AIR DEFENCE SAM 614+ Medium-range 200 HQ-16A/B (CH-SA-16) Short-range 414: 24 9K331 Tor-M1 (RS-SA-15 Gauntlet); 30 HQ-6D (CH-SA-6); 200 HQ-7A/B (CH-SA-4); 140 HQ-17 (CH-SA-15); 20+ HQ-17A (CH-SA-15) Point-defence HN-5A/B (CH-SA-3); FN-6 (CH-SA-10); QW-1 (CH-SA-7); QW-2 (CH-SA-8) GUNS 7,396+ SP 396: 25mm 270 PGZ-04A; 30mm some PGL-19; 35mm 120 PGZ-07; 37mm 6 PGZ-88 TOWED 7,000+: 25mm PG-87; 35mm PG-99 (GDF002); 37mm PG-55 (M-1939)/PG-65/PG-74; 57mm PG59 (S-60); 100mm PG-59 (KS-19) AIR-LAUNCHED MISSILES AAM • IR TY-90 ASM AKD-8; AKD-9; AKD-10

Navy ε260,000 The PLA Navy is organised into five service arms: submarine, surface, naval aviation, coastal defence and marine corps, as well as other specialised units. There are three fleets, one each in the Eastern, Southern and Northern theatre commands EQUIPMENT BY TYPE SUBMARINES 59 STRATEGIC • SSBN 6 Type-094 (Jin) with up to 12 JL-2 (CH-SS-N-14) strategic SLBM, 6 single 533mm TT with Yu-6 HWT TACTICAL 53 SSN 6: 2 Type-093 (Shang I) with 6 single 533mm TT with YJ-82 (CH-SS-N-7) AShM or YJ-18 (CH-SS-N-13) AShM/Yu-3 HWT/Yu-6 HWT 4 Type-093A (Shang II) with 6 single 533mm TT with YJ-82 (CH-SS-N-7) AShM or YJ-18 (CH-SS-N-13) AShM/Yu-3 HWT/Yu-6 HWT (3 Type-091 (Han) in reserve with 6 single 533mm TT with YJ-82 (CH-SS-N-7) AShM/Yu-3 HWT) SSK 46: 2 Project 877 (Kilo) with 6 single 533mm TT with TEST-71ME HWT/53-65KE HWT 2 Project 636 (Improved Kilo) with 6 single 533mm TT with TEST-71ME HWT/53-65KE HWT 8 Project 636M (Improved Kilo) with 6 single 533mm TT with TEST-71ME HWT/53-65KE HWT/3M54E Klub-S (RS-SS-N-27B Sizzler) AShM 4 Type-035B (Ming) with 8 single 533mm TT with Yu-3 HWT/Yu-4 HWT 12 Type-039(G) (Song) with 6 single 533mm TT with YJ-82 (CH-SS-N-7) AShM or YJ-18 (CH-SS-N-13) AShM/Yu-3 HWT/Yu-6 HWT 4 Type-039A (Yuan) (fitted with AIP) with 6 533mm TT with YJ-82 (CH-SS-N-7) AShM or YJ-18 (CHSS-N-13) AShM/Yu-3 HWT/Yu-6 HWT 14 Type-039B (Yuan) (fitted with AIP) with 6 533mm TT with YJ-82 (CH-SS-N-7) AShM or YJ-18 (CHSS-N-13) AShM/Yu-3 HWT/Yu-6 HWT

Asia

AAV 900 ZBD-05 AUV Dongfeng Mengshi; Tiger 4×4 ENGINEERING & MAINTENANCE VEHICLES ARV Type-73; Type-84; Type-85; Type-97; Type-654 VLB MTU; TMM; GQL-110A (Type-84A); GQL-111 (HZQL75); GQL-321 (HZQL22); GQL-410; High Altitude VLB; HZQL-18; ZGQ-84 MW Type-74; Type-79; Type-81-II; Type-84 ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE MSL SP 1,100: 450 HJ-8 (veh mounted); 200 HJ-10; 450 ZSL02B MANPATS HJ-73D; HJ-8A/C/E; HJ-11; HJ-12 RCL 3,966: 75mm PF-56; 82mm PF-65 (B-10); PF-78; 105mm PF-75; 120mm PF-98 GUNS 1,788 SP 480: 100mm 250 PTL-02; 120mm 230 PTZ-89 TOWED • 100mm 1,308 PT-73 (T-12)/PT-86 ARTILLERY 9,834+ SP 2,910: 122mm 2,140: 500 PLZ-89; 550 PLZ-07A; 150 PLZ-07B; 300 PCL-09; 550 PLL-09; 30 PCL-161; 60+ PCL171; 152mm 150 PLZ-83A/B; 155mm 620: 320 PLZ-05; 300 PCL-181; (400 in store: 122mm 200 PLZ-89; 152mm 200 PLZ-83A) TOWED 1,234: 122mm 500 PL-96 (D-30); 130mm 234 PL-59 (M-46)/PL-59-I; 152mm 500 PL-66 (D-20); (4,400 in store: 122mm 2,800 PL-54-1 (M-1938)/PL-83/PL-60 (D74)/PL-96 (D-30); 152mm 1,600 PL-54 (D-1)/PL-66 (D-20)) GUN/MOR 120mm 1,250: 450 PLL-05; 800 PPZ-10 MRL 1,640+ 107mm PH-63; 122mm 1,415: 550 PHL-81/ PHL-90; 350 PHL-11; 375 PHZ-89; 100 PHZ-11; 30 PHL20; 10+ PHL-21; 300mm 175 PHL-03; 370mm 50+ PHL-19; (700 in store: 122mm 700 PHL-81) MOR 2,800: 82mm PP-53 (M-37)/PP-67/PP-82/PP-87; SP 82mm PCP-001; 100mm PP-89 COASTAL DEFENCE AShM HY-1 (CH-SSC-2 Silkworm); HY-2 (CH-SSC-3 Seersucker); HY-4 (CH-SSC-7 Sadsack); YJ-62 PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 25 PB 25: 9 Huzong; 16 Shenyang AMPHIBIOUS • LANDING CRAFT • LCM 255: 3+ Yugong; 50+ Yunnan II; 100+ Yupen; 2+ Yutu; approx. 100 Yuwei LOGISTICS AND SUPPORT 22 AK 6+ Leizhuang AKR 1 Yunsong (capacity 1 MBT; 1 med hel) ARC 1 AOT 11: 1 Fuzhong; 8 Fubing; 2 Fulei ATF 2 Huntao AX 1 Haixun III AIRCRAFT • TPT 6: Medium 4: 2 Y-8; 2 Y-9; Light 2 Y-7 HELICOPTERS ATK 300+: 180 WZ-10; 120+ WZ-19 MRH 208: 22 Mi-17 Hip H; 3 Mi-17-1V Hip H; 38 Mi17V-5 Hip H; 25 Mi-17V-7 Hip H; ε120 Z-9WZ TPT 398: Heavy 111: 9 Z-8A; 96 Z-8B; 6 Z-8L; Medium 219: 140 Mi-171; 19 S-70C2 (S-70C) Black Hawk; ε60 Z-20; Light 68: 15 H120 Colibri; 53 Z-11 UNINHABITED AERIAL VEHICLES CISR • Heavy 5+ CH-4B ISR • Heavy BZK-005; BZK-009 (reported); Medium BZK-006 (incl variants); BZK-007; BZK-008

258 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2022 (10 Type-035(G) (Ming) in reserve with 8 single 533mm TT with Yu-3 HWT/Yu-4 HWT) SSB 1 Type-032 (Qing) (SLBM trials) PRINCIPAL SURFACE COMBATANTS 86 AIRCRAFT CARRIERS • CV 2: 1 Type-001 (Kuznetsov) with 3 18-cell GMLS with HHQ-10 (CH-SA-N-17) SAM, 2 RBU 6000 Smerch 2 A/S mor, 3 H/PJ-11 CIWS (capacity 18–24 J-15 ac; 17 Ka-28/Ka-31/Z-8S/Z-8JH/Z-8AEW hel) 1 Type-002 (Kuznetsov mod) with 3 18-cell GMLS with HHQ-10 (CH-SA-N-17) SAM, 2 RBU 6000 Smerch 2 A/S mor, 3 H/PJ-11 CIWS (capacity 32 J-15 ac; 12 Ka28/Ka-31/Z-8S/Z-8JH/Z-8AEW hel) CRUISERS • CGHM 3 Type-055 (Renhai) with 14 8-cell VLS (8 fore, 6 aft) with YJ-18A (CH-SS-N-13) AShM/ HHQ-9B (CH-SA-N-21) SAM/Yu-8 A/S msl, 1 24-cell GMLS with HHQ-10 (CH-SA-N-17) SAM, 2 triple 324mm TT with Yu-7 LWT, 1 H/PJ-11 CIWS, 1 130mm gun (capacity 2 med hel) DESTROYERS 36 DDGHM 34: 1 Hangzhou (Project 956E (Sovremenny I)) (in refit) with 2 quad lnchr with 3M80E Moskit-E (RS-SSN-22A Sunburn) AShM, 2 single 3S90E lnchr with 9M38E M-22E Shtil (RS-SA-N-7 Gadfly) SAM, 2 twin 533mm DTA-53-956 ASTT with SET-65KE HWT/53-65KE HWT, 2 RBU 1000 Smerch 3 A/S mor, 4 AK630 CIWS, 2 twin 130mm gun (capacity 1 Z-9C/Ka-28 Helix A hel) 2 Hangzhou (Project 956EM (Sovremenny II)) with 2 quad lnchr with 3M80MVE Moskit-E (RS-SS-N22B Sunburn) AShM, 2 single 3S90E lnchr with 9M38E M-22E Shtil (RS-SA-N-7 Gadfly) SAM, 2 twin 533mm DTA-53-956 ASTT with SET-65KE HWT/53-65KE HWT, 2 RBU 1000 Smerch 3 A/S mor, 2 Kashtan (RS-CADS-N-1) CIWS, 1 twin 130mm gun (capacity 1 Z-9C/Ka-28 Helix A hel) 1 Hangzhou (Project 956E (Sovremenny III)) with 2 quad lnchr with YJ-12A AShM, 4 8-cell H/AJK16 VLS with HHQ-16 (CH-SA-N-16) SAM/Yu-8 A/S msl, 2 triple 324mm ASTT with Yu-7 LWT, 4 AK630M CIWS, 2 twin 130mm gun (capacity 1 Z-9C/Ka-28 Helix A hel) 1 Type-051B (Luhai) with 4 quad lnchr with YJ-12A AShM, 4 8-cell H/AJK-16 VLS with HHQ-16 (CHSA-N-16) SAM/Yu-8 A/S msl, 2 triple 324mm ASTT with Yu-7 LWT, 2 H/PJ-11 CIWS, 1 twin 100mm gun (capacity 2 Z-9C/Ka-28 Helix A hel) 2 Type-052 (Luhu) with 4 quad lnchr with YJ-83 AShM, 1 octuple lnchr with HHQ-7 (CH-SA-N-4) SAM, 2 triple 324mm ASTT with Yu-7 LWT, 2 FQF 2500 A/S mor, 2 H/PJ-12 CIWS, 1 twin 100mm gun (capacity 2 Z-9C hel) 2 Type-052B (Luyang) (of which 1 in refit) with 4 quad lnchr with YJ-83 AShM, 2 single 3S90E lnchr with 9M317E Shtil-1 (SA-N-7B) SAM, 2 triple 324mm ASTT with Yu-7 LWT, 2 H/PJ-12 CIWS, 1 100mm gun (capacity 1 Ka-28 Helix A hel) 6 Type-052C (Luyang II) with 2 quad lnchr with YJ62 AShM, 8 8-cell VLS with HHQ-9 (CH-SA-N-9) SAM (CH-SA-N-9), 2 triple 324mm TT with Yu-7

LWT, 2 H/PJ-12 CIWS, 1 100mm gun (capacity 2 Ka-28 Helix A hel) 10 Type-052D (Luyang III) with 8 octuple VLS with YJ-18A (CH-SS-N-13) AShM/HHQ-9B (CHSA-N-21) SAM/Yu-8 A/S msl, 1 24-cell GMLS with HHQ-10 (CH-SA-N-17) SAM, 2 triple 324mm TT with Yu-7 LWT, 1 H/PJ-12 CIWS, 1 130mm gun (capacity 2 Ka-28 Helix A hel) 3 Type-052D (Luyang III) with 8 octuple VLS with YJ18A (CH-SS-N-13) AShM/HHQ-9B (CH-SA-N-21) SAM/Yu-8 A/S msl, 1 24-cell GMLS with HHQ-10 (CH-SA-N-17) SAM, 2 triple 324mm TT with Yu-7 LWT, 1 H/PJ-11 CIWS, 1 130mm gun (capacity 2 Ka-28 Helix A hel) 6 Type-052D mod (Luyang III mod) with 8 octuple VLS with YJ-18A (CH-SS-N-13) AShM/HHQ-9B (CH-SA-N-21) SAM/Yu-8 A/S msl, 1 24-cell GMLS with HHQ-10 (CH-SA-N-17) SAM, 2 triple 324mm TT with Yu-7 LWT, 1 H/PJ-11 CIWS, 1 130mm gun (capacity 2 Z-9/Z-20 hel) DDGM 2 Type-051C (Luzhou) with 2 quad lnchr with YJ-83 AShM; 6 6-cell B-204 VLS with S-300FM Rif-M (SA-N-20 Gargoyle) SAM, 2 H/PJ-12 CIWS, 1 100mm gun, 1 hel landing platform FRIGATES 45 FFGHM 40: 4 Type-053H3 (Jiangwei II) with 2 quad lnchr with YJ-83 AShM, 1 octuple lnchr with HHQ-7 (CHSA-N-4) SAM, 2 RBU 1200 A/S mor, 1 twin 100mm gun (capacity 1 Z-9C hel) 4 Type-053H3 (Jiangwei II Upgrade) with 2 quad lnchr with YJ-83 AShM, 1 8-cell GMLS with HHQ10 (CH-SA-N-17) SAM, 2 RBU 1200 A/S mor, 1 twin 100mm gun (capacity 1 Z-9C hel) 1 Type-054 (Jiangkai) with 2 quad lnchr with YJ-83 AShM, 1 octuple lnchr with HHQ-7 (CH-SA-N-4) SAM, 2 triple 324mm TT with Yu-7 LWT, 2 RBU 1200 A/S mor, 4 AK630 CIWS, 1 100mm gun (capacity 1 Ka-28 Helix A/Z-9C hel) 1 Type-054 (Jiangkai) with 2 quad lnchr with YJ83 AShM, 1 24-cell GMLS with HHQ-10 (CHSA-N-17) SAM, 2 triple 324mm TT with Yu-7 LWT, 2 RBU 1200 A/S mor, 4 AK630 CIWS, 1 100mm gun (capacity 1 Ka-28 Helix A/Z-9C hel) 16 Type-054A (Jiangkai II) with 2 quad lnchr with YJ83 AShM, 4 8-cell VLS with Yu-8 A/S msl/HHQ16 (CH-SA-N-16) SAM, 2 triple 324mm TT with Yu-7 LWT, 2 FQF 3200 A/S mor, 2 H/PJ-12 CIWS, 1 76mm gun (capacity 1 Ka-28 Helix A/Z-9C hel) 14 Type-054A (Jiangkai II) with 2 quad lnchr with YJ83 AShM, 4 8-cell VLS with Yu-8 A/S msl/HHQ16 (CH-SA-N-16) SAM, 2 triple 324mm TT with Yu-7 LWT, 2 FQF 3200 A/S mor, 2 H/PJ-11 CIWS, 1 76mm gun (capacity 1 Ka-28 Helix A/Z-9C hel) FFG 5: 1 Type-053H1 (Jianghu I) with 2 twin lnchr with HY-2 (CH-SS-N-2 Safflower) AShM, 2 RBU 1200 Uragan A/S mor, 1 twin 100mm gun (capacity 1 Z-9C hel) 4 Type-053H1G (Jianghu I Upgrade) with 2 quad lnchr with YJ-83 AShM, 2 RBU 1200 Uragan A/S mor, 2 twin 100mm gun

PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS ε196 CORVETTES • FSGM 72: 22 Type-056 (Jiangdao) with 2 twin lnchr with YJ-83 AShM, 1 8-cell GMLS with HHQ-10 (CH-SA-N-17) SAM, 2 triple 324mm ASTT with Yu-7 LWT, 1 76mm gun, 1 hel landing platform 50 Type-056A (Jiangdao) with 2 twin lnchr with YJ-83 AShM, 1 8-cell GMLS with HHQ-10 (CH-SA-N-17) SAM, 2 triple 324mm ASTT with Yu-7 LWT, 1 76mm gun, 1 hel landing platform PCFG ε60 Type-022 (Houbei) with 2 quad lnchr with YJ83 AShM, 1 H/PJ-13 CIWS PCG 24: 6 Type-037-II (Houjian) with 2 triple lnchr with YJ-8 (CH-SS-N-4) AShM; 18 Type-037-IG (Houxin) with 2 twin lnchr with YJ-8 (CH-SS-N-4) AShM PCC 8+: some Type-037 (Hainan) with ε4 RBU 1200 Uragan A/S mor, 2 twin 57mm gun some Type-037-I (Haijiu) with 4 RBU 1200 Uragan A/S mor, 1 twin 57mm gun ε8 Type-037-IS (Haiqing) with 2 FQF-3200 A/S mor PB ε32 Type-062-1 (Shanghai III) MINE WARFARE • MINE COUNTERMEASURES 57: MCO 20: 4 Type-081 (Wochi); 9+ Type-081A (Wochi mod); 7+ Type-082II (Wozang) MSC 16: 4 Type-082 (Wosao I); 12 Type-082-II (Wosao II) MSD 21 Type-529 (Wonang) (operated by Wozang MCO) AMPHIBIOUS PRINCIPAL AMPHIBIOUS SHIPS 9: LHD 1 Type-075 (Yushen) with 2 24-cell GMLS with HHQ-10 (CH-SA-N-17) SAM, 2 H/PJ-11 CIWS (capacity 3 Yuyi LCAC; 800 troops; at least 60 AFVs; 28 hel) LPD 8 Type-071 (Yuzhao) with 4 AK630 CIWS, 1 76mm gun (capacity 4 Yuyi LCAC plus supporting vehicles; 800 troops; 60 armoured vehs; 4 hel) LANDING SHIPS 49 LST 28: 4 Type-072-IIG (Yukan) (capacity 2 LCVP; 10 tk; 200 troops) 9 Type-072-II/III (Yuting I) (capacity 10 tk; 250 troops; 2 hel) 9 Type-072A (Yuting II) (capacity 4 LCVP; 10 tk; 250 troops) 6 Type-072B (Yuting II) (capacity 4 LCVP; 10 tk; 250 troops) LSM 21: 1 Type-073-II (Yudeng) with 1 twin 57mm gun (capacity 5 tk or 500 troops) 10 Type-073A (Yunshu) (capacity 6 tk) 7 Type-074 (Yuhai) (capacity 2 tk; 250 troops) 3 Type-074 (mod) LANDING CRAFT 60 LCU 11 Type-074A (Yubei) (capacity 10 tanks or 150 troops) LCM ε30 Type-067A (Yunnan) LCAC 19: 15+ Type-726 (Yuyi); 4 Zubr LOGISTICS AND SUPPORT 157 ABU 1 Type-744A AFS 2: 1 Type-904 (Dayun); 1 Type-904A (Danyao I)

AFSH 2 Type-904B (Danyao II) AG 7: 6 Kanhai; 1 Kanwu AGB 2 Type-272 (Yanrao) with 1 hel landing platform AGE 7: 2 Type-909 (Dahua) with 1 hel landing platform (weapons test platform); 1 Kantan; 3 Type-636 (Shupang); 1 Yuting I (naval rail gun test ship) AGI 19: 1 Dadie; 1 Type-815 (Dongdiao) with 1 hel landing platform; 9 Type-815A (Dongdiao) with 1 hel landing platform; 8 FT-14 AGM 4 Type-718 (Yuan Wang) (space and missile tracking) AGOR 2 Dahua AGOS 4 Dongjian AGS 8 Type-636A (Shupang) with 1 hel landing platform AH 8: 5 Ankang; 1 Type-920 (Anwei); 2 Anshen AOEH 2 Type-901 (Fuyu) with 2 H/PJ-13 CIWS AORH 10: 2 Type-903 (Fuchi); 7 Type-903A (Fuchi mod); 1 Fusu AOT 22: 4 Fubai; 16 Type-632 (Fujian); 2 Fuxiao AP 4: 2 Daguan; 2 Darong ARC 2 Youlan ARS 18: 1 Dadao; 1 Dadong; 1 Type-922III (Dalang II); 3 Type-922IIIA (Dalang III); 3 Dasan; 4 Datuo; 2 Dazhou; 3 Hai Jiu 101 with 1 hel landing platform ASR 6: 3 Type-926 (Dalao); 3 Type-925 (Dajiang) (capacity 2 Z-8) ATF 14: ε11 Hujiu; 3 Tuqiang AWT 8: 4 Fujian; 3 Fushi; 1 Jinyou AX 4: 1 Type-0891A (Dashi) with 2 hel landing platforms 1 Daxin with 2 FQF 1200 A/S mor, 1 57mm gun, 1 hel landing platform 1 Type-927 (Qi Ji Guang) with 1 76mm gun, 1 hel landing platform 1 Yudao ESD 1 Donghaidao COASTAL DEFENCE • AShM 72 YJ-12/YJ-62 (3 regt)

Naval Aviation 26,000 FORCES BY ROLE Naval aviation fighter/ground-attack units adopted brigade structure in 2017 BOMBER 2 regt with H-6DU/G/J FIGHTER/GROUND ATTACK 1 bde with J-10A/S Firebird; Su-30MK2 Flanker G 1 bde with J-11B/BS Flanker L 1 bde with J-11B/BS Flanker L; JH-7A Flounder 1 bde with J-8F Finback; JH-7A Flounder 2 regt with J-15 Flanker GROUND ATTACK 1 bde with JH-7 Flounder ANTI-SUBMARINE WARFARE 2 regt with KQ-200 ELINT/ISR/ASW 1 regt with Y-8JB/X; Y-9JZ; KQ-200 AIRBORNE EARLY WARNING & CONTROL 3 regt with Y-8J; KJ-200; KJ-500 TRANSPORT 1 regt with Y-7H; Y-8C; CRJ-200/700

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Asia 259

260 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2022 TRAINING 1 regt with CJ-6A 1 regt with HY-7 2 regt with JL-8 1 regt with JL-9G 1 regt with JL-9 1 regt with JL-10 1 regt with Z-9C HELICOPTER 1 regt with Ka-27PS; Ka-28; Ka-31 1 regt with AS365N; Z-9C/D; Z-8J/JH 1 regt with Y-7G; Z-8; Z-8J; Z-8S; Z-9C/D AIR DEFENCE 2 SAM bde with HQ-9; HQ-9B: HQ-6A EQUIPMENT BY TYPE AIRCRAFT 446 combat capable BBR 45: 27 H-6G/G mod; 18 H-6J FTR 24 J-8F Finback FGA 169: 16 J-10A Firebird; 7 J-10S Firebird; 72 J-11B/ BS Flanker L; ε50 J-15 Flanker; 24 Su-30MK2 Flanker G ATK 120: 48 JH-7; 72 JH-7A Flounder ASW 20+ KQ-200 ELINT 13: 4 Y-8JB High New 2; 3 Y-8X; 6 Y-9JZ AEW&C 24: 6 KJ-200 Moth; 14+ KJ-500; 4 Y-8J Mask TKR 5 H-6DU TPT 38: Medium 6 Y-8C; Light 28: 20 Y-5; 2 Y-7G; 6 Y-7H; PAX 4: 2 CRJ-200; 2 CRJ-700 TRG 118: 38 CJ-6; 12 HY-7; 16 JL-8*; 28 JL-9*; 12 JL-9G*; 12 JL-10* HELICOPTERS ASW 32: 14 Ka-28 Helix A; 14 Z-9C; 4 Z-18F AEW 10+: 9 Ka-31; 1+ Z-18 AEW MRH 18: 7 AS365N; 11 Z-9D SAR 11: 3 Ka-27PS; 4 Z-8JH; 2 Z-8S; 2 Z-9S TPT 38: Heavy 30: 8 SA321 Super Frelon; 9 Z-8; 13 Z-8J; Medium 8 Mi-8 Hip UNINHABITED AERIAL VEHICLES ISR Heavy BZK-005; Medium BZK-007 AIR DEFENCE • SAM Long-range 32: 16 HQ-9 (CH-SA-9); 16 HQ-9B (CHSA-21) Short-range HQ-6A (CH-SA-6) AIR-LAUNCHED MISSILES AAM • IR PL-5; PL-8; PL-9; R-73 (RS-AA-11A Archer); IR/SARH R-27 (RS-AA-10 Alamo); SARH PL-11; ARH R-77 (RS-AA-12A Adder); PL-12 (CH-AA-7) ASM KD-88 AShM Kh-31A (RS-AS-17B Krypton); YJ-12; YJ-61; YJ8K; YJ-83K; YJ-9 ARM Kh-31P (RS-AS-17A Krypton); YJ-91 BOMBS Laser-guided: LS-500J TV-guided: KAB-500KR; KAB-1500KR

Marines ε35,000 FORCES BY ROLE SPECIAL FORCES 1 spec ops bde MANOEUVRE Mechanised 3 mne bde

Amphibious 3 mne bde HELICOPTER 1 bde (forming) with Z-8C EQUIPMENT BY TYPE ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES LT TK 80+: ε80 ZTD-05; some ZTQ-15 ASLT ε50 ZTL-11 IFV ε150 ZBL-08 AAV ε240 ZBD-05 ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE MSL • MANPATS HJ-73; HJ-8 RCL 120mm Type-98 ARTILLERY 40+ SP 122mm 40+: 20+ PLZ-07; 20+ PLZ-89 MRL 107mm PH-63 MOR 82mmε HELICOPTERS TPT • Heavy 5 Z-8C AIR DEFENCE • SAM • Point-defence HN-5 (CHSA-3); FN-6 (CH-SA-10); QW-2 (CH-SA-8)

Air Force 395,000 FORCES BY ROLE BOMBER 1 regt with H-6M 2 regt with H-6H 4 regt with H-6K 1 bde with H-6N (forming) FIGHTER 2 bde with J-7 Fishcan 5 bde with J-7E Fishcan 5 bde with J-7G Fishcan 2 bde with J-8F/H Finback 2 bde with J-11A/Su-27UBK Flanker 4 bde with J-11A/J-11B/Su-27UBK Flanker 2 bde with J-11B/BS Flanker L FIGHTER/GROUND ATTACK 6 bde with J-10A/S Firebird 1 bde with J-10A/C/S Firebird 2 bde with J-10B/S Firebird 5 bde with J-10C/S Firebird 1 bde with Su-35 Flanker M; Su-30MKK Flanker G 5 bde with J-16 Flanker 2 bde with Su-30MKK Flanker G 1 bde with J-20A 1 bde with J-11B/BS Flanker L; J-20A GROUND ATTACK 6 bde with JH-7A Flounder ELECTRONIC WARFARE 4 regt with Y-8CB/DZ/G/XZ; Y-9G/XZ ISR 1 regt with JZ-8F Finback* 1 bde with JZ-8F Finback* AIRBORNE EARLY WARNING & CONTROL 1 regt with KJ-500 1 regt with KJ-200 Moth; KJ-2000; Y-8T SEARCH & RESCUE 4 bde with Y-5; Mi-171E; Z-8 1 regt with Y-5; Mi-171E; Z-8

Asia 261 Medium-range 150 HQ-12 (CH-SA-12) Short-range 74+: 50+ HQ-6A (CH-SA-6); 24 HQ-6D (CH-SA-6) GUNS • TOWED • 57mm PG-59 (S-60) AIR-LAUNCHED MISSILES AAM • IR PL-5B/C; PL-8; R-73 (RS-AA-11A Archer); IIR PL-10; IR/SARH R-27 (RS-AA-10 Alamo); SARH PL-11; ARH PL-12 (CH-AA-7); PL-15 (CH-AA-10); R-77 (RSAA-12A Adder); R-77-1 (RVV-SD) (RS-AA-12B Adder) ASM AKD-9; AKD-10; KD-88; Kh-29 (RS-AS-14 Kedge); Kh-31A (RS-AS-17B Krypton); Kh-59M (RS-AS-18 Kazoo) AShM YJ-12 ARM Kh-31P (RS-AS-17A Krypton); YJ-91 (Domestically produced Kh-31P variant) ALCM • Conventional CJ-20; YJ(KD)-63 BOMBS Laser-guided: LS-500J; LT-2 TV-guided: KAB-500KR; KAB-1500KR

Airborne Corps FORCES BY ROLE SPECIAL FORCES 1 spec ops bde MANOEUVRE Air Manoeuvre 6 AB bde COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT 1 spt bde TRANSPORT 1 bde with Y-5; Y-7; Y-8; Y-12 HELICOPTER 1 regt with WZ-10K; Z-8KA; Z-9WZ EQUIPMENT BY TYPE ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES ABCV 180 ZBD-03 APC • APC (T) 4 ZZZ-03 (CP) AUV CS/VN3 mod ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE SP some HJ-9 ARTILLERY 162+ TOWED 122mm ε54 PL-96 (D-30) MRL 107mm ε54 PH-63 MOR 54+: 82mm some; 100mm 54 AIRCRAFT • TPT 40: Medium 6 Y-8; Light 34: 20 Y-5; 2 Y-7; 12 Y-12D HELICOPTERS ATK 8 WZ-10K CSAR 8 Z-8KA MRH 12 Z-9WZ AIR DEFENCE SAM • Point-defence QW-1 (CH-SA-7) GUNS • TOWED 25mm 54 PG-87

Strategic Support Force ε175,000 At the end of 2015, a new Strategic Support Force was established by drawing upon capabilities previously exercised by the PLA’s 3rd and 4th departments and other central functions. It reports to the Central Military Commission and is responsible for the PLA’s space and cyber capabilities

Asia

TANKER 1 bde with H-6U TRANSPORT 1 (VIP) regt with A319; B-737; CRJ-200/700 1 (VIP) regt with Tu-154M; Tu-154M/D 1 regt with Il-76MD/TD Candid 1 regt with Il-76MD Candid; Il-78 Midas 1 regt with Y-7 2 regt with Y-9 2 regt with Y-20/Y-20U TRAINING 5 bde with CJ-6/6A/6B; Y-5 6 bde with J-7; JJ-7A 13 bde with JL-8; JL-9; JL-10 1 trg bde with Y-7; Y-8C TRANSPORT HELICOPTER 1 (VIP) regt with AS332 Super Puma; H225 ISR UAV 2 bde with GJ-1; GJ-2 1 regt with WZ-7 AIR DEFENCE 1 SAM div (3 SAM regt) 24 SAM bde EQUIPMENT BY TYPE AIRCRAFT 2,475 combat capable BBR 176: ε12 H-6A (trg role); ε60 H-6H/M; ε100 H-6K; 4+ H-6N FTR 517: 100 J-7 Fishcan; 120 J-7E Fishcan; 120 J-7G Fishcan; 50 J-8F/H Finback; 95 J-11; 32 Su-27UBK Flanker FGA 972+: 220 J-10A Firebird; 55 J-10B Firebird; 180+ J-10C Firebird; 70 J-10S Firebird; 130 J-11B/BS Flanker L; 170+ J-16 Flanker; ε50 J-20A; 73 Su-30MKK Flanker G; 24 Su-35 Flanker M ATK 140 JH-7A Flounder EW 21: 2+ J-16D Flanker*; 4 Y-8CB High New 1; 2 Y-8DZ; 6 Y-8G High New 3; 2 Y-8XZ High New 7; 3 Y-9G; 2 Y-9XZ ELINT 4 Tu-154M/D Careless ISR 48: 24 JZ-8 Finback*; 24 JZ-8F Finback* AEW&C 19: 4 KJ-200 Moth; 11 KJ-500; 4 KJ-2000 C2 5: 2 B-737; 3 Y-8T High New 4 TKR 13: 10 H-6U; 3 Il-78 Midas TKR/TPT 3 Y-20U TPT 247+ Heavy 51+: 20 Il-76MD/TD Candid; 31+ Y-20; Medium 55+: 30 Y-8C; 25+ Y-9; Light 111: 70 Y-5; 41 Y-7/ Y-7H; PAX 30: 3 A319; 9 B-737 (VIP); 5 CRJ-200; 5 CRJ700; 8 Tu-154M Careless TRG 1,012+: 400 CJ-6/-6A/-6B; 12+ HY-7; 50 JJ-7*; 150 JJ7A*; 350 JL-8*; 30 JL-9*; 40+ JL-10* HELICOPTERS MRH 22: 20 Z-9; 2 Mi-17V-5 Hip H TPT 31+: Heavy 18+ Z-8; Medium 13+: 6+ AS332 Super Puma (VIP); 3 H225 (VIP); 4+ Mi-171 UNINHABITED AERIAL VEHICLES CISR • Heavy 12+ GJ-1; GJ-2; GJ-11 (in test) ISR • Heavy 14+: 12+ WZ-7; 2+ WZ-8 AIR DEFENCE SAM 832+ Long-range 608+: 180 HQ-9 (CH-SA-9); 80 HQ-9B (CHSA-21); 100+ HQ-22; 32 S-300PMU (RS-SA-10 Grumble); 64 S-300PMU1 (RS-SA-20 Gargoyle); 120 S-300PMU2 (RS-SA-20 Gargoyle); 32 S-400 (RS-SA-21B Growler)

262 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2022

Theatre Commands In early 2016, the previous seven military regions were consolidated into five new theatre commands

Eastern Theatre Command Eastern Theatre Ground Forces

71st Group Army (1 spec ops bde, 4 armd bde, 1 mech inf bde, 1 inf bde, 1 arty bde, 1 engr/NBC bde bde, 1 spt bde, 1 hel bde, 1 AD bde) 72nd Group Army (1 spec ops bde, 1 armd bde, 1 mech inf bde, 2 inf bde, 2 amph bde, 1 arty bde, 1 engr bde, 1 NBC bde, 1 spt bde, 1 hel bde, 1 AD bde) 73rd Group Army (1 spec ops bde, 1 armd bde, 1 mech inf bde, 2 inf bde, 2 amph bde, 1 arty bde, 1 engr/NBC bde, 1 spt bde, 1 hel bde, 1 AD bde)

Eastern Theatre Navy Coastal defence from south of Lianyungang to Dongshan (approx. 35°10´N to 23°30´N), and to seaward; HQ at Ningbo; support bases at Fujian, Zhoushan, Ningbo 18 SSK; 13 DDGHM; 17 FFGHM; 2 FFG; 30 FSGM; ε30 PCFG/PCG; ε22 MCMV; 3 LPD; ε22 LST/M

Eastern Theatre Navy Aviation

1st Naval Aviation Division (1 AEW&C regt with KJ-500: 1 ASW regt with KQ-200) Other Forces (1 bbr regt with H-6DU/G/J; 1 FGA bde with JH-7; 1 FGA bde with Su-30MK2; J-10A; 1 hel regt with Ka27PS; Ka-28; Ka-31)

Eastern Theatre Air Force

10th Bomber Division (1 bbr regt with H-6H; 1 bbr regt with H-6K; 1 bbr regt with H-6M) 26th Special Mission Division (1 AEW&C regt with KJ-500; 1 AEW&C regt with KJ200/KJ-2000/Y-8T) Fuzhou Base (1 ftr bde with J-7E; 1 FGA bde with J-10C; 1 ftr bde with J-11A/B; 1 FGA bde with J-16; 1 FGA bde with Su-30MKK; 2 SAM bde) Shanghai Base (1 ftr bde with J-8F/H; 1 ftr bde with J-11B; 1 FGA bde with J-10A; 1 FGA bde with J-16; 1 FGA bde with J-20A; 2 atk bde with JH-7A; 1 trg bde with J-7/JJ-7A; 2 SAM bde) Other Forces (1 ISR bde with JZ-8F; 1 SAR bde; 1 Flight Instructor Training Base with CJ-6; JL-8; JL-9; JL-10)

Other Forces Marines (2 mne bde)

Southern Theatre Command Southern Theatre Ground Forces

74th Group Army (1 spec ops bde, 1 armd bde, 1 mech inf bde, 2 inf bde, 2 amph bde, 1 arty bde, 1 engr bde, 1 NBC bde, 1 spt bde, 1 hel bde, 1 AD bde) 75th Group Army (1 spec ops bde, 3 armd bde, 1 mech inf bde, 2 inf bde, 1 air aslt bde, 1 arty bde, 1 engr/NBC bde, 1 spt bde, 1 AD bde) Other Forces (1 (composite) inf bde (Hong Kong); 1 hel sqn (Hong Kong), 1 AD bn (Hong Kong))

Southern Theatre Navy Coastal defence from Dongshan (approx. 23°30´N) to VNM border, and to seaward (including Paracel and Spratly islands); HQ at Zhanjiang; support bases at Yulin, Guangzhou 6 SSBN; 2 SSN; 13 SSK; 1 CV; 1 CGHM; 11 DDGHM; 12 FFGHM; 1 FFG; 27 FSGM; ε38 PCFG/ PCG; ε16 MCMV; 1 LHD; 5 LPD; ε21 LST/M

Southern Theatre Navy Aviation

3rd Naval Aviation Division (1 ASW regt with KQ-200; 1 AEW&C regt with KJ-500) Other Forces (1 bbr regt with H-6DU/G/J; 1 FGA regt with J-15; 1 FGA bde with J-11B; 1 FGA bde with J-11B; JH-7A; 1 tpt/hel regt with Y-7G; Z-8; Z-8J; Z-8S; Z-9C/D; 1 SAM bde)

Southern Theatre Air Force

8th Bomber Division (2 bbr regt with H-6K) 20th Special Mission Division (3 EW regt with Y-8CB/DZ/G/XZ; Y-9G/XZ) Kunming Base (1 FGA bde with J-10A; 1 FGA bde with J-10C; 1 trg bde with JJ-7A; 1 SAM bde) Nanning Base (1 ftr bde with J-11A; 1 FGA bde with J-10A; 1 FGA bde with J-10C; 1 FGA bde with J-16; 1 FGA bde with Su-35; 1 FGA bde with Su-30MKK; 1 atk bde with JH7A; 3 SAM bde) Other Forces (1 tkr bde with H-6U; 1 SAR bde; 1 UAV bde)

Other Forces

Marines (1 spec ops bde; 2 mne bde)

Western Theatre Command Western Theatre Ground Forces

76th Group Army (1 spec ops bde, 4 armd bde, 2 inf bde, 1 arty bde, 1 engr/NBC bde, 1 spt bde, 1 hel bde, 1 AD bde) 77th Group Army (1 spec ops bde, 2 armd bde, 1 mech inf bde; 3 inf bde, 1 arty bde, 1 engr bde, 1 NBC bde, 1 spt bde, 1 hel bde, 1 AD bde)

Asia 263

Western Theatre Air Force

4th Transport Division (2 tpt regt with Y-9; 1 tpt regt with Y-20A) Lanzhou Base (1 ftr bde with J-11A/B; 1 ftr bde with J-7; 1 ftr bde with J-7E; 1 FGA bde with J-16; 1 SAM bde) Urumqi Base (1 ftr bde with J-8F/H; 1 ftr bde with J-11A/B; 1 atk bde with JH-7A; 2 SAM bde) Lhasa Base (1 SAM bde) Xi’an Flying Academy (1 trg bde with JJ-7A; 1 trg bde with JL-9A; 2 trg bde with JL-8; 1 trg bde with Y-7; Y-8) Other Forces (1 SAR regt)

Northern Theatre Command Northern Theatre Ground Forces

78th Group Army (1 spec ops bde, 4 armd bde, 1 mech inf bde, 1 inf bde, 1 arty bde, 1 engr/NBC bde, 1 spt bde, 1 hel bde, 1 AD bde) 79th Group Army (1 spec ops bde, 4 armd bde, 1 mech inf bde, 1 inf bde, 1 arty bde, 1 engr bde, 1 NBC bde, 1 spt bde, 1 hel bde, 1 AD bde) 80th Group Army (1 spec ops bde, 1 armd bde; 1 mech inf bde, 4 inf bde, 1 arty bde, 1 engr/NBC bde, 1 spt bde, 1 hel bde, 1 AD bde)

Northern Theatre Navy

Coastal defence from the DPRK border (Yalu River) to south of Lianyungang (approx 35°10´N), and to seaward; HQ at Qingdao; support bases at Lushun, Qingdao. 4 SSN; 16 SSK; 1 CV; 2 CGHM; 10 DDGHM; 2 DDGM; 11 FFGHM; 2 FFG; 15 FSGM; ε18 PCFG/ PCG; ε18 MCMV; ε7 LST/M

Northern Theatre Navy Aviation

2nd Naval Air Division (1 EW/ISR/ASW regt with KQ-200; Y-8JB/X; Y-9JZ; 1 AEW&C regt with Y-8J; KJ-200; KJ-500) Other Forces (1 FGA regt with J-15; 1 FGA bde with JH-7A; J-8F; ; 1 hel regt with AS365N; Z-8J/JH; Z-9C/D1 tpt regt with Y-7H/Y-8C/CRJ-200/CRJ-700; 1 trg regt with CJ-6A; 2 trg regt with JL-8; 1 trg regt with HY-7; 1 trg regt with JL-9G; 1 trg regt with JL-9; 1 trg regt with JL-10)

Northern Theatre Air Force

16th Special Mission Division (1 EW regt with Y-8CB/G; 1 ISR regt with JZ-8F; 1 UAV regt with WZ-7)

Dalian Base (1 ftr bde with J-7; 2 ftr bde with J-7E; 1 ftr bde with J-11B; 1 FGA bde with J-10A/C; 1 FGA bde with J-10B; 1 FGA bde with J-16; 1 FGA bde with J-11B/J-20A; 1 atk bde with JH-7A; 3 SAM bde) Jinan Base (1 ftr bde with J-7G; 1 FGA bde with J-10A; 1 atk bde with JH-7A; 2 SAM bde) Harbin Flying Academy (1 trg bde with CJ-6; Y-5; 1 trg bde with H-6; HY-7; 2 trg bde with JL-8; 1 trg bde with JL-9) Other Forces (1 SAR bde)

Other Forces

Marines (2 mne bde; 1 hel bde)

Central Theatre Command Central Theatre Ground Forces

81st Group Army (1 spec ops bde, 2 armd bde, 1 (OPFOR) armd bde, 2 mech inf bde, 1 inf bde, 1 arty bde, 1 engr/NBC bde, 1 spt bde, 1 avn bde, 1 AD bde) 82nd Group Army (1 spec ops bde, 4 armd bde, 1 mech bde, 2 inf bde, 1 arty bde, 1 engr bde, 1 NBC bde, 1 spt bde, 1 hel bde, 1 AD bde) 83rd Group Army (1 spec ops bde, 2 armd bde, 4 mech inf bde, 1 air aslt bde, 1 arty bde, 1 engr/NBC bde, 1 spt bde, 1 AD bde) Other Forces (2 (Beijing) gd div)

Central Theatre Air Force

13th Transport Division (1 tpt regt with Y-20A; 1 tpt regt with Il-76MD/TD; 1 tpt regt with Il-76MD; Il-78) 34th VIP Transport Division (1 tpt regt with A319; B-737; CRJ200/700; 1 tpt regt with Tu-154M; Tu-154M/D; 1 tpt regt with Y-7; 1 hel regt with AS332; H225) 36th Bomber Division (1 bbr regt with H-6K; 1 bbr regt with H-6H) Datong Base (3 ftr bde with J-7E/G; 1 ftr bde with J-11A/B; 2 FGA bde with J-10A; 1 FGA bde with J-10C; 1 SAM div; 4 SAM bde) Wuhan Base (2 ftr bde with J-7E/G; 1 ftr bde with J-11A; 1 FGA bde with J-10B; 1 trg bde with J-7/JJ-7A; 3 SAM bde) Shijiazhuang Flying Academy (3 trg bde with JL-8; 1 trg bde with JL-8; JL-10) Airborne Corps (6 AB bde; 1 tpt bde; 1 hel regt) Other Forces (1 bbr bde with H-6N; 1 SAR bde)

Gendarmerie & Paramilitary 500,000+ active People’s Armed Police ε500,000

In 2018 the People’s Armed Police (PAP) divested its border-defence, firefighting, gold, forest, hydropower

Asia

Xinjiang Military District (1 spec ops bde, 3 (high alt) mech div, 1 (high alt) inf div, 2 mech inf regt, 1 arty bde, 1 AD bde, 1 engr regt, 1 hel bde) Xizang Military District (1 spec ops bde; 1 mech inf bde; 2 inf bde; 1 arty bde, 1 AD bde, 1 engr/NBC bde, 1 hel bde)

264 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2022 and security-guard units. In addition to the forces listed below, PAP also has 32 regional commands, each with one or more mobile units FORCES BY ROLE MANOEUVRE Other 1 (1st Mobile) paramilitary corps (3 SF regt; 9 (mobile) paramilitary units; 1 engr/CBRN unit; 1 hel unit) 1 (2nd Mobile) paramilitary corps (2 SF unit; 9 (mobile) paramilitary units; 1 engr/CBRN unit; 1 hel unit)

China Coast Guard (CCG) In 2018 the CCG was moved from the authority of the State Oceanic Administration to that of the People’s Armed Police. The CCG is currently reorganising its pennant-number system, making it problematic to assess the number of vessels that entered service since 2019. EQUIPMENT BY TYPE PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 524 PSOH 42: 2 Zhaotou with 1 76mm gun (capacity 2 med hel) 7 Type-054 mod (Zhaoduan) with 1 76mm gun (capacity 1 med hel) 3 Type-053H2G (Jiangwei I) (capacity 1 med hel) (ex-PLAN) 4 Shuoshi II (capacity 1 med hel) 2 Shucha I (capacity 1 med hel) 10 Shucha II (capacity 1 med hel) 12 Zhaoyu (capacity 1 med hel) 1 Zhaochang (capacity 1 med hel) 1 Zhongyang (capacity 1 med hel) PSO 49: 9 Type-718B (Zhaojun) with 1 76mm gun, 1 hel landing platform 1 Type-922 (Dalang I) (ex-PLAN) 1 Type-625C (Hai Yang) (ex-PLAN) 1 Type-053H (Jianghu I) (ex-PLAN) 1 Type-636A (Kanjie) with 1 hel landing platform (ex-PLAN) 6 Shusheng with 1 hel landing platform 3 Shuwu 3 Tuzhong (ex-PLAN) 4 Type-056 mod (Zhaogao) with 1 hel landing platform 1 Type-918 (Wolei) (ex-PLAN) 1 Xiang Yang Hong 9 (ex-PLAN) 4 Zhaolai with 1 hel landing platform 14 Zhaotim PCO 29: 1 Shuke I; 4 Shuke II; 14 Shuke III; 3 Shuyou; 4 Zhaodai; 3 Zhaoming PCC 104: 25+ Type-618B-II; 45 Hailin I/II; 1 Shuzao II; 14 Shuzao III; 10 Zhongeng; 2 Zhongmel; 7 Zhongsui PB/PBF 300+ AMPHIBIOUS • LANDING SHIPS 2 LST 2 Type-072-II (Yuting I) (ex-PLAN; used as hospital vessels and island supply) LOGISTICS AND SUPPORT 27 AG 6: 5+ Kaobo; 1 Shutu

AGB 1 Type-210 (Yanbing) (ex-PLAN) AGOR 9: 4 Haijian; 3 Shuguang 04 (ex-PLAN); 2 Xiang Yang Hong 9 ATF 11 AIRCRAFT MP 1+ MA60H TPT • Light Y-12 (MP role) HELICOPTERS TPT • Light Z-9

Maritime Militia Composed of full- and part-time personnel. Reports to PLA command and trains to assist PLAN and CCG in a variety of military roles. These include ISR, maritime law enforcement, island supply, troop transport and supporting sovereignty claims. The Maritime Militia operates a variety of civilian vessels including fishing boats and oil tankers.

DEPLOYMENT DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO: UN • MONUSCO 232; 1 engr coy; 1 fd hospital DJIBOUTI: 240; 1 mne coy(-); 1 med unit; 2 ZTL-11; 8 ZBL08; 1 LPD; 1 ESD GULF OF ADEN: 1 DDGHM; 1 FFGHM; 1 AORH LEBANON: UN • UNIFIL 419; 2 engr coy; 1 med coy MALI: UN • MINUSMA 426; 1 engr coy; 1 fd hospital MIDDLE EAST: UN • UNTSO 4 SOUTH SUDAN: UN • UNMISS 1,054; 1 inf bn; 1 engr coy; 1 fd hospital SUDAN: UN • UNISFA 86; 1 hel flt TAJIKISTAN: ε300 (trg) WESTERN SAHARA: UN • MINURSO 11

Fiji FJI Fijian Dollar FJD GDP per capita

2020

2021

FJD

9.75bn

9.46bn

USD

4.49bn

4.64bn

USD

4,995

5,127

Growth

-15.7

-4.0

Inflation

-2.6

1.1

Def bdgt

FJD

112m

94.9m

USD

51.8m

46.5m

2.17

2.04

USD1=FJD

2022

94.2m

Real-terms defence budget trend (USDm, constant 2015) 74 42 2008

Population

2015

2021

939,535

Age

0–14

15–19

20–24

25–29

Male

13.4%

4.0%

3.8%

3.9%

30–64 65 plus 22.0%

3.6%

Female

12.8%

3.9%

3.6%

3.8%

20.9%

4.2%

Asia 265

The Republic of Fiji Military Forces (RFMF) are an infantrydominated defence force with a small naval element. The RFMF has intervened heavily in Fiji’s domestic politics and after a third coup in 2006, democracy was effectively suspended until 2014. Guidelines issued in 2018 emphasised the need to confront non-traditional threats such as climate change, terrorism and transnational crime. The RFMF is developing a deployable-force headquarters, funded by Australia, which will also administer and train personnel for peacekeeping and HADR roles. Engagement in international peacekeeping operations is an important source of revenue for the government. Fiji’s principal defence relationships are with Australia and New Zealand, with which the RFMF regularly conducts training and maritime patrols. Defence relations with China, South Korea and the US are growing, with all three countries providing training or donating equipment. The RFMF is attempting to improve the quality of senior NCOs and to raise standards across the rest of the force. Fiji has no significant defence industry and is only able to carry out basic equipment maintenance domestically. Significant upgrade and maintenance work is usually conducted in Australia.

ACTIVE 4,040 (Army 3,700 Navy 340) RESERVE ε6,000

LOGISTICS AND SUPPORT 2 AGHS 2: 1 Kacau; 1 Volasiga

DEPLOYMENT EGYPT: MFO 170; elm 1 inf bn IRAQ: UN • UNAMI 168; 2 sy unit LEBANON: UN • UNIFIL 1 MIDDLE EAST: UN • UNTSO 3 SOUTH SUDAN: UN • UNMISS 4 SYRIA/ISRAEL: UN • UNDOF 151; 1 inf coy

India IND Indian Rupee INR GDP

2020

2021

INR

197tr

225tr

USD

2.66tr

2.95tr

USD

1,930

2,116

Growth

-7.3

9.5

Inflation

6.2

5.6

per capita

Def bdgt [a]

INR

4.71tr

4.96tr

USD

63.5bn

65.1bn

74.23

76.24

2022

Asia

Capabilities

(to age 45)

USD1=INR

ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE

Real-terms defence budget trend (USDbn, constant 2015)

[a] Includes defence civil estimates, which include military pensions 60.5

Army 3,700 (incl 300 recalled reserves) FORCES BY ROLE SPECIAL FORCES 1 spec ops coy MANOEUVRE Light 3 inf bn COMBAT SUPPORT 1 arty bty 1 engr bn COMBAT SUPPORT 1 log bn

Reserves 6,000 FORCES BY ROLE MANOEUVRE Light 5 inf bn EQUIPMENT BY TYPE ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES AUV 10 Bushmaster IMV ARTILLERY • MOR 81mm 12

Navy 340 EQUIPMENT BY TYPE PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 4: PCO 1 Guardian (AUS Bay mod) PB 3: 1 Kula (AUS Pacific); 2 Levuka

2008

Population

27.8 2021

2015

1,339,330,514

Age

0–14

15–19

20–24

25–29

Male

13.6%

4.6%

4.4%

30–64 65 plus 21.4%

3.3%

Female

12.1%

4.1%

4.0%

3.9%

20.3%

3.7%

Capabilities India continues to modernise its armed forces, though progress in some areas remains slow. The armed forces are orientated against both Pakistan and China, and violence on the western frontier with China in 2020 raised tensions. India is looking to improve military infrastructure on its northern border. Mutual reaffirmation of the 2003 ceasefire agreement between India and Pakistan has reduced conflict across the Line of Control in the disputed region of Kashmir. New Delhi considers the Taliban victory in Afghanistan as increasing the threat from violent extremists. There is growing focus on Indian Ocean security. Large numbers of paramilitary forces remain employed in the internal-security role. Army doctrine issued in late 2018 identified requirements including for ‘integrated battle groups’ and improved cyber, information-warfare and electronic-warfare capabilities. A Joint Armed Forces Doctrine was issued in 2017, much of which was consistent with similar US and NATO doctrines. It set out doctrine for Indian nuclear command and control, and envisaged an ‘emerging triad’ of space, cyber and special-operations capabilities complementing conventional land, sea and air capabilities. India continues to develop its nuclear capabilities. In 2020 the first Chief of Defence Staff was appointed, which may improve

266 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2022 high-level coordination of military planning. India continues to operate significant quantities of equipment of Soviet as well as Russian origin, though recent imports of foreign equipment have primarily been from the US and France. Nonetheless, India is also interested in acquiring new Russian equipment, such as air-defence systems, and continues to develop the Brahmos supersonic cruise missile as a joint venture with a Russian missile design bureau. Indian personnel participate in numerous bilateral and multilateral exercises, and the country is one of the main troop contributors to UN peacekeeping operations. However, the overall capability of India’s large conventional forces is limited by inadequate logistics, maintenance and shortages of ammunition, spare parts and maintenance personnel. Though modernisation continues, many equipment projects have seen delays and cost overruns, particularly indigenous systems. The government’s ‘Make in India’ policy aims to strengthen the defence-industrial base.

ACTIVE 1,460,350 (Army 1,237,000 Navy 70,900 Air 139,850 Coast Guard 12,600) Gendarmerie & Paramilitary 1,608,150 RESERVE 1,155,000 (Army 960,000 Navy 55,000 Air 140,000) Gendarmerie & Paramilitary 941,000 Army first-line reserves (300,000) within 5 years of full-time service, further 500,000 have commitment to age 50

ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE Strategic Forces Command Strategic Forces Command (SFC) is a tri-service command established in 2003. The commander-in-chief of SFC, a senior three-star military officer, manages and administers all strategic forces through army, navy and air-force chains of command FORCES BY ROLE SURFACE-TO-SURFACE MISSILE 1 SRBM bde with Agni I 1 IRBM bde with Agni II/III 2 SRBM bde with SS-250 Prithvi II EQUIPMENT BY TYPE SURFACE-TO-SURFACE MISSILE LAUNCHERS 54 ICBM • Nuclear Agni V (in test) IRBM • Nuclear ε4 Agni III; Agni IV (in test) MRBM • Nuclear ε8 Agni II SRBM • Nuclear 54: ε12 Agni I; ε42 SS-250 Prithvi II; some SS-350 Dhanush (naval testbed) SUBMARINES • STRATEGIC • SSBN 1 Arihant with 4 1-cell VLS with K-15 Sagarika SLBM, 6 533mm TT AIR-LAUNCHED MISSILES • ALCM • Nuclear Nirbhay (likely nuclear capable; in development) Some Indian Air Force assets (such as Mirage 2000H or Su30MKI) may be tasked with a strategic role

Space EQUIPMENT BY TYPE SATELLITES 21 NAVIGATION, POSITIONING, TIMING: 7 IRNSS COMMUNICATIONS: 2 GSAT-7/-7A ISR 11: 8 Cartosat; 3 RISAT ELINT/SIGINT 1 EMISAT

Army 1,237,000 6 Regional Comd HQ (Northern, Western, Central, Southern, Eastern, Southwestern), 1 Training Comd (ARTRAC) FORCES BY ROLE COMMAND 4 (strike) corps HQ 10 (holding) corps HQ SPECIAL FORCES 8 SF bn MANOEUVRE Armoured 2 armd div (3 armd bde, 1 arty bde (2 arty regt)) 1 armd div (3 armd bde, 1 SP arty bde (2 SP arty regt)) 8 indep armd bde Mechanised 6 (RAPID) mech inf div (1 armd bde, 2 mech inf bde, 1 arty bde) 2 indep mech bde Light 15 inf div (2–5 inf bde, 1 arty bde) 1 inf div (forming) 7 indep inf bde 12 mtn div (3-4 mtn inf bde, 1 arty bde) 2 indep mtn bde Air Manoeuvre 1 para bde SURFACE-TO-SURFACE MISSILE 1 SRBM bde with Agni I 1 IRBM bde with Agni II/III 2 SRBM bde with SS-250 Prithvi II 3 GLCM regt with PJ-10 Brahmos COMBAT SUPPORT 3 arty div (2 arty bde, 1 MRL bde) 2 indep arty bde 4 engr bde HELICOPTER 25 hel sqn AIR DEFENCE 8 AD bde

Reserve Organisations Reserves 300,000 reservists (first-line reserve within 5 years full-time service); 500,000 reservists (commitment until age 50) (total 800,000) Territorial Army 160,000 reservists (only 40,000 regular establishment) FORCES BY ROLE MANOEUVRE Light 42 inf bn COMBAT SUPPORT 6 (Railway) engr regt 2 engr regt 1 sigs regt COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT 6 ecological bn

Asia 267

Navy 70,900 (incl 7,000 Naval Avn and 1,200 Marines) Fleet HQ New Delhi. Commands located at Mumbai, Vishakhapatnam, Kochi and Port Blair EQUIPMENT BY TYPE SUBMARINES 17 STRATEGIC • SSBN 1 Arihant with 4 1-cell VLS with K-15 Sagarika SLBM, 6 533mm TT TACTICAL 16 SSK 16: 4 Shishumar (GER T-209/1500) with 8 single 533mm TT with SUT mod 1 HWT 1 Sindhughosh (FSU Kilo) with 6 single 533mm TT with 53-65KE HWT/TEST-71ME HWT/SET-65E HWT 7 Sindhughosh (FSU Kilo) with 6 single 533mm TT with 3M54E1/E Klub-S (RS-SS-N-27A/B) (Klub-S AShM variant unclear) AShM/53-65KE HWT/ TEST-71ME HWT/SET-65E HWT 4 Kalvari (FRA Scorpène) with 6 533mm TT with SM39 Exocet Block 2 AShM PRINCIPAL SURFACE COMBATANTS 28 AIRCRAFT CARRIERS • CV 1 Vikramaditya (exFSU Kiev mod) with 3 8-cell VLS with Barak-1 SAM, 4 AK630M CIWS (capacity: 12 MiG-29K/KUB Fulcrum FGA ac; 6 Ka-28 Helix A ASW hel/Ka-31 Helix B AEW hel) DESTROYERS 10 DDGHM 7: 2 Delhi (Project 15) with 4 quad lnchr with 3M24E Uran-E (RS-SS-N-25 Switchblade) AShM, 2 single 3S90E lnchr with 9M38E M-22E Shtil (RS-SA-N-7 Gadfly) SAM, 4 8-cell VLS with Barak-1 SAM, 5 single 533mm ASTT with SET-65E HWT/ Varunastra HWT, 2 RBU 6000 Smerch 2 A/S mor; 2 AK630 CIWS, 1 100mm gun (capacity either 2 Dhruv hel/Sea King Mk42A ASW hel) 1 Delhi (Project 15) with 4 quad lnchr with 3M24E Uran-E (RS-SS-N-25 Switchblade) AShM, 2 single 3S90E lnchr with 9M38E M-22E Shtil (RS-SA-N-7 Gadfly) SAM, 5 single 533mm ASTT with SET65E HWT/Varunastra HWT, 2 RBU 6000 Smerch 2 A/S mor; 2 AK630 CIWS, 1 100mm gun (capacity either 2 Dhruv hel/Sea King Mk42A ASW hel) 3 Kolkata (Project 15A) with 2 8-cell UVLM VLS with Brahmos AShM, 4 8-cell VLS with Barak-8 SAM; 2 twin 533mm TT with SET-65E HWT/Varanustra HWT, 2 RBU 6000 Smerch 2 A/S mor, 4 AK630M CIWS, 1 76mm gun (capacity 2 Dhruv/Sea King Mk42B hel) 1 Visakhapatnam (Project 15B) with 2 8-cell UVLM VLS with Brahmos AShM, 4 8-cell VLS with Barak-8 SAM; 2 twin 533mm TT with Varanustra HWT, 2 RBU 6000 Smerch 2 A/S mor, 4 AK630M CIWS, 1 76mm gun (capacity 2 Dhruv/Sea King Mk42B hel) DDGM 3: 1 Rajput (FSU Kashin) with 2 twin lnchr with P-27 Termit-R (RS-SS-N-2D Styx) AShM, 2 twin ZIF101 lnchr with 4K91 M-1 Volnya (RS-SA-N-1 Goa)

Asia

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES MBT 3,690: 122 Arjun; 2,418 T-72M1; ε1,150 T-90S (ε1,100 various models in store) RECCE Ferret (used for internal-security duties along with some indigenously built armd cars) IFV 3,100: 700 BMP-1; 2,400 BMP-2 Sarath (incl some BMP-2K CP) APC 336+ APC (W) 157+ OT-64 PPV 179: 165 Casspir; 14+ Yukthirath MPV ENGINEERING & MAINTENANCE VEHICLES AEV BMP-2; FV180 ARV 730+: T-54/T-55; 156 VT-72B; 222 WZT-2; 352 WZT3 VLB AM-50; BLG-60; BLG T-72; Kartik; MTU-20; MT-55; Sarvatra MW 24 910 MCV-2 ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE MSL SP 110 9P148 Konkurs (RS-AT-5 Spandrel) MANPATS 9K113 Konkurs (RS-AT-5 Spandrel); Milan 2 RCL 3,000+: 84mm Carl Gustaf; 106mm 3,000+ M40A1 (10 per inf bn) ARTILLERY 9,859+ SP 155mm 100 K9 Vajra-T TOWED 3,011+: 105mm 1,350+: 600+ IFG Mk1/Mk2/ Mk3; up to 700 LFG; 50 M-56; 122mm 520 D-30; 130mm ε600 M-46 (500 in store) 155mm 541: ε300 FH-77B; ε200 M-46 (mod); 41 M777A2 MRL 228: 122mm ε150 BM-21/LRAR 214mm 36 Pinaka; 300mm 42 9A52 Smerch MOR 6,520+: 81mm 5,000+ E1; 120mm ε1,500 AM-50/E1; SP 120mm E1; 160mm 20 M-58 Tampella SURFACE-TO-SURFACE MISSILE LAUNCHERS IRBM • Nuclear some Agni-III (entering service) MRBM • Nuclear ε12 Agni-II SRBM • Nuclear 42: ε12 Agni-I; ε30 250 Prithvi II GLCM • Conventional 15 PJ-10 Brahmos HELICOPTERS MRH 343: 79 Dhruv; 12 Lancer; 74 Rudra; 118 SA315B Lama (Cheetah); 60 SA316B Alouette III (Chetak) UNINHABITED AERIAL VEHICLES ISR • Medium 25: 13 Nishant; 12 Searcher Mk I/II AIR DEFENCE SAM 748+ Medium-range ε48 Akash Short-range 180 2K12 Kub (RS-SA-6 Gainful) Point-defence 520+: 20-80 2K22 Tunguska (RS-SA-19 Grison); 50+ 9K33AKM Osa-AKM (RS-SA-8 Gecko); 200 9K31 Strela-1 (RS-SA-9 Gaskin); 250 9K35 Strela-10 (RSSA-13 Gopher); 9K310 Igla-1 (RS-SA-16 Gimlet); 9K38 Igla (RS-SA-18 Grouse) GUNS 2,315+ SP 23mm 75 ZSU-23-4; ZU-23-2 (truck-mounted); TOWED 2,240+: 20mm Oerlikon (reported); 23mm 320 ZU-23-2; 40mm 1,920 L40/70

268 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2022 SAM, 5 single 533mm PTA-51-61ME ASTT with SET-65E HWT/Varanustra HWT, 2 RBU 6000 Smerch 2 A/S mor, 2 AK630M CIWS, 1 76mm gun (capacity Ka-28 Helix A hel) 2 Rajput (FSU Kashin) with 1 8-cell UVLM VLS with Brahmos AShM, 2 twin lnchr with P-27 Termit-R (RS-SS-N-2D Styx) AShM, 2 8-cell VLS with Barak-1 SAM, 1 twin ZIF-101 lnchr with 4K91 M-1 Volnya (RS-SA-N-1 Goa) SAM, 5 single 533mm ASTT with SET-65E HWT/Varanustra HWT, 2 RBU 6000 Smerch 2 A/S mor, 4 AK630M CIWS, 1 76mm gun (capacity 1 Ka-28 Helix A hel) FRIGATES 17 FFGHM 13: 3 Brahmaputra (Project 16A) with 4 quad lnchr with 3M24E Uran-E (RS-SS-N-25 Switchblade) AShM, 3 8-cell VLS with Barak-1 SAM, 2 triple ILAS-3 (B-515) 324mm ASTT with A244 LWT, 4 AK630M CIWS, 1 76mm gun (capacity 2 SA316B Alouette III (Chetak)/Sea King Mk42 ASW hel) (of which 1 non-operational) 1 Godavari (Project 16) with 4 single lnchr with P-27 Termit-R (RS-SS-N-2D Styx) AShM, 1 8-cell VLS with Barak-1 SAM, 2 triple 324mm ILAS-3 (B-515) ASTT with A244 LWT, 4 AK630 CIWS, 1 76mm gun (capacity 2 SA316B Alouette III (Chetak)/Sea King Mk42 ASW hel) 3 Shivalik (Project 17) with 1 8-cell 3S14E VLS with 3M54TE Klub-N (RS-SS-N-27B Sizzler) AShM/ Brahmos AShM, 4 8-cell VLS with Barak-1 SAM, 1 single 3S90E lnchr with 9M317E Shtil-1 (RS-SA-N7B) SAM, 2 triple 324mm ILAS-3 (B-515) ASTT, 2 RBU 6000 Smerch 2 A/S mor, 2 AK630M CIWS, 1 76mm gun (capacity 1 Sea King Mk42B ASW hel) 3 Talwar I with 1 8-cell 3S14E VLS with 3M54TE Klub-N (RS-SS-N-27B Sizzler) AShM, 1 single 3S90E lnchr with 9M317E Shtil-1 (RS-SA-N-7B) SAM, 2 twin 533mm DTA-53-11356 ASTT with SET-65E HWT/Varunastra HWT, 2 RBU 6000 Smerch 2 A/S mor, 2 Kashtan (RS-CADS-N-1) CIWS, 1 100mm gun (capacity 1 Dhruv/Ka-28 Helix A ASW hel) 3 Talwar II with 1 8-cell UVLM VLS with Brahmos AShM, 1 single 3S90E lnchr with 9M317E Shtil-1 (RS-SA-N-7B) SAM, 2 twin 533mm DTA-53-11356 ASTT with SET-65E HWT/Varunastra HWT, 2 RBU 6000 Smerch 2 A/S mor, 2 AK630M CIWS, 1 100mm gun (capacity 1 Dhruv/Ka-28 Helix A ASW hel) FFH 4 Kamorta (Project 28) with 2 twin 533mm ITTL ASTT with Varunastra HWT, 2 RBU 6000 Smerch 2 A/S mor, 2 AK630 CIWS, 1 76mm gun (capacity 1 Dhruv/ Ka-28 Helix A ASW hel) PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 169 CORVETTES • FSGM 8: 4 Khukri (Project 25) with 2 twin lnchr with P-27 Termit-R (RS-SS-N-2D Styx) AShM, 2 twin lnchr (manual aiming) with 9K32M Strela-2M (RSSA-N-5 Grail) SAM, 2 AK630M CIWS, 1 76mm gun, 1 hel landing platform (for Dhruv/SA316 Alouette III (Chetak))

4 Kora (Project 25A) with 4 quad lnchr with 3M24E Uran-E (RS-SS-N-25 Switchblade) AShM, 1 quad lnchr (manual aiming) with 9K32M Strela-2M (RS-SA-N-5 Grail) SAM, 2 AK630M CIWS, 1 76mm gun, 1 hel landing platform (for Dhruv/ SA316 Alouette III (Chetak)) PSOH 10: 4 Saryu with 2 AK630M CIWS, 1 76mm gun (capacity 1 Dhruv); 6 Sukanya with 4 RBU 2500 A/S mor (capacity 1 SA316 Alouette III (Chetak)) PCFGM 8: 6 Veer (FSU Tarantul) with 4 single lnchr with P-27 Termit-R (RS-SS-N-2D Styx) AShM, 2 quad lnchr (manual aiming) with 9K32M Strela-2M (RS-SA-N-5 Grail), 2 AK630M CIWS, 1 76mm gun 2 Prabal (mod Veer) each with 4 quad lnchr with 3M24E Uran-E (RS-SS-N-25 Switchblade) AShM, 1 quad lnchr (manual aiming) with 9K32M Strela-2M (RS-SA-N-5 Grail) SAM, 2 AK630M CIWS, 1 76mm gun PCMT 3 Abhay (FSU Pauk II) with 1 quad lnchr (manual aiming) with 9K32M Strela-2M (RS-SA-N-5 Grail) SAM, 2 twin 533mm DTA-53 ASTT with SET-65E, 2 RBU 1200 Uragan A/S mor, 1 AK630M CIWS, 1 76mm gun PCC 15: 4 Bangaram; 10 Car Nicobar; 1 Trinkat (SDB Mk5) PCF 4 Tarmugli (Car Nicobar mod) PBF 121: 9 Immediate Support Vessel (Rodman 78); 13 Immediate Support Vessel (Craftway); 15 Plascoa 1300 (SPB); 5 Super Dvora; 79 Solas Marine Interceptor AMPHIBIOUS PRINCIPAL AMPHIBIOUS VESSELS • LPD 1 Jalashwa (ex-US Austin) with 1 Mk 15 Phalanx CIWS (capacity up to 6 med spt hel; either 9 LCM or 4 LCM and 2 LCAC; 4 LCVP; 930 troops) LANDING SHIPS 8 LSM 3 Kumbhir (FSU Polnochny C) (capacity 5 MBT or 5 APC; 160 troops) LST 5: 2 Magar (capacity 15 MBT or 8 APC or 10 trucks; 500 troops); 3 Magar mod (capacity 11 MBT or 8 APC or 10 trucks; 500 troops) LANDING CRAFT 12 LCT 8 LCU Mk-IV (capacity 1 Arjun MBT/2 T-90 MBT/4 IFV/160 troops) LCM 4 LCM 8 (for use in Jalashwa) LOGISTICS AND SUPPORT 43 AFD 2: 1 FDN-1; 1 FDN-2 AGOR 1 Sagardhwani with 1 hel landing platform AGHS 8: 1 Makar; 7 Sandhayak AGM 1 Dhruv AO 4 GSL 1,000T Fuel Barge AOL 10: 1 Ambika; 2 Poshak; 7 Purak AOR 1 Jyoti with 1 hel landing platform AORH 3: 1 Aditya (based on Deepak (1967) Bremer Vulkan design); 2 Deepak with 4 AK630 CIWS AP 3 Nicobar with 1 hel landing platform ASR 1 ATF 1 AWT 3 Ambuda AX 1 Tir AXS 4: 2 Mhadei; 2 Tarangini

Asia 269

FORCES BY ROLE FIGHTER/GROUND ATTACK 2 sqn with MiG-29K/KUB Fulcrum ANTI-SUBMARINE WARFARE 1 sqn with Ka-28 Helix A 1 sqn with Sea King Mk42B MARITIME PATROL 4 sqn with BN-2 Islander; Do-228-101 1 sqn with Do-228 1 sqn with Il-38SD May 1 sqn with P-8I Neptune AIRBORNE EARLY WARNING & CONTROL 1 sqn with Ka-31 Helix B SEARCH & RESCUE 1 sqn with SA316B Alouette III (Chetak); Sea King Mk42C 1 sqn with Dhruv TRANSPORT 1 sqn with HS-748M (HAL-748M) TRAINING 1 sqn with Do-228 1 sqn with HJT-16 Kiran MkI/II, Hawk Mk132* 1 hel sqn with Sea King Mk42B TRANSPORT HELICOPTER 1 sqn with UH-3H Sea King ISR UAV 3 sqn with Heron; Searcher MkII EQUIPMENT BY TYPE AIRCRAFT 76 combat capable FTR 43 MiG-29K/KUB Fulcrum ASW 16: 5 Il-38SD May; 11 P-8I Neptune MP 13+ Do-228-101 TPT 37: Light 27: 17 BN-2 Islander; 10 Do-228 PAX 10 HS-748M (HAL-748M) TRG 29: 6 HJT-16 Kiran MkI; 6 HJT-16 Kiran MkII; 17 Hawk Mk132* HELICOPTERS ASW 32: 12 Ka-28 Helix A; 2 MH-60R Seahawk; 18 Sea King Mk42B MRH 57: 10 Dhruv; 24 SA316B Alouette III (Chetak); 23 SA319 Alouette III AEW 11 Ka-31 Helix B TPT • Medium 11: 5 Sea King Mk42C; up to 6 UH-3H Sea King UNINHABITED AERIAL VEHICLES ISR 10: Heavy 4 Heron; Medium 6 Searcher Mk II AIR-LAUNCHED MISSILES AAM • IR R-550 Magic/Magic 2; R-73 (RS-AA-11A Archer); IR/SARH R-27 (RS-AA-10 Alamo); ARH: R-77 (RS-AA-12A Adder) AShM AGM-84 Harpoon (on P-8I ac); Kh-35 (RS-AS-20 Kayak; on May ac); Sea Eagle (possibly WFU)

Marines ε1,200 (Additional 1,000 for SPB duties) After the Mumbai attacks, the Sagar Prahari Bal (SPB), with 80 PBF, was established to protect critical maritime infrastructure

FORCES BY ROLE SPECIAL FORCES 1 (marine) cdo force MANOEUVRE Amphibious 1 amph bde

Air Force 139,850

5 regional air comds: Western (New Delhi), Southwestern (Gandhinagar), Eastern (Shillong), Central (Allahabad), Southern (Trivandrum). 2 support comds: Maintenance (Nagpur) and Training (Bangalore) FORCES BY ROLE FIGHTER 3 sqn with MiG-29 Fulcrum; MiG-29UB Fulcrum FIGHTER/GROUND ATTACK 4 sqn with Jaguar IB/IS 6 sqn with MiG-21 Bison 3 sqn with Mirage 2000E/ED/I/IT (2000H/TH – secondary ECM role) 2 sqn with Rafale DH/EH 11 sqn with Su-30MKI Flanker 2 sqn with Tejas ANTI SURFACE WARFARE 1 sqn with Jaguar IM ISR 1 unit with Gulfstream IV SRA-4 AIRBORNE EARLY WARNING & CONTROL 1 sqn with Il-76TD Phalcon TANKER 1 sqn with Il-78 Midas TRANSPORT 1 sqn with C-130J-30 Hercules 1 sqn with C-17A Globemaster III 5 sqn with An-32/An-32RE Cline 1 (comms) sqn with B-737; B-737BBJ; EMB-135BJ 4 sqn with Do-228; HS-748 1 sqn with Il-76MD Candid 1 flt with HS-748 TRAINING 1 OCU sqn with Su-30MKI Flanker ATTACK HELICOPTER 1 sqn with Mi-25 Hind; Mi-35 Hind 1 sqn with Mi-25 Hind; Mi-35 Hind; AH-64E Apache Guardian TRANSPORT HELICOPTER 5 sqn with Dhruv 7 sqn with Mi-17/Mi-17-1V Hip H 12 sqn with Mi-17V-5 Hip H 2 sqn with SA316B Alouette III (Chetak) 1 flt with Mi-26 Halo 2 flt with SA315B Lama (Cheetah) 2 flt with SA316B Alouette III (Chetak) ISR UAV 5 sqn with Heron; Searcher MkII AIR DEFENCE 25 sqn with S-125M Pechora-M (RS-SA-3B Goa) 6 sqn with 9K33M3 Osa-AKM (RS-SA-8B Gecko) 2 sqn with Akash 10 flt with 9K38 Igla-1 (RS-SA-18 Grouse)

Asia

Naval Aviation 7,000

270 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2022 EQUIPMENT BY TYPE AIRCRAFT 777 combat capable FTR 61: 54 MiG-29 Fulcrum (incl 12+ MiG-29UPG); 7 MiG-29UB Fulcrum B FGA 500: 109 MiG-21 Bison; 38 MiG-21U/UM Mongol; 38 Mirage 2000E/I (2000H); 10 Mirage 2000ED/IT (2000TH); 8 Rafale DH; 18 Rafale EH; 263 Su-30MKI Flanker H; 16 Tejas ATK 115: 28 Jaguar IB; 79 Jaguar IS; 8 Jaguar IM ISR 3 Gulfstream IV SRA-4 AEW&C 5: 2 EMB-145AEW Netra (1 more in test); 3 Il-76TD Phalcon TKR 6 Il-78 Midas TPT 243: Heavy 28: 11 C-17A Globemaster III; 17 Il-76MD Candid; Medium 10 C-130J-30 Hercules; Light 141: 47 An-32; 55 An-32RE Cline; 35 Do-228; 4 EMB-135BJ; PAX 64: 1 B-707; 4 B-737; 3 B-737BBJ; 56 HS-748 TRG 308: 101 Hawk Mk132*; 90 HJT-16 Kiran MkI/IA; 42 HJT-16 Kiran MkII; 75 PC-7 Turbo Trainer MkII HELICOPTERS ATK 39: 22 AH-64E Apache Guardian; 17 Mi-25/Mi-35 Hind MRH 402: 60 Dhruv; 35 Mi-17 Hip H; 45 Mi-17-1V Hip H; 148 Mi-17V-5 Hip H; 59 SA315B Lama (Cheetah); 39 SA316B Alouette III (Chetak); 16 Rudra TPT • Heavy 16: 15 CH-47F Chinook; 1+ Mi-26 Halo UNINHABITED AERIAL VEHICLES ISR • Heavy 9 Heron; Medium some Searcher MkII LOITERING MUNITIONS Harop AIR DEFENCE • SAM Medium-range 68: ε64 Akash; 4 MRSAM Short-range S-125M Pechora-M (RS-SA-3B Goa); Spyder-SR Point-defence 9K33M3 Osa-AKM (RS-SA-8 Gecko); 9K38 Igla (RS-SA-18 Grouse) AIR-LAUNCHED MISSILES AAM • IR R-60 (RS-AA-8 Aphid); R-73 (RS-AA-11A Archer) R-550 Magic; IIR Mica IR; IR/SARH R-27 (RSAA-10 Alamo); SARH Super 530D ARH R-77 (RS-AA12A Adder); Mica RF AShM AGM-84 Harpoon; AM39 Exocet; Kh-31A (RS-AS17B Krypton); Sea Eagle† ASM AGM-114L/R Hellfire; Kh-29 (RS-AS-14 Kedge); Kh-59 (RS-AS-13 Kingbolt); Kh-59M (RS-AS-18 Kazoo); AS-30; Popeye II (Crystal Maze) ARM Kh-25MP (RS-AS-12A Kegler); Kh-31P (RS-AS-17A Krypton) ALCM • Nuclear Nirbhay (likely nuclear capable; in development) BOMBS INS/SAT guided Spice Laser-guided Paveway II

Coast Guard 12,600 EQUIPMENT BY TYPE PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 136 PSOH 25: 2 Sankalp (capacity 1 Chetak/Dhruv hel); 4 Samar with 1 76mm gun (capacity 1 Chetak/Dhruv hel); 9 Samarth; 7 Vikram (capacity 1 Dhruv hel); 3 Vishwast (capacity 1 Dhruv hel) PSO 3 Samudra Prahari with 1 hel landing platform PCC 44: 20 Aadesh; 8 Rajshree (Flight I); 4 Rajshree (Flight II) 5 Rani Abbakka; 7 Sarojini Naidu

PBF 63: 6 C-154; 2 C-141; 11 C-143; 44 C-401 PB 1 Priyadarshini AMPHIBIOUS • UCAC 18: 6 H-181 (Griffon 8000TD); 12 H-187 (Griffon 8000TD) AIRCRAFT • MP 23 Do-228-101 HELICOPTERS • MRH 21: 4 Dhruv; 17 SA316B Alouette III (Chetak)

Gendarmerie & Paramilitary 1,608,150 Rashtriya Rifles 65,000 Ministry of Defence. 15 sector HQ FORCES BY ROLE MANOEUVRE Other 65 paramilitary bn

Assam Rifles 65,150 Ministry of Home Affairs. Security within northeastern states, mainly army-officered; better trained than BSF FORCES BY ROLE Equipped to roughly same standard as an army inf bn COMMAND 7 HQ MANOEUVRE Other 46 paramilitary bn EQUIPMENT BY TYPE ARTILLERY • MOR 81mm 252

Border Security Force 263,900 Ministry of Home Affairs FORCES BY ROLE MANOEUVRE Other 192 paramilitary bn EQUIPMENT BY TYPE Small arms, lt arty, some anti-tank weapons ARTILLERY • MOR 81mm 942+ AIRCRAFT • TPT some (air spt) HELICOPTERS • MRH 2 Mi-17V-5 Hip

Central Industrial Security Force 144,400 (lightly armed security guards) Ministry of Home Affairs. Guards public-sector locations

Central Reserve Police Force 324,800 Ministry of Home Affairs. Internal-security duties, only lightly armed, deployable throughout the country FORCES BY ROLE MANOEUVRE Other 215 paramilitary bn 15 (rapid action force) paramilitary bn 10 (CoBRA) paramilitary bn 6 (Mahila) paramilitary bn (female) 2 sy gp COMBAT SUPPORT 5 sigs bn

Asia 271

Defence Security Corps 31,000

SOMALIA: UN • UNSOM 1

Provides security at Defence Ministry sites

SOUTH SUDAN: UN • UNMISS 2,372; 2 inf bn; 1 engr coy; 1 sigs coy; 1 fd hospital

FORCES BY ROLE MANOEUVRE Other 56 paramilitary bn

National Security Guards 12,000 Anti-terrorism contingency deployment force, comprising elements of the armed forces, CRPF and Border Security Force

Railway Protection Forces 70,000 Sashastra Seema Bal 79,450 Guards the borders with Nepal and Bhutan FORCES BY ROLE MANOEUVRE Other 73 paramilitary bn

Special Frontier Force 10,000 Mainly ethnic Tibetans

Special Protection Group 3,000 Protection of ministers and senior officials

SUDAN: UN • UNISFA 4 SYRIA/ISRAEL: UN • UNDOF 198; 1 inf pl, 1 MP pl, 1 log coy(-) WESTERN SAHARA: UN • MINURSO 4

FOREIGN FORCES Total numbers for UNMOGIP mission in India and Pakistan Argentina 2 Croatia 8 Italy 1 Korea, Republic of 7 Mexico 1 Philippines 6 Romania 1 Sweden 4 Switzerland 3 Thailand 5 Uruguay 3

Indonesia IDN Indonesian Rupiah IDR GDP

State Armed Police 450,000 For duty primarily in home state only, but can be moved to other states. Some bn with GPMG and army-standard infantry weapons and equipment FORCES BY ROLE MANOEUVRE Other 144 (India Reserve Police) paramilitary bn

Reserve Organisations

Asia

Indo-Tibetan Border Police 89,450 Ministry of Home Affairs. Tibetan border security SF/ guerrilla-warfare and high-altitude-warfare specialists

2020

2021

IDR

15434tr

16456tr

USD

1.06tr

1.15tr

USD

3,922

4,225

Growth

-2.1

3.2

Inflation

2.0

1.6

per capita

Def bdgt FMA (US)

IDR

118tr

120tr

USD

8.10bn

8.40bn

USD

USD1=IDR

14m

14565.47

14306.19

2022

134tr 14m

Real-terms defence budget trend (USDbn, constant 2015) 8.23

Civil Defence 500,000 reservists

Operate in 225 categorised towns in 32 states. Some units for NBC defence

Home Guard 441,000 reservists (547,000 authorised str)

In all states except Arunachal Pradesh and Kerala; men on reserve lists, no trg. Not armed in peacetime. Used for civil defence, rescue and firefighting provision in wartime; 6 bn (created to protect tea plantations in Assam)

DEPLOYMENT CYPRUS: UN • UNFICYP 1 DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO: UN • MONUSCO 1,858; 2 inf bn; 1 med coy LEBANON: UN • UNIFIL 867; 1 inf bn; 1 med coy MIDDLE EAST: UN • UNTSO 2

3.30 2008

Population

2015

2021

275,122,131

Age

0–14

15–19

20–24

25–29

Male

12.8%

4.3%

4.1%

3.9%

30–64 65 plus 21.6%

3.3%

Female

12.3%

4.1%

3.9%

3.7%

22.1%

3.8%

Capabilities The Tentara Nasional Indonesia (Indonesian National Armed Forces – TNI) are the largest armed forces in Southeast Asia. They have traditionally been concerned primarily with internal security and counter-insurgency. The army remains the dominant service and is deployed operationally for counter-insurgency in West Papua and in a counter-terrorist role in central Sulawesi. A modernisation plan adopted in 2010 called for establishing a ‘Minimum Essential Force’ including strengthened naval and air forces by 2024. The

272 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2022 2015 defence white paper outlined Indonesia’s ‘Global Maritime Fulcrum’ policy and advocated building up maritime, satellite and UAV capabilities. Some of these objectives were reflected in the 2020 State Defence Policy document. In 2018, Indonesia expanded its forces in the country’s east and established a third naval fleet command and a third air-force regional command in that region. A new army reserve division and a third marine corps group were also established in the east. Indonesia has no formal defence alliances but there are a number of defence-cooperation agreements with regional and extra-regional partners. China has supplied some military equipment, including armed UAVs. The armed forces have contributed to UN and other international peacekeeping operations and exercise regularly with Australian and US armed forces and those of other Southeast Asian states. The TNI’s inventory comprises equipment from diverse international sources, and the country uses technology-transfer agreements to develop its national defence industry which has significant capabilities in specific areas, including naval construction and the manufacture of transport aircraft and helicopters.

ACTIVE 395,500 (Army 300,400 Navy 65,000 Air 30,100) Gendarmerie & Paramilitary 280,000 Conscription liability 24 months selective conscription authorised (not required by law)

RESERVE 400,000 Army cadre units; numerical str n.k., obligation to age 45 for officers

ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE Army ε300,400 Mil Area Commands (KODAM)

15 comd (I, II, III, IV, V, VI, IX, XII, XIII, XIV, XVI, XVII, XVIII, Jaya & Iskandar Muda) FORCES BY ROLE MANOEUVRE Mechanised 3 armd cav bn 8 cav bn 1 mech inf bde (1 cav bn, 3 mech inf bn) 1 mech inf bde (3 mech inf bn) 3 indep mech inf bn Light 1 inf bde (3 cdo bn) 1 inf bde (2 cdo bn, 1 inf bn) 1 inf bde (1 cdo bn, 2 inf bn) 2 inf bde (3 inf bn) 3 inf bde (1 cdo bn, 1 inf bn) 3 inf bde (2 inf bn) 24 indep inf bn 20 indep cdo bn COMBAT SUPPORT 11 fd arty bn 11 cbt engr bn COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT 4 construction bn AVIATION 1 composite avn sqn HELICOPTER 1 hel sqn with Bo-105; Bell 205A; Bell 412; Bell 412EPI Twin Huey; AH-64E Apache Guardian 1 hel sqn Mi-35P Hind; Mi-17V-5 Hip H

AIR DEFENCE 1 AD regt (2 ADA bn, 1 SAM unit) 8 ADA bn 3 SAM unit

Special Forces Command (KOPASSUS) FORCES BY ROLE SPECIAL FORCES 3 SF gp (total: 2 cdo/para unit, 1 CT unit, 1 int unit)

Strategic Reserve Command (KOSTRAD) FORCES BY ROLE COMMAND 3 div HQ MANOEUVRE Armoured 2 tk bn Mechanised 1 mech inf bde (3 mech inf bn) Light 2 inf bde (3 cdo bn) 1 inf bde (2 inf bn) Air Manoeuvre 3 AB bde (3 AB bn) COMBAT SUPPORT 2 arty regt (1 SP arty bn; 1 MRL bn; 1 fd arty bn) 1 fd arty bn 2 cbt engr bn AIR DEFENCE 3 AD bn EQUIPMENT BY TYPE ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES MBT 103: 42 Leopard 2A4; 61 Leopard 2RI LT TK 350: 275 AMX-13 (partially upgraded); 15 PT-76; 60 FV101 Scorpion-90 RECCE 142: 55 Ferret (13 upgraded); 69 Saladin (16 upgraded); 18 VBL IFV 64: 22 Black Fox; 42 Marder 1A3 APC 834+ APC (T) 267: 75 AMX-VCI; 34 BTR-50PK; 15 FV4333 Stormer; 143 M113A1-B APC (W) 567+: 350 Anoa; some Barracuda; 40 BTR-40; 45 FV603 Saracen (14 upgraded); 100 LAV-150 Commando; 32 VAB-VTT PPV some Casspir AUV 39: 14 APR-1; 3 Bushmaster; 22 Commando Ranger ENGINEERING & MAINTENANCE VEHICLES AEV 4: 3 PiPz-2RI Dachs; 1 M113A1-B-GN ARV 15+: 2 AMX-13; 6 AMX-VCI; 3 BREM-2; 4 BPz-3 Buffel; Stormer; T-54/T-55 VLB 19: 10 AMX-13; 3 BPR Biber-1; 4 M3; 2 Stormer ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE MSL • MANPATS FGM-148 Javelin; SS.11; Milan; 9K11 Malyutka (RS-AT-3 Sagger) RCL 90mm M67; 106mm M40A1 RL 89mm LRAC ARTILLERY 1,238+ SP 87: 105mm 20 AMX Mk61; 155mm 67: 49 CAESAR; 18 M109A4 TOWED 133+: 105mm 110+: some KH-178; 60 M101; 50 M-56; 155mm 23: 5 FH-88; 18 KH-179

MRL 127mm 63 ASTROS II Mk6 MOR 955: 81mm 800; 120mm 155: 75 Brandt; 80 UBM 52 AMPHIBIOUS LANDING SHIPS • LST 2 ADRI LI with 1 hel landing platform (capacity 8 MBT; 500 troops) LANDING CRAFT • LCU 17: 1 ADRI XXXII; 4 ADRI XXXIII; 1 ADRI XXXIX; 1 ADRI XL; 3 ADRI XLI; 2 ADRI XLIV; 2 ADRI XLVI; 2 ADRI XLVIII; 1 ADRI L AIRCRAFT • TPT • Light 9: 1 BN-2A Islander; 6 C-212 Aviocar (NC-212); 2 Turbo Commander 680 HELICOPTERS ATK 14: 8 AH-64E Apache Guardian; 6 Mi-35P Hind MRH 51: 12 H125M Fennec; 17 Bell 412 Twin Huey (NB412); 6 Bell 412EPI Twin Huey; 16 Mi-17V-5 Hip H TPT • Light 29: 7 Bell 205A; 20 Bo-105 (NBo-105); 2 H120 Colibri TRG up to 19 Hughes 300C AIR DEFENCE SAM • Point-defence 95+: 2 Kobra (with 125 GROM-2 msl); Starstreak; TD-2000B (Giant Bow II); 51 Rapier; 42 RBS-70; QW-3 GUNS • TOWED 411: 20mm 121 Rh 202; 23mm Giant Bow; 40mm 90 L/70; 57mm 200 S-60 AIR-LAUNCHED MISSILES ASM AGM-114 Hellfire

Navy ε65,000 (including Marines and Aviation) Three fleets: East (Sorong), Central (Surabaya) and West (Jakarta). Two Forward Operating Bases at Kupang (West Timor) and Tahuna (North Sulawesi) EQUIPMENT BY TYPE SUBMARINES • SSK 4: 1 Cakra (Type-209/1300) with 8 single 533mm TT with SUT HWT 3 Nagapasa (Type-209/1400) with 8 single 533mm TT with Black Shark HWT PRINCIPAL SURFACE COMBATANTS 7 FRIGATES 7: FFGHM 5: 1 Ahmad Yani (ex-NLD Van Speijk) with 2 twin-cell VLS with 3M55E Yakhont (RS-SS-N-26 Strobile) AShM; 2 twin Simbad lnchr (manual) with Mistral SAM, 2 triple 324mm SVTT Mk 32 ASTT with Mk 46 LWT, 1 76mm gun (capacity 1 Bo-105 (NBo-105) hel) 2 Ahmad Yani (ex-NLD Van Speijk) with 2 twin lnchr with C-802 (CH-SS-N-6) AShM, 2 twin Simbad lnchr (manual) with Mistral SAM, 2 triple 324mm SVTT Mk 32 ASTT with Mk 46 LWT, 1 76mm gun (capacity 1 Bo-105 (NBo-105) hel) 2 R.E. Martadinata (SIGMA 10514) with 2 quad lnchr with MM40 Exocet Block 3 AShM, 2 6-cell CLA VLS with VL MICA SAM, 2 triple 324mm ILAS3 (B-515) ASTT with A244/S LWT, 1 Millennium CIWS, 1 76mm gun (capacity 1 med hel) FFHM 2 Ahmad Yani (ex-NLD Van Speijk) with 2 twin Simbad lnchr (manual) with Mistral SAM, 2 triple 324mm ASTT with Mk 46 LWT, 1 76mm gun (capacity 1 Bo-105 (NBo-105) hel)

PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 136 CORVETTES 24 FSGM 7: 3 Bung Tomo with 2 quad lnchr with MM40 Exocet Block 2 AShM, 1 18-cell VLS with Sea Wolf SAM, 2 triple 324mm ASTT, 1 76mm gun (capacity: 1 Bo105 hel) 4 Diponegoro (SIGMA 9113) with 2 twin lnchr with MM40 Exocet Block 2 AShM, 2 quad Tetral lnchr with Mistral SAM, 2 triple 324mm ILAS-3 (B-515) ASTT with MU90 LWT, 1 76mm gun, 1 hel landing platform FSGH 1 Nala with 2 twin lnchr with MM38 Exocet AShM, 1 twin Bofors ASW Rocket Launcher System 375mm A/S mor, 1 120mm gun (capacity 1 lt hel) FS 16: 2 Fatahillah with 2 triple 324mm SVTT Mk 32 ASTT with Mk 46 LWT, 1 twin 375mm A/S mor, 1 120mm gun 14 Kapitan Pattimura (GDR Parchim I) with 4 single 400mm ASTT, 2 RBU 6000 Smerch 2 A/S mor, 1 twin 57mm gun PCFG 3 Mandau with 4 single lnchr with MM38 Exocet AShM, 1 57mm gun PCG 4: 2 Sampari (KCR-60M)with 2 twin lnchr for C-705 AShM 2 Todak with 2 single lnchr with C-802 (CH-SS-N-6), 1 57mm gun PCT 2 Andau with 2 single 533mm TT with SUT, 1 57mm gun PCC 13: 4 Kakap with 1 hel landing platform; 2 Pandrong; 3 Pari; 2 Sampari (KCR-60M) with 1 NG-18 CIWS; 2 Todak with 1 57mm gun PBG 8: 2 Clurit with 2 single lnchr with C-705 AShM, 1 AK630 CIWS; 6 Clurit with 2 single lnchr with C-705 AShM PBF 4 Combat Boat AL D-18 PB 78: 2 Badau (ex-BRN Waspada); 9 Boa; 1 Cucut (ex-SGP Jupiter); 4 Kobra; 1 Krait; 8 Sibarau; 32 Sinabang (KAL 28); 4 Tarihu; 13 Tatihu (PC-40); 4 Viper MINE WARFARE • MINE COUNTERMEASURES 8 MCO 2 Pulau Rengat MSC 6 Pulau Rote (ex-GDR Wolgast) AMPHIBIOUS PRINCIPAL AMPHIBIOUS VESSELS • LPD 6: 1 Dr Soeharso (ex-Tanjung Dalpele) (capacity 2 LCU/ LCVP; 13 tanks; 500 troops; 2 AS332L Super Puma) (used in AH role) 4 Makassar (capacity 2 LCU or 4 LCVP; 13 tanks; 500 troops; 2 AS332L Super Puma) 1 Semarang (IDN Makassar mod) (capacity 2 LCM; 3 hels; 28 vehs; 650 troops) (used in AH role) LANDING SHIPS • LST 23 1 Teluk Amboina (capacity 16 tanks; 800 troops) 2 Teluk Bintuni (capacity 10 MBT) 2 Teluk Cirebon (ex-GDR Frosch II) 9 Teluk Gilimanuk (ex-GDR Frosch) 5 Teluk Lada with 1 hel landing platform (capacity 4 LCVP; 470 troops; 15 APC; 10 MBT) 4 Teluk Semangka (capacity 17 tanks; 200 troops)

Asia

Asia 273

274 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2022 LANDING CRAFT 54 LCM 20 LCU 4 LCVP 30 LOGISTICS AND SUPPORT 18 AGF 1 Multatuli with 1 hel landing platform AGOR 2 Rigel (OSV 190) AGOS 1 Leuser AGHS 1 Dewa Kembar (ex-UK Hecla) AGS 1 Pulau Rote (ex-GDR Wolgast) AKSL 1 AORLH (1 Arun (ex-UK Rover) damaged at sea 2018, non-operational and in repair) AOR 2: 1 Bontang with 1 hel landing platform; 1 Tarakan with 1 hel landing platform AOT 1 Sorong AP 2: 1 Tanjung Kambani (troop transport) with 1 hel landing platform; 1 Karang Pilang (troop transport) ATF 1 Soputan AX 2 Kadet AXS 3: 1 Arung Samudera; 1 Bima Suci; 1 Dewaruci

Naval Aviation ε1,000 EQUIPMENT BY TYPE AIRCRAFT MP 28: 3 C212-200; 5 CN235-220 (MPA); 14 N-22B Searchmaster B; 6 N-22SL Searchmaster L TPT • Light 33: 1 Beech 350i King Air (VIP transport); 8 Beech G36 Bonanza; 2 Beech G38 Baron; 17 C-212-200 Aviocar; 3 TB-9 Tampico; 2 TB-10 HELICOPTERS ASW 11 AS565MBe Panther MRH 4 Bell 412 (NB-412) Twin Huey CSAR 4 H225M Caracal TPT 15: Medium 3 AS332L Super Puma (NAS322L); Light 12: 3 H120 Colibri; 9 Bo-105 (NBo-105)

Marines ε20,000 FORCES BY ROLE SPECIAL FORCES 1 SF bn MANOEUVRE Amphibious 2 mne gp (1 cav regt, 3 mne bn, 1 arty regt, 1 cbt spt regt, 1 CSS regt) 1 mne gp (forming) 1 mne bde (3 mne bn) EQUIPMENT BY TYPE ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES LT TK 65: 10 AMX-10 PAC 90; 55 PT-76† RECCE 21 BRDM-2 IFV 114: 24 AMX-10P; 22 BMP-2; 54 BMP-3F; 2 BTR-4; 12 BTR-80A APC 103: APC (T) 100 BTR-50P; APC (W) 3 BTR-4M AAV 15: 10 LVTP-7A1; 5 M113 Arisgator ARTILLERY 71+ TOWED 50: 105mm 22 LG1 MK II; 122mm 28 M-38 MRL 122mm 21: 4 PHL-90B; 9 RM-70; 8 RM-70 Vampir MOR 81mm some AIR DEFENCE • GUNS • 40mm 5 L/60/L/70; 57mm S-60

Air Force 30,100

3 operational comd (East, Central and West) plus trg comd FORCES BY ROLE FIGHTER 1 sqn with F-16A/B/C/D Fighting Falcon FIGHTER/GROUND ATTACK 1 sqn with F-16C/D Fighting Falcon 1 sqn with Su-27SK Flanker; Su-30MK Flanker 1 sqn with Su-27SKM Flanker; Su-30MK2 Flanker 2 sqn with Hawk Mk109*/Mk209* 1 sqn with T-50i Golden Eagle* GROUND ATTACK 1 sqn with EMB-314 (A-29) Super Tucano* MARITIME PATROL 1 sqn with B-737-200 1 sqn with CN235M-220 MPA; CN235M-110 TANKER/TRANSPORT 1 sqn with C-130B/KC-130B Hercules TRANSPORT 1 VIP sqn with B-737-200; C-130H/H-30 Hercules; L-10030; F-27-400M Troopship; F-28-1000/3000 1 sqn with C-130H/H-30 Hercules; L-100-30 1 sqn with C-130H Hercules 1 sqn with C-212 Aviocar (NC-212/NC-212i) 1 sqn with C295M TRAINING 1 sqn with Grob 120TP 1 sqn with KT-1B TRANSPORT HELICOPTER 2 sqn with H225M; AS332L Super Puma (NAS332L); NAS332 C1+ Super Puma; SA330J/L Puma (NAS330J/L) 1 VIP sqn with AS332L Super Puma (NAS332L); SA330SM Puma (NAS300SM) 1 sqn with H120 Colibri ISR UAV 1 sqn with Aerostar EQUIPMENT BY TYPE Only 45% of ac op AIRCRAFT 108 combat capable FTR 9: 7 F-16A Fighting Falcon; 2 F-16B Fighting Falcon (8 F-5E Tiger II; 4 F-5F Tiger II non-operational) FGA 40: 19 F-16C Fighting Falcon; 5 F-16D Fighting Falcon; 2 Su-27SK Flanker; 3 Su-27SKM Flanker; 2 Su-30MK Flanker F; 9 Su-30MK2 Flanker G MP 8: 3 B-737-200; 2 CN235M-220 MPA ISR 1 C295M TKR/TPT 1 KC-130B Hercules TPT 53: Medium 19: 4 C-130B Hercules; 7 C-130H Hercules; 6 C-130H-30 Hercules; 2 L-100-30; Light 25: 9 C295; 9 C-212 Aviocar (NC-212); 2 C-212 Aviocar (NC212i); 5 CN235M-110; PAX 9: 1 B-737-200; 3 B-737-400; 1 B-737-500; 1 B-737-800BBJ; 1 F-28-1000; 2 F-28-3000 TRG 103: 15 EMB-314 (A-29) Super Tucano*; 30 Grob 120TP; 7 Hawk Mk109*; 22 Hawk Mk209*; 14 KT-1B; 15 T-50i Golden Eagle* HELICOPTERS TPT 37: Heavy 6 H225M (CSAR); Medium 19: 9 AS332 Super Puma (NAS332L) (VIP/CSAR); 1 NAS332 C1+ Super Puma; 1 SA330SM Puma (NAS330SM) (VIP); 4 SA330J Puma (NAS330J); 4 SA330L Puma (NAS330L); Light 12 H120 Colibri

Asia 275

DEPLOYMENT CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC: UN • MINUSCA 230; 1 engr coy DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO: UN • MONUSCO 1,035; 1 inf bn; 1 engr coy LEBANON: UN • UNIFIL 1,229; 1 mech inf bn; 1 MP coy; 1 FSGHM MALI: UN • MINUSMA 9 PHILIPPINES: IMT 9

Special Forces (Paskhasau)

SOUTH SUDAN: UN • UNMISS 4

FORCES BY ROLE SPECIAL FORCES 3 (PASKHASAU) SF wg (total: 6 spec ops sqn) 4 indep SF coy

SUDAN: UN • UNISFA 4

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE AIR DEFENCE SAM • Point Chiron; QW-3 GUNS • TOWED 35mm 6 Oerlikon Skyshield

Gendarmerie & Paramilitary 280,000+ Police ε280,000 (including 14,000 police ‘mobile bde’ (BRIMOB) org in 56 coy, incl CT unit (Gegana))

WESTERN SAHARA: UN • MINURSO 3

Japan JPN Japanese Yen JPY GDP

JPY

per capita

2020

2021

539tr

553tr

USD

5.05tr

5.10tr

USD

40,089

40,704

Growth

-4.6

2.4

Inflation

-0.0

-0.2

Def bdgt

JPY

5.31tr

5.34tr

USD

49.8bn

49.3bn

106.77

108.46

2022

Asia

UNINHABITED AERIAL VEHICLES CISR • Heavy CH-4B (in test) ISR • Medium Aerostar AIR-LAUNCHED MISSILES AAM • IR AIM-9P Sidewinder; R-73 (RS-AA-11A Archer); IR/SARH R-27 (RS-AA-10 Alamo) ARH R-77 (RS-AA-12A Adder) ASM AGM-65G Maverick; AR-2; Kh-59M (RS-AS-18 Kazoo); Kh-59T (RS-AS-14B Kedge) ARM Kh-31P (RS-AS-17A Krypton)

5.45tr

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES APC (W) 34 Tactica AIRCRAFT • TPT • Light 6: 2 Beech 18; 2 C-212 Aviocar (NC-212); 1 C295; 1 Turbo Commander 680 HELICOPTERS MRH 1 Bell 412EP TPT • Light 22: 3 Bell 206 Jet Ranger; 19 Bo-105 (NBo105)

USD1=JPY

Age

0–14

15–19

20–24

25–29

KPLP (Coast and Seaward Defence Command)

Male

6.5%

2.4%

2.5%

2.6%

21.9%

12.7%

Female

6.1%

2.2%

2.3%

2.4%

22.3%

16.1%

Responsible to Military Sea Communications Agency

Capabilities

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 37 PCO 7: 1 Arda Dedali; 3 Chundamani; 1 Kalimasada; 2 Trisula PB 30: 4 Golok (SAR); 5 Kujang; 6 Rantos; 15 (various) LOGISTICS AND SUPPORT • ABU 1 Jadayat

Bakamla (Maritime Security Agency) EQUIPMENT BY TYPE PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 10 PSO 4: 3 Pulau Nipah with 1 hel landing platform; 1 Tanjung Datu with 1 hel landing platform PB 6 Bintang Laut (KCR-40 mod)

Reserve Organisations Kamra People’s Security ε40,000 Report for 3 weeks’ basic training each year; part-time police auxiliary

Real-terms defence budget trend (USDbn, constant 2015) 43.2

2008

Population

38.5 2021

2015

124,687,293 30–64 65 plus

Japan’s concerns over its regional security environment have heightened, as evidenced in its 2021 Defense White Paper. These principally relate to security challenges posed by a more assertive China and continued concern over North Korea. As a result, there have been defence-budget increases and defence-policy and legislative reforms designed to enable Japan to play a more active international security role and strengthen the Japan Self-Defense Force (JSDF). Due to their defensive mandate, JSDF deployments are mostly for peacekeeping purposes. While the JSDF’s offensive capacity remains weak, the navy has strengths in anti-submarine warfare and air defence. In 2018, a Ground Component Command was created. An Amphibious Rapid Deployment Brigade has also been established, tasked mainly with the defence of remote islands. The Izumo helicopter carrier has completed the first stage of modifications to embark and operate fixed-wing aircraft, and in October 2021, F-35B aircraft from the US Marine Corps successfully landed on and took off from its flight deck. Final conversion work will take place in FY 2025, while JS Kaga will be fully modified in FY 2022. Japan is developing capabilities in space, cyberspace and the electromagnetic spectrum to develop a ‘multi-domain defence force’, based on the 2018 National Defense Program Guidelines and the 2019–23

276 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2022 Mid-Term Defense Program. In 2020, a Space Operations Squadron was set up, with the aim of enhancing space situational-awareness capabilities. The Cyber Defense Group is to expand. Enhancing ballistic-missile defence remains a key priority. In December 2020, the cabinet announced that two vessels equipped with Aegis ballisticmissile-defence systems would be developed as alternatives to the cancelled land-based Aegis Ashore. Japan’s alliance with the US remains the cornerstone of its defence policy, reflected by continued US basing, the widespread use of US equipment across all three services and regular training with US forces. Meanwhile, meetings with Germany, India, Indonesia and the UK have indicated efforts to expand security relations. Following a joint statement in March 2021 by the ‘Quad’ (Australia, India, Japan and the US), in which they reaffirmed their ‘commitment to quadrilateral cooperation’, the first-ever Leaders’ Summit was held in September 2021. In November 2020, Australia and Japan agreed in principle on a Reciprocal Access Agreement, while India and Japan inked an Acquisition and Cross-Servicing Agreement in September 2020. In September 2021, negotiations for a Reciprocal Access Agreement began with the UK. Japan has an advanced defence-industrial base. Defence exports have mainly consisted of components, though there are ambitions to secure more significant export deals; a notable development was the August 2020 contract to supply air-surveillance radars to the Philippines Air Force. Japan’s ongoing military-procurement drive is focused on power projection, mobility and ISR. Budget documents also note research on a hypersonic glide body, new anti-ship missiles and research on advanced radar technology.

ACTIVE 247,150 (Ground Self-Defense Force 150,700 Maritime Self-Defense Force 45,300 Air Self-Defense Force 46,950 Central Staff 4,200) Gendarmerie & Paramilitary 14,350 RESERVE 55,900 (General Reserve Army (GSDF) 46,000 Ready Reserve Army (GSDF) 8,000 Navy 1,100 Air 800)

ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE Space EQUIPMENT BY TYPE SATELLITES 11 COMMUNICATIONS 2: 1 Kirameki-1; 1 Kirameki-2 ISR 9 IGS

Ground Self-Defense Force 150,700 FORCES BY ROLE COMMAND 5 army HQ (regional comd) SPECIAL FORCES 1 spec ops unit (bn) MANOEUVRE Armoured 1 (7th) armd div (1 armd recce sqn, 3 tk regt, 1 armd inf regt, 1 hel sqn, 1 SP arty regt, 1 AD regt, 1 cbt engr bn, 1 sigs bn, 1 NBC bn, 1 log regt) 1 indep tk bn Mechanised 1 (2nd) inf div (1 armd recce sqn, 1 tk regt, 3 inf regt, 1 hel sqn, 1 SP arty regt, 1 AT coy, 1 ADA bn, 1 cbt engr bn, 1 sigs bn, 1 NBC bn, 1 log regt)

1 (4th) inf div (1 armd recce bn, 3 inf regt, 1 inf coy, 1 hel sqn, 1 AT coy, 1 SAM bn, 1 cbt engr bn, 1 sigs bn, 1 NBC bn, 1 log regt) 1 (6th) inf div (1 recce sqn, 1 mech inf regt; 3 inf regt, 1 hel sqn, 1 SAM bn, 1 cbt engr bn, 1 sigs bn, 1 NBC bn, 1 log regt) 1 (9th) inf div (1 armd recce sqn, 1 tk bn, 3 inf regt, 1 hel sqn, 1 SAM bn, 1 cbt engr bn, 1 sigs bn, 1 NBC bn, 1 log regt) 1 (5th) inf bde (1 armd recce sqn, 1 tk bn, 3 inf regt, 1 hel sqn, 1 SP arty bn, 1 SAM coy, 1 cbt engr coy, 1 sigs coy, 1 NBC coy, 1 log bn) 1 (11th) inf bde (1 armd recce sqn, 1 tk sqn, 3 inf regt, 1 hel sqn, 1 SP arty bn, 1 SAM coy, 1 cbt engr coy, 1 sigs coy, 1 NBC coy, 1 log bn) Light 2 (1st & 3rd) inf div (1 recce sqn, 1 tk bn, 3 inf regt, 1 hel sqn, 1 fd arty bn, 1 SAM bn, 1 cbt engr bn, 1 sigs bn, 1 NBC bn, 1 log regt) 1 (10th) inf div (1 recce sqn, 1 tk bn, 3 inf regt, 1 hel sqn, 1 fd arty regt, 1 SAM bn, 1 cbt engr bn, 1 sigs bn, 1 NBC bn, 1 log regt) 1 (8th) inf div (1 recce sqn, 3 inf regt, 1 hel sqn, 1 SAM bn, 1 cbt engr bn, 1 sigs bn, 1 NBC bn, 1 log regt) 1 (13th) inf bde (1 recce sqn, 1 tk coy, 3 inf regt, 1 hel sqn, 1 fd arty bn, 1 SAM coy, 1 cbt engr coy, 1 NBC coy, 1 sigs coy, 1 log bn) 1 (14th) inf bde (1 recce sqn, 2 inf regt, 1 hel sqn, 1 SAM coy, 1 cbt engr coy, 1 NBC coy, 1 sigs coy, 1 log bn) 1 (15th) inf bde (1 recce sqn, 1 inf regt, 1 avn sqn, 1 AD regt, 1 cbt engr coy, 1 NBC coy, 1 sigs coy, 1 log bn) Air Manoeuvre 1 (1st) AB bde (3 AB bn, 1 fd arty bn, 1 cbt engr coy, 1 sigs coy, 1 log bn) 1 (12th) air mob inf bde (1 recce sqn, 3 inf regt, 1 avn sqn, 1 fd arty bn, 1 SAM coy, 1 cbt engr coy, 1 NBC coy, 1 sigs coy, 1 log bn) Amphibious 1 amph bde (1 recce coy, 2 amph regt, 1 amph aslt bn, 1 log bn) COMBAT SUPPORT 1 (1st) arty bde (1 SP arty regt (2 SP arty bn, 1 MRL bn); 1 SP arty regt (1 SP arty bn, 1 MRL bn); 3 AShM regt) 1 (Northwestern Army) arty bde (1 fd arty regt (4 fd arty bn); 1 AShM regt) 1 (Western Army) arty bde (1 fd arty regt (4 fd arty bn); 1 MRL bn; 1 AShM regt) 1 (Central Army) fd arty bn 4 engr bde 1 engr unit 1 EW bn 5 int bn 1 MP bde 1 sigs bde COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT 5 log unit (bde) 5 trg bde HELICOPTER 2 sqn with MV-22B Osprey (forming)

HELICOPTER 1 hel bde (5 tpt hel sqn; 1 VIP tpt hel bn) 5 hel gp (1 atk hel bn, 1 hel bn) AIR DEFENCE 2 SAM bde (2 SAM gp) 2 SAM gp EQUIPMENT BY TYPE ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES MBT 579: 99 Type-10; 145 Type-74; 335 Type-90 ASLT 123 Type-16 MCV RECCE 111 Type-87 IFV 68 Type-89 APC 804 APC (T) 226 Type-73 APC (W) 578: 197 Type-82; 381 Type-96 AAV 52 AAV-7 AUV 8 Bushmaster ENGINEERING & MAINTENANCE VEHICLES ARV 63: 5 Type-11; 28 Type-78; 30 Type-90 VLB 22 Type-91 NBC VEHICLES 55: 34 Chemical Reconnaissance Vehicle; 21 NBC Reconnaissance Vehicle ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE MSL SP 37 Type-96 MPMS MANPATS Type-79 Jyu-MAT; Type-87 Chu-MAT; Type-01 LMAT RCL • 84mm Carl Gustaf ARTILLERY 1,582 SP 166: 155mm 135 Type-99; 203mm 31 M110A2 TOWED 155mm 229 FH-70 MRL 227mm 54 M270 MLRS MOR 1,133: 81mm 656 L16 120mm 453 RT-61; SP 120mm 24 Type-96 COASTAL DEFENCE • AShM 92: 30 Type-12; 62 Type-88 AIRCRAFT • TPT • Light 8 Beech 350 King Air (LR-2) TILTROTOR • TPT 7+ MV-22B Osprey HELICOPTERS ATK 99: 50 AH-1S Cobra; 12 AH-64D Apache; 37 OH-1 TPT 249: Heavy 53: 18 CH-47D Chinook (CH-47J); 35 CH-47JA Chinook; Medium 43: 3 H225 Super Puma MkII+ (VIP); 40 UH-60L Black Hawk (UH-60JA); Light 153: 123 Bell 205 (UH-1J); 30 Enstrom 480B (TH-480B) AIR DEFENCE SAM 311+ Medium-range 130: 48 Type-03 Chu-SAM; 4 Type-03 Chu-SAM Kai; 78 MIM-23B I-Hawk Short-range ε44 Type-11 Tan-SAM Point-defence 137+: 46 Type-81 Tan-SAM; 91 Type-93 Kin-SAM; Type-91 Kei-SAM GUNS • SP 35mm 52 Type-87

Maritime Self-Defense Force 45,300 Surface units organised into 4 Escort Flotillas with a mix of 8 warships each. Bases at Yokosuka, Kure, Sasebo, Maizuru, Ominato. SSK organised into two flotillas with bases at Kure and Yokosuka

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE SUBMARINES • SSK 22: 11 Oyashio (of which 2 in trg role) with 6 single 533mm TT with UGM-84C Harpoon Block 1B AShM/Type-89 HWT 11 Soryu (of which 9 fitted with AIP and 2 fitted with lithium-ion fuel battery; 1 other AIP-fitted boat nonoperational following 2021 collision) with 6 single 533mm TT with UGM-84C Harpoon Block 1B AShM/ Type-89 HWT PRINCIPAL SURFACE COMBATANTS 49 AIRCRAFT CARRIERS • CVH 4: 2 Hyuga with 2 8-cell Mk 41 VLS with ASROC/RIM162B ESSM SAM, 2 triple 324mm HOS-303 ASTT with Mk 46/Type-97 LWT, 2 Mk 15 Phalanx Block 1B CIWS (normal ac capacity 3 SH-60 Seahawk ASW hel; plus additional ac embarkation up to 7 SH-60 Seahawk or 7 MCH-101) 2 Izumo (being converted to CVS) with 2 11-cell Mk 15 SeaRAM lnchr with RIM-116 SAM, 2 Mk 15 Phalanx Block 1B CIWS (normal ac capacity 7 SH-60 Seahawk ASW hel; plus additional ac embarkation up to 5 SH60 Seahawk/MCH-101 hel) CRUISERS • CGHM 4: 2 Atago with Aegis Baseline 9 C2, 2 quad lnchr with SSM-1B (Type-90) AShM, 12 8-cell Mk 41 VLS (8 fore, 4 aft) with SM-2 Block IIIA/B SAM/SM-3 Block IA/IB SAM/ASROC A/S msl, 2 triple 324mm HOS302 ASTT with Mk 46 LWT, 2 Mk 15 Phalanx Block 1B CIWS, 1 127mm gun (capacity 1 SH-60 Seahawk ASW hel) 2 Maya (Atago mod) with Aegis Baseline 9 C2, w quad lnchr with SSM-1B (Type-90) AShM), 12 8-cell Mk 41 VLS (8 fore, 4 aft) with SM-2 Block IIIA/B SAM/SM-3 Block IA/IB SAM/Type-07 A/S msl, 2 triple 324mm HOS-303 ASTT with Mk 46 LWT, 2 Mk 15 Phalanx Block 1B CIWS, 1 127mm gun (capacity 1 SH-60 Seahawk ASW hel) DESTROYERS 35 DDGHM 29: 8 Asagiri with 2 quad lnchr with RGM-84C Harpoon Block 1B AShM, 1 octuple Mk 29 lnchr with RIM7M Sea Sparrow SAM, 2 triple 324mm HOS-302 ASTT with Mk 46 LWT, 1 octuple Mk 112 lnchr with ASROC, 2 Mk 15 Phalanx CIWS, 1 76mm gun (capacity 1 SH-60 Seahawk ASW hel) 4 Akizuki with 2 quad lnchr with SSM-1B (Type-90) AShM, 4 8-cell Mk 41 VLS with ASROC/RIM-162B ESSM SAM, 2 triple 324mm HOS-303 ASTT with Type-97 LWT, 2 Mk 15 Phalanx Block 1B CIWS, 1 127mm gun (capacity 1 SH-60 Seahawk ASW hel) 2 Asahi (Akizuki mod) with 2 quad lnchr with SSM1B (Type-90) AShM, 4 8-cell Mk 41 VLS with RIM-162B ESSM SAM/Type-07 A/S msl, 2 triple 324mm HOS-303 ASTT with Type-12 LWT, 2 Mk 15 Phalanx Block 1B CIWS, 1 127mm gun (capacity 1 SH-60 Seahawk ASW hel) 1 Hatsuyuki (trg role) with 2 quad lnchr with RGM84C Harpoon Block 1B AShM, 1 octuple Mk 29 lnchr with RIM-7F/M Sea Sparrow SAM, 2 triple 324mm HOS-301 ASTT with Mk 46 LWT, 1 octuple Mk 112

Asia

Asia 277

278 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2022 lnchr with ASROC A/S msl, 2 Mk 15 Phalanx CIWS, 1 76mm gun (capacity 1 SH-60 Seahawk ASW hel) 9 Murasame with 2 quad lnchr with SSM-1B (Type90) AShM, 1 16-cell Mk 48 mod 0 VLS with RIM162C ESSM SAM, 2 triple 324mm HOS-302 ASTT with Mk 46 LWT, 2 8-cell Mk 41 VLS with ASROC, 2 Mk 15 Phalanx CIWS, 2 76mm gun (capacity 1 SH-60 Seahawk ASW hel) 5 Takanami (improved Murasame) with 2 quad lnchr with SSM-1B (Type-90) AShM, 4 8-cell Mk 41 VLS with RIM-162B ESSM SAM/ASROC A/S msl, 2 triple 324mm HOS-302 ASTT with Mk 46 LWT, 2 Mk 15 Phalanx Block 1B CIWS, 1 127mm gun (capacity 1 SH-60 Seahawk ASW hel) DDGM 6: 2 Hatakaze (trg role) with 2 quad lnchr with RGM84C Harpoon Block 1B AShM, 1 Mk 13 GMLS with SM-1MR Block VI SAM, 2 triple 324mm HOS-301 ASTT with Mk 46 LWT, 1 octuple Mk 112 lnchr with ASROC, 2 Mk 15 Phalanx CIWS, 2 127mm gun, 1 hel landing platform 4 Kongou with Aegis Baseline 5 C2, 2 quad lnchr with RGM-84C Harpoon Block 1B AShM, 12 8-cell Mk 41 VLS (of which 2 only 5-cell and fitted with reload crane) with SM-2 Block IIIA/B SAM/SM-3 Block IA SAM/ASROC A/S msl, 2 triple 324mm HOS-302 ASTT with Mk 46 LWT, 2 Mk 15 Phalanx Block 1B CIWS, 1 127mm gun FRIGATES • FFG 6 Abukuma with 2 quad lnchr with RGM-84C Harpoon Block 1B AShM, 2 triple 324mm HOS301 ASTT with Mk 46 LWT, 1 octuple Mk 112 lnchr with ASROC A/S msl, 1 Mk 15 Phalanx CIWS, 1 76mm gun PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 6 PBFG 6 Hayabusa with 4 SSM-1B (Type-90) AShM, 1 76mm gun MINE WARFARE • MINE COUNTERMEASURES 22 MCCS 2: 1 Uraga with 1 76mm gun, 1 hel landing platform (for MCH-101 hel) 1 Uraga with 1 hel landing platform (for MCH-101) MSC 17: 3 Hirashima; 11 Sugashima; 3 Enoshima MSO 3 Awaji AMPHIBIOUS PRINCIPAL AMPHIBIOUS SHIPS • LHD 3 Osumi with 2 Mk 15 Phalanx CIWS (capacity for 2 CH-47 hel) (capacity 10 Type-90 MBT; 2 LCAC(L) ACV; 330 troops) LANDING CRAFT 8 LCM 2 LCU-2001 LCAC 6 LCAC(L) (capacity either 1 MBT or 60 troops) LOGISTICS AND SUPPORT 24 AGBH 1 Shirase (capacity 2 AW101 Merlin hel) AGEH 1 Asuka (wpn trials) with 1 8-cell Mk 41 VLS (capacity 1 SH-60 Seahawk hel) AGOS 3 Hibiki with 1 hel landing platform AGS 3: 1 Futami; 1 Nichinan; 1 Shonan AOE 5: 2 Mashu (capacity 1 med hel); 3 Towada with 1 hel landing platform ARC 1 Muroto ASR 2: 1 Chihaya with 1 hel landing platform; 1 Chiyoda with 1 hel landing platform ATF 5 Hiuchi

AX 3: 1 Kashima with 2 triple 324mm HOS-301 ASTT, 1 76mm gun, 1 hel landing platform 1 Kurobe with 1 76mm gun (trg spt ship) 1 Tenryu (trg spt ship); with 1 76mm gun (capacity: 1 med hel)

Naval Aviation ε9,800 7 Air Groups FORCES BY ROLE ANTI SUBMARINE/SURFACE WARFARE 5 sqn with SH-60B (SH-60J)/SH-60K Seahawk MARITIME PATROL 2 sqn with P-1 2 sqn with P-3C Orion ELECTRONIC WARFARE 1 sqn with EP-3 Orion MINE COUNTERMEASURES 1 sqn with MCH-101 SEARCH & RESCUE 1 sqn with Shin Meiwa US-2 2 sqn with UH-60J Black Hawk TRANSPORT 1 sqn with AW101 Merlin (CH-101); Beech 90 King Air (LC-90); KC-130R Hercules TRAINING 1 sqn with Beech 90 King Air (TC-90) 1 sqn with P-3C Orion 1 sqn with T-5J 1 hel sqn with H135 (TH-135); SH-60K Seahawk EQUIPMENT BY TYPE AIRCRAFT 73 combat capable ASW 73: 29 P-1; 44 P-3C Orion ELINT 5 EP-3C Orion SAR 6 Shin Meiwa US-2 TPT 24: Medium 6 C-130R Hercules; Light 18: 5 Beech 90 King Air (LC-90); 13 Beech 90 King Air (TC-90) (trg) TRG 30 T-5J HELICOPTERS ASW 83: 14 SH-60B Seahawk (SH-60J); 69 SH-60K Seahawk MCM 10 MCH-101 SAR 9 UH-60J Black Hawk TPT 18: Medium 3 AW101 Merlin (CH-101); Light 15 H135 (TH-135) (trg) AIR-LAUNCHED MISSILES AShM ASM-1C (Type-90)

Air Self-Defense Force 46,950 7 cbt wg

FORCES BY ROLE FIGHTER 7 sqn with F-15J Eagle 3 sqn with Mitsubishi F-2 2 sqn with F-35A Lightning II ELECTRONIC WARFARE 1 sqn with Kawasaki EC-1; YS-11EA ELINT 1 sqn with RC-2; YS-11EB

Asia 279

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE AIRCRAFT 514 combat capable FTR 201: 156 F-15J Eagle; 45 F-15DJ Eagle FGA 116: 64 F-2A; 27 F-2B; 25 F-35A Lightning II EW 3: 1 Kawasaki EC-1; 2 YS-11EA SIGINT 4: 1 RC-2; 3 YS-11EB AEW&C 18: 10 E-2C Hawkeye; 4 E-2D Hawkeye; 4 E-767 SAR 26 U-125A Peace Krypton TKR/TPT 7: 1 KC-46A Pegasus; 2 KC-130H Hercules; 4 KC-767J TPT 54: Medium 34: 14 C-130H Hercules; 8 C-1; 12 C-2; PAX 20: 2 B-777-300ER (VIP); 13 Beech T-400; 5 Gulfstream IV (U-4) TRG 246: 197 T-4*; 49 T-7 HELICOPTERS SAR 39 UH-60J Black Hawk TPT • Heavy 15 CH-47JA Chinook AIR-LAUNCHED MISSILES AAM • IR AAM-3 (Type-90); AIM-9L Sidewinder; IIR AAM-5 (Type-04); SARH AIM-7 Sparrow; ARH AAM-4 (Type-99); AIM-120C5/C7 AMRAAM (limited numbers) AShM ASM-1 (Type-80); ASM-2 (Type-93) BOMBS INS/SAT guided GBU-38 JDAM; GBU-54 Laser JDAM

Air Defence Ac control and warning. 4 wg; 28 radar sites FORCES BY ROLE AIR DEFENCE 6 SAM gp (total: 24 SAM bty with M902 Patriot PAC3) 1 AD gp with Type-81 Tan-SAM; M167 Vulcan EQUIPMENT BY TYPE AIR DEFENCE SAM 146+ Long-range 120 M902 Patriot PAC-3 Short-range ε26 Air Base Defense SAM Point-defence Type-81 Tan-SAM GUNS • TOWED 20mm M167 Vulcan

Gendarmerie & Paramilitary 14,350 Coast Guard 14,350

Ministry of Land, Transport, Infrastructure and Tourism (no cbt role) EQUIPMENT BY TYPE PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 383 PSOH 18: 2 Mizuho (capacity 2 hels); 1 Mizuho II (capacity 2 hels); 4 Shikishima (capacity 2 hels); 1 Shunko (capacity 2 hels); 1 Soya (capacity 1 hel) (icebreaking capability); 9 Tsugaru (Soya mod) (capacity 1 hel) PSO 48: 9 Hateruma with 1 hel landing platform; 3 Hida with 1 hel landing platform; 6 Iwami; 1 Izu with 1 hel landing platform; 1 Kojima (trg) with 1 hel landing platform; 2 Kunigami with 1 hel landing platform; 1 Miura with 1 hel landing platform; 1 Miyako with 1 hel landing platform; 6 Ojika with 1 hel landing platform; 18 Taketomi with 1 hel landing platform PCO 16: 3 Aso; 8 Katori; 5 Teshio PCC 26: 4 Amami; 22 Tokara PBF 50: 24 Hayagumo; 3 Mihashi; 15 Raizan; 2 Takatsuki; 6 Tsuruugi PB 55: 4 Asogiri; 4 Hamagumo; 11 Hayanami; 15 Katonami; 1 Matsunami; 10 Shimoji; 10 Yodo PBI 170: 2 Hakubai; 1 Hayagiku; 167 Himegiku LOGISTICS AND SUPPORT 18 ABU 1 Teshio AGS 14: 6 Hamashio; 1 Jinbei; 2 Meiyo; 2 Peiyo; 1 Shoyo; 1 Takuyo; 1 Tenyo AX 3 AIRCRAFT MP 4 Falcon 2000MSA SAR 4 Saab 340B TPT 26: Light 24: 5 Cessna 172; 10 Beech 350 King Air (LR-2); 9 DHC Dash-7 (Bombardier 300) (MP); PAX 2 Gulfstream V (MP) HELICOPTERS MRH 4 Bell 412 Twin Huey SAR 12 S-76D TPT 37: Medium 12: 2 AS332 Super Puma; 10 H225 Super Puma; Light 25: 18 AW139; 4 Bell 505 Jet Ranger X; 3 S-76C

DEPLOYMENT ARABIAN SEA & GULF OF ADEN: MSDF: 1 DDGHM; Combined Maritime Forces • CTF-151: 1 DDGHM DJIBOUTI: 180; 2 P-3C Orion SOUTH SUDAN: UN • UNMISS 4

FOREIGN FORCES United States US Pacific Command: 55,600 Army 2,600; 1 corps HQ (fwd); 1 SF gp; 1 avn bn; 1 SAM bn with M903 Patriot PAC MSE Navy 20,000; 1 CVN; 3 CGHM; 4 DDGHM; 4 DDGM; 1 LCC; 4 MCO; 1 LHA; 2 LPD; 2 LSD; 3 FGA sqn with 10 F/A-18E Super Hornet; 1 FGA sqn with 10 F/A-18F Super Hornet; 2 ASW sqn with 5 P-8A Poseidon; 1 ELINT flt

Asia

AIRBORNE EARLY WARNING & CONTROL 2 sqn with E-2C/D Hawkeye 1 sqn with E-767 SEARCH & RESCUE 1 wg with U-125A Peace Krypton; UH-60J Black Hawk TANKER 1 sqn with KC-46A Pegasus (forming) 1 sqn with KC-767J TRANSPORT 1 (VIP) sqn with B-777-300ER 1 sqn with C-1; Gulfstream IV (U-4) 1 sqn with C-2 1 sqn with C-130H Hercules; KC-130H Hercules Some (liaison) sqn with Gulfstream IV (U-4); T-4* TRAINING 1 (aggressor) sqn with F-15J Eagle TEST 1 wg with F-15J Eagle; T-4* TRANSPORT HELICOPTER 4 flt with CH-47JA Chinook

280 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2022 with 2 EP-3E Aries II; 2 EW sqn with 5 EA-18G Growler; 1 AEW&C sqn with 5 E-2D Hawkeye; 2 ASW hel sqn with 12 MH-60R Seahawk; 1 tpt hel sqn with MH-60S Knight Hawk; 1 base at Sasebo; 1 base at Yokosuka USAF: 13,000; 1 HQ (5th Air Force) at Okinawa–Kadena AB; 1 ftr wg at Misawa AB (2 ftr sqn with 22 F-16C/D Fighting Falcon); 1 ftr wg at Okinawa–Kadena AB (2 ftr sqn with 27 F-15C/D Eagle; 1 tkr sqn with 15 KC-135R Stratotanker; 1 AEW sqn with 2 E-3B Sentry; 1 CSAR sqn with 10 HH-60G Pave Hawk); 1 tpt wg at Yokota AB with 10 C-130J-30 Hercules; 3 Beech 1900C (C-12J); 1 spec ops gp at Okinawa–Kadena AB with (1 sqn with 5 MC-130J Commando II; 1 sqn with 5 CV-22B Osprey); 1 ISR sqn with RC-135 Rivet Joint; 1 ISR UAV flt with 5 RQ-4A Global Hawk USMC 20,000; 1 mne div; 1 mne regt HQ; 1 arty regt HQ; 1 recce bn; 1 mne bn; 1 amph aslt bn; 1 arty bn; 1 FGA sqn at Iwakuni with 12 F/A-18A++/C+ Hornet; 2 FGA sqn at Iwakuni with 12 F-35B Lightning II; 1 tkr sqn at Iwakuni with 15 KC-130J Hercules; 2 tpt sqn at Futenma with 12 MV-22B Osprey US Strategic Command: 1 AN/TPY-2 X-band radar at Shariki; 1 AN/TPY-2 X-band radar at Kyogamisaki

Korea, Democratic People’s Republic of DPRK North Korean Won KPW GDP

2020

2021

ACTIVE 1,280,000 (Army 1,100,000 Navy 60,000 Air 110,000 Strategic Forces 10,000) Gendarmerie & Paramilitary 189,000 Conscript liability Army 5–12 years, Navy 5–10 years, Air Force 3–4 years, followed by compulsory part-time service to age 40. Thereafter service in the Worker/Peasant Red Guard to age 60

RESERVE ε600,000 (Armed Forces ε600,000), 2022

Gendarmerie & Paramilitary 5,700,000 Reservists are assigned to units (see also Paramilitary)

USD

per capita

USD

Def exp

KPW

ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE Strategic Forces ε10,000

USD

North Korea describes its ballistic missile force as nuclear capable, although there is no conclusive evidence to verify the successful integration of a warhead with any of these systems

USD1=KPW *definitive economic data not available Population

Pyongyang has nonetheless often found ways to develop military ties. Official conscription for both men and women is often extended, sometimes indefinitely. Training is focused on fighting a short, intensive war on the peninsula, but the armed forces’ overall effectiveness in a modern conflict against technologically superior opposition is unclear. Internal exercises are conducted regularly, but those publicised are staged and are not necessarily representative of wider operational capability. North Korea’s conventional forces remain reliant on increasingly obsolete equipment, with older Soviet-era and Chinese-origin equipment supplemented by a growing number of indigenous designs and upgrades, though the precise capability of these remains unclear. Overall effectiveness and serviceability of some equipment remains in doubt but there is local maintenance, repair and overhaul capacity. Local defence-industrial capacity includes the manufacture of light arms, armoured vehicles, artillery and missile systems. North Korea has exported weaponry in the past. It is unclear whether the country would have had the capability to indigenously develop some of the technical advances it has demonstrated, including in rocket propulsion.

25,831,360

Age

0–14

15–19

20–24

25–29

Male

10.4%

3.5%

3.7%

4.0%

30–64 65 plus 23.6%

3.4%

Female

10.0%

3.4%

3.7%

3.9%

24.0%

6.3%

Capabilities Renewed diplomacy reduced overall tensions on the Korean Peninsula after 2018, though North Korea’s observed actions remain inconsistent with de-nuclearisation. Aware of the qualitative inferiority of its conventional forces, North Korea continues to invest in asymmetric capabilities, particularly the development of nuclear weapons and ballistic-missile delivery systems. A self-imposed 2018 moratorium covering nuclear- and long-range-missile tests technically remains unbroken, though the resumption of launch testing since 2019 has included several potentially dual-capable shorter-range missiles together with a medium-range SLBM. Pyongyang’s ambitions to further diversify delivery systems were also indicated in September 2021 with flight tests of an apparent Land Attack Cruise Missile (LACM), its first known rail-based ballistic missile and what Pyongyang claimed was a Hypersonic Glide Vehicle (HGV). Other new designs have been shown but as yet remain untested, including ICBM and additional SLBM designs. North Korea remains diplomatically isolated. While foreign defence cooperation is restricted by international pressure and sanctions,

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE (ε) SURFACE-TO-SURFACE MISSILE LAUNCHERS ICBM 10+: 6+ Hwasong-14 (in test)/Hwasong-15 (in test); 4+ Hwasong-17 (under development); (Earlier Hwasong-13/-13 mod designs untested and presumed cancelled) IRBM 10+ Hwasong-10 (Musudan) (status uncertain)/ Hwasong-12 (in test) MRBM 17+: ε10 Nodong mod 1/mod 2 (ε90+ msl); some Scud-ER; 7+ Pukgusong-2 (in test) SBRM 69+: 30+ Hwasong-5/-6 (RS-SS-1C/D Scud-B/C) (ε200+ msl); 1+ Hwasong-8 with HGV (in test); 9+ Hwasong-11 mod (in test); 6+ Scud (mod) (in test); 17+ KN-23 (road & rail mobile variants); 6+ KN-23 mod 1 (in test) GLCM some M-2021 (in test)

Army ε1,100,000 FORCES BY ROLE COMMAND 10 inf corps HQ 1 (Capital Defence) corps HQ

MANOEUVRE Armoured 1 armd div 15 armd bde Mechanised 6 mech div Light 27 inf div 14 inf bde COMBAT SUPPORT 1 arty div 21 arty bde 9 MRL bde 5–8 engr river crossing/amphibious regt 1 engr river crossing bde

Special Purpose Forces Command 88,000 FORCES BY ROLE SPECIAL FORCES 8 (Reconnaissance General Bureau) SF bn MANOEUVRE Reconnaissance 17 recce bn Light 9 lt inf bde 6 sniper bde Air Manoeuvre 3 AB bde 1 AB bn 2 sniper bde Amphibious 2 sniper bde

Reserves 600,000 FORCES BY ROLE MANOEUVRE Light 40 inf div 18 inf bde EQUIPMENT BY TYPE (ε) ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES The Korean People’s Army displayed a number of new armoured-vehicle designs at a parade in 2020, but it is unclear if any of them have entered operational service MBT 3,500+ T-34/T-54/T-55/T-62/Type-59/Chonma/ Pokpoong/Songun LT TK 560+: 560 PT-76; M-1985 IFV 32 BTR-80A APC 2,500+ APC (T) BTR-50; Type-531 (Type-63); VTT-323 APC (W) 2,500 BTR-40/BTR-60/M-1992/1/BTR-152/ M-2010 (6×6)/M-2010 (8×8) ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE MSL SP 9K11 Malyutka (RS-AT-3 Sagger); M-2010 ATGM MANPATS 2K15 Shmel (RS-AT-1 Snapper); 9K111 Fagot (RS-AT-4 Spigot); 9K111-1 Konkurs (RS-AT-5 Spandrel) RCL 82mm 1,700 B-10 ARTILLERY 21,600+ SP/TOWED 8,600:

SP 122mm M-1977; M-1981; M-1985; M-1991; 130mm M-1975; M-1981; M-1991; 152mm M-1974; M-1977; M-2018; 170mm M-1978; M-1989 TOWED 122mm D-30; D-74; M-1931/37; 130mm M-46; 152mm M-1937; M-1938; M-1943 GUN/MOR 120mm (reported) MRL 5,500: 107mm Type-63; VTT-323 107mm; 122mm BM-11; M-1977 (BM-21); M-1985; M-1992; M-1993; VTT323 122mm; 200mm BMD-20; 240mm BM-24; M-1985; M-1989; M-1991; 300mm some M-2015 (KN-SS-X-09) (in test); 600mm some M-2019 (in test) MOR 7,500: 82mm M-37; 120mm M-43; 160mm M-43 SURFACE-TO-SURFACE MISSILE LAUNCHERS SBRM 24+: 24 FROG-3/5/7; some Toksa (RS-SS-21B Scarab mod) AIR DEFENCE SAM Point-defence 9K35 Strela-10 (RS-SA-13 Gopher); 9K310 Igla-1 (RS-SA-16 Gimlet); 9K32 Strela-2 (RS-SA-7 Grail)‡ GUNS 11,000+ SP 14.5mm M-1984; 23mm M-1992; 37mm M-1992; 57mm M-1985 TOWED 11,000: 14.5mm ZPU-1/ZPU-2/ZPU-4; 23mm ZU-23; 37mm M-1939; 57mm S-60; 85mm M-1939 KS12; 100mm KS-19

Navy ε60,000 EQUIPMENT BY TYPE SUBMARINES 71 SSB 1 8.24 Yongung (Gorae (Sinpo-B)) (SLBM trials) with 1 Pukguksong-1 SLBM (status unclear)/KN-23 Mod 2 SLBM (in test) SSK ε20 Type-033 (Romeo) with 8 single 533mm TT with SAET-60 HWT SSC ε40 (some Sang-O some with 2 single 533mm TT with 53–65E HWT; some Sang-O II with 4 single 533mm TT with 53–65E HWT) SSW ε10† (some Yugo some with 2 single 406mm TT; some Yeono some with 2 single 533mm TT) PRINCIPAL SURFACE COMBATANTS 2 FRIGATES • FFG 2: 1 Najin with 2 single lnchr with P-20 (RS-SS-N-2A Styx) AShM, 2 RBU 1200 Uragan A/S mor, 2 100mm gun, 2 twin 57mm gun 1 Najin with 2 twin lnchr with Kumsong-3 (KN-SS-N-2 Stormpetrel) AShM, 2 RBU 1200 Uragan A/S mor, 2 100mm gun, 2 twin 57mm gun (operational status unclear) PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 372+ CORVETTES • FS 5: 4 Sariwon with 2 twin 57mm gun; 1 Tral with 1 85mm gun (Two Tuman- and two Amnokclass corvettes constructed since early 2010s; operational status unknown) PCG 10 Soju (FSU Project 205 mod (Osa)) with 4 single lnchr with P-20 (RS-SS-N-2A Styx) AShM PCC 18: 6 Type-037 (Hainan) with 4 RBU 1200 A/S mor, 2 twin 57mm gun 7 Taechong I with 2 RBU 1200 Uragan A/S mor, 1 85mm gun, 1 twin 57mm gun

Asia

Asia 281

282 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2022 5 Taechong II with 2 RBU 1200 Uragan A/S mor, 1 100mm gun, 1 twin 57mm gun PBFG 31+: 4 Huangfeng (Type-021) with 4 single lnchr with P-15 Termit (RS-SS-N-2 Styx) AShM, 2 twin AK230 CIWS 6 Komar with 2 single lnchr with P-20 (RS-SS-N-2A Styx) AShM 8 Project 205 (Osa I) with 4 single lnchr with P-20 (RS_ SS-N-2A Styx) AShM, 2 twin AK230 CIWS 6 Sohung (Komar mod) with 2 single lnchr with P-20 (RS-SS-N-2A Styx) AShM 1+ Nongo with 2 single lnchr with P-15 Termit (RSSS-N-2 Styx) AShM (operational status unknown) 6+ Nongo with 2 twin lnchr with Kumsong-3 (KN-SS-N-2 Stormpetrel) AShM (operational status unknown) PBF 222: approx. 50 Chong-Jin with 1 85mm gun; 142 Ku Song/Sin Hung/Sin Hung (mod); approx. 30 Sinpo PB 86: approx. 50 Chaho; 6 Chong-Ju with 2 RBU 1200 Uragan A/S mor, 1 85mm gun; 12 Type-062 (Shanghai II); 18 SO-1 with 4 RBU 1200 Uragan A/S mor, 2 twin 57mm gun MINE WARFARE • MINE COUNTERMEASURES 20 MSC 20: 15 Yukto I; 5 Yukto II AMPHIBIOUS LANDING SHIPS • LSM 10 Hantae (capacity 3 tanks; 350 troops) LANDING CRAFT 255 LCM 25 LCPL approx. 95 Nampo (capacity 35 troops) UCAC 135 Kongbang (capacity 50 troops) LOGISTICS AND SUPPORT 23: AGI 14 (converted fishing vessels) AS 8 (converted cargo ships) ASR 1 Kowan

Coastal Defence FORCES BY ROLE COASTAL DEFENCE 2 AShM regt with HY-1/Kumsong-3 (6 sites, some mobile launchers) EQUIPMENT BY TYPE COASTAL DEFENCE ARTY 130mm M-1992; SM-4-1 AShM HY-1; Kumsong-3 ARTILLERY • TOWED 122mm M-1931/37; 152mm M-1937

Air Force 110,000 4 air divs. 1st, 2nd and 3rd Air Divs (cbt) responsible for N, E and S air-defence sectors respectively; 8th Air Div (trg) responsible for NE sector. The AF controls the national airline FORCES BY ROLE BOMBER 3 lt regt with H-5; Il-28 Beagle FIGHTER 1 regt with MiG-15 Fagot 6 regt with J-5; MiG-17 Fresco 4 regt with J-6; MiG-19 Farmer 5 regt with J-7; MiG-21F-13/PFM Fishbed 1 regt with MiG-21bis Fishbed

1 regt with MiG-23ML/P Flogger 1 regt with MiG-29A/S/UB Fulcrum GROUND ATTACK 1 regt with Su-25K/UBK Frogfoot TRANSPORT Some regt with An-2 Colt/Y-5 (to infiltrate 2 air-force sniper brigades deep into ROK rear areas); Il-62M Classic TRAINING Some regt with CJ-6; FT-2; MiG-21U/UM TRANSPORT HELICOPTER Some regt with Hughes 500D/E; Mi-8 Hip; Mi-17 Hip H; Mil-26 Halo; PZL Mi-2 Hoplite; Mi-4 Hound; Z-5 AIR DEFENCE 19 bde with S-125M1 Pechora-M1 (RS-SA-3 Goa); S-75 Dvina (RS-SA-2 Guideline); S-200 Angara (RS-SA-5 Gammon); 9K36 Strela-3 (RS-SA-14 Gremlin); 9K310 Igla-1 (RS-SA-16 Gimlet); 9K32 Strela-2 (RS-SA-7 Grail)‡ EQUIPMENT BY TYPE AIRCRAFT 545 combat capable BBR 80 Il-28 Beagle/H-5‡ (includes some Il-28 for ISR) FTR 401+: MiG-15 Fagot‡; 107 MiG-17 Fresco/J-5‡; 100 MiG-19 Farmer/J-6; 120 MiG-21F-13 Fishbed/J-7; MiG21PFM Fishbed; 46 MiG-23ML Flogger; 10 MiG-23P Flogger; 18+ MiG-29A/S/UB Fulcrum FGA 30 MiG-21bis Fishbed (18 Su-7 Fitter in store) ATK 34 Su-25K/UBK Frogfoot TPT 205: Heavy 3 Il-76 (operated by state airline); Light ε200 An-2 Colt/Y-5; PAX 2 Il-62M Classic (VIP) TRG 215+: 180 CJ-6; 35 FT-2; some MiG-21U/UM HELICOPTERS MRH 80 Hughes 500D/E (some armed) TPT 206: Heavy 4 Mi-26 Halo; Medium 63: 15 Mi-8 Hip/ Mi-17 Hip H; 48 Mi-4 Hound/Z-5; Light 139 PZL Mi-2 Hoplite UNINHABITED AERIAL VEHICLES ISR • Medium some (unidentified indigenous type); Light Pchela-1 (Shmel) (reported) AIR DEFENCE • SAM 209+ Long-range 10 S-200 Angara† (RS-SA-5 Gammon) Medium-range 179+: some Pongae-5 (KN-SA-X-01) (status unknown); 179+ S-75 Dvina (RS-SA-2 Guideline) Short-range ε20 S-125M1 Pechora-M1† (RS-SA-3 Goa) Point-defence 9K32 Strela-2 (RS-SA-7 Grail)‡; 9K36 Strela-3 (RS-SA-14 Gremlin); 9K310 Igla-1 (RS-SA-16 Gimlet) AIR-LAUNCHED MISSILES AAM • IR R-3 (RS-AA-2 Atoll)‡; R-60 (RS-AA-8 Aphid); R-73 (RS-AA-11A Archer); PL-5; PL-7; SARH R-23/24 (RS-AA-7 Apex); R-27R/ER (RS-AA-10 A/C Alamo) ASM Kh-23 (RS-AS-7 Kerry)‡; Kh-25 (RS-AS-10 Karen); Kh-29L (RS-AS-14A Kedge)

Gendarmerie & Paramilitary 189,000 active Security Troops 189,000 (incl border guards, public-safety personnel) Ministry of Public Security

Worker/Peasant Red Guard ε5,700,000 reservists

Org on a province/town/village basis; comd structure is bde–bn–coy–pl; small arms with some mor and AD guns (but many units unarmed)

Asia 283

Reserve Paramilitary 3,000,000

Korea, Republic of ROK

Being reorganised

2020

2021

KRW

1933tr

2069tr

USD

1.64tr

1.82tr

USD

31,638

35,196

Growth

-0.9

4.3

Inflation

0.5

2.2

Def bdgt

KRW

48.4tr

52.9tr

USD

41.0bn

46.7bn

1180.00

1134.35

GDP per capita

USD1=KRW

2022

Space EQUIPMENT BY TYPE SATELLITES • COMMUNICATIONS 2 Anasis 55.2tr

Real-terms defence budget trend (USDbn, constant 2015) 43.3

2008

Population

27.0 2021

2015

ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE

51,715,162

Age

0–14

15–19

20–24

25–29

Male

6.2%

2.4%

3.2%

3.8%

30–64 65 plus 27.2%

7.3%

Female

5.8%

2.2%

3.0%

3.3%

26.1%

9.5%

Capabilities South Korea’s forces are some of the best equipped and trained in the region. Defence policy remains focused on North Korea, and Seoul continues to prioritise developing new capabilities to respond to the nuclear and conventional threat from the DPRK. The Defense Reform 2.0 project announced in 2018 sets out ambitions to modernise, restructure and re-equip the armed forces, placing emphasis on new technologies. In early 2019, the threeaxis defence strategy comprising ‘Kill Chain’, ‘Korea Air and Missile Defense’ and ‘Korea Massive Punishment and Retaliation’ components was reportedly rebranded. The 2020 defence white paper, released in February 2021, detailed plans to tackle North Korea’s missile threats through a ‘four-Ds strategy’ of detect, disrupt, destroy and defend. The long-established alliance with the US is a central element of defence strategy. The planned transfer of wartime operational control of forces to Seoul is now ‘conditions based’ with no firm date set. A large number of US military personnel and equipment remain stationed in South Korea, along with THAAD missile-defence systems. South Korea has demonstrated the capacity to support small international deployments, including contributions to UN missions and counter-piracy operations in the Arabian Sea. The equipment inventory increasingly comprises modern systems. South Korea has developed a substantial domestic defence industry which supplies a large proportion of equipment requirements, although some equipment – notably the F-35 combat aircraft – is still procured from the US. Local defence companies are finding growing export success.

ACTIVE 555,000 (Army 420,000 Navy 70,000 Air 65,000) Gendarmerie & Paramilitary 13,500 Conscript liability Service period reducing from Oct 2018, by three months for the army and marines (now 18 months), and the navy (now 20 months); and by two months for the air force (now 22 months)

RESERVE 3,100,000 Reserve obligation of three days per year. First Combat Forces (Mobilisation Reserve Forces) or Regional Combat Forces (Homeland Defence Forces) to age 33

Army 420,000 FORCES BY ROLE COMMAND 8 corps HQ 1 (Capital Defence) comd HQ SPECIAL FORCES 1 (Special Warfare) SF comd (1 SF gp; 6 spec ops bde) 6 cdo regt 2 indep cdo bn MANOEUVRE Armoured 7 armd bde 1 (Capital) armd inf div (1 armd cav bn, 2 armd bde, 1 armd inf bde, 1 SP arty bde, 1 engr bn) 1 (8th) armd inf div (1 armd cav bn, 1 armd bde, 2 armd inf bde, 1 SP arty bde, 1 engr bn) 1 (11th) armd inf div (1 armd cav bn, 3 armd inf bde, 1 SP arty bde, 1 engr bn) 2 tk bn Light 15 inf div (1 recce bn, 1 tk bn, 3 inf bde, 1 arty bde, 1 engr bn) 2 indep inf bde Air Manoeuvre 1 air mob div (2 cdo bde) 1 air aslt bde Other 5 sy regt SURFACE-TO-SURFACE MISSILE 3 SSM bn COMBAT SUPPORT 6 arty bde 1 MRL bde (3 MRL bn; 1 SSM bn) 6 engr bde 5 engr gp 1 CBRN defence bde 8 sigs bde COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT 4 log spt comd HELICOPTER 1 (army avn) comd AIR DEFENCE 1 ADA bde 5 ADA bn

Reserves FORCES BY ROLE COMMAND 1 army HQ

Asia

South Korean Won KRW

284 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2022 MANOEUVRE Light 24 inf div EQUIPMENT BY TYPE ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES MBT 2,074: 1,000 K1/K1E1; 484 K1A1/K1A2; ε150 K2; ε400 M48A5; 40 T-80U IFV 540: ε500 K21; 40 BMP-3 APC 2,490 APC (T) 2,260: 1,700 KIFV; 420 M113; 140 M577 (CP) APC (W) 220; 20 BTR-80; 200 K806/K808 PPV 10 MaxxPro ENGINEERING & MAINTENANCE VEHICLES AEV 207 M9 ARV 238+: 200 K1; K21 ARV; K288A1; M47; 38 M88A1 VLB 56 K1 ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE MSL SP Hyeongung MANPATS 9K115 Metis (RS-AT-7 Saxhorn); Hyeongung; TOW-2A RCL 75mm; 90mm M67; 106mm M40A2 GUNS 58 SP 90mm 50 M36 TOWED 76mm 8 M18 Hellcat (AT gun) ARTILLERY 12,128+ SP 2,330: 105mm ε50 K105A1; 155mm 2,280: ε1,240 K9/ K9A1 Thunder; 1,040 M109A2 (K55/K55A1) TOWED 3,500+: 105mm 1,700 M101/KH-178; 155mm 1,800+ KH-179/M114 MRL 298: 130mm ε40 K136 Kooryong; 227mm 58: 48 M270 MLRS; 10 M270A1 MLRS; 239mm ε200 K239 Cheonmu MOR 6,000: 81mm KM29 (M29); 107mm M30 SURFACE-TO-SURFACE MISSILE LAUNCHERS SRBM • Conventional 30+: 30 Hyonmu IIA/IIB; MGM140A/B ATACMS (launched from M270/M270A1 MLRS) GLCM • Conventional Hyonmu III HELICOPTERS ATK 96: 60 AH-1F/J Cobra; 36 AH-64E Apache MRH 175: 130 Hughes 500D; 45 MD-500 TPT 236+: Heavy 37: 31 CH-47D Chinook; 6 MH-47E Chinook; Medium 187+: 100+ KUH-1 Surion; 87 UH-60P Black Hawk; Light 12 Bo-105 AIR DEFENCE SAM • Point-defence Chiron; Chun Ma (Pegasus); FIM92 Stinger; Javelin; Mistral; 9K310 Igla-1 (RS-SA-16 Gimlet) GUNS 477+ SP 317: 20mm ε150 KIFV Vulcan SPAAG; 30mm 167 K30 Biho TOWED 160: 20mm 60 M167 Vulcan; 35mm 20 GDF003; 40mm 80 L/60/L/70; M1 AIR-LAUNCHED MISSILES ASM AGM-114R1 Hellfire

Navy 70,000 (incl marines) Three separate fleet elements: 1st Fleet Donghae (East Sea/ Sea of Japan); 2nd Fleet Pyeongtaek (West Sea/Yellow Sea); 3rd Fleet Busan (South Sea/Korea Strait); independent submarine command; three additional flotillas (incl SF,

mine-warfare, amphibious and spt elements) and 1 Naval Air Wing (3 gp plus spt gp) EQUIPMENT BY TYPE SUBMARINES 19 SSB 1 Chang Bogo III (Batch I (GER Type-214 mod; KSSIII)) (fitted with AIP) with 6 SLBM (likely based on Hyeonmu-IIB), 8 single 533mm TT with K731 White Shark SSK 18: 6 Chang Bogo I (GER Type-209/1200; KSS-1) with 8 single 533mm TT with SUT HWT/K731 White Shark HWT 3 Chang Bogo I (GER Type-209/1200; KSS-1) with 8 single 533mm TT with UGM-84 Harpoon AShM/SUT HWT/K731 White Shark HWT 9 Chang Bogo II (GER Type-214; KSS-2) (fitted with AIP) with 8 single 533mm TT with Hae Sung III LACM/ Hae Sung I AShM/SUT HWT/K731 White Shark HWT PRINCIPAL SURFACE COMBATANTS 26 CRUISERS • CGHM 3: 3 Sejong (KDD-III) with Aegis Baseline 7 C2, 6 8-cell K-VLS with Hae Sung II LACM/Red Shark A/S msl, 4 quad lnchr with Hae Sung I AShM, 10 8-cell Mk 41 VLS (6 fore, 4 aft) with SM-2 Block IIIA/B SAM, 1 21cell Mk 49 GMLS with RIM-116 RAM SAM, 2 triple 324mm SVTT Mk 32 ASTT with K745 Blue Shark LWT, 1 Goalkeeper CIWS, 1 127mm gun (capacity 2 Lynx Mk99/AW159 Wildcat hels) DESTROYERS • DDGHM 6 Chungmugong Yi Sun-Sin (KDD-II) with 2 8-cell K-VLS with Hae Sung II LACM/ Red Shark A/S msl, 2 quad lnchr with RGM-84 Harpoon AShM/Hae Sung I AShM, 4 8-cell Mk 41 VLS with SM-2 Block IIIA/B SAM, 1 21-cell Mk 49 GMLS with RIM-116 RAM SAM, 2 triple 324mm SVTT Mk 32 ASTT with Mk 46 LWT, 1 Goalkeeper CIWS, 1 127mm gun (capacity 1 Lynx Mk99/AW159 Wildcat hel) FRIGATES 17 FFGHM 13: 3 Gwanggaeto Daewang (KDD-I) with 2 quad lnchr with RGM-84 Harpoon AShM, 2 8-cell Mk 48 mod 2 VLS with RIM-7P Sea Sparrow SAM, 2 triple 324mm KMk. 32 ASTT with K745 Blue Shark LWT, 2 Goalkeeper CIWS, 1 127mm gun (capacity 1 Lynx Mk99/AW159 Wildcat hel) 6 Incheon with 2 quad lnchr with TSLM LACM/Hae Sung I AShM, 1 21-cell Mk 49 lnchr with RIM-116 RAM SAM, 2 triple 324mm KMk. 32 ASTT with K745 Blue Shark LWT, 1 Mk 15 Phalanx Block 1B CIWS, 1 127 mm gun (capacity 1 Lynx Mk99/ AW159 Wildcat hel) 4 Daegu (Incheon Batch II)† (limited serviceability due to faulty propulsion system) with 2 8-cell K-VLS with Hae Sung II LACM/TSLM LACM/ Haegung (K-SAAM) SAM/Red Shark A/S msl, 2 quad lnchr with TSLM LACM/Hae Sung I AShM, 2 triple 324mm KMk. 32 ASTT with K745 Blue Shark LWT, 1 Mk 15 Phalanx Block 1B CIWS, 1 127mm gun (capacity 1 Lynx Mk99/AW159 Wildcat hel) FFG 4 Ulsan with 2 quad lnchr with RGM-84 Harpoon AShM, 2 triple 324mm SVTT Mk 32 ASTT with Mk 46 LWT, 2 76mm gun

Asia 285

Naval Aviation EQUIPMENT BY TYPE AIRCRAFT 16 combat capable ASW 16: 8 P-3C Orion; 8 P-3CK Orion TPT • Light 5 Cessna F406 Caravan II

HELICOPTERS ASW 31: 11 Lynx Mk99; 12 Lynx Mk99A; 8 AW159 Wildcat TPT 15: Medium 8 UH-60P Black Hawk Light 7 Bell 205 (UH-1H Iroquois)

Marines 29,000 FORCES BY ROLE SPECIAL FORCES 1 SF regt MANOEUVRE Amphibious 2 mne div (1 recce bn, 1 tk bn, 3 mne bde, 1 amph bn, 1 arty bde, 1 engr bn) 1 mne bde (1 recce coy, 4 mne bn, 1 SP arty bn) 1 mne bde (3 mne bn, 1 fd arty bn) 1 mne BG (1 mne bn, 1 SP arty bn) EQUIPMENT BY TYPE ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES MBT 100: 50 K1A1; 50 M48A3 AAV 166 AAV-7A1 ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTUCTURE • MSL SP Spike NLOS MANPATS Hyeongung ARTILLERY 238 SP • 155mm 80: ε40 K9 Thunder; ε20 K9A1 Thunder; ε20 M109A2 (K55/K55A1) TOWED 140: 105mm ε20 M101; 155mm ε120 KH-179 MRL • 239mm 18 K239 Cheonmu MOR 81mm KM29 (M29) COASTAL DEFENCE • AShM RGM-84A Harpoon (truck mounted) HELICOPTERS • TPT • Medium 5+ MUH-1 Surion AIR DEFENCE GUNS • Towed • 20mm M167 Vulcan (direct fire role)

Naval Special Warfare Flotilla Air Force 65,000 4 Comd (Ops, Southern Combat, Logs, Trg) FORCES BY ROLE FIGHTER/GROUND ATTACK 1 sqn with F-4E Phantom II 5 sqn with F-5E/F Tiger II 3 sqn with F-15K Eagle 8 sqn with F-16C/D Fighting Falcon (KF-16C/D) 2 sqn with F-35A Lightning II 3 sqn with FA-50 Fighting Eagle ISR 1 wg with KO-1 1 sqn with F-16C/D Fighting Falcon (KF-16C/D) SIGINT 1 sqn with Hawker 800RA/XP AIRBORNE EARLY WARNING & CONTROL 1 sqn with B-737 AEW SEARCH & RESCUE 2 sqn with AS332L Super Puma; Bell 412EP; HH-47D Chinook; HH-60P Black Hawk; Ka-32 Helix C TANKER 1 sqn with A330 MRTT

Asia

PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS ε78 CORVETTES • FSG 10: 5 Po Hang (Flight IV) with 2 twin lnchr with RGM-84 Harpoon AShM, 2 triple 324mm ASTT with Mk 46 LWT, 2 76mm gun 5 Po Hang (Flight V) with 2 twin lnchr with Hae Sung I AShM, 2 triple 324mm KMk. 32 ASTT with K745 Blue Shark LWT, 2 76mm gun PCFG 22: 18 Gumdoksuri with 2 twin lnchr with Hae Sung I AShM, 1 76mm gun; 4 Chamsuri II with 1 12-cell 130mm MRL, 1 76mm gun PBF ε46 Sea Dolphin MINE WARFARE 11 MINE COUNTERMEASURES 9 MHO 6 Kan Kyeong MSO 3 Yang Yang MINELAYERS • ML 2: 1 Won San with 2 triple 324mm SVTT Mk 32 ASTT with Mk 46 LWT/K745 Blue Shark LWT, 1 76mm gun, 1 hel landing platform 1 Nampo (MLS-II) with 1 4-cell K-VLS VLS with Haegung (K-SAAM) SAM, 2 triple KMk. 32 triple 324mm ASTT with K745 Blue Shark LWT, 1 76mm gun (capacity 1 med hel) AMPHIBIOUS PRINCIPAL AMPHIBIOUS SHIPS 6 LHD 2: 1 Dokdo with 1 Mk 49 GMLS with RIM-116 RAM SAM, 2 Goalkeeper CIWS (capacity 2 LCAC; 10 tanks; 700 troops; 10 UH-60 hel) 1 Marado (Dokdo mod) with 1 4-cell K-VLS with K-SAAM SAM, 2 Mk 15 Phalanx Block 1B CIWS (capacity 2 LCAC; 6 MBT, 7 AAV-7A1, 720 troops; 7-12 hels) LPD 4 Cheonwangbong (LST-II) (capacity 3 LCM; 2 MBT; 8 AFV; 300 troops; 2 med hel) LANDING SHIPS • LST 4 Go Jun Bong with 1 hel landing platform (capacity 20 tanks; 300 troops) LANDING CRAFT 25 LCU 7+ Mulgae I LCT 3 Mulgae II LCM 10 LCM-8 LCAC 5: 3 Tsaplya (capacity 1 MBT; 130 troops); 2 LSFII (capacity 150 troops or 1 MBT & 24 troops) LOGISTICS AND SUPPORT 11 AG 1 Sunjin (trials spt) AOEH 1 Soyangham (AOE-II) with 1 Mk 15 Phalanx Block 1B CIWS (capacity 1 med hel) AORH 3 Chun Jee ARS 1 Cheong Hae Jin ATS 2 Tongyeong AX 3: 1 Hansando with 2 triple 324mm KMk. 32 ASTT with K745 Blue Shark LWT, 1 76mm gun (fitted for but not with K-VLS) (capacity 2 med hels; 300 students); 2 MTB

286 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2022 TRANSPORT 1 VIP sqn with B-737-300; B-747; CN235-220; S-92A Superhawk; VH-60P Black Hawk (VIP) 3 sqn (incl 1 Spec Ops) with C-130H/H-30/J-30 Hercules 2 sqn with CN235M-100/220 TRAINING 1 sqn with F-5E/F Tiger II 1 sqn with F-16C/D Fighting Falcon 4 sqn with KT-1 1 sqn with KT-100 3 sqn with T-50/TA-50 Golden Eagle* TRANSPORT HELICOPTER 1 sqn with UH-60P Black Hawk (Spec Ops) ISR UAV 1 sqn with RQ-4B Global Hawk (forming) SPECIAL FORCES 1 SF sqn AIR DEFENCE 3 AD bde (total: 6 SAM bn with Chunggung; 2 SAM bn with M902 Patriot PAC-3 CRI) EQUIPMENT BY TYPE AIRCRAFT 601 combat capable FTR 174: 142 F-5E Tiger II; 32 F-5F Tiger II FGA 347: 30 F-4E Phantom II; 59 F-15K Eagle; 118 F-16C Fighting Falcon (KF-16C); 44 F-16D Fighting Falcon (KF16D); 36 F-35A Lightning II; 60 FA-50 Fighting Eagle AEW&C 4 B-737 AEW ISR 24: 4 Hawker 800RA; 20 KO-1 SIGINT 6: 4 Hawker 800SIG; 2 Falcon 2000 (COMINT/ SIGINT) TKR/TPT 4 A330 MRTT TPT 38: Medium 16: 8 C-130H Hercules; 4 C-130H-30 Hercules; 4 C-130J-30 Hercules; Light 20: 12 CN235M-100; 8 CN235M-220 (incl 2 VIP); PAX 2: 1 B-737-300; 1 B-747400 TRG 183: 83 KT-1; 49 T-50 Golden Eagle*; 9 T-50B Black Eagle* (aerobatics); 22 TA-50 Golden Eagle*; ε20 KT-100 HELICOPTERS SAR 16: 5 HH-47D Chinook; 11 HH-60P Black Hawk MRH 3 Bell 412EP TPT • Medium 30: 2 AS332L Super Puma; 8 Ka-32 Helix C; 3 S-92A Super Hawk; 7 UH-60P Black Hawk; 10 VH60P Black Hawk (VIP) UNINHABITED AERIAL VEHICLES • ISR 7+: Heavy 4 RQ-4B Global Hawk; Medium 3+: some Night Intruder; 3 Searcher LOITERING MUNITIONS 100 Harpy AIR DEFENCE • SAM 120 Long-range 48 M902 Patriot PAC-3 CRI Medium-range 72 Chunggung (KM-SAM) AIR-LAUNCHED MISSILES AAM • IR AIM-9 Sidewinder; IIR AIM-9X Sidewinder II; SARH AIM-7 Sparrow; ARH AIM-120B/C-5/7 AMRAAM ASM AGM-65A Maverick; AGM-130 AShM AGM-84L Harpoon Block II; AGM-142 Popeye ARM AGM-88 HARM ALCM AGM-84H SLAM-ER; KEPD-350 Taurus BOMBS • Laser-guided Paveway II

Gendarmerie & Paramilitary 13,500 active Civilian Defence Corps 3,000,000 reservists (to age 50) Coast Guard 13,500 Part of the Ministry of Maritime Affairs and Fisheries. Five regional headquarters with 19 coastguard stations and one guard unit EQUIPMENT BY TYPE PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 111 PSOH 16: 1 Lee Cheong-ho with 1 76mm gun; 1 Sambongho; 14 Tae Pung Yang with 1 med hel PSO 21: 3 Han Kang with 1 76mm gun, 1 hel landing platform; 5 Han Kang II with 1 76mm gun, 1 hel landing pllatform; 12 Jaemin with 1 hel landing platform; 1 Sumjinkang PCO 23 Tae Geuk PCC 21: 4 Hae Uri; 15 Hae Uri II; 2 Hae Uri III PB 30: 26 Haenuri; ε4 (various) AMPHIBIOUS • LANDING CRAFT 8 UCAC 8: 1 BHT-150; 4 Griffon 470TD; 3 Griffon 8000TD AIRCRAFT MP 5: 1 C-212-400 MP; 4 CN235-110 MPA TPT • PAX 1 CL-604 HELICOPTERS MRH 7: 5 AS565MB Panther; 1 AW139; 1 Bell 412SP SAR 2 S-92 TPT • Medium 10: 8 Ka-32 Helix C; 2 KUH-1 Surion

DEPLOYMENT ARABIAN SEA & GULF OF ADEN: Combined Maritime Forces • CTF-151: 1 DDGHM INDIA/PAKISTAN: UN • UNMOGIP 7 LEBANON: UN • UNIFIL 255; 1 mech inf coy; 1 engr coy; 1 sigs coy; 1 maint coy SOUTH SUDAN: UN • UNMISS 274; 1 engr coy UNITED ARAB EMIRATES: 170 (trg activities at UAE Spec Ops School) WESTERN SAHARA: UN • MINURSO 6

FOREIGN FORCES Sweden NNSC: 5 Switzerland NNSC: 5 United States US Pacific Command: 30,400 Army 21,500; 1 HQ (8th Army) at Pyeongtaek; 1 div HQ at Pyeongtaek; 1 armd bde with M1A2 SEPv2 Abrams; M2A3/M3A3 Bradley; M109A6; 1 (cbt avn) hel bde with AH-64D/E Apache; CH-47F Chinook; UH-60L/M Black Hawk; 1 MRL bde with M270A1 MLRS; 1 AD bde with M902 Patriot PAC-3/FIM-92A Avenger; 1 SAM bty with THAAD; 1 (APS) armd bde eqpt set Navy 350 USAF 8,350; 1 HQ (7th Air Force) at Osan AB; 1 ftr wg at Kunsan AB (2 ftr sqn with 20 F-16C/D Fighting Falcon); 1 ftr wg at Osan AB (1 ftr sqn with 20 F-16C/D Fighting

Asia 287

Laos LAO Lao Kip LAK

2020

2021

GDP

LAK

170tr

183tr

USD

18.8bn

19.4bn

per capita

USD

2,587

2,626

-0.4

2.1

Growth Inflation Def exp

5.1

4.9

LAK

n.k.

USD USD1=LAK Population

n.k.

9058.06

9421.03

2022

7,574,356

Age

0–14

15–19

20–24

25–29

Male

15.6%

5.1%

5.0%

4.5%

30–64 65 plus 17.4%

2.0%

Female

15.3%

5.1%

4.6%

17.9%

2.4%

Capabilities The Lao People’s Armed Forces (LPAF) are closely linked to the ruling Communist Party and their primary role is internal security. Their main operational experience dates from the Second Indo-China War and the 1988 border war with Thailand. Defence spending and military procurement have been constrained for the last two decades. Contacts continue with the Chinese and Vietnamese armed forces, and there is defence cooperation with Russia. Training support has been provided by Russia and Vietnam. The LPAF have participated in exercises, including those organised by the ADMM-Plus, with other regional countries and international partners. However, they have made no international deployments and have little capacity for sustained operations. Laos still operates Soviet-era military equipment and relies on Russian supplies, as illustrated by ongoing deliveries of training aircraft, armoured reconnaissance vehicles and main battle tanks. The country lacks a traditional defence-industrial base and maintenance capacity is limited, reflected in a support contract with a Russian firm for helicopter maintenance in 2016.

ACTIVE 29,100 (Army 25,600 Air 3,500) Gendarmerie & Paramilitary 100,000

Conscript liability 18 months minimum

ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE Space EQUIPMENT BY TYPE SATELLITES • ISR 1 LaoSat-1

Army 25,600 FORCES BY ROLE 4 mil regions MANOEUVRE Armoured 1 armd bn

Light 5 inf div 7 indep inf regt 65 indep inf coy COMBAT SUPPORT 5 arty bn 1 engr regt 2 (construction) engr regt AIR DEFENCE 9 ADA bn EQUIPMENT BY TYPE ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES MBT 25: 15 T-54/T-55; 10 T-72B1 LT TK 10 PT-76 RECCE BRDM-2M IFV 10+ BMP-1 APC • APC (W) 50: 30 BTR-40/BTR-60; 20 BTR-152 AUV Dongfeng Mengshi 4×4; ZYZ-8002 (CS/VN3) ENGINEERING & MAINTENANCE VEHICLES ARV T-54/T-55 VLB MTU ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE • RCL 57mm M18/A1; 75mm M20; 106mm M40; 107mm B-11 ARTILLERY 62+ TOWED 62: 105mm 20 M101; 122mm 20 D-30/M-30 M-1938; 130mm 10 M-46; 155mm 12 M114 MOR 81mm; 82mm; 107mm M-1938/M2A1; 120mm M-43 AIR DEFENCE SAM Short-range 6+: 6 S-125M Pechora-M† (RS-SA-3 Goa); some Yitian (CH-SA-13) Point-defence 9K32M Strela-2M (RS-SA-7 Grail)‡; 9K35 Strela-10 (RS-SA-13 Gopher); 9K310 Igla-1 (RSSA-16 Gimlet) GUNS SP 23mm ZSU-23-4 TOWED 14.5mm ZPU-1/ZPU-4; 23mm ZU-23; 37mm M-1939; 57mm S-60

Army Marine Section ε600 EQUIPMENT BY TYPE PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS • PBR some AMPHIBIOUS • LCM some

Air Force 3,500 FORCES BY ROLE TRANSPORT 1 regt with MA60; MA600; Mi-17 Hip H EQUIPMENT BY TYPE AIRCRAFT 4 combat capable TPT • Light 5: 1 An-74TK Coaler; 2 MA60; 2 MA600 TRG 4 Yak-130 Mitten* HELICOPTERS MRH 15: 6 Mi-17 Hip H; 5 Mi-17V-5 Hip; 4 Z-9A TPT 4: Medium 1 Ka-32T Helix C; Light 3 SA360 Dauphin

Gendarmerie & Paramilitary Militia Self-Defence Forces 100,000+ Village ‘home guard’ or local defence

Asia

Falcon, 1 atk sqn with 24 A-10C Thunderbolt II); 1 ISR sqn at Osan AB with U-2S USMC 200

288 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2022

Malaysia MYS

ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE 2020

2021

GDP

MYR

1.42tr

1.51tr

2 mil region

USD

337bn

371bn

USD

10,231

11,125

FORCES BY ROLE COMMAND 5 div HQ SPECIAL FORCES 1 SF bde (3 SF bn) MANOEUVRE Armoured 1 tk regt Mechanised 4 armd regt 1 mech inf bde (4 mech bn, 1 cbt engr sqn) Light 1 inf bde (6 inf bn, 1 arty regt) 4 inf bde (3 inf bn, 1 arty regt) 2 inf bde (3 inf bn) 1 inf bde (2 inf bn, 1 arty regt) 1 inf bde (2 inf bn) 1 inf bde (forming) Air Manoeuvre 1 (Rapid Deployment Force) AB bde (1 lt tk sqn, 4 AB bn, 1 lt arty regt, 1 engr sqn) Other 2 (border) sy bde (5 bn) COMBAT SUPPORT 9 arty regt 1 STA regt 1 MRL regt 1 cbt engr sqn 3 fd engr regt (total: 7 cbt engr sqn, 3 engr spt sqn) 1 construction regt 1 int unit 4 MP regt 1 sigs regt HELICOPTER 1 hel sqn 1 tpt sqn with S-61A-4 Nuri (forming) AIR DEFENCE 3 ADA regt

per capita Growth

-5.6

3.5

Inflation

-1.1

2.5

Def bdgt

MYR

15.6bn

15.9bn

USD

3.71bn

3.90bn

4.20

4.06

USD1=MYR

2022

Army 80,000

Malaysian Ringgit MYR

Real-terms defence budget trend (USDbn, constant 2015) 4.55 3.08 2008

Population

2015

2021

33,519,406

Age

0–14

15–19

20–24

25–29

30–64 65 plus

Male

11.8%

4.1%

4.6%

4.7%

22.4%

3.7%

Female

11.1%

3.9%

4.4%

21.1%

3.9%

Capabilities Modernisation programmes over the past 30 years have provided the Malaysian armed forces with a limited capacity for external defence. However, the army has continued to be the dominant service, reflecting a longstanding but now outdated focus on counter-insurgency. In December 2019, the then-government tabled its first-ever defence white paper, which identified the ‘three pillars’ of Malaysia’s defence strategy as ‘concentric deterrence’ (the armed forces’ protection of national interests in ‘core’, ‘extended’ and ‘forward’ zones); ‘comprehensive defence’ (involving wholeof-government and whole-of-society support for the nationaldefence effort); and ‘credible partnerships’ (involving engagement in regional and wider international defence cooperation). While the paper identified new defence challenges, including tensions in the South China Sea and cyber threats, it provided no detailed insights into future resource allocation or capability development. However, it is likely that budgetary constraints will continue to limit defence resources. Malaysian forces regularly participate in ADMM-Plus, Five Power Defence Arrangements and other exercises with regional and international partners, including the US. Malaysia has invested in synthetic military-training aids. In 2017, Malaysia began trilateral joint maritime patrols and joint Sulu–Sulawesi seas air patrols with Indonesia and the Philippines. Much of Malaysia’s military equipment is ageing and there are important capability gaps, particularly in air defence and maritime surveillance. New equipment brought into service since 2015 includes A400M transport aircraft, and there are plans to acquire new light combat aircraft. An air force squadron was established in 2021 to operate new UAVs. Malaysia’s defence industry focuses mainly on providing maintenance, repair and overhaul services, and on naval shipbuilding.

ACTIVE 113,000 (Army 80,000 Navy 18,000 Air 15,000) Gendarmerie & Paramilitary 22,500 RESERVE 51,600 (Army 50,000, Navy 1,000 Air Force 600) Gendarmerie & Paramilitary 244,700

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES MBT 48 PT-91M Twardy LT TK 21 Scorpion-90 RECCE 98: 74 SIBMAS (some†); 24 AV8 Gempita IFV 212: 31 ACV300 Adnan (25mm Bushmaster); 13 ACV300 Adnan AGL; 46 AV8 Gempita IFV25; 122 AV8 Gempita IFV30 (incl 54 with Ingwe ATGM) APC 629 APC (T) 265: 149 ACV300 Adnan (incl 69 variants); 13 FV4333 Stormer (upgraded); 63 K200A; 40 K200A1 APC (W) 335: 35 AV8 Gempita APC (incl 13 CP; 3 sigs; 9 amb); 300 Condor (incl variants) PPV 29: 9 IAG Guardian; 20 Lipanbara ENGINEERING & MAINTENANCE VEHICLES AEV 3 MID-M

ARV 65+: Condor; 15 ACV300; 4 K288A1; 22 SIBMAS; 6 WZT-4; 18 AV8 Gempita ARV VLB 5+: Leguan; 5 PMCz-90 NBC VEHICLES 4+: 4 AV8 Gempita; K216A1 ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE • MSL SP 8 ACV300 Baktar Shikan MANPATS 9K115 Metis (RS-AT-7 Saxhorn); 9K115-2 Metis-M1 (RS-AT-13); Eryx; Baktar Shihan (HJ-8); SS.11 RCL 84mm Carl Gustaf ARTILLERY 438 TOWED 140: 105mm 118: 18 LG1 MkIII; 100 Model 56 pack howitzer; 155mm 22 G-5 MRL 36 ASTROS II (equipped with 127mm SS-30) MOR 262: 81mm 232; SP 81mm 14: 4 K281A1; 10 ACV300-S; SP 120mm 16: 8 ACV-S; 8 AV8 Gempita AMPHIBIOUS • LANDING CRAFT LCA 165 Damen Assault Craft 540 (capacity 10 troops) HELICOPTERS • TPT 12: Medium 2 S-61A-4 Nuri; Light 10 AW109 AIR DEFENCE SAM • Point-defence 15+: 15 Jernas (Rapier 2000); AnzaII; HY-6 (FN-6) (CH-SA-10); 9K38 Igla (RS-SA-18 Grouse); Starstreak GUNS 52+ SP 20mm K263 TOWED 52: 35mm 16 GDF-005; 40mm 36 L40/70

Reserves Territorial Army

Some paramilitary forces to be incorporated into a reorganised territorial organisation FORCES BY ROLE MANOEUVRE Mechanised 4 armd sqn Light 16 inf regt (3 inf bn) Other 5 (highway) sy bn COMBAT SUPPORT 5 arty bty 2 fd engr regt 1 int unit 3 sigs sqn COMBAT SUPPORT 4 med coy 5 tpt coy

Navy 18,000 3 Regional Commands: MAWILLA 1 (Kuantan), MAWILLA 2 (Sabah) and MAWILLA 3 (Langkawi). A fourth is being formed (Bintulu) EQUIPMENT BY TYPE SUBMARINES 2 SSK 2 Tunku Abdul Rahman (FRA Scorpène) with 6 single 533mm TT with SM39 Exocet AShM/Black Shark HWT PRINCIPAL SURFACE COMBATANTS • FRIGATES 2 FFGHM 2 Lekiu with 2 quad lnchr with MM40 Exocet Block 2 AShM, 1 16-cell VLS with Sea Wolf SAM, 2 triple

324mm ILAS-3 (B-515) ASTT with A244/S LWT, 1 57mm gun (capacity 1 Super Lynx 300 hel) PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 63 CORVETTES 8 FSG 2 Kasturi with 2 quad lnchr with MM40 Exocet Block 2 AShM, 2 triple 324mm ILAS-3 (B-515) ASTT with A244/S LWT, 1 57mm gun, 1 hel landing platform FSH 6 Kedah (GER MEKO 100) with 1 76mm gun, 1 hel landing platform (fitted for but not with MM40 Exocet AShM & RAM SAM) PCFM 4 Laksamana with 1 Albatros quad lnchr with Aspide SAM, 1 76mm gun PCF 4 Perdana (FRA Combattante II) with 1 57mm gun PCC 3 Keris (Littoral Mission Ship) PB 4 Handalan (SWE Spica-M) with 1 57mm gun PBF 23: 6 Gading Marine FIC; 17 Tempur (SWE CB90) PB 17: 6 Jerong (Lurssen 45) with 1 57mm gun; 9 Sipadan Steel; 2 Sri Perlis MINE WARFARE • MINE COUNTERMEASURES 4 MCO 4 Mahamiru (ITA Lerici) LOGISTICS AND SUPPORT 14 AFS 2: 1 Mahawangsa with 2 57mm guns, 1 hel landing platform; 1 Sri Indera Sakti with 1 57mm gun, 1 hel landing platform AG 3: 2 Bunga Mas Lima with 1 hel landing platform; 1 Tun Azizan AGS 2: 1 Dayang Sari; 1 Perantau AP 2 Sri Gaya ASR 1 Mega Bakti ATF 1 AX 2 Gagah Samudera with 1 hel landing platform AXS 1 Tunas Samudera

Naval Aviation 160 EQUIPMENT BY TYPE HELICOPTERS ASW 6 Super Lynx 300 MRH 6 AS555 Fennec AIR-LAUNCHED MISSILES • AShM Sea Skua

Special Forces FORCES BY ROLE SPECIAL FORCES 1 (mne cdo) SF unit

Air Force 15,000 1 air op HQ, 2 air div, 1 trg and log comd, 1 Intergrated Area Def Systems HQ FORCES BY ROLE FIGHTER/GROUND ATTACK 1 sqn with F/A-18D Hornet 1 sqn with Su-30MKM Flanker 2 sqn with Hawk Mk108*/Mk208* MARITIME PATROL 1 sqn with Beech 200T TANKER/TRANSPORT 2 sqn with KC-130H Hercules; C-130H Hercules; C-130H-30 Hercules TRANSPORT 1 sqn with A400M Atlas

Asia

Asia 289

290 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2022 1 (VIP) sqn with A319CT; AW109; BD700 Global Express; F-28 Fellowship; Falcon 900 1 sqn with CN235M-220 TRAINING 1 unit with PC-7 TRANSPORT HELICOPTER 4 (tpt/SAR) sqn with H225M Super Cougar; S-61N; S-70A Black Hawk UNINHABITED AERIAL VEHICLE 1 sqn (forming) AIR DEFENCE 1 sqn with Starburst SPECIAL FORCES 1 (Air Force Commando) unit (airfield defence/SAR) EQUIPMENT BY TYPE AIRCRAFT 42 combat capable FTR (8 MiG-29 Fulcrum (MiG-29N); 2 MiG-29UB Fulcrum B (MIG-29NUB) in store) FGA 26: 8 F/A-18D Hornet (some serviceability in doubt); 18 Su-30MKM (some serviceability in doubt) ISR 3 Beech 200T TKR/TPT 4 KC-130H Hercules TPT 24: Heavy 4 A400M Atlas; Medium 10: 2 C-130H Hercules; 8 C-130H-30 Hercules; Light 6 CN235M-220 (incl 1 VIP and 2 being reconfigured); PAX 4: 1 A319CT (VIP); 1 BD700 Global Express; 1 F-28 Fellowship; 1 Falcon 900 TRG 70: 4 Hawk Mk108*; 12 Hawk Mk208*; 7 MB-339C; 30 PC-7; 17 PC-7 Mk II Turbo Trainer HELICOPTERS TPT 17: Heavy 12 H225M Super Cougar; Medium 4: 2 S-61N; 2 S-70A Black Hawk; Light 1 AW109 AIR DEFENCE • SAM • Point-defence Starstreak AIR-LAUNCHED MISSILES AAM • IR AIM-9 Sidewinder; R-73 (RS-AA-11A Archer); IIR AIM-9X Sidewinder II; IR/SARH R-27 (RSAA-10 Alamo); SARH AIM-7 Sparrow; ARH AIM-120C AMRAAM; R-77 (AA-12A Adder) ASM AGM-65 Maverick; Kh-29T (RS-AS-14B Kedge); Kh29L (RS-AS-14A Kedge); Kh-31P (RS-AS-17A Krypton); Kh-59M (RS-AS-18 Kazoo) ARM Kh-31P (RS-AS-17A Krypton); AShM AGM-84D Harpoon; Kh-31A (RS-AS-17B Krypton) BOMBS Electro-optical guided KAB-500KR; KAB-500OD Laser-guided Paveway II

Gendarmerie & Paramilitary ε22,500 Police–General Ops Force 18,000 FORCES BY ROLE COMMAND 5 bde HQ SPECIAL FORCES 1 spec ops bn MANOEUVRE Other 19 paramilitary bn 2 (Aboriginal) paramilitary bn 4 indep paramilitary coy

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES APC • APC (W) AT105 Saxon AUV ε30 SB-301

Malaysian Maritime Enforcement Agency (MMEA) ε4,500 Controls 5 Maritime Regions (Northern Peninsula; Southern Peninsula; Eastern Peninsula; Sarawak; Sabah), subdivided into a further 18 Maritime Districts. Supported by one provisional MMEA Air Unit EQUIPMENT BY TYPE PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 128 PSO 4: 1 Arau (ex-JPN Nojima) with 1 hel landing platform; 2 Langkawi with 1 57mm gun, 1 hel landing platform; 1 Pekan (ex-JPN Ojika) with 1 hel landing platform PCC 5 Bagan Datuk PBF 56: 18 Penggalang 17 (TUR MRTP 16); 2 Penggalang 18; 6 Penyelamat 20; 16 Penggalang 16; 14 Tugau PB 63: 15 Gagah; 4 Malawali; 2 Nusa; 3 Nusa 28; 1 Peninjau; 7 Ramunia; 2 Rhu; 4 Semilang; 8 Icarus 1650; 10 Pengawal; 4 Penyelamat; 2 Perwira; 1 Sugut LOGISTICS AND SUPPORT • AX 1 Marlin AIRCRAFT • MP 2 Bombardier 415MP HELICOPTERS SAR 3 AW139 MRH 3 AS365 Dauphin

Area Security Units 3,500 reservists

(Auxiliary General Ops Force) FORCES BY ROLE MANOEUVRE Other 89 paramilitary unit

Border Scouts 1,200 reservists in Sabah, Sarawak

People’s Volunteer Corps 240,000 reservists (some 17,500 armed) RELA

DEPLOYMENT DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO: UN • MONUSCO 6 LEBANON: UN • UNIFIL 1,045; 1 mech inf bn PHILIPPINES: IMT 11 SUDAN: UN • UNISFA 2 WESTERN SAHARA: UN • MINURSO 9

FOREIGN FORCES Australia 130; 1 inf coy (on 3-month rotational tours); 1 P-8A Poseidon (rotational)

Asia 291 COMBAT SUPPORT 1 arty regt

Mongolian Tugrik MNT GDP per capita

2020

2021

MNT

37.0tr

41.6tr

USD

13.1bn

14.3bn 4,186

USD

3,916

Growth

-5.3

5.2

Inflation

3.7

5.4

Def bdgt

MNT

295bn

284bn

USD

105m

97.4m

USD

2813.32

2912.62

FMA (US) USD1=MNT

2022

Real-terms defence budget trend (USDm, constant 2015) 110 55 2008

Population

2015

2021

3,198,913

Age

0–14

15–19

20–24

25–29

Male

13.7%

3.6%

3.8%

4.0%

30–64 65 plus 21.7%

2.0%

Female

13.1%

3.5%

3.7%

4.1%

23.8%

3.0%

Capabilities Mongolia’s latest defence-policy document, from 2015, stresses the importance of peacekeeping and anti-terrorist capabilities. The country has no formal military alliances, but pursues defence ties and bilateral training with regional states and others including India, Turkey and the US. Mongolia hosts the annual Khaan Quest multinational peacekeeping-training exercise. The country’s main exercise partners are India and Russia, with each country running regular bilateral exercises. In 2021, Mongolia and Russia held the counter-terrorism-focused exercise Selega. In 2021, NATO completed a multi-year project that involved establishing a Cyber Security Centre and Cyber Incident Response Capability. Mongolia’s most significant deployment is to the UN peacekeeping mission in South Sudan, followed by the MINUSMA mission in Mali. The inventory generally comprises Soviet-era equipment, supplemented by deliveries of second-hand Russian weapons. Barring maintenance facilities, there is no significant defenceindustrial base.

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES MBT 420: 370 T-54/T-55; 50 T-72A RECCE 120 BRDM-2 IFV 310 BMP-1 APC • APC (W) 210: 150 BTR-60; 40 BTR-70M; 20 BTR-80 ENGINEERING & MAINTENANCE VEHICLES ARV T-54/T-55 ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE GUNS • TOWED 200: 85mm D-44/D-48; 100mm M-1944/MT-12 ARTILLERY 570 TOWED ε300: 122mm D-30/M-30 (M-1938); 130mm M-46; 152mm ML-20 (M-1937) MRL 122mm 130 BM-21 MOR 140: 120mm; 160mm; 82mm AIR DEFENCE SAM Medium-range 2+ S-125-2M Pechora-2M (RS-SA-26) GUNS • TOWED 23mm ZU-23-2

Air Force 800 FORCES BY ROLE FIGHTER 1 sqn (forming) with MiG-29UB Fulcrum B TRANSPORT 1 sqn with An-24 Coke; An-26 Curl ATTACK/TRANSPORT HELICOPTER 1 sqn with Mi-8 Hip; Mi-171 AIR DEFENCE 2 regt with S-60/ZPU-4/ZU-23 EQUIPMENT BY TYPE AIRCRAFT 2 combat capable FTR 2 MiG-29UB Fulcrum B TPT • Light 3: 2 An-24 Coke; 1 An-26 Curl HELICOPTERS TPT • Medium 12: 10 Mi-8 Hip; 2 Mi-171 AIR DEFENCE • GUNS • TOWED 150: 14.5mm ZPU-4; 23mm ZU-23; 57mm S-60

Gendarmerie & Paramilitary 7,500 active

ACTIVE 9,700 (Army 8,900 Air 800) Gendarmerie & Paramilitary 7,500

Border Guard 1,300; 4,700 conscript (total 6,000)

RESERVE 137,000 (Army 137,000)

Internal Security Troops 400; 800 conscript (total 1,200)

Conscript liability 12 months for males aged 18–25

ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE Army 5,600; 3,300 conscript (total 8,900) FORCES BY ROLE MANOEUVRE Mechanised 1 MR bde Light 1 (rapid deployment) lt inf bn (2nd bn to form) Air Manoeuvre 1 AB bn

FORCES BY ROLE MANOEUVRE Other 4 gd unit

Construction Troops 300

DEPLOYMENT DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO: UN • MONUSCO 2 SOUTH SUDAN: UN • UNMISS 871; 1 inf bn

Asia

Mongolia MNG

292 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2022 SUDAN: UN • UNISFA 4

also has growing naval shipbuilding capabilities, notably through the Naval Dockyard in Yangon, which was reported in December 2020 to be building a frigate-sized ship.

WESTERN SAHARA: UN • MINURSO 3

ACTIVE 356,000 (Army 325,000 Navy 16,000 Air 15,000) Gendarmerie & Paramilitary 107,000

Myanmar MMR Myanmar Kyat MMK GDP per capita

2020

2021

MMK

115tr

99.1tr

USD

81.3bn

66.7bn

USD

1,527

1,246

Growth

3.2

-17.9

Inflation

5.7

4.1

Def bdgt

MMK

3.39tr

3.41tr

USD

2.39bn

2.30bn

1416.56

1485.07

USD1=MMK

2022

ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE Army ε325,000 14 military regions, 7 regional op comd. Following the 2021 coup, and reports of desertions, combat losses and recruitment problems, personnel figures should be treated with caution

Real-terms defence budget trend (USDbn, constant 2015) 2.58 n.k.

1.90

2008

Population

2015

Conscript liability 24–36 months

2021

57,069,099

Age

0–14

15–19

20–24

25–29

Male

13.1%

4.3%

4.2%

4.1%

30–64 65 plus 20.9%

2.7%

Female

12.5%

4.1%

4.2%

22.1%

3.6%

Capabilities Since the country’s independence struggle in the 1940s, Myanmar’s large, army-dominated Tatmadaw (armed forces) has been intimately involved in domestic politics as well as internal security. Even though the National League for Democracy (NLD) won the November 2015 election, the armed forces remained politically powerful. A defence white paper published in 2016 gave a ‘statebuilding’ role to the Tatmadaw, further legitimising intervention in politics. Despite the NLD winning an increased majority in the November 2020 election, the Tatmadaw declared the result illegitimate and seized power on 1 February 2021, declaring a year-long state of emergency. The 2016 white paper prioritised ending conflicts with domestic armed groups. However, widespread civil unrest and an escalation in clashes with ethnic-minority armed groups since the coup will have intensified the Tatmadaw’s focus on internal security and counter-insurgency. Opposition forces in May announced the establishment of an armed wing, and there have since been a series of attacks targeting the Tatmadaw. These issues have also focused attention on force health, including morale and general cohesion; there have been reports of defections and desertion. The Tatmadaw extended the state of emergency to August 2023, with no elections to be held until then. The Tatmadaw has been accused of widespread human-rights abuses against non-combatants during counter-insurgency operations. These concerns intensified after the widely condemned actions aimed at the Rohingya ethnic minority in 2017. China and Russia are key partners in defence cooperation. Since the 1990s, the armed forces have attempted to develop limited conventional-warfare capabilities, though these efforts have been called into question by renewed focus on internal security and counterinsurgency. There is limited defence-industrial capacity. The Aircraft Production and Maintenance Base has assembled Chinese K-8 trainer aircraft and the Tatmadaw reportedly intends to negotiate licence-production of the Chinese JF-17 combat aircraft. Myanmar

FORCES BY ROLE COMMAND 20 div HQ (military op comd) 10 inf div HQ 34+ bde HQ (tactical op comd) MANOEUVRE Armoured 10 armd bn Light 100 inf bn (coy) 337 inf bn (coy) (regional comd) COMBAT SUPPORT 7 arty bn 37 indep arty coy 6 cbt engr bn 54 fd engr bn 40 int coy 45 sigs bn AIR DEFENCE 7 AD bn EQUIPMENT BY TYPE ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES MBT 195+: 10 T-55; 50 T-72S; 25+ Type-59D; 100 Type-69II; 10+ Type-90-II (MBT-2000) LT TK 105 Type-63 (ε60 serviceable) ASLT 24 PTL-02 mod RECCE 95+: ε50 AML-90; 33 BRDM-2MS (incl CP); 12+ EE-9 Cascavel; MAV-1 IFV 36+: 10+ BTR-3U; 26+ MT-LBMSh APC 345+ APC (T) 305: 250 ZSD-85; 55 ZSD-90 APC (W) 30+ ZSL-92 PPV 10+: BAAC-87; Gaia Thunder; 10 MPV AUV MAV-2; MAV-3 ENGINEERING & MAINTENANCE VEHICLES ARV Type-72 VLB MT-55A ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE RCL 84mm Carl Gustaf; 106mm M40A1 GUNS • TOWED 60: 57mm 6-pdr; 76mm 17-pdr ARTILLERY 440+ SP 155mm 42: 30 NORA B-52; 12 SH-1 TOWED 282+: 105mm 150: 54 M-56; 96 M101; 122mm 100 D-30; 130mm 16 M-46; 140mm; 155mm 16 Soltam M-845P

Asia 293

Navy ε16,000 EQUIPMENT BY TYPE SUBMARINES 1 SSK 1 Min Ye Thein Kha Thu (ex-IND Sindhughosh (Project 877EKM (Kilo))) with 6 single 533mm TT PRINCIPAL SURFACE COMBATANTS • FRIGATES 5 FFGHM 2 Kyansitthar with 2 twin lnchr with C-802 (CHSS-N-6) AShM, 1 sextuple lnchr with MANPAD SAM, 2 RDC-32 A/S mor, 3 AK630 CIWS, 1 76mm gun (capacity 1 med hel) FFG 3: 1 Aung Zeya with 2 quad lnchr with DPRK AShM (possibly 3M24 derivative), 4 AK630 CIWS, 1 76mm gun, 1 hel landing platform 2 Mahar Bandoola (ex-PRC Type-053H1 (Jianghu I)) with 2 quad lnchr with C-802 (CH-SS-N-6) AShM, 2 RBU 1200 Uragan A/S mor, 2 twin 100mm gun PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 80 CORVETTES 3 FSGHM 1 Tabinshwethi (Anawrahta mod) with 2 twin lnchr with C-802 (CH-SS-N-6), 1 sectuple lnchr with unknown MANPADs, 2 RBU 1200 Uragan A/S mor, 1 76mm gun (capacity 1 med hel) FSG 2 Anawrahta with 2 twin lnchr with C-802 (CHSS-N-6) AShM, 2 RDC-32 A/S mor, 1 76mm gun, 1 hel landing platform PSOH 1 Inlay with 1 twin 57mm gun PCG 8: 6 Type-037-IG (Houxin) with 2 twin lnchr with C-801 (CH-SS-N-4) AShM; 2 FAC(M) mod with 2 twin lnchr with C-802 (CH-SS-N-6) AShM, 1 AK630 CIWS PCT 2 Yan Nyein Aung (Project PGG 063) with 2 FQF 1200 A/S mor, 2 triple 324mm TLS with Shyena LWT PCO 2 Indaw PCC 7 Type-037 (Hainan) with 4 RBU 1200 Uragan A/S mor, 2 twin 57mm gun PBG 4 Myanmar with 2 single lnchr with C-801 (CHSS-N-4) AShM PBF 7: 1 Type-201; 6 Super Dvora Mk III PB 32: 3 PB-90; 6 PGM 401; 6 PGM 412; 14 Myanmar; 3 Swift PBR 14: 4 Sagu; 9 Y-301†; 1 Y-301 (Imp)

AMPHIBIOUS PRINCIPAL AMPHIBIOUS VESSELS • LPD 1: 1 Moattama (ROK Makassar) (capacity 2 LCVP; 2 hels; 13 tanks; 500 troops) LANDING CRAFT 21: LCU 5; LCM 16 LOGISTICS AND SUPPORT 13 ABU 1 AGHS 2: 1 Innya; 1 (near shore) AGS 1 AH 2 AK 1 AKSL 5 AP 1 Chindwin

Naval Infantry 800 FORCES BY ROLE MANOEUVRE Light 1 inf bn

Air Force ε15,000 FORCES BY ROLE FIGHTER 4 sqn with F-7 Airguard; FT-7; JF-17 Thunder; MiG-29 Fulcrum; MiG-29SE/SM Fulcrum; MiG-29UB Fulcrum GROUND ATTACK 2 sqn with A-5C Fantan TRANSPORT 1 sqn with F-27 Friendship; FH-227; PC-6AB Turbo Porter TRAINING 2 sqn with G-4 Super Galeb*; PC-7 Turbo Trainer*; PC-9* 1 (trg/liaison) sqn with Cessna 550 Citation II; Cessna 180 Skywagon; K-8 Karakorum* TRANSPORT HELICOPTER 4 sqn with Bell 205; Bell 206 Jet Ranger; Mi-17 Hip H; Mi-35P Hind; PZL Mi-2 Hoplite; PZL W-3 Sokol; SA316 Alouette III EQUIPMENT BY TYPE AIRCRAFT 159 combat capable FTR 63: 21 F-7 Airguard; 10 FT-7; 11 MiG-29 Fulcrum; 6 MiG-29SE Fulcrum; 10 MiG-29SM Fulcrum; 5 MiG-29UB Fulcrum FGA 6: 4 JF-17 Thunder (FC-1 Block 2); 2 JF-17B Thunder (FC-1 Block 2) ATK 22 A-5C Fantan MP 2 ATR-42 TPT 26: Medium 5: 4 Y-8D; 1 Y-8F-200W Light 20: 1 ATR-42; 6 Beech 1900D; 4 Cessna 180 Skywagon; 1 Cessna 550 Citation II; 3 F-27 Friendship; 5 PC-6A/B Turbo Porter PAX 1+ FH-227 TRG 88: 11 G-4 Super Galeb*; 20 Grob G120; 24+ K-8 Karakorum*; 12 PC-7 Turbo Trainer*; 9 PC-9*; 12 Yak-130 Mitten* HELICOPTERS ATK 12 Mi-35P Hind MRH 23: 3 AS365; 11 Mi-17 Hip H; 9 SA316 Alouette III TPT 49: Medium 10 PZL W-3 Sokol; Light 39: 12 Bell 205; 6 Bell 206 Jet Ranger; 4 H120 Colibri; 17 PZL Mi-2 Hoplite UNINHABITED AERIAL VEHICLES CISR • Heavy 4 CH-3

Asia

MRL 36+: 107mm 30 Type-63; 122mm BM-21 Grad (reported); Type-81; 240mm 6+ M-1985 mod MOR 80+: 82mm Type-53 (M-37); 120mm 80+: 80 Soltam; Type-53 (M-1943) SURFACE-TO-SURFACE MISSILE LAUNCHERS SRBM • Conventional some Hwasong-6 (reported) AIR DEFENCE SAM 4+ Medium-range 12+: 12+ KS-1A (CH-SA-12); S-1252M Pechora-2M (RS-SA-26); 2K12 Kvadrat-M (RS-SA-6 Gainful) Point-defence Some 2K22 Tunguska (RS-SA-19 Grison); HN-5 (CH-SA-3) (reported); 9K310 Igla-1 (RS-SA-16 Gimlet) GUNS 46 SP 57mm 12 Type-80 TOWED 34: 37mm 24 Type-74; 40mm 10 M1

294 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2022 AIR-LAUNCHED MISSILES AAM • IR PL-5; R-73 (RS-AA-11A Archer); PL-5E-II; IR/ SARH R-27 (RS-AA-10 Alamo); ARH PL-12 (CH-AA-7) AShM C-802A

Gendarmerie & Paramilitary 107,000 People’s Police Force 72,000 People’s Militia 35,000

Nepal NPL Nepalese Rupee NPR

2020

2021

GDP

NPR

3.91tr

4.13tr

USD

34.0bn

34.3bn

per capita

USD

1,178

1,173

Growth

-2.1

1.8

Inflation

6.2

3.6

Def bdgt FMA (US)

NPR

50.1bn

49.2bn

USD

435m

408m

USD

1.7m

115.20

120.49

USD1=NPR

2022

51.0bn 0m

Real-terms defence budget trend (USDm, constant 2015) 385 204 2008

Population

2015

2021

30,424,878

Age

0–14

15–19

20–24

25–29

Male

14.1%

5.1%

5.2%

4.9%

30–64 65 plus 16.7%

2.9%

Female

13.3%

4.9%

5.2%

5.0%

19.8%

2.9%

Capabilities The principal role of Nepal’s armed forces is maintaining territorial integrity, but they have also traditionally focused on internal security and humanitarian relief. Nepal has a history of deploying contingents to UN peacekeeping operations. Training support is provided by several countries, including China, India and the US. Following a 2006 peace accord with the Maoist People’s Liberation Army, Maoist personnel underwent a process of demobilisation or integration into the armed forces. Gurkhas continue to be recruited by the British and Indian armed forces and the Singaporean police. The small air wing provides a limited transport and support capacity but mobility remains a challenge, in part because of topography. Nepal’s logistic capability appears to be sufficient for internal-security operations; however, its contingents on UN peacekeeping operations appear to largely depend on contracted logistic support. Modernisation plans include a very limited increase in the size of its air force. Barring maintenance capacities there is no defenceindustrial base, and Nepal is dependent on foreign suppliers for modern equipment.

ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE Army 96,600 FORCES BY ROLE COMMAND 2 inf div HQ 1 (valley) comd SPECIAL FORCES 1 bde (1 SF bn, 1 AB bn, 1 cdo bn, 1 ranger bn, 1 mech inf bn) MANOEUVRE Light 18 inf bde (total: 62 inf bn; 32 indep inf coy) COMBAT SUPPORT 1 arty bde 4 arty regt 5 engr bn 1 sigs bde AIR DEFENCE 2 AD regt 4 indep AD coy EQUIPMENT BY TYPE ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES RECCE 40 Ferret APC 253 APC (W) 13: 8 OT-64C; 5 WZ-551 PPV 240: 90 Casspir; 150 MPV AUV Dongfeng Mengshi; CS/VN3C mod 2 ARTILLERY 92+ TOWED 105mm 22: 8 L118 Light Gun; 14 pack howitzer (6 non-operational) MOR 70+: 81mm; 120mm 70 M-43 (est 12 op) AIR DEFENCE • GUNS • TOWED 32+: 14.5mm 30 Type56 (ZPU-4); 37mm (PRC); 40mm 2 L/60

Air Wing 320 EQUIPMENT BY TYPE† AIRCRAFT • TPT • Light 7: 1 BN-2T Islander; 1 CN235M-220; 3 M-28 Skytruck; 2 PA-28 Cherokee (trg) HELICOPTERS MRH 14: 1 A139; 1 Bell 407GXP (VIP); 2 Dhruv; 2 Lancer; 3 Mi-17-1V Hip H; 2 Mi-17V-5 Hip; 1 SA315B Lama (Cheetah); 2 SA316B Alouette III TPT 3: Medium 1 SA330J Puma; Light 2 AS350B2 Ecureuil

Paramilitary 15,000 Armed Police Force 15,000 Ministry of Home Affairs

DEPLOYMENT CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC: UN • MINUSCA 752; 1 inf bn; 1 MP pl

ACTIVE 96,600 (Army 96,600) Gendarmerie &

DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO: UN • MONUSCO 899; 1 inf bn; 1 engr coy

Paramilitary 15,000

IRAQ: UN • UNAMI 77; 1 sy unit

Asia 295 LEBANON: UN • UNIFIL 877; 1 mech inf bn MALI: UN • MINUSMA 202; 1 EOD coy

of numerous private companies and subsidiaries of larger North American and European companies. These companies are able to provide some maintenance, repair and overhaul capability but significant work is contracted to foreign companies.

MIDDLE EAST: UN • UNTSO 3

ACTIVE 9,750 (Army 4,850 Navy 2,350 Air 2,550)

SOUTH SUDAN: UN • UNMISS 1,752; 2 inf bn

RESERVE 2,700 (Army 1,850 Navy 550 Air Force 300)

LIBYA: UN • UNISMIL 234; 2 sy coy

SUDAN: UN • UNISFA 8 SYRIA/ISRAEL: UN • UNDOF 409; 1 mech inf coy; 1 inf coy; 1 log coy(-) WESTERN SAHARA: UN • MINURSO 4

New Zealand NZL NZD

2020

2021

322bn

350bn

USD

209bn

248bn

USD

41,165

48,349

Growth

-2.1

5.1

Inflation

1.7

3.0

Def bdgt

NZD

5.06bn

4.62bn

USD

3.29bn

3.27bn

1.54

1.41

per capita

USD1=NZD

2022

5.19bn

Real-terms defence budget trend (USDbn, constant 2015) 3.09 1.96 2008

Population

2015

2021

4,991,442

Age

0–14

15–19

20–24

25–29

30–64 65 plus

Male

10.0%

3.2%

3.4%

3.6%

22.4%

7.4%

Female

9.5%

3.0%

3.2%

3.5%

22.3%

8.4%

Capabilities New Zealand has a strong military tradition. The New Zealand Defence Force (NZDF) is well trained and has operational experience. The June 2016 defence white paper forecast a range of challenges likely to affect the country’s security in the period to 2040, including rising tension in the South and East China seas. The white paper indicated investments including in improved maritime air-surveillance capability and cyber-support capability for deployed operations, but said that until 2030 defence spending was expected to remain pegged at around 1% of GDP. New Zealand’s closest defence partner is Australia but the country has revived defence relations with the US. The 2016 Defence Capability Plan outlined plans including deliveries of new frigates in the late 2020s. In 2018, it was announced that four P-8 Poseidon maritimepatrol aircraft would be procured, while at-sea replenishment capability was revived in 2020 with the commissioning of HMNZS Aotearoa. A new 2019 Defence Capability Plan detailed plans to expand the army to 6,000 personnel by 2035, as well as to acquire a sealift vessel in the late 2020s. Replacement of the ANZAC frigates, both of which are being upgraded, has now been postponed until the 2030s. New Zealand has a small defence industry consisting

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES IFV 93 NZLAV-25 ENGINEERING & MAINTENANCE VEHICLES AEV 7 NZLAV ARV 3 LAV-R ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE MSL • MANPATS FGM-148 Javelin RCL 84mm Carl Gustaf ARTILLERY 60 TOWED 105mm 24 L118 Light Gun MOR 81mm 36

Reserves Territorial Force 1,850 reservists

Responsible for providing trained individuals for augmenting deployed forces FORCES BY ROLE COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT 3 (Territorial Force Regional) trg regt

Navy 2,350 Fleet based in Auckland. Fleet HQ at Wellington EQUIPMENT BY TYPE PRINCIPAL SURFACE COMBATANTS • FRIGATES 2 FFHM 2: 1 Anzac (GER MEKO 200) with 1 8-cell Mk 41 VLS with RIM-7M Sea Sparrow SAM, 2 triple SVTT Mk 32 324mm TT with Mk 46 mod 5 LWT, 1 Mk 15 Phalanx Block 1B CIWS, 1 127mm gun (capacity 1 SH-2G(I) Super Seasprite ASW hel) (undergoing refit in Canada since 2018) 1 Anzac (GER MEKO 200) with 1 20-cell VLS with Sea Ceptor SAM, 2 triple SVTT Mk 32 324mm ASTT with Mk 46 mod 5 LWT, 1 Mk 15 Phalanx Block 1B CIWS, 1 127mm gun (capacity 1 SH-2G(I) Super Seasprite ASW hel) PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 4 PSOH 2 Otago (capacity 1 SH-2G(I) Super Seasprite ASW hel) (ice-strengthened hull) PCC 2 Lake

Asia

FOREIGN FORCES

New Zealand Dollar NZD

Army 4,850 FORCES BY ROLE SPECIAL FORCES 1 SF regt MANOEUVRE Light 1 inf bde (1 armd recce regt, 2 lt inf bn, 1 arty regt (2 arty bty), 1 engr regt(-), 1 MP coy, 1 sigs regt, 2 log bn)

United Kingdom 60 (Gurkha trg org)

GDP

ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE

296 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2022 AMPHIBIOUS • LANDING CRAFT 2 LCM 2 (operated off HMNZS Canterbury) LOGISTICS AND SUPPORT • 3 AGHS 1 Manawanui with 1 hel landing platform AKRH 1 Canterbury (capacity 4 NH90 tpt hel; 1 SH-2G(I) Super Seasprite ASW hel; 2 LCM; 16 NZLAV; 20 trucks; 250 troops) AORH 1 Aotearoa (capacity 1 NH90/SH-2G(I) hel)

Air Force 2,550 FORCES BY ROLE MARITIME PATROL 1 sqn with P-3K2 Orion TRANSPORT 1 sqn with B-757-200 (upgraded); C-130H Hercules (upgraded) ANTI-SUBMARINE/SURFACE WARFARE 1 (RNZAF/RNZN) sqn with SH-2G(I) Super Seasprite TRAINING 1 sqn with T-6C Texan II 1 sqn with Beech 350 King Air (leased) TRANSPORT HELICOPTER 1 sqn with AW109LUH; NH90 EQUIPMENT BY TYPE AIRCRAFT 5 combat capable ASW 5 P-3K2 Orion TPT 11: Medium 5 C-130H Hercules (upgraded); Light 4 Beech 350 King Air (leased); PAX 2 B-757-200 (upgraded) TRG 11 T-6C Texan II HELICOPTERS ASW 8 SH-2G(I) Super Seasprite TPT 13: Medium 8 NH90; Light 5 AW109LUH AIR-LAUNCHED MISSILES • AShM AGM-119 Penguin Mk2 mod7

DEPLOYMENT EGYPT: MFO 26; 1 trg unit; 1 tpt unit IRAQ: Operation Inherent Resolve 9 MIDDLE EAST: UN • UNTSO 7 SOUTH SUDAN: UN • UNMISS 3

Pakistan PAK Pakistani Rupee PKR GDP per capita

2020

2021

PKR

41.6tr

47.7tr

USD

262bn

288bn 1,209

USD

1,255

Growth

-0.5

3.9

Inflation

10.7

8.9

Def bdgt [a]

PKR

1.48tr

1.65tr

USD

9.33bn

10.4bn

158.78

158.80

USD1=PKR

2022

1.73tr

[a] Includes defence allocations to the Public Sector Development Programme (PSDP), including funding to the Defence Division and the Defence Production Division Real-terms defence budget trend (USDbn, constant 2015) 11.80 5.95 2008

Population

2015

2021

238,181,034

Age

0–14

15–19

20–24

25–29

Male

18.2%

5.2%

4.7%

4.2%

30–64 65 plus 16.6%

2.1%

Female

17.4%

5.0%

4.4%

4.0%

15.8%

2.4%

Capabilities The armed forces have considerable domestic political influence and are the dominant voice on defence and security policy. Pakistan’s nuclear and conventional forces have traditionally been oriented and structured against a prospective threat from India. Since 2008 counter-insurgency and counter-terrorism have been the forces’ main effort. Although an army-led counter-terrorism operation has improved domestic security, terrorist attacks continue. Pakistan’s leaders called for engagement with the new Taliban regime in Afghanistan, with some analysts considering that they considered the Taliban victory a policy success. Mutual reaffirmation of the 2003 ceasefire agreement between India and Pakistan has reduced conflict across the Line of Control in the disputed region of Kashmir. The armed forces have a major role in disaster relief. China is Pakistan’s main defence partner, with all three services employing a large amount of Chinese equipment. Military cooperation with the US is limited by sanctions aiming to improve cooperation on counter-terrorism. Recruitment is good, retention is high and the forces are well trained. The army and air force have considerable operational experience from a decade of counter-insurgency operations in Pakistan’s tribal areas. Funds have been directed towards improving security on the border with Afghanistan. Major investment in military nuclear programmes continues, including the testing of a nuclear-capable sea-launched cruise missile. The navy plans to increase surface combatants, patrol vessels, submarines (in collaboration with China), maritimepatrol aircraft and UAVs. This is to improve both combat capability and the protection of sea-based nuclear weapons. The air force is modernising its inventory while improving its precision-strike and ISR capabilities. The indigenous defence industry exports platforms, weapons and ammunition and there is considerable defence-industrial collaboration with China.

ACTIVE 651,800 (Army 560,000 Navy 21,800 Air 70,000) Gendarmerie & Paramilitary 291,000

Asia 297

Strategic Forces

Operational control rests with the National Command Authority. The Strategic Plans Directorate (SPD) manages and commands all of Pakistan’s military nuclear capability. The SPD also commands a reportedly 25,000-strong military security force responsible for guarding military nuclear infrastructure

Army Strategic Forces Command 12,000– 15,000

Commands all land-based strategic nuclear forces

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE SURFACE-TO-SURFACE MISSILE LAUNCHERS 60+ MRBM • Nuclear 30+: ε30 Ghauri/Ghauri II (Hatf-V)/ Shaheen-II (Hatf-VI); Shaheen-III (in test) SRBM • Nuclear 30+: ε30 Ghaznavi (Hatf-III – PRC M-11)/Shaheen-I (Hatf-IV); some Abdali (Hatf-II); some Nasr (Hatf-IX) GLCM • Nuclear Babur-I/IA (Hatf-VII); Ra’ad (HatfVIII – in test)

Air Force

1–2 sqn of F-16A/B or Mirage 5 may be assigned a nuclear-strike role

Army 560,000 FORCES BY ROLE COMMAND 9 corps HQ 1 (Northern) comd SPECIAL FORCES 2 SF gp (total: 4 SF bn) MANOEUVRE Armoured 2 armd div 7 indep armd bde Mechanised 2 mech inf div 1 indep mech bde Light 18 inf div 5 indep inf bde 4 (Northern Command) inf bde Other 2 sy div COMBAT SUPPORT 1 arty div 14 arty bde 7 engr bde AVIATION 1 VIP avn sqn 4 avn sqn HELICOPTER 3 atk hel sqn 2 ISR hel sqn 2 SAR hel sqn 2 tpt hel sqn 1 spec ops hel sqn

AIR DEFENCE 1 AD comd (3 AD gp (total: 8 AD bn)) EQUIPMENT BY TYPE ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES MBT 2,487: 300 Al-Khalid (MBT 2000); ε100 Al-Khalid I; 315 T-80UD; ε500 Al-Zarrar; 400 Type-69; 268 Type-85IIAP; 4+ VT-4; ε600 ZTZ-59 APC 3,545 APC (T) 3,200: 2,300 M113A1/A2/P; ε200 Talha; 600 VCC-1/VCC-2; ε100 ZSD-63 APC (W) 120 BTR-70/BTR-80 PPV 225 Maxxpro AUV 10 Dingo 2 ENGINEERING & MAINTENANCE VEHICLES ARV 262+: 175 Type-70/Type-84 (W653/W653A); AlHadeed; 52 M88A1; 35 Maxxpro ARV; T-54/T-55 VLB M47M; M48/60 MW Aardvark Mk II ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE MSL SP M901 TOW; ε30 Maaz (HJ-8 on Talha chassis) MANPATS HJ-8; TOW RCL 75mm Type-52; 106mm M40A1 RL 89mm M20 GUNS 85mm 200 Type-56 (D-44) ARTILLERY 4,565+ SP 498: 155mm 438: 200 M109A2; ε115 M109A5; 123 M109L; 203mm 60 M110/M110A2 TOWED 1,629: 105mm 329: 216 M101; 113 M-56; 122mm 570: 80 D-30 (PRC); 490 Type-54 (M-1938); 130mm 410 Type-59-I; 155mm 292: 144 M114; 148 M198; 203mm 28 M115 MRL 88+: 107mm Type-81; 122mm 52+: 52 Azar (Type83); some KRL-122; 300mm 36 A100 MOR 2,350+: 81mm; 120mm AM-50 SURFACE-TO-SURFACE MISSILE LAUNCHERS MRBM • Nuclear 30+: ε30 Ghauri/Ghauri II (Hatf-V)/ Shaheen-II (Hatf-VI); some Shaheen-III (in test) SRBM 135+: Nuclear 30+: ε30 Ghaznavi (Hatf-III – PRC M-11)/Shaheen-I (Hatf-IV); some Abdali (Hatf-II); some Nasr (Hatf-IX); Conventional 105 Hatf-I GLCM • Nuclear some Babur-I/IA (Hatf-VII) AIRCRAFT TPT • Light 13: 1 Beech 350 King Air; 3 Cessna 208B; 1 Cessna 421; 1 Cessna 550 Citation; 1 Cessna 560 Citation; 2 Turbo Commander 690; 4 Y-12(II) TRG 87 MFI-17B Mushshak HELICOPTERS ATK 42: 38 AH-1F/S Cobra with TOW; 4 Mi-35M Hind; (1 Mi-24 Hind in store) MRH 115+: 10 H125M Fennec; 7 AW139; 26 Bell 412EP Twin Huey; 38+ Mi-17 Hip H; 2 Mi-171E Hip; 12 SA315B Lama; 20 SA319 Alouette III TPT 76: Medium 36: 31 SA330 Puma; 4 Mi-171; 1 Mi172; Light 40: 17 H125 Ecureuil (SAR); 5 Bell 205 (UH1H Iroquois); 5 Bell 205A-1 (AB-205A-1); 13 Bell 206B Jet Ranger II TRG 10 Hughes 300C UNINHABITED AERIAL VEHICLES CISR • Heavy 5 CH-4 ISR • Light Bravo; Jasoos; Vector

Asia

ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE

298 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2022 AIR DEFENCE SAM 27+ Medium-range 27 LY-80 (CH-SA-16) Short-range FM-90 (CH-SA-4) Point-defence M113 with RBS-70; Anza-II; FN-6 (CHSA-10); Mistral; QW-18 (CH-SA-11); RBS-70 GUNS • TOWED 1,933: 14.5mm 981; 35mm 248 GDF002/GDF-005 (with 134 Skyguard radar units); 37mm 310 Type-55 (M-1939)/Type-65; 40mm 50 L/60; 57mm 144 Type-59 (S-60); 85mm 200 Type-72 (M-1939) KS-12

Navy 21,800 (incl ε3,200 Marines) EQUIPMENT BY TYPE SUBMARINES 8 SSK 5: 2 Hashmat (FRA Agosta 70) with 4 single 533mm ASTT with UGM-84 Harpoon AShM/F-17P HWT 3 Khalid (FRA Agosta 90B) (of which 2 fitted with AIP) with 4 single 533mm ASTT with SM39 Exocet AShM/ SeaHake mod 4 (DM2A4) HWT SSW 3 MG110 (SF delivery) each with 2 single 533mm TT with F-17P HWT PRINCIPAL SURFACE COMBATANTS • FRIGATES 8 FFGHM 5: 4 Sword (F-22P) with 2 quad lnchr with C-802A AShM, 1 octuple lnchr with FM-90N (CH-SA-N-4) SAM, 2 triple 324mm ASTT with ET-52C (A244/S) LWT, 2 RDC-32 A/S mor, 1 Type 730B (H/PJ-12) CIWS, 1 76mm gun (capacity 1 Z-9C Haitun hel) 1 Tughril (Type-054AP (Jiangkai II)) with 2 twin lnchr with CM-302 (YJ-12A) AShM, 4 8-cell H/AJK-16 VLS with LY-80N (HHQ-16 (CH-SA-N-16)) SAM, 2 triple 324mm ASTT with Yu-7 LWT, 2 H/PJ-11 CIWS, 1 76mm gun (capacity 1 Z-9C Haitun ASW hel) FFGH 1 Alamgir (ex-US Oliver Hazard Perry) with 2 quad lnchr with RGM-84 Harpoon AShM, 2 triple 324mm ASTT with Mk 46 LWT, 1 Mk 15 Phalanx CIWS, 1 76mm gun FFHM 2 Tariq (ex-UK Amazon) with 1 sextuple lnchr with LY-60N SAM, 2 triple 324mm ASTT with Mk 46 LWT, 1 Mk 15 Phalanx Block 1B CIWS, 1 114mm gun (capacity 1 hel) PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 19 CORVETTES • FSH 2 Yarmook (Damen OPV 1900) (fitted for but not with 2 quad lnchr for AShM) (capacity 1 hel) PCG 3: 2 Azmat (FAC(M)) with 2 quad lnchr with C-802A AShM, 1 AK630 CIWS; 1 Azmat (FAC(M)) with 2 triple lnchr with C-602 AShM, 1 AK630 CIWS PBG 4: 2 Jalalat with 2 twin lnchr with C-802 (CH-SS-N-6) AShM; 2 Jurrat with 2 twin lnchr with C-802 (CH-SS-N-6) AShM PBF 4: 2 Kaan 15; 2 Zarrar (33) PB 6: 1 Larkana; 1 Rajshahi†; 4 M16 Fast Assault Boat MINE WARFARE • MINE COUNTERMEASURES 3 MCC 3 Munsif (FRA Eridan) AMPHIBIOUS • LANDING CRAFT 8 LCM 2 LCAC 2 Griffon 8100TD UCAC 4 Griffon 2000 LOGISTICS AND SUPPORT 9 AGS 2: 1 Behr Masa; 1 Behr Paima

AOL 2 Madagar AORH 2: 1 Fuqing with 1 Mk 15 Phalanx CIWS (capacity 1 SA319 Alouette III hel); 1 Moawin (Fleet Tanker) with 2 Mk 15 Phalanx CIWS, 1 hel landing platform AOT 2 Gwadar AXS 1

Marines ε3,200 FORCES BY ROLE SPECIAL FORCES 1 cdo gp MANOEUVRE Amphibious 3 mne bn AIR DEFENCE 1 AD bn

Naval Aviation EQUIPMENT BY TYPE AIRCRAFT 9 combat capable ASW 9: 7 P-3B/C Orion; 2 ATR-72-500 MP 7: 6 F-27-200 MPA; 1 Lineage 1000 TPT 3: Light 2 ATR-72-500; PAX 1 Hawker 850XP HELICOPTERS ASW 11: 4 Sea King Mk45; 7 Z-9C Haitun MRH 6 SA319B Alouette III SAR 1 Sea King (ex-HAR3A) TPT • Medium 1 Sea King (ex-HC4) AIR-LAUNCHED MISSILES • AShM AM39 Exocet

Coastal Defence FORCES BY ROLE COASTAL Defence 1 AShM regt with Zarb (YJ-62) EQUIPMENT BY TYPE COASTAL DEFENCE • AShM Zarb (YJ-62)

Air Force 70,000 3 regional comds: Northern (Peshawar), Central (Sargodha), Southern (Masroor). The Composite Air Tpt Wg, Combat Cadres School and PAF Academy are Direct Reporting Units FORCES BY ROLE FIGHTER 3 sqn with F-7PG/FT-7PG Airguard 1 sqn with F-16A/B MLU Fighting Falcon 1 sqn with F-16A/B ADF Fighting Falcon 1 sqn with Mirage IIID/E (IIIOD/EP) FIGHTER/GROUND ATTACK 1 sqn with JF-17 Thunder (FC-1 Block 1) 3 sqn with JF-17 Thunder (FC-1 Block 2) 1 sqn with JF-17B Thunder (FC-1 Block 2) 1 sqn with F-16C/D Block 52 Fighting Falcon 3 sqn with Mirage 5 (5PA) ANTI-SURFACE WARFARE 1 sqn with Mirage 5PA2/5PA3 with AM-39 Exocet AShM ELECTRONIC WARFARE/ELINT 1 sqn with Falcon 20F AIRBORNE EARLY WARNING & CONTROL 1 sqn with Saab 2000; Saab 2000 Erieye 1 sqn with ZDK-03

Asia 299 ASM AGM-65 Maverick; Raptor II AShM AM39 Exocet ARM MAR-1 ALCM • Nuclear Ra’ad BOMBS INS/SAT-guided FT-6 (REK) Laser-guided Paveway II

Gendarmerie & Paramilitary 291,000 active Airport Security Force 9,000 Government Aviation Division

Pakistan Coast Guards Ministry of Interior

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 5: PBF 4 PB 1

Frontier Corps 70,000

Ministry of Interior

FORCES BY ROLE MANOEUVRE Reconnaissance 1 armd recce sqn Other 11 paramilitary regt (total: 40 paramilitary bn) EQUIPMENT BY TYPE ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES APC (W) 45 UR-416

Maritime Security Agency ε2,000 FORCES BY ROLE MARITIME PATROL 1 sqn with BN-2T Defender EQUIPMENT BY TYPE PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 19 PSO 1 Kashmir PCC 10: 4 Barkat; 4 Hingol; 2 Sabqat (ex-US Island) PBF 5 PB 3 Guns AIRCRAFT • TPT • Light 3 BN-2T Defender

National Guard 185,000

Incl Janbaz Force; Mujahid Force; National Cadet Corps; Women Guards

Pakistan Rangers 25,000

Ministry of Interior

DEPLOYMENT ARABIAN SEA & GULF OF ADEN: Combined Maritime Forces • CTF-151: 1 FFGHM CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC: UN • MINUSCA 1,314; 1 inf bn; 2 engr coy; 1 hel sqn CYPRUS: UN • UNFICYP 2 DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO: UN • MONUSCO 1,974; 2 inf bn; 1 hel sqn

Asia

SEARCH & RESCUE 1 sqn with Mi-171Sh; AW139 (SAR/liaison) 5 sqn with SA316 Alouette III 2 sqn with AW139 TANKER 1 sqn with Il-78 Midas TRANSPORT 1 sqn with C-130B/E Hercules; L-100-20 1 sqn with CN235M-220 1 VIP sqn with B-707; Cessna 560XL Citation Excel; CN235M-220; F-27-200 Friendship; Falcon 20E; Gulfstream IVSP 1 (comms) sqn with EMB-500 Phenom 100; Y-12 (II) TRAINING 1 OCU sqn with F-7P/FT-7P Skybolt 1 OCU sqn with Mirage III/Mirage 5 1 OCU sqn with F-16A/B MLU Fighting Falcon 2 sqn with K-8 Karakorum* 2 sqn with MFI-17 2 sqn with T-37C Tweet AIR DEFENCE 1 bty with HQ-2 (SA-2 Guideline); 9K310 Igla-1 (SA-16 Gimlet) 6 bty with Crotale 10 bty with SPADA 2000 EQUIPMENT BY TYPE AIRCRAFT 416 combat capable FTR 151: 46 F-7PG Airguard; 20 F-7P Skybolt; 23 F-16A MLU Fighting Falcon; 21 F-16B MLU Fighting Falcon; 9 F-16A ADF Fighting Falcon; 4 F-16B ADF Fighting Falcon; 21 FT-7; 5 FT-7PG; 2 Mirage IIIB FGA 217: 12 F-16C Block 52 Fighting Falcon; 6 F-16D Block 52 Fighting Falcon; 49 JF-17 Thunder (FC-1 Block 1); 61 JF17 Thunder (FC-1 Block 2); 15 JF-17B Thunder; 7 Mirage IIID (Mirage IIIOD); 30 Mirage IIIE (IIIEP); 25 Mirage 5 (5PA)/5PA2; 2 Mirage 5D (5DPA)/5DPA2; 10 Mirage 5PA3 (ASuW) ISR 10 Mirage IIIR* (Mirage IIIRP) ELINT 2 Falcon 20F AEW&C 10: 6 Saab 2000 Erieye; 4 ZDK-03 TKR 4 Il-78 Midas TPT 35: Medium 16: 5 C-130B Hercules; 10 C-130E Hercules; 1 L-100-20; Light 14: 2 Cessna 208B; 1 Cessna 560XL Citation Excel; 4 CN235M-220; 4 EMB-500 Phenom 100; 1 F-27-200 Friendship; 2 Y-12 (II); PAX 5: 1 B-707; 1 Falcon 20E; 2 Gulfstream IVSP; 1 Saab 2000 TRG 141: 38 K-8 Karakorum*; 80 MFI-17B Mushshak; 23 T-37C Tweet HELICOPTERS MRH 29: 15 SA316 Alouette III; 14 AW139 TPT • Medium 4 Mi-171Sh UNINHABITED AERIAL VEHICLES CISR • Heavy CH-3 (Burraq); CH-4 (reported) ISR • Medium Falco AIR DEFENCE • SAM 190+ Medium-range 6 HQ-2 (CH-SA-1) Short-range 184: 144 Crotale; ε40 SPADA 2000 Point-defence 9K310 Igla-1 (RS-SA-16 Gimlet) AIR-LAUNCHED MISSILES AAM • IR AIM-9L/P Sidewinder; U-Darter; PL-5; PL-5EII; SARH Super 530; ARH PL-12; AIM-120C AMRAAM

300 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2022 MALI: UN • MINUSMA 217; 1 hel sqn SOMALIA: UN • UNSOS 1 SOUTH SUDAN: UN • UNMISS 285; 1 engr coy SUDAN: UN • UNISFA 4 WESTERN SAHARA: UN • MINURSO 13

FOREIGN FORCES Figures represent total numbers for UNMOGIP mission in India and Pakistan Argentina 2 Croatia 8 Italy 1 Korea, Republic of 7 Mexico 1 Philippines 6 Romania 1 Sweden 4 Switzerland 3 Thailand 5 Uruguay 3

Papua New Guinea PNG Papua New Guinea Kina PGK GDP PGK

2020

2021

81.5bn

92.7bn

per capita Growth

USD

23.3bn

26.5bn

USD

2,651

2,952

-3.9

1.2

Inflation

4.9

3.6

Def bdgt

PGK

329m

305m

USD

93.9m

87.2m

3.50

USD1=PGK

2022

42 2015

ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE Army ε3,700 FORCES BY ROLE SPECIAL FORCES 1 spec ops unit MANOEUVRE Light 2 inf bn COMBAT SUPPORT 1 engr bn 1 EOD unit 1 sigs sqn EQUIPMENT BY TYPE ARTILLERY • MOR 3+: 81mm Some; 120mm 3

HQ located at Port Moresby EQUIPMENT BY TYPE PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS • PCO 3 Guardian (AUS Bay mod) AMPHIBIOUS • LANDING SHIPS • LCT 3 Salamaua (ex-AUS Balikpapan) (of which 1 in trg role) 97

2008

ACTIVE 4,000 (Army 3,700 Maritime Element 200

Air 100)

Maritime Element ε200

Real-terms defence budget trend (USDm, constant 2015)

Population

Australia and also from China, which has donated equipment. In late 2018, plans to build a joint US–Australia–Papua New Guinea naval base at Lombrum were announced. The PNGDF is not able to deploy outside the country without outside assistance and there have only been small PNGDF deployments to UN peacekeeping missions. The PNGDF will receive four of the Guardian-class patrol boats that Australia is donating to small Pacific island nations. These will replace the four Pacific-class boats Australia donated in the 1980s. Papua New Guinea has no significant defence industry, though there is some local maintenance capacity.

2021

7,399,757

Age

0–14

15–19

20–24

25–29

Male

15.8%

5.1%

4.8%

4.3%

30–64 65 plus 18.4%

2.4%

Female

15.3%

4.9%

4.7%

4.2%

17.5%

2.6%

Capabilities Since independence in 1975, the Papua New Guinea Defence Force (PNGDF) has suffered from underfunding and lack of capacity to perform its core roles. After personnel reductions in the 2000s, the government made efforts in the next decade to revive defence capability. A 2013 defence white paper identified core roles including defending the state and civil-emergency assistance, but noted that ‘defence capabilities have deteriorated to the extent that we have alarming gaps in our land, air and maritime borders’. The white paper called for strengthening defence capability on an ambitious scale, with long-term plans calling for a ‘division-sized force’ of 10,000 personnel by 2030. The PNGDF continues to receive substantial external military assistance from

Air Force ε100 FORCES BY ROLE TRANSPORT 1 sqn with CN235M-100; IAI-201 Arava TRANSPORT HELICOPTER 1 sqn with Bell 205 (UH-1H Iroquois)† EQUIPMENT BY TYPE AIRCRAFT • TPT • Light 3: 1 CN235M-100 (1 more in store); 2 IAI-201 Arava HELICOPTERS • TPT • Light 3: 2 Bell 412 (leased); 1 Bell 212 (leased) (2 Bell 205 (UH-1H Iroquois) non-operational)

DEPLOYMENT SOUTH SUDAN: UN • UNMISS 2

Asia 301

Philippines PHL

per capita Growth Inflation Def bdgt [a] FMA (US)

2020

2021

PHP

17.9tr

19.0tr

USD

361bn

386bn

USD

3,323

3,492

-9.6

3.2

2.6

4.3

PHP

261bn

279bn

USD

5.27bn

5.65bn

USD

USD1=PHP

40m

49.62

49.33

2022

5 Area Unified Comd (joint service), 1 National Capital Region Comd

295bn 40m

[a] Excludes military pensions Real-terms defence budget trend (USDbn, constant 2015) 5.46 2.46 2008

Population

2015

Army 103,200

2021

110,818,325

Age

0–14

15–19

20–24

25–29

Male

16.4%

5.1%

4.7%

4.2%

30–64 65 plus 17.8%

2.0%

Female

15.7%

4.9%

4.5%

4.0%

17.8%

3.0%

Capabilities Despite modest increases in defence funding, mainly in response to the growing challenge posed by China to Philippine interests in the South China Sea, the capabilities and procurement plans of the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP), which have traditionally focused on maintaining internal security, remain limited. The National Defense Strategy 2018–22 identified policy priorities including ensuring sovereignty and territorial integrity, and internal stability. Organisational changes have included establishing in 2018 an AFP Special Operations Command to command all special-forces units. There are also plans to upgrade anti-submarine-warfare capabilities and create a space agency with a national-security mandate. Despite occasional anti-American rhetoric from the country’s president, the Philippines remains an ally of the US, which provides support for the AFP’s external security role and its counter-terrorist operations. Bilateral defence relations improved in 2021 after President Duterte agreed in July to maintain the bilateral Visiting Forces Agreement. The AFP continues to host the long-running Balikatan exercise series with US forces, and to participate in ADMM-Plus exercises. In 2017 it began trilateral joint maritime patrols in the Sulu Sea with Indonesia and Malaysia to counter regional terrorist activity. The armed forces continue to be deployed on internal-security duties in the south, where Manila faces continuing challenges from insurgent groups. The second phase (2018–22) of the ‘second horizon’ AFP modernisation programme was approved in 2018. Acquisition plans include armoured vehicles, air-surveillance radars, maritimepatrol aircraft, OPVs and, in the long term, light and medium airlift. The Philippine Aerospace Development Corporation, owned by the defence department since 2019, has assembled a variety of small helicopters and aircraft for the AFP, and also provides maintenance, repair and overhaul services for military aircraft.

ACTIVE 145,300 (Army 103,200 Navy 24,500 Air 17,600) Gendarmerie & Paramilitary 12,300 RESERVE 131,000 (Army 100,000 Navy 15,000 Air 16,000) Gendarmerie & Paramilitary 50,000 (to age 49)

FORCES BY ROLE SPECIAL FORCES 1 spec ops comd (1 ranger regt, 1 SF regt, 1 CT regt) MANOEUVRE Mechanised 1 armd div (2 mech bde (total: 3 lt armd sqn; 7 armd cav tp; 4 mech inf bn; 1 cbt engr coy; 1 avn regt; 1 cbt engr coy, 1 sigs coy)) Light 1 div (4 inf bde; 1 arty bn, 1 int bn, 1 sigs bn) 9 div (3 inf bde; 1 arty bn, 1 int bn, 1 sigs bn) 1 bde (1 mech inf bn; 2 inf bn, 1 arty bn) Other 1 (Presidential) gd gp COMBAT SUPPORT 1 arty regt HQ 1 MRL bty (forming) 5 engr bde SURFACE-TO-SURFACE MISSILE 1 SSM bty (forming) AIR DEFENCE 1 AD bty EQUIPMENT BY TYPE ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES LT TK 7 FV101 Scorpion IFV 54: 2 YPR-765; 34 M113A1 FSV; 18 M113A2 FSV APC 387 APC (T) 168: 6 ACV300; 42 M113A1; 120 M113A2 (some with Dragon RWS) APC (W) 219: 73 LAV-150 Commando; 146 Simba ENGINEERING & MAINTENANCE VEHICLES ARV ACV-300; Samson; M578; 4 M113 ARV ANTI-TANK-ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE • RCL 75mm M20; 90mm M67; 106mm M40A1 ARTILLERY 260+ TOWED 220: 105mm 204 M101/M102/Model 56 pack howitzer; 155mm 16: 10 M114/M-68; 6 Soltam M-71 MOR 40+: 81mm M29; 107mm 40 M30; 120mm some Cardom AIRCRAFT TPT • Light 4: 1 Beech 80 Queen Air; 1 Cessna 170; 1 Cessna 172; 1 Cessna P206A HELICOPTERS TPT • Light 2 R-44 Raven II UNINHABITED AERIAL VEHICLES • ISR • Medium Blue Horizon

Navy 24,500 EQUIPMENT BY TYPE PRINCIPAL SURFACE COMBATANTS • FRIGATES 2 FFGHM 2 Jose Rizal (HDF-3000) with 2 quad lnchr with Hae Sung I AShM, 2 twin Simbad-RC lnchr with Mistral SAM, 2 triple 324mm SEA TLS ASTT with K745 Blue

Asia

Philippine Peso PHP GDP

ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE

302 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2022 Shark LWT, 1 76mm gun (fitted for but not with 1 8-cell VLS) (capacity 1 AW159 Wildcat) PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 58 CORVETTES • FS 1 Conrado Yap (ex-ROK Po Hang (Flight III)) with 2 triple 324mm SVTT Mk 32 ASTT, 2 76mm gun PSOH 3 Del Pilar (ex-US Hamilton) with 1 76mm gun (capacity 1 Bo 105) PCF 1 General Mariano Alvares (ex-US Cyclone) PCO 5: 3 Emilio Jacinto (ex-UK Peacock) with 1 76mm gun; 2 Miguel Malvar (ex-US) with 1 76mm gun PBFG 3 MPAC Mk3 with 1 Typhoon MLS-ER quad lnchr with Spike-ER SSM PBF 9: 6 MPAC Mk1/2; 3 MPAC Mk3 (to be fitted with Spike-ER SSM) PB 30: 22 Jose Andrada; 2 Kagitingan; 2 Point (ex-US); 4 Swift Mk3 (ex-US) PBR 6 Silver Ships AMPHIBIOUS PRINCIPAL AMPHIBIOUS SHIPS • LPD 2: 2 Tarlac (IDN Makassar) (capacity 2 LCVP; 3 hels; 13 tanks; 500 troops) LANDING SHIPS • LST 4: 2 Bacolod City (US Besson) with 1 hel landing platform (capacity 32 tanks; 150 troops) 2 LST-1/542 (ex-US) (capacity 16 tanks; 200 troops) LANDING CRAFT 15 LCM 2: 1 Manobo; 1 Tagbanua (capacity 100 tons; 200 troops) LCT 5 Ivatan (ex-AUS Balikpapan) LCU 4: 3 LCU Mk 6 (ex-US); 1 Mulgae I (ex-RoK) LCVP 4 LOGISTICS AND SUPPORT 4 AGOR 1 Gregorio Velasquez (ex-US Melville) AOL 1 AP 1 Ang Pangulo AWT 1 Lake Buluan

Naval Aviation EQUIPMENT BY TYPE AIRCRAFT • TPT • Light 10: 3 BN-2A Defender; 2 Cessna 177 Cardinal; 5 Beech 90 King Air (TC-90) HELICOPTERS ASW 2 AW159 Wildcat TPT 13: Medium 4 Mi-171Sh; Light 9: 3 AW109; 2 AW109E; 4 Bo-105

Marines 8,300 FORCES BY ROLE SPECIAL FORCES 1 (force recon) spec ops bn MANOEUVRE Amphibious 4 mne bde (total: 12 mne bn) COMBAT SUPPORT 1 CSS bde (6 CSS bn) EQUIPMENT BY TYPE ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES APC • APC (W) 42: 19 LAV-150 Commando; 23 LAV300 AAV 67: 8 AAV-7A1; 4 LVTH-6†; 55 LVTP-7

ARTILLERY 37+ TOWED 37: 105mm 31: 23 M101; 8 M-26; 155mm 6 Soltam M-71 MOR 107mm M30

Naval Special Operations Group FORCES BY ROLE SPECIAL FORCES 1 SEAL unit 1 diving unit 10 naval spec ops unit 1 special boat unit COMBAT SUPPORT 1 EOD unit

Air Force 17,600 FORCES BY ROLE FIGHTER 1 sqn with FA-50PH Fighting Eagle* GROUND ATTACK 1 sqn with EMB-314 Super Tucano* 1 sqn with OV-10A/C Bronco*; SF-260F/TP* ISR 1 sqn with Cessna 208B Grand Caravan; Turbo Commander 690A SEARCH & RESCUE 4 (SAR/Comms) sqn with Bell 205 (UH-1M Iroquois); AUH-76; W-3A Sokol TRANSPORT 1 sqn with C-130B/H/T Hercules 1 sqn with C295; F-27-200 MPA; F-27-500 Friendship 1 sqn with N-22B Nomad; N-22SL Searchmaster; C-212 Aviocar (NC-212i) 1 VIP sqn with C295M; F-28 Fellowship; Gulfstream G280 TRAINING 1 sqn with SF-260FH 1 sqn with T-41B/D/K Mescalero 1 sqn with S-211* 1 sqn with Bell 205 (UH-1H Iroquois) ATTACK HELICOPTER 1 sqn with AH-1S Cobra; MD-520MG 1 sqn with AW109E TRANSPORT HELICOPTER 2 sqn with Bell 205 (UH-1H Iroquois) 1 sqn with S-70i Black Hawk 1 (VIP) sqn with Bell 412EP Twin Huey; S-70A Black Hawk (S-70A-5) ISR UAV 1 sqn Hermes 450/900 EQUIPMENT BY TYPE AIRCRAFT 49 combat capable FGA 12 FA-50PH Fighting Eagle MP 3: 1 C-130T MP mod; 1 F-27-200 MPA; 1 N-22SL Searchmaster ISR 11: 2 Cessna 208B Grand Caravan; 9 OV-10A/C Bronco* TPT 15: Medium 4: 1 C-130B Hercules; 2 C-130H Hercules; 1 C-130T Hercules Light 9: 3 C295; 1 C295M; 1 F-27-500 Friendship; 1 N-22B Nomad; 1 Turbo Commander 690A; 2

Asia 303

Gendarmerie & Paramilitary 12,300 Coast Guard 12,300 EQUIPMENT BY TYPE Rodman 38 and Rodman 101 owned by Bureau of Fisheries and Aquatic Resources PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 80 PSOH 1 Gabriela Silang (OCEA OPV 270) PCO 4 San Juan with 1 hel landing platform PB 64: 4 Boracay (FPB 72 Mk II); 4 Ilocos Norte; 12 PCF 50 (US Swift Mk1/2); 10 PCF 46; 10 PCF 65 (US Swift Mk3); 4 Rodman 38; 10 Rodman 101; 10 Parola (MRRV) PBR 11 LOGISTICS AND SUPPORT • ABU 1 Corregidor AIRCRAFT • TPT • Light 3: 2 BN-2 Islander; 1 Cessna 208B Grand Caravan EX HELICOPTERS • TPT • Light 4: 2 Bo-105; 2 H145

Citizen Armed Force Geographical Units 50,000 reservists FORCES BY ROLE MANOEUVRE Other 56 militia bn (part-time units which can be called up for extended periods)

DEPLOYMENT CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC: UN • MINUSCA 2 INDIA/PAKISTAN: UN • UNMOGIP 6 SOUTH SUDAN: UN • UNMISS 2

FOREIGN FORCES Australia Operation Augury 100 Brunei IMT 8 Indonesia IMT 9 Malaysia IMT 11 United States US Pacific Command: Operation Pacific Eagle – Philippines 200

Singapore SGP Singapore Dollar SGD GDP per capita

2020

2021

SGD

469bn

503bn

USD

340bn

379bn 66,263

USD

59,795

Growth

-5.4

6.0

Inflation

-0.2

1.6

Def bdgt

SGD

13.6bn

15.4bn

USD

9.88bn

11.6bn

1.38

1.33

USD1=SGD

2022

Real-terms defence budget trend (USDbn, constant 2015) 10.7 8.49 2008

Population

2015

2021

5,866,139

Age

0–14

15–19

20–24

25–29

30–64 65 plus

Male

7.9%

3.1%

3.9%

4.3%

24.9%

5.8%

Female

7.4%

2.8%

3.6%

3.9%

25.7%

6.7%

Capabilities The Singapore Armed Forces (SAF) are the best equipped in Southeast Asia. They are organised essentially along Israeli lines, with the air force and navy staffed mainly by professional personnel while, apart from a small core of regulars, the much larger army is based on conscripts and reservists. Although there are no publicly available defence-policy documents, it is widely presumed that the SAF’s primary role is to deter attacks on the city state or interference with its vital interests – particularly its sea lines of communication – by potential regional adversaries. There is an additional focus on counter-terrorist operations. With an ageing population and declining conscript cohort, there is a significant personnel challenge, which the defence ministry is addressing by lean staffing and increased use of technology. There is routine overseas training, and plans have been announced to further improve domestic training areas. The SAF also engages extensively in bilateral and multilateral exercises with regional and international partners. Singaporean forces have gradually become more involved – albeit on a small scale – in multinational operations. While deployments have provided some operational experience, and training standards and operational readiness are high, the army’s reliance on conscripts and reservists limits its capacity for sustained operations abroad. Equipment modernisation continues: plans to acquire F-35 combat aircraft, new domestically produced armoured fighting vehicles, multi-role combat vessels and multi-mission ships are intended to maintain Singapore’s military edge over other Southeast Asian countries. There is a small but sophisticated defence industry. ST Engineering manufactures armoured vehicles, artillery and naval vessels for the SAF.

ACTIVE 51,000 (Army 41,000 Navy 4,000 Air 6,000) Gendarmerie & Paramilitary 7,400 Conscription liability 22–24 months

RESERVE 252,500 (Army 240,000 Navy 5,000 Air 7,500) Annual trg to age 40 for army other ranks, 50 for officers

Asia

C-212 Aviocar (NC-212i); PAX 2: 1 F-28 Fellowship (VIP); 1 Gulfstream G280 TRG 45: 6 EMB-314 Super Tucano*; 12 S-211*; 7 SF-260FH; 10 SF-260TP*; 10 T-41B/D/K Mescalero HELICOPTERS ATK 2 AH-1S Cobra MRH 39: 8 W-3A Sokol; 2 AUH-76; 8 AW109E; 8 Bell 412EP Twin Huey; 2 Bell 412HP Twin Huey; 11 MD-520MG TPT 35: Medium 16: 1 S-70A Black Hawk (S-70A-5); 15 S-70i Black Hawk; Light 19 Bell 205 (UH-1H Iroquois) (25 more non-operational) UNINHABITED AERIAL VEHICLES ISR • Medium 6: 2 Blue Horizon II; 1 Hermes 450; 3 Hermes 900 AIR-LAUNCHED MISSILES AAM • IR AIM-9L Sidewinder ASM AGM-65D Maverick; AGM-65G2 Maverick BOMBS INS/GPS-guided: GBU-49 Enhanced Paveway II

304 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2022

ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE Army 41,000 (including 26,000 conscripts) FORCES BY ROLE COMMAND 3 (combined arms) div HQ 1 (rapid reaction) div HQ 4 armd bde HQ 9 inf bde HQ 1 air mob bde HQ 1 amph bde HQ SPECIAL FORCES 1 cdo bn MANOEUVRE Reconnaissance 3 lt armd/recce bn Armoured 1 armd bn Mechanised 6 mech inf bn Light 2 (gds) inf bn Other 2 sy bn COMBAT SUPPORT 2 arty bn 1 STA bn 2 engr bn 1 EOD bn 1 ptn br bn 1 int bn 2 ISR bn 1 CBRN bn 3 sigs bn COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT 3 med bn 2 tpt bn 3 spt bn

Reserves Activated units form part of divisions and brigades listed above; 1 op reserve div with additional armd & inf bde; People’s Defence Force Comd (homeland defence) with 12 inf bn FORCES BY ROLE SPECIAL FORCES 1 cdo bn MANOEUVRE Reconnaissance 6 lt armd/recce bn Mechanised 6 mech inf bn Light ε56 inf bn COMBAT SUPPORT ε12 arty bn ε8 engr bn EQUIPMENT BY TYPE ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES MBT 96+ Leopard 2SG

LT TK ε50 AMX-13 SM1 (22 AMX-10 PAC 90; ε300 AMX13 SM1 in store) IFV 600+: 250 Bionix IFV-25; 250 Bionix IFV-40/50; ε50 Hunter AFV; 50+ M113A2 Ultra; (22 AMX-10P) APC 1,375+ APC (T) 1,100+: 700+ M113A1/A2; 400+ ATTC Bronco APC (W) 135 Terrex ICV; (250 LAV-150/V-200 Commando; 30 V-100 Commando in store) PPV 140: 74 Belrex; 15 MaxxPro Dash; 51 Peacekeeper ENGINEERING & MAINTENANCE VEHICLES AEV 94: 18 CET; 54 FV180; 14 Kodiak; 8 M728 ARV Bionix; Büffel; LAV-150; LAV-300 VLB 72+: Bionix; LAB 30; Leguan; M2; 60 M3; 12 M60 MW 910-MCV-2; Trailblazer ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE MSL • MANPATS Milan; Spike-SR; Spike-MR RCL 90+: 84mm Carl Gustaf; 106mm 90 M40A1 ARTILLERY 798+ SP 155mm 54 SSPH-1 Primus TOWED 88: 105mm (37 LG1 in store); 155mm 88: 18 FH-2000; ε18 Pegasus; 52 FH-88 MRL 227mm 18 M142 HIMARS MOR 638+ SP 90+: 81mm; 120mm 90: 40 on Bronco; 50 on M113 TOWED 548: 81mm 500 120mm 36 M-65; 160mm 12 M-58 Tampella

Navy 4,000 (incl 1,000 conscripts) EQUIPMENT BY TYPE SUBMARINES • SSK 4: 2 Archer (ex-SWE Västergötland) (fitted with AIP) with 3 single 400mm TT with Torped 431, 6 single 533mm TT with Black Shark HWT 2 Challenger (ex-SWE Sjoormen) with 2 single 400mm TT with Torped 431, 4 single 533mm TT with Torped 613 PRINCIPAL SURFACE COMBATANTS • FRIGATES 6 FFGHM 6 Formidable with 2 quad lnchr with RGM-84 Harpoon AShM, 4 8-cell Sylver A43 VLS with Aster 15 SAM, 2 triple 324mm ILAS-3 (B-515) ASTT with A244/S LWT, 1 76mm gun (capacity 1 S-70B Sea Hawk hel) PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 26 CORVETTES • FSM 8 Independence (Littoral Mission Vessel) with 1 12-cell CLA VLS with VL MICA, 1 76mm gun, 1 hel landing platform PCGM 6 Victory with 2 quad lnchr with RGM-84 Harpoon AShM, 2 8-cell VLS with Barak-1 SAM, 2 triple 324mm ILAS-3 (B-515) ASTT with A244/S LWT, 1 76mm gun PCO 4 Sentinel (Fearless mod) with 1 76mm gun PBF 8: 2 SMC Type 1; 6 SMC Type 2 MINE WARFARE • MINE COUNTERMEASURES 4 MCC 4 Bedok AMPHIBIOUS PRINCIPAL AMPHIBIOUS SHIPS • LPD 4 Endurance with 2 twin Simbad lnchr with Mistral SAM, 1 76mm gun (capacity 2 hel; 4 LCVP; 18 MBT; 350 troops) LANDING CRAFT • LCVP 23: ε17 FCEP; 6 FCU LOGISTICS AND SUPPORT 5 ASR 1 Swift Rescue ATF 2 AX 2: 1 Avatar; 1 Stet Polaris

Naval Diving Unit FORCES BY ROLE SPECIAL FORCES 1 SF gp 1 (diving) SF gp COMBAT SUPPORT 1 EOD gp

Air Force 6,000 (incl 3,000 conscripts) 5 comds FORCES BY ROLE FIGHTER/GROUND ATTACK 2 sqn with F-15SG Eagle 2 sqn with F-16C/D Fighting Falcon (some used for ISR with pods) ANTI-SUBMARINE WARFARE 1 sqn with S-70B Seahawk MARITIME PATROL/TRANSPORT 1 sqn with F-50 AIRBORNE EARLY WARNING & CONTROL 1 sqn with G550-AEW TANKER 1 sqn with A330 MRTT TANKER/TRANSPORT 1 sqn with KC-130B/H Hercules; C-130H Hercules TRAINING 1 (aggressor) sqn with F-15SG Eagle; F-16C/D Fighting Falcon 1 (FRA-based) sqn with M-346 Master 4 (US-based) units with AH-64D Apache; CH-47D Chinook; F-15SG: F-16C/D 1 (AUS-based) sqn with PC-21 1 hel sqn with H120 Colibri ATTACK HELICOPTER 1 sqn with AH-64D Apache TRANSPORT HELICOPTER 1 sqn with CH-47SD Super D Chinook 2 sqn with AS332M Super Puma; AS532UL Cougar ISR UAV 1 sqn with Hermes 450 2 sqn with Heron 1 AIR DEFENCE 1 AD bn with Mistral (opcon Army) 3 AD bn with RBS-70; 9K38 Igla (RS-SA-18 Grouse); Mechanised Igla (opcon Army) 1 ADA sqn with Oerlikon 1 AD sqn with SAMP/T 1 AD sqn with Spyder-SR 1 radar sqn with radar (mobile) 1 radar sqn with LORADS MANOEUVRE Other 4 (field def) sy sqn EQUIPMENT BY TYPE AIRCRAFT 105 combat capable FGA 100: 40 F-15SG Eagle; 20 F-16C Block 52 Fighting Falcon; 20 F-16D Block 52 Fighting Falcon; 20 F-16D Block 52+ Fighting Falcon (incl reserves) MP 5 F-50 Maritime Enforcer* AEW&C 4 G550-AEW

TKR/TPT 11: 6 A330 MRTT; 4 KC-130B Hercules; 1 KC130H Hercules TPT 9: Medium 5 C-130H Hercules (2 ELINT); PAX 4 F-50 TRG 31: 12 M-346 Master; 19 PC-21 HELICOPTERS ATK 19 AH-64D Apache ASW 8 S-70B Seahawk TPT 56: Heavy 21: 6 CH-47D Chinook; 10 CH-47SD Super D Chinook; 2+ CH-47F Chinook; 3+ H225M; Medium 30: 18 AS332M Super Puma (incl 5 SAR); 12 AS532UL Cougar; Light 5 H120 Colibri (leased) UNINHABITED AERIAL VEHICLES ISR 17+: Heavy 8+ Heron 1; Medium 9+ Hermes 450 AIR DEFENCE SAM 4+ Long-range 4+ SAMP/T Short-range Spyder-SR Point-defence 9K38 Igla (RS-SA-18 Grouse); Mechanised Igla; Mistral; RBS-70 GUNS 34 SP 20mm GAI-C01 TOWED 34+: 20mm GAI-C01; 35mm 34 GDF (with 25 Super-Fledermaus fire-control radar) AIR-LAUNCHED MISSILES AAM • IR AIM-9P/S Sidewinder; Python 4 (reported); IIR AIM-9X Sidewinder II; SARH AIM-7P Sparrow; ARH (AIM-120C5/7 AMRAAM in store in US) ASM: AGM-65B/G Maverick; AGM-114K/L Hellfire; AGM-154A/C JSOW AShM AGM-84 Harpoon; AM39 Exocet BOMBS INS/GPS guided GBU-31 JDAM Laser-guided Paveway II

Gendarmerie & Paramilitary 7,400 active Civil Defence Force 5,600 (incl conscripts); 500 auxiliaries (total 6,100) Singapore Gurkha Contingent 1,800 Under the Police FORCES BY ROLE MANOEUVRE Other 6 paramilitary coy

DEPLOYMENT AUSTRALIA: 2 trg schools – 1 with 12 AS332M1 Super Puma/ AS532UL Cougar (flying trg) located at Oakey; 1 with PC-21 (flying trg) located at Pearce. Army: prepositioned AFVs and heavy equipment at Shoalwater Bay training area BRUNEI: 1 trg camp with inf units on rotation; 1 hel det with AS332M1 Super Puma FRANCE: 200: 1 trg sqn with 12 M-346 Master TAIWAN: 3 trg camp (incl inf and arty) THAILAND: 1 trg camp (arty, cbt engr) UNITED STATES: Trg units with F-16C/D; 12 F-15SG; AH64D Apache; 6+ CH-47D Chinook

Asia

Asia 305

306 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2022

FOREIGN FORCES United States US Pacific Command: 200; 1 naval spt facility at Changi naval base; 1 USAF log spt sqn at Paya Lebar air base

Sri Lanka LKA 2020

2021

GDP

Sri Lankan Rupee LKR LKR

15.0tr

16.3tr

USD

80.7bn

80.8bn

per capita

USD

3,682

3,666

Growth

-3.6

3.6

Inflation

4.6

5.1

Def bdgt

LKR

312bn

308bn

USD

1.68bn

1.53bn

185.54

201.32

USD1=LKR

2022

Real-terms defence budget trend (USDbn, constant 2015) 2.05 1.45 2008

Population

2015

2021

23,044,123

Age

0–14

15–19

20–24

25–29

Male

11.6%

3.9%

3.5%

3.6%

30–64 65 plus 21.5%

4.6%

Female

11.1%

3.8%

3.4%

3.5%

23.0%

6.4%

Capabilities Since the defeat of the Tamil Tigers, the armed forces have reoriented to a peacetime internal-security role. Support has been provided by China, in an indication of a growing military-tomilitary relationship. The US has eased its long-standing military trade restrictions and Japan has stated an intention to increase maritime cooperation. Sri Lanka has little capacity for force projection beyond its national territory but has sent small numbers of troops on UN missions. The navy’s littoral capability, based on fast-attack and patrol boats, has been strengthened with the acquisition of offshore-patrol vessels, while the US has gifted a former US coastguard cutter and China has gifted a frigate. The army is reducing in size and there appears to have been little spending on new equipment since the end of the civil war. Sri Lanka is looking to begin a series of procurements to fill key capability gaps but ambitions are limited by budget constraints. Beyond maintenance facilities and limited fabrication, such as at Sri Lanka’s shipyards, there is no defence-industrial base.

ACTIVE 255,000 (Army 177,000 Navy 50,000 Air 28,000) Gendarmerie & Paramilitary 62,200 RESERVE 5,500 (Army 1,100 Navy 2,400 Air Force 2,000) Gendarmerie & Paramilitary 30,400

ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE Army 113,000; 64,00 active reservists (recalled) (total 177,000) Regt are bn sized

FORCES BY ROLE COMMAND 7 region HQ 21 div HQ SPECIAL FORCES 1 indep SF bde MANOEUVRE Reconnaissance 3 armd recce regt Armoured 1 armd bde(-) Mechanised 1 mech inf bde Light 60 inf bde 1 cdo bde Air Manoeuvre 1 air mob bde COMBAT SUPPORT 7 arty regt 1 MRL regt 8 engr regt 6 sigs regt EQUIPMENT BY TYPE ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES MBT 62 T-55A/T-55AM2 RECCE 15 Saladin IFV 62+: 13 BMP-1; 49 BMP-2; WZ-551 20mm APC 211+ APC (T) 30+: some Type-63; 30 Type-85; some Type-89 APC (W) 181: 25 BTR-80/BTR-80A; 31 Buffel; 20 WZ551; 105 Unicorn ENGINEERING & MAINTENANCE VEHICLES ARV 16 VT-55 VLB 2 MT-55 ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE MANPATS HJ-8 RCL 40: 105mm ε10 M-65; 106mm ε30 M40 GUNS 85mm 8 Type-56 (D-44) ARTILLERY 908 TOWED 96: 122mm 20; 130mm 30 Type-59-I; 152mm 46 Type-66 (D-20) MRL 122mm 28: 6 KRL-122; 22 RM-70 MOR 784: 81mm 520; 82mm 209; 120mm 55 M-43 UNINHABITED AERIAL VEHICLES ISR • Medium 1 Seeker

Navy ε37,000; ε13,000 active reserves (total 50,000) Seven naval areas EQUIPMENT BY TYPE PRINCIPAL SURFACE COMBATANTS • FRIGATES 1 FFH 1 Parakramabahu (ex-PRC Type-053H2G (Jiangwei I)) with 1 twin 100mm gun (capacity 1 med hel) PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 120 PSOH 4: 1 Gajabahu (ex-US Hamilton) with 1 76mm gun (capacity 1 med hel); 1 Sayura (ex-IND Sukanya); 2 Sayurala (IND Samarth) PCO 2: 1 Samudura (ex-US Reliance); 1 Sagara (IND Vikram) with 1 hel landing platform

Asia 307

Marines ε500 FORCES BY ROLE MANOEUVRE Amphibious 1 mne bn

TPT 20: Medium 2 C-130K Hercules; Light 18: 3 An-32B Cline; 6 Cessna 150L; 1 Cessna 421C Golden Eagle; 6 Y-12 (II); 2 Y-12 (IV) TRG 13: 7 K-8 Karakorum*; 6 PT-6 HELICOPTERS ATK 11: 6 Mi-24P Hind; 3 Mi-24V Hind E; 2 Mi-35V Hind MRH 18: 6 Bell 412 Twin Huey (VIP); 2 Bell 412EP (VIP); 10 Mi-17 Hip H TPT 16: Medium 4 Mi-171Sh; Light 12: 2 Bell 206A Jet Ranger; 2 Bell 206B Jet Ranger; 8 Bell 212 UNINHABITED AERIAL VEHICLES ISR • Medium 2+: some Blue Horizon II; 2 Searcher MkII AIR DEFENCE • GUNS • TOWED 27: 40mm 24 L/40; 94mm 3 (3.7in) AIR-LAUNCHED MISSILES AAM • IR PL-5E

Gendarmerie & Paramilitary ε62,200 Home Guard 13,000 National Guard ε15,000

Special Boat Service ε100

Police Force 30,200; 1,000 (women) (total 31,200) 30,400 reservists

Reserve Organisations

Ministry of Defence Special Task Force 3,000

Sri Lanka Volunteer Naval Force (SLVNF) 13,000 active reservists

Air Force 28,000 (incl SLAF Regt) FORCES BY ROLE FIGHTER 1 sqn with F-7BS/G; FT-7 FIGHTER/GROUND ATTACK 1 sqn with Kfir C-2 1 sqn with K-8 Karakorum* TRANSPORT 1 sqn with An-32B Cline; C-130K Hercules; Cessna 421C Golden Eagle 1 sqn with Beech B200 King Air; Y-12 (II) TRAINING 1 wg with PT-6, Cessna 150L ATTACK HELICOPTER 1 sqn with Mi-24V Hind E; Mi-35P Hind TRANSPORT HELICOPTER 1 sqn with Mi-17 Hip H; Mi-171Sh 1 sqn with Bell 206A/B (incl basic trg), Bell 212 1 (VIP) sqn with Bell 212; Bell 412 Twin Huey ISR UAV 1 sqn with Blue Horizon II 1 sqn with Searcher MkII MANOEUVRE Other 1 (SLAF) sy regt EQUIPMENT BY TYPE AIRCRAFT 13 combat capable FTR 5: 3 F-7GS; 2 FT-7 (3 F-7BS; 1 F-7GS non-operational) FGA 1 Kfir C-2 (2 Kfir C-2; 1 Kfir C-7; 2 Kfir TC-2; 6 MiG27M Flogger J; 1 MiG-23UB Flogger C non-operational)

Anti-guerrilla unit

Coast Guard n/k

Ministry of Defence EQUIPMENT BY TYPE PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 28 PCO 1 Suraksha (ex-IND Vikram) with 1 hel landing platform PBF 22: 2 Dvora; 4 Super Dvora Mk I; 3 Killer (ROK); 10 (Inshore Patrol Craft); 3 (Fast Patrol Craft) PB 4: 2 Simonneau Type-508; 2 Samudra Raksha PBR 1

DEPLOYMENT CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC: UN • MINUSCA 113; 1 hel sqn LEBANON: UN • UNIFIL 123; 1 inf coy MALI: UN • MINUSMA 242; 1 sy coy SOUTH SUDAN: UN • UNMISS 66; 1 fd hospital; 1 hel sqn WESTERN SAHARA: UN • MINURSO 2

Asia

PCC 3: 1 Jayasagara; 2 Nandimithra (ISR Sa’ar 4) with 1 76mm gun PBF 74: 26 Colombo; 6 Shaldag; 4 Super Dvora Mk II; 6 Super Dvora Mk III; 5 Trinity Marine; 27 Wave Rider PB 11: 2 Mihikatha (ex-AUS Bay); 2 Prathapa (PRC mod Haizhui); 3 Ranajaya (PRC Haizhui); 1 Ranarisi (PRC mod Shanghai II); 3 Weeraya (PRC Shanghai II) PBR 26 AMPHIBIOUS LANDING SHIPS • LSM 1 Shakthi (PRC Yuhai) (capacity 2 tanks; 250 troops) LANDING CRAFT 5 LCM 2 LCU 2 Yunnan UCAC 1 M 10 (capacity 56 troops) LOGISTICS AND SUPPORT 3: 2 AP; 1 AX

308 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2022

Taiwan (Republic of China) ROC

ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE

New Taiwan Dollar TWD

2020

2021

GDP

TWD

19.8tr

22.0tr

Space

USD

668bn

786bn 33,402

per capita

USD

28,358

Growth

3.1

5.9

Inflation

-0.2

1.6

Def bdgt

TWD

411bn

453bn

USD

13.9bn

16.2bn

29.58

27.96

USD1=TWD

2022

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE SATELLITES • ISR 1 Formosat-5

Army 94,000 (incl ε5,000 MP) 472bn

Real-terms defence budget trend (USDbn, constant 2015) 13.5 9.80 2008

Population

2015

2021

23,572,052

Age

0–14

15–19

20–24

25–29

Male

6.4%

2.5%

3.2%

3.5%

30–64 65 plus 26.3%

7.5%

Female

6.0%

2.3%

3.1%

3.4%

26.8%

9.1%

Capabilities Taiwan’s security policy is dominated by its relationship with China and its attempts to sustain a credible military capability. Taiwan’s current focus is on air defence and deterrence in coastal areas, on both sides of the island. The 2021 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) for the first time mentioned the need to counter the grey zone threat from China’s People’s Liberation Army. The armed forces are well trained and exercise regularly. Demographic pressure has influenced plans for force reductions and a shift towards an all-volunteer force, which the 2021 QDR credited for helping the armed forces reach its planned ‘goal of [a] 90% manning ratio’. Taiwan’s main security partnership is with the US. The Taiwan Relations Act from 1979 states that the US ‘shall provide Taiwan with arms of a defensive character’. In 2019, the US approved the transfer of new F-16C/D Block 70 combat aircraft to Taiwan. Taipei maintains an interest in the F-35. In late 2020 the US issued notifications regarding the possible sale of MQ-9B UAVs, HIMARS launchers and a variety of long-range precision-strike missiles which, if these sales proceeded, would significantly boost Taiwan’s military capabilities. Nonetheless, Taiwan is modernising its existing holdings and developing its domestic defence industry through increased funding and the development of new weapons programmes. In 2021, the government proposed further spending amounting to USD9 billion in addition to its defence budget in order to fund domestic weapons R&D and production spending. The proposal is yet to be approved by the Legislative Yuan. The government launched a new defence-industrial policy in 2019, aimed at strengthening defencemanufacturing capacities. Taiwan’s defence-industrial base has strengths in aerospace, shipbuilding and missiles.

ACTIVE 169,000 (Army 94,000 Navy 40,000 Air 35,000) Gendarmerie & Paramilitary 11,800

Conscript liability (19–40 years) 12 months for those born before 1993; four months for those born after 1994 (alternative service available)

RESERVE 1,657,000 (Army 1,500,000 Navy 67,000

Air Force 90,000)

Some obligation to age 30

FORCES BY ROLE COMMAND 3 corps HQ 5 defence comd HQ SPECIAL FORCES/HELICOPTER 1 SF/hel comd (5 spec ops bn, 2 hel bde) MANOEUVRE Armoured 4 armd bde Mechanised 3 mech inf bde COMBAT SUPPORT 3 arty gp 3 engr gp 3 CBRN gp 3 sigs gp COASTAL DEFENCE 1 AShM bn

Reserves FORCES BY ROLE MANOEUVRE Light 27 inf bde EQUIPMENT BY TYPE ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES MBT 650: 200 M60A3; 450 CM-11 Brave Tiger (M48H); (100 CM-12 in store) LT TK ε100 M41A3/D IFV 257: 225 CM-25 (M113 with 20–30mm cannon); 32 CM-34 Yunpao APC 1,318 APC (T) 650 M113 APC (W) 668: 368 CM-32 Yunpao; 300 LAV-150 Commando ENGINEERING & MAINTENANCE VEHICLES AEV 18 M9 ARV CM-27/A1; 37 M88A1 VLB 22 M3; M48A5 NBC VEHICLES 48+: BIDS; 48 K216A1; KM453 ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE MSL SP TOW MANPATS FGM-148 Javelin; TOW RCL 500+: 90mm M67; 106mm 500+: 500 M40A1; Type-51 ARTILLERY 2,093 SP 488: 105mm 100 M108; 155mm 318: 225 M109A2/A5; 48 M44T; 45 T-69; 203mm 70 M110 TOWED 1,060+: 105mm 650 T-64 (M101); 155mm 340+: 90 M59; 250 T-65 (M114); M44; XT-69; 203mm 70 M115 MRL 223: 117mm 120 Kung Feng VI; 126mm 103: 60 Kung Feng III/Kung Feng IV; 43 RT 2000 Thunder

MOR 322+ SP 162+: 81mm 72+: M29; 72 M125; 107mm 90 M106A2 TOWED 81mm 160 M29; T-75; 107mm M30; 120mm K5; XT-86 COASTAL DEFENCE ARTY 54: 127mm ε50 US Mk32 (reported); 240mm 4 M1 AShM Ching Feng HELICOPTERS ATK 96: 67 AH-1W Cobra; 29 AH-64E Apache MRH 38 OH-58D Kiowa Warrior TPT 38: Heavy 8 CH-47SD Super D Chinook; Medium 30 UH-60M Black Hawk TRG 29 TH-67 Creek UNINHABITED AERIAL VEHICLES ISR • Light Mastiff III AIR DEFENCE SAM • Point-defence 76+: 74 M1097 Avenger; 2 M48 Chaparral; FIM-92 Stinger GUNS SP 40mm M42 TOWED 40mm L/70

Navy 40,000 EQUIPMENT BY TYPE SUBMARINES • SSK 4: 2 Hai Lung with 6 single 533mm TT with UGM-84L Harpoon Block II AShM/SUT HWT 2 Hai Shih† (ex-US Guppy II (used in trg role)) with 10 single 533mm TT (6 fwd, 4 aft) with SUT HWT PRINCIPAL SURFACE COMBATANTS 26 DESTROYERS • DDGHM 4 Keelung (ex-US Kidd) with 2 quad lnchr with RGM-84L Harpoon Block II AShM, 2 twin Mk 26 GMLS with SM-2 Block IIIA SAM, 2 triple 324mm SVTT Mk 32 ASTT with Mk 46 LWT, 2 Mk 15 Phalanx Block 1B CIWS, 2 127mm gun (capacity 1 S-70 ASW hel) FRIGATES 22 FFGHM 21: 8 Cheng Kung (US Oliver Hazard Perry mod) with 2 quad lnchr with Hsiung Feng II/III AShM, 1 Mk 13 GMLS with SM-1MR Block VI SAM, 2 triple 324mm SVTT Mk 32 ASTT with Mk 46 LWT, 1 Mk 15 Phalanx Block 1B CIWS, 1 76mm gun (capacity 2 S-70C ASW hel) 2 Meng Chuan (ex-US Oliver Hazard Perry) with 1 Mk13 GMLS with RGM-84 Harpoon AShM/SM1MR Block VI SAM, 2 triple 324mm SVTT Mk 32 ASTT with Mk 46 LWT, 1 Mk 15 Phalanx Block 1B CIWS, 1 76mm gun (capacity 2 S-70C ASW hel) 5 Chin Yang (ex-US Knox) with 1 octuple Mk 16 lnchr with RGM-84C Harpoon Block 1B AShM/ASROC A/S msl, 2 triple lnchr with SM-1MR Block VI SAM, 2 twin lnchr with SM-1MR Block VI SAM, 2 twin 324mm SVTT Mk 32 ASTT with Mk 46 LWT, 1 Mk 15 Phalanx Block 1B CIWS, 1 127mm gun (capacity 1 MD-500 hel) 6 Kang Ding with 2 quad lnchr with Hsiung Feng II AShM, 1 quad lnchr with Sea Chaparral SAM, 2 triple 324mm SVTT Mk 32 ASTT with Mk 46 LWT,

1 Mk 15 Phalanx Block 1B CIWS, 1 76mm gun (capacity 1 S-70C ASW hel) FFGH 1 Chin Yang (ex-US Knox) with 1 octuple Mk 112 lnchr with RGM-84C Harpoon Block 1B AShM, 2 twin 324mm SVTT Mk 32 ASTT with Mk 46 LWT, 1 Mk 15 Phalanx Block 1B CIWS, 1 127mm gun (capacity 1 MD500 hel) PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 44 CORVETTES • FSGM 1 Ta Jiang (Tuo Jiang mod) with 4 twin lnchr with Hsiung Feng II AShM, 2 twin lnchr with Hsiung Feng III AShM, 2 octuple lnchr with Tien Chien 2N (Sea Sword II) SAM, 1 Mk 15 Phalanx CIWS, 1 76mm gun, 1 hel landing platform PCFG 1 Tuo Jiang (Hsun Hai) with 4 twin lnchr with Hsiung Feng II AShM, 4 twin lnchr with Hisung Feng III AShM, 2 triple 324mm SVTT Mk 32 ASTT, 1 Mk 15 Phalanx Block 1B CIWS; 1 76mm gun PCG 10: 4 Jin Chiang with 2 twin lnchr with Hsiung Feng II AShM, 1 76mm gun 6 Jin Chiang with 1 twin lnchr with Hsiung Feng III AShM, 1 76mm gun PCC 1 Jin Chiang (test platform) PBG 31 Kwang Hua with 2 twin lnchr with Hsiung Feng II AShM MINE WARFARE • MINE COUNTERMEASURES 7 MHC 6: 4 Yung Feng; 2 Yung Jin (ex-US Osprey) MSO 1 Yung Yang (ex-US Aggressive) COMMAND SHIPS • LCC 1 Kao Hsiung AMPHIBIOUS PRINCIPAL AMPHIBIOUS SHIPS • LSD 1 Shiu Hai (ex-US Anchorage) with 2 Mk 15 Phalanx CIWS, 1 hel landing platform (capacity either 2 LCU or 18 LCM; 360 troops) LANDING SHIPS LST 6: 4 Chung Hai (ex-US LST-524) (capacity 16 tanks; 200 troops) 2 Chung Ho (ex-US Newport) with 1 Mk 15 Phalanx CIWS, 1 hel landing platform (capacity 3 LCVP, 23 AFVs, 400 troops) LANDING CRAFT 44 LCM ε32 (various) LCU 12 LCU 1610 (capacity 2 M60A3 or 400 troops) (minelaying capability) LOGISTICS AND SUPPORT 9 AGOR 1 Ta Kuan AOEH 1 Panshih with 1 quad lnchr with Sea Chaparral SAM, 2 Mk 15 Phalanx CIWS (capacity 3 med hel) AOE 1 Wu Yi with 1 quad lnchr with Sea Chaparral SAM, 1 hel landing platform ARS 2: 1 Da Hu (ex-US Diver); 1 Da Juen (ex-US Bolster) ATF 4 Ta Tung (ex-US Cherokee)

Marines 10,000 FORCES BY ROLE MANOEUVRE Amphibious 2 mne bde Other 1 (airfield def) sy gp

Asia

Asia 309

310 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2022 COMBAT SUPPORT Some cbt spt unit EQUIPMENT BY TYPE ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES MBT 100 M60A3 TTS AAV 202: 52 AAV-7A1; 150 LVTP-5A1 ENGINEERING & MAINTENANCE VEHICLES ARV 2 AAVR-7 ANIT-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE RCL 106mm ARTILLERY • TOWED 105mm; 155mm

Naval Aviation FORCES BY ROLE ANTI SUBMARINE WARFARE 2 sqn with S-70C Seahawk (S-70C Defender) 1 sqn with MD-500 Defender ISR UAV 1 bn with Chung Shyang II EQUIPMENT BY TYPE HELICOPTERS ASW 20 S-70C Seahawk (S-70C Defender) MRH 10 MD-500 Defender UNINHABITED AERIAL VEHICLES • ISR • Medium ε28 Chung Shyang II

Air Force 35,000 FORCES BY ROLE FIGHTER 3 sqn with Mirage 2000-5E/D (2000-5EI/DI) FIGHTER/GROUND ATTACK 3 sqn with F-5E/F Tiger II 3 sqn with F-16A/B Fighting Falcon 3 sqn with F-16V(A/B) Fighting Falcon 5 sqn with F-CK-1A/B/C/D Ching Kuo ANTI-SUBMARINE WARFARE 1 sqn with P-3C Orion ELECTRONIC WARFARE 1 sqn with C-130HE Tien Gian ISR 1 sqn with RF-5E Tigereye AIRBORNE EARLY WARNING & CONTROL 1 sqn with E-2T Hawkeye SEARCH & RESCUE 1 sqn with H225; UH-60M Black Hawk TRANSPORT 2 sqn with C-130H Hercules 1 (VIP) sqn with B-727-100; B-737-800; Beech 1900; F-50; S-70C Black Hawk TRAINING 1 sqn with AT-3A/B Tzu-Chung* 1 sqn with Beech 1900 1 (basic) sqn with T-34C Turbo Mentor EQUIPMENT BY TYPE AIRCRAFT 474 combat capable FTR 216: 84 F-5E/F Tiger II (some in store); 77 F-16A/B Fighting Falcon; 9 Mirage 2000-5D (2000-5DI); 46 Mirage 2000-5E (2000-5EI) FGA 191: 127 F-CK-1C/D Ching Kuo; 64 F-16V(A/B) Fighting Falcon

ASW 12 P-3C Orion EW 1 C-130HE Tien Gian ISR 7 RF-5E Tigereye AEW&C 6 E-2T Hawkeye TPT 33: Medium 19 C-130H Hercules; Light 10 Beech 1900; PAX 4: 1 B-737-800; 3 F-50 TRG 97: 55 AT-3A/B Tzu-Chung*; 42 T-34C Turbo Mentor HELICOPTERS TPT • Medium 17: 3 H225; 14 UH-60M Black Hawk AIR-LAUNCHED MISSILES AAM • IR AIM-9J/P Sidewinder; R-550 Magic 2; Shafrir; Sky Sword I; IIR AIM-9X Sidewinder II MICA IR; ARH Mica RF; ARH AIM-120C-7 AMRAAM; Sky Sword II ASM AGM-65A Maverick AShM AGM-84 Harpoon ARM Sky Sword IIA LACM Conventional Wan Chien BOMBS • Laser-guided GBU-12 Paveway II

Air Defence and Missile Command FORCES BY ROLE SURFACE-TO-SURFACE MISSILE 1 GLCM bde (2 GLCM bn with Hsiung Feng IIE) AIR DEFENCE 1 (792) SAM bde (1 SAM bn with Tien Kung III; 2 ADA bn) 2 (793 & 794) SAM bde (1 SAM bn with Tien Kung II; 1 SAM bn with M902 Patriot PAC-3; 1 SAM bn with MIM-23 Hawk) 1 (795) SAM bde (1 SAM bn with M902 Patriot PAC-3; 2 ADA bn) EQUIPMENT BY TYPE SURFACE-TO-SURFACE MISSILE LAUNCHERS GLCM • Conventional ε12 Hsiung Feng IIE AIR DEFENCE SAM 202+ Long-range 122+: 72+ M902 Patriot PAC-3; ε50 Tien Kung II Medium-range 50 MIM-23 Hawk Short-range 30 RIM-7M Sparrow with Skyguard Point-defence Antelope GUNS • 20mm some T-82; 35mm 20+ GDF-006 with Skyguard MISSILE DEFENCE Tien Kung III

Gendarmerie & Paramilitary 11,800 Coast Guard 11,800 EQUIPMENT BY TYPE PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 168 PSOH 5: 1 Chiayi; 2 Tainan; 2 Yilan PSO 6: 4 Miaoli with 1 hel landing platform; 2 Ho Hsing PCF 3 Anping (Tuo Jiang mod) PCO 14: 2 Kinmen; 2 Mou Hsing; 1 Shun Hu 1; 3 Shun Hu 7; 4 Taichung; 2 Taipei PBF ε58 (various) PB 82: 1 Shun Hu 6; ε81 (various)

FOREIGN FORCES Singapore 3 trg camp (incl inf and arty)

Asia 311

Thailand THA Thai Baht THB GDP per capita Growth

2020

2021

THB

15.7tr

16.1tr

Army 130,000; ε115,000 conscript (total 245,000)

USD

502bn

546bn

Cav, lt armd, recce and tk sqn are bn sized

USD

7,188

7,809

-6.1

1.0

Inflation

-0.8

0.9

Def bdgt

THB

214bn

215bn

USD

6.84bn

7.27bn

FMA (US)

USD

USD1=THB

31.29

29.50

2022

203bn 10m

Real-terms defence budget trend (USDbn, constant 2015) 6.19 4.76 2008

Population

2015

2021

69,480,520

Age

0–14

15–19

20–24

25–29

Male

8.4%

3.1%

3.2%

3.6%

30–64 65 plus 24.6%

5.9%

Female

8.0%

2.9%

3.2%

3.5%

26.3%

7.3%

Capabilities Thailand has large, well-funded armed forces and its air force is one of the best equipped and trained in Southeast Asia. Facing an increasingly unstable regional-security environment, the Royal Thai Armed Forces are moving towards a greater emphasis on deterring external threats, while continuing their longstanding internal-security role, particularly in the country’s far south, where a Malay-nationalist insurgency continues. The Vision 2026 defence-modernisation plan, approved by the defence council in October 2017, outlines the armed forces’ planned capability improvements for the next decade. Thailand is classed as a major non-NATO ally by the US, but it has also developed closer defence ties with China since 2014. The armed forces regularly take part in international military exercises, notably the multinational annual Cobra Gold series with the US and some of its allies and security partners. Personnel continue to be deployed to the UNMISS mission in South Sudan. The military-modernisation effort includes development of a submarine capability, as well as the strengthening of anti-submarine-warfare capability and procurement of new surface ships. The armoured-vehicle fleet has been recapitalised with deliveries from China and Ukraine. Saab 340 AEW aircraft, Gripen combat aircraft and a new command-and-control system have improved air capability. In January 2020, the Royal Thai Air Force (RTAF) issued a white paper which detailed further acquisition and upgrade requirements through the 2020s, including fighters, tactical-transport and VIP aircraft. The RTAF launched a space-operations centre in August 2019, a priority identified in the National Strategy 2018–37 development programme. Under its Defence Industry Masterplan, the government indicates that expanding Thailand’s presently limited defence sector could be an important way to develop military capability. More broadly, the government is making efforts to reform defence procurement and offsets by expanding the role of its Defence Technology Institute.

ACTIVE 360,850 (Army 245,000 Navy 69,850 Air 46,000) Gendarmerie & Paramilitary 93,700 Conscription liability 24 months

RESERVE 200,000 Gendarmerie & Paramilitary 45,000

FORCES BY ROLE COMMAND 4 (regional) army HQ 3 corps HQ SPECIAL FORCES 1 SF div 1 SF regt MANOEUVRE Armoured 1 (3rd) mech cav div (2 tk regt (2 tk sqn); 1 sigs bn; 1 maint bn; 1 hel sqn) Mechanised 1 (1st) mech cav div (1 armd recce sqn; 2 mech cav regt (3 mech cav sqn); 1 indep mech cav sqn; 1 sigs bn; 1 maint bn; 1 hel sqn) 1 (2nd) mech cav div (1 armd recce sqn; 2 (1st & 5th) mech cav regt (1 tk sqn, 2 mech cav sqn); 1 (4th) mech cav regt (3 mech cav sqn); 1 sigs bn; 1 maint bn; 1 hel sqn) 1 (2nd) mech inf div (1 armd recce sqn; 1 tk bn; 3 mech inf regt (3 mech inf bn); 1 arty regt (4 arty bn); 1 engr bn; 1 sigs bn) 1 (11th) mech inf div (2 mech inf regt (3 mech inf bn); 1 engr bn; 1 sigs bn) Light 1 (1st) inf div (1 lt armd sqn; 1 ranger regt (3 ranger bn); 1 arty regt (4 arty bn); 1 engr bn; 1 sigs bn) 1 (3rd) inf div (3 inf regt (3 inf bn); 1 arty regt (3 arty bn); 1 engr bn; 1 sigs bn) 1 (4th) inf div (1 lt armd sqn; 2 inf regt (3 inf bn); 1 arty regt (3 arty bn); 1 engr bn; 1 sigs bn) 1 (5th) inf div (1 lt armd sqn; 3 inf regt (3 inf bn); 1 arty regt (4 arty bn); 1 engr bn; 1 sigs bn) 1 (6th) inf div (2 inf regt (3 inf bn); 1 arty regt (4 arty bn); 1 engr bn; 1 sigs bn) 1 (7th) inf div (2 inf regt (3 inf bn); 1 arty regt (2 arty bn); 1 engr bn; 1 sigs bn) 1 (9th) inf div (1 mech cav sqn; 3 inf regt (3 inf bn); 1 arty regt (3 arty bn); 1 engr bn; 1 sigs bn) 1 (15th) inf div (1 mech cav sqn; 3 inf regt (3 inf bn); 1 engr bn; 1 sigs bn) COMBAT SUPPORT 1 arty div (1 arty regt (1 SP arty bn; 2 fd arty bn); 1 arty regt (1 MRL bn; 2 fd arty bn)) 1 engr div COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT 4 economic development div HELICOPTER Some hel flt ISR UAV 1 UAV bn with Hermes 450; Searcher II AIR DEFENCE 1 ADA div (6 bn)

Asia

ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE

312 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2022 EQUIPMENT BY TYPE ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES MBT 370: 53 M60A1; 125 M60A3; 105 M48A5; 49 T-84 Oplot; 38 VT-4; (50 Type-69 in store) LT TK 194: 24 M41; 104 Scorpion (50 in store); 66 Stingray RECCE 32 S52 Shorland IFV 220: 168 BTR-3E1; 52 VN-1 (incl variants) APC 1,190 APC (T) 880: Bronco; 430 M113A1/A3; 450 Type-85 APC (W) 210: 9 BTR-3K (CP); 6 BTR-3C (amb); 18 Condor; 142 LAV-150 Commando; 35 M1126 Stryker ICV PPV 100 REVA ENGINEERING & MAINTENANCE VEHICLES ARV 58+: 2 BREM-84 Atlet; 13 BTR-3BR; 22 M88A1; 6 M88A2; 10 M113; 5 Type-653; WZT-4 VLB Type-84 MW Bozena; Giant Viper ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE MSL SP 30+: 18+ M901A5 (TOW); 12 BTR-3RK MANPATS M47 Dragon RCL 180: 75mm 30 M20; 106mm 150 M40 ARTILLERY 2,567 SP 155mm 42: 16 ATMOS-2000; 6 CAESAR; 20 M109A5 TOWED 525: 105mm 296: 24 LG1 MkII; 12 M-56; 200 M101A1; 60 L119 Light Gun; (12 M102; 32 M618A2 in store); 155mm 229: 90 GHN-45 A1; 118 M198; 21 M-71 (48 M114 in store) MRL 68: 122mm 4 SR-4; 130mm 60 PHZ-85; 302mm 4: 1 DTI-1 (WS-1B); 3 DTI-1G (WS-32) MOR 1,932+: SP 81mm 39: 18 BTR-3M1; 21 M125A3; SP 107mm M106A3; SP 120mm 26: 8 BTR-3M2; 6+ Elbit Spear; 12 M1064A3; 1,867 81mm/107mm/120mm AIRCRAFT TPT • Light 22: 2 Beech 200 King Air; 2 Beech 1900C; 1 C-212 Aviocar; 1 C295W; 3 Cessna 182T Skylane; 9 Cessna A185E (U-17B); 2 ERJ-135LR; 2 Jetstream 41 TRG 33: 11 MX-7-235 Star Rocket; 22 T-41B Mescalero HELICOPTERS ATK 7 AH-1F Cobra MRH 20: 8 AS550 Fennec; 2 AW139; 10 Mi-17V-5 Hip H TPT 123: Heavy 5 CH-47D Chinook; Medium 12: 9 UH60L Black Hawk; 3 UH-60M Black Hawk; Light 106: 27 Bell 206 Jet Ranger; 52 Bell 212 (AB-212); 16 Enstrom 480B; 6 H145M (VIP tpt); 5 UH-72A Lakota TRG 53 Hughes 300C UNINHABITED AERIAL VEHICLES ISR • Medium 4+: 4 Hermes 450; Searcher; Searcher II AIR DEFENCE SAM 8+ Short-range Aspide Point-defence 8+: 8 Starstreak; 9K338 Igla-S (RS-SA-24 Grinch) GUNS 192 SP 54: 20mm 24 M163 Vulcan; 40mm 30 M1/M42 SP TOWED 138: 20mm 24 M167 Vulcan; 35mm 8 GDF007 with Skyguard 3; 37mm 52 Type-74; 40mm 48 L/70; 57mm ε6 Type-59 (S-60) (18+ more non-operational)

Navy 44,000 (incl Naval Aviation, Marines, Coastal Defence); 25,850 conscript (total 69,850) EQUIPMENT BY TYPE PRINCIPAL SURFACE COMBATANTS 8 AIRCRAFT CARRIERS • CVH 1 Chakri Naruebet with 3 sextuple Sadral lnchr with Mistral SAM (capacity 6 S-70B Seahawk ASW hel) FRIGATES 7 FFGHM 3: 2 Naresuan with 2 quad lnchr with RGM-84 Harpoon AShM, 1 8 cell Mk 41 VLS with RIM-162B ESSM SAM, 2 triple SVTT Mk 32 324mm TT with Mk 46 LWT, 1 127mm gun (capacity 1 Super Lynx 300 hel) 1 Bhumibol Adulyadej (DW3000F) with 2 quad lnchr with RGM-84L Harpoon Block II AShM, 1 8-cell Mk 41 VLS with RIM-162B ESSM SAM, 2 triple 324mm SEA TLS ASTT with Mk 54 LWT, 1 Mk 15 Phalanx Block 1B CIWS, 1 76mm gun (capacity 1 med hel) FFG 4: 2 Chao Phraya (trg role) with 4 twin lnchr with C-802A AShM, 2 RBU 1200 Uragan A/S mor, 2 twin 100mm gun 2 Chao Phraya with 4 twin lnchr with C-802A AShM, 2 RBU 1200 Uragan A/S mor, 1 twin 100mm gun, 1 hel landing platform PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 92 CORVETTES 7: FSGM 2 Rattanakosin with 2 twin lnchr with RGM-84 Harpoon AShM, 1 octuple Albatros lnchr with Aspide SAM, 2 triple 324mm SVTT Mk 32 ASTT with Stingray LWT, 1 76mm gun FSG 1 Krabi (UK River mod) with 2 twin lnchr with RGM-84L Harpoon Block II AShM, 1 76mm gun FS 4: 1 Makut Rajakumarn with 2 triple 324mm ASTT, 2 114mm gun 1 Pin Klao (ex-US Cannon) (trg role) with 2 triple 324mm SVTT Mk 32 ASTT, 3 76mm gun 2 Tapi with 2 triple 324mm SVTT Mk 32 ASTT with Mk 46 LWT, 1 76mm gun PSO 1 Krabi (UK River mod) with 1 76mm gun PCFG 4: 3 Prabparapak with 2 single lnchr with Gabriel I AShM, 1 triple lnchr with Gabriel I AShM, 1 57mm gun; 1 Ratcharit with 2 twin lnchr with MM38 Exocet AShM, 1 76mm gun PCT 3 Khamronsin with 2 triple 324mm ASTT with Stingray LWT, 1 76mm gun PCOH 2 Pattani (1 in trg role) with 1 76mm gun PCO 4: 3 Hua Hin with 1 76mm gun; 1 M58 Patrol Gun Boat with 1 76mm gun PCC 9: 3 Chon Buri with 2 76mm gun; 6 Sattahip with 1 76mm gun PBF 4 M18 Fast Assault Craft (capacity 18 troops) PB 58: 1 T-11 (US PGM-71); 3 T-81; 6 T-91; 5 M36 Patrol Boat; 13 T-213; 1 T-227; 23 M21 Patrol Boat; 3 T-991; 3 T-994 MINE WARFARE • MINE COUNTERMEASURES 17 MCCS 1 Thalang MCO 2 Lat Ya MCC 2 Bang Rachan MSR 12: 7 T1; 5 T6

Asia 313

Naval Aviation 1,200 EQUIPMENT BY TYPE AIRCRAFT 3 combat capable ASW 2 P-3A Orion (P-3T) ISR 9 Sentry O-2-337 MP 1 F-27-200 MPA* TPT • Light 15: 7 Do-228-212; 2 ERJ-135LR; 2 F-27-400M Troopship; 3 N-24A Searchmaster; 1 UP-3A Orion (UP-3T) HELICOPTERS ASW 8: 6 S-70B Seahawk; 2 Super Lynx 300 MRH 2 MH-60S Knight Hawk TPT 18: Medium 2 Bell 214ST (AB-214ST); Light 16: 6 Bell 212 (AB-212); 5 H145M; 5 S-76B AIR-LAUNCHED MISSILES • AShM AGM-84 Harpoon

Marines 23,000 FORCES BY ROLE COMMAND 1 mne div HQ MANOEUVRE Reconnaissance 1 recce bn Light 2 inf regt (total: 6 bn) Amphibious 1 amph aslt bn COMBAT SUPPORT 1 arty regt (3 fd arty bn, 1 ADA bn) EQUIPMENT BY TYPE ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES IFV 14 BTR-3E1 APC • APC (W) 24 LAV-150 Commando AAV 33 LVTP-7 ENGINEERING & MAINTENANCE VEHICLES ARV 1 AAVR-7 ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE MSL SP 10 M1045A2 HMMWV with TOW MANPATS M47 Dragon; TOW RCL • SP 106mm M40A1

ARTILLERY 54 SP 155mm 6 ATMOS-2000 TOWED 48: 105mm 36 M101A1; 155mm 12 GC-45 AIR DEFENCE SAM Point-defence QW-18 GUNS 12.7mm 14

Naval Special Warfare Command Air Force ε46,000 4 air divs, one flying trg school FORCES BY ROLE FIGHTER 2 sqn with F-5E/5F Tiger II 3 sqn with F-16A/B Fighting Falcon FIGHTER/GROUND ATTACK 1 sqn with Gripen C/D GROUND ATTACK 1 sqn with Alpha Jet* 1 sqn with AU-23A Peacemaker 1 sqn with T-50TH Golden Eagle* ELINT/ISR 1 sqn with DA42 MPP Guardian AIRBORNE EARLY WARNING & CONTROL 1 sqn with Saab 340B; Saab 340 Erieye TRANSPORT 1 (Royal Flight) sqn with A319CJ; A340-500; B-737-800 1 sqn with ATR-72; BAe-748 1 sqn with BT-67 1 sqn with C-130H/H-30 Hercules TRAINING 1 sqn with CT-4A/B Airtrainer; T-41D Mescalero 1 sqn with CT-4E Airtrainer 1 sqn with PC-9 1 sqn with H135 TRANSPORT HELICOPTER 1 sqn with Bell 205 (UH-1H Iroquois) 1 sqn with Bell 412 Twin Huey; S-92A EQUIPMENT BY TYPE AIRCRAFT 123 combat capable FTR 76: 1 F-5B Freedom Fighter; 20 F-5E Tiger II; 2 F-5F Tiger II (F-5E/F being upgraded); 1 F-5TH(E) Tiger II; 1 F-5TH(F) Tiger II; 37 F-16A Fighting Falcon; 14 F-16B Fighting Falcon FGA 11: 7 Gripen C; 4 Gripen D ATK 16 AU-23A Peacemaker ISR 5 DA42 MPP Guardian AEW&C 2 Saab 340 Erieye ELINT 2 Saab 340 Erieye (COMINT/ELINT) TPT 42: Medium 14: 6 C-130H Hercules; 6 C-130H-30 Hercules; 2 Saab 340B; Light 21: 3 ATR-72; 3 Beech 200 King Air; 8 BT-67; 1 Commander 690; 6 DA42M; PAX 7: 1 A319CJ; 1 A320CJ; 1 A340-500; 1 B-737-800; 3 SSJ-10095LR (1 A310-324 in store) TRG 87: 16 Alpha Jet*; 13 CT-4A Airtrainer; 6 CT-4B Airtrainer; 20 CT-4E Airtrainer; 21 PC-9; 7 T-41D Mescalero; 4 T-50TH Golden Eagle* HELICOPTERS MRH 11: 2 Bell 412 Twin Huey; 2 Bell 412SP Twin Huey; 1 Bell 412HP Twin Huey; 6 Bell 412EP Twin Huey

Asia

AMPHIBIOUS PRINCIPAL AMPHIBIOUS SHIPS • LPD 1 Angthong (SGP Endurance) with 1 76mm gun (capacity 2 hel; 19 MBT; 500 troops) LANDING SHIPS 2 LST 2 Sichang with 2 hel landing platform (capacity 14 MBT; 300 troops) LANDING CRAFT 14 LCU 9: 3 Man Nok; 2 Mataphun (capacity either 3–4 MBT or 250 troops); 4 Thong Kaeo LCM 2 UCAC 3 Griffon 1000TD LOGISTICS AND SUPPORT 13 ABU 1 Suriya AGOR 1 Sok AGS 2: 1 Chanthara; 1 Paruehatsabodi AOL 5: 1 Matra with 1 hel landing platform; 2 Proet; 1 Prong; 1 Samui AOR 1 Chula AORH 1 Similan (capacity 1 hel) AWT 2

314 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2022 CSAR 8 H225M Super Cougar TPT 23: Medium 3 S-92A Super Hawk; Light 20: 17 Bell 205 (UH-1H Iroquois); 3 H135 UNINHABITED AERIAL VEHICLES • ISR • Light U-1 AIR DEFENCE SAM Medium-range 3+ KS-1C (CH-SA-12) AIR-LAUNCHED MISSILES AAM • IR AIM-9P/S Sidewinder; Python 3; IIR IRIS-T; Python 5 (reported); ARH AIM-120 AMRAAM; Derby (reported) ASM AGM-65 Maverick AShM RBS15F BOMBS Laser-guided Paveway II INS/GPS-guided GBU-38 JDAM

United States US Pacific Command: 100

Growth

Royal Security Command FORCES BY ROLE MANOEUVRE Light 2 inf regt (3 inf bn)

Gendarmerie & Paramilitary ε93,700 Border Patrol Police 20,000

DEPLOYMENT INDIA/PAKISTAN: UN • UNMOGIP 5 SOUTH SUDAN: UN • UNMISS 276; 1 engr coy

FOREIGN FORCES

Timor-Leste TLS 2020

2021

GDP

US Dollar USD USD

1.78bn

1.70bn

per capita

USD

1,348

1,263

-7.6

1.8

Inflation

0.5

1.6

Def bdgt

USD

41.7m

39.2m

2022

Real-terms defence budget trend (USDm, constant 2015) 81 21 2008

2015

Population

2021

1,413,958

Age

0–14

15–19

20–24

25–29

Marine Police 2,200

Male

20.4%

5.5%

4.8%

3.8%

13.5%

2.0%

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 101 PCO 1 Srinakrin PCC 2 Hameln PB 52: 1 Chasanyabadee; 3 Cutlass; 2 M25; 2 Ratayapibanbancha (Reef Ranger); 1 Sriyanont; 2 Wasuthep; 41 (various) PBR 46

Female

19.2%

5.3%

4.7%

4.0%

14.7%

2.1%

National Security Volunteer Corps 45,000 – Reserves Police Aviation 500 EQUIPMENT BY TYPE AIRCRAFT 6 combat capable ATK 6 AU-23A Peacemaker TPT 16: Light 15: 2 CN235; 8 PC-6 Turbo-Porter; 3 SC-7 3M Skyvan; 2 Short 330UTT; PAX 1 F-50 HELICOPTERS MRH 12: 6 Bell 412 Twin Huey; 6 Bell 429 TPT • Light 61: 27 Bell 205A; 14 Bell 206 Jet Ranger; 20 Bell 212 (AB-212)

Provincial Police 50,000 (incl ε500 Special Action Force) Thahan Phran (Hunter Soldiers) 21,000 Volunteer irregular force FORCES BY ROLE MANOEUVRE Other 22 paramilitary regt (total: 275 paramilitary coy)

30–64 65 plus

Capabilities The small Timor-Leste Defence Force (F-FDTL) has been afflicted by funding, personnel and morale challenges since it was established in 2001. The F-FDTL was reconstituted in the wake of fighting between regional factions in the security forces in 2006, but is still a long way from meeting the ambitious force-structure goals set out in the Force 2020 plan published in 2007. In 2016, the government published a Strategic Defence and Security Concept (SDSC). This outlined the roles of the F-FDTL as including the protection of the country from external threats and combating violent crime. However, this parallel internal-security role has sometimes brought it into conflict with the national police force. The SDSC also stated that the F-FDTL needs to improve its naval capabilities, owing to the size of Timor-Leste’s exclusive economic zone. The origins of the F-FDTL in the Falintil national resistance force, and continuing training and doctrinal emphasis on low-intensity infantry tactics, mean that the force provides a deterrent to invasion. The F-FDTL has received training from Australian and US personnel. Australia is also donating two Guardian-class patrol vessels as part of its Pacific Patrol Boat Replacement programme; these are due to arrive in 2023. Maintenance capacity is limited and the country has no defence industry.

ACTIVE 2,280 (Army 2,200 Naval Element 80)

ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE Army 2,200 Training began in January 2001 with the aim of deploying 1,500 full-time personnel and 1,500 reservists. Authorities are engaged in developing security structures with international assistance

Asia 315 FORCES BY ROLE MANOEUVRE Light 2 inf bn COMBAT SUPPORT 1 MP pl COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT 1 log spt coy

Naval Element 80 EQUIPMENT BY TYPE PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 5 PB 5: 2 Dili (ex-ROK); 2 Shanghai II; 1 Kamenassa (exROK Chamsuri)

ACTIVE 482,000 (Army 412,000 Navy 40,000 Air 30,000) Gendarmerie & Paramilitary 40,000

Air Component EQUIPMENT BY TYPE AIRCRAFT • TPT • Light 1 Cessna 172

Conscript liability 2 years army and air defence, 3 years air force and navy, specialists 3 years, some ethnic minorities 2 years

GDP per capita

2020

2021

VND

7966tr

8390tr

USD

343bn

368bn

USD

3,523

3,743

Growth

2.9

3.8

Inflation

3.2

2.0

Def bdgt

VND

ε133tr

ε145tr

USD

ε5.73bn

ε6.35bn

USD

45.0m

10.9m

23217.71

22798.35

FMA (US) USD1=VND

2022

ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE Space EQUIPMENT BY TYPE SATELLITES • ISR 1 VNREDSat

Army ε412,000 12.0m

Real-terms defence budget trend (USDbn, constant 2015) 5.73 2.84 2008

Population

2015

RESERVES Gendarmerie & Paramilitary 5,000,000

2021

102,789,598

Age

0–14

15–19

20–24

25–29

Male

12.6%

3.8%

3.7%

4.2%

30–64 65 plus 22.9%

2.9%

Female

11.3%

3.6%

3.5%

4.0%

23.1%

4.3%

Capabilities Vietnam has a stronger military tradition, and its armed forces have more operational experience, than many of its neighbours. Its defence efforts and armed forces also benefit from broad popular support, particularly in the context of tensions with China over conflicting claims in the South China Sea. Vietnam adopted a new Law on National Defence in 2018 and issued a defence white paper in 2019. The latter referred several times to Vietnam’s differences with China and the need for both sides to ‘put more effort into maintaining stability’. It is evident, from Hanoi’s perspective, that stability will depend in good measure on Vietnam bolstering its deterrent capabilities in the South China Sea. This explains the emphasis on strengthening naval and air capabilities, including development of an advanced submarine capability and procurement of new ISR, air-defence and naval anti-surface systems to boost the capacity for anti-access/area-denial operations in Vietnam’s maritime littoral. While Russia continues to be the dominant

8 Mil Regions (incl capital) FORCES BY ROLE COMMAND 4 corps HQ SPECIAL FORCES 1 SF bde (1 AB bde, 1 demolition engr regt) MANOEUVRE Armoured 10 tk bde Mechanised 2 mech inf div Light 23 inf div SURFACE-TO-SURFACE MISSILE 1 SRBM bde COMBAT SUPPORT 13 arty bde 1 arty regt 11 engr bde 1 engr regt 1 EW unit 3 sigs bde 2 sigs regt COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT 9 economic construction div 1 log regt 1 med unit 1 trg regt AIR DEFENCE 11 AD bde

Asia

Vietnam VNM Vietnamese Dong VND

defence supplier, Washington lifted its arms embargo on Vietnam in 2016, and New Delhi and Seoul are understood to be seeking inroads into Vietnam’s defence market. Long-expected orders for new combat aircraft and maritime-patrol aircraft have failed to materialise so far, though Vietnam ordered a Japanese-produced satellite-based surveillance system in April 2020 and L-39NG jet trainers from the Czech Republic in February 2021. The US Air Force also agreed to supply Vietnam with three Beechcraft T-6 Texan II turboprop trainers in June 2021, and has enhanced the country’s coastguard capabilities with three ex-Hamilton-class vessels. Vietnam is developing its limited defence-industrial capacities with the launch of a defence-focused subsidiary to state-owned Viettel Military Industry and Telecoms Group. Called Viettel High Technology Industries Corporation, it focuses on defence electronics and communications.

316 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2022

Reserve FORCES BY ROLE MANOEUVRE Light 9 inf div EQUIPMENT BY TYPE ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES MBT 1,383: 45 T-34; 850 T-54/T-55; 4+ T-54B mod; 70 T-62; 64 T-90S; 350 Type-59; LT TK 620: 300 PT-76; 320 Type-62/Type-63 RECCE 100 BRDM-1/BRDM-2 IFV 300 BMP-1/BMP-2 APC 1,380+ APC (T) 280+: Some BTR-50; 200 M113 (to be upgraded); 80 Type-63 APC (W) 1,100 BTR-40/BTR-60/BTR-152 ENGINEERING & MAINTENANCE VEHICLES AEV IMR-2 ARV BREM-1M VLB TMM-3 ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE MSL • MANPATS 9K11 Malyutka (RS-AT-3 Sagger); 9M14 mod RCL 75mm Type-56; 82mm Type-65 (B-10); 87mm Type-51 GUNS SP 100mm SU-100; 122mm SU-122 TOWED 100mm T-12 (arty); M-1944 ARTILLERY 3,040+ SP 30+: 122mm 2S1 Gvozdika; 152mm 30 2S3 Akatsiya; 175mm M107 TOWED 2,300: 105mm M101/M102; 122mm D-30/Type54 (M-1938)/Type-60 (D-74); 130mm M-46; 152mm D-20; 155mm M114 MRL 710+: 107mm 360 Type-63; 122mm 350 BM-21 Grad; 140mm BM-14 MOR 82mm; 120mm M-1943; 160mm M-1943 SURFACE-TO-SURFACE MISSILE LAUNCHERS SRBM • Coventional 9K72/9K77 (RS-SS-1C/D Scud B/C) AIR DEFENCE SAM • Point-defence 9K32 Strela-2 (RS-SA-7 Grail)‡; 9K310 Igla-1 (RS-SA-16 Gimlet); 9K38 Igla (RS-SA-18 Grouse) GUNS 12,000 SP 23mm ZSU-23-4 TOWED 14.5mm/30mm/37mm/57mm/85mm/100mm

Navy ε40,000 (incl ε27,000 Naval Infantry) EQUIPMENT BY TYPE SUBMARINES 8 SSK 6 Hanoi (RUS Project 636.1 (Improved Kilo)) with 6 533mm TT with 3M14E Klub-S (RS-SS-N-30B) LACM/3M54E1/E Klub-S (RS-SS-N-27A/B) AShM (Klub-S AShM variant unclear)/53-65KE HWT/TEST-71ME HWT SSW 2 Yugo (DPRK) PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 75 CORVETTES 12: FSGM 5: 1 BPS-500 with 2 quad lnchr with 3M24E Uran-E (RSSS-N-25 Switchblade) AShM, 1 9K32 Strela-2M (RSSA-N-5 Grail) SAM (manually operated), 2 twin 533mm TT, 1 RBU 1600 A/S mor, 1 AK630 CIWS, 1 76mm gun

2 Dinh Tien Hoang (RUS Gepard 3.9 (Project 11661E)) with 2 quad lnchr with 3M24E Uran-E (RS-SS-N-25 Switchblade) AShM, 1 3M89E Palma (Palash) CIWS with Sosna-R SAM (RS-CADS-N-2), 2 AK630M CIWS, 1 76mm gun, 1 hel landing platform 2 Tran Hung Dao (RUS Gepard 3.9 (Project 11661E)) with 2 quad lnchr with 3M24E Uran-E (RS-SS-N-25 Switchblade), 1 3M89E Palma (Palash) CIWS with Sosna-R SAM (RS-CADS-N-2), 2 twin 533mm TT with SET-53M HWT, 2 AK630M CIWS, 1 76mm gun, 1 hel landing platform FSG 1 Po Hang (Flight III) (ex-ROK) with 2 quad lnchr with 3M24E Uran-E (RS-SS-N-25 Switchblade) AShM, 2 76mm guns FS 6: 3 Project 159A (ex-FSU Petya II) with 1 quintuple 406mm ASTT, 4 RBU 6000 Smerch 2 A/S mor, 2 twin 76mm gun 2 Project 159AE (ex-FSU Petya III) with 1 triple 533mm ASTT with SET-53ME HWT, 4 RBU 2500 Smerch 1 A/S mor, 2 twin 76mm gun 1 Po Hang (Flight III) (ex-ROK) with 2 76mm guns PCFGM 12: 4 Project 1241RE (Tarantul I) with 2 twin lnchr with P-15 Termit-R (RS-SS-N-2D Styx) AShM, 1 quad lnchr with 9K32 Strela-2M (RS-SA-N-5 Grail) SAM (manually operated), 2 AK630M CIWS, 1 76mm gun 8 Project 12418 (Tarantul V) with 4 quad lnchr with 3M24E Uran-E (RS-SS-N-25 Switchblade) AShM, 1 quad lnchr with 9K32 Strela-2M (RS-SA-N-5 Grail) SAM (manually operated), 2 AK630M CIWS, 1 76mm gun PCO 7: 1 Project FC264; 6 TT-400TP with 2 AK630M CIWS, 1 76mm gun PCC 6 Svetlyak (Project 1041.2) with 1 AK630M CIWS, 1 76mm gun PBFG 8 Project 205 (Osa II) with 4 single lnchr with P-20U (SS-N-2B Styx) AShM PBFT 1+ Shershen† (FSU) with 4 single 533mm TT PH 2 Shtorm (ex-FSU Project 206M (Turya))† with 1 twin 57mm gun PHT 3 Shtorm (ex-FSU Project 206M (Turya))† with 4 single 533mm TT with 53-65KE HWT, 1 twin 57mm gun PB 20: 14 Zhuk (Grif-M)†; 4 Zhuk (mod); 2 TP-01 PBR 4 Stolkraft MINE WARFARE • MINE COUNTERMEASURES 13 MSO 2 Akvamaren (Project 266 (Yurka)) MSC 4 Sonya (Project 1265 (Yakhont)) MHI 2 Korund (Project 1258 (Yevgenya)) MSR 5 K-8 AMPHIBIOUS LANDING SHIPS 7 LST 2 Tran Khanh Du (ex-US LST 542) with 1 hel landing platform (capacity 16 Lt Tk/APC; 140 troops) LSM 5: 1 Polnochny A (capacity 6 Lt Tk/APC; 200 troops) 2 Polnochny B (capacity 6 Lt Tk/APC; 200 troops) 2 Nau Dinh LANDING CRAFT • LCM 13 8 LCM 6 (capacity 1 Lt Tk or 80 troops) 4 LCM 8 (capacity 1 MBT or 200 troops) 1 VDN-150

Asia 317

Naval Infantry ε27,000 EQUIPMENT BY TYPE ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES LT TK PT-76; Type-63 APC • APC (W) BTR-60

Coastal Defence FORCES BY ROLE COASTAL DEFENCE 3 AShM bde 1 coastal arty bde EQUIPMENT BY TYPE COASTAL DEFENCE • AShM 4K44 Redut (RS-SSC-1B Sepal); 4K51 Rubezh (RS-SSC-3 Styx); K-300P Bastion-P (RS-SSC-5 Stooge) ARTILLERY • MRL 160mm AccuLAR-160; 306mm EXTRA

Navy Air Wing FORCES BY ROLE ASW/SAR 1 regt with H225; Ka-28 (Ka-27PL) Helix A; Ka-32 Helix C EQUIPMENT BY TYPE AIRCRAFT • TPT • Light 6 DHC-6-400 Twin Otter HELICOPTERS ASW 10 Ka-28 Helix A TPT • Medium 4: 2 H225; 2 Ka-32 Helix C

Air Force 30,000 3 air div, 1 tpt bde

FORCES BY ROLE FIGHTER/GROUND ATTACK 3 regt with Su-22M3/M4/UM Fitter (some ISR) 1 regt with Su-27SK/Su-27UBK Flanker 1 regt with Su-27SK/Su-27UBK Flanker; Su-30MK2 Flanker 2 regt with Su-30MK2 Flanker TRANSPORT 2 regt with An-2 Colt; Bell 205 (UH-1H Iroquois); Mi-8 Hip; Mi-17 Hip H; M-28 Bryza; C295M TRAINING 1 regt with L-39 Albatros 1 regt with Yak-52 ATTACK/TRANSPORT HELICOPTER 2 regt with Mi-8 Hip; Mi-17 Hip H; Mi-171; Mi-24 Hind AIR DEFENCE 6 AD div HQ 2 SAM regt with S-300PMU1 (RS-SA-20 Gargoyle) 3 SAM regt with Spyder-MR 3 SAM regt with S-75 Dvina (RS-SA-2 Guideline) 4 SAM regt with S-125-2TM Pechora-2TM

2 SAM regt with S-125M Pechora-M 4 ADA regt EQUIPMENT BY TYPE AIRCRAFT 78 combat capable FGA 72: 26 Su-22M3/M4/UM Fitter (some ISR); 6 Su-27SK Flanker; 5 Su-27UBK Flanker B; 35 Su-30MK2 Flanker G TPT • Light 12: 6 An-2 Colt; 3 C295M; 1 M-28 Bryza; 2 C-212 Aviocar (NC-212i) TRG 53: 17 L-39 Albatros; 6 Yak-130 Mitten*; 30 Yak-52 HELICOPTERS MRH 6 Mi-17 Hip H TPT 28: Medium 17: 14 Mi-8 Hip; 3 Mi-171; Light 11 Bell 205 (UH-1H Iroquois) AIR DEFENCE SAM 98+: Long-range 12 S-300PMU1 (RS-SA-20 Gargoyle) Medium-range 65: ε25 S-75 Dvina (RS-SA-2 Guideline); ε30 S-125-2TM Pechora-2TM; ε10 Spyder-MR Short-range 21+: 2K12 Kub (RS-SA-6 Gainful); 21 S-125M Pechora-M (RS-SA-3 Goa) Point-defence 9K32 Strela-2 (RS-SA-7 Grail)‡; 9K310 Igla-1 (RS-SA-16 Gimlet) GUNS 37mm; 57mm; 85mm; 100mm; 130mm AIR-LAUNCHED MISSILES AAM • IR R-60 (RS-AA-8 Aphid); R-73 (RS-AA-11A Archer); IR/SARH R-27 (RS-AA-10 Alamo); ARH R-77 (RS-AA-12A Adder) ASM Kh-29L/T (RS-AS-14 Kedge); Kh-59M (RS-AS-18 Kazoo) AShM Kh-31A (RS-AS-17B Krypton) ARM Kh-28 (RS-AS-9 Kyle); Kh-31P (RS-AS-17A Krypton)

Gendarmerie & Paramilitary 40,000+ active Border Defence Corps ε40,000 Coast Guard EQUIPMENT BY TYPE PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 79+ PSOH 2 Hamilton (ex-US) with 1 76mm gun (capacity 1 med hel) PSO 4 DN2000 (Damen 9014) PCO 13+: 1 Mazinger (ex-ROK); 9 TT-400; 3+ other PCC 2 Hae Uri (ex-ROK) PBF 28: 26 MS-50S; 2 Shershen PB 30: 1 MS-50; approx 14 TT-200; 14 TT-120; 1 other LOGISTICS AND SUPPORT 5 AFS 1 ATF 4 Damen Salvage Tug AIRCRAFT • MP 5 C-212-400 MPA

Local Forces ε5,000,000 reservists Incl People’s Self-Defence Force (urban units) and People’s Militia (rural units); comprises static and mobile cbt units, log spt and village protection pl; some arty, mor and AD guns; acts as reserve

DEPLOYMENT CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC: UN • MINUSCA 7 SOUTH SUDAN: UN • UNMISS 68; 1 fd hospital

Asia

LOGISTICS AND SUPPORT 22 AGS 1 Tran Dai Nia (Damen Research Vessel 6613) AH 1 Khanh Hoa (Truong Sa mod) AKR 4 Damen Stan Lander 5612 AKSL 10+ AP 1 Truong Sa ASR 1 Yết Kiêu (Damen Rescue Gear Ship 9316) AT 2 AWT 1 AXS 1 Le Quy Don

318 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2022

Chapter Seven

Middle East and North Africa Regional defence spending declined in real terms for the fourth consecutive year. While spending is the same as in 2017, in nominal terms, inflation rates averaging 6.9% annually mean that real-terms reductions have been sizeable, with cuts averaging 3.6% annually in the four years to 2021. The US Global Posture Review was expected to set out Washington’s thinking on its future dispositions in the region, though little change was announced on release and the review called for further study of regional requirements. In July 2021, the US announced that its combat mission in Iraq would come to a close by the end of the year, though some US forces would continue to operate in an advisory role. NATO had earlier announced that it was expanding its NATO Mission Iraq. The Abraham Accords normalised relations between Israel, Bahrain and the UAE, presaged increased security and defence cooperation and appeared to unlock important arms deals. In January, letters

Active military personnel – top 10 (25,000 per unit)

Iran 610,000

Egypt 438,500

Saudi Arabia 257,000

-5

-10

-15 2011

2013

2015

2017

2019

Note: Defence budget only – excludes security expenditure

2021

Year-on-year % change

USDbn, constant 2015

Saudi Arabia, real-terms defence budget trend, 2011–21 (USDbn, constant 2015)*

of agreement were signed concerning a proposed UAE purchase of F-35A Lightning II combat aircraft. There have been bilateral meetings between defence officials and, in November, a small maritime-security exercise in the Red Sea involving the US and the three states. There is growing defence cooperation with extraregional states. Cyprus, France, Greece, Israel and the UAE increased diplomatic coordination and took part in the Iniochos air exercise in April. In late year France secured a major sale of 80 Rafale combat aircraft to the UAE. Both the UAE and Saudi Arabia have also sent combat aircraft to Greece to take part in exercises. Egypt’s naval capabilities are growing. In 2021 a new naval base was opened at Ras Gargoub, while a fourth Type-209/1400 submarine and a second FREMM frigate (built by Italy’s Fincantieri) was commissioned. In October it was announced that Egypt would buy the UK’s two decommissioned Fort Rosalie-class logistics ships.

Global total 19,605,000

Morocco 195,800 Iraq 193,000 Israel 169,500 Syria 169,000 Algeria 139,000 Jordan 100,500 United Arab Emirates 63,000

Regional total 13.1% 2,572,000

Middle East and North Africa 319

Regional defence policy and economics

320 ►

Arms procurements and deliveries

329 ►

Armed forces data section

332 ►

Egypt’s growing naval capabilities

Middle East and North Africa: Fighter/Fighter Ground-Attack aircraft

Frigates Attack submarines

Fighter Ground-Attack aircraft Fighter aircraft

2,000

9 8

1,500

7 6

1,000

500

2 1

0 2014

2016

2018

2020

Heavy and Medium Combat-UAVs and ISR UAVs

2014

2021

2016

2018

2020

2021

US deployments to Gulf countries: 2014–21

Algeria 2014

Egypt Iran

2015

Iraq

Bahrain Iraq Kuwait Qatar Saudi Arabia United Arab Emirates

2016

Israel

2017

Lebanon Morocco

2018

Qatar 2019

Saudi Arabia Syria

2020

United Arab Emirates 2014 Medium ISR

Heavy ISR

2016

2018

Medium Combat

2020

2021

Heavy Combat

2021 0

3,000

6,000

9,000

Number of personnel

12,000

15,000

Middle East and North Africa

320 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2022

Middle East and North Africa Tentative de-escalation took place on many fronts in the Middle East throughout 2021. After years of military engagement and regional brinkmanship, a combination of battlefield fatigue, geopolitical stalemate, the cost of the coronavirus pandemic and a new United States administration intent on reshaping the nature of its military involvement in the Middle East had a noticeable impact on the calculations and behaviour of regional and local powers. However, it was uncertain whether this reduction in violence and tension was sustainable, or whether it could lead to local and regional settlements. The US decision on its future involvement, however, will prove consequential for regional military postures. Between 2020 and 2021, Washington removed one THAAD and four Patriot missile-defence batteries from Saudi Arabia and in July 2021 announced that the US combat mission in Iraq would come to a close by the end of the year (though some US forces would continue to operate in an advisory role; NATO had earlier announced that it was expanding its NATO Mission Iraq). The Biden administration’s Interim National Security Strategic Guidance – issued in March 2021 – said that the US will not engage in ‘forever wars’ and that it would, in the Middle East, ‘right-size our military presence to the level required to disrupt international terrorist networks, deter Iranian aggression, and protect other vital U.S. interests’. The US Global Posture Review was released in late November 2021, but little detail was made public; the Pentagon was required to conduct ‘additional analysis’ on the future US regional posture.

The wars in Syria, Libya and Yemen

Nonetheless, conflict persisted across the broader region. Levels of violence in Yemen remained high during 2021. Soon after taking office, the Biden administration suspended all conflict-related military assistance and arms sales to Saudi Arabia and indicated that it would seek a negotiated end to the conflict. According to analysts, Riyadh itself had been keen to reduce its military involvement after failing to achieve its main goals but was unsure how to do so. Sensing this, during the year the Houthi rebel movement sought to capture the oil-rich and

strategically important city of Marib in central Yemen, the loss of which would be a significant blow to the anti-Houthi front. The vast majority of Saudi air operations took place around Marib in support of the loyalist forces defending it. Reports indicated that Houthi casualties were high, but nonetheless Houthi forces continued attacking in strength, leading some observers to consider that the rebel group may be seeking an outright victory instead of a settlement. In parallel, the Houthis demonstrated increased missile and uninhabited aerial vehicle (UAV) capabilities, conducting dozens of attacks against military and civilian targets on Saudi territory. The deployment of these capabilities showed continuous Iranian material inflows and support, as documented by United Nations and Western reports. The possibility that an attack could cause significant damage and loss of life and escalate into a regional conflict loomed over regional politics, prompting Saudi Arabia to seek upgrades to its air defences and to enter talks with Tehran. Fighting persisted in Syria but there was no significant change along the key front-lines following intense fighting in late 2019 and early 2020. Russian and Turkish reluctance to engage in direct fighting ensured that regular clashes along the front-lines in Idlib did not escalate, though in some places this picture began to change towards the end of 2021. Regime forces generally focused on consolidating power in former rebel-held areas and on harassing villages in Idlib through artillery and rocket fire. Southern Syria was also the scene of regime pressure. In areas nominally under its control since 2018, but where rebel forces had been given some autonomy under Russian supervision, Iranian expansion and regime brutality stirred tensions during summer 2021, culminating in sieges of towns and the expulsion of fighters and citizens supporting the rebellion. In Deraa, Russia deployed its own forces in early September as part of a plan to halt a government offensive and try to persuade rebel fighters to relocate to the north. An uneasy relationship continued in northeastern Syria between US-supported Kurdish forces, Russian- and Iranian-backed regime units and Turkish forces backed by Syrian proxies. The Islamic

Middle East and North Africa 321

among warring factions. Much hinged on elections scheduled for December 2021, though the possibility that political brinkmanship and breakdown would lead to renewed fighting remained high.

Regional competition drives defence diplomacy and procurement

Regional states demonstrated more involvement out of area, with growing defence cooperation with external states, including participation in military exercises. The Eastern Mediterranean is a particular area of focus, having gained renewed strategic importance as Turkey competes against an informal and powerful grouping comprising Cyprus, Egypt, France, Greece, Israel and the UAE. Rooted in historical conflicts and territorial claims, this rivalry acquired a geopolitical boost due to the wars in Syria and Libya, the emergence of Russian military power in the arena and important gas and oil finds in the region. Throughout 2020 and 2021, Turkey made maritime claims as part of its ‘blue homeland’ vision, an expansionist definition of its maritime domain that includes waters under Cypriot and Greek control. To sustain these claims, Turkey reached an agreement with the Libyan government and dispatched exploration and military vessels in contested areas. This led to several incidents, including a disagreement between France and Turkey over suspected shipments of weapons to Libya and other incidents with a NATO naval mission. In response, Cyprus, France, Greece, Israel and the UAE increased diplomatic coordination and took part in the Iniochos air exercise in April. (Meanwhile, France and Greece agreed a strategic defence partnership that includes the purchase of naval vessels.) Both the UAE and Saudi Arabia have also dispatched combat aircraft to Greece to take part in exercises, while Greece sent a Patriot air-defence battery to Saudi Arabia for installation-protection duties. Russia was another power demonstrating its regional military reach, as it continued to consolidate its presence in Syria. In May, Moscow deployed nuclear-capable Tu-22M3 Backfire C bomber aircraft at its Hmeimim air base, though the visit – and the maritime strike exercises the aircraft were reported as undertaking – could also have been timed to match the transit through the Eastern Mediterranean of the UK’s Carrier Strike Group. The Abraham Accords, which normalised relations between Israel, Bahrain and the UAE,

Middle East and North Africa

State (also known as ISIS or ISIL) jihadi organisation remained subdued, conducting insurgent operations across eastern and central Syria. A lack of resources meant that the Syrian Arab Army was still understaffed and underequipped, with reports of low morale. Military reform proceeded slowly and inconclusively, impeded by limited resources, the proliferation of militias, competition among security services and divergence between Iran and Russia. Moscow sought to promote leadership changes in the general staff and to empower loyal units, including the 5th Corps, which includes some former rebels, but its attempts were often countered by factions supported by Iran, most notably the Republican Guard and the 4th Division. There were similar divisions in the intelligence services: Military Intelligence, aligned with Russia, and Air Force Intelligence, backed by Iran, competed for influence, notably in southern Syria and around Damascus. Foreign forces remained militarily active, though at a significantly lower tempo. US troops, numbering fewer than 1,000, focused on defeating ISIS, while Russia, which still maintained several thousand troops and advanced weapons systems, conducted operations in support of the Syrian regime. The Turkish Armed Forces relied on proxy forces to control territory in northern Syria but refrained from launching major operations against the Kurdish militia, which managed to consolidate its authority in eastern Syria. Israel and Iran were locked in a confrontation in which Israel conducted regular aerial attacks at night against the latter’s forces and weapons shipments. In Libya, a military stalemate emerged after eastern warlord Khalifa Haftar’s campaign to seize the capital, supported by Russia, Egypt and the United Arab Emirates (UAE), was beaten back in 2020 by his Tripoli-based, Turkey-backed rivals. This led to a UN-mediated, Western-supported political process that reduced violence considerably across the country throughout 2021. An internal agreement stipulated the departure of all foreign forces, but Libya remained an arena for competition. The deployment of advanced weapons systems that was observed in 2019 and 2020 mostly stopped, but Turkish and Russian forces maintained a presence in the country, while reports persist of the presence of mercenaries and personnel from private military companies. Another objective was security-sector reform and the integration of militias into a national force, but there was little movement on this, highlighting continuing mistrust

322 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2022

presaged increased security and defence cooperation and appeared to unlock important arms deals. The most significant was the signing in January of letters of agreement concerning a proposed UAE purchase of F-35A Lightning II combat aircraft, MQ-9B Sky Guardian UAVs and advanced missiles from the US, a deal with a potential value of USD23.27 billion. Despite some opposition in the US Congress, both the Trump and Biden administrations endorsed this sale perhaps in part to reward the UAE for its opening to Israel and in part to solidify their relations. Even then, questions were raised about whether the provision of such weaponry would erode the US commitment to maintain Israel’s Qualitative Military Edge. Other critics worried that the UAE’s growing relations with Russia and especially China would expose sensitive US technology to its geopolitical rivals and there were reports that the US was asking the UAE to remove Huawei equipment in advance of any sale. Nonetheless, the UAE and Saudi Arabia remained interested in deepening defence relations with both: there have been reports of contacts between Russia and the UAE concerning an unnamed combat-aircraft project, while both countries have

previously purchased Chinese systems, including missiles and UAVs (Saudi Arabia’s rocket force is principally based around Chinese systems). Air power remains a procurement focus in, for instance, the Arabian Peninsula, Egypt and Morocco, notably combat aircraft and rotary-wing modernisation. Examples include the significant order for 80 Rafale combat aircraft from France announced by the UAE in December, with an estimated value of around USD19bn, the order by the UAE for 10 AH-64E Apache attack helicopters and an upgrade package for 26 more, and Morocco’s Foreign Military Sales (FMS) contract for 24 AH-64E Apaches in 2020. Interest in boosting regional maritime-security capacities is also growing. In September 2021, Bahrain agreed to partner with US Naval Forces Central Command (NAVCENT) to accelerate the integration of new unmanned systems into regional maritime operations. Between 2018 and 2020, Saudi Arabia placed orders for five Avante 2200 frigates from Spain, 39 HSI-32 patrol craft from France and four Multi-Mission Surface Combatant frigates from the US. In 2019, the UAE signed a deal for two Gowind 2500 frigates from France while the German Bundestag approved the sale of three

Lebanon Lebanon’s deteriorating economic situation and political paralysis have placed considerable pressure on an already strained Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF). With the government increasingly deprived of resources and legitimacy and facing street protests, road closures, attacks on state infrastructure and symbols, and interpartisan scuffles, it has increasingly relied on the LAF for a variety of internal-security missions. Internal tasks like these have always been a prime role for the LAF, and the force has intervened across the country to defuse tensions and tackle local armed groups (including Islamist, Palestinian and criminal groups). Small units were dispatched across the country to defuse tensions and secure banks, bakeries and gas stations, and to deliver aid and identify traffickers. The latter task assumed greater urgency after 2020, with growing public pressure to reduce the approximately 30% of Lebanon’s subsidised gasoline that was being smuggled to Syria. The economic crisis in Lebanon began in earnest in 2019 and the country’s debt levels reached 174% of GDP by the end of 2020. A liquidity crisis ensued when banks, having placed client deposits into the Central Bank (which in turn loaned it to an insolvent state), severely limited access to deposits. The IMF estimates that real GDP contracted by

7.28% in 2019 and 25.0% in 2020 as economic problems were compounded by lack of economic reform, donor fatigue and the significant financial costs of the port explosion in Beirut on 4 August 2020. Debt repayments, suspended in 2020, had grown to account for one-third of Lebanon’s annual budget, creating pressure on other areas of spending. The defence budget was significantly affected as a result, with knock-on effects in terms of reduced equipment investment and operational spending, lower readiness and lower morale. The defence budget was an estimated LBP2897bn (USD0.62bn) in 2020 with no details available for 2021 at the time of writing. In real terms, the 2020 budget was 37.9% lower than 2019 levels. Paid in Lebanese pounds, salaries for all public employees, including members of the military and security forces, have suffered as the currency has lost more than 90% of its value against the dollar since 2019. Rations, benefits and pensions are all reported to have been reduced. Fears were expressed that soldiers might seek additional employment or take leave to take on other jobs. In response, some politicians proposed augmenting military pay, but the proposal was shelved after an outcry over perceived unfairness, as well as inflationary risks. In March 2021, LAF Commander General Joseph Aoun gave an unprecedented public speech to an audience of

MEKO A200 frigates to Egypt. (At least one of the frigates and 18 of the HSI-32 patrol craft will be built in Egypt and Saudi Arabia respectively.) Egypt’s naval capabilities continue to grow. In 2021 it inaugurated a new naval base at Ras Gargoub close to the Libyan border, commissioned its fourth Type209/1400 submarine, commissioned the second FREMM frigate built by Italy’s Fincantieri while in October it was announced that Egypt would buy the UK’s two decommissioned Fort Rosalie-class logistics ships. Iran showed no sign of rushing to sign arms deals, despite the expiry in October 2020 of a UN arms embargo that prevented it from importing modern weapons systems. This reflected cautious decision-making and a parlous financial situation in Tehran as well as lingering concerns in Moscow and Beijing about Iran’s behaviour. Tehran may in time look to modernise its air force, acquire missile systems and deploy modern armour. Iran’s prowess in deploying missiles and UAVs, its reliance on asymmetric capabilities and its maritime harassment have provided Tehran with adequate defence. The maritime harassment has persisted, with attacks on commercial vessels evident since 2019, and has been

seen as part of a confrontation between Iran and Israel. Targets have included Iranian tankers carrying oil destined for Syria, an Iranian ship off the coast of Yemen that was a base for the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, and merchant ships belonging to or linked to Israelis. At the end of July, the attack on the MV Mercer Street, a ship managed by a UK company owned by an Israeli, was an escalation, carried out using a UAV apparently originating from Iran. An embargo on the import of missile technology remained in place, though Iran has developed indigenous research-and-development (R&D) and production capabilities that limit the effect of this restriction. Tehran has developed several land-attack cruise missiles (LACMs), including the system known in the Houthi inventory as the Quds-1 and Quds-2. The first version is a 700 kilometre-range groundlaunched system, with the second possibly providing around a 30% range extension. The Quds has not been seen in Iranian service but is likely to be deployed. Furthermore, a variant of the Meshkat, Soumar, Hoveizeh development line of larger ground-launched LACMs may be being introduced into service. Iran remains the only regional state known to operate

officers in which he described the dire state of the LAF. Putting the responsibility on the political class, he asked ‘What do you plan to do? We have warned more than once of the danger of the situation.’ He also warned that the LAF could soon no longer be able to fulfil all its missions. Fearing that the LAF would weaken and potentially lose cohesion, external funders, notably the US, the UK, France and key Arab states, began to adjust their support, prioritising food donations, medical assistance, fuel, equipment and spare parts. For instance, in July Qatar pledged to provide 70 tonnes of food per month, while France and Italy also pledged food support. Such support often came as part of a broader UN-coordinated assistance plan. Aoun defended international assistance against domestic criticism of foreign interference, stressing that ‘were it not for such assistance, the situation would have been far worse’. Washington was keen to highlight its ongoing cooperation and trust in the LAF by holding joint exercises and increasing its annual support to USD120m. It also donated three refurbished Huey helicopters and six MD530F+ helicopters. China made its first large-scale donation in 2021, of some 100 trucks and light vehicles. Counter-terrorism and border security continued to be the primary interests of Western partner states. Additionally,

supporting the LAF is increasingly seen as important in tackling migration and refugee flows from Lebanon into Cyprus and the European Union. Such support continued despite US congressional criticism of the LAF for its inability to restrain Hizbullah. At an international conference convened by France in June 2021 to coordinate foreign aid and raise funds to support the LAF, Aoun reiterated his alarming assessment, saying: ‘The situation is critical. If unmitigated, the economic and financial crisis will inevitably lead to the collapse of all state institutions including the LAF.’ According to press and civil-society reports, there has been some erosion of the LAF’s image, with the force increasingly blamed for defending a political class deemed corrupt and inept by the reformist movement, and for using harsh tactics and military courts against protesters and critics. Its long-standing inability to restrain Hizbullah has angered local parties and damaged state sovereignty. The investigation into the August 2020 port explosion in Beirut was seen as highlighting a deficient response on the part of the upper echelon of the armed and security forces. A former LAF commander, as well as former and serving security chiefs, were called for questioning by the investigative judge but benefited from political protection and in some cases legal immunity.

Middle East and North Africa

Middle East and North Africa 323

324 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2022

ground-launched LACMs. Elsewhere, the trend has been to acquire air-launched systems most often as part of combat-aircraft procurement, with the European SCALP EG/Storm Shadow bought by several Gulf states.

DEFENCE ECONOMICS Macroeconomics

The 2014–16 collapse in oil prices, and low prices since then, meant that fiscal conditions were already constrained in the region when the economic impact of the coronavirus pandemic became apparent in 2020. Regional real GDP contracted by 3.8% in 2020 and the World Bank estimated that cumulative GDP losses by the end of 2021 will have reached USD227 billion. However, the regional rate masks important national variations. For instance, in 2020, countries like Iraq, Lebanon and Libya experienced double-digit reductions in real GDP, and most oil exporters in the Gulf faced contractions of 5–8%. Israel’s, Jordan’s and Qatar’s real GDP reductions were much milder (2–3%) while Egypt, a net

importer of oil, experienced real GDP growth of 3.8% in 2020. Iran’s economy also grew in 2020 as the loss in output from the pandemic was less pronounced than in other countries because the economy had already contracted by 6.0% in both 2018 and 2019. There has been a modest recovery, but with regional real GDP growth reaching just 2.2% in 2021, it will take until at least 2022 for the region to return to pre-pandemic (i.e., 2019) levels of output, with this taking even longer for some countries. Like the economic impact of the pandemic, the economic outlook varies depending on the COVID-19 infection rates, vaccine programmes, fiscal profiles and economic fundamentals of each country, and not least on their exposure to commodities, tourism and contact-intensive sectors such as hospitality. Countries that implemented widespread vaccination programmes relatively quickly (the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) states, Morocco and Israel) performed better in 2021, while Algeria, Lebanon and Tunisia, whose vaccine roll-outs were slower because of financial constraints or supply issues, will struggle to return to pre-pandemic levels

▼ Map 5 Middle East and North Africa: regional defence spending1

Lebanon Tunisia

Israel^ Jordan

Morocco Algeria

Syria

Iraq*

Iran* Kuwait

Libya

Bahrain Egypt

Saudi Arabia*

Mauritania

Qatar UAE Oman

Yemen 2021 Defence Spending (USDbn) 46.67 20 15 10 5 1 0.5 Estimate

* Security expenditure removed from defence budget figure [1] Map illustrating 2021 planned defence-spending levels (in USD at market exchange rates), as well as the annual real percentage change in planned defence spending between 2020 and 2021 (at constant 2015 prices and exchange rates). Percentage changes in defence spending can vary considerably from year to year, as states revise the level of funding allocated to defence. Changes indicated here highlight the short-term trend in planned defence spending between 2020 and 2021. Actual spending changes prior to 2020, and projected spending levels post-2021, are not reflected.

Middle East and North Africa 325 Other North Africa, 0.9%

Algeria, 5.3%

Saudi Arabia 27.2%

Other Levant 1.7% Israel 13.8% Bahrain 0.8% Qatar, 3.7%

United Arab Emirates, 14.6%

Oman, 3.8% Kuwait, 4.3% Iraq, 5.6%

Iran, 11.2%

Note: Analysis excludes Libya, Palestinian Authority, Syrian Arab Republic and Yemen.

▲ Figure 21 Middle East and North Africa: defence spending by country and sub-region, 2021

of output, in real terms, before 2023. Moreover, political instability and conflict in Libya, Syria and Yemen is stalling vaccine roll-out programmes and compounding the economic challenges brought by the pandemic. There are, however, signs that some regional players, including Morocco and the UAE, are acting to improve the vaccine roll-out in countries that are further behind. On a per capita basis, GDP levels are estimated to have declined by 5.3% in 2020 with growth of just 0.6% in 2021, which will exacerbate regional inequality. The World Bank has indicated that the economic impact of the pandemic may increase the number of people in the region living in poverty to 192 million, up from 176m in 2019. Unprecedented levels of fiscal support were implemented to mitigate the financial impact of the pandemic, but while this has alleviated some of the impact on economic growth, it has come at a cost to fiscal balance sheets. Fiscal deficits extended significantly in countries like Bahrain, Iraq, Kuwait, Oman and Saudi Arabia. Even though Qatar maintained a fiscal surplus in 2020, this fell considerably from 4.9% to 1.3% of GDP. The recovery in the oil price has eased some of the pressure on government finances, particularly in GCC states. The price of Brent Crude fell to USD18 a barrel in April 2020 and stabilised at USD65–75 a barrel in the second half of 2021. The US Energy Information Administration projects that the oil price will average USD72 a barrel over 2021 and be maintained at this level in 2022, a level sufficient

to balance the budgets of several countries in the region. Meanwhile, government debt levels rose from an average of 64.2% of GDP in 2019 to 73.8% in 2020. While most countries in the region will manage to reduce deficit and debt levels over time, the IMF predicts that Algeria’s debt levels will continue to increase as a percentage of GDP until at least 2026 as the deficit is projected to persist at levels above 6% of GDP in the short term.

Defence economics

These economic challenges will influence the trajectory of regional defence budgets, as will uncertainty over the pace of economic recovery. Fiscal pressures and the potential for a shift in public-spending priorities towards social and healthcare sectors, where the pandemic highlighted vulnerabilities, create challenges for defence-spending growth. Regional defence spending, already under pressure before the pandemic, declined in real terms for the fourth consecutive year in 2021. In nominal terms, regional spending has been relatively stable since 2017, hovering around USD170bn – including Foreign Military Financing allocations from the US. However, with rates of inflation averaging 6.9% annually (and in some countries exceeding 30%), realterms reductions are sizeable, with cuts averaging 3.6% annually in the four years to 2021. Despite a gradual recovery in oil prices in 2021, constraints on government spending remained in place, with defence spending again coming under pressure in several countries. In Saudi Arabia, the defence budget was cut in 2021 for a fourth successive year. The 2021 defence budget is 21.9% lower than the 2017 allocation in nominal terms. In real terms, spending (in constant 2015 US dollars) has fallen from USD59.0bn four years ago to USD43.0bn in 2021 – a 27.1% real reduction. Furthermore, the Saudi Ministry of Finance’s 2022 pre-budget statement, released in September 2021, outlined plans to further reduce overall state spending in the next three years, suggesting that there will be little respite from the challenging budgetary environment in the medium term. Fiscal restrictions may ease if the oil price stabilises in 2022 at a level closer to that needed to balance the budget – indeed Saudi Arabia’s fiscal breakeven oil price has fallen from USD89 a barrel in 2018 to USD76 a barrel in 2021 according to the IMF. In Oman, constraints on spending remained firmly in place as the country attempted to bring its

Middle East and North Africa

Egypt, 3.6% Morocco, 3.7%

326 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2022 6 5

4.98

4.80

4.99 4.46

4.45

2018

2019

4.10

% of GDP

4 3 2 1 0

2016

2017

2020

2021

▲ Figure 22 Middle East and North Africa: defence spending as % of GDP (average)

large budget deficit under control. State spending on defence declined by a further 14.1% in 2021 and is now some 23.8% below its 2015 peak in nominal terms. Nevertheless, with the IMF announcing in October that it expected Muscat’s fiscal balance to improve from -18.7% of GDP in 2020 to just -2.6% in 2021, and to move into surplus the following year, the worst of the country’s recent fiscal challenges may now be over. Unlike its neighbours, Kuwait increased the Ministry of Defence budget by 37.0% in real terms in 2021, with spending reaching USD9.63bn compared to USD6.82bn in 2020. The reason for the uplift remains unclear, though it may be linked to initial deliveries of the 28 Eurofighter Typhoon combat aircraft that were contracted in April 2016. Deliveries were due to take place between 2020 and 2023 but were delayed by the pandemic. The group of Kuwaiti Typhoon pilots began their Operational Conversion Unit training course with the Italian Air Force in January 2020. Despite a sizeable fiscal deficit, which extended to 8.3% of GDP in 2020, Kuwait entered the pandemic with relatively low levels of government debt (11.6% of GDP compared to the GCC average of 64.2% in 2019) and so has more headroom with which to increase borrowing in the short term. Furthermore, potential orders including for AH-64E Apache attack helicopters from the US may make it harder to reduce defence spending. Meanwhile defence budgets of the oil-importing countries in North Africa continued their upward trajectory. Egypt’s defence budget has shown consistent growth in real terms in recent years, averaging 4.6% annually since 2019 as the country continues to fund naval- and air-modernisation programmes. Budget increases in Tunisia have been sufficient to

counter inflation rates in excess of 6%, with the 2020 and 2021 budget remaining steady at USD1.2bn. Moroccan spending also continued to strengthen, with a 2.5% real increase in 2021 following the significant 20.9% jump in 2020. The uplift comes amid continuing tensions with Algeria and the country funds an ambitious procurement programme that included 24 Boeing AH-64E Apache Guardian attack helicopters and a new ground-based air defence system. Morocco’s defence budget came to USD6.35bn in 2021, comparable to levels in Oman and Qatar but still some way behind Algeria’s budget of USD9.04bn. Algeria’s defence budget, meanwhile, has stagnated in recent years as the oil price faltered.

Defence industry

Domestic production capabilities and ambitions vary across the region. Israel’s defence industry is well established, with capabilities shaped by the country’s strategic concerns and close partnership with the US. These include light weapons, missile-detection systems and the uninhabited-systems field, from development to manufacture. Saudi Arabia, Qatar and the UAE have all embarked on development programmes aimed at bolstering indigenous industry and strategic autonomy while countries with smaller budgets are almost entirely reliant on imports to fulfil capability requirements. Saudi Arabia’s Vision 2030 development plan, released in 2016, set a target to increase the proportion of defence procurement sourced domestically from 2% of the total to 50% by the end of the period. Progress on this localisation effort is evident including in relation to armoured vehicles and munitions. The General Authority for Military Industries (GAMI), established in 2017 to facilitate the goals of Vision 2030, stated in August 2021 that the localisation rate had increased to 8% when it launched the Military Industry Marketplace (MIM), intended to increase the visibility of procurement contracts open to the domestic supply chain. The UAE has moved to consolidate defenceindustrial enterprises in recent years, culminating in the formation of EDGE in November 2019, which has brought together more than 25 assets under one entity and now has revenues of USD5bn. As the country focused on developing high-technology sectors, domestic capabilities have emerged in autonomous systems and guided munitions beyond those already established in relation to naval construction and wheeled land systems.

ISRAEL Domestic challenges, including from the coronavirus pandemic and a long political stalemate, arguably preoccupied Israel more than security threats during 2021. The most important event of the year was Benjamin Netanyahu’s ousting as prime minister, after more than 12 consecutive years in office. The appointment of Naftali Bennett as prime minister, on 13 June, had immediate strategic implications. Israel’s relationship with the Biden administration quickly improved, though some Israeli analysts speculated that this may lead some of Israel’s opponents to challenge the new government, led by a young premier and relying on a slender political margin. Instability persisted in the south as well as the north, with a 12-day military operation (Guardian of the Walls) in Gaza in May. There had also been, at the time of writing, six episodes of rocket fire from Lebanon, and Israeli artillery fire in response, and a further two from across the Syrian border. Meanwhile, Israel continued its campaign against Iranian military interests in the region, which included dozens of airstrikes, mostly in Syria. There were also reports of incidents of sabotage at Iranian nuclear sites, as well as the reported attacks on each other’s maritime traffic in the Red Sea and the Persian Gulf

Gaza

The latest escalation of violence between Israel and Hamas was the worst since the fighting during the 2014 Operation Protective Edge. The immediate trigger for the May 2021 conflict came when Hamas launched six rockets from Gaza into the Jerusalem area and Israel retaliated with heavy airstrikes. The Palestinian justification for the rockets had been the growing tensions around the Temple Mount in East Jerusalem, which for days involved violent clashes between Israeli police and Muslim worshippers. While the fighting did not lead to an Israeli ground incursion into the Gaza Strip, over 250 Palestinians and 12 Israelis died during hostilities, most of them civilians. In the year to September 2021, Hamas and other Palestinian organisations launched over 5,000 rockets into Israel, according to Israeli security analysts. Israeli Iron Dome batteries reportedly intercepted about 90% of the rockets that were projected to land in populated areas. The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) also managed to thwart Palestinian attacks using UAVs, tunnels and frogmen. Meanwhile,

the Israeli Air Force (IAF) destroyed some Hamas tunnels and assassinated some of the organisation’s senior operatives. However, a plan to destroy a significant part of Hamas’s underground tunnel project (apparently nicknamed ‘The Metro’ by the IDF) was initiated prematurely which led to few Hamas casualties. Media reports asserted that Israel indicated, in advance media releases, that a ground assault was likely in the hope that Hamas personnel would then use the tunnels to deploy to their assigned positions. Hamas proved its durability under significant military pressure from Israel and has enjoyed growing popularity in the West Bank, East Jerusalem and among Arab citizens of Israel, thousands of which were involved in riots during the May operation in Gaza. The same month also saw violence by JewishIsraelis directed against Palestinians. The communal unrest raised worries, according to some Israeli analysts, about the ability of Jews and Arabs to coexist inside the 1967 borders. This is causing concern among the Israeli leadership. It is also alarmed by mistakes in intelligence analysis, which meant that the latest Hamas moves were not anticipated. The lack of information on Hamas’s rocket arsenal within IDF intelligence has also raised concerns and there remain doubts about the army’s willingness (or indeed capability) to carry out large-scale ground manoeuvres inside adversary territory. The army’s and the politicians’ hesitance to deploy ground forces likely also stems from a reduced willingness among the Israeli public to accept military casualties.

Syria and Iran

From the perspective of Israeli security analysts, the situation in Syria has changed little in the last year. Relations between Syria, Russia and Iran remain strained, and Israel is using this space to continue airstrikes, mostly aimed at Iranian targets in Syria. These targets include convoys smuggling weapons to Hizbullah in Lebanon, as well as pro-Iranian militia bases. Although Syrian anti-aircraft batteries have consistently targeted Israeli aircraft, they have not succeeded in hitting one since an Israeli F-16 was shot down in February 2018. Moreover, Israeli analysts understand that despite public commitments, Moscow has not delivered the relatively more modern S-300 batteries into Syrian hands, the implication being that those in-country are operated by Russian personnel. Israel also periodically attacks small Hizbullah positions near the Syrian border in

Middle East and North Africa

Middle East and North Africa 327

328 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2022

the Golan Heights. The Hizbullah fighters arrived there in late 2018, ignoring a Russian commitment to Israel to keep Iranian and allied formations at least 50 miles from the Israeli border. Israel remains particularly concerned by Iran’s continued nuclear ambitions. While Israel has recommended that the US should not return to the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA – the Iran nuclear deal) – the IDF chief of staff said as much in January 2021 – Israeli officials are aware that if the Iranian leadership announces its willingness to renew the agreement, it is possible that the US would sign on. If the JCPOA is rekindled, Israel may ask the US for some form of compensation, both in further financial military assistance and in strengthened intelligence and security ties. It may also decide to continue its sabotage campaign against Iranian nuclear and ballistic-missile sites, though in a less transparent way. Senior Israeli officials believe it is necessary to improve the country’s capabilities to unilaterally mount an attack on Iran. This is seen as an important effort in case it appears that Iran has breached its new commitments in a future agreement.

The Abraham Accords

A year after the signing of the Abraham Accords between Israel, the UAE and Bahrain, normalisation with the Gulf states appears to be one of Netanyahu’s most significant foreign-policy achievements. Israel has also upgraded its relationships with Morocco and Sudan but made less progress in attempts to improve the relationship with Saudi Arabia. Normalisation in the Gulf includes improved intelligence ties, cyber-warfare and other technology deals. However, military ties are another matter, and Israeli analysts understand that regional states’ dealings with Israel in this area may be limited by concern over possible Iranian retaliation. Nonetheless, in late 2020 there was discussion in the press about whether there could be future cooperation over regional missile defence, possibly including radars and interceptor capabilities, while late 2021 saw Israeli naval personnel take part in a maritime security exercise, in the Red Sea, with naval personnel from Bahrain, the UAE and the US. More broadly, international military cooperation increased in 2021 having been limited in 2020 because of the pandemic. In July, the IAF hosted exercise Blue Guardian, involving UAV teams from Israel, France, Germany, Italy, the UK and the US. In March, the IAF held an exercise with US F-35s in Israel.

The United States

Israel under Netanyahu enjoyed a close relationship with the Trump administration, which changed somewhat under Biden; for instance, the new US administration applied pressure on Israel to end the fighting in Gaza in May. In August, Bennett visited Washington, where Biden reaffirmed the ‘historic partnership’ between the US and Israel and conveyed his ‘ironclad support’ for Israel’s security. In September 2021, the US moved the responsibility for military contacts with Israel from US European Command (EUCOM) to Central Command (CENTCOM). The US had resisted doing so for some years, fearing that such a move would have a negative effect on its relationships with Arab states.The Biden administration is still considering an Israeli request for an extra USD1bn to cover expenses on both air-force munitions and Iron Dome interceptors during the last operation in Gaza. Meanwhile, US concern about Israel’s relationship with China has grown under the Biden administration, and the US has increased pressure on Israel in this regard. Washington has expressed opposition to Beijing’s involvement in bids for major infrastructure projects in Israel.

The multi-year plan

For more than two years, IDF Chief of the General Staff Lt-Gen. Aviv Kochavi watched as his five-year plan for the army, Tnufa, was delayed because of political turmoil and various governments’ failure to pass a budget. Kochavi had to transfer resources within the army budget to compensate, but military officials admitted that this solution was a long way from the original plan and realised only a few of his ambitions. The new budget, approved in August, indicated that Kochavi has managed, against expectations, to secure an increase in defence allocations despite pandemic-related economic challenges. Additionally, the government approved the army’s suggestion for a mechanism that would secure relatively high pensions for senior officers and cancelled a plan to shorten mandatory military service for men by two more months (to 30 months). Kochavi has only slightly more than one year of his term remaining to advance some of his ambitious plans for the IDF. Tnufa advocates a significant upgrade of the army’s aerial, intelligence and technological capabilities, with an emphasis on stand-off capabilities. More funds may be available, but the risk remains that the plans could be derailed by an unanticipated crisis.

Middle East and North Africa 329

Arms procurements and deliveries – Middle East and North Africa Significant events in 2021

FEBRUARY

UAE–UKRAINE COOPERATION

A trilateral collaboration agreement was signed in Abu Dhabi between three state-owned defence companies: the United Arab Emirates (UAE)’s EDGE and Ukraine’s UkrOboronProm and Ukrspecexport. Although specific details were not disclosed, the companies stated that investments could reach USD1bn. This is not the first instance of defence-industrial cooperation between the two countries. In August 2017, they announced that they would explore the potential for collaboration on precisionguided weapons, UAVs and SIGINT equipment, as well as the production of Antonov transport aircraft for the UAE Air Force. Although little seems to have so far resulted from the 2017 agreement, earlier efforts in 2015, between Ukraine’s KrAZ and UAE’s Streit Group, did lead to the production of a small number of Shrek MRAP vehicles for Ukraine’s National Guard.

FEBRUARY

SAUDI ARABIA PROCUREMENT REFORM

APRIL

ELBIT SYSTEMS ACQUISITIONS

Elbit Systems completed the acquisition of Florida-based air-launched sonobuoy producer Sparton Corporation for USD380m. This adds to Elbit’s products in the maritime sector, which currently includes uninhabited surface vessels, combat-management systems and uninhabited air vehicles, including the Hermes 900, which can be configured for maritime patrol. Earlier in the month, Elbit completed the USD31m acquisition of BAE Systems’ Jerusalem-based subsidiary Rokar International. Rokar manufactures guidance systems for artillery ammunition, including the Silver Bullet guidance kit that lost out in an Israeli Army competition in 2017 to Israel Aerospace Industries (IAI). Elbit Systems manufactures the wheeled ATMOS 2000 howitzer, which has so far been exported to five countries.

APRIL

BAHRAIN LAUNCHES OFFSET POLICY

Bahrain published a new offset policy, the Bahrain Defence Force Economic Program (BDFEP). The new policy sets out a USD7m minimum threshold above which a defence deal has to include offsets amounting to 60% of the total contract value. To promote the ‘made in Kingdom of Bahrain’ goal, the BDFEP offers various bonus schemes depending on the position that the local supply chain occupies in each project, the number of highly skilled local workers employed and the complexity of each contract (based on the parameters of system design and integration, testing and final assembly services). While BDFEP seeks primarily to attract investment in the aerospace sector, the policy also indicates a desire to work on relatively new technologies such as big data, artificial intelligence and quantum computing.

SEPTEMBER

MOROCCO’S EQUIPMENT MODERNISATION

Morocco reportedly received the first of 13 Bayraktar TB2 armed UAVs that were ordered from Turkey in April 2021. The end of a ceasefire with the Polisario Front in late 2020, as well as a desire to diversify weapons suppliers, has led to a series of significant contracts in the last two years. In January 2021, a contract was signed with Spain’s Navantia to deliver an offshore patrol ship in 2024. In August 2020, a contract was signed with Lockheed Martin to supply 24 F-16V Fighting Falcon fighter aircraft by December 2026, while a contract was signed with Boeing for 24 AH-64E Apaches in June 2020. These helicopters will arrive from 2024. In 2019, the US government approved the upgrade of Morocco’s current fleet of F-16s, although it is unclear whether this will proceed in the wake of the contract for new aircraft.

Middle East and North Africa

Saudi Arabia announced that, from 2024 onwards, it would no longer award contracts to foreign companies that have no Saudi-based regional headquarters. This is reflected in Saudi Arabia’s plan to improve its domestic defence sector, within the context of the Kingdom’s Vision 2030 plan, launched in April 2016, which aims to localise 50% of Saudi Arabian defence spending by 2030. In February, Saudi Arabian Military Industries (SAMI) signed an agreement with Lockheed Martin to establish a joint venture. The new company will facilitate technology-and-knowledge transfer and SAMI will hold a 51% stake. SAMI also signed a memorandum of understanding (MoU) with EDGE, the UAE’s state-owned defence conglomerate, to collaborate on manufacturing NIMR’s Jais 4×4 armoured personnel carriers.

330 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2022

Table 10

Kuwait: defence procurement since 2010

After increasing in the early 2010s, Kuwait’s economic growth slowed in the latter half of that decade. Despite this, low debt levels and favourable fiscal conditions have enabled Kuwait to steadily increase its defence budget (culminating in a 37% real increase in 2021) – allowing it to commit to large-scale procurements from predominantly European and American companies, most significantly the multi-billion-dollar acquisitions of the Eurofighter combat aircraft (from Italy’s final assembly line) and F/A-18E/F Super Hornets from Boeing.

As a result, Kuwait’s combat aircraft inventory will increase from 38 to 56. In the region, only Qatar’s air force is expanding on a proportionally larger scale. Kuwait is also upgrading its Patriot air-defence system, replacing its M1A2 Abrams main battle tanks on a one-for-one basis with the M1A2K variant, and is also buying 30 H225M heavy transport helicopters from France. Deliveries of the latter were delayed due to technical issues with the first two helicopters but the resumption of deliveries after late 2020 indicates a resolution of these issues.

Contract date

Equipment

Type

Quantity Value (USD)

2010

KC-130J Hercules

569.6m

Lockheed Martin

2014

Air Force

c. 2012

Pandur

Tanker/transport aircraft Infantry fighting vehicle

56+

n.k.

2013–14

National Guard

2012

BMP-3M

Infantry fighting vehicle

n.k.

2015

Army

c. 2013

C-17A Globemaster III

Heavy transport aircraft

n.k.

General Dynamics European Land Systems – Steyr Kurganmashzavod (KMZ) Boeing

2014

Air Force

c. 2015

Internal Security Vehicle (ISV)

Protected patrol vehicle

n.k.

Otokar

2016

National Guard

2015

Sherpa Light Scout

Armoured utility vehicle

120

ε119.84m

2016–19

National Guard

2015

Assafar (ADSB Landing craft tank 64m) Abhan (ADSB 42m) Landing craft mechanised ADSB 16m Landing craft vehicles and personnel Sherpa Light Armoured utility vehicle Scout

70.8m

Arquus (formerly Renault Trucks Defense) Abu Dhabi Ship Building Company (ADSB)

2017–18

Navy

2019– ongoing

Army

By 2022*

Air Defence Command

2016

Prime contractor(s)

Deliveries

Service

5 300

Long-range surface- 6 bty to-air missile system upgrade 12 Nuclear, biological and chemical warfare defence vehicles

298.78m

Arquus (formerly Renault Trucks Defense) Raytheon Technologies

523.39m

2016

Patriot configuration 3+

2016

NBC-RS 2

2016

H225M Caracal

Heavy transport helicopter

1.23bn

2016

Eurofighter

Fighter ground-attack 28 aircraft

8.81bn

Leonardo

2020–23*

Army and National Guard Air Force

2017

M1A2K Abrams

Main battle tank

n.k.

2021–22*

Army

2018

F/A-18E Super Hornet F/A-18F Super Hornet

Fighter ground-attack 22 aircraft

General Dynamics Land Systems Boeing

2021–n.k.

Air Force

*Planned; M – multinational

218

n.k.

5.2bn

Rheinmetall MAN Military Vehicles (RMMW) Airbus

c. 2017–18 Army

2020– ongoing

Israel: UAV exports to armed forces since 2000

Ecuador

Chile

Hn S

Colombia

Mexico

Canada

Hs A

Brazil Hn Hs Hs

Switzerland

Turkey

Georgia

Middle East and North Africa

B Hn Hs

Leased Licensed production

Heron Hermes Searcher Aerostar Blue Horizon

Singapore

Sri Lanka

Hn S

Hn Hs A

India

Azerbaijan

Russia

Australia

Indonesia

Thailand

Philippines

Hs B

South Korea

the privately owned Elbit Systems. The former produces the large Heron series of UAVs as well as the medium-weight Searcher family. Elbit has widely exported the Hermes 450/900 UAVs. While most exports are entirely built and assembled in Israel, both the UK and Russia have set up local final assembly facilities for the Watchkeeper (a modification of the Hermes 450) and the Forpost (a variant of the Searcher MkII) respectively, with both aircraft built in enough quantities to make this investment economically viable.

Selected Israeli Medium and Heavy UAVs and manufacturers Heron – Israel Hermes 450/900 – Aerospace Industries Elbit Systems

Zambia

Nigeria

Spain Hn

France

Morocco

United Kingdom

Germany

Israel reportedly first began operating uninhabited aerial vehicles (UAVs) in the 1973 Yom Kippur War, in the form of Firebee UAVs imported from the United States. It was not until the late 1970s that Israel’s armed forces began operating locally developed and built systems; it began exporting UAVs around the same time. Since 2000, Israel has established itself as the world’s most prominent exporter of military UAVs, although today it faces a growing number of competitors, such as China and Turkey. Israel’s two principal UAV manufacturers are the state-owned Israel Aerospace Industries (IAI) and

Figure 23

Middle East and North Africa 331

332 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2022

ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE

Algeria ALG Algerian Dinar DZD

2020

2021

GDP

DZD

18.7tr

22.3tr

USD

148bn

164bn

per capita

USD

3,337

3,638

Growth

-4.9

3.4

Inflation

2.4

6.5

Def bdgt

DZD

1.23tr

USD

9.70bn

9.04bn

126.85

136.08

USD1=DZD

2022

Real-terms defence budget trend (USDbn, constant 2015) 11.1

2008

Population

3.58 2021

2015

43,576,691

Age

0–14

15–19

20–24

25–29

30–64 65 plus

Male

15.0%

3.7%

3.4%

4.1%

21.4%

3.0%

Female

14.3%

3.5%

3.2%

3.9%

21.0%

3.4%

Capabilities Algeria’s armed forces are among the most capable and best equipped in North Africa. Their primary roles relate to territorial integrity, internal security and regional stability. The army retains a key political position since its instrumental role in 2019 in ending President Abdelaziz Bouteflika’s two decades in power. Algeria is part of the African Union’s North African Regional Capability Standby Force, hosting the force’s logistics base in Algiers. There are discussions with neighbours about regional security challenges such as counter-terrorism and there is close security cooperation with Tunisia. A November 2020 referendum approved a change to the constitution that allows Algeria to send forces on UN peacekeeping missions. Long-standing tensions with Morocco increased in 2021 and both countries increased the number of soldiers deployed to the border. The conscript-based force exercises regularly, with training appearing to be of a relatively good standard. There is an ongoing attempt to professionalise the armed forces, which was reflected in the reduction of conscription liability from 18 to 12 months in 2014. The armed forces’ logistics capabilities appear sufficient to support internal deployments. The army and air force inventories consist of a core of modern, primarily Russiansourced equipment, though China has also supplied equipment, including self-propelled artillery. Algiers continues to recapitalise its fixed-wing combat-aircraft inventory, and the navy has invested in its submarine and frigate fleet. Local industry and the services are capable of equipment maintenance. Algeria is largely dependent on foreign suppliers for new equipment, but it has in recent years made significant investments towards developing a domestic defence industry. This has led to joint ventures with foreign partners, such as Italy’s Leonardo and Germany’s Rheinmetall.

ACTIVE 139,000 (Army 110,000 Navy 15,000 Air 14,000) Gendarmerie & Paramilitary 187,200 Conscript liability 12 months

RESERVE 150,000 (Army 150,000) to age 50

Army 35,000; 75,000 conscript (total 110,000) FORCES BY ROLE 6 Mil Regions MANOEUVRE Armoured 2 (1st & 8th) armd div (3 tk regt; 1 mech regt, 1 arty gp) 2 indep armd bde Mechanised 2 (12th & 40th) mech div (1 tk regt; 3 mech regt, 1 arty gp) 4 indep mech bde Light 1 indep mot bde Air Manoeuvre 1 AB div (4 para regt; 1 SF regt) COMBAT SUPPORT 2 arty bn 1 AT regt 4 engr bn AIR DEFENCE 7 AD bn EQUIPMENT BY TYPE ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES MBT 1,495: 270 T-55AMV; 300 T-62; 325 T-72M1/M1M; 600+ T-90SA RECCE 134: 44 AML-60; 26 BRDM-2; 64 BRDM-2M with 9M133 Kornet (RS-AT-14 Spriggan) IFV 980: ε220 BMP-2; 760 BMP-2M with 9M133 Kornet (RS-AT-14 Spriggan) APC 1,107+ APC (T) VP-6 APC (W) 1,105: 250 BTR-60; 150 BTR-80; 150 OT-64; 55 M3 Panhard; ε400 Fuchs 2; 100 Fahd PPV 2+: 2 Marauder; some Maxxpro AUV Nimr Ajban; Nimr Ajban LRSOV ENGINEERING & MAINTENANCE VEHICLES AEV IMR-2 ARV BREM-1 VLB MTU-20 MW M58 MICLIC ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE SP 31+: 28 9P163-3 Kornet-EM (RS-AT-14 Spriggan); 3+ BMPT-72 MSL • MANPATS 9K11 Malyutka (RS-AT-3 Sagger); 9K111 Fagot (RS-AT-4 Spigot); 9K111-1 Konkurs (RS-AT-5 Spandrel); 9K115-2 Metis-M1 (RS-AT-13); 9K135 Kornet-E (RS-AT-14 Spriggan); Luch Skif; Milan RCL 180: 82mm 120 B-10; 107mm 60 B-11 GUNS 100mm 10 T-12 ARTILLERY 1,127 SP 224: 122mm 140 2S1 Gvozdika; 152mm 30 2S3 Akatsiya; 155mm ε54 PLZ-45 TOWED 393: 122mm 345: 160 D-30 (incl some truck mounted SP); 25 D-74; 100 M-1931/37; 60 M-30; 130mm 10 M-46; 152mm 20 M-1937 (ML-20); 155mm 18 PLL-01 MRL 180: 122mm 48 BM-21 Grad; 140mm 48 BM-14; 220mm 36: 18+ SR5; ε18 TOS-1A; 240mm 30 BM-24; 300mm 18 9A52 Smerch MOR 330+: 82mm 150 M-37; 120mm 120 M-1943; W86; SP 120mm SM4; W86 (SP); 160mm 60 M-1943

Middle East and North Africa 333

Navy ε15,000 EQUIPMENT BY TYPE SUBMARINES • SSK 6: 2 Paltus (FSU Project 877 (Kilo)) with 6 single 533mm TT with TEST-71ME HWT 4 Varshavyanka (RUS Project 636.1 (Improved Kilo)) with 6 single 533mm TT with 3M14E Klub-S (RS-SS-N-30B) LACM/3M54E1/E Klub-S (RS-SS-N-27A/B) AShM (Klub-S AShM variant unclear)/TEST-71ME HWT PRINCIPAL SURFACE COMBATANTS • FRIGATES 5 FFGHM 5: 3 Adhafer (C-28A) with 2 quad lnchr with C-802A AShM, 1 octuple lnchr with FM-90 (CH-SA-N-4) SAM, 2 triple 324mm ASTT, 2 Type-730B (H/PJ-12) CIWS, 1 76mm gun (capacity 1 hel) 2 Erradii (MEKO A200AN) with 2 octuple lnchrs with RBS15 Mk3 AShM, 4 8-cell VLS with Umkhonto-IR SAM, 2 twin 324mm TT with MU90 LWT, 1 127mm gun (capacity 1 Super Lynx 300) PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 28 CORVETTES • FS 3 Mourad Rais (FSU Project 1159 (Koni)) with 2 twin 533mm TT, 2 RBU 6000 Smerch 2 A/S mor, 2 twin 76mm gun PCGM 3 Rais Hamidou (FSU Project 1234E (Nanuchka II)) with 4 quad lnchr with 3M24E Uran-E (RS-SS-N-25 Switchblade) AShM, 1 twin lnchr with 4K33 Osa-M (RSSA-N-4 Gecko) SAM, 1 AK630 CIWS, 1 twin 57mm gun PCG 4: 3 Djebel Chenoua with 2 twin lnchr with C-802 (CH-SS-N-6) AShM, 1 AK630 CIWS, 1 76mm gun; 1 Rais Hassen Barbiar (Djebel Chenoua mod) with 2 twin lnchr with C-802 (CH-SS-N-6) AShM, 1 Type-730 (H/PJ-12) CIWS, 1 76mm gun PBFG 9 Project 205 (ex-FSU Osa II) (or which 3†) with 4 single lnchr with P-20U (RS-SS-N-2B Styx) AShM PB 9 Kebir with 1 76mm gun MINE WARFARE • MINE COUNTERMEASURES 2 MCC 2 El-Kasseh (ITA Gaeta mod) AMPHIBIOUS PRINCIPAL AMPHIBIOUS SHIPS • LHD 1 Kalaat Beni Abbes with 1 8-cell Sylver A50 VLS with Aster 15 SAM, 1 76mm gun (capacity 5 med hel; 3 LCVP; 15 MBT; 350 troops) LANDING SHIPS 3: LSM 1 Polnochny B with 1 twin AK230 CIWS (capacity 6 MBT; 180 troops) LST 2 Kalaat beni Hammad (capacity 7 MBT; 240 troops) with 1 med hel landing platform LANDING CRAFT • LCVP 3

LOGISTICS AND SUPPORT 3 AGS 1 El Idrissi AX 1 Daxin with 2 AK230 CIWS, 1 76mm gun, 1 hel landing platform AXS 1 El Mellah

Naval Infantry ε7,000 FORCES BY ROLE SPECIAL FORCES 1 cdo bn MANOEUVRE Amphibious 8 naval inf bn EQUIPMENT BY TYPE ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES APC • APC(W) BTR-80

Naval Aviation EQUIPMENT BY TYPE HELICOPTERS MRH 9: 3 AW139 (SAR); 6 Super Lynx 300 SAR 9: 5 AW101 SAR; 4 Super Lynx Mk130

Coastal Defence FORCES BY ROLE COASTAL DEFENCE 1 AShM regt with 4K51 Rubezh (RS-SSC-3 Styx) EQUIPMENT BY TYPE COASTAL DEFENCE AShM 4K51 Rubezh (RS-SSC-3 Styx)

Coast Guard ε500 EQUIPMENT BY TYPE PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 74 PBF 6 Baglietto 20 PB 68: 6 Baglietto Mangusta; 12 Jebel Antar; 40 Deneb; 4 El Mounkid; 6 Kebir with 1 76mm gun LOGISTICS AND SUPPORT 9 AR 1 El Mourafek ARS 3 El Moundjid AXL 5 El Mouderrib (PRC Chui-E) (2 more in reserve†)

Air Force 14,000 FORCES BY ROLE FIGHTER 1 sqn with MiG-25PDS/RU Foxbat 4 sqn with MiG-29S/UB Fulcrum FIGHTER/GROUND ATTACK 3 sqn with Su-30MKA Flanker H GROUND ATTACK 2 sqn with Su-24M/MK Fencer D ELINT 1 sqn with Beech 1900D MARITIME PATROL 2 sqn with Beech 200T/300 King Air ISR 1 sqn with Su-24MR Fencer E*; MiG-25RBSh Foxbat D*

Middle East and North Africa

SURFACE-TO-SURFACE MISSILE LAUNCHERS SRBM 12 Iskander-E AIR DEFENCE SAM 106+ Short-range 38 96K6 Pantsir-S1 (RS-SA-22 Greyhound); Pantsir-SM Point-defence 68+: ε48 9K33M Osa (RS-SA-8B Gecko); ε20 9K31 Strela-1 (RS-SA-9 Gaskin); 9K32 Strela-2 (RSSA-7A/B Grail)‡; QW-2 (CH-SA-8) GUNS ε425 SP 23mm ε225 ZSU-23-4 TOWED 200: 14.5mm 100: 60 ZPU-2; 40 ZPU-4; 23mm 100 ZU-23-2

334 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2022 TANKER 1 sqn with Il-78 Midas TRANSPORT 1 sqn with C-130H/H-30 Hercules; L-100-30 1 sqn with C295M 1 sqn with Gulfstream IV-SP; Gulfstream V 1 sqn with Il-76MD/TD Candid TRAINING 2 sqn with Z-142 1 sqn with Yak-130 Mitten* 2 sqn with L-39C/ZA Albatros 1 hel sqn with PZL Mi-2 Hoplite ATTACK HELICOPTER 3 sqn with Mi-24 Hind (one re-equipping with Mi-28NE Havoc) TRANSPORT HELICOPTER 1 sqn with AS355 Ecureuil 5 sqn with Mi-8 Hip; Mi-17 Hip H 1 sqn with Ka-27PS Helix D; Ka-32T Helix ISR UAV 1 sqn with Seeker II AIR DEFENCE 3 ADA bde 3 SAM regt with S-125M/M1 Pechora-M/M1 (RS-SA-3 Goa); 2K12 Kub (RS-SA-6 Gainful); S-300PMU2 (RSSA-20 Gargoyle) EQUIPMENT BY TYPE AIRCRAFT 147 combat capable FTR 34: 11 MiG-25PDS/RU Foxbat; 23 MiG-29S/UB Fulcrum FGA 57: some MiG-29M/M2 Fulcrum; 57 Su-30MKA Flanker H ATK 33 Su-24M/MK Fencer D ISR 7: 4 MiG-25RBSh Foxbat D*; 3 Su-24MR Fencer E* TKR 6 Il-78 Midas TPT 65: Heavy 11: 3 Il-76MD Candid B; 8 Il-76TD Candid; Medium 16: 8 C-130H Hercules; 6 C-130H-30 Hercules; 2 L-100-30; Light 32: 3 Beech C90B King Air; 5 Beech 200T King Air; 6 Beech 300 King Air; 12 Beech 1900D (electronic surv); 5 C295M; 1 F-27 Friendship; PAX 6: 1 A340; 4 Gulfstream IV-SP; 1 Gulfstream V TRG 99: 36 L-39ZA Albatros; 7 L-39C Albatros; 16 Yak-130 Mitten*; 40 Z-142 HELICOPTERS ATK 72: 30 Mi-24 Hind; 42+ Mi-28NE/UB Havoc SAR 3 Ka-27PS Helix D MRH 85: 8 AW139 (SAR); 3 Bell 412EP; 74 Mi-8 Hip (med tpt)/Mi-17 Hip H TPT 62: Heavy 14 Mi-26T2 Halo; Medium 4 Ka-32T Helix; Light 44: 8 AW119KE Koala; 8 AS355 Ecureuil; 28 PZL Mi-2 Hoplite UNINHABITED AERIAL VEHICLES CISR • Heavy CH-3; CH-4; Yabhon United-30 ISR • Medium Seeker II; Yabhon Flash-20 AIR DEFENCE • SAM Long-range 32+ S-300PMU2 (RS-SA-20 Gargoyle) Medium-range 9K317 Buk-M2E (RS-SA-17 Grizzly) Short-range 36+: 2K12 Kvadrat (RS-SA-6 Gainful); 12 S-125M; Pechora-M (RS-SA-3 Goa); 24 S-125M1 Pechora-M1 (RS-SA-3 Goa) AIR-LAUNCHED MISSILES AAM • IR R-60 (RS-AA-8 Aphid); R-73 (RS-AA-11A Archer); IR/SARH R-40/46 (RS-AA-6 Acrid); R-23/24 (RS-

AA-7 Apex); R-27 (RS-AA-10 Alamo); ARH R-77 (RS-AA12A Adder) ASM Kh-25 (RS-AS-10 Karen); Kh-29 (RS-AS-14 Kedge); Kh-59ME (RS-AS-18 Kazoo); ZT-35 Ingwe; 9M120 Ataka (RS-AT-9) AShM Kh-31A (RS-AS-17B Krypton) ARM Kh-25MP (RS-AS-12A Kegler); Kh-31P (RS-AS-17A Krypton)

Gendarmerie & Paramilitary ε187,200 Gendarmerie 20,000 Ministry of Defence control; 6 regions EQUIPMENT BY TYPE ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES RECCE AML-60 APC • APC (W) 210: 100 TH-390 Fahd; 110 Panhard M3 HELICOPTERS • TPT • Light 12+: 12 AW109; Some PZL Mi-2 Hoplite

National Security Forces 16,000 Directorate of National Security. Small arms

Republican Guard 1,200 EQUIPMENT BY TYPE ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES RECCE AML-60 APC • APC (T) M3 half-track

Legitimate Defence Groups ε150,000 Self-defence militia, communal guards (60,000)

DEPLOYMENT DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO: UN • MONUSCO 2

Bahrain BHR Bahraini Dinar BHD

2020

2021

GDP

BHD

13.1bn

14.7bn

USD

34.7bn

39.1bn

per capita

USD

23,590

26,294

Growth

-5.1

2.4

Inflation

-2.3

1.0

Def bdgt [a] FMA (US)

BHD

528m

526m

USD

1.41bn

1.40bn

USD

USD1=BHD

0.38

2022

[a] Excludes funds allocated to the Ministry of the Interior and the National Security Agency Real-terms defence budget trend (USDm, constant 2015) 1546 829 2008

Population

2015

1,526,929

2021

Middle East and North Africa 335 0–14

15–19

20–24

25–29

30–64 65 plus

Male

9.3%

3.6%

4.9%

6.3%

34.6%

1.8%

Female

9.0%

3.0%

3.4%

3.9%

18.4%

1.7%

Capabilities Bahrain is a member of the GCC and occupies a key strategic position between regional rivals Iran and Saudi Arabia. The principal roles of the armed forces are territorial defence and internal-security support. Bahrain’s most critical security relationship is with Saudi Arabia, but it also has a strong defence relationship with the US and has been a US major non-NATO ally since 2002. The US 5th Fleet is headquartered in Bahrain, as is the US-led Combined Maritime Forces and the UK-led International Maritime Security Construct. The armed forces for the most part still operate 1980s-era equipment, though there is incremental modernisation in some areas. The armed forces carried out a limited expeditionary deployment in support of the Saudi-led intervention in Yemen, notably by the special forces, and have previously commanded Combined Task Force 151. As part of a major air-force modernisation, Bahrain is in the process of acquiring new F-16V fighters and upgrading its existing F-16s to that configuration, as well as acquiring the Patriot air- and missiledefence system. In recent years there have been modest naval upgrades including to fire-control systems. The armed forces have organic maintenance support, but there is little in the way of a defence-industrial base beyond the limited maintenance support provided by the Arab Shipbuilding and Repair Yard.

ACTIVE 8,200 (Army 6,000 Navy 700 Air 1,500) Gendarmerie & Paramilitary 11,260

ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE Army 6,000 FORCES BY ROLE SPECIAL FORCES 1 SF bn MANOEUVRE Armoured 1 armd bde(-) (1 recce bn, 2 armd bn) Mechanised 1 inf bde (2 mech bn, 1 mot bn) Light 1 (Amiri) gd bn COMBAT SUPPORT 1 arty bde (1 hvy arty bty, 2 med arty bty, 1 lt arty bty, 1 MRL bty) 1 engr coy COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT 1 log coy 1 tpt coy 1 med coy AIR DEFENCE 1 AD bn (1 ADA bty, 2 SAM bty) EQUIPMENT BY TYPE ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES MBT 100 M60A3; (80 more in store) RECCE 22 AML-90 IFV 67: 25 YPR-765 PRI; 42 AIFV-B-C25 APC 303+ APC (T) 303: 300 M113A2; 3 AIFV-B

APC (W) Arma 6×6 AUV M-ATV ENGINEERING & MAINTENANCE VEHICLES ARV 53 Fahd 240 ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE MSL SP 5 AIFV-B-Milan; HMMWV with BGM-71A TOW; 9P163-3 Kornet-EM (RS-AT-14 Spriggan) MANPATS BGM-71A TOW; Kornet-EM (RS-AT-14 Spriggan) RCL 31: 106mm 25 M40A1; 120mm 6 MOBAT ARTILLERY 175 SP 82: 155mm 20 M109A5; 203mm 62 M110A2 TOWED 36: 105mm 8 L118 Light Gun; 155mm 28 M198 MRL 13: 220mm 4 SR5; 227mm 9 M270 MLRS MOR 44: 81mm 32: 12 L16; 20 EIMOS; SP 120mm 12 M113A2 SURFACE-TO-SURFACE MISSILE LAUNCHERS SRBM • Conventional MGM-140A ATACMS (launched from M270 MLRS) AIR DEFENCE SAM 13+ Medium-range 6 MIM-23B I-Hawk Short-range 7 Crotale Point-defence 9K338 Igla-S (RS-SA-24 Grinch) (reported); FIM-92 Stinger; RBS-70 GUNS 24: 35mm 12 GDF-003/-005; 40mm 12 L/70

Navy 700 EQUIPMENT BY TYPE PRINCIPAL SURFACE COMBATANTS • FRIGATES 1 FFGHM 1 Sabha (ex-US Oliver Hazard Perry) with 1 Mk 13 GMLS with RGM-84C Harpoon Block 1B AShM/SM-1MR Block VI SAM, 2 triple 324mm SVTT Mk 32 ASTT with Mk 46 LWT, 1 Mk 15 Phalanx Block 1B CIWS, 1 76mm gun (capacity 1 Bo-105 hel) PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 20 PSO 1 Al Zubara (ex-UK River (OPV) Batch 1 (mod)) with 1 hel landing platform PCFG 4 Ahmed el Fateh (GER Lurssen 45m) with 2 twin lnchr with MM40 Exocet AShM, 1 76mm gun PCG 2 Al Manama (GER Lurssen 62m) with 2 twin lnchr with MM40 Exocet AShM, 2 76mm guns, 1 hel landing platform PB 6: 2 Al Jarim (US Swift FPB-20); 2 Al Riffa (GER Lurssen 38m); 2 Mashhoor (US Swiftships 35m) PBF 7 Mk V FPB AMPHIBIOUS • LANDING CRAFT 9 LCM 7: 1 Loadmaster; 4 Mashtan; 2 Dinar (ADSB 42m) LCVP 2 Sea Keeper

Naval Aviation EQUIPMENT BY TYPE HELICOPTERS • TPT • Light 2 Bo-105

Air Force 1,500 FORCES BY ROLE FIGHTER 2 sqn with F-16C/D Fighting Falcon

Middle East and North Africa

Age

336 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2022 FIGHTER/GROUND ATTACK 1 sqn with F-5E/F Tiger II TRANSPORT 1 (Royal) flt with B-737–800; B-767; B-747; BAe-146; Gulfstream II; Gulfstream IV; Gulfstream 450; Gulfstream 550; S-92A TRAINING 1 sqn with Hawk Mk129* 1 sqn with T-67M Firefly ATTACK HELICOPTER 2 sqn with AH-1E/F Cobra; TAH-1P Cobra TRANSPORT HELICOPTER 1 sqn with Bell 212 (AB-212); Bell 412EP Twin Huey 1 sqn with UH-60M Black Hawk 1 (VIP) sqn with Bo-105; S-70A Black Hawk; UH-60L Black Hawk EQUIPMENT BY TYPE AIRCRAFT 38 combat capable FTR 12: 8 F-5E Tiger II; 4 F-5F Tiger II FGA 20: 16 F-16C Block 40 Fighting Falcon; 4 F-16D Block 40 Fighting Falcon MRH 2+ Bell 412EP Twin Huey TPT 14: Medium 2 C-130J Hercules; PAX 12: 1 B-737800 (VIP); 1 B-767 (VIP); 2 B-747 (VIP); 1 Gulfstream II (VIP); 1 Gulfstream IV (VIP); 1 Gulfstream 450 (VIP); 1 Gulfstream 550 (VIP); 2 BAe-146-RJ85 (VIP); 1 BAe-146RJ100 (VIP); 1 BAe-146-RJ170 (VIP); (1 B-727 in store) TRG 9: 6 Hawk Mk129*; 3 T-67M Firefly HELICOPTERS ATK 22: 10 AH-1E Cobra; 12 AH-1F Cobra TPT 27: Medium 13: 3 S-70A Black Hawk; 1 S-92A (VIP); 1 UH-60L Black Hawk; 8 UH-60M Black Hawk; Light 14: 11 Bell 212 (AB-212); 3 Bo-105 TRG 6 TAH-1P Cobra AIR-LAUNCHED MISSILES AAM • IR AIM-9P Sidewinder; SARH AIM-7 Sparrow; ARH AIM-120B/C AMRAAM ASM AGM-65D/G Maverick; some TOW BOMBS Laser-guided GBU-10/12 Paveway II

Gendarmerie & Paramilitary ε11,260 Police 9,000 Ministry of Interior EQUIPMENT BY TYPE ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES RECCE 8 S52 Shorland APC • PPV Otokar ISV; AUV Cobra HELICOPTERS MRH 2 Bell 412 Twin Huey ISR 2 Hughes 500 TPT • Light 1 Bo-105

National Guard ε2,000 FORCES BY ROLE MANOEUVRE Other 3 paramilitary bn

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES APC • APC (W) Arma 6×6; Cobra

Coast Guard ε260 Ministry of Interior PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 55 PBF 26: 2 Ares 18; 3 Response Boat-Medium (RB-M); 4 Jaris; 6 Saham; 6 Fajr; 5 Jarada PB 29: 6 Haris; 1 Al Muharraq; 10 Deraa (of which 4 Halmatic 20, 2 Souter 20, 4 Rodman 20); 10 Saif (of which 4 Fairey Sword, 6 Halmatic 160); 2 Hawar AMPHIBIOUS • LANDING CRAFT • LCU 1 Loadmaster II

FOREIGN FORCES United Kingdom Operation Kipion 1,000; 1 FFGHM; 2 MCO; 2 MHO; 1 LSD; 1 naval base United States US Central Command 4,700; 1 HQ (5th Fleet); 10 PCFG; 4 MCO; 1 ESB; 1 ASW sqn with 5 P-8A Poseidon; 1 EP-3E Aries II; 2 SAM bty with M902/M903 Patriot PAC-3/PAC-3 MSE

Egypt EGY Egyptian Pound EGP

2020

2021

GDP

EGP

5.84tr

6.26tr

USD

363bn

396bn

per capita

USD

3,601

3,852

Growth

3.6

3.3

Inflation

5.7

4.5

Def bdgt FMA (US)

EGP

66.0bn

76.2bn

USD

4.11bn

4.82bn

USD

1.3bn

16.08

15.79

USD1=EGP

2022

1.3bn

Real-terms defence budget trend (USDbn, constant 2015) 7.00 5.71 2008

Population

2015

2021

106,437,241

Age

0–14

15–19

20–24

25–29

Male

17.4%

4.5%

4.7%

4.5%

30–64 65 plus 17.8%

2.2%

Female

16.3%

4.2%

4.4%

4.3%

17.4%

2.4%

Capabilities Egypt’s armed forces are the largest in the region and are focused principally on maintaining territorial integrity and internal security, including combatting ISIS-affiliated groups in northern Sinai. The armed forces remain deeply involved in the civilian economy and retain a central role in Egyptian politics. Egypt and the US maintain a strong strategic partnership, which has seen significant US equipment deliveries and ongoing foreign military assistance. Defence relations with Russia have developed, particularly regarding procurement. Operational experience will likely have been bolstered by counter-insurgency operations in the Sinai since 2011 and contributions to several UN deployments. Training is

supplemented by regular involvement in multinational exercises. Egypt has a developing capacity to deploy independently beyond its borders. It contributes to UN missions, has intervened militarily in Libya and has sent combat aircraft to support the Saudi-led coalition in Yemen. The navy’s two Mistral-class amphibious assault ships have bolstered its capacity to deploy regionally, although Egypt currently lacks the range of maritime helicopters to utilise them fully. The armed forces’ inventory primarily comprises obsolete Soviet-era systems and newer Western equipment. However, the armed forces are undertaking an extensive equipmentrecapitalisation programme, which includes the delivery of Russian multi-role fighters, attack helicopters and SAM systems. Combat aircraft have also been sourced from France and armed UAVs from China. Naval recapitalisation includes submarines (from Germany) and frigates (from France, Germany and Italy). Egypt has an established domestic defence industry, supplying equipment for both the armed forces and export markets, ranging from small arms to armoured vehicles. There is a history of licensed and co-production with foreign companies, including the local assembly of M1A1 main battle tanks from US-supplied kits and the production of frigates with French assistance.

ACTIVE 438,500 (Army 310,000 Navy 18,500 Air 30,000 Air Defence Command 80,000) Gendarmerie & Paramilitary 397,000 Conscription liability 12–36 months (followed by refresher training over a period of up to 9 years)

RESERVE 479,000 (Army 375,000 Navy 14,000 Air 20,000 Air Defence Command 70,000)

ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE Space EQUIPMENT BY TYPE SATELLITES • ISR 1 Egyptsat-A

Army 90,000–120,000; 190,000–220,000 conscript (total 310,000) FORCES BY ROLE SPECIAL FORCES 5 cdo gp 1 counter-terrorist unit 1 spec ops unit MANOEUVRE Armoured 4 armd div (2 armd bde, 1 mech bde, 1 arty bde) 4 indep armd bde 1 Republican Guard bde Mechanised 8 mech div (1 armd bde, 2 mech bde, 1 arty bde) 4 indep mech bde Light 1 inf div 2 indep inf bde Air Manoeuvre 2 air mob bde 1 para bde SURFACE-TO-SURFACE MISSILE 1 SRBM bde with FROG-7 1 SRBM bde with 9K72 Elbrus (RS-SS-1C Scud-B)

COMBAT SUPPORT 15 arty bde 6 engr bde (3 engr bn) 2 spec ops engr bn 6 salvage engr bn 24 MP bn 18 sigs bn COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT 36 log bn 27 med bn EQUIPMENT BY TYPE ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES MBT 2,480: 1,130 M1A1 Abrams; 300 M60A1; 850 M60A3; 200 T-62 (840 T-54/T-55; 300 T-62 all in store) RECCE 412: 300 BRDM-2; 112 Commando Scout IFV 690: 390 YPR-765 25mm; 300 BMP-1 APC 5,244+ APC (T) 2,700: 2,000 M113A2/YPR-765 (incl variants); 500 BTR-50; 200 OT-62 APC (W) 1,560: 250 BMR-600P; 250 BTR-60; 410 Fahd30/TH 390 Fahd; 650 Walid PPV 984+: 535 Caiman; some REVA III; some REVA V LWB; 360 RG-33L; 89 RG-33 HAGA (amb) AUV 95+: Panthera T6; 95+ Sherpa Light Scout ENGINEERING & MAINTENANCE VEHICLES ARV 367+: Fahd 240; BMR 3560.55; 12 Maxxpro ARV; 220 M88A1; 90 M88A2; M113 ARV; 45 M578; T-54/55 ARV VLB KMM; MTU; MTU-20 MW Aardvark JFSU Mk4 ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE • MSL SP 352+: 52 M901, 300 YPR-765 PRAT; HMMWV with TOW-2 MANPATS 9K11 Malyutka (RS-AT-3 Sagger) (incl BRDM-2); HJ-73; Luch Corsar (reported); Milan; Stugna-P (reported); TOW-2 ARTILLERY 4,468 SP 492+: 122mm 124+: 124 SP 122; D-30 mod; 130mm M-46 mod; 155mm 368: 164 M109A2; 204 M109A5 TOWED 962: 122mm 526: 190 D-30M; 36 M-1931/37; 300 M-30; 130mm 420 M-46; 155mm 16 GH-52 MRL 450: 122mm 356: 96 BM-11; 60 BM-21; 50 Sakr-10; 50 Sakr-18; 100 Sakr-36; 130mm 36 K136 Kooryong; 140mm 32 BM-14; 227mm 26 M270 MLRS; 240mm (48 BM-24 in store) MOR 2,564: 81mm 50 M125A2; 82mm 500; SP 107mm 100: 65 M106A1; 35 M106A2; 120mm 1,848: 1,800 M-1943; 48 Brandt; SP 120mm 36 M1064A3; 160mm 30 M-160 SURFACE-TO-SURFACE MISSILE LAUNCHERS SRBM • Conventional 42+: 9 FROG-7; 24 Sakr-80; 9 9K72 Elbrus (RS-SS-1C Scud-B) UNINHABITED AERIAL VEHICLES ISR • Medium R4E-50 Skyeye; ASN-209 AIR DEFENCE SAM 45+ Point-defence 45 Sinai-23 with Ayn al-Saqr; Ayn alSaqr; FIM-92 Stinger; 9K38 Igla (RS-SA-18 Grouse); 9K338 Igla-S (RS-SA-24 Grinch) (reported) GUNS 860 SP 160: 23mm 120 ZSU-23-4; 57mm 40 ZSU-57-2 TOWED 700: 14.5mm 300 ZPU-4; 23mm 200 ZU-23-2; 57mm 200 S-60

Middle East and North Africa

Middle East and North Africa 337

338 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2022

Navy ε8,500 (incl 2,000 Coast Guard); 10,000 conscript (total 18,500) EQUIPMENT BY TYPE SUBMARINES • SSK 8 4 Type-033 (PRC Romeo) with 8 single 533mm TT with UGM-84C Harpoon Block 1B AShM/Mk 37 HWT 4 Type-209/1400 with 8 single 533mm TT with UGM-84L Harpoon Block II AShM/SeaHake mod 4 (DM2A4) HWT PRINCIPAL SURFACE COMBATANTS • FRIGATES 11 FFGHM 7: 4 Alexandria (ex-US Oliver Hazard Perry) with 1 Mk 13 GMLS with RGM-84C Harpoon Block 1B AShM/ SM-1MR Block VI SAM, 2 triple 324mm ASTT with Mk 46 LWT, 1 Mk 15 Phalanx CIWS, 1 76mm gun (capacity 2 SH-2G Super Seasprite ASW hel) 2 El Fateh (Gowind 2500) with 2 quad lnchrs with MM40 Exocet Block 3 AShM, 1 16-cell CLA VLS with VL MICA SAM, 2 triple 324mm ASTT with MU90 LWT, 1 76mm gun (capacity 1 med hel) 1 Tahya Misr (FRA Aquitaine (FREMM)) with 2 quad lnchr with MM40 Exocet Block 3 AShM, 2 8-cell Sylver A43 VLS with Aster 15 SAM, 2 twin 324mm B-515 ASTT with MU90 LWT, 1 76mm gun (capacity 1 med hel) FFGH 2 Damyat (ex-US Knox) with 1 octuple Mk 16 GMLS with RGM-84C Harpoon Block 1B AShM/ASROC, 2 twin 324mm SVTT Mk 32 TT with Mk 46 LWT, 1 Mk 15 Phalanx CIWS, 1 127mm gun (capacity 1 SH-2G Super Seasprite ASW hel) FFHM 2 Al-Galala (ITA Bergamini (FREMM)) with 2 8-cell Sylver A50 VLS with Aster 15/30 SAM, 2 twin 324mm B-515 ASTT with MU90 LWT, 1 127mm gun, 1 76mm gun (fitted for but not with Otomat (Teseo) Mk2A AShM) (capacity 2 med hel) PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 73 CORVETTES 5 FSGM 2 Abu Qir (ESP Descubierta) (of which 1†) with 2 quad lnchr with RGM-84C Harpoon Block 1B AShM, 1 octuple Albatros lnchr with Aspide SAM, 2 triple 324mm SVTT Mk 32 ASTT with Sting Ray LWT, 1 twin 375mm Bofors ASW Rocket Launcher System A/S mor, 1 76mm gun FSG 2 Najim Al Zaffer (PRC Type-053HE (Jianghu I)) with 2 twin lnchr with HY-2 (CH-SS-N-2 Safflower) AShM, 4 RBU 1200 A/S mor, 2 twin 57mm guns FS 1 Shabab Misr (ex-RoK Po Hang) with 2 76mm guns PCFGM 4 Ezzat (US Ambassador Fast Missile Craft) with 2 quad lnchr with RGM-84L Harpoon Block II AShM, 1 21-cell Mk49 lnchr with RIM-116B RAM Block 1A SAM, 1 Mk15 Mod 21 Block 1B Phalanx CIWS 1 76mm gun PCFG 8: 1 Project 12418 (RUS Tarantul IV) with 2 twin lnchr with 3M80E Moskit (RS-SS-N-22A Sunburn), 2 AK630 CIWS, 1 76mm gun 6 Ramadan with 4 single lnchr with Otomat Mk2 AShM, 1 76mm gun 1 Tiger with 2 twin lnchr with RGM-84 Harpoon AShM, 1 76mm gun PCF 4 Tiger with 1 76mm gun

PCC 15: 5 Al-Nour (ex-PRC Hainan) (3 more in reserve†) with 2 triple 324mm TT, 4 RBU 1200 A/S mor, 2 twin 57mm guns; 1 Lurssen 41m; 9 OPB 40 PBFGM 8 Project 205 (ex-YUG Osa I) (of which 3†) with 4 single lnchr with P-20 (RS-SS-N-2A Styx) AShM, 1 9K32 Strela-2 (RS-SA-N-5 Grail) SAM (manual aiming) PBFG 9: 4 Type-024 (PRC Hegu) (2 additional vessels in reserve) with 2 single lnchr with SY-1 (CH-SS-N-1 Scrubbrush) AShM 5 October (FSU Komar) (of which 1†) with 2 single lnchr with Otomat Mk2 AShM (1 additional vessel in reserve) PBFM 4 Shershen (FSU) with 1 9K32 Strela-2 (RS-SA-N-5 Grail) SAM (manual aiming), 1 12-tube BM-24 MRL PBF 10: 6 Kaan 20 (TUR MRTP 20) 4 Project 205 (ex-FIN Osa II) PB 6: 4 Type-062 (ex-PRC Shanghai II) 2 Shershen (FSU) (of which 1†) with 4 single 533mm TT, 1 8-tube BM-21 MRL MINE WARFARE • MINE COUNTERMEASURES 14 MHC 5: 2 Al Siddiq (ex-US Osprey); 3 Dat Assawari (US Swiftships) MSI 2 Safaga (US Swiftships) MSO 7: 3 Assiout (FSU T-43); 4 Aswan (FSU Yurka) AMPHIBIOUS PRINCIPAL AMPHIBIOUS SHIPS • LHD 2 Gamal Abdel Nasser (FRA Mistral) (capacity 16 med hel; 2 LCT or 4 LCM; 13 MBTs; 50 AFVs; 450 troops) LANDING CRAFT 15: LCT 2 EDA-R LCM 13: 4 CTM NG; 9 Vydra (FSU) (capacity either 3 MBT or 200 troops) LOGISTICS AND SUPPORT 23 AE 1 Halaib (ex-GER Westerwald) AKR 3 Al Hurreya AOT 7 Ayeda (FSU Toplivo) (1 more in reserve) AR 1 Shaledin (ex-GER Luneberg) ARS 2 Al Areesh ATF 5 Al Maks† (FSU Okhtensky) AX 4: 1 El Horriya (also used as the presidential yacht); 1 Al Kousser; 1 Intishat; 1 other

Coastal Defence

Army tps, Navy control EQUIPMENT BY TYPE COASTAL DEFENCE ARTY 100mm; 130mm SM-4-1; 152mm AShM 4K87 (RS-SSC-2B Samlet); Otomat MkII

Naval Aviation

All aircraft operated by Air Force AIRCRAFT • TPT • Light 4 Beech 1900C (maritime surveillance) UNINHABITED AERIAL VEHICLES ISR • Light 2 S-100 Camcopter

Coast Guard 2,000 EQUIPMENT BY TYPE PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 89

PBF 14: 6 Crestitalia; 5 Swift Protector; 3 Peterson PB 75: 5 Nisr; 12 Sea Spectre MkIII; 25 Swiftships; 21 Timsah; 3 Type-83; 9 Peterson

Air Force 20,000; 10,000 conscript (total 30,000) FORCES BY ROLE FIGHTER 1 sqn with F-16A/B Fighting Falcon 8 sqn with F-16C/D Fighting Falcon 1 sqn with Mirage 2000B/C FIGHTER/GROUND ATTACK 1 sqn with Mirage 5E2 2 sqn with Rafale DM/EM 3 sqn with MiG-29M/M2 Fulcrum ANTI-SUBMARINE WARFARE 1 sqn with SH-2G Super Seasprite MARITIME PATROL 1 sqn with Beech 1900C ELECTRONIC WARFARE 1 sqn with Beech 1900 (ELINT); Commando Mk2E (ECM) ELECTRONIC WARFARE/TRANSPORT 1 sqn with C-130H/VC-130H Hercules AIRBORNE EARLY WARNING 1 sqn with E-2C Hawkeye SEARCH & RESCUE 1 unit with AW139 TRANSPORT 1 sqn with An-74TK-200A 1 sqn with C-130H/C-130H-30 Hercules 1 sqn with C295M 1 sqn with DHC-5D Buffalo 1 sqn with B-707-366C; B-737-100; Beech 200 Super King Air; Falcon 20; Gulfstream III; Gulfstream IV; Gulfstream IV-SP TRAINING 1 sqn with Alpha Jet* 1 sqn with DHC-5 Buffalo 3 sqn with EMB-312 Tucano 1 sqn with Grob 115EG ε6 sqn with K-8 Karakorum* 1 sqn with L-39 Albatros; L-59E Albatros* ATTACK HELICOPTER 1 sqn with Mi-24V 2 sqn with AH-64D Apache 1 sqn with Ka-52A Hokum B 2 sqn with SA-342K Gazelle (with HOT) 1 sqn with SA-342L Gazelle TRANSPORT HELICOPTER 1 sqn with CH-47C/D Chinook 1 sqn with Mi-8 1 sqn with Mi-8/Mi-17-V1 Hip 1 sqn with S-70 Black Hawk; UH-60A/L Black Hawk UAV Some sqn with R4E-50 Skyeye; Wing Loong I EQUIPMENT BY TYPE AIRCRAFT 509 combat capable FTR 32: 26 F-16A Fighting Falcon; 6 F-16B Fighting Falcon FGA 274: 138 F-16C Fighting Falcon; 37 F-16D Fighting Falcon; 2 Mirage 2000B; 15 Mirage 2000C; 12 Mirage 5E2; ε46 MiG-29M/M2 Fulcrum; 16 Rafale DM; 8 Rafale EM ELINT 2 VC-130H Hercules

ISR 12: ε6 AT-802 Air Tractor*; 6 Mirage 5R (5SDR)* AEW&C 7 E-2C Hawkeye TPT 82: Heavy 2 Il-76MF Candid; Medium 24: 21 C-130H Hercules; 3 C-130H-30 Hercules; Light 45: 3 An-74TK-200A; 1 Beech 200 King Air; 4 Beech 1900 (ELINT); 4 Beech 1900C; 24 C295M; 9 DHC-5D Buffalo (being withdrawn) PAX 11: 1 B-707-366C; 3 Falcon 20; 2 Gulfstream III; 1 Gulfstream IV; 4 Gulfstream IV-SP TRG 329: 36 Alpha Jet*; 54 EMB-312 Tucano; 74 Grob 115EG; 120 K-8 Karakorum*; 10 L-39 Albatros; 35 L-59E* HELICOPTERS ATK 104: 45 AH-64D Apache; up to 46 Ka-52A Hokum B; ε13 Mi-24V Hind E ASW 10 SH-2G Super Seasprite (opcon Navy) ELINT 4 Commando Mk2E (ECM) MRH 77: 2 AW139 (SAR); 5 AW149; 65 SA342K Gazelle (some with HOT); 5 SA342L Gazelle (opcon Navy) TPT 96: Heavy 19: 3 CH-47C Chinook; 16 CH-47D Chinook; Medium 77: 2 AS-61; 24 Commando (of which 3 VIP); 40 Mi-8T Hip; 3 Mi-17-1V Hip; 4 S-70 Black Hawk (VIP); 4 UH-60L Black Hawk (VIP) TRG 17 UH-12E UNINHABITED AERIAL VEHICLES CISR • Heavy 4+ Wing Loong I ISR • Medium R4E-50 Skyeye AIR LAUNCHED MISSILES AAM • IR AIM-9M/P Sidewinder; R-73 (RS-AA-11A Archer); R-550 Magic; 9M39 Igla-V; IIR Mica IR; ARH Mica RF; R-77 (RS-AA-12 Adder); SARH AIM-7F/M Sparrow; R-530 ASM AASM; AGM-65A/D/F/G Maverick; AGM-114F/K Hellfire; AS-30L; HOT; LJ-7 (AKD-10); 9M120 Ataka (RSAT-9) LACM SCALP EG AShM AGM-84L Harpoon Block II; AM39 Exocet; Kh35U (RS-AS-20 Kayak) ARM Armat; Kh-25MP (RS-AS-12A Kegler) BOMBS Laser-guided GBU-10/12 Paveway II

Air Defence Command 80,000 conscript; 70,000 reservists (total 150,000) FORCES BY ROLE AIR DEFENCE 5 AD div HQ (geographically based) 3 SAM bty with S-300V4 (RS-SA-23) 4 SAM bty with 9K37M1-2/9K317 Buk-M1-2/M2E (RSSA-11 Gadfly/RS-SA-17 Grizzly) 11 SAM bty with MIM-23B I-Hawk 38 SAM bty with S-75M Volkhov (RS-SA-2 Guideline) 10 SAM bty with S-125-2M Pechora-2M (RS-SA-26) Some SAM bty with 2K12 Kub (RS-SA-6 Gainful) 2 SAM bty with 9K331/9K331ME Tor-M1/M2E (RSSA-15 Gauntlet) 14 SAM bty with Crotale 12 SAM bty with M48 Chaparral 30 SAM bty with S-125M Pechora-M (RS-SA-3 Goa) 18 AD bn with RIM-7M Sea Sparrow with Skyguard/GDF003 with Skyguard 12 ADA bde (total: 100 ADA bn)

Middle East and North Africa

Middle East and North Africa 339

340 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2022 EQUIPMENT BY TYPE AIR DEFENCE SAM 777 Long-range ε18 S-300V4 (RS-SA-23) Medium-range 323+: 40+ 9K37M1-2/9K317 Buk-M1-2/ M2E (RS-SA-11 Gadfly/RS-SA-17 Grizzly); ε33 MIM23B I-Hawk; ε210 S-75M Volkhov (RS-SA-2 Guideline); ε40 S-125-2M Pechora-2M (RS-SA-26) Short-range 300+: 56+ 2K12 Kub (RS-SA-6 Gainful); 10 9K331 Tor-M1 (RS-SA-15 Gauntlet); 10+ 9K331ME Tor-M2E (RS-SA-15 Gauntlet); 24+ Crotale; 80 RIM-7M Sea Sparrow with Skyguard; ε120 S-125M Pechora-M (RS-SA-3 Goa) Point-defence 136+: 50 M1097 Avenger; 50+ M48 Chaparral; 36+ Sinai-23 with Ayn al-Saqr GUNS 910 SP • 23mm 230 ZSU-23-4 Shilka TOWED 680: 35mm 80 GDF-005 with Skyguard; 57mm 600 S-60

Canada MFO 55 Colombia MFO 275; 1 inf bn Czech Republic MFO 18; 1 C295M Fiji MFO 170; elm 1 inf bn France MFO 1 Italy MFO 75; 3 PB New Zealand MFO 26; 1 trg unit; 1 tpt unit Norway MFO 3 United Kingdom MFO 2 United Arab Emirates ε300: 12 F-16E/F Fighting Falcon (reported); Wing Loong I UAV; Wing Loong II UAV United States MFO 452; elm 1 ARNG recce bn; 1 ARNG spt bn (1 EOD coy, 1 medical coy, 1 hel coy) Uruguay MFO 41 1 engr/tpt unit

Gendarmerie & Paramilitary ε397,000 active

GDP

Iran IRN Iranian Rial IRR

2020

2021

IRR

35085tr

51048tr

USD

835bn

1.08tr

USD

9,928

12,725

2022

Central Security Forces ε325,000

per capita

Ministry of Interior; includes conscripts ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES APC • APC (W) Walid AUV Sherpa Light Scout

Growth

3.4

2.5

Inflation

36.4

39.3

IRR

ε695tr

ε1,180tr

National Guard ε60,000

USD

ε16.5bn

ε25.0bn

USD1=IRR

41999.98

47206.72

Lt wpns only

[a] Excludes Law Enforcement Forces (NAJA)

FORCES BY ROLE MANOEUVRE Other 8 paramilitary bde (cadre) (3 paramilitary bn)

Real-terms defence budget trend (USDbn, constant 2015)

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES APC • APC (W) 250 Walid

Border Guard Forces ε12,000 Ministry of Interior; lt wpns only FORCES BY ROLE MANOEUVRE Other 18 Border Guard regt

DEPLOYMENT CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC: UN • MINUSCA 1,022; 1 inf bn; 1 tpt coy DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO: UN • MONUSCO 11 MALI: UN • MINUSMA 1,066; 1 spec ops coy; 1 sy bn; 1 MP coy SOUTH SUDAN: UN • UNMISS 4 WESTERN SAHARA: UN • MINURSO 25

FOREIGN FORCES Australia MFO (Operation Mazurka) 27

Def bdgt [a]

18.94

2008

Population

8.13 2021

2015

85,888,910

Age

0–14

15–19

20–24

25–29

Male

12.2%

3.5%

3.3%

4.2%

30–64 65 plus 24.6%

2.9%

Female

11.7%

3.4%

3.1%

4.0%

23.9%

3.3%

Capabilities Iran is a major regional military power, with a military doctrine that combines territorial defence, through national mobilisation and a substantial missile arsenal, with an asymmetric forward-defence strategy. To achieve the latter objective, Iran exerts significant military effect via a range of regional allies and proxies, chiefly through their relationship with the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) Quds Force, as well as by the supply of weapons and other material. Iran has a key relationship with Syria and has developed significant influence in weaker regional states like Iraq, Lebanon and Yemen through a network of non-state groups, such as Hizbullah and Houthi forces. Tehran’s direct military power-projection capabilities are based around the Middle East’s largest short- and medium-range ballistic-missile inventory, as well as nascent cruisemissile and UAV capabilities. Attacks in Iraq and Saudi Arabia have demonstrated these systems’ improved accuracy as well as sophisticated planning capabilities. The rest of the conventional armed forces, although large by regional standards, struggle with an increasingly obsolescent equipment inventory that ingenuity and asymmetric-warfare techniques can only partially offset. The divi-

sion of capability between the regular military services and the IRGC hampers effective command and control, although the IRGC has effectively monopolised the coordination roles in the military hierarchy. The IRGC’s operational primacy, coupled with the regular armed forces’ dependence on conscript personnel, has also focused combat experience in IRGC formations. In regional terms, Iran has a well-developed defence-industrial base, which has displayed the capacity to support and sustain equipment. However, it is still incapable of meeting the domestic need for major weapons systems, outside of specific sectors such as missiles and rockets systems.

ACTIVE 610,000 (Army 350,000 Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps 190,000 Navy 18,000 Air 37,000 Air Defence 15,000) Gendarmerie & Paramilitary 40,000 Armed Forces General Staff coordinates two parallel organisations: the regular armed forces and the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps Conscript liability 18–21 months (reported, with variations depending on location in which service is performed)

RESERVE 350,000 (Army 350,000, ex-service volunteers)

ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE Army 130,000; 220,000 conscript (total 350,000) FORCES BY ROLE 5 corps-level regional HQ COMMAND 1 cdo div HQ 4 armd div HQ 2 mech div HQ 4 inf div HQ SPECIAL FORCES 1 cdo div (3 cdo bde) 6 cdo bde 1 SF bde MANOEUVRE Armoured 8 armd bde Mechanised 14 mech bde Light 12 inf bde Air Manoeuvre 1 AB bde Aviation Some avn gp COMBAT SUPPORT 5 arty gp EQUIPMENT BY TYPE Totals incl those held by IRGC Ground Forces. Some equipment serviceability in doubt ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES MBT 1,513+: 480 T-72S; 150 M60A1; 75+ T-62; 100 Chieftain Mk3/Mk5; 540 T-54/T-55/Type-59/Safir-74; 168 M47/M48 LT TK 80+: 80 Scorpion RECCE 35 EE-9 Cascavel IFV 610+: 210 BMP-1; 400 BMP-2 with 9K111 Fagot (RSAT-4 Spigot); BMT-2 Cobra

APC 640+ APC (T) 340: 140 Boragh with 9K111 Fagot (RS-AT-4 Spigot); 200 M113 APC (W) 300+: 300 BTR-50/BTR-60; Rakhsh PPV Toofan ENGINEERING & MAINTENANCE VEHICLES ARV 20+: BREM-1 reported; 20 Chieftain ARV; M578; T-54/55 ARV reported VLB 15 Chieftain AVLB MW Taftan 1 ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE MSL • MANPATS 9K11 Malyutka (RS-AT-3 Sagger); 9K111 Fagot (RS-AT-4 Spigot); 9K111-1 Konkurs (RS-AT-5 Spandrel/Towsan-1); Almaz; Dehleavieh (Kornet); I-Raad; Saeqhe 1; Saeqhe 2; Toophan; Toophan 2 RCL 200+: 75mm M20; 82mm B-10; 106mm ε200 M40; 107mm B-11 ARTILLERY 6,798+ SP 292+: 122mm 60+: 60 2S1 Gvozdika; Raad-1 (Thunder 1); 155mm 150+: 150 M109A1; Raad-2 (Thunder 2); 170mm 30 M-1978; 175mm 22 M107; 203mm 30 M110 TOWED 2,030+; 105mm 150: 130 M101A1; 20 M-56; 122mm 640: 540 D-30; 100 Type-54 (M-30); 130mm 985 M-46; 152mm 30 D-20; 155mm 205: 120 GHN-45; 70 M114; 15 Type-88 WAC-21; 203mm 20 M115 MRL 1,476+: 107mm 1,300: 700 Type-63; 600 HASEB Fadjr 1; 122mm 157: 7 BM-11; 100 BM-21 Grad; 50 Arash/ Hadid/Noor; 240mm 19+: ε10 Fadjr 3; 9 M-1985; 330mm Fadjr 5 MOR 3,000: 81mm; 82mm; 107mm M30; 120mm HM-15; HM-16; M-65 SURFACE-TO-SURFACE MISSILE LAUNCHERS SRBM • Conventional ε30 CH-SS-8 (175 msl); Shahin-1/ Shahin-2; Nazeat; Oghab AIRCRAFT • TPT 17 Light 16: 10 Cessna 185; 2 F-27 Friendship; 4 Turbo Commander 690; PAX 1 Falcon 20 HELICOPTERS ATK 50 AH-1J Cobra TPT 167: Heavy ε20 CH-47C Chinook; Medium 69: 49 Bell 214; 20 Mi-171; Light 78: 68 Bell 205A (AB-205A); 10 Bell 206 Jet Ranger (AB-206) UNINHABITED AERIAL VEHICLES CISR • Medium Mohajer 6; Kaman 12 ISR • Medium Ababil 2; Ababil 3; Mohajer 3; Mohajer 4; Light Mohajer 2 AIR DEFENCE SAM Short-range FM-80 (CH-SA-4) Point-defence 9K36 Strela-3 (RS-SA-14 Gremlin); 9K32 Strela-2 (RS-SA-7 Grail)‡; Misaq 1 (QW-1); Misaq 2 (QW-18); 9K338 Igla-S (RS-SA-24 Grinch) (reported); HN-5A (CH-SA-3) GUNS 1,122 SP 180: 23mm 100 ZSU-23-4; 57mm 80 ZSU-57-2 TOWED 942+: 14.5mm ZPU-2; ZPU-4; 23mm 300 ZU23-2; 35mm 92 GDF-002; 37mm M-1939; 40mm 50 L/70; 57mm 200 S-60; 85mm 300 M-1939 BOMBS Laser-guided Qaem Electro-optical guided Qaem

Middle East and North Africa

Middle East and North Africa 341

342 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2022

Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps 190,000 Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps Ground Forces 150,000

Controls Basij paramilitary forces. Lightly manned in peacetime. Primary role: internal security; secondary role: external defence, in conjunction with regular armed forces FORCES BY ROLE COMMAND 31 provincial corps HQ (2 in Tehran) SPECIAL FORCES 3 spec ops div 1 AB bde MANOEUVRE Armoured 2 armd div 3 armd bde Light 8+ inf div 5+ inf bde

Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps Naval Forces 20,000+ (incl 5,000 Marines) FORCES BY ROLE COMBAT SUPPORT Some arty bty Some AShM bty with HY-2 (CH-SSC-3 Seersucker) AShM EQUIPMENT BY TYPE In addition to the vessels listed, the IRGC operates a substantial number of patrol boats with a full-load displacement below 10 tonnes, including Boghammar-class vessels and small Bavar-class wing-in-ground effect air vehicles PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 127 PBFG 56: 5 C14 with 2 twin lnchr with C-701 (Kosar)/C-704 (Nasr) AShM 10 Mk13 with 2 single lnchr with C-704 (Nasr) AShM, 2 single 324mm TT 10 Thondor (PRC Houdong) with 2 twin lnchr with C-802A (Ghader) AShM, 2 AK230 CIWS 25 Peykaap II (IPS-16 mod) with 2 single lnchr with C-701 (Kosar) AShM/C-704 (Nasr), 2 single 324mm TT 6 Zolfaghar (Peykaap III/IPS-16 mod) with 2 single lnchr with C-701 (Kosar)/C-704 (Nasr) AShM PBFT 15 Peykaap I (IPS -16) with 2 single 324mm TT PBF 35: 15 Kashdom II; 10 Tir (IPS-18); ε10 Pashe (MIG-G-1900) PB 21: ε20 Ghaem; 1 Shahid Nazeri AMPHIBIOUS LANDING SHIPS • LST 3 Hormuz 24 (Hejaz design for commercial use) LANDING CRAFT • LCT 2 Hormuz 21 (minelaying capacity) LOGISTICS AND SUPPORT • AP 3 Naser COASTAL DEFENCE • AShM C-701 (Kosar); C-704 (Nasr); C-802 (Noor); HY-2 (CH-SSC-3 Seersucker) HELICOPTERS MRH 5 Mi-171 Hip TPT • Light some Bell 206 (AB-206) Jet Ranger

UNINHABITED AERIAL VEHICLES CISR • Medium Mohajer 6 BOMBS Laser-guided Qaem Electro-optical guided Qaem

Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps Marines 5,000+ FORCES BY ROLE MANOEUVRE Amphibious 1 mne bde

Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps Aerospace Force 15,000

Controls Iran’s strategic-missile force FORCES BY ROLE MISSILE ε1 bde with Shahab-1/-2; Qiam-1 ε1 bn with Shahab-3 (IR-SS-7)

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE SURFACE-TO-SURFACE MISSILE LAUNCHERS MRBM • Conventional up to 50: Shahab-3 (IR-SS-7) (mobile & silo); some Ghadr-1 (in test); some Emad-1 (in test); some Sajjil-2 (in devt); some Khorramshahr (in devt) SRBM • Conventional up to 100: some Fateh-110; some Fateh-313; Some Khalij Fars (Fateh-110 mod ASBM); some Shahab-1/-2; some Qiam-1; some Zelzal; some Zolfagar (IR-SS-1) GLCM • Conventional some Ya’ali (Quds-1) UNINHABITED AERIAL VEHICLES CISR • Heavy Shahed 129; Medium Shahed 181; Shahed 191 ISR • Medium Ababil 3; Mohajer 4; Shahed 123 AIR DEFENCE SAM Medium-range Ra‘ad/3rd Khordad; Talash/15th Khordad Point-defence Misaq 1 (QW-1); Misaq 2 (QW-18) BOMBS Laser-guided Sadid Electro-optical guided Sadid

Islamic Revolutionary Quds Force 5,000 Navy 18,000 HQ at Bandar Abbas EQUIPMENT BY TYPE In addition to the vessels listed, the Iranian Navy operates a substantial number of patrol boats with a full-load displacement below 10 tonnes SUBMARINES • TACTICAL 17 SSK 1 Taregh (RUS Paltus (Project 877EKM (Kilo))) (2 more non-operational) with 6 single 533mm TT SSC 1 Fateh with 4 single 533mm TT with C-704 (Nasr-1) AShM/Valfajr HWT SSW 15: 14 Ghadir (Yono) with 2 single 533mm TT with Jask-2 (C-704 (Nasr)) AShM/Valfajr HWT (additional vessels in build); 1 Nahang

Middle East and North Africa 343

Marines 2,600 FORCES BY ROLE MANOEUVRE Amphibious 2 mne bde

Naval Aviation 2,600 EQUIPMENT BY TYPE AIRCRAFT TPT 16: Light 13: 5 Do-228; 4 F-27 Friendship; 4 Turbo Commander 680; PAX 3 Falcon 20 (ELINT) HELICOPTERS ASW ε10 SH-3D Sea King MCM 3 RH-53D Sea Stallion TPT • Light 17: 5 Bell 205A (AB-205A); 2 Bell 206 Jet Ranger (AB-206); 10 Bell 212 (AB-212) UNINHABITED AERIAL VEHICLES CISR • Heavy Shahed 129; BOMBS Laser-guided Sadid Electro-optical guided Sadid

Air Force 37,000 FORCES BY ROLE Serviceability probably about 60% for US ac types and about 80% for PRC/Russian ac. Includes IRGC AF equipment FIGHTER 1 sqn with F-7M Airguard; JJ-7* 2 sqn with F-14 Tomcat 2 sqn with MiG-29A/UB Fulcrum FIGHTER/GROUND ATTACK 1 sqn with Mirage F-1B/E; 1 sqn with F-5E/F Tiger II 5 sqn with F-4D/E Phantom II 3 sqn with F-5E/F Tiger II 1 sqn (forming) with Su-22M4 Fitter K; Su-22UM-3K Fitter G GROUND ATTACK 1 sqn with Su-24MK Fencer D MARITIME PATROL 1 sqn with P-3F Orion ISR 1 (det) sqn with RF-4E Phantom II* SEARCH & RESCUE Some flt with Bell 214C (AB-214C) TANKER/TRANSPORT 1 sqn with B-707; B-747; B-747F TRANSPORT 1 sqn with B-707; Falcon 50; L-1329 Jetstar; Bell 412 2 sqn with C-130E/H Hercules 1 sqn with F-27 Friendship; Falcon 20 1 sqn with Il-76 Candid; An-140 (Iran-140 Faraz) TRAINING 1 sqn with Beech F33A/C Bonanza 1 sqn with F-5B Freedom Fighter 1 sqn with PC-6 1 sqn with PC-7 Turbo Trainer Some units with EMB-312 Tucano; MFI-17 Mushshak; TB21 Trinidad; TB-200 Tobago TRANSPORT HELICOPTER 1 sqn with CH-47 Chinook Some units with Bell 206A Jet Ranger (AB-206A); Shabaviz 2-75; Shabaviz 2061

Middle East and North Africa

PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 68 CORVETTES 7 FSGM 3 Jamaran (UK Vosper Mk 5 derivative – 1 more undergoing sea trials) with 2 twin lnchr with C-802 (Noor) (CH-SS-N-6) AShM, 2 single lnchr with SM-1 SAM, 2 triple 324mm SVTT Mk 32 ASTT, 1 76mm gun, 1 hel landing platform FSG 4: 2 Alvand (UK Vosper Mk 5) with 2 twin lnchr with C-802 (CH-SS-N-6) AShM, 2 triple 324mm SVTT Mk 32 ASTT, 1 114mm gun 1 Alvand (UK Vosper Mk 5) with 2 twin lnchr with C-802 (CH-SS-N-6) AShM, 2 triple 324mm SVTT Mk 32 ASTT, 1 AK630M CIWS, 1 114mm gun 1 Bayandor (US PF-103) with 2 twin lnchr with C-802 (CH-SS-N-6) AShM, 2 triple 324mm SVTT Mk 32 ASTT, 1 76mm gun PCFG 15: up to 10 Kaman (FRA Combattante II) with 1 twin lnchr with C-802 (Noor) (CH-SS-N-6) AShM, 1 76mm gun; 5+ Sina with 1 twin lnchr with C-802 (Noor) (CH-SS-N-6) AShM, 1 76mm gun PBG 9: 3 Hendijan with 2 twin lnchr with C-802 (Noor) (CHSS-N-6) AShM 3 Kayvan with 2 single lnchr with C-704 (Nasr) AShM 3 Parvin with 2 single lnchr with C-704 (Nasr) AShM PBFT 3 Kajami (semi-submersible) with 2 324mm TT PBF 1 MIL55 PB 33: 9 C14; 8 Hendijan; 6 MkII; 10 MkIII MINE WARFARE • MINE COUNTERMEASURES • MCC 1 Shahin AMPHIBIOUS LANDING SHIPS 12 LST 3 Hengam with 1 hel landing platform (capacity 9 tanks; 225 troops) LSM 3 Farsi (ROK) (capacity 9 tanks; 140 troops) LSL 6 Fouque LANDING CRAFT 11 LCT 2 LCU 1 Liyan 110 UCAC 8: 2 Wellington Mk 4; 4 Wellington Mk 5; 2 Tondar (UK Winchester) LOGISTICS AND SUPPORT 18 AE 2 Delvar AFD 2 Dolphin AG 1 Hamzah with 2 single lnchr with C-802 (Noor) (CHSS-N-6) AShM AK 3 Delvar AKR 1 Makran AORH 2 Bandar Abbas AWT 5: 4 Kangan; 1 Delvar AX 2 Kialas COASTAL DEFENCE • AShM C-701 (Kosar); C-704 (Nasr); C-802 (Noor); C-802A (Ghader); Ra’ad (reported)

344 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2022 EQUIPMENT BY TYPE AIRCRAFT 332 combat capable FTR 182+: 20 F-5B Freedom Fighter; 55+ F-5E/F Tiger II; 24 F-7M Airguard; up to 42 F-14 Tomcat; 35 MiG-29A/UB Fulcrum; up to 6 Azarakhsh (reported) FGA 90: 62 F-4D/E Phantom II; 2 Mirage F-1BQ; 10 Mirage F-1EQ; up to 6 Saegheh (reported); up to 7 Su-22M4 Fitter K; 3+ Su-22UM-3K Fitter G ATK 39: 29 Su-24MK Fencer D; 7 Su-25K Frogfoot (status unknown); 3 Su-25UBK Frogfoot (status unknown) ASW 3 P-3F Orion ISR: 6+ RF-4E Phantom II* TKR/TPT 3: ε1 B-707; ε2 B-747 TPT 116: Heavy 12 Il-76 Candid; Medium ε19 C-130E/H Hercules; Light 75: 11 An-74TK-200; 5 An-140 (Iran-140 Faraz); 10 F-27 Friendship; 1 L-1329 Jetstar; 10 PC-6B Turbo Porter; 8 TB-21 Trinidad; 4 TB-200 Tobago; 3 Turbo Commander 680; 14 Y-7; 9 Y-12; PAX 10: ε1 B-707; 1 B-747; 4 B-747F; 1 Falcon 20; 3 Falcon 50 TRG 141: 25 Beech F33A/C Bonanza; 15 EMB-312 Tucano; 14 JJ-7*; 25 MFI-17 Mushshak; 12 Parastu; 15 PC-6; 35 PC-7 Turbo Trainer HELICOPTERS MRH 2 Bell 412 TPT 34+: Heavy 2+ CH-47 Chinook; Medium 30 Bell 214C (AB-214C); Light 2+: 2 Bell 206A Jet Ranger (AB-206A); some Shabaviz 2-75 (indigenous versions in production); some Shabaviz 2061 AIR-LAUNCHED MISSILES AAM • IR PL-2A‡; PL-7; R-60 (RS-AA-8 Aphid); R-73 (RS-AA-11A Archer); AIM-9J Sidewinder; IR/SARH R-27 (RS-AA-10 Alamo); SARH AIM-7E-2 Sparrow; ARH AIM54 Phoenix† ASM AGM-65A Maverick; Kh-25 (RS-AS-10 Karen); Kh25ML (RS-AS-10 Karen); Kh-29L/T (RS-AS-14A/B Kedge) AShM C-801K ARM Kh-58 (RS-AS-11 Kilter) BOMBS Electro-optical guided GBU-87/B Qassed

Air Defence Force 15,000 FORCES BY ROLE AIR DEFENCE 16 bn with MIM-23B I-Hawk/Shahin 4 bn with S-300PMU2 (RS-SA-20 Gargoyle) 5 sqn with FM-80 (CH-SA-4); Rapier; HQ-2 (CH-SA-1); S-200 Angara (RS-SA-5 Gammon); 9K331 Tor-M1 (RSSA-15 Gauntlet) EQUIPMENT BY TYPE AIR DEFENCE SAM 410 Long-range 42+: 10 S-200 Angara (RS-SA-5 Gammon); 32 S-300PMU2 (RS-SA-20 Gargoyle); Bavar-373 Medium-range 59+: ε50 MIM-23B I-Hawk/Shahin; 9 HQ-2 (CH-SA-1); Talash/15th Khordad Short-range 279: 250 FM-80 (CH-SA-4); 29 9K331 Tor-M1 (RS-SA-15 Gauntlet) Point-defence 30+: 30 Rapier; Misaq 1 (QW-1); Misaq 2 (QW-18) GUNS • TOWED 23mm ZU-23-2; 35mm GDF-002

Gendarmerie & Paramilitary 40,000–60,000 Law-Enforcement Forces 40,000–60,000 (border and security troops); 450,000 on mobilisation (incl conscripts) Part of armed forces in wartime EQUIPMENT BY TYPE PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS • PB ε90 AIRCRAFT • TPT • Light 2+: 2 An-140; some Cessna 185/Cessna 310 HELICOPTERS • TPT • Light ε24 AB-205 (Bell 205)/ AB-206 (Bell 206) Jet Ranger

Basij Resistance Force ε600,000 on mobilisation

Paramilitary militia with claimed membership of 12.6 million; ε600,000 combat capable FORCES BY ROLE MANOEUVRE Other 2,500 militia bn(-) (claimed, limited permanent membership)

DEPLOYMENT GULF OF ADEN AND SOMALI BASIN: Navy: 1 FSG; 1 LST MALI: UN • MINUSMA 2 SYRIA: 1,500

Iraq IRQ 2020

2021

GDP

Iraqi Dinar IQD IQD

202tr

292tr

USD

169bn

201bn

per capita

USD

4,223

4,893

Growth

-15.7

3.6

Inflation

0.6

6.4

Def bdgt [a] FMA (US)

IQD

ε12.1tr

ε10.7tr

USD

ε10.2bn

ε7.4bn

USD

1190.81

1450.00

USD1=IQD

2022

250m

[a] Excludes Ministry of the Interior and National Security Council budget Real-terms defence budget trend (USDbn, constant 2015) 10.9

2008

Population

6.19 2021

2015

39,650,145

Age

0–14

15–19

20–24

25–29

Male

18.6%

5.4%

4.7%

3.9%

30–64 65 plus 16.1%

1.5%

Female

17.8%

5.2%

4.5%

3.9%

16.2%

1.9%

Capabilities While the armed forces’ capabilities and morale have generally improved since the collapse of several divisions in the face of the ISIS advance in the north in 2014, there remains concern about

Middle East and North Africa 345

ACTIVE 193,000 (Army 180,000 Navy 3,000 Air 5,000 Air Defence 5,000) Gendarmerie & Paramilitary 266,000

ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE Army ε180,000

Includes Counter Terrorism Service FORCES BY ROLE SPECIAL FORCES 3 SF bde 1 ranger bde (3 ranger bn) MANOEUVRE Armoured 1 (9th) armd div (2 armd bde, 2 mech bde, 1 engr bn, 1 sigs regt, 1 log bde) Mechanised 3 (5th, 8th & 10th) mech div (4 mech inf bde, 1 engr bn, 1 sigs regt, 1 log bde) 1 (7th) mech div (2 mech inf bde, 1 inf bde, 1 engr bn, 1 sigs regt, 1 log bde) Light 1 (6th) mot div (3 mot inf bde, 1 inf bde, 1 engr bn, 1 sigs regt, 1 log bde) 1 (14th) mot div (2 mot inf bde, 3 inf bde, 1 engr bn, 1 sigs regt, 1 log bde) 1 (1st) inf div (2 inf bde) 1 (11th) inf div (3 lt inf bde, 1 engr bn, 1 sigs regt, 1 log bde) 1 (15th) inf div (5 inf bde) 1 (16th) inf div (2 inf bde) 1 (17th Cdo) inf div (4 inf bde, 1 engr bn, 1 sigs regt, 1 log bde) 1 inf bde Other 1 (PM SF) sy div (3 inf bde) HELICOPTER 1 atk hel sqn with Mi-28NE Havoc 1 atk hel sqn with Mi-35M Hind 1 sqn with Bell 205 (UH-1H Huey II) 3 atk hel sqn with Bell T407; H135M

3 sqn with Mi-17 Hip H; Mi-171Sh 1 ISR sqn with SA342M Gazelle 2 trg sqn with Bell 206; OH-58C Kiowa 1 trg sqn with Bell 205 (UH-1H Huey II) 1 trg sqn with Mi-17 Hip EQUIPMENT BY TYPE ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES MBT 391+: ε100 M1A1 Abrams; 168+ T-72M/M1; ε50 T-55; 73 T-90S RECCE 453: ε400 Akrep; 18 BRDM 2; 35 EE-9 Cascavel; IFV 650: ε400 BMP-1; ε90 BMP-3M; ε60 BTR-4 (inc variants); 100 BTR-80A APC 1,592+ APC (T) 900: ε500 M113A2/Talha; ε400 MT-LB PPV 692+: 12 Barracuda; 250 Caiman; Gorets-M; ε400 ILAV Badger; Mamba; 30 Maxxpro AUV 20+: M-ATV; 20 Commando ENGINEERING & MAINTENANCE VEHICLES ARV 222+: 180 BREM; 35+ M88A1/2; 7 Maxxpro ARV; T-54/55 ARV; Type-653; VT-55A NBC VEHICLES 20 Fuchs NBC ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE MSL • MANPATS 9K135 Kornet (RS-AT-14 Spriggan) (reported) ARTILLERY 1,064+ SP 48+: 152mm 18+ Type-83; 155mm 30: 6 M109A1; 24 M109A5 TOWED 60+: 130mm M-46/Type-59; 152mm D-20; Type83; 155mm ε60 M198 MRL 6+: 122mm some BM-21 Grad; 220mm 6+ TOS-1A MOR 950+: 81mm ε500 M252; 120mm ε450 M120; 240mm M-240 HELICOPTERS ATK 35: 11 Mi-28NE Havoc; 4 Mi-28UB Havoc; 20+ Mi35M Hind MRH 63+: 4+ SA342 Gazelle; 17 Bell IA407; 23 H135M; ε19 Mi-17 Hip H/Mi-171Sh ISR 10 OH-58C Kiowa TPT • Light 44: 16 Bell 205 (UH-1H Huey II); 10 Bell 206B3 Jet Ranger; ε18 Bell T407 UNINHABITED AERIAL VEHICLES • CISR Heavy 12 CH-4† AIR-LAUNCHED MISSILES • ASM 9K114 Shturm (RSAT-6 Spiral); AGR-20A APKWS; AR-1; Ingwe

Navy 3,000 EQUIPMENT BY TYPE PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 32 PCF (2 Musa ibn Nusayr (ITA Assad) with 1 76mm gun non operational) PCO 2 Al Basra (US River Hawk) PCC 4 Fateh (ITA Diciotti) PB 20: 12 Swiftships 35; 5 Predator (PRC 27m); 3 Al Faw PBR 6: 2 Type-200; 4 Type-2010

Marines 1,000 FORCES BY ROLE MANOEUVRE Amphibious 2 mne bn

Middle East and North Africa

Baghdad’s ability to independently sustain this level of operational effectiveness. The continuing reliance on a relatively small number of key formations for offensive operations, particularly the wellregarded Counter-Terrorism Service, has resulted in these forces suffering disproportionately high levels of attrition. Meanwhile, the nature of the relationship between the official government forces, the Kurdish Peshmerga forces and the Popular Mobilisation Units militias remains an unresolved issue. The government’s most critical security relationship has been with the US, on whom Iraqi forces remain largely dependent for training and ISR support, as well as contractor maintenance. Political pressure from nationalist and Iran-aligned political parties, and continuing attacks on US forces by Iranian-supported militia units, have strained this relationship in recent years, and the US has begun drawing down its presence in the country. The NATO Mission Iraq remains, with a focus on training and capacity-building. The armed forces’ inventory comprises a heterogeneous mix of Soviet-era and Russian equipment combined with newer European- and US-sourced platforms, and significant shortcomings in logistics support remain a problem. Barring military maintenance facilities, Iraq’s defence industry has only limited capacity, focusing on the manufacture of light weapons and ammunition.

346 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2022

Air Force ε5,000

Territorial Interdiction Force ε50,000

FORCES BY ROLE FIGHTER/GROUND ATTACK 2 sqn with F-16C/D Fighting Falcon GROUND ATTACK 1 sqn with Su-25/Su-25K/Su-25UBK Frogfoot 1 sqn with L-159A; L-159T1 ISR 1 sqn with CH-2000 Sama; SB7L-360 Seeker 1 sqn with Cessna 208B Grand Caravan; Cessna AC-208B Combat Caravan* 1 sqn with Beech 350 King Air TRANSPORT 1 sqn with An-32B Cline 1 sqn with C-130E/J-30 Hercules TRAINING 1 sqn with Cessna 172, Cessna 208B 1 sqn with Lasta-95 1 sqn with T-6A 1 sqn with T-50IQ Golden Eagle*

FORCES BY ROLE MANOEUVRE Other 4 sy bde 11 sy bde (forming)

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE AIRCRAFT 90 combat capable FGA 34: 26 F-16C Fighting Falcon; 8 F-16D Fighting Falcon; ATK 30: 10 L-159A; 1 L-159T1; ε19 Su-25/Su-25K/Su25UBK Frogfoot† ISR 10: 2 Cessna AC-208B Combat Caravan*; 2 SB7L-360 Seeker; 6 Beech 350ER King Air TPT 29: Medium 15: 3 C-130E Hercules; 6 C-130J-30 Hercules; 6 An-32B Cline (of which 2 combat capable); Light 14: 1 Beech 350 King Air; 5 Cessna 208B Grand Caravan; 8 Cessna 172 TRG 57+: 8 CH-2000 Sama; 10+ Lasta-95; 15 T-6A; 24 T-50IQ Golden Eagle* AIR-LAUNCHED MISSILES AAM • IR AIM-9L Sidewinder; AIM-9M Sidewinder; SARH AIM-7M Sparrow ASM AGM-114 Hellfire BOMBS Laser-guided GBU-10 Paveway II; GBU-12 Paveway II INS/GPS-guided FT-9

Air Defence Command ε5,000 FORCES BY ROLE AIR DEFENCE 1 SAM bn with 96K6 Pantsir-S1 (RS-SA-22 Greyhound) 1 SAM bn with M1097 Avenger 1 SAM bn with 9K338 Igla-S (RS-SA-24 Grinch) 1 ADA bn with ZU-23-2; S-60 EQUIPMENT BY TYPE AIR DEFENCE SAM 24+ Short-range 24 96K6 Pantsir-S1 (RS-SA-22 Greyhound) Point-defence M1097 Avenger; 9K338 Igla-S (RS-SA-24 Grinch) GUNS • TOWED 23mm ZU-23-2; 57mm S-60

Gendarmerie & Paramilitary ε266,000 Iraqi Federal Police ε36,000

Militias ε180,000 Popular Mobilisation Units include: Badr Organisation; Kataib Hizbullah; Kataib Imam Ali; Kataib Sayyid alShuhada

FOREIGN FORCES Australia Operation Inherent Resolve (Okra) 110 • NATO Mission Iraq 2 Belgium Operation Inherent Resolve (Valiant Phoenix) 7 Canada Operation Inherent Resolve (Impact) 250; 1 SF gp; 1 hel flt with 3 Bell 412 (CH-146 Griffon); 1 med unit • NATO Mission Iraq 17 Czech Republic Operation Inherent Resolve 60 Denmark NATO Mission Iraq 210; 1 SF gp; 1 trg team Estonia Operation Inherent Resolve 10 • NATO Mission Iraq 40 Fiji UNAMI 168; 2 sy unit Finland Operation Inherent Resolve 75; 1 trg unit • NATO Mission Iraq 5 France Operation Inherent Resolve 6 • NATO Mission Iraq 3 Germany Operation Inherent Resolve 80 • NATO Mission Iraq 10 Greece NATO Mission Iraq 1 Hungary Operation Inherent Resolve 138 • NATO Mission Iraq 19 Italy Operation Inherent Resolve (Prima Parthica) 600; 1 inf regt; 1 trg unit; 1 hel sqn with 4 NH90 • NATO Mission Iraq 280 Latvia Operation Inherent Resolve 6 Lithuania Operation Inherent Resolve 6 • NATO Mission Iraq 9 Nepal UNAMI 77; 1 sy unit Netherlands Operation Inherent Resolve 150; 2 trg units • NATO Mission Iraq 2 New Zealand Operation Inherent Resolve 9 Norway Operation Inherent Resolve 60; 1 trg unit • NATO Mission Iraq 2 Poland Operation Inherent Resolve 150 • NATO Mission Iraq 30 Portugal Operation Inherent Resolve 30 Romania Operation Inherent Resolve 1 • NATO Mission Iraq 4 Slovakia NATO Mission Iraq 5 Slovenia Operation Inherent Resolve 6 Spain Operation Inherent Resolve 150; 1 trg units; 1 hel unit • NATO Mission Iraq 115 Sweden Operation Inherent Resolve 2 • NATO Mission Iraq 1 Turkey Army 1,000; 1 cdo unit • NATO Mission Iraq 86

Middle East and North Africa 347 United Kingdom Operation Inherent Resolve (Shader)/ NATO Mission Iraq 100 United States Operation Inherent Resolve 2,000; 1 ARNG inf bde(-); 1 EOD pl; 1 atk hel bn with AH-64E Apache; 1 CISR UAV sqn with MQ-9A Reaper • NATO Mission Iraq 1

2020

2021

ILS

1.40tr

1.52tr

USD

407bn

468bn

USD

44,181

49,840

Growth

-2.2

7.1

Inflation

-0.6

1.4

Def bdgt FMA (US)

ILS

59.3bn

65.9bn

USD

17.2bn

20.3bn

USD

3.30bn

3.44

3.25

USD1=ILS

2022

Israel is widely believed to have a nuclear capability – delivery means include F-15I and F-16I ac, Jericho 2 IRBM and, reportedly, Dolphin/Tanin-class SSKs with LACM 63.9bn 3.30bn

19.4

2008

16.8 2021

2015

ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE Strategic Forces

Real-terms defence budget trend (USDbn, constant 2015)

Population

55,000)

8,787,045

Age

0–14

15–19

20–24

25–29

Male

13.6%

4.1%

3.9%

3.6%

30–64 65 plus 19.7%

5.4%

Female

13.0%

4.0%

3.7%

3.4%

19.1%

6.6%

Capabilities The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) are organised for territorial defence, short-term interventions in neighbouring states and limited regional power projection. Israel is widely believed to possess a nuclear-weapons capability. Following the 2015 Plan Gideon, the IDF adopted a new five-year Plan Tnufa (Momentum) in 2020. It seeks to improve areas of relative superiority such as technology and intelligence, to ensure swifter and more decisive operations against future threats. The new government approved a defence budget in mid-2021, following two years without a new budget, which has enabled the plan to proceed. The US remains Israel’s key defence partner, as well as a significant source of funding, and is instrumental in several of the IDF’s equipment programmes, particularly in missile defence and combat aviation. Israel also maintains discreet ties with a number of Arab states and has recently normalised relations with several Gulf states. Personnel quality and training are generally high, despite the IDF’s continuing reliance on national service. Ground-forces training is being overhauled, with new training centres under construction. Given its planned mission-set, the IDF’s logistics capabilities are limited to sustaining operations within Israel itself or in immediately neighbouring territories. The largely asymmetric nature of the threats the IDF has faced in recent years has focused modernisation efforts on forceprotection, missile-defence and precision-strike capabilities. Israel maintains a broad defence-industrial base, with world-class capabilities in several areas, notably armoured vehicles, uninhabited systems, guided weapons, radars and sensors, and cyber security.

ACTIVE 169,500 (Army 126,000 Navy 9,500 Air 34,000) Gendarmerie & Paramilitary 8,000

FORCES BY ROLE SURFACE-TO-SURFACE MISSILE 3 IRBM sqn with Jericho 2 EQUIPMENT BY TYPE SURFACE-TO-SURFACE MISSILE LAUNCHERS IRBM • Nuclear: ε24 Jericho 2

Strategic Defences FORCES BY ROLE AIR DEFENCE 3 bty with Arrow 2 ATBM with Green Pine/Super Green Pine radar and Citrus Tree command post 10 bty with Iron Dome (incl reserve bty) 4 bty with M901 Patriot PAC-2 2 bty with David’s Sling

Space EQUIPMENT BY TYPE SATELLITES 10 COMMUNICATIONS 3 Amos ISR 7: 1 EROS; 5 Ofeq (5, 7, 9, 10 & 16); 1 TecSAR-1 (Polaris)

Army 26,000; 100,000 conscript (total 126,000)

Organisation and structure of formations may vary according to op situations. Equipment includes that required for reserve forces on mobilisation FORCES BY ROLE COMMAND 3 (regional comd) corps HQ 2 armd div HQ 1 (Multidimensional) div HQ 5 (territorial) inf div HQ 1 (home defence) comd HQ SPECIAL FORCES 1 spec ops bde (3 spec ops unit) MANOEUVRE Reconnaissance 1 indep recce bn Armoured 3 armd bde (1 recce coy, 3 a rmd bn, 1 AT coy, 1 cbt engr bn) 1 (Multidimensional) armd inf/ISR bn Mechanised 3 mech inf bde (3 mech inf bn, 1 cbt spt bn, 1 sigs coy) 1 mech inf bde (1 recce bn, 4 mech inf bn, 1 cbt spt bn) 1 indep mech inf bn

Middle East and North Africa

New Israeli Shekel ILS

per capita

RESERVE 465,000 (Army 400,000 Navy 10,000 Air Annual trg as cbt reservists to age 40 (some specialists to age 54) for male other ranks, 38 (or marriage/pregnancy) for women

Israel ISR GDP

Conscript liability Officers 48 months, other ranks 32 months, women 24 months (Jews and Druze only; Christians, Circassians and Muslims may volunteer)

348 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2022 Light 1 (Border Protection) inf bde (2 ISR bn, 4 inf bn) 1 mtn inf bde 2 indep inf bn Air Manoeuvre 1 para bde (3 para bn, 1 cbt spt bn, 1 sigs coy) Other 1 armd trg bde (3 armd bn) 1 (Border Protection) sy bde (4 sy bn; 2 ISR bn) COMBAT SUPPORT 3 arty bde 1 engr bde (3 engr bn, 3 EOD coy) 1 CBRN bn 1 int bde (3 int bn) 1 SIGINT unit 2 MP bn

Reserves 400,000+ on mobilisation FORCES BY ROLE COMMAND 3 armd div HQ 1 AB div HQ MANOEUVRE Armoured 9 armd bde Mechanised 8 mech inf bde Light 16 (territorial/regional) inf bde Air Manoeuvre 4 para bde Mountain 1 mtn inf bn COMBAT SUPPORT 5 arty bde COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT 6 log unit EQUIPMENT BY TYPE ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES MBT ε400 Merkava MkIV (ε700 Merkava MkIII; ε200 Merkava MkIV all in store) APC • APC (T) 1,190: ε290 Namer; 500 M113A2; ε400 Nagmachon (Centurion chassis); Nakpadon (5,100: ε100 Achzarit (modified T-55 chassis); 5,000 M113A1/A2 all in store) AUV Ze’ev ENGINEERING & MAINTENANCE VEHICLES AEV D9R; Namer; Puma ARV Nemmera; M88A1; M113 ARV VLB Alligator MAB; M48/60; MTU NBC VEHICLES ε8 TPz-1 Fuchs NBC ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE • MSL SP M113 with Spike; Tamuz (Spike NLOS) MANPATS IMI MAPATS; Spike SR/MR/LR/ER ARTILLERY 530 SP 250: 155mm 250 M109A5 (155mm 30 M109A2; 175mm 36 M107; 203mm 36 M110 all in store) TOWED (155mm 171: 40 M-46 mod; 50 M-68/M-71; 81 M-839P/M-845P all in store) MRL 30: 227mm 30 M270 MLRS; 306mm IMI Lynx (160mm 50 LAR-160; 227mm 18 M270 MLRS; 290mm 20 LAR-290 all in store)

MOR 250: 81mm 250 (81mm 1,100; 120mm 650; 160mm 18 Soltam M-66 all in store) AIR DEFENCE • SAM • Point-defence Machbet; FIM-92 Stinger

Navy 7,000; 2,500 conscript (total 9,500) EQUIPMENT BY TYPE SUBMARINES 5 SSK 5: 3 Dolphin (GER HDW design) with 6 single 533mm TT with UGM-84C Harpoon Block 1B AShM/SeaHake (DM2A3) HWT/SeaHake mod 4 (DM2A4) HWT/ Kaved HWT, 4 single 650mm TT with dual-capable LACM (reported) 2 Tanin (GER HDW design) (fitted with AIP) with 6 single 533mm TT with UGM-84C Harpoon Block 1B AShM/SeaHake (DM2A3) HWT/SeaHake mod 4 (DM2A4) HWT/Kaved HWT, 4 single 650mm TT with dual-capable LACM (reported) PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 49 CORVETTES • FSGHM 7: 2 Eilat (Sa’ar 5) with 2 quad lnchr with RGM-84 Harpoon AShM/Gabriel V AShM, 4 8-cell VLS with Barak-1 SAM (being upgraded to Barak-8), 2 triple 324mm TT with Mk 46 LWT, 1 Mk 15 Phalanx CIWS (capacity 1 AS565SA Panther ASW hel) 1 Eilat (Sa’ar 5) with 2 quad lnchr with RGM-84 Harpoon AShM/Gabriel V AShM, 4 8-cell VLS with Barak-8 SAM, 2 triple 324mm TT with Mk 46 LWT, 1 Mk 15 Phalanx CIWS (capacity 1 AS565SA Panther ASW hel) 4 Magen (Sa’ar 6) with 2 quad lnchr with Gabriel V AShM, 2 20-cell VLS with Tamir (C-Dome) SAM, 4 8-cell VLS with Barak LRAD, 2 triple 324mm ASTT with Mk 54 LWT (capacity 1 AS565SA Panther ASW hel) PCGM 8 Hetz (Sa’ar 4.5) with 2 quad lnchr with RGM84 Harpoon AShM (can also be fitted with up to 6 single lnchr with Gabriel II AShM), 2 8-cell VLS with Barak-1 SAM, (can be fitted with 2 triple 324mm Mk32 TT with Mk46 LWT), 1 Mk 15 Phalanx CWIS, 1 76mm gun PBF 34: 5 Shaldag; 3 Stingray; 9 Super Dvora Mk I (SSM & TT may be fitted); 4 Super Dvora Mk II (SSM & TT may be fitted); 6 Super Dvora Mk II-I (SSM & TT may be fitted); 4 Super Dvora Mk III (SSM & TT may be fitted); 3 Super Dvora Mk III (SSM may be fitted) AMPHIBIOUS • LANDING CRAFT • LCVP 3 Manta LOGISTICS AND SUPPORT • AG 1 Bat Yam (ex-GER Type-745)

Naval Commandos ε300 FORCES BY ROLE SPECIAL FORCES 1 cdo unit

Air Force 34,000

Responsible for Air and Space Coordination FORCES BY ROLE FIGHTER & FIGHTER/GROUND ATTACK 1 sqn with F-15A/B/D Eagle (Baz) 1 sqn with F-15B/C/D Eagle (Baz) 1 sqn with F-15I Ra’am

5 sqn with F-16C/D Fighting Falcon (Barak) 4 sqn with F-16I Fighting Falcon (Sufa) 2 sqn with F-35I Adir ANTI-SUBMARINE WARFARE 1 sqn with AS565SA Panther (missions flown by IAF but with non-rated aircrew) ELECTRONIC WARFARE 1 sqn with RC-12D Guardrail; Beech A36 Bonanza (Hofit); Beech 200 King Air; Beech 200T King Air; Beech 200CT King Air AIRBORNE EARLY WARNING & CONTROL 1 sqn with Gulfstream G550 Eitam; Gulfstream G550 Shavit TANKER/TRANSPORT 1 sqn with C-130E/H Hercules; KC-130H Hercules 1 sqn with C-130J-30 Hercules 1 sqn with KC-707 TRAINING 1 OPFOR sqn with F-16C/D Fighting Falcon (Barak) 1 sqn with F-35I Adir 1 sqn with M-346 Master (Lavi) ATTACK HELICOPTER 1 sqn with AH-64A Apache (Peten) 1 sqn with AH-64D Apache (Sarat) TRANSPORT HELICOPTER 2 sqn with CH-53D Sea Stallion 2 sqn with S-70A Black Hawk; UH-60A Black Hawk 1 medevac unit with CH-53D Sea Stallion UAV 1 ISR sqn with Hermes 450 1 ISR sqn with Heron (Shoval); Heron TP (Eitan) 1 ISR sqn with Heron (Shoval) (MP role) AIR DEFENCE 3 bty with Arrow 2/3 10 bty with Iron Dome 4 bty with M901 Patriot PAC-2 2 bty with David’s Sling SPECIAL FORCES 1 SF wg (2 SF unit, 1 CSAR unit, 1 int unit) SURFACE-TO-SURFACE MISSILE 3 IRBM sqn with Jericho 2 EQUIPMENT BY TYPE AIRCRAFT 339 combat capable FGA 309: 16 F-15A Eagle (Baz); 6 F-15B Eagle (Baz); 17 F-15C Eagle (Baz); 19 F-15D Eagle (Baz); 25 F-15I Ra’am; ε50 F-16C Fighting Falcon (Barak); 49 F-16D Fighting Falcon (Barak); 97 F-16I Fighting Falcon (Sufa); 30 F-35I Adir ISR 7: 6 RC-12D Guardrail; 1 Gulfstream G550 Oron ELINT 4: 1 EC-707; 3 Gulfstream G550 Shavit AEW 4: 2 B-707 Phalcon; 2 Gulfstream G550 Eitam (1 more on order) TKR/TPT 10: 4 KC-130H Hercules; 6 KC-707 TPT 65: Medium 18: 5 C-130E Hercules; 6 C-130H Hercules; 7 C-130J-30 Hercules; Light 47: 3 AT-802 Air Tractor; 9 Beech 200 King Air; 8 Beech 200T King Air; 5 Beech 200CT King Air; 22 Beech A36 Bonanza (Hofit) TRG 66: 16 Grob G-120; 30 M-346 Master (Lavi)*; 20 T-6A HELICOPTERS ATK 43: 26 AH-64A Apache (Peten); 17 AH-64D Apache (Sarat)

ASW 7 AS565SA Panther (missions flown by IAF but with non-rated aircrew) ISR 12 OH-58B Kiowa TPT 80: Heavy 25 CH-53D Sea Stallion; Medium 49: 39 S-70A Black Hawk; 10 UH-60A Black Hawk; Light 6 Bell 206 Jet Ranger UNINHABITED AERIAL VEHICLES ISR 3+: Heavy 3+: Heron (Shoval); 3 Heron TP (Eitan); RQ5A Hunter; Medium Hermes 450; Hermes 900 (22+ Searcher MkII in store); (an unknown number of ISR UAVs are combat capable) LOITERING MUNITIONS Harop; Harpy SURFACE-TO-SURFACE MISSILE LAUNCHERS IRBM • Nuclear ε24 Jericho 2 AIR DEFENCE SAM 40+: Long-range M901 Patriot PAC-2 Medium-range some David’s Sling Short-range up to 40 Iron Dome Point-defence Machbet GUNS • TOWED 20mm M167 Vulcan MISSILE DEFENCE • SAM 24 Arrow 2/Arrow 3; AIR-LAUNCHED MISSILES AAM • IR AIM-9 Sidewinder; Python 4; IIR Python 5; ARH AIM-120C AMRAAM ASM AGM-114 Hellfire; AGM-62B Walleye; AGM-65 Maverick; Delilah AL; Popeye I/II; Spike NLOS BOMBS IIR guided Opher Laser-guided Griffin; Lizard; Paveway II INS/GPS guided GBU-31 JDAM; GBU-39 Small Diameter Bomb (Barad Had); Spice

Airfield Defence 3,000 active (15,000 reservists) Gendarmerie & Paramilitary ε8,000 Border Police ε8,000

FOREIGN FORCES UNTSO unless specified. UNTSO figures represent total numbers for mission Argentina 3 Australia 13 Austria 4 Belgium 1 Bhutan 6 • UNDOF 3 Canada 5 Chile 3 China 4 Czech Republic UNDOF 3 Denmark 10 Estonia 3 Fiji 3 • UNDOF 151; 1 inf coy Finland 15 Ghana UNDOF 6 India 2 • UNDOF 198; 1 inf pl; 1 MP pl; 1 log coy(-) Ireland 11 • UNDOF 130; 1 inf coy Nepal 3 • UNDOF 409; 1 mech inf coy; 1 inf coy; 1 log coy(-)

Middle East and North Africa

Middle East and North Africa 349

350 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2022 Netherlands 11 • UNDOF 1 New Zealand 7 Norway 12 Poland 3 Russia 4 Serbia 1 Slovakia 3 Slovenia 2 Sweden 6 Switzerland 13 United States 2 • US Strategic Command; 100; 1 AN/TPY2 X-band radar at Mount Keren Uruguay UNDOF 232; 1 mech inf coy Zambia 1

Jordanian Dinar JOD

2020

2021

JOD

31.0bn

32.1bn

USD

43.8bn

45.3bn

USD

4,286

4,394

Growth

-1.6

2.0

Inflation

0.4

1.6

JOD

1.22bn

1.28bn

USD

1.72bn

1.80bn

USD

425m

500m

0.71

per capita

Def bdgt [a] FMA (US) USD1=JOD

2022

350m

[a] Excludes expenditure on public order and safety Real-terms defence budget trend (USDbn, constant 2015) 2.17 1.58 2008

Population

ACTIVE 100,500 (Army 86,000 Navy 500 Air 14,000) Gendarmerie & Paramilitary 15,000 RESERVE 65,000 (Army 60,000 Joint 5,000)

ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE Army 86,000

Jordan JOR GDP

operations in Afghanistan and in coalition air operations over Syria and Yemen. Jordan’s inventory largely comprises older systems and procurements have typically been in small numbers, secondhand or donations. Although the state-owned Jordan Design and Development Bureau (JODDB, formerly KADDB) has demonstrated the capacity to upgrade vehicles, the army has largely recapitalised its armoured-vehicle fleet with second-hand armour from European countries. JODDB produces some light armoured vehicles for domestic use, but the company currently has little export profile.

2015

2021

10,909,567

Age

0–14

15–19

20–24

25–29

30–64 65 plus

Male

16.6%

5.3%

5.0%

4.7%

19.1%

1.8%

Female

15.8%

5.0%

4.4%

4.0%

16.3%

1.9%

Capabilities The Jordanian armed forces are structured to provide border security and an armoured response to conventional threats. Efforts to restructure, review modernisation requirements and increase efficiency are ongoing. In recent years, Jordan has withdrawn some equipment from service, particularly aircraft, likely due to budgetary pressure. There has been no recent public statement of defence policy, but regional instability is a prime concern, principally the ongoing war in Syria. Jordan is a major non-NATO ally of the US and there is a close bilateral defence relationship, with Jordan receiving a minimum of USD350 million a year in Foreign Military Financing until the end of 2022. The country has developed a bespoke special-forces training centre and has hosted training for numerous state and non-state military forces. A training centre for female personnel was inaugurated in mid-2021 and aims to boost the number of women in the military to 3% of the total. Personnel are well trained, particularly aircrew and special forces, who are highly regarded internationally. Jordanian forces are able to independently deploy regionally and have participated in ISAF

FORCES BY ROLE SPECIAL FORCES 1 (Royal Guard) SF gp (1 SF regt, 1 SF bn, 1 CT bn) 1 spec ops bde (3 spec ops bn) MANOEUVRE Armoured 2 armd bde Mechanised 8 mech bde Light 2 (Border Gd) inf bde 1 (Border Gd) inf gp Air Manoeuvre 1 AB bde (3 AB bn) COMBAT SUPPORT 4 arty bde 4 AD bde 1 MRL bn 1 engr bn COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT 1 log bn EQUIPMENT BY TYPE ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES MBT 266: ε80 FV4034 Challenger 1 (Al Hussein) (being withdrawn); 4+ Leclerc; 182 M60A3 (ε300 FV4034 Challenger 1 (Al Hussein) in store) ASLT 80 B1 Centauro (61 more in store) IFV 720: 13 AIFV-B-C25; 50 Marder 1A3; 321 Ratel-20; 336 YPR-765 PRI APC 923+ APC (T) 729: 370 M113A1/A2 Mk1J; 269 M577A2 (CP); 87 YPR-765 PRCO (CP); 3 AIFV-B PPV 194: some Al-Wahsh; 25 Marauder; 25 Matador; 100 MaxxPro; 44 Nomad/Thunder AUV 35 Cougar ENGINEERING & MAINTENANCE VEHICLES ARV 85+: Al Monjed; 5 BPz-1; FV4204 Chieftain ARV; 32 M88A1; 30 M578; 18 YPR-806 MW 12 Aardvark Mk2 ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE • MSL SP 115: 70 M901; 45 AIFV-B-Milan MANPATS FGM-148 Javelin; TOW/TOW-2A; 9K135 Kornet (RS-AT-14 Spriggan); Luch Corsar; Stugna-P

Middle East and North Africa 351

Navy ε500 EQUIPMENT BY TYPE PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 9 PBF 2 Response Boat-Medium (RB-M) PB 7: 4 Abdullah (US Dauntless); 3 Al Hussein (UK Vosper 30m)

Marines FORCES BY ROLE MANOEUVRE Amphibious 1 mne unit

Air Force 14,000 FORCES BY ROLE FIGHTER/GROUND ATTACK 2 sqn with F-16AM/BM Fighting Falcon ISR 1 sqn with AT-802U Air Tractor 1 sqn with Cessna 208B TRANSPORT 1 sqn with C-130E Hercules TRAINING 1 OCU with F-16AM/BM Fighting Falcon 1 sqn with PC-21 1 sqn with Grob 120TP 1 hel sqn with R-44 Raven II ATTACK HELICOPTER 2 sqn with AH-1F Cobra (with TOW) TRANSPORT HELICOPTER 1 sqn with AS332M Super Puma; UH-60A Black Hawk 1 sqn with UH-60A Black Hawk 1 sqn with UH-60M Black Hawk 1 sqn with Mi-26T2 Halo 1 (Royal) flt with VH-60M Black Hawk; AW139 ISR UAV 1 sqn with S-100 Camcopter AIR DEFENCE 2 bde with MIM-23B Phase III I-Hawk EQUIPMENT BY TYPE AIRCRAFT 57 combat capable FGA 47: 33 F-16AM Fighting Falcon; 14 F-16BM Fighting Falcon ATK (2 AC235 in store, offered for sale) ISR 10 AT-802U Air Tractor*

TPT 10: Medium 3 C-130E Hercules (1 C-130B Hercules; 4 C-130H Hercules in store); Light 7: 5 Cessna 208B; 2 M-28 Skytruck (2 C295M in store, offered for sale) TRG 27: 15 Grob 120TP; 12 PC-21; (12 Hawk Mk63* in store, offered for sale) HELICOPTERS ATK 12 AH-1F Cobra (17 more in store, offered for sale) MRH 14: 3 AW139; 11 H135M (Tpt/SAR) (6 MD-530F in store, offered for sale) TPT 49: Heavy 4 Mi-26T2 Halo; Medium 33: 10 AS332M Super Puma (being WFU); 8 UH-60A Black Hawk; 12 UH60M Black Hawk; 3 VH-60M Black Hawk; (8 UH-60L in store, offered for sale); Light 12 R-44 Raven II; (13 Bell 205 (UH-1H Iroquois) in store, offered for sale) UNINHABITED AERIAL VEHICLES CISR • Heavy (some CH-4B in store, offered for sale) ISR • Light up to 10 S-100 Camcopter AIR DEFENCE SAM • Medium-range 24 MIM-23B Phase III I-Hawk GUNS • TOWED 40mm 22 L/70 (with Flycatcher radar) AIR-LAUNCHED MISSILES AAM • IR AIM-9J/N/P Sidewinder; SARH AIM-7 Sparrow; ARH AIM-120C AMRAAM ASM AGM-65D/G Maverick; BGM-71 TOW BOMBS Laser-guided GBU-10/12 Paveway II

Gendarmerie & Paramilitary ε15,000 active Gendarmerie ε15,000 active 3 regional comd FORCES BY ROLE SPECIAL FORCES 2 SF unit MANOEUVRE Other 10 sy bn EQUIPMENT BY TYPE ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES APC • APC (W) 25+: AT105 Saxon (reported); 25+ EE-11 Urutu AUV AB2 Al-Jawad

DEPLOYMENT CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC: UN • MINUSCA 10 DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO: UN • MONUSCO 14 MALI: UN • MINUSMA 329; 1 mech inf coy(+) SOUTH SUDAN: UN • UNMISS 6 WESTERN SAHARA: UN • MINURSO 2

FOREIGN FORCES France Operation Inherent Resolve (Chammal) 300; 4 Rafale F3 Germany Operation Inherent Resolve 150; 1 A400M United States Central Command: Operation Inherent Resolve 2,000; 1 FGA sqn with 18 F-16C Fighting Falcon; 1 CISR sqn with 12 MQ-9A Reaper

Middle East and North Africa

ARTILLERY 1,393+ SP 506: 155mm 358 M109A1/A2; 203mm 148 M110A2 TOWED 94: 105mm 66: 54 M102; 12 M119A2; 155mm 28: 10 M1/M59; 18 M114; 203mm (4 M115 in store) MRL 16+: 227mm 12 M142 HIMARS; 273mm 4+ WM-80 MOR 777: 81mm 359; SP 81mm 50; 107mm 50 M30; 120mm 300 Brandt SP 120mm 18 Agrab Mk2 AIR DEFENCE SAM • Point-defence 92+: 92 9K35 Strela-10 (RS-SA-13 Gopher); 9K36 Strela-3 (RS-SA-14 Gremlin); 9K310 Igla-1 (RS-SA-16 Gimlet); 9K38 Igla (RS-SA-18 Grouse); 9K338 Igla-S (RS-SA-24 Grinch) GUNS • SP 108: 23mm 48 ZSU-23-4 Shilka; 35mm 60 Gepard

352 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2022

Kuwait KWT Kuwaiti Dinar KWD

2020

2021

32.4bn

40.2bn

GDP

KWD USD

106bn

132bn

per capita

USD

22,684

27,927

Growth

-8.9

0.9

Inflation

2.1

3.2

Def bdgt [a]

KWD

2.09bn

2.93bn

USD

6.82bn

9.64bn

0.31

0.30

USD1=KWD

2022

[a] Includes National Guard Real-terms defence budget trend (USDbn, constant 2015) 8.64 5.00 2008

Population

2015

2021

3,032,065

Age

0–14

15–19

20–24

25–29

Male

12.5%

3.3%

4.9%

7.2%

30–64 65 plus 28.8%

1.3%

Female

11.5%

3.1%

3.7%

4.3%

17.7%

1.7%

Capabilities Kuwait’s armed forces are postured to provide territorial defence through a strategy of holding out against any superior aggressor until allied forces can be mobilised to assist. Kuwait is a member of the GCC, but its key defence relationship has been with the US since 1991. Washington designated Kuwait a major non-NATO ally in 2004, and a bilateral defence-cooperation agreement provides for a range of joint activities and mentoring, and the stationing and pre-positioning of significant numbers of US personnel and supplies of equipment. The US drawdown of forces from CENTCOM in 2021 means that, in future, greater emphasis for Kuwait’s defence may be placed upon the country’s own capabilities, as well as those of its regional GCC allies. The focus on national defence means that Kuwait has little expeditionary sustainment capacity, although it did make a small air contribution to the Saudi-led coalition at the beginning of the Yemen conflict. Air and missile defence has been the primary focus of recent modernisation actions, given Kuwait’s proximity to Iran, but the Emirate has also begun to modernise its fleets of ageing land- and air-combat platforms. There is some organic maintenance capacity, though this is bolstered by contractor support. Kuwait lacks a domestic defence-industrial base and is reliant on imports, albeit with offset requirements to help stimulate the country’s wider industrial sector.

ACTIVE 17,500 (Army 11,500 Navy 2,000 Air 2,500

Emiri Guard 1,500) Gendarmerie & Paramilitary 7,100

Conscript liability 12 months, males 18–35 years

MANOEUVRE Reconnaissance 1 mech/recce bde Armoured 3 armd bde Mechanised 2 mech inf bde Light 1 cdo bde Other 1 (Amiri) gd bde COMBAT SUPPORT 1 arty bde 1 engr bde 1 MP bn COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT 1 log gp 1 fd hospital

Reserve FORCES BY ROLE MANOEUVRE Mechanised 1 bde EQUIPMENT BY TYPE ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES MBT 294: 218 M1A2 Abrams; 1 M1A2K Abrams; 75 M-84AB (75 more in store) IFV 537: 76 BMP-2; 122 BMP-3; 103 BMP-3M; 236 Desert Warrior† (incl variants) APC 260 APC (T) 260: 230 M113A2; 30 M577 (CP) APC (W) (40 TH 390 Fahd in store) AUV 300 Sherpa Light Scout ENGINEERING & MAINTENANCE VEHICLES ARV 19+: 19 M88A1/2; Type-653A; Warrior MW Aardvark Mk2 NBC VEHICLES 12 Fuchs-2 NBC ARTY 211 SP 155mm 106: 37 M109A3; 18 Mk F3; 51 PLZ-45 (18 AUF-1 in store) MRL 300mm 27 9A52 Smerch MOR 78: 81mm 60; 107mm 6 M30; 120mm ε12 RT-F1 ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE MSL SP 74: 66 HMMWV TOW; 8 M901 MANPATS 9K135 Kornet (RS-AT-14 Spriggan); TOW-2 RCL 84mm Carl Gustaf AIR DEFENCE SAM • Point-defence Starburst; FIM-92 Stinger

RESERVE 23,700 (Joint 23,700)

Navy ε2,000 (incl 500 Coast Guard)

Reserve obligation to age 40; 1 month annual trg

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 20 PCFG 2: 1 Al Sanbouk (GER Lurssen TNC 45m) with 2 twin lnchr with MM40 Exocet AShM, 1 76mm gun 1 Istiqlal (GER Lurssen TNC 57m) with 2 twin lnchr with MM40 Exocet AShM, 1 76mm gun PBF 10 Al Nokatha (US Mk V PBF)

ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE Army 11,500 FORCES BY ROLE SPECIAL FORCES 1 SF unit

Middle East and North Africa 353

Air Force 2,500 FORCES BY ROLE FIGHTER/GROUND ATTACK 2 sqn with F/A-18C/D Hornet TRANSPORT 1 sqn with C-17A Globemaster III; KC-130J Hercules; L-100-30 TRAINING 1 OCU sqn with F/A-18C/D Hornet 1 unit with EMB-312 Tucano*; Hawk Mk64* ATTACK HELICOPTER 2 sqn with AH-64D Apache 1 atk/trg sqn with SA342 Gazelle with HOT TRANSPORT HELICOPTER 1 sqn with AS532 Cougar; H225M; SA330 Puma 1 (VIP) sqn with S-92A EQUIPMENT BY TYPE AIRCRAFT 47 combat capable FGA 33: 26 F/A-18C Hornet; 7 F/A-18D Hornet TKR/TPT 3 KC-130J Hercules TPT 5: Heavy 2 C-17A Globemaster III; Medium 3 L-10030 TRG 14: 6 EMB-312 Tucano*; 8 Hawk Mk64* (10 EMB-312 Tucano* in store) HELICOPTERS ATK 16 AH-64D Apache MRH 13 SA342 Gazelle with HOT TPT 19: Heavy 6+ H225M; Medium 13: 3 AS532 Cougar; 7 SA330 Puma; 3 S-92A (SAR/VIP) AIR-LAUNCHED MISSILES AAM • IR AIM-9L Sidewinder; R-550 Magic; SARH AIM-7F Sparrow; ARH AIM-120C7 AMRAAM ASM AGM-65G Maverick; AGM-114K Hellfire; HOT AShM AGM-84D Harpoon Block IC

Air Defence Command FORCES BY ROLE AIR DEFENCE 1 SAM bde (7 SAM bty with M902 Patriot PAC-3) 1 SAM bde (6 SAM bty with Skyguard/Aspide) EQUIPMENT BY TYPE AIR DEFENCE SAM 47 Long-range 35 M902 Patriot PAC-3 Short-range 12 Aspide with Skyguard GUNS • TOWED 35mm 12+ Oerlikon GDF

Emiri Guard 1,500 FORCES BY ROLE MANOEUVRE Other 1 (Emiri) gd bde

Gendarmerie & Paramilitary ε7,100 active National Guard ε6,600 active FORCES BY ROLE SPECIAL FORCES 1 SF bn MANOEUVRE Reconnaissance 1 armd car bn Other 3 security bn COMBAT SUPPORT 1 MP bn EQUIPMENT BY TYPE ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES RECCE 20 VBL IFV ε150 Pandur (incl variants) APC 67+ APC (W) 27+: 5+ Desert Chameleon; 22 S600 (incl variants) PPV 40 Otokar ISV AUV 120 Sherpa Light Scout ENGINEERING & MAINTENANCE VEHICLES ARV Pandur HELICOPTERS TPT • Heavy 3 H225M

Coast Guard 500 EQUIPMENT BY TYPE PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 32 PBF 12 Manta PB 20: 3 Al Shaheed; 4 Inttisar (Austal 31.5m); 3 Kassir (Austal 22m); 10 Subahi AMPHIBIOUS • LANDING CRAFT LCU 4: 2 Al Tahaddy; 1 Saffar; 1 other LOGISTICS AND SUPPORT • AG 1 Sawahil

DEPLOYMENT SAUDI ARABIA: Operation Restoring Hope 4 F/A-18A Hornet

FOREIGN FORCES Canada Operation Inherent Resolve (Impact) 2 C-130J-30 Hercules (CC-130J) Italy Operation Inherent Resolve (Prima Parthica) 300; 4 Tornado ECR; 1 MQ-9A Reaper; 1 C-27J Spartan; 1 KC767A; 1 SAM bty with SAMP/T United Kingdom Operation Inherent Resolve (Shader) 50; 1 CISR UAV sqn with 8 MQ-9A Reaper United States Central Command: 10,000; 1 ARNG armd bn; 1 ARNG (cbt avn) hel bde; 1 spt bde; 1 tpt sqn with 6 MV-22B Osprey; 1 CISR UAV sqn with MQ-9A Reaper; 1 (APS) armd bde eqpt set; 1 (APS) inf bde eqpt set

Middle East and North Africa

PBG 8 Um Almaradim (FRA Combattante 1 derivative) with 2 twin lnchr with Sea Skua AShM AMPHIBIOUS • LANDING CRAFT 8 LCT 2 Assafar (ADSB 64m) LCM 1 Abhan (ADSB 42m) LCVP 5 ADSB 16m LOGISTICS AND SUPPORT • AG 1 Sawahil with 1 hel landing platform

354 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2022

Lebanon LBN Lebanese Pound LBP

2020

2021

GDP

LBP

95.8tr

86.2tr

USD

19.0bn

18.0bn

per capita

USD

2,785

3,421

Growth

-25.0

-10

Inflation

84.9

n.k

Def bdgt

LBP

2.90tr

ε2.90tr

USD

575m

ε579m

FMA (US)

USD

50m

USD1=LBP

2022

160m

5039.75

Real-terms defence budget trend (USDbn, constant 2015) 2.04 0.98 2008

Population

2015

2021

5,261,372

Age

0–14

15–19

20–24

25–29

30–64 65 plus

Male

10.1%

3.7%

3.9%

24.9%

3.6%

Female

9.6%

3.6%

3.5%

3.7%

24.8%

4.8%

Capabilities The ability of the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) to fulfil its missions remains under strain from Hizbullah’s position in national politics and from the spillover effects of the Syrian conflict. Moreover, Lebanon is facing a severe and prolonged economic depression and crisis in governance, highlighted and indeed exacerbated by the port explosion in Beirut on 4 August 2020. The LAF is reliant on outside assistance to continue its operations. In August 2021, the UN Security Council ordered the UNIFIL peacekeeping mission to provide the LAF with food, fuel and medicine, and a number of governments have provided other assistance. The economic crisis has left the government struggling to pay wages to troops, while inflation has eroded the value of salaries. This has led to fears that troops may have to supplement their wages with other employment. Training and operational assistance have traditionally been provided by the US, as well as by France, Germany, Italy and the UK. Reconstruction, funded by Germany, has started of the Beirut naval base. The base was damaged in the 2020 port explosion. LAF operations several years ago against ISIS demonstrated an improved capability, but how much of this remains is unclear. The LAF has no requirement for and minimal capability for extraterritorial deployment. It remains dependent on foreign support to replace and modernise its ageing equipment inventory. Barring limited organic maintenance facilities, Lebanon has no significant domestic defence industry.

ACTIVE 60,000 (Army 56,600 Navy 1,800 Air 1,600) Gendarmerie & Paramilitary 20,000

ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE Army 56,600 FORCES BY ROLE 5 regional comd (Beirut, Bekaa Valley, Mount Lebanon, North, South) SPECIAL FORCES 1 cdo regt

MANOEUVRE Armoured 1 armd regt Mechanised 11 mech inf bde Air Manoeuvre 1 AB regt Amphibious 1 mne cdo regt Other 1 Presidential Guard bde 6 intervention regt 4 border sy regt COMBAT SUPPORT 2 arty regt 1 cbt spt bde (1 engr regt, 1 AT regt, 1 sigs regt; 1 log bn) 1 MP gp COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT 1 log bde 1 med gp 1 construction regt EQUIPMENT BY TYPE MBT 334: 92 M48A1/A5; 10 M60A2; 185 T-54; 47 T-55 RECCE 55 AML IFV 56: 24 AIFV-B-C25; 32 M2A2 Bradley APC 1,378 APC (T) 1,274 M113A1/A2 (incl variants) APC (W) 96: 86 VAB VCT; 10 VBPT-MR Guarani PPV 8 Maxxpro ENGINEERING & MAINTENANCE VEHICLES ARV 3 M88A1; M113 ARV; T-54/55 ARV (reported) VLB MTU-72 reported MW Bozena ARTILLERY 641 SP 155mm 12 M109A2 TOWED 313: 105mm 13 M101A1; 122mm 35: 9 D-30; 26 M-30; 130mm 15 M-46; 155mm 250: 18 M114A1; 218 M198; 14 Model-50 MRL 122mm 11 BM-21 MOR 305: 81mm 134; 82mm 112; 120mm 59: 29 Brandt; 30 M120 ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE MSL SP 35 VAB with HOT MANPATS Milan; TOW RCL 106mm 113 M40A1 UNINHABITED AERIAL VEHICLES ISR • Medium 8 Mohajer 4 AIR DEFENCE SAM • Point-defence 9K32 Strela-2M (RS-SA-7B Grail)‡ GUNS • TOWED 77: 20mm 20; 23mm 57 ZU-23-2

Navy 1,800 EQUIPMENT BY TYPE PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 13 PCC 1 Trablous PBF 1 PB 11: 1 Aamchit (ex-GER Bremen); 1 Al Kalamoun (exFRA Avel Gwarlarn); 7 Tripoli (ex-UK Attacker/Tracker Mk 2); 1 Naquora (ex-GER Bremen); 1 Tabarja (ex-GER Bergen)

AMPHIBIOUS • LANDING CRAFT LCT 2 Sour (ex-FRA EDIC – capacity 8 APC; 96 troops)

Air Force 1,600 4 air bases FORCES BY ROLE GROUND ATTACK 1 sqn with Cessna AC-208 Combat Caravan* 1 sqn with EMB-314 Super Tucano* ATTACK HELICOPTER 1 sqn with SA342L Gazelle TRANSPORT HELICOPTER 4 sqn with Bell 205 (UH-1H Iroquois/Huey II) 1 sqn with SA330/IAR330SM Puma 1 trg sqn with R-44 Raven II EQUIPMENT BY TYPE AIRCRAFT 9 combat capable ISR 3 Cessna AC-208 Combat Caravan* TRG 9: 3 Bulldog; 6 EMB-314 Super Tucano* HELICOPTERS MRH 15: 1 AW139; 6 MD530F+; 8 SA342L Gazelle (5 SA342L Gazelle; 5 SA316 Alouette III; 1 SA318 Alouette II all non-operational) TPT 41: Medium 13: 3 S-61N (fire fighting); 10 SA330/ IAR330 Puma; Light 28: 18 Bell 205 (UH-1H Iroquois); 6 Bell 205 (UH-1H Huey II); 4 R-44 Raven II (basic trg) (11 Bell 205; 7 Bell 212 all non-operational) AIR LAUNCHED MISSILES ASM AGM-114 Hellfire; AGR-20A APKWS

Gendarmerie & Paramilitary ε20,000 active Internal Security Force ε20,000 Ministry of Interior FORCES BY ROLE Other Combat Forces 1 (police) judicial unit 1 regional sy coy 1 (Beirut Gendarmerie) sy coy EQUIPMENT BY TYPE ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES APC • APC (W) 60 V-200 Chaimite

Customs EQUIPMENT BY TYPE PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 7 PB 7: 5 Aztec; 2 Tracker

FOREIGN FORCES Unless specified, figures refer to UNTSO and represent total numbers for the mission Argentina 3 Armenia UNIFIL 32 Australia 13 Austria 4 • UNIFIL 172: 1 log coy Bangladesh UNIFIL 229: 1 FSGM Belarus UNIFIL 9 Belgium 1

Bhutan 6 Brazil UNIFIL 9 Brunei UNIFIL 31 Cambodia UNIFIL 179: 1 EOD coy Canada 5 (Operation Jade) Chile 3 China, People’s Republic of 4 • UNIFIL 419: 2 engr coy; 1 med coy Colombia UNIFIL 1 Croatia UNIFIL 1 Cyprus UNIFIL 2 Denmark 10 El Salvador UNIFIL 54: 1 inf pl Estonia 3 • UNIFIL 1 Fiji 3 • UNIFIL 1 Finland 15 • UNIFIL 162; 1 inf coy France UNIFIL 567: 1 mech inf bn(-); VBL; VBCI; VAB; Mistral Germany UNIFIL 103: 1 FFGM Ghana UNIFIL 877: 1 recce coy; 1 mech inf bn Greece UNIFIL 111: 1 FFGHM Guatemala UNIFIL 2 Hungary UNIFIL 16 India 2 • UNIFIL 867: 1 inf bn; 1 med coy Indonesia UNIFIL 1,229: 1 mech inf bn; 1 MP coy; 1 FSGHM Ireland 11 • UNIFIL 338: 1 mech inf bn(-) Italy MIBIL 315 • UNIFIL 906: 1 mech bde HQ; 1 mech inf bn; 1 MP coy; 1 sigs coy; 1 hel bn Kazakhstan UNIFIL 37 Kenya UNIFIL 4 Korea, Republic of UNIFIL 255: 1 mech inf coy; 1 engr coy; 1 sigs coy; 1 maint coy Macedonia, North UNIFIL 3 Malaysia UNIFIL 1,045: 1 mech inf bn Malta UNIFIL 11 Nepal 3 • UNIFIL 877: 1 mech inf bn Netherlands 11 • UNIFIL 1 New Zealand 7 Nigeria UNIFIL 1 Norway 12 Peru UNIFIL 1 Poland 3 • UNIFIL 192; 1 mech inf coy Qatar UNIFIL 1 Russia 4 Serbia 1 • UNIFIL 177; 1 mech inf coy Sierra Leone UNIFIL 3 Slovakia 3 Slovenia 2 Spain UNIFIL 625: 1 mech bde HQ; 1 mech inf bn(-); 1 engr coy; 1 sigs coy Sri Lanka UNIFIL 123: 1 inf coy Sweden 6 Switzerland 13 Tanzania UNIFIL 125: 1 MP coy Turkey UNIFIL 112: 1 PCFG

Middle East and North Africa

Middle East and North Africa 355

356 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2022 United States 2 Uruguay UNIFIL 1 Zambia 1 • UNIFIL 2

Libya LBY Libyan Dinar LYD

2020

2021

GDP

LYD

26.6bn

121bn

USD

19.2bn

27.3bn

per capita

USD

2,891

4,069

-59.7

123.2 21.1

Growth Inflation

2.8

Def bdgt

LYD

n.k.

USD

n.k.

1.39

4.44

USD1=LYD Population

2022

7,017,224

Age

0–14

15–19

20–24

25–29

Male

17.1%

4.1%

3.7%

3.5%

30–64 65 plus 20.8%

1.9%

Female

16.4%

3.9%

3.5%

3.3%

19.4%

2.2%

Capabilities The formation of a new Government of National Unity, in March 2021, unifies the Tripoli-based Government of National Accord (GNA) and the Tobruk-based House of Representatives. A UNbacked ceasefire, agreed in October 2020, is intended to see the deployment of monitors, while a follow-up resolution agreed in April 2021 called for all foreign forces and mercenaries to withdraw. Reconstruction is the new government’s top priority as well as holding elections in December 2021. The new president, Mohamed Al-Menfi, promised to unify government institutions and the military forces of the GNA and the Libyan Arab Armed Forces (LAAF) controlled by General Khalifa Haftar. Forces affiliated to both have relatively low levels of training. The presence in these formations of units from the former Gadhafi-era army has over the years bolstered their military capability. The GNA-affiliated forces have since 2016 benefited from several military advisory and training programmes, including EUNAVFOR–MED maritime-security training for the Libyan Navy and Coast Guard. Foreign-military involvement increased in 2020. Both the GNA and the LAAF continue to be supported by foreign military forces, private military contractors and mercenaries. There are also reports of Syrian combatants paid to fight for both sides. LAAF troops have combat experience from fighting ISIS in the eastern coastal region and they have allegedly received training and combat support from external actors in the region. Equipment is mainly of Russian or Soviet origin, including items from the former Libyan armed forces, and suffers from varying degrees of obsolescence. The country has no domestic defence-industrial capability.

IFV BMP-2 APC APC (T) ACV-AAPC; Steyr 4K-7FA APC (W) Mbombe-6 PPV Al-Wahsh; Kirpi-2; Vuran AUV Lenco Bearcat G3; Nimr Ajban ENGINEERING & MAINTENANCE VEHICLES ARV Centurion 105 AVRE ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE • MSL SP 9P157-2 Khrizantema-S (RS-AT-15 Springer) MANPATS 9K115 Metis (RS-AT-7 Saxhorn) ARTILLERY SP 155mm Palmaria TOWED 122mm D-30 AIR DEFENCE SAM • Point-defence QW-18 (CH-SA-11) GUNS • SP 14.5mm ZPU-2 (on tch); 23mm ZU-23-2 (on tch)

Navy n.k.

A number of intact naval vessels remain in Tripoli, although serviceability is questionable EQUIPMENT BY TYPE PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 3+ CORVETTES • FSGM (1 Al Hani (ex-FSU Project 1159 (Koni)) in Malta for refit since 2013 with 2 twin lnchr with P-22 (RS-SS-N-2C Styx) AShM, 1 twin lnchr with 4K33 Osa-M (RS-SA-N-4 Gecko) SAM, 2 twin 406mm ASTT, 1 RBU 6000 Smerch 2 A/S mor, 2 AK230 CIWS, 2 twin 76mm gun) PBFG 1 Sharaba (FRA Combattante II) with 4 single lnchr with Otomat Mk2 AShM, 1 76mm gun† PB 2+ PV30 AMPHIBIOUS LANDING SHIPS • LST 1 Ibn Harissa (capacity 1 hel; 11 MBT; 240 troops) LOGISTICS AND SUPPORT 2 AFD 1 ARS 1 Al Munjed (YUG Spasilac)†

Air Force n.k.

Forces loyal to the Government of National Accord (Tripoli-based)

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE AIRCRAFT 3+ combat capable FGA 2 MiG-23BN ATK 1 J-21 Jastreb† TRG 9+: 3 G-2 Galeb*; ε5 L-39ZO*; 1+ SF-260ML* HELICOPTERS ATK Mi-24 Hind TPT • Medium Mi-17 Hip AIR-LAUNCHED MISSILES • AAM • IR R-3 (RS-AA-2 Atoll)‡; R-60 (RS-AA-8 Aphid); R-24 (RS-AA-7 Apex)

ACTIVE n.k.

Paramilitary n.k.

ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE Ground Forces n.k. EQUIPMENT BY TYPE ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES MBT T-55; T-72

Coast Guard n.k. EQUIPMENT BY TYPE PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 10 PCC 1 Damen Stan 2909 with 1 sextuple 122mm MRL PBF 6: 4 Bigliani; 2 Fezzan (ex-ITA Corrubia) PB 3: 1 Burdi (Damen Stan 1605); 1 Hamelin; 1 Ikrimah (FRA RPB 20)

Middle East and North Africa 357

Italy MIASIT 400; 1 inf coy; 1 CBRN unit; 1 trg unit Nepal UNSMIL 234; 2 sy coy Turkey ε500; ACV-AAPC; Kirpi; 1 arty unit with T-155 Firtina; 1 AD unit with MIM-23B Hawk; Korkut; GDF-003; 1 CISR UAV unit with Bayraktar TB2 United Kingdom UNSMIL 1 United States UNSMIL 1

TERRITORY WHERE THE RECOGNISED AUTHORITY DOES NOT EXERCISE EFFECTIVE CONTROL Data here represents the de facto situation. This does not imply international recognition

ACTIVE n.k.

ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE Libyan Arab Armed Forces n.k. EQUIPMENT BY TYPE ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES MBT T-55; T-62; T-72 RECCE BRDM-2; EE-9 Cascavel IFV BMP-1; Ratel-20 APC APC (T) M113 APC (W) Al-Mared; BTR-60PB; Mbombe-6; Nimr Jais; Puma PPV Al-Wahsh; Caiman; Streit Spartan; Streit Typhoon; Vuran; Titan-DS AUV Panthera T6; Panthera F9; Terrier LT-79 ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE MSL SP 9P157-2 Khrizantema-S (status unknown) MANPATS 9K11 Malyutka (RS-AT-3 Sagger); 9K111 Fagot (RS-AT-4 Spigot); 9K111-1 Konkurs (RS-AT-5 Spandrel); 9K135 Kornet (RS-AT-14 Spriggan); Milan RCL: 106mm M40A1; 84mm Carl Gustaf ARTILLERY SP 122mm 2S1 Gvodzika; 155mm G5 TOWED 122mm D-30 MRL 107mm Type-63; 122mm BM-21 Grad MOR M106 AIR DEFENCE SAM Short-range 2K12 Kvadrat (RS-SA-6 Gainful) Point-defence 9K338 Igla-S (RS-SA-24 Grinch) GUNS • SP 14.5mm ZPU-2 (on tch); 23mm ZSU-23-4 Shilka; ZU-23-2 (on tch)

Navy n.k. EQUIPMENT BY TYPE PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 7+ PB: 7+: 2 Burdi (Damen Stan 1605); 1 Burdi (Damen Stan 1605) with 1 73mm gun; 2 Ikrimah (FRA RPB20); 1 Hamelin; 1+ PV30 LOGISTICS AND SUPPORT • AFD 1

Air Force n.k. EQUIPMENT BY TYPE AIRCRAFT 24 combat capable FGA 13: ε10 MiG-21MF Fishbed; 1 Mirage F-1AD; 1 Mirage F-1ED; 1 Su-22UM3 Fitter G TRG 12: ε10 L-39ZO Albatros*; 1+ MiG-21UM Mongol B; 1 SF-260ML* HELICOPTERS ATK Mi-24/35 Hind TPT • Medium 3: up to 3 H215 (AS332L) Super Puma; Mi-8/Mi-17 Hip AIR-LAUNCHED MISSILES • AAM • IR R-3 (AA-2 Atoll)‡; R-60 (AA-8 Aphid)

FOREIGN FORCES United Arab Emirates UH-60M; Pantsir-S1 Wagner Group 3,000; Ural-432007 PPV; Tigr; Pantsir-S1; 12 MiG-29; 4 Su-24M

Mauritania MRT Mauritanian Ouguiya MRU GDP MRU

294bn

336bn

USD

8.11bn

9.16bn 2,161

per capita

2020

2021

USD

1,956

Growth

-1.8

2.7

Inflation

2.3

2.7

Def bdgt

MRU

7.53bn

7.77bn

USD

207m

212m

36.30

36.67

USD1=MRU

2022

Middle East and North Africa

FOREIGN FORCES

Real-terms defence budget trend (USDm, constant 2015) 185 n.k. 0 2008

Population

2015

2021

4,079,284

Age

0–14

15–19

20–24

25–29

Male

18.5%

5.1%

4.5%

3.9%

30–64 65 plus 14.4%

1.8%

Female

18.4%

5.2%

4.8%

4.3%

16.8%

2.4%

Capabilities The country’s small and modestly equipped armed forces are tasked with maintaining territorial integrity and internal security. In light of the regional threat from extremist Islamist groups, border security is also a key role for the armed forces, which are accustomed to counter-insurgency operations in the desert. In early 2021, the cabinet approved a draft decree establishing a defence area along the northern border to counter incursions by the Polisario Front. This followed the group’s closure of a border crossing for several weeks in late 2020. The country is a member of the G5 Sahel group and in late 2021 the armed forces of Mauritania and Senegal signed an agreement to jointly patrol offshore gas fields. Mauritania’s armed forces take part in the US-led specialoperations Flintlock training exercise. The country also benefits from training with French armed forces. Deployment capabilities are limited to neighbouring countries without external support, but the armed forces have demonstrated mobility and sustain-

358 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2022 ability in desert regions. Mauritania has a limited and ageing equipment inventory, which hampers operational capability. Despite some recent acquisitions, including small ISR aircraft, aviation resources are insufficient considering the country’s size. Naval equipment is geared toward coastal-surveillance missions and China’s donation of a landing ship has helped establish a basic sealift capability. There is no domestic defence industry.

ACTIVE 15,850 (Army 15,000 Navy 600 Air 250) Gendarmerie & Paramilitary 5,000 Conscript liability 24 months

ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE Army 15,000 FORCES BY ROLE 6 mil regions MANOEUVRE Reconnaissance 1 armd recce bn Armoured 1 armd bn Light 7 mot inf bn 8 (garrison) inf bn Air Manoeuvre 1 cdo/para bn Other 2 (camel corps) bn 1 gd bn COMBAT SUPPORT 3 arty bn 4 ADA bty 1 engr coy EQUIPMENT BY TYPE ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES MBT 35 T-54/T-55 RECCE 70: 20 AML-60; 40 AML-90; 10 Saladin APC • APC (W) 32: 5 FV603 Saracen; 7 Bastion APC; ε20 Panhard M3 AUV 12 Cobra ENGINEERING & MAINTENANCE VEHICLES ARV T-54/55 ARV reported ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE MSL • MANPATS Milan RCL • 106mm ε90 M40A1 ARTILLERY 180 TOWED 80: 105mm 36 HM-2/M101A1; 122mm 44: 20 D-30; 24 D-74 MRL 10: 107mm 4 Type-63; 122mm 6 Type-81 MOR 90: 81mm 60; 120mm 30 Brandt AIR DEFENCE SAM • Point-defence ε4 9K31 Strela-1 (RS-SA-9 Gaskin) (reported); 9K32 Strela-2 (RS-SA-7 Grail)‡ GUNS • TOWED 82: 14.5mm 28: 16 ZPU-2; 12 ZPU4; 23mm 20 ZU-23-2; 37mm 10 M-1939; 57mm 12 S-60; 100mm 12 KS-19

Navy ε600 EQUIPMENT BY TYPE PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 17 PCO 1 Voum-Legleita PCC 7: 1 Abourbekr Ben Amer (FRA OPV 54); 1 Arguin; 2 Conejera; 1 Limam El Hidrami (PRC); 2 Timbédra (PRC Huangpu Mod) PB 9: 1 El Nasr† (FRA Patra); 4 Mandovi; 2 Saeta-12; 2 Megsem Bakkar (FRA RPB20 – for SAR duties) AMPHIBIOUS • LANDING SHIPS 1 LSM 1 Nimlane (PRC)

Fusiliers Marins FORCES BY ROLE MANOEUVRE Amphibious 1 mne unit

Air Force 250 EQUIPMENT BY TYPE AIRCRAFT 2 combat capable ISR 2 Cessna 208B Grand Caravan TPT 9: Light 8: 2 BN-2 Defender; 1 C-212; 1 CN235; 2 PA-31T Cheyenne II; 2 Y-12(II); PAX 1 BT-67 (with sensor turret) TRG 9: 3 EMB-312 Tucano; 2 EMB-314 Super Tucano*; 4 SF-260E HELICOPTERS MRH 3: 1 SA313B Alouette II; 2 Z-9 TPT • Light 2 AW109

Gendarmerie & Paramilitary ε5,000 active Gendarmerie ε3,000 Ministry of Interior FORCES BY ROLE MANOEUVRE Other 6 regional sy coy EQUIPMENT BY TYPE PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS • PB 2 Rodman 55M

National Guard 2,000 Ministry of Interior

Customs EQUIPMENT BY TYPE PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS • PB 2: 1 Dah Ould Bah (FRA Amgram 14); 1 Yaboub Ould Rajel (FRA RPB18)

DEPLOYMENT CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC: UN • MINUSCA 464; 1 inf bn(-) MALI: UN • MINUSMA 7 SOMALIA: UN • UNSOS 1

Middle East and North Africa 359

ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE

Morocco MOR 2020

2021

MAD

1.09tr

1.16tr

USD

115bn

126bn

per capita

USD

3,188

3,471

Growth

-6.3

5.7

Inflation

0.6

1.4

Def bdgt [a] FMA (US)

MAD

56.6bn

58.6bn

USD

5.95bn

6.35bn

USD

10m

9.51

9.23

USD1=MAD

2022

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE SATELLITES • ISR 2 Mohammed VI

Army 175,000 61.5bn 10m

[a] Includes autonomous defence spending (SEGMA) and Treasury funding for ‘Acquisitions and Repair of Equipment for Royal Armed Forces’ Real-terms defence budget trend (USDbn, constant 2015) 5.63 3.57 2008

Population

2015

2021

35,892,951

Age

0–14

15–19

20–24

25–29

Male

13.6%

4.3%

3.9%

3.8%

20.6%

3.6%

Female

13.1%

4.2%

4.0%

3.8%

21.2%

3.8%

30–64 65 plus

Capabilities Regional security challenges are a key concern for Morocco’s armed forces. A 30-year ceasefire between Morocco and the Polisario Front ended in late 2020 and the UN has reported that hostilities have resumed, albeit at a low level. Morocco maintains defence ties with France and the US, receiving military training and equipment from both. There is also close cooperation with NATO, and in 2016 Morocco was granted access to the Alliance’s Interoperability Platform in order to strengthen the defence and security sectors and bring the armed forces up to NATO standards. In 2017, Morocco rejoined the African Union. The armed forces have also gained experience from UN peacekeeping deployments and from multinational exercises. Conscription was reintroduced in early 2019. The armed forces have some capacity to deploy independently within the region and on UN peacekeeping missions in sub-Saharan Africa, although they lack heavy sealift and airlift capabilities. Morocco has also deployed overseas in a combat role, contributing F-16 aircraft to the Saudi-led coalition intervention in Yemen from 2015 to early 2019. The inventory primarily comprises ageing French and US equipment. However, there are plans to re-equip all the services and to invest significantly in the navy. Morocco operates two Earth-observation satellites, meeting some surveillance requirements. Morocco relies on imports and donations for major defence equipment. However, its relative stability has attracted Western defence companies, such as Airbus, Safran and Thales, to establish aerospace manufacturing and servicing facilities in the country.

ACTIVE 195,800 (Army 175,000 Navy 7,800 Air 13,000) Gendarmerie & Paramilitary 50,000 Conscript liability 12 months for men aged 19–25

RESERVE 150,000 (Army 150,000) Reserve obligation to age 50

Space

FORCES BY ROLE 2 comd (Northern Zone, Southern Zone) MANOEUVRE Armoured 1 armd bde 11 armd bn Mechanised 3 mech inf bde Mechanised/Light 8 mech/mot inf regt (2–3 bn) Light 1 lt sy bde 3 (camel corps) mot inf bn 35 lt inf bn 4 cdo unit Air Manoeuvre 2 para bde 2 AB bn Mountain 1 mtn inf bn COMBAT SUPPORT 11 arty bn 7 engr bn AIR DEFENCE 1 AD bn

Royal Guard 1,500 FORCES BY ROLE MANOEUVRE Other 1 gd bn 2 cav sqn EQUIPMENT BY TYPE ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES MBT 656: 222 M1A1SA Abrams; 220 M60A1 Patton; 120 M60A3 Patton; 40 T-72B; 54 Type-90-II (MBT-2000); (ε200 M48A5 Patton & ε60 T-72B in store) LT TK 116: 5 AMX-13; 111 SK-105 Kuerassier ASLT 80 AMX-10RC RECCE 284: 38 AML-60-7; 190 AML-90; 40 EBR-75; 16 Eland IFV 238: 10 AMX-10P; 30 Ratel Mk3-20; 30 Ratel Mk3-90; 45 VAB VCI; 123 YPR-765 APC 1,225 APC (T) 905: 400 M113A1/A2; 419 M113A3; 86 M577A2 (CP) APC (W) 320 VAB VTT ENGINEERING & MAINTENANCE VEHICLES ARV 85+: 10 Greif; 55 M88A1; M578; 20 VAB-ECH ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE MSL SP 80 M901 MANPATS 9K11 Malyutka (RS-AT-3 Sagger); HJ-8L; M47 Dragon; Milan; TOW

Middle East and North Africa

Moroccan Dirham MAD GDP

360 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2022 RCL 106mm 350 M40A1 GUNS • SP 36: 90mm 28 M56; 100mm 8 SU-100 ARTILLERY 2,317 SP 355: 105mm 5 AMX Mk 61; 155mm 290: ε130 M109A1/ A1B/A2/A3/A4; 70 M109A5; 90 Mk F3; 203mm 60 M110 TOWED 118: 105mm 50: 30 L118 Light Gun; 20 M101; 130mm 18 M-46; 155mm 50: 30 FH-70; 20 M114 MRL 47: 122mm 35 BM-21 Grad; 300mm 12+ PHL-03 MOR 1,797: 81mm 1,100 Expal model LN; SP 107mm 36 M106A2; 120mm 550 Brandt; SP 120mm 110: 20 (VAB APC); 91 M1064A3 UNINHABITED AERIAL VEHICLES ISR • Medium R4E-50 Skyeye AIR DEFENCE SAM 67+ Medium-range 18 Tianlong-50 Short-range DK-9 (CH-SA-5) Point-defence 49+: 12 2K22M Tunguska-M (RS-SA-19 Grison); 37 M48 Chaparral; 9K38 Igla (RS-SA-18 Grouse) GUNS 390 SP 20mm 60 M163 Vulcan TOWED 330: 14.5mm 200: 150–180 ZPU-2; 20 ZPU-4; 20mm 40 M167 Vulcan; 23mm 75–90 ZU-23-2; 35mm some PG-99

Navy 7,800 (incl 1,500 Marines) EQUIPMENT BY TYPE PRINCIPAL SURFACE COMBATANTS • FRIGATES 3 FFGHM 1 Mohammed VI (FRA FREMM) with 2 quad lnchr with MM40 Exocet Block 3 AShM, 2 8-cell Sylver A43 VLS with Aster 15 SAM, 2 triple 324mm ILAS-3 (B515) ASTT with MU90 LWT, 1 76mm gun (capacity 1 AS565SA Panther) FFGH 2 Mohammed V (FRA Floreal) with 2 single lnchr with MM38 Exocet AShM, 1 76mm gun (fitted for but not with Simbad SAM) (capacity 1 AS565SA Panther) PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 53 CORVETTES 4 FSGHM 3: 2 Sultan Moulay Ismail (NLD SIGMA 9813) with 2 twin lnchr with MM40 Exocet Block 2/3 AShM, 1 12-cell CLA VLS with VL MICA SAM, 2 triple 324mm ILAS-3 (B-515) ASTT with MU90 LWT, 1 76mm gun (capacity 1 AS565SA Panther) 1 Tarik ben Ziyad (NLD SIGMA 10513) with 2 twin lnchr with MM40 Exocet Block 3 AShM, 1 12-cell CLA VLS with VL MICA SAM, 2 triple 324mm ILAS-3 (B-515) ASTT with MU90 LWT, 1 76mm gun (capacity 1 AS565SA Panther) FSM 1 Lt Col Errhamani (ESP Descubierto) with 1 octuple Albatros lnchr with Aspide SAM, 2 triple 324mm ASTT with Mk46 LWT, 1 76mm gun PSO 1 Bin an Zaran (OPV 70) with 1 76mm gun PCG 4 Cdt El Khattabi (ESP Lazaga 58m) with 4 single lnchr with MM38 Exocet AShM, 1 76mm gun PCO 5 Rais Bargach (under control of fisheries dept) PCC 12: 4 El Hahiq (DNK Osprey 55, incl 2 with customs) 6 LV Rabhi (ESP 58m B-200D) 2 Okba (FRA PR-72) each with 1 76mm gun

PB 27: 6 El Wacil (FRA P-32); 10 VCSM (RPB 20); 10 Rodman 101; 1 other (UK Bird) AMPHIBIOUS LANDING SHIPS • LST 3 Ben Aicha (FRA Champlain BATRAL) with 1 hel landing platform (capacity 7 tanks; 140 troops) LANDING CRAFT 2: LCT 1 Sidi Ifni LCM 1 CTM (FRA CTM-5) LOGISTICS AND SUPPORT 9 AG 1 Damen 3011 AGHS 1 Dar Al Beida (FRA BHO2M) AGOR 1 Abou Barakat Albarbari† (ex-US Robert D. Conrad) AGS 1 Damen Stan Tender 1504 AK 2 AX 1 Essaouira AXS 2

Marines 1,500 FORCES BY ROLE MANOEUVRE Amphibious 2 naval inf bn

Naval Aviation EQUIPMENT BY TYPE AIRCRAFT • MP 2 Beech 350ER King Air HELICOPTERS • ASW/ASUW 3 AS565SA Panther

Air Force 13,000 FORCES BY ROLE FIGHTER/GROUND ATTACK 2 sqn with F-5E/F-5F Tiger II 3 sqn with F-16C/D Fighting Falcon 1 sqn with Mirage F-1C (F-1CH) 1 sqn with Mirage F-1E (F-1EH) ELECTRONIC WARFARE 1 sqn with EC-130H Hercules; Falcon 20 (ELINT) MARITIME PATROL 1 flt with Do-28 TANKER/TRANSPORT 1 sqn with C-130/KC-130H Hercules TRANSPORT 1 sqn with CN235 1 VIP sqn with B-737BBJ; Beech 200/300 King Air; Falcon 50; Gulfstream II/III/V-SP/G550 TRAINING 1 sqn with Alpha Jet* 1 sqn T-6C ATTACK HELICOPTER 1 sqn with SA342L Gazelle (some with HOT) TRANSPORT HELICOPTER 1 sqn with Bell 205A (AB-205A); Bell 206 Jet Ranger (AB206); Bell 212 (AB-212) 1 sqn with CH-47D Chinook 1 sqn with SA330 Puma EQUIPMENT BY TYPE AIRCRAFT 90 combat capable FTR 22: 19 F-5E Tiger II; 3 F-5F Tiger II

Middle East and North Africa 361

Gendarmerie & Paramilitary 50,000 active Gendarmerie Royale 20,000 FORCES BY ROLE MANOEUVRE Air Manoeuvre 1 para sqn Other 1 paramilitary bde 4 (mobile) paramilitary gp 1 coast guard unit TRANSPORT HELICOPTER 1 sqn EQUIPMENT BY TYPE PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS • PB 15 Arcor 53 AIRCRAFT • TRG 2 R-235 Guerrier HELICOPTERS MRH 14: 3 SA315B Lama; 2 SA316 Alouette III; 3 SA318 Alouette II; 6 SA342K Gazelle TPT 8: Medium 6 SA330 Puma; Light 2 SA360 Dauphin

Force Auxiliaire 30,000 (incl 5,000 Mobile Intervention Corps) Customs/Coast Guard EQUIPMENT BY TYPE PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS PB 36: 4 Erraid; 18 Arcor 46; 14 (other SAR craft)

DEPLOYMENT CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC: UN • MINUSCA 767; 1 inf bn DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO: UN • MONUSCO 926; 1 inf bn; 1 fd hospital SOUTH SUDAN: UN • UNMISS 2

Oman OMN Omani Rial OMR

2020

2021

GDP

OMR

24.4bn

31.0bn

USD

63.4bn

80.6bn

per capita

USD

14,255

17,633

Growth

-2.8

2.5

Inflation

-0.9

3.0

Def bdgt [a]

OMR

2.88bn

2.47bn

USD

7.48bn

6.43bn

0.38

USD1=OMR

2022

[a] Excludes security funding Real-terms defence budget trend (USDbn, constant 2015) 8.45

2008

Population

3.70 2021

2015

3,694,755

Age

0–14

15–19

20–24

25–29

30–64 65 plus

Male

15.3%

4.1%

4.8%

5.7%

22.2%

1.8%

Female

14.6%

3.8%

4.2%

4.5%

17.0%

2.0%

Capabilities The principal task for Oman’s armed forces is ensuring territorial integrity, with a particular focus on maritime security, given the country’s long coastline. A defence and security review is currently underway with support from the UK, a country with which Muscat has a close and long-standing defence and security relationship. Oman does not host a significant permanent presence of US or other foreign forces, in contrast to other GCC states, but UK forces are frequently deployed to the country for training. In addition, both the US and the UK make use of Omani air- and naval-logistics facilities, most notably the port at Duqm. Whilst Oman is a member of the GCC, it has not participated in the Saudiled coalition’s operations in Yemen. Although Muscat has recently maintained the highest level of defence spending as a percentage of GDP in the GCC, the defence budget was reduced in 2021. Nonetheless, Oman has recently recapitalised its core air and maritime inventory, including acquisitions of combat aircraft and patrol and high-speed support vessels, and is now looking to do the same in the land domain. Oman has very limited indigenous defence-industrial capacity, but it has begun local production of various types of ammunition.

ACTIVE 42,600 (Army 25,000 Navy 4,200 Air 5,000 Foreign Forces 2,000 Royal Household 6,400) Gendarmerie & Paramilitary 4,400

Middle East and North Africa

FGA 49: 15 F-16C Fighting Falcon; 8 F-16D Fighting Falcon; 15 Mirage F-1C (F-1CH); 11 Mirage F-1E (F-1EH) ELINT 1 EC-130H Hercules TKR/TPT 2 KC-130H Hercules TPT 47: Medium 17: 4 C-27J Spartan; 13 C-130H Hercules; Light 19: 4 Beech 100 King Air; 2 Beech 200 King Air; 1 Beech 200C King Air; 2 Beech 300 King Air; 3 Beech 350 King Air; 5 CN235; 2 Do-28; PAX 11: 1 B-737BBJ; 2 Falcon 20; 2 Falcon 20 (ELINT); 1 Falcon 50 (VIP); 1 Gulfstream II (VIP); 1 Gulfstream III; 1 Gulfstream V-SP; 2 Gulfstream G550 TRG 80: 12 AS-202 Bravo; 19 Alpha Jet*; 2 CAP-10; 24 T-6C Texan; 9 T-34C Turbo Mentor; 14 T-37B Tweet HELICOPTERS MRH 19 SA342L Gazelle (7 with HOT, 12 with cannon) TPT 76: Heavy 10 CH-47D Chinook; Medium 24 SA330 Puma; Light 42: 24 Bell 205A (AB-205A); 11 Bell 206 Jet Ranger (AB-206); 3 Bell 212 (AB-212); 4 Bell 429 UNINHABITED AERIAL VEHICLES CISR • Heavy Wing Loong (reported) ISR • Heavy Heron AIR-LAUNCHED MISSILES AAM • IR AIM-9J Sidewinder; R-550 Magic; Mica IR; IIR AIM-9X Sidewinder II; ARH AIM-120C7 AMRAAM; Mica RF ASM AASM; AGM-65 Maverick; HOT ARM AGM-88B HARM BOMBS Laser-guided Paveway II; GBU-54 Laser JDAM INS/GPS-guided GBU-31 JDAM

362 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2022

ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE Army 25,000 FORCES BY ROLE (Regt are bn size) MANOEUVRE Armoured 1 armd bde (2 armd regt, 1 recce regt) Light 1 inf bde (5 inf regt, 1 arty regt, 1 fd engr regt, 1 engr regt, 1 sigs regt) 1 inf bde (3 inf regt, 2 arty regt) 1 indep inf coy (Musandam Security Force) Air Manoeuvre 1 AB regt COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT 1 tpt regt AIR DEFENCE 1 ADA regt (2 ADA bty) EQUIPMENT BY TYPE ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES MBT 117: 38 Challenger 2; 6 M60A1 Patton; 73 M60A3 Patton LT TK 37 FV101 Scorpion RECCE 149: 13 FV105 Sultan (CP); 12 Pars III 6×6; 124 VBL IFV 72 Pars III 8×8 APC 262 APC (T) 10 FV4333 Stormer APC (W) 252: 15 Pars III 6×6 (incl 10 CP; 1 trg); 47 Pars III 8×8 (38 CP; 8 amb; 1 trg); 175 Piranha (incl variants); 15 AT-105 Saxon AUV 6 FV103 Spartan ENGINEERING & MAINTENANCE VEHICLES AEV 6 Pars III AEV ARV 19: 4 Challenger ARV; 2 M88A1; 8 Pars III ARV; 2 Piranha ARV; 3 Samson ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE • MSL SP 8 VBL with TOW MANPATS FGM-148 Javelin; Milan; BGM-71 TOW/ TOW-2A ARTILLERY 245 SP 155mm 24 G-6 TOWED 108: 105mm 42 L118 Light Gun; 122mm 30 D-30; 130mm 24: 12 M-46; 12 Type-59-I; 155mm 12 FH-70 MOR 113: 81mm 69; 107mm 20 M30; 120mm 12 Brandt; SP 120mm 12 Pars III AIR DEFENCE SAM • Point-defence 8 Mistral 2; Javelin; 9K32 Strela-2 (RS-SA-7 Grail)‡ GUNS 26: 23mm 4 ZU-23-2; 35mm 10 GDF-005 (with Skyguard); 40mm 12 L/60 (Towed)

Navy 4,200 EQUIPMENT BY TYPE PRINCIPAL SURFACE COMBATANTS • FRIGATES 3 FFGHM 3 Al-Shamikh with 2 twin lnchr with MM40 Exocet Block 3 AShM, 2 6-cell CLA VLS with VL MICA SAM, 1 76mm gun

PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 11 CORVETTES • FSGM 2: 2 Qahir Al Amwaj with 2 quad lnchr with MM40 Exocet AShM, 1 octuple lnchr with Crotale SAM, 1 76mm gun, 1 hel landing platform PCFG 1 Dhofar with 2 quad lnchr with MM40 Exocet AShM, 1 76mm gun PCO 4 Al Ofouq with 1 76mm gun, 1 hel landing platform PCC 3 Al Bushra (FRA P-400) with 1 76mm gun PBF 1 1400 FIC AMPHIBIOUS LANDING SHIPS • LST 1 Nasr el Bahr† with 1 hel landing platform (capacity 7 tanks; 240 troops) (in refit since 2017) LANDING CRAFT 5: 1 LCU; 1 LCT; 3 LCM LOGISTICS AND SUPPORT 8 AGS 1 Al Makhirah AK 1 Al Sultana AP 2 Shinas (commercial tpt – auxiliary military role only) (capacity 56 veh; 200 tps) AX 1 Al-Mabrukah AXS 1 Shabab Oman II EPF 2 Al Mubshir (High Speed Support Vessel 72) with 1 hel landing platform (capacity 260 troops)

Air Force 5,000 FORCES BY ROLE FIGHTER/GROUND ATTACK 2 sqn with F-16C/D Block 50 Fighting Falcon 1 sqn with Hawk Mk103; Hawk Mk203; Hawk Mk166 1 sqn with Typhoon MARITIME PATROL 1 sqn with C295MPA TRANSPORT 1 sqn with C-130H/J/J-30 Hercules 1 sqn with C295M TRAINING 1 sqn with MFI-17B Mushshak; PC-9*; Bell 206 (AB-206) Jet Ranger TRANSPORT HELICOPTER 4 (med) sqn; Bell 212 (AB-212); NH-90; Super Lynx Mk300 (maritime/SAR) AIR DEFENCE 2 sqn with NASAMS EQUIPMENT BY TYPE AIRCRAFT 63 combat capable FGA 35: 17 F-16C Block 50 Fighting Falcon; 6 F-16D Block 50 Fighting Falcon; 12 Typhoon MP 4 C295MPA TPT 12: Medium 6: 3 C-130H Hercules; 2 C-130J Hercules; 1 C-130J-30 Hercules (VIP); Light 4 C295M; PAX 2 A320300 TRG 43: 4 Hawk Mk103*; 7 Hawk Mk166; 12 Hawk Mk203*; 8 MFI-17B Mushshak; 12 PC-9* HELICOPTERS MRH 15 Super Lynx Mk300 (maritime/SAR) TPT 26+ Medium 20 NH90 TTH; Light 6: 3 Bell 206 (AB206) Jet Ranger; 3 Bell 212 (AB-212) AIR DEFENCE • SAM Short-range NASAMS

Middle East and North Africa 363

Police Air Wing EQUIPMENT BY TYPE AIRCRAFT • TPT • Light 4: 1 BN-2T Turbine Islander; 2 CN235M; 1 Do-228 HELICOPTERS • TPT • Light 5: 2 Bell 205A; 3 Bell 214ST (AB-214ST)

FOREIGN FORCES

Royal Household 6,400

United Kingdom 90

(incl HQ staff)

Palestinian Territories PT

FORCES BY ROLE SPECIAL FORCES 2 SF regt

Royal Guard Brigade 5,000 FORCES BY ROLE MANOEUVRE Other 1 gd bde (1 armd sqn, 2 gd regt, 1 cbt spt bn) EQUIPMENT BY TYPE ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES ASLT 9 Centauro MGS (9 VBC-90 in store) IFV 14 VAB VCI APC • APC (W) ε50 Type-92 ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE MSL • MANPATS Milan ARTILLERY • MRL 122mm 6 Type-90A AIR DEFENCE SAM • Point-defence Javelin GUNS • SP 9: 20mm 9 VAB VDAA

Royal Yacht Squadron 150 EQUIPMENT BY TYPE LOGISTICS AND SUPPORT 3 AP 1 Fulk Al Salamah (also veh tpt) with up to 2 AS332 Super Puma hel

Royal Flight 250 EQUIPMENT BY TYPE AIRCRAFT • TPT • PAX 7: 1 747-400; 1 747-8; 1 B-747SP; 1 A319; 1 A320; 2 Gulfstream IV HELICOPTERS • TPT • Medium 6 EC225LP Super Puma

Gendarmerie & Paramilitary 4,400 active Tribal Home Guard 4,000

New Israeli Shekel ILS

2020

GDP

USD

per capita

USD

Growth

Inflation

2021

2022

USD1=ILS Population

4,906,308

Age

0–14

15–19

20–24

25–29

Male

19.3%

5.7%

5.0%

4.4%

30–64 65 plus 14.7%

1.6%

Female

18.3%

5.5%

4.9%

4.4%

14.6%

1.7%

Capabilities The Palestinian Territories remain effectively divided between the Palestinian Authority-run West Bank and Hamas-run Gaza. Each organisation controls its own security forces, principally the National Security Forces (NSF) in the West Bank and the Izz al-Din al-Qassam Brigades in Gaza. Both have generally proved effective at maintaining internal security in their respective territories. The Palestinian Authority has received support from the EU, Jordan and the US. NSF battalions, as well as the Presidential Guard and Civil Police, conduct US-funded internal-security training at the Jordan International Police Training Center. Israel claims that a small number of Izz al-Din al-Qassam Brigades personnel have received military training in Iran and Syria. None of the Palestinian security organisations conduct external military deployments, and they lack a formal military-logistics structure. Both Hamas and the Palestinian Authority lack heavy military equipment, although the former has retained a substantial arsenal of improvised rocket and mortar capabilities, as well as some portable guided weapons. During renewed conflict in mid-2021, Hamas demonstrated a loitering-munition capability as well as new missiles with a claimed range of 250 km. No formal defence industry exists, although Hamas can acquire light or improvised weapons, either smuggled into Gaza or of local construction.

ACTIVE 0 Gendarmerie & Paramilitary n.k.

org in teams of ε100

Precise personnel-strength figures for the various Palestinian groups are not known

Police Coast Guard 400

ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 32 PCO 2 Haras PBF 3 Haras (US Mk V PBF) PB 27: 3 Rodman 101; 1 Haras (SWE CG27); 3 Haras (SWE CG29); 14 Rodman 58; 1 D59116; 5 Zahra

There is little available data on the status of the organisations mentioned below. Following internal fighting in June 2007, Gaza has been under the de facto control of Hamas, while the West Bank is controlled by the Palestinian Authority. In October 2017, both sides agreed a preliminary reconciliation deal on control of Gaza.

Middle East and North Africa

MSL AAM • IR AIM-9/M/P Sidewinder; IIR AIM-9X Sidewinder II; ARH AIM-120C7 AMRAAM ASM AGM-65D/G Maverick AShM AGM-84D Harpoon BOMBS Laser-guided EGBU-10 Paveway II; EGBU-12 Paveway II INS/GPS guided GBU-31 JDAM

364 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2022

Gendarmerie & Paramilitary Palestinian Authority n.k. Presidential Security ε3,000 Special Forces ε1,200 Police ε9,000

Qatar QTR Qatari Riyal QAR

2020

2021

529bn

616bn

GDP

QAR USD

145bn

169bn

per capita

USD

54,185

61,791

National Security Force ε10,000

Growth

-3.6

1.9

Inflation

-2.7

2.5

FORCES BY ROLE MANOEUVRE Other 9 paramilitary bn

Def bdgt [a]

Preventative Security ε4,000 Civil Defence ε1,000 The al-Aqsa Brigades n.k.

QAR

23.5bn

22.8bn

USD

6.47bn

6.26bn

3.64

USD1=QAR

2022

[a] 2020 estimate derived from analysis of public spending breakdown, procurement programme announcements, force size and structure, and operational tempo. 2021 estimate derived from Defence and Security allocation in ‘Public Budget Statement 2021’ Real-terms defence budget trend (USDbn, constant 2015)

6.47

Profess loyalty to the Fatah group that dominates the Palestinian Authority

Hamas n.k.

2.12 2008

2015

2021

Izz al-Din al-Qassam Brigades ε15,000–20,000

Population

FORCES BY ROLE COMMAND 6 bde HQ (regional) MANOEUVRE Other 1 cdo unit (Nukhba) 27 paramilitary bn 100 paramilitary coy COMBAT SUPPORT Some engr units COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT Some log units EQUIPMENT BY TYPE ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE • MSL • MANPATS 9K11 Malyutka (RS-AT-3 Sagger) (reported); Dehlavieh (Kornet) (reported) ARTILLERY MRL • Qassam rockets (multiple calibres); 122mm some; 240mm some Fadjr 3 (reported); 330mm some Fadjr 5 (reported) MOR some (multiple calibres) SURFACE-TO-SURFACE MISSILE LAUNCHERS SRBM • Conventional some Ayyash-250

Age

0–14

15–19

20–24

25–29

30–64 65 plus

Male

6.5%

2.4%

5.8%

10.3%

51.3%

0.8%

Female

6.4%

1.6%

1.8%

2.6%

9.9%

0.4%

Martime Police ε600

2,479,995

Capabilities Qatar is attempting to transform its military capabilities and regional defence standing based on significant equipment acquisitions, including platforms with power-projection capability. The scale of the equipment plan is increasing personnel requirements and suggests that Qatar will need significant foreign help to integrate and operate its new capabilities. Combat-aircraft procurements will dramatically increase the size of the air force, where Qatar faces most questions about its ability to develop and sustain the necessary infrastructure, maintenance and personnel. The diplomatic crisis with several of its GCC neighbours brought Qatar and Turkey closer together in their limited but significant defence cooperation, which includes a small Turkish military presence incountry. The crisis appears not to have affected the significant Qatar–US military relationship, including the presence of forces from the US and other Western states at Al-Udeid airbase, and the key US-run coalition air-operations centre. Qatar has begun deploying its own Patriot air- and missile-defence systems, and its AN/FPS-132 early-warning radar is approaching completion. The Italian Navy is supporting training for new Italian-built vessels and a joint Qatar–UK Eurofighter Typhoon squadron has begun training flights. Qatar currently has a limited indigenous defence-industrial capability, including in ship repair.

ACTIVE 16,500 (Army 12,000 Navy 2,500 Air 2,000) Gendarmerie & Paramilitary up to 5,000

Conscript liability 12 months, males 18–35 years. Voluntary national service for women

ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE Space EQUIPMENT BY TYPE SATELLITES • COMMUNICATIONS 1 Es’hail-2

Middle East and North Africa 365

Army 12,000 (including Emiri Guard)

Coast Guard

FORCES BY ROLE SPECIAL FORCES 1 SF coy MANOEUVRE Armoured 1 armd bde (1 tk bn, 1 mech inf bn, 1 mor sqn, 1 AT bn) Mechanised 3 mech inf bn 1 (Emiri Guard) bde (3 mech regt) COMBAT SUPPORT 1 SP arty bn 1 fd arty bn

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 12 PBF 4 DV 15 PB 8: 4 Crestitalia MV-45; 3 Halmatic M160; 1 other

Navy 2,500 (incl Coast Guard) EQUIPMENT BY TYPE PRINCIPAL SURFACE COMBATANTS • FRIGATES 1 FFGHM 1 Al Zubarah with 2 quad lnchr with MM40 Exocet Block 3 AShM, 2 8-cell Sylver A50 VLS with Aster 30 SAM, 1 21-cell Mk 49 GMLS with RIM-116 RAM SAM, 1 76mm gun (capacity 1 med hel) PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 11 PCFGM 4 Barzan (UK Vita) with 2 quad lnchr with MM40 Exocet Block 3 AShM, 1 sextuple Sadral lnchr with Mistral SAM, 1 Goalkeeper CIWS, 1 76mm gun PCFG 3 Damsah (FRA Combattante III) with 2 quad lnchr with MM40 Exocet AShM, 1 76mm gun PBF 3 MRTP 16 PB 1 MRTP 34

FORCES BY ROLE COASTAL DEFENCE 1 bty with 3 quad lnchr with MM40 Exocet AShM EQUIPMENT BY TYPE COASTAL DEFENCE • AShM 12 MM40 Exocet AShM

Air Force 2,000 FORCES BY ROLE FIGHTER/GROUND ATTACK 1 sqn with Alpha Jet* 1 sqn with Mirage 2000D; Mirage 2000ED 1 sqn with Rafale DQ/EQ 1 sqn(-) with Typhoon (joint QTR-UK unit) 1 sqn with F-15QA (forming) TRANSPORT 1 sqn with C-17A Globemaster III; C-130J-30 Hercules 1 sqn with A340; B-707; B-727; Falcon 900 ATTACK HELICOPTER 1 ASuW sqn with Commando Mk3 with Exocet 1 sqn with SA341 Gazelle; SA342L Gazelle with HOT TRANSPORT HELICOPTER 1 sqn with Commando Mk2A; Commando Mk2C 1 sqn with AW139 EQUIPMENT BY TYPE AIRCRAFT 53 combat capable FGA 47: 5 F-15QA; 9 Mirage 2000ED; 3 Mirage 2000D; 9 Rafale DQ; 21 Rafale EQ TPT 18: Heavy 8 C-17A Globemaster III; Medium 4 C-130J-30 Hercules; PAX 6: 1 A340; 2 B-707; 1 B-727; 2 Falcon 900 TRG 37: 6 Alpha Jet*; 2 Hawk Mk167; 21 PC-21; 8 Super Mushshak HELICOPTERS ATK 24 AH-64E Apache ASuW 8 Commando Mk3 MRH 34: 21 AW139 (incl 3 for medevac); 2 SA341 Gazelle; 11 SA342L Gazelle TPT 5: Medium 4: 3 Commando Mk2A; 1 Commando Mk2C; Light 1 H125 Ecureuil (trg config) UNINHABITED AERIAL VEHICLES CISR • Medium 6 Bayraktar TB2 AIR DEFENCE • SAM Long-range M903 Patriot PAC-3 MSE Point-defence FIM-92 Stinger; FN-6 (CH-SA-10); Mistral AIR-LAUNCHED MISSILES AAM • IR R-550 Magic 2; ARH Mica RF ASM Apache; AGM-114R Hellfire; AGR-20A APKWS; HOT AShM AM39 Exocet

Gendarmerie & Paramilitary up to 5,000 Internal Security Force up to 5,000

Middle East and North Africa

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES MBT 62 Leopard 2A7+ ASLT 48: 12 AMX-10RC; 36 Piranha II 90mm RECCE 56: 32 Fennek; 8 V-150 Chaimite; 16 VBL IFV 40 AMX-10P APC 340 APC (T) 30 AMX-VCI APC (W) 160 VAB PPV 172+: 170+ Ejder Yalcin; 2+ Kirpi-2; RG-31 AUV 14+: 14 Dingo 2; NMS ENGINEERING & MAINTENANCE VEHICLES AEV 6 Wisent 2 ARV 3: 1 AMX-30D; 2 Piranha ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE MSL SP 24 VAB VCAC HOT; Ejder Yalcin with Stugna-P; NMS with Stugna-P MANPATS FGM-148 Javelin; Milan; Kornet-EM RCL 84mm Carl Gustaf ARTILLERY 89+ SP 155mm 24 PzH 2000 TOWED 155mm 12 G-5 MRL 8+: 107mm PH-63; 122mm 2+ (30-tube); 127mm 6 ASTROS II Mk3 MOR 45: 81mm 26 L16; SP 81mm 4 VAB VPM 81; 120mm 15 Brandt SURFACE-TO-SURFACE MISSILE LAUNCHERS SRBM • Conventional 8+ BP-12A (CH-SS-14 mod 2) AIR DEFENCE SAM • Point-defence NMS with Igla

Coastal Defence

366 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2022 There is a modest domestic defence-industrial base, mainly in the assembly and overhaul of land systems. Riyadh has declared an intention to spend 50% of its defence outlays locally as part of its Vision 2030 initiative, and established the state-owned Saudi Arabian Military Industries to oversee local defence production.

DEPLOYMENT LEBANON: UN • UNIFIL 1

FOREIGN FORCES Turkey 300 (trg team); 1 mech coy; 1 arty unit United States US Central Command: 10,000; CAOC; 1 ISR sqn with 4 RC-135 Rivet Joint; 1 ISR sqn with 4 E-8C JSTARS; 2 tkr sqn with 12 KC-135R/T Stratotanker; 1 tpt sqn with 4 C-17A Globemaster; 4 C-130H/J-30 Hercules; 2 SAM bty with M902/M903 Patriot PAC-3/PAC-3 MSE • US Strategic Command: 1 AN/TPY-2 X-band radar

Saudi Arabia SAU Saudi Riyal SAR GDP per capita

2020

2021

SAR

2.63tr

3.16tr

USD

700bn

843bn 23,762

USD

19,996

Growth

-4.1

2.8

Inflation

3.4

3.2

Def bdgt [a]

SAR

195bn

175bn

USD

52.0bn

46.7bn

3.75

USD1=SAR

2022

[a] Military budget only – excludes security budget Real-terms defence budget trend (USDbn, constant 2015) 59.0 31.7 2008

Population

2015

2021

34,783,757

Age

0–14

15–19

20–24

25–29

Male

12.5%

4.1%

3.9%

4.4%

30–64 65 plus 29.7%

2.0%

Female

12.0%

3.8%

3.5%

3.7%

18.6%

1.8%

Capabilities The Saudi armed forces are among the best equipped in the region, and the Kingdom has displayed an increasing willingness to use them as part of a more assertive foreign policy. Principal roles are securing territorial integrity, internal security and regional stability. Saudi Arabia’s defence posture continues to emphasise the deployment of airpower. Saudi Arabia is the leading member of the GCC. However, its most critical defence relationship is with the US. Riyadh also has significant security relationships with France and the UK, though recently there has been diversification of defence relationships, including with China. Significant training support is supplied by the US and, to a lesser extent, the UK. The armed forces continue to gain combat experience from their involvement in the conflict in Yemen, though the operation has exposed areas of comparative weakness and capability gaps, especially in the application of precision airpower, air–ground coordination, and in logistics support. Meanwhile, the cruise-missile and UAV attacks on Saudi oil infrastructure in September 2019 exposed further capability weaknesses. Saudi Arabia’s conduct of its campaign in Yemen and other associated policies have increased the controversy surrounding arms sales to the country. Equipment recapitalisation continues, with orders for combat aircraft, corvettes and multimission surface combatants despite concerns about austerity.

ACTIVE 257,000 (Army 75,000 Navy 13,500 Air 20,000 Air Defence 16,000 Strategic Missile Forces 2,500 National Guard 130,000) Gendarmerie & Paramilitary 24,500

ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE Army 75,000 FORCES BY ROLE MANOEUVRE Armoured 4 armd bde (1 recce coy, 3 tk bn, 1 mech bn, 1 fd arty bn, 1 AD bn, 1 AT bn, 1 engr coy, 1 log bn, 1 maint coy, 1 med coy) Mechanised 5 mech bde (1 recce coy, 1 tk bn, 3 mech bn, 1 fd arty bn, 1 AD bn, 1 AT bn, 1 engr coy, 1 log bn, 1 maint coy, 1 med coy) Light 2 lt inf bde Other 1 (Al-Saif Al-Ajrab) gd bde 1 (Royal Guard) gd regt (3 lt inf bn) Air Manoeuvre 1 AB bde (2 AB bn, 3 SF coy) Aviation 1 comd (3 hel gp) COMBAT SUPPORT 3 arty bde EQUIPMENT BY TYPE MBT 1,010: 140 AMX-30; ε500 M1A2/A2S Abrams; ε370 M60A3 Patton RECCE 300 AML-60/AML-90 IFV 860: 380 AMX-10P; 380 M2A2 Bradley; 100 VAB Mk3 APC 1,340 APC (T) 1,190 M113A4 (incl variants) APC (W) 150 Panhard M3; (ε40 AF-40-8-1 Al-Fahd in store) AUV 1,200+: 100 Didgori (amb); 1,000+ M-ATV; Al-Shibl 2; 100 Sherpa Light Scout; Terradyne Gurkha ENGINEERING & MAINTENANCE VEHICLES AEV 15 M728 ARV 275+: 8 ACV ARV; AMX-10EHC; 55 AMX-30D; Leclerc ARV; 122 M88A1; 90 M578 VLB 10 AMX-30 MW Aardvark Mk2 NBC VEHICLES 10 TPz-1 Fuchs NBC ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE MSL SP 290+: 90+ AMX-10P (HOT); 200 VCC-1 ITOW; M-ATV with Milan MANPATS Hyeongung; Luch Corsar (reported); Luch Skif (reported); Stugna-P (reported); TOW-2A RCL 84mm Carl Gustaf; 90mm M67; 106mm M40A1

Middle East and North Africa 367

Navy 13,500 Navy HQ at Riyadh; Eastern Fleet HQ at Jubail; Western Fleet HQ at Jeddah EQUIPMENT BY TYPE PRINCIPAL SURFACE COMBATANTS • FRIGATES 6 FFGHM 6: 3 Al Riyadh (FRA La Fayette mod) with 2 quad lnchr with MM40 Exocet Block 2 AShM, 2 8-cell Sylver A43 VLS with Aster 15 SAM, 4 single 533mm TT with F17P HWT, 1 76mm gun (capacity 1 AS365N Dauphin 2 hel) 3 Madina (FRA F-2000) (1 more damaged in 2017 and non-operational) with 2 quad lnchr with Otomat Mk2 AShM, 1 octuple lnchr with Crotale SAM, 4 single 533mm TT with F17P HWT, 1 100mm gun (capacity 1 AS365N Dauphin 2 hel) PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 53 CORVETTES • FSG 4 Badr (US Tacoma) with 2 quad lnchr with RGM-84C Harpoon Block 1B AShM, 2 triple 324mm ASTT with Mk 46 LWT, 1 Mk 15 Phalanx CIWS, 1 76mm gun PCFG 9 Al Siddiq (US 58m) with 2 twin lnchr with RGM84C Harpoon Block 1B AShM, 1 Mk 15 Phalanx CIWS, 1 76mm gun PBF 21 HSI 32 PB 19: 17 (US) Halter Marine 24m; 2 Plascoa 2200 MINE WARFARE • MINE COUNTERMEASURES 3 MHC 3 Al Jawf (UK Sandown) AMPHIBIOUS • LANDING CRAFT 5 LCU ε2 Al Qiaq (US LCU 1610) (capacity 120 troops) LCM 3 LCM 6 (capacity 80 troops) LOGISTICS AND SUPPORT 1 AORH 1 Boraida (mod FRA Durance) (1 more nonoperational and in drydock since 2017) (capacity either 2 AS365F Dauphin 2 hel or 1 AS332C Super Puma)

Naval Aviation EQUIPMENT BY TYPE HELICOPTERS MRH 34: 6 AS365N Dauphin 2; 15 AS565; 13 Bell 406CS Combat Scout TPT • Medium 12 AS332B/F Super Puma AIR-LAUNCHED MISSILES AShM AM39 Exocet; AS-15TT

Marines 3,000 FORCES BY ROLE SPECIAL FORCES 1 spec ops regt with (2 spec ops bn) EQUIPMENT BY TYPE ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES RECCE Bastion Patsas APC • APC (W) 135 BMR-600P

Air Force 20,000 FORCES BY ROLE FIGHTER 4 sqn with F-15C/D Eagle FIGHTER/GROUND ATTACK 3 sqn with F-15S/SA Eagle 3 sqn with Typhoon GROUND ATTACK 3 sqn with Tornado IDS; Tornado GR1A AIRBORNE EARLY WARNING & CONTROL 1 sqn with E-3A Sentry 1 sqn with Saab 2000 Erieye ELINT 1 sqn with RE-3A/B; Beech 350ER King Air TANKER 1 sqn with KE-3A TANKER/TRANSPORT 1 sqn with KC-130H/J Hercules 1 sqn with A330 MRTT TRANSPORT 3 sqn with C-130H Hercules; C-130H-30 Hercules; CN235; L-100-30HS (hospital ac) 2 sqn with Beech 350 King Air (forming) TRAINING 1 OCU sqn with F-15SA Eagle 3 sqn with Hawk Mk65*; Hawk Mk65A*; Hawk Mk165* 1 sqn with Jetstream Mk31 1 sqn with MFI-17 Mushshak; SR22T 2 sqn with PC-9; PC-21 TRANSPORT HELICOPTER 4 sqn with AS532 Cougar (CSAR); Bell 212 (AB-212); Bell 412 (AB-412) Twin Huey (SAR) EQUIPMENT BY TYPE AIRCRAFT 456 combat capable FTR 81: 56 F-15C Eagle; 25 F-15D Eagle FGA 222: up to 67 F-15S Eagle (being upgraded to F-15SA configuration); 84 F-15SA Eagle; 71 Typhoon ATK 66 Tornado IDS ISR 14+: 12 Tornado GR1A*; 2+ Beech 350ER King Air AEW&C 7: 5 E-3A Sentry; 2 Saab 2000 Erieye ELINT 2: 1 RE-3A; 1 RE-3B TKR/TPT 15: 6 A330 MRTT; 7 KC-130H Hercules; 2 KC130J Hercules TKR 7 KE-3A TPT 47+: Medium 36: 30 C-130H Hercules; 3 C-130H-30 Hercules; 3 L-100-30; Light 11+: 10+ Beech 350 King Air; 1 Jetstream Mk31 TRG 194: 24 Hawk Mk65* (incl aerobatic team); 16 Hawk Mk65A*; 35 Hawk Mk165*; 20 MFI-17 Mushshak; 20 PC-9; 55 PC-21; 24 SR22T

Middle East and North Africa

ARTILLERY 833 SP 155mm 224: 60 AU-F-1; 110 M109A1B/A2; 54 PLZ-45 TOWED 172: 105mm 62 LG1; (100 M101/M102 in store); 155mm 110: 50 M114; 60 M198; 203mm (8 M115 in store) MRL 70: 127mm 60 ASTROS II Mk3; 220mm 10 TOS-1A MOR 367: SP 81mm 70; SP 107mm 150 M30; 120mm 147: 110 Brandt; 37 M12-1535; SP 120mm 2R2M HELICOPTERS ATK 35: 11 AH-64D Apache; 24 AH-64E Apache MRH 21: 6 AS365N Dauphin 2 (medevac); 15 Bell 406CS Combat Scout TPT 77: Medium 58: 22 UH-60A Black Hawk (4 medevac); 36 UH-60L Black Hawk; Light 19 Schweizer 333 AIR DEFENCE • SAM Short-range Crotale Point-defence FIM-92 Stinger

368 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2022 HELICOPTERS MRH 15 Bell 412 (AB-412) Twin Huey (SAR) TPT 30: Medium 10 AS532 Cougar (CSAR); Light 20 Bell 212 (AB-212) UNINHABITED AERIAL VEHICLES CISR • Heavy some Wing Loong I (reported); some CH-4 ISR • Medium some Falco AIR-LAUNCHED MISSILES AAM • IR AIM-9P/L Sidewinder; IIR AIM-9X Sidewinder II; IRIS-T; SARH AIM-7 Sparrow; AIM-7M Sparrow; ARH AIM-120C AMRAAM ASM AGM-65 Maverick; AR-1; Brimstone AShM AGM-84L Harpoon Block II ARM ALARM ALCM Storm Shadow BOMBS Laser-guided GBU-10/12 Paveway II; Paveway IV INS/GPS-guided GBU-31 JDAM; FT-9

Royal Flt EQUIPMENT BY TYPE AIRCRAFT • TPT 24: Medium 8: 5 C-130H Hercules; 3 L-100-30; Light 3: 1 Cessna 310; 2 Learjet 35; PAX 13: 1 A340; 1 B-737-200; 2 B-737BBJ; 2 B-747SP; 4 BAe-125-800; 2 Gulfstream III; 1 Gulfstream IV HELICOPTERS • TPT 3+: Medium 3: 2 AS-61; 1 S-70 Black Hawk; Light some Bell 212 (AB-212)

Air Defence Forces 16,000 FORCES BY ROLE AIR DEFENCE 6 bn with M902 Patriot PAC-3 17 bty with Shahine/AMX-30SA 16 bty with MIM-23B I-Hawk EQUIPMENT BY TYPE AIR DEFENCE SAM 817+ Long-range 108 M902 Patriot PAC-3 Medium-range 128 MIM-23B I-Hawk Short-range 181: 40 Crotale; 141 Shahine Point-defence 400+: 400 M1097 Avenger; Mistral GUNS 218 SP • 20mm 90 M163 Vulcan TOWED 128: 35mm 128 GDF Oerlikon; 40mm (150 L/70 in store)

Strategic Missile Forces 2,500 EQUIPMENT BY TYPE MSL • TACTICAL IRBM 10+ DF-3 (CH-SS-2) (service status unclear) MRBM Some DF-21 (CH-SS-5 – variant unclear) (reported)

National Guard 130,000 FORCES BY ROLE MANOEUVRE Mechanised 5 mech bde (1 recce coy, 3 mech inf bn, 1 SP arty bn, 1 cbt engr coy, 1 sigs coy, 1 log bn)

Light 5 inf bde (3 combined arms bn, 1 arty bn, 1 log bn) 3 indep lt inf bn Other 1 (Special Security) sy bde (3 sy bn) 1 (ceremonial) cav sqn COMBAT SUPPORT 1 MP bn EQUIPMENT BY TYPE ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES ASLT 239: 204 LAV-AG (90mm); 35 LAV 6.0 (105mm) IFV 1,115: ε635 LAV-25; ε480 LAV 6.0 (incl variants) APC 778 APC (W) 514: 116 LAV-A (amb); 30 LAV-AC (ammo carrier); 296 LAV-CC (CP); 72 LAV-PC PPV 264 Aravis; some Arive ENGINEERING & MAINTENANCE VEHICLES AEV 58 LAV-E ARV 111 LAV-R; V-150 ARV MW MV5; MV10 ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE MSL SP 182 LAV-AT MANPATS TOW-2A; M47 Dragon RCL • 106mm M40A1 ARTILLERY 363+ SP 155mm up to 136 CAESAR TOWED 108: 105mm 50 M102; 155mm 58 M198 MOR 119+: 81mm some; 120mm 119 LAV-M HELICOPTERS ATK 12 AH-64E Apache MRH 35: 23 AH-6i Little Bird; 12 MD530F (trg role) TPT • Medium ε50 UH-60M Black Hawk AIR DEFENCE SAM 73 Short-range 5 VL MICA Point-defence 68 MPCV GUNS • TOWED • 20mm 30 M167 Vulcan AIR-LAUNCHED MISSILES ASM AGM-114R Hellfire II

Gendarmerie & Paramilitary 24,500+ active Border Guard 15,000 FORCES BY ROLE Subordinate to Ministry of Interior. HQ in Riyadh. 9 subordinate regional commands MANOEUVRE Other Some mobile def (long-range patrol/spt) units 2 border def (patrol) units 12 infrastructure def units 18 harbour def units Some coastal def units COMBAT SUPPORT Some MP units EQUIPMENT BY TYPE ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES APC • PPV Caprivi Mk1/Mk3

Middle East and North Africa 369

Facilities Security Force 9,000+

Subordinate to Ministry of Interior

General Civil Defence Administration Units EQUIPMENT BY TYPE HELICOPTERS • TPT • Medium 10 Boeing Vertol 107

Special Security Force 500 EQUIPMENT BY TYPE ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES APC • APC (W) UR-416 AUV Gurkha LAPV

DEPLOYMENT YEMEN: Operation Restoring Hope 2,500; 2 armd BG; M60A3; M2A2 Bradley; M113A4; M-ATV; 2+ M902 Patriot PAC-3

FOREIGN FORCES France 50 (radar det) Greece 100: 1 SAM bty with M901 Patriot PAC-2 United Kingdom 50 (radar det) United States US Central Command: 1,800; 1 FGA sqn with 12 F-16C Fighting Falcon

Syria SYR Syrian Pound SYP GDP

2020

2021

2022

SYP USD

per capita

USD

Growth

Inflation

Def exp

SYP USD

USD1=SYP Population

20,384,316

Age

0–14

15–19

20–24

25–29

Male

17.1%

4.9%

4.8%

4.0%

30–64 65 plus 17.2%

2.0%

Female

16.3%

4.7%

4.8%

4.2%

17.8%

2.3%

Capabilities The protracted civil war has significantly depleted the combat capabilities of the Syrian armed forces and transformed them into an irregularly structured militia-style organisation focused on internal security. Various nominally pro-government militias, often formed around local or religious identity, are reportedly funded by local businessmen or foreign powers, raising questions over capa-

bility and morale as well as loyalty. There is no published defence doctrine or white paper, the conflict instead dictating ad hoc requirements. Opposition groups maintain de facto control over parts of the country. Most formal pre-war structures and formations exist in name only, as resources have been channelled into the irregular network of military organisations that form the regime’s most effective military capabilities. Russia is the regime’s principal ally and has provided essential combat support and assistance, as well as replacement equipment. Russia is also involved in efforts to reconstitute the army’s pre-war divisions, although there have been reports of corruption and Iranian attempts to subvert Russian influence in the military. Iran and Hizbullah also continue to assist in the provision and training of militias and other ground forces. Overall levels of training remain poor but combat experience has improved proficiency in select regular and irregular military formations. The armed forces lack the requisite capabilities for external deployment, although they remain able to redeploy moderate numbers of formations and capabilities within the country. Logistics support for major internal operations away from established bases remains a challenge. Before the civil war, Syria did not have a major domestic defence industry, although it possessed facilities to overhaul and maintain its existing systems. It did, however, possess some capacity in focused areas, such as ballistic missiles and chemical weapons. International efforts to verify destruction of Syria’s chemical-weapons stockpiles and production facilities continue.

ACTIVE 169,000 (Army 130,000 Navy 4,000 Air 15,000 Air Defence 20,000) Gendarmerie & Paramilitary 100,000 Conscript liability 30 months (there is widespread avoidance of military service)

ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE Army ε130,000 FORCES BY ROLE The Syrian Arab Army combines conventional formations, special forces and auxiliary militias. The main fighting units are the 4th Division, the Republican Guard, the Special Forces (including the former Tiger Forces) and the brigades assigned to the 5th Assault Corps; they receive the most attention and training. Most other formations are under-strength, at an estimated 500–1,000 personnel in brigades and regiments, but Russia has been assisting in the reconstruction and re-equipment of some divisions. COMMAND 5 corps HQ SPECIAL FORCES 3 SF div(-) MANOEUVRE Mechanised 2 (4th & Republican Guard) mech div 1 (1st) mech div (being reconstituted) 10 mech div(-) 7 mech bde (assigned to 5th Assault Corps) 2 indep inf bde(-) Amphibious 1 mne unit COMBAT SUPPORT 2 SSM bde

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PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 106 PCC 13 OPB 40 PBF 85: 4 Al Jouf; 2 Sea Guard; 79 Plascoa FIC 1650 PB 8: 6 Damen Stan Patrol 2606; 2 Al Jubatel AMPHIBIOUS • LANDING CRAFT • UCAC 8: 5 Griffon 8000; 3 other LOGISTICS AND SUPPORT 4: 1 AXL; 3 AO

370 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2022 EQUIPMENT BY TYPE Attrition during the civil war has severely reduced equipment numbers for almost all types. It is unclear how much remains available for operations ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES MBT T-55A; T-55AM; T-55AMV; T-62; T-62M; T-72; T-72AV; T-72B; T-72B3; T-72M1; T-90; T-90A RECCE BRDM-2 IFV BMP-1; BMP-2; BTR-82A APC APC (T) BTR-50 APC (W) BTR-152; BTR-60; BTR-70; BTR-80 APC IVECO LMV ENGINEERING & MAINTENANCE VEHICLES ARV BREM-1 reported; T-54/55 VLB MTU; MTU-20 MW UR-77 ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE • MSL SP 9P133 Malyutka-P (BRDM-2 with RS-AT-3C Sagger); 9P148 Konkurs (BRDM-2 with RS-AT-5 Spandrel) MANPATS 9K111 Fagot (RS-AT-4 Spigot); 9K1111 Konkurs (RS-AT-5 Spandrel); 9K115 Metis (RS-AT-7 Saxhorn); 9K115-2 Metis-M (RS-AT-13); 9K135 Kornet (RSAT-14 Spriggan); Milan ARTILLERY SP 122mm 2S1 Gvozdika; 152mm 2S3 Akatsiya TOWED 122mm D-30; M-30 (M1938); 130mm M-46; 152mm D-20; ML-20 (M-1937); 180mm S-23 GUN/MOR 120mm 2S9 NONA-S MRL 107mm Type-63; 122mm BM-21 Grad; 140mm BM-14; 220mm 9P140 Uragan; 300mm 9A52 Smerch; 330mm some (also improvised systems of various calibres) MOR 82mm some; 120mm M-1943; 160mm M-160; 240mm M-240 SURFACE-TO-SURFACE MISSILE LAUNCHERS SRBM • Conventional 8K14 (RS-SS-1C Scud-B); 9K72 Elbrus (RS-SS-1D Scud C) 9K72-1 (RS-SS-1E Scud D); Scud lookalike; 9K79 Tochka (RS-SS-21 Scarab); Fateh110/M-600 UNINHABITED AERIAL VEHICLES ISR • Medium Mohajer 3/4; Light Ababil AIR DEFENCE SAM Medium-range 9K37 Buk (RS-SA-11 Gadfly); 9K317 Buk-M2 (RS-SA-17 Grizzly) Short-range 96K6 Pantsir-S1 (RS-SA-22 Greyhound) Point-defence 9K31 Strela-1 (RS-SA-9 Gaskin); 9K33 Osa (RS-SA-8 Gecko); 9K35 Strela-10 (RS-SA-13 Gopher); 9K32 Strela-2 (RS-SA-7 Grail)‡; 9K38 Igla (RS-SA-18 Grouse); 9K36 Strela-3 (RS-SA-14 Gremlin); 9K338 Igla-S (RS-SA-24 Grinch) GUNS SP 23mm ZSU-23-4; 57mm ZSU-57-2 TOWED 23mm ZU-23-2; 37mm M-1939; 57mm S-60; 100mm KS-19

Navy ε4,000

Some personnel are likely to have been drafted into other services EQUIPMENT BY TYPE PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 31: CORVETTES • FS 1 Project 159AE (Petya III)† with 1 triple 533mm ASTT with SAET-60 HWT, 4 RBU 2500 Smerch 1 A/S mor, 2 twin 76mm gun PBFG 22: 16 Project 205 (Osa I/II)† with 4 single lnchr with P-22 (RS-SS-N-2C Styx) AShM 6 Tir with 2 single lnchr with C-802 (CH-SS-N-6) AShM PB 8 Zhuk† MINE WARFARE • MINE COUNTERMEASURES 7 MHC 1 Project 1265 (Sonya) with 2 quad lnchr with 9K32 Strela-2 (RS-SA-N-5 Grail)‡ SAM, 2 AK630 CIWS MSO 1 Akvamaren-M (FSU Project 266M (Natya)) with 2 quad lnchr with 9K32 Strela-2 (RS-SA-N-5 Grail)‡ SAM MSI 5 Korund (Project 1258 (Yevgenya)) AMPHIBIOUS • LANDING SHIPS • LSM 3 Polnochny B (capacity 6 MBT; 180 troops) LOGISTICS AND SUPPORT • AX 1 Al Assad

Coastal Defence FORCES BY ROLE COASTAL DEFENCE 1 AShM bde with P-35 (RS-SSC-1B Sepal); P-15M Termit-R (RS-SSC-3 Styx); C-802; K-300P Bastion (RS-SSC-5 Stooge) EQUIPMENT BY TYPE COASTAL DEFENCE • AShM P-35 (RS-SSC-1B Sepal); P-15M Termit-R (RS-SSC-3 Styx); C-802; K-300P Bastion (RS-SSC-5 Stooge)

Naval Aviation All possibly non-operational after vacating base for Russian deployment EQUIPMENT BY TYPE HELICOPTERS • ASW 10: 4 Ka-28 Helix A; 6 Mi-14 Haze

Air Force ε15,000(-) FORCES BY ROLE FIGHTER 2 sqn with Mig-23MF/ML/MLD/UM Flogger 2 sqn with MiG-29A/UB/SM Fulcrum FIGHTER/GROUND ATTACK 4 sqn with MiG-21MF/bis Fishbed; MiG-21U Mongol A 2 sqn with MiG-23BN/UB Flogger GROUND ATTACK 4 sqn with Su-22M3/M4 Fitter J/K 1 sqn with Su-24MK Fencer D 1 sqn with L-39ZA/ZO Albatros* TRANSPORT 1 sqn with An-24 Coke; An-26 Curl; Il-76 Candid 1 sqn with Falcon 20; Falcon 900 1 sqn with Tu-134B-3 1 sqn with Yak-40 Codling ATTACK HELICOPTER 3 sqn with Mi-24D/P Hind D/F 2 sqn with SA342L Gazelle

Middle East and North Africa 371

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE Heavy use of both fixed- and rotary-wing assets has likely reduced readiness and availability to very low levels. It is estimated that no more than 30–40% of the inventory is operational AIRCRAFT 184 combat capable FTR 55: ε25 MiG-23MF/ML/MLD/UM Flogger; ε30 MiG29A/SM/UB Fulcrum FGA 79: ε50 MiG-21MF/bis Fishbed J/L; 9 MiG-21U Mongol A; ε20 MiG-23BN/UB Flogger ATK 30: 20 Su-22M3/M4 Fitter J/K; ε10 Su-24MK Fencer D TPT 23: Heavy 3 Il-76 Candid; Light 13: 1 An-24 Coke; 6 An-26 Curl; 2 PA-31 Navajo; 4 Yak-40 Codling; PAX 7: 2 Falcon 20; 1 Falcon 900; 4 Tu-134B-3 TRG 20+: ε20 L-39ZA/ZO Albatros*; some MBB-223 Flamingo† HELICOPTERS ATK 20+: ε20 Mi-24D Hind D; some Mi-24P Hind F MRH 40: ε20 Mi-17 Hip H; ε20 SA342L Gazelle TPT • Medium ε10 Mi-8 Hip AIR-LAUNCHED MISSILES AAM • IR R-60 (RS-AA-8 Aphid); R-73 (RS-AA-11 Archer); IR/SARH; R-23/24 (RS-AA-7 Apex); R-27 (RSAA-10 Alamo); ARH; R-77 (RS-AA-12A Adder) ASM Kh-25 (RS-AS-10 Karen); Kh-29T/L (RS-AS-14 Kedge); HOT ARM Kh-31P (RS-AS-17A Krypton)

Air Defence Command ε20,000(-) FORCES BY ROLE AIR DEFENCE 4 AD div with S-125M/M1 Pechora-M/M1 (RS-SA-3 Goa); S-125-2M Pechora-2M (RS-SA-26); 2K12 Kub (RS-SA-6 Gainful); S-75 Dvina (RS-SA-2 Guideline) 3 AD regt with S-200 Angara (RS-SA-5 Gammon); S-300PMU2 (RS-SA-20 Gargoyle) EQUIPMENT BY TYPE AIR DEFENCE • SAM Long-range S-200 Angara (RS-SA-5 Gammon); 24 S-300PMU2 (RS-SA-20 Gargoyle) Medium-range 36+: S-75 Dvina (RS-SA-2 Guideline); ε36 S-125-2M Pechora-2M (RS-SA-26) Short-range 2K12 Kub (RS-SA-6 Gainful); S-125M/M1 Pechora-M/M1 (RS-SA-3 Goa) Point-defence 9K32 Strela-2/2M (RS-SA-7A/B Grail)‡

Gendarmerie & Paramilitary ε100,000 National Defence Force ε50,000 An umbrella of disparate regime militias performing a variety of roles, including territorial control

Other Militias ε50,000 Numerous military groups fighting for the Assad regime, including Afghan, Iraqi, Pakistani and sectarian organisations. Some receive significant Iranian support

FOREIGN FORCES Hizbullah 7,000–8,000 Iran 1,500 Russia 4,000: 1 inf BG; 3 MP bn; 1 engr unit; ε10 T-72B3; ε20 BTR-82A; BPM-97; 12 2A65; 4 9A52 Smerch; 10 Su-24M Fencer; 6 Su-34; 6 Su-35S; 1 A-50U; 1 Il-20M; 12 Mi-24P/ Mi-35M Hind; 4 Mi-8AMTSh Hip; 1 AShM bty with 3K55 Bastion (RS-SSC-5 Stooge); 1 SAM bty with S-400 (RS-SA-21 Growler); 1 SAM bty with Pantsir-S1/S2; air base at Latakia; naval facility at Tartus

TERRITORY WHERE THE GOVERNMENT DOES NOT EXERCISE EFFECTIVE CONTROL Data here represents the de facto situation for selected armed opposition groups and their observed equipment

Syrian Democratic Forces ε50,000 A coalition of predominantly Kurdish rebel groups in de facto control of much of northeastern Syria. Kurdish forces from the YPG/J (People’s Protection Units/Women’s Protection Units) provide military leadership and main combat power, supplemented by Arab militias and tribal groups. EQUIPMENT BY TYPE ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES MBT T-55; T-72 (reported) IFV BMP-1 APC • PPV Guardian AUV M-ATV ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE MSL • MANPATS 9K111-1 Konkurs (RS-SA-5 Spandrel) RCL 73mm SPG-9; 90mm M-79 Osa ARTILLERY MRL 122mm BM-21 Grad; 9K132 Grad-P MOR 82mm 82-BM-37; M-1938; 120mm M-1943; improvised mortars of varying calibre AIR DEFENCE • GUNS SP 14.5mm ZPU-4 (tch); ZPU-2 (tch); ZPU-1 (tch); 1 ZPU-2 (tch/on T-55); 23mm ZSU-23-4 Shilka; ZU-23-2 (tch); 57mm S-60 TOWED 14.5mm ZPU-2; ZPU-1; 23mm ZU-23-2

Syrian National Army & National Front for Liberation ε70,000 In late 2019 the Syrian National Army (SNA) and the National Front for Liberation (NLF) began to merge under the SNA umbrella. The SNA formed in late 2017 from Syrian Arab and Turkmen rebel factions operating under Turkish command in the Aleppo governate and northwestern Syria, including Afrin province. The NLF is a coalition of surviving Islamist and nationalist rebel factions formed in 2018 operating in northwestern Syria, particularly in and around Idlib. EQUIPMENT BY TYPE ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES MBT T-54; T-55; T-62 IFV BMP-1

Middle East and North Africa

TRANSPORT HELICOPTER 6 sqn with Mi-8 Hip/Mi-17 Hip H

372 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2022 ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE MSL • MANPATS 9K11 Malyutka (RS-AT-3 Sagger); 9K111 Fagot (RS-AT-4 Spigot); 9K113 Konkurs (RS-T-5 Spandrel); 9K115 Metis (RS-AT-7); 9K115-2 Metis-M (RSAT-13 Saxhorn 2); 9K135 Kornet (RS-AT-14 Spriggan); BGM-71 TOW; Milan RCL 73mm SPG-9; 82mm B-10 ARTILLERY TOWED 122mm D-30 MRL 107mm Type-63; 122mm 9K132 Grad-P; BM-21 Grad; Grad (6-tube tech) MOR 82mm 2B9 Vasilek; improvised mortars of varying calibre AIR DEFENCE SAM • Point-defence MANPADS some GUNS SP 14.5mm ZPU-4 (tch); ZPU-2 (tch); ZPU-1 (tch); 23mm ZU-23-2 (tch); ZSU-23-4 Shilka; 57mm AZP S-60 TOWED 14.5mm ZPU-1; ZPU-2; ZPU-4; 23mm ZU23-2

Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) ε10,000

HTS was formed by Jabhat Fateh al-Sham (formerly known as Jabhat al-Nusra) in January 2017 by absorbing other hardline groups. It is designated a terrorist organisation by the US government. EQUIPMENT BY TYPE ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE MSL • MANPATS 9K11 Malyutka (RS-AT-3 Sagger); 9K113 Konkurs (RS-AT-5 Spandrel); 9K115-2 Metis-M (RSAT-13); 9K135 Kornet (RS-AT-14 Spriggan) RCL 73mm SPG-9; 106mm M-40 ARTILLERY MRL 107mm Type-63 MOR 120mm some; improvised mortars of varying calibres AIR DEFENCE SAM Point-defence 9K32M Strela-2M (RS-SA-7B Grail)‡ GUNS SP 14.5mm ZPU-1; ZPU-2; 23mm ZU-23-2; 57mm S-60

Guardians of Religion (Huras al-Din) ε2,500

An al-Qaeda-affiliated group operating in Idlib province. It is designated a terrorist organisation by the US government.

FOREIGN FORCES Turkey ε3,000; 3 armd BG; some cdo units; 1 gendarmerie unit United States Operation Inherent Resolve 900; 1 armd inf coy; 1 mne bn(-)

Tunisia TUN Tunisian Dinar TND

2020

2021

TND

110bn

120bn

USD

39.2bn

42.7bn

USD

3,295

3,556

Growth

-8.6

3.0

Inflation

5.6

5.7

TND

3.24bn

3.44bn

USD

1.15bn

1.22bn

USD

85m

40m

2.81

2.82

GDP per capita

Def bgt FMA (US) USD1=TND

2022

85m

Real-terms defence budget trend (USDm, constant 2015) 1326 449 2008

Population

2015

2021

11,811,335

Age

0–14

15–19

20–24

25–29

Male

13.0%

3.4%

3.1%

3.5%

30–64 65 plus 22.3%

4.4%

Female

12.2%

3.2%

3.1%

3.7%

23.4%

4.8%

Capabilities Ensuring territorial sovereignty and internal security are the main tasks of the armed forces, which have limited capacities but are undergoing a modernisation process. The civil war in Libya and Islamist terrorist groups operating from there continue to pose a security concern. In the light of terrorist attacks, the armed forces are engaged in counter-terrorism operations and have been tasked with securing sensitive industrial sites. Designated a major non-NATO ally by the US in 2015, Tunisia benefits from defence and security cooperation with US AFRICOM and also with France. A ten-year militarycooperation agreement signed with the US in 2020 will provide more training and after-sales support. In 2019, Tunisia sent a Hercules transport aircraft to support the UN’s MINUSMA peacekeeping mission in Mali and reportedly plans to deploy an infantry battalion and military police to the mission. The deployment of a helicopter unit to the Central African Republic was approved in early 2021. The country has received training from Algeria and is a member of the Saudi-led Islamic Military Counter Terrorism Coalition. The armed forces are involved in multinational exercises, notably those led by the US. The country is also strengthening its intelligence capabilities. Overall military capability is limited by the ageing equipment inventory, although Tunisia has been the recipient of surplus US systems, including armed utility helicopters. The country has limited defence-industrial capabilities but has recently manufactured a small number of patrol boats for the navy capabilities.

ACTIVE 35,800 (Army 27,000 Navy 4,800 Air 4,000) Gendarmerie & Paramilitary 12,000

Conscript liability 12 months selective

ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE Army 5,000; 22,000 conscript (total 27,000) FORCES BY ROLE SPECIAL FORCES 1 SF bde 1 (Sahara) SF bde

Middle East and North Africa 373

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES MBT 84: 30 M60A1; 54 M60A3 LT TK 48 SK-105 Kuerassier RECCE 60: 40 AML-90; 20 FV601 Saladin APC 425+ APC (T) 140 M113A1/A2 APC (W) 110 Fiat 6614 PPV 180+: 4 Bastion APC: 71 Ejder Yalcin; 100+ Kirpi; 5 +Vuran ENGINEERING & MAINTENANCE VEHICLES ARV 11: 5 Greif; 6 M88A1 ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE • MSL SP 35 M901 ITV TOW MANPATS Milan; TOW ARTILLERY 276 TOWED 115: 105mm 48 M101A1/A2; 155mm 67: 12 M114A1; 55 M198 MOR 161: 81mm 95; SP 107mm 48 M106; 120mm 18 Brandt AIR DEFENCE SAM • Point-defence 26 M48 Chaparral; RBS-70 GUNS 112 SP 40mm 12 M42 TOWED • 20mm 100 M-55

Navy ε4,800 EQUIPMENT BY TYPE PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 37 PSO 4 Jugurtha (Damen Stan MSOPV 1400) (of which 2 with 1 hel landing platform) PCFG 3 La Galite (FRA Combattante III) with 2 quad lnchr with MM40 Exocet AShM, 1 76mm gun PCC 3 Bizerte (FRA PR 48) PCFT 6 Albatros (GER Type-143B) with 2 single 533mm TT, 2 76mm guns PBF 2 20m Fast Patrol Boat PB 19: 5 Istiklal; 3 Utique (ex-PRC Type-062 (Haizhui II) mod); 5 Joumhouria; 6 V Series LOGISTICS AND SUPPORT 7: ABU 3: 2 Tabarka (ex-US White Sumac); 1 Sisi Bou Said AGE 1 Hannibal AGS 1 Khaireddine (ex-US Wilkes) AWT 1 Ain Zaghouan (ex-ITA Simeto) AX 1 Salambo (ex-US Conrad, survey)

Air Force 4,000 FORCES BY ROLE FIGHTER/GROUND ATTACK 1 sqn with F-5E/F-5F Tiger II TRANSPORT 1 sqn with C-130B/H/J-30 Hercules; G.222; L-410 Turbolet 1 liaison unit with S-208A

TRAINING 2 sqn with L-59 Albatros*; MB-326B; SF-260 1 sqn with MB-326K; MB-326L TRANSPORT HELICOPTER 2 sqn with AS350B Ecureuil; AS365 Dauphin 2; AB-205 (Bell 205); SA313; SA316 Alouette III; UH-1H Iroquois; UH-1N Iroquois 1 sqn with HH-3E EQUIPMENT BY TYPE AIRCRAFT 23 combat capable FTR 11: 9 F-5E Tiger II; 2 F-5F Tiger II ATK 3 MB-326K ISR 12 Maule MX-7-180B TPT 18: Medium 13: 5 C-130B Hercules; 1 C-130H Hercules; 2 C-130J-30 Hercules; 5 G.222; Light 5: 3 L-410 Turbolet; 2 S-208A TRG 30: 9 L-59 Albatros*; 4 MB-326B; 3 MB-326L; 14 SF-260 HELICOPTERS MRH 34: 1 AS365 Dauphin 2; 6 SA313; 3 SA316 Alouette III; 24 OH-58D Kiowa Warrior SAR 11 HH-3E TPT 39: Medium 8 UH-60M Black Hawk; Light 31: 6 AS350B Ecureuil; 15 Bell 205 (AB-205); 8 Bell 205 (UH1H Iroquois); 2 Bell 212 (UH-1N Iroquois) AIR-LAUNCHED MISSILES AAM • IR AIM-9P Sidewinder ASM AGM-114R Hellfire

Gendarmerie & Paramilitary 12,000 National Guard 12,000 Ministry of Interior

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES ASLT 2 EE-11 Urutu FSV APC 29+ APC (W) 16 EE-11 Urutu (anti-riot); VAB Mk3 PPV 13 Streit Typhoon AUV IVECO LMV PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 24 PCC 6 Rais el Blais (ex-GDR Kondor I) PBF 7: 4 Gabes; 3 Patrouiller PB 11: 5 Breitla (ex-GDR Bremse); 4 Rodman 38; 2 Socomena HELICOPTERS MRH 8 SA318 Alouette II/SA319 Alouette III TPT • Light 3 Bell 429

DEPLOYMENT CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC: UN • MINUSCA 134; 1 hel sqn DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO: UN • MONUSCO 13 MALI: UN • MINUSMA 87; 1 tpt flt with C-130J-30 SOUTH SUDAN: UN • UNMISS 3

Middle East and North Africa

MANOEUVRE Reconnaissance 1 recce regt Mechanised 3 mech bde (1 armd regt, 2 mech inf regt, 1 arty regt, 1 AD regt, 1 engr regt, 1 sigs regt, 1 log gp) COMBAT SUPPORT 1 engr regt

374 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2022

United Arab Emirates UAE Emirati Dirham AED GDP per capita

2020

2021

AED

1.32tr

1.51tr

USD

359bn

410bn 43,538

USD

38,661

Growth

-6.1

2.2

Inflation

-2.1

2.0

AED

ε72.8bn

ε70.4bn

USD

ε19.8bn

ε19.2bn

3.67

Def bdgt [a] USD1=AED

ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE 2022

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE SATELLITES 4 COMMUNICATIONS 3 Yahsat ISR 1 FalconEye

Army 44,000

[a] Defence budget estimate derived from central MoD expenditure and a proportion of the Federal Services section of the Abu Dhabi budget Real-terms defence budget trend (USDbn, constant 2015) 19.33 9.95 2008

Population

2015

Space

2021

9,856,612

Age

0–14

15–19

20–24

25–29

Male

8.3%

2.6%

2.7%

4.9%

30–64 65 plus 49.5%

1.2%

Female

7.8%

2.2%

3.1%

14.9%

0.4%

Capabilities The UAE’s armed forces are arguably the best trained and most capable of all GCC states. Iran remains a key defence concern, for reasons including the continuing dispute with Tehran over ownership of islands in the Strait of Hormuz, as well as attacks both on tankers off the UAE coast and on oil infrastructure. However, the UAE has shown a growing willingness to take part in operations and project power and influence further abroad, including by sending an F-16 detachment to Afghanistan and involvement in the conflict in Libya. The UAE also joined the Saudi-led intervention in Yemen, although it has subsequently drawn down its forces, and political disagreements with Riyadh relating to the conflict continue to complicate relations between the two GCC members. Experience gained in these operations has offered combat lessons, not least in limited amphibious operations, and has demonstrated the country’s developing approach to both the use of force and the acceptance of military risk. The UAE hosts a French base and is diversifying its security relationships, including with China, India and Japan, although the US remains the country’s key extraregional defence partner. A new defence agreement with Washington came into force in May 2019 and the US Air Force continues to maintain a substantial force at the Al Dhafra airbase. The armed forces have an advanced inventory of modern equipment across the domains, including air and missile defences, and are taking steps to upgrade their airborne ISR capabilities. The UAE continues to develop its domestic defence-industrial base, having consolidated its leading defence firms into the state-owned EDGE Group in 2019, but the country remains reliant on external providers for many major weapons systems.

ACTIVE 63,000 (Army 44,000 Navy 2,500 Air 4,500 Presidential Guard 12,000) Conscript liability 16–24 months, males 18–30 years dependent on education level. Voluntary service enrolment for women

FORCES BY ROLE MANOEUVRE Armoured 2 armd bde Mechanised 2 mech bde Light 1 inf bde COMBAT SUPPORT 1 arty bde (3 SP arty regt) 1 engr gp EQUIPMENT BY TYPE ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES MBT 303: 45 AMX-30; 258 Leclerc LT TK 76 FV101 Scorpion RECCE 73: 49 AML-90; 24 VBL IFV 524: 390 BMP-3; 134 Rabdan APC 1,656 APC (T) 136 AAPC (incl 53 engr plus other variants) APC (W) 185: 45 AMV 8×8 (one with BMP-3 turret); 120 EE-11 Urutu; 20 VAB PPV 1,335: ε460 Caiman; ε680 Maxxpro LWB; 150 Nimr Hafeet 630A (CP); 45 Nimr Hafeet (Amb) AUV 650 M-ATV; Nimr Ajban; Nimr Jais ENGINEERING & MAINTENANCE VEHICLES AEV 53+: 53 ACV-AESV; Wisent-2 ARV 158: 8 ACV-AESV Recovery; 4 AMX-30D; 85 BREM-L; 46 Leclerc ARV; 15 Maxxpro ARV NBC VEHICLES 32: 8 Fuchs 2 BIO-RS; 16 Fuchs 2 NBC-RS; 8 Fuchs 2 NBC-CPS (CP) ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE MSL SP 135: 20 HOT; 115 Nimr Ajban 440A with Kornet-E (RS-AT-14 Spriggan) MANPATS FGM-148 Javelin; Milan; TOW RCL 84mm Carl Gustaf ARTILLERY 619+ SP 155mm 181: 78 G-6; 85 M109A3; 18 Mk F3 TOWED 99: 105mm 73 L118 Light Gun; 130mm 20 Type59-I; 155mm 6 AH-4 MRL 94+: 122mm 50+: 48 Firos-25 (est 24 op); 2 Jobaria; Type-90 (reported); 227mm 32 M142 HIMARS; 239mm ε6 K239 Chunmoo; 300mm 6 9A52 Smerch MOR 251: 81mm 134: 20 Brandt; 114 L16; 120mm 21 Brandt; SP 120mm 96 RG-31 MMP Agrab Mk2 SURFACE-TO-SURFACE MISSILE LAUNCHERS SRBM • Conventional 6 Hwasong-5 (up to 20 msl); MGM-168 ATACMS (launched from M142 HIMARS) UNINHABITED AERIAL VEHICLES ISR • Medium Seeker II AIR DEFENCE SAM • Point-defence Mistral

Middle East and North Africa 375

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 43 CORVETTES 7 FSGHM 6 Baynunah with 2 quad lnchr with MM40 Exocet Block 3 AShM, 1 8-cell Mk 56 VLS with RIM162 ESSM SAM, 1 21-cell Mk 49 GMLS with RIM-116C RAM Block 2 SAM, 1 76mm gun FSGM 1 Abu Dhabi with 2 twin lnchr with MM40 Exocet Block 3 AShM, 1 76mm gun PCFGM 2 Mubarraz (GER Lurssen 45m) with 2 twin lnchr with MM40 Exocet AShM, 1 sextuple Sadral lnchr with Mistral SAM, 1 76mm gun PCGM 4: 2 Muray Jib (GER Lurssen 62m) with 2 quad lnchr with MM40 Exocet Block 2 AShM, 1 octuple lnchr with Crotale SAM, 1 Goalkeeper CIWS, 1 76mm gun, 1 hel landing platform 2 Ganthoot with 2 twin lnchr with MM40 Exocet Block 3 AShM, 2 3-cell VLS with VL-MICA SAM, 1 76mm gun, 1 hel landing platform PCFG 6 Ban Yas (GER Lurssen TNC-45) with 2 twin lnchr with MM40 Exocet Block 3 AShM, 1 76mm gun PBFG 12 Butinah (Ghannatha mod) with 4 single lncher with Marte Mk2/N AShM PBF 12: 6 Ghannatha with 1 120mm NEMO mor (capacity 42 troops); 6 Ghannatha (capacity 42 troops) MINE WARFARE • MINE COUNTERMEASURES 2 MHO 2 Al Murjan (ex-GER Frankenthal Type-332) AMPHIBIOUS LANDING SHIPS • LST 2 Alquwaisat with 1 hel landing platform LANDING CRAFT 18 LCM 5: 3 Al Feyi (capacity 56 troops); 2 (capacity 40 troops and additional vehicles) LCP 4 Fast Supply Vessel (multipurpose) LCT 9: 7 ADSB 64m; 1 Al-Saadiyat with 1 hel landing platform; 1 Al Shareeah (LSV 75m) with 1 hel landing platform LOGISTICS AND SUPPORT 3: AFS 2 Rmah with 4 single 533mm TT AX 1 Al Semeih with 1 hel landing platform

Air Force 4,500 FORCES BY ROLE FIGHTER/GROUND ATTACK 3 sqn with F-16E/F Block 60 Fighting Falcon 3 sqn with Mirage 2000-9DAD/EAD/RAD AIRBORNE EARLY WARNING AND CONTROL 1 flt with GlobalEye SEARCH & RESCUE 2 flt with AW109K2; AW139 TANKER 1 flt with A330 MRTT TRANSPORT 1 sqn with C-17A Globemaster 1 sqn with C-130H/H-30 Hercules; L-100-30 1 sqn with CN235M-100 TRAINING 1 sqn with Grob 115TA

1 sqn with Hawk Mk102* 1 sqn with PC-7 Turbo Trainer 1 sqn with PC-21 TRANSPORT HELICOPTER 1 sqn with Bell 412 Twin Huey EQUIPMENT BY TYPE AIRCRAFT 156 combat capable FGA 137: 54 F-16E Block 60 Fighting Falcon (Desert Eagle); 24 F-16F Block 60 Fighting Falcon (13 to remain in US for trg); 15 Mirage 2000-9DAD; 44 Mirage 2000-9EAD MP 2 DHC-8 Dash 8 MPA ISR 7 Mirage 2000 RAD* SIGINT 1 Global 6000 AEW&C 3 GlobalEye TPT/TKR 3 A330 MRTT TPT 26: Heavy 8 C-17A Globemaster III; Medium 6: 3 C-130H Hercules; 1 C-130H-30 Hercules; 2 L-100-30; Light 16: 5 C295W; 5 CN235; 2 P.180 Avanti (MEDEVAC) TRG 79: 12 Grob 115TA; 12 Hawk Mk102*; 30 PC-7 Turbo Trainer; 25 PC-21 HELICOPTERS MRH 21: 12 AW139; 9 Bell 412 Twin Huey TPT • Light 4: 3 AW109K2; 1 Bell 407 UNINHABITED AERIAL VEHICLES CISR • Heavy Wing Loong I; Wing Loong II ISR • Heavy RQ-1E Predator XP AIR-LAUNCHED MISSILES AAM • IR AIM-9L Sidewinder; R-550 Magic; IIR AIM9X Sidewinder II; IIR/ARH Mica; ARH AIM-120B/C AMRAAM ASM AGM-65G Maverick; LJ-7; Hakeem 1/2/3 (A/B) ARM AGM-88C HARM ALCM Black Shaheen (Storm Shadow/SCALP EG variant) BOMBS INS/SAT guided Al Tariq Laser-guided GBU-12/58 Paveway II

Air Defence FORCES BY ROLE AIR DEFENCE 2 AD bde (3 bn with MIM-23B I-Hawk; M902 Patriot PAC-3) 3 (short range) AD bn with Crotale; Mistral; Rapier; RBS-70; Javelin; 9K38 Igla (RS-SA-18 Grouse); 96K6 Pantsir-S1 (RS-SA-22) 2 SAM bty with THAAD EQUIPMENT BY TYPE AIR DEFENCE SAM 42+ Long-range M902 Patriot PAC-3 Medium-range MIM-23B I-Hawk Short-range 42+: Crotale; 42 96K6 Pantsir-S1 (RSSA-22) Point-defence 9K38 Igla (RS-SA-18 Grouse); RBS-70; Rapier; Mistral GUNS • Towed 35mm GDF-005 MISSILE DEFENCE 12 THAAD

Middle East and North Africa

Navy 2,500

376 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2022 PCM 2 Arialah (Damen Sea Axe 6711) with 1 11-cell Mk 15 SeaRAM GMLS with RIM-116C RAM Block 2 SAM, 1 57mm gun, 1 hel landing platform PCC 1 Shujaa (Damen Stan Patrol 5009) PBF 58: 6 Baglietto GC23; 3 Baglietto 59; 15 DV-15; 34 MRTP 16 PB 53: 2 Protector; 16 (US Camcraft 65); 5 (US Camcraft 77); 6 Watercraft 45; 12 Halmatic Work; 12 Al Saber

Presidential Guard Command 12,000 FORCES BY ROLE SPECIAL FORCES 1 SF bn 1 spec ops bn MANOEUVRE Reconaissance 1 recce sqn Mechanised 1 mech bde (1 tk bn, 4 mech inf bn, 1 AT coy, 1 cbt engr coy, 1 CSS bn) Amphibious 1 mne bn EQUIPMENT BY TYPE ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES MBT 50 Leclerc IFV 290: 200 BMP-3; 90 BTR-3U Guardian ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE MSL • SP HMMWV with 9M133 Kornet (RS-AT-14 Spriggan)

Joint Aviation Command FORCES BY ROLE GROUND ATTACK 1 sqn with Archangel; AT802 Air Tractor ANTI-SURFACE/ANTI-SUBMARINE WARFARE 1 sqn with AS332F Super Puma; AS565 Panther TRANSPORT 1 (Spec Ops) gp with AS365F Dauphin 2; H125M Fennec; AW139; Bell 407MRH; Cessna 208B Grand Caravan; CH-47C/F Chinook; DHC-6-300/400 Twin Otter; UH60L/M Black Hawk ATTACK HELICOPTER 1 gp with AH-64D Apache EQUIPMENT BY TYPE AIRCRAFT 37 combat capable ATK 23 Archangel ISR ε6 AT802 Air Tractor* TPT • Light 14: 2 Beech 350 King Air; 7 Cessna 208B Grand Caravan*; 1 DHC-6-300 Twin Otter; 4 DHC-6-400 Twin Otter HELICOPTERS ATK 28 AH-64D Apache ASW 7 AS332F Super Puma (5 in ASuW role) MRH 53+: 4 AS365F Dauphin 2 (VIP); 9 H125M Fennec; 7 AS565 Panther; 3 AW139 (VIP); 20 Bell 407MRH; 4 SA316 Alouette III; 6+ UH-60M Black Hawk (ABH) TPT 66: Heavy 22 CH-47F Chinook; Medium 44: 11 UH60L Black Hawk; up to 33 UH-60M Black Hawk AIR-LAUNCHED MISSILES ASM AGM-114 Hellfire; Cirit; Hydra-70; HOT AShM AS-15TT; AM39 Exocet

Paramilitary Critical Infrastructure and Coastal Protection Agency (CICPA) Ministry of Interior

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 115 PSO 1 Al Wtaid

DEPLOYMENT EGYPT: ε300 12 F-16E/F Fighting Falcon (reported); Wing Loong I UAV; Wing Loong II UAV LIBYA: UH-60M; Pantsir-S1

FOREIGN FORCES Australia 400; 1 tpt det with 2 C-130J-30 Hercules France 650: 1 armd BG (1 tk coy, 1 armd inf coy; 1 aty bty); Leclerc; VBCI; CAESAR; 7 Rafale F3; • EMASOH; 1 Atlantique-2 Korea, Republic of 170 (trg activities at UAE Spec Ops School) United Kingdom 200; 1 tkr/tpt flt with C-17A Globemaster; C-130J Hercules; A330 MRTT Voyager United States 5,000; 1 ISR sqn with 4 U-2S; 1 AEW&C sqn with 4 E-3B/G Sentry; 1 tkr sqn with 12 KC-10A; 1 ISR UAV sqn with RQ-4 Global Hawk; 2 SAM bty with M902/ M903 Patriot PAC-3/PAC-3 MSE

Yemen, Republic of YEM Yemeni Rial YER GDP per capita

2020

2021

YER

14.0tr

19.6tr

USD

18.8bn

19.5bn

USD

580

585

-8.5

-2.0

Inflation

23.1

40.7

Def bdgt

YER

n.k

USD

n.k

742.99

1004.86

Growth

USD1=YER Population

2022

30,399,243

Age

0–14

15–19

20–24

25–29

Male

18.6%

5.8%

5.1%

4.4%

30–64 65 plus 15.1%

1.4%

Female

18.0%

5.6%

5.0%

4.3%

14.8%

1.7%

Capabilities Yemen continues to be afflicted by a conflict that is, according to the UN, the world’s worst humanitarian crisis. There appears to be little prospect that any of the competing forces will be able to gain a decisive upper hand. UN peace efforts have faltered as the government has continued to struggle with Houthi rebels in the north and the secessionist Southern Transitional Council. The government of President Abdu Rabbu Mansour Hadi appears to exercise limited control over the forces nominally loyal to it, while the proxy forces supposedly allied to the government and supported by the members of the Saudi-led coalition answer to those member

Middle East and North Africa 377

ACTIVE 40,000 (Goverment forces 40,000)

ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE Government forces ε40,000 (incl militia) Despite a Saudi-brokered deal that has included the Southern Transitional Council (STC) in a newly formed unity government, President Hadi still only appears to exercise limited control over the forces nominally allied together against the Houthis. Irregular forces, such as Tareq Saleh’s National Resistance and those of the STC, are reportedly better paid and equipped than government forces. FORCES BY ROLE MANOEUVRE Mechanised up to 20 bde(-) EQUIPMENT BY TYPE ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES MBT Some M60A1; T-34†; T-54/55; T-62; T-72 RECCE some BRDM-2 IFV BMP-2; BTR-80A; Ratel-20 APC APC (W) BTR-60 PPV Streit Cougar; Streit Spartan AUV M-ATV ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE MSL • MANPATS 9K11 Malyutka (RS-AT-3 Sagger); M47 Dragon; TOW GUNS • SP 100mm SU-100† ARTILLERY • SP 122mm 2S1 Gvozdika AIRCRAFT • ISR 6 AT-802 Air Tractor* AIR DEFENCE • GUNS • TOWED 14.5mm ZPU-4; 23mm ZU-23-2

DEPLOYMENT MALI: UN • MINUSMA 2

FOREIGN FORCES All Operation Restoring Hope unless stated Saudi Arabia 2,500: 2 armd BG; M60A3; M2A2 Bradley; M113A4; M-ATV; AH-64 Apache; M902 Patriot PAC-3 Sudan 650; 1 mech BG; T-72AV; BTR-70M Kobra 2

TERRITORY WHERE THE GOVERNMENT DOES NOT EXERCISE EFFECTIVE CONTROL Insurgent forces 20,000 (incl Houthi and tribes) The Houthi-run de facto administration has controlled northern Yemen since 2015 and is supported by a combination of Houthi tribal militias and elements of the Yemeni armed forces loyal to former president Ali Abdullah Saleh. Following a break between the Houthis and Saleh in late 2017 that resulted in the latter’s death, Saleh’s former forces have become further split between those that remained affiliated with the Houthis and those who have joined his son and nephew to fight against them. Houthi forces appear to continue to receive material support from Iran, with several clandestine weapons shipments of Iranian origin intercepted in recent years. FORCES BY ROLE MANOEUVRE Mechanised up to 20 bde(-) EQUIPMENT BY TYPE ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES MBT T-55; T-72 IFV BMP-2; BTR-80A APC • APC (W) Some BTR-40; BTR-60 AUV M-ATV ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE MSL • MANPATS M47 Dragon; 9K111-1 Konkurs (RS-AT-5B Spandrel/Towsan-1); 9K115 Metis (RS-AT-7 Saxhorn); Dehlavieh (Kornet) RCL 82mm B-10 SURFACE-TO-SURFACE MISSILE LAUNCHERS SRBM • Conventional 9K79 Tochka (RS-SS-21 Scarab); 9K72 Elbrus (RS-SS-1C Scud-B); Hwasong-5 (RS-SS1C Scud-B); Hwasong-6 (RS-SS-1D Scud-C); Borkan-1 (extended-range Scud derivative); Borkan-2H (Qiam-1); Qaher-1 (converted S-75 SAM) GLCM • Conventional Quds-1; Quds-2 (reported) COASTAL DEFENCE • AShM C-801; C-802 UNINHABITED AERIAL VEHICLES ISR • Medium Qasef-1; Qasef-2K; Sammad-1; Sammad-2; Sammad-3 (many of these systems have been fitted with a warhead payload to function as a form of improvised missile) AIR DEFENCE • GUNS • TOWED 20mm M167 Vulcan; 23mm ZU-23-2

Middle East and North Africa

states rather than Yemeni military authorities. The rebel Houthi forces, who are assumed to receive material support from Iran, are largely tribal-based militias, along with some elements of the Yemeni armed forces who were loyal to the former Saleh regime. Al-Qaeda affiliates also appear to be active in the country. Government forces tend to be under-equipped and poorly paid compared to the proxy groups supported by the Saudi-led coalition. The Houthi rebel forces benefited from the training and capabilities of Yemeni armed forces previously loyal to former president Saleh. The Saudi-led coalition continues to provide air support for the Hadi government, although the UAE has largely drawn down its forces. The conflict appears to have been sustained by a combination of large existing stockpiles of weapons and ammunition and external supplies, despite UN embargoes. There is no domestic defence industry, barring some limited maintenance and workshop facilities.

378 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2022

Chapter Eight

Latin America and the Caribbean Lacklustre economic performance and the absence of major external security threats still continue to constrain regional defence budgets, while social challenges and internal security concerns have increased demands for government spending in other areas. Total defence funding in the region is in real terms at the same level as in 2009. The region’s defencebudgetsin 2021 remained stable atabout1% of GDP–a proportion smaller than in any other region.

measures designed to mitigate the impact of the pandemic were among the more extensive in the region. Nominal allocations have risen, but the rial has depreciated against the dollar, while high inflation meant that the 2021 and 2022 defence budgets represented real terms cuts of 9.6% and 4.2%. There has been some effect on some procurement plans, including for the KC-390 transport aircraft, though the Gripen and submarine programmes continue.

The continued impact of the coronavirus pandemic has required sustained military support for publichealth structures during 2021, even though lockdowns and other measures were less strict than in 2020.

In Argentina, there has been a continuing focus on the incremental modernisation of the armed forces, though the budgetary situation remains bleak and there has been a continued failure to recapitalise air-combat capability.

With the proportion of defence funding available for investment remaining low, modernisation plans are likely to become more incremental, with most countries unable to significantly improve their military capability. Brazil remains the major exception. The financial costs of the pandemic have also begun to affect defence budgeting in Brazil. Fiscal-policy

Latin America and the Caribbean defence spending, 2021 – top 5, including US Foreign Military Financing United States USD754bn

In Colombia, budget funds allocated to ‘Defence and Police’ have increased in recent years, despite wider economic difficulties, rising in real terms by 10.9% between 2018 and 2021. Currency depreciation has eroded the international purchasing power of the budget.

Active military personnel – top 10 (15,000 per unit)

Global total 19,605,000

Brazil 366,500 Colombia 255,950 Mexico 216,000 Venezuela 123,000

Total Latin America and the Caribbean spending USD50bn Brazil

Peru 81,000 Argentina 72,100 Chile 68,500 Mexico

USD21.8bn USD6.8bn

Colombia

Chile

Argentina

USD6.0bn USD4.2bn USD2.6bn

Dominican Republic 56,050 Cuba 49,000 Ecuador 41,250

7.6%

Regional total 1,488,000

Latin America and the Caribbean 379

Latin America defence spending as % of GDP (average)

Regional defence policy and economics

380 ►

Armed forces data section

390 ►

Arms procurements and deliveries

392 ►

Caribbean and Central America patrol vessels, 2014–21

1.25

280

1.15

260

1.05 240 0.95 220

0.85

200 2008

2010

2012

2014

2016

Medium and Heavy Transport aircraft, 2014–21

100

Medium transport aircraft Heavy transport aircraft

2018

2020 2021

2014

Tanker and Tanker/Transport aircraft, 2014–21

2016

2018

2021

Argentina: Fighter Ground-Attack and Ground Attack aircraft, 2014–21

100

2020

Ground Attack aircraft Fighter Ground-Attack aircraft

80 15 70

60 10

40 30 5

20 10 3

0 2014

2016

2018

2020

2021

0 2014

2016

2018

2020

2021

2014

2016

2018

2020

2021

Latin America and the Caribbean

0.75

380 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2022

Latin America and the Caribbean Policy and capability

The continued impact of the coronavirus pandemic has required sustained military support for publichealth structures during 2021, even though lockdowns and other measures have been less strict than in 2020. However, the economic impact of the pandemic on the region’s defence budgets has become more noticeable this year. With the proportion of defence funding available for investment remaining low, modernisation plans are likely to become more incremental, with almost all countries unable to significantly improve their military capability. The major exception is Brazil, which has continued to modernise its air and naval platforms, with the participation of local defence-industries, although rising inflation means its defence budget has declined in real terms since 2019. Perhaps the most significant security challenge remains that posed by organised crime and narcotrafficking groups in Mexico and Central American states, though countries such as Peru, Colombia and Venezuela continue to face challenges including from localised insurgencies and organised crime. Venezuela’s crisis is still having sub-regional effects as neighbouring states continue to host refugees from that country. Meanwhile, the fallout from protests in 2019–21 in countries including Chile and Colombia, where security forces took on a publicorder role, has led to a renewed focus on levels of public trust in security institutions. More broadly, the roles undertaken by the armed forces in Latin America continue to receive attention – for instance the Brazilian armed forces’ internal-security role, and concerns expressed in some quarters over possible politicisation. Meanwhile, the armed forces in Mexico have been tasked with development and infrastructure projects, and their counterparts in Peru may be given similar roles. Mexico’s security environment remains challenging, with continuing turf wars between the country’s main drug-trafficking organisations. These include the Cártel Sinaloa and Cártel Jalisco Nueva Generación, which are both based in the Pacific coast region but have established a presence in other parts

of the country. A revitalised Gulf Cartel and splinter groups from former cartels continue to operate in the northeast and centre of the country. Moreover, recent years have also seen a resurgence in local self-defence groups (autodefensas). The government of President Andrés Manuel López Obrador has continued efforts to bolster the National Guard, which was created as a gendarmerie-style civilian force and has been relatively heavily equipped from its inception. While it is currently under the operational control of the Secretariat of National Defense (SEDENA), there are plans to create a Joint National Defence Staff under SEDENA, including the army, air force and National Guard, and to establish a unified command for the army and air force to boost joint operational capability. Budgetary factors continue to constrain procurement, with the future of fast-jet capability one area of concern. Mexico brought some of its ageing F-5 combat aircraft back into service in 2020, and it has been suggested that a replacement programme may begin around 2025. Meanwhile, the navy’s Benito-Juárez-class (Damen SIGMA 10514) frigate, which entered service in 2020, was in September 2021 en route to take part in the SIFOREX, UNITAS LXII and SOLIDAREX II military exercises. Brazil’s armed forces continue their modernisation drive. This has seen them obtain some of the most advanced equipment in Latin America, with some projects including technology-transfer arrangements with foreign defence firms as well as local production. However, the financial costs of the pandemic have begun to affect defence budgeting – fiscal-policy measures implemented by Brazil to mitigate the impact of the pandemic were among the more extensive in the region, estimated by the IMF to have added up to 12% of GDP in 2020. It is unlikely to derail major procurement programmes, but it has contributed to decisions to reduce some programme acquisitions. For example, it now seems likely that the air force will now procure only about half of the 28 Embraer KC-390 medium transport aircraft that it originally envisaged. In March, the finance ministry had rejected an air-force plan to acquire two transport aircraft, after the president had

indicated interest in Airbus aircraft earlier in January. However, the acquisition of two tanker/transport aircraft was finally authorised in May, with analysts suggesting the possible acquisition of used A330 MRTTs. Meanwhile, the first Saab F-39 Gripen (JAS-39 E) arrived in late 2020, and four more were handed over in Sweden in November 2021. The first aircraft was built in Sweden and has been tested in Brazil, including at the Gripen Flight Test Center at Embraer’s facility in Gavião Peixoto in São Paulo state, which also houses the Gripen Design and Development Center. These facilities are part of the technologytransfer agreement. Fuselages are to be produced at the Saab aerostructures facility in São Bernardo do Campo in the São Paulo metropolitan area. Other developments have included the introduction of a number of new radar stations and a memorandum of understanding between Embraer and the Ministry of Defence concerning studies relating to uninhabited aerial vehicle (UAV) systems. Under the PROSUB programme, which involves technology-transfer arrangements with France as well as local production, Brazil aims to procure one nuclearpowered submarine – the country’s first – and four conventionally powered boats. The programme took a step forward in July 2021 when the navy’s submarine staff relocated to the Ilha da Madeira submarine base at the Itaguaí naval complex, which houses the country’s main submarine shipyard. Construction of the hull of Brazil’s first nuclear-powered submarine (SN-BR), Álvaro Alberto, is moving closer, with plans for this build moving ahead. The second locally built Scorpène-class conventionally powered submarine (S-41 Humaitá) was launched in December 2020, and the final two boats are expected in 2022–23. The first vessel, S-40 Riachuelo, was on sea trials in late 2021 and may commission before the end of the year. Brazil’s land forces have focused mainly on modernisation projects, including for part of the fleet of M113 armoured personnel carriers (APCs), while also retiring older platforms including some Leopard 1 and M60A3 main battle tanks (MBTs). The last M113s from the modernisation programme initiated in 2010 in partnership with BAE Systems Land & Armaments were handed over to the 7th Armoured Infantry Battalion in August 2020. Four upgraded M109A5 155mm self-propelled artillery pieces were handed over to the 29th SP Artillery Group in June; another batch is expected before the end of 2021. A request for proposals was issued in March for an 8×8 wheeled assault gun vehicle, based on a foreign design and

with a 105mm gun, to replace the EE-9 Cascavel reconnaissance vehicle. Much international attention during the year focused on political–military relations, particularly after the resignation in March of the army, navy and air-force commanders. Tensions had reportedly risen in part because of a growing number of appointments of former military officers to political positions, giving rise to concerns about the nature of civil–military relations. In November 2020 the service chiefs had released a statement noting the importance of the separation between the armed forces and the political sphere. Their resignations came a day after the abrupt departure of defence minister Fernando Azevedo e Silva, described in some parts of the media as a resignation and in others as a sacking by President Jair Bolsonaro. Chile’s armed forces have devoted significant resources to the pandemic response, deploying widely across the country, while defence industries have produced medical equipment such as ventilators. Santiago’s expenditures in the wake of the pandemic have resulted in a degree of retrenchment in defence budgeting. One example was the decision in July to postpone further modernisation of the F-16 fleet, for which over USD600 million had reportedly been earmarked. However, other modernisation plans have been approved, such as the Proaco programme (led by FAMAE) for Leopard 2A4 MBTs and Marder 1A3 infantry fighting vehicles, which will have their fire-control and targeting systems upgraded. FAMAE is also to upgrade the fire-control systems of the M109 self-propelled artillery fleet. Meanwhile, the VARD 7 series from Vard Marine, a Canadian subsidiary of Italian firm Fincantieri, was selected as the design for a new multi-role vessel that is likely to blend the characteristics of an offshore patrol vessel (OPV) and a transport vessel, and should also be capable of operating in the Antarctic. Construction is due to begin in late 2021. Argentina does not face any major domestic or external security threats, but it has concerns regarding transnational organised crime and its armed forces have, like others, been involved in responding to the pandemic. There has been a continuing focus on the incremental modernisation of the armed forces, though the budgetary situation remains bleak – the 2021 budget was smaller than the previous year’s in real terms. This means new developments are not taking place at a pace that would allow the country’s combat capabilities to make up the ground lost in

Latin America and the Caribbean

Latin America and the Caribbean 381

382 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2022

▼ Map 6 China: defence and security exports to Latin America since the early 2000s, selected systems In the mid-2000s, it became apparent that some states in Latin America were moving away from their traditional military equipment suppliers, Russia and the US. China had exported small quantities of equipment in the 1990s and Beijing increased its exports after the mid-2000s. Initially these consisted mainly of non-lethal items such as uniforms and communication devices, which were at times paired with equipment donations, but conventional equipment deliveries grew in number to include armoured vehicles (including for

2018 Caribe Hydrographic Survey Vessel 1

internal security purposes) and radars. Beijing has also offered loans and competitive pricing, which has helped China’s emergence as an supplier, appealing, it seems, not only to left-leaning governments in the region but also to states operating within budgetary constraints. By 2014, China had closed deals with half of the countries in the region. There have been few deals since then, reflecting regional economic problems, though China has also gifted trucks and other defence equipment.

VENEZUELA

COLOMBIA 2011 YLC/2V-3D, YLC-18 Long-range radar 4

2013 Type-90B MRL 27

ECUADOR

2005 JYL-1 Long-range radar 3

2011/13 JY-11B Long-range radar 10

2012 Y-8 Medium transport aircraft 8

2009–13 K-8W Karakorum Training aircraft 27

2011 VN-16 Light tank 10

2011 VN-1, VN-18 Infantry fighting vehicle 21

PERU 2012–15 VN-4 AUV 2009 K-8W Karakorum Training aircraft 6

BOLIVIA

2012–15 ABV-1 Crowd-control vehicle

ε700 2014 JZ/QF-612 Short-range radar n.k.

2014 Harbin Z-9 Multi-role helicopter 6

2008 WZ-551B1 APC (W) 4

2012–15 WCT-1 Water cannon

ARGENTINA

2014 JY-27A-3-D Long-range radar ≥3

Order years Equipment name Equipment type Quantity

Latin America and the Caribbean 383

various 105mm and 155mm towed artillery pieces. The practical results of these efforts are hard to gauge. The navy also suffers from maintenance and availability issues that are affecting a number of platforms and refit ambitions. There have also been efforts to improve the country’s guided-weapons capabilities, though it is unclear whether the Chineseorigin C-802A anti-ship missiles that were contracted have arrived.

DEFENCE ECONOMICS Macroeconomics

According to IMF data, the economic contraction that Latin America and the Caribbean suffered in 2020 as a result of the pandemic was the most severe in the world, with regional GDP decreasing by 7%. The region was also among the worst affected in terms of infections and mortality in 2020, with 79 deaths per 100,000 people compared to the global average of 23. In 2021 the impact of the virus in many countries has been exacerbated by slow vaccine roll-outs. Despite unprecedented fiscal and monetary policy support, strengthening commodity prices and signs of recovery in key trading partners, the regional recovery has been inhibited by the persistence of COVID-19, with many countries hit by successive waves of the virus and continued restrictions on economic activity. The IMF estimates that the region’s GDP will have increased by 4.6% in 2021, and predicts growth of just 3.1% in 2022. As a result, regional income per capita will not recover to pre-pandemic level until 2024. Economic performance varies across the region, as does the economic outlook. The relatively fast and effective vaccine roll-out in Chile, combined with extensive fiscal policy measures in response to the economic impact of the pandemic, means that the country’s GDP is on course to recover to pre-pandemic levels by the end of 2021. Brazil’s GDP, meanwhile, is unlikely to return to its pre-pandemic level until 2022, with the country facing new COVID-19 variants and the government beginning to withdraw fiscal support in response to high debt levels. The rates of economic growth in Argentina and Mexico during 2021, projected to be 5.8% and 5.0% respectively, are insufficient to make up for the contractions of 10.0% and 8.2% that they suffered in 2020. Mexico will likely take until 2023 to recover, despite spillover benefits from the US fiscal-stimulus plan, with domestic fiscal support and investment remaining weak. Finally, those Caribbean countries

Latin America and the Caribbean

recent decades – certainly not when compared to neighbours Brazil and Chile. A case in point is the failure to recapitalise air-combat capability, which is limited to a handful of A-4 Skyhawk light attack aircraft along with combat-capable trainers such as the domestically built AT-63 Pampa II. Earlier plans to obtain second-hand aircraft such as the Mirage F1 and Kfir, as an interim measure before acquiring a fourth-generation fighter, were unsuccessful, and the most recent effort to purchase Korean FA-50 Fighting Eagle fighter ground-attack aircraft was derailed after the United Kingdom vetoed the export of UK-sourced components. The most recent successful fast-jet acquisition came in 2017 with the purchase of five former-French Super Etendard Modernisé fighter ground-attack aircraft for the naval-aviation arm. That said, there is reportedly a plan to refurbish up to ten A-4s by 2025. The navy, meanwhile, has received its third French-built Gowind-class OPV, ARA Storni, with one further vessel in the class scheduled for delivery in 2022. The army is also upgrading its M113 APCs, and negotiations have been reported with Israel to upgrade over 70 TAM MBTs. Peru’s armed forces remain engaged in military operations against the Shining Path terrorist group, particularly in the VRAEM (valley of the Apurímac, Ene and Mantaro rivers) region, while President Pedro Castillo has announced that he plans to give the armed forces additional responsibilities, tasking them with development and infrastructure projects. Despite sustained economic growth over the past decade, recent budget constraints have restricted capability development. Acquisition plans that have been reported include three OPVs for the navy (the plan is apparently to build these in Peru) and 22 8×8 armoured fighting vehicles for the army. Early in 2021, the air force acquired a pair of second-hand KC-130H tanker/transport aircraft from Spain. Venezuela remains mired in an economic depression that, combined with US economic sanctions, has reduced its ability to maintain its US-origin military equipment. However, defence relations with Russia (and to a lesser extent China) have allowed Caracas to procure advanced weaponry over the past decade, though the pace of modernisation has slowed in recent years and attention has turned towards the challenge of maintenance. Efforts at refurbishing obsolete (mostly Western) equipment have reportedly focused on the army’s Scorpion-90 light tanks, various types of armoured recovery vehicle, AMX-13 self-propelled artillery pieces, and

384 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2022

Bahamas Mexico

Haiti

Cuba Jamaica Belize Honduras Nicaragua

Guatemala El Salvador

Puerto Rico Antigua and Barbuda

Dominican Rep.

Barbados

Panama

Trinidad and Tobago

Costa Rica

Venezuela

Guyana Guyan

Colombia

Fr. Guiana

Suriname

Ecuador

Peru

Brazil

Bolivia

Paraguay

Argentina

2021 Defence Spending (USDbn)

Chile

Uruguay

21.75 10

5 3 1 .25 .05

▲ Map 7 Latin America and the Caribbean: regional defence spending1

that are highly dependent on tourism may take until 2024 to recover to pre-pandemic levels of GDP, with global travel restrictions continuing into 2022. Moreover, the pandemic has exacerbated structural issues that were already inhibiting regional economic growth and sustainable development. These include low productivity, high dependence on natural resources, low levels of tax collection, insufficient investment and large informal economies. According to the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, labour productivity in Latin America has been declining relative to the rest of the world

since the 1980s, while data from the International Labour Organization shows that real GDP per employed person has fallen every year since 2014. Increased unemployment has also led to a rise in regional inequality and poverty. Analysis from the UN suggests that inequality, as measured by the Gini coefficient, increased by 2.9% in 2020, while the IMF estimated in early 2021 that 19 million people across the region had fallen into poverty since the start of the pandemic. Prolonged school closures are likely to have a further negative impact on productivity levels in the longer term.

Latin America and the Caribbean 385

Lacklustre economic performance and the absence of major external security threats have long combined to constrain regional defence budgets, while social challenges and internal security concerns have increased demands for government spending in other areas. Across the region as a whole, total defence funding in real terms is at the same level as in 2009. Defence budgets have also fallen significantly in US-dollar terms, as several currencies – including Brazil’s real and Colombia’s peso – have fallen significantly in value against the dollar since 2018. The slow rate of growth of Brazil’s defence budget, in nominal terms, has significantly constrained ▼ Figure 24 Latin America and the Caribbean: defence spending by country and sub-region, 2021 Other Central America, 4.6%

The Caribbean, 3.5%

Mexico, 13.5% Other South America, 2.7% Brazil 43.4%

Ecuador 3.2% Peru, 3.7% Argentina 5.1% Chile, 8.4% Colombia, 11.9% Note: Analysis excludes Cuba, Suriname and Venezuela

1.5 1.19

1.08

1.07

2017

2018

2019

1.18

1.05

1.0

0.5

0.0

2016

2020

2021

analysis25 excludes Cuba,America Suriname and Venezuela ▲Note: Figure Latin and the Caribbean: regional defence spending as % of GDP (average)

overall regional spending, as Brazil has accounted for about 40% of regional defence spending over the last decade. Brazil’s defence budget during that period has fluctuated between 1.3% and 1.5% of GDP but the majority of countries in the region spend less than 0.9% of GDP. As a result, the regional budget allocation to defence has remained stable at about 1% of GDP – a proportion smaller than in any other region. A proposal to cut Brazil’s 2020 defence budget by USD10 billion was reversed by a parliamentary amendment in August 2020, and in nominal terms the final budget allocation (BRL115bn) was marginally higher than in 2019 (BRL107bn). However, the depreciation of the real against the dollar during 2020 meant that in dollar terms the budget declined to just USD22.3bn, compared to USD27.1bn in 2019. The 2021 and 2022 budgets were maintained in nominal terms – at BRL115bn (USD21.8bn) and BRL117bn (USD22.6bn) respectively – but high rates of inflation mean they represented cuts of 9.6% and 4.2% in real terms. In April 2021, President Bolsonaro said that BRL1.36bn (USD257m) of the 2021 budget should be frozen as ‘contingency funds’ that could only be spent if economic conditions improved, suggesting that budget difficulties remain. When the severe cut to the 2020 budget was proposed in August 2019, defence chiefs expressed concerns about where the savings could be made – a shorter working week for the army was even considered as a partial solution. With investment only accounting for around 10% of the annual defence budget, procurement and research-and-development (R&D) programmes are already under pressure and would have been

Latin America and the Caribbean

Defence spending

2.0

% of GDP

In recent years, inequality and broader economic challenges have fuelled street protests in several countries. Waves of demonstrations that began in late 2019 in Chile, Colombia, Ecuador and Peru were interrupted by the restrictions placed on public gatherings in 2020, but have re-emerged in 2021 as the underlying drivers of unrest have intensified in the wake of the pandemic. Those working in the informal economy found their earnings particularly hard hit by lockdowns, and were less likely to receive financial assistance from the state due to their limited access to bank accounts and the internet. As countries in the region implement economic reforms aimed at reducing their debt levels – Colombia’s ‘Sustainable Solidarity Law’ is one example – analysts have voiced concern that such reforms may place further burdens on lower-income groups.

386 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2022

100 Argentina Brazil Colombia Mexico Chile Peru

80 60 40 20 0 2008

2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025

Source: IMF World Economic Outlook October 2021. Note: No IMF public debt data from 2020 for Argentina

2026 © IISS

▲ Figure 26 Latin America: selected countries, gross public debt (% of GDP), 2008–26

severely constrained if the 2020 budget had cut as planned. The outlook for Brazil’s defence budget is made more challenging by underlying economic conditions. Real GDP is unlikely to recover to its pre-pandemic (2019) level until 2023, while the budget deficit rose beyond 13% of GDP in 2020 and is projected to remain above 7% of GDP until 2024. Public debt jumped from 88% to 99% of GDP between 2019 and 2020 and is expected to persist at levels close to 90% of GDP until 2026. In Colombia, the growth in funding for ‘defence and police’ has strengthened, with the budgets for the years 2020 and 2021 increasing by 1.9% and 5.8% respectively in real terms to reach COP39.1 trillion (USD10.6bn). A further 3.7% real increase is projected for the 2022 budget, although currency depreciation has eroded the purchasing power of the budget internationally. In the 2021 budget, the IISS has determined that 57% (or USD6.0bn) was allocated to the armed forces and 43% to the police, which suggests that internal security has been growing in importance in relation to defence – the funding split in 2008, for example, was 64–36%. The recent increases come despite ongoing pandemic-related economic difficulties, but they also follow a decade of stagnation in Colombian defence spending. Moreover, as with defence spending in Brazil, the depreciation of the Colombian peso against the dollar has eroded the purchasing power of an already-small investment budget, that in this case accounts for only 3–5% of the budget. Despite nominal annual increases that have averaged 32% since 2011, Argentina’s budget has plummeted in both real and US-dollar terms since

2017. Inflation, averaging 40% per year between 2018 and 2021, has created further pressure to devalue a currency that has already fallen from an exchange rate of 17 pesos to the dollar in 2017 to about 100 pesos to the dollar in 2021. Consequently, the 20% nominal defence budget increase between 2020 and 2021, from ARS205bn to ARS246bn, equates to a decrease from USD2.90bn to USD2.57bn in US dollar terms and an 18.6% cut in real terms. Indeed, in real terms the Argentinian defence budget in 2021 has almost halved since 2015. Like its neighbours, Argentina allocates less than 5% of the budget to investment, which has likely slowed the pace of recapitalisation by limiting options to purchase foreign defence equipment. Movements in Mexico’s defence budget have been volatile in recent years, with an 8.3% real-terms cut in 2019 followed by sharp increases of 14.4% and 12.1% in 2020 and 2021 respectively, reaching USD6.76bn. The recent increases stem from the armed forces’ increasing role in internal security. This could lead to a further expansion of the budget, but there is also a risk of conflicting priorities and that higher spending on internal security could mask reductions in core defence capabilities. The outlook for Mexico’s defence budget is constrained by multiple points of exposure to the global impact of the pandemic, which make the economy, and consequently the public finances, vulnerable in the short term. Although Mexico’s deficit, at 5.8% of GDP in 2020, was smaller than that of its neighbours, this was primarily because of a lack of comprehensive fiscal stimulus as well as strict tax collection. This was in keeping with President Obrador’s promise of a balanced primary or central budget in 2020, though the limited nature of the fiscal

Latin America and the Caribbean 387

Defence industry

Brazil’s ambition to develop its defence-industrial capabilities has been evident in successive national defence strategies since 2005. Its aim has been to progress from off-the-shelf purchases towards programmes that would enhance domestic capabilities and enable import substitution. Technology transfer and industrial participation have been leveraged in foreign procurement contracts to develop the domestic defence sector, resulting in a defenceindustrial base that has the capability to produce modern naval and air platforms as well as rockets and artillery. According to the Minstry of Defence, Brazilian defence and security exports increased from USD3.2bn to USD3.6bn between 2018 and 2019. Meanwhile, Brazil’s principal defence company, Embraer, reported that its defence and security segment saw revenues increase by 13.5% in 2020. Coming amid a 31% drop in company-wide revenues in 2020, this somewhat offset the poor performance of the commercial-aviation segment due to the dramatic decrease in global travel in the wake of the pandemic. Beyond Brazil, the lack of any significant and sustained growth in defence spending and the low levels of funding allocated to investment (procurement plus R&D) among the major regional states – at between 2% and 10% of annual defence expenditure – constrains the development of indigenous capabilities in Latin America. Colombia’s offset policy has yet to result in a wide-ranging or advanced domestic defence capability, with the country still heavily reliant on foreign imports for major programmes. Mexico, meanwhile, has established a small defence industry capable of producing small arms and light weapons, 4×4 tactical patrol vehicles, UAVs, fast interceptor craft and coastal and offshore patrol vessels.

COLOMBIA Policy and capability

Colombia’s defence policy and military capability have been shaped in recent years by the transformation of the strategic environment following the signature of the demobilisation agreement with FARC guerrillas, and budgetary challenges posed by a deteriorating economy. The armed forces’ missions have changed while the resources available to meet new requirements have become more limited – a challenge made more acute by the coronavirus pandemic. Some analysts posit that reductions in military capability – with relatively low investment funding being one factor – may exacerbate security challenges. The risk is that fewer troops and less equipment might weaken territorial control, increasing border insecurity and potentially even creating the conditions for expanded drug production. Meanwhile, there are reports of continued border incursions by the Venezuelan armed forces, while military operations by Caracas within its own territory have led to further population displacement across the border. Colombia’s defence establishment formally adopted a post-conflict posture in January 2019 when it approved the ‘Defense and Security Policy for Legality, Entrepreneurship and Equity’. This document retained some traditional tasks, such as the counter-insurgency campaign against the National Liberation Army (ELN) guerrillas, but also gave the armed forces a key role in post-conflict stabilisation and emphasised other objectives such as the protection of natural resources, deterrence against external threats and an expansion of international military cooperation. Military roles expanded further as a result of the pandemic, with the armed forces (under Operation San Roque) and the National Police (who come under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of National Defense) employed during the country’s several prolonged lockdowns. A series of riots, fuelled by the management of the public health crisis and subsequent economic problems, led to additional deployments between April and July 2021.

Personnel reductions

Colombia’s armed forces have significantly reduced in size, with total personnel numbers falling from over 290,000 to around 255,000 in the five years to 2021. The reduction has been particularly steep in the army, where numbers have reduced from 225,000 to 186,000. This is due partly to a fall in conscript

Latin America and the Caribbean

stimulus will affect demand and slow the economic recovery. The annual defence budget in Peru was stable between 2015 and 2019, ranging from USD2.2bn to USD2.4bn, but there have been increasingly stringent cuts since then. The budget was reduced by 3.7% in real terms in 2019, by 4.8% in 2020, and a further 12.3% in 2021, falling to USD1.87bn. Further south, Chile’s defence budget has remained relatively stable in nominal terms since 2019, despite considerable economic headwinds and political challenges. However, as with other countries in the region, cuts have been severe in real terms, reaching 4.6% and 11.7% in 2020 and 2021 respectively.

388 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2022

numbers: early in the last decade the army was recruiting around 90,000 conscripts per year, but in recent years it has struggled to reach 60,000. The size of the professional army has also decreased slightly. As a result, Colombia’s armed forces are smaller than at any point in the last 15 years, while there are also reports of ‘hollow’ units with actual strength falling below establishment strength. Reforms of the Army Command in 2016 and the Armed Forces General Command in 2018 have had the effect of expanding the military bureaucracy and reducing the number of officers available to lead operational units. The decrease in the size of the army has not been accompanied by an expansion of the police. Although there were plans to expand the National Police, their personnel strength has instead decreased, partly because of a change in pension regulations in 2019 that allowed several thousand middle-ranking officers to take early retirement. Budget pressures have also affected training and participation in international exercises. Training has been reduced in order to preserve key resources, such as fuel for operations, and financial restrictions have forced the armed forces to reduce their participation in international exercises. After deploying the corvette Almirante Padilla to the RIMPAC exercise in 2016, the navy decided not to send a ship in 2018 or 2020, instead dispatching staff officers. Similarly, the air force reduced its participation in Exercise Red Flag in 2019, sending its tanker aircraft but not the combat aircraft it had also sent on previous occasions.

International cooperation

This reduced participation in exercises reflects the challenges the armed forces are facing in maintaining their ambitious programme of international cooperation, a situation compounded by the pandemic. One example is the so-called United States–Colombia Action Plan (USCAP), which aims to provide Colombian trainers and advisers to other Latin American countries and has been a central pillar of Colombia’s international-security assistance. Between 2013 and 2020, this initiative provided training to thousands of military and police personnel from Costa Rica, the Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Mexico, Panama, Paraguay and Peru. Although USCAP is funded almost entirely by the US, factors including the requirement for the Colombian defence ministry to pay special benefits to its deployed personnel have imposed limits on the scale of the programme.

Budgetary pressure has also hampered other forms of international security cooperation. Colombia became a NATO partner in 2017, but progress has so far been limited apart from a Strategic Dialogue process, set up to explore opportunities for cooperation, and NATO’s certification of Colombia’s International Demining Center as a training provider. However, Colombia has not taken part in any other NATO activities other than multinational exercises.

Defence economics

At first glance, the funds allocated to ‘Defence and Police’ in the annual budget have increased significantly in recent years, despite wider economic difficulties. Partly this is a reflection of the need to allocate greater resources to internal security in the wake of the pandemic. After ranging between COP25 trillion (USD8.47 billion) and COP30tr (USD10.2bn) between 2012 and 2017, the defence and police budget has since grown from COP32.4tr in 2018 to COP39.1tr in 2021 – a nominal increase of more than 20% and a real-terms increase of 10.9%. However, given the depreciation of the peso against the dollar, the overall budget has decreased slightly in dollar terms, from USD11.0bn in 2018 to USD10.6bn in 2021. The portion of the overall budget allocated to the armed forces (i.e., excluding funding for the National Police) is estimated by the IISS to have increased from COP18.7tr in 2018 to COP22.1tr in 2021 – but this again translates to a slight decrease in dollar terms from USD6.3bn to USD6.0bn. The stagnation of the budget in dollar terms has had a negative effect on equipment maintenance and acquisition programmes, mainly because they often depend on foreign suppliers that have to be paid for in hard currency. Colombian firms have been given a greater role in basic maintenance in an attempt to reduce costs – for example in the case of the 32 LAV III Gladiator infantry fighting vehicles acquired by the army in the last decade. However, this has not prevented a decrease in operational capacity: for example, analysts reported that the readiness level of the army and police helicopter fleets was below 50% at the beginning of 2020. Additionally, some procurement programmes have either been cancelled or postponed. Plans to replace the obsolete fleet of Kfir C-10/C-12 fighter aircraft were cancelled in May 2021, while the project to develop a locally built frigate, the so-called Strategic Surface Platform (PES), has been postponed. There have been a few exceptions, including the

Latin America and the Caribbean 389

Defence industry

The portion of the defence and police budget devoted to investment spending remains very small, ranging from 3–5% annually and therefore severely restricting the resources available for the acquisition of new equipment either from domestic or foreign suppliers. State-owned shipbuilder COTECMAR has seen not only the postponement of the PES project but also the discontinuation of the plan to build six Piloto Pardoclass OPVs, with only three having been built so far. Budgetary constraints have also affected the prospects of CIAC, the aerospace company owned by the air force. The postponement of the Kfirreplacement plan dashed any hopes of technologytransfer opportunities as part of an offset agreement with the manufacturer of a future Colombian fighter. Additionally, production of the Calima T-90 basic trainer (based on a design by US manufacturer Lancair), to replace the ageing T-41D Mescalero and

now-retired T-34 Mentor, was halted after just over 20 airframes were acquired. The T-41Ds are instead being replaced by Cessna 172 Skyhawks that were delivered in July. It remains to be seen whether defence exports will be able to compensate for reduced domestic demand. Although exports have increased in recent years, there is still only limited penetration of foreign markets. For example, INDUMIL, the state-owned manufacturer of light weapons and explosives, increased its foreign sales from USD2.87m in 2017 to USD23.14m in 2019, but that was due to a single contract to provide munitions to the armed forces of the United Arab Emirates. COTECMAR, meanwhile, sold only two LCU (landing craft utility) vessels – one to Honduras, one to Guatemala. The defence industry hopes to be able to penetrate new markets with products such as CIAC’s short-range Quimbaya UAV, to be sold initially to the Colombian armed forces, and the uninhabited maritime vehicle currently being designed by COTECMAR to operate from large surface combatants. However, technological limitations and strong international competition, along with the lack of funding, cast doubt on the chances of these projects becoming export successes.

Latin America and the Caribbean

acquisition of C-130H transport aircraft (to replace older C-130s) through the US Excess Defense Articles (EDA) programme, South Korea’s donation of a Po Hang-class corvette to the navy in 2020, and China’s donation of 75 trucks to the army in 2021.

390 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2022

Arms procurements and deliveries – Latin America and the Caribbean Significant events in 2021 FEBRUARY

ECUADOR PROCUREMENT PLAN

Ecuador is coming to the end of its current Strategic Defence Plan (PEI) (2017–21). The government released its annual defence procurement investment plan, which details USD72.85 million-worth of investment, including six twin-engine search-and-rescue helicopters worth USD23.08m and training aircraft worth USD15.42m. This continues the trend seen in the past decade of recapitalising transport and utility aviation. The deliveries of six Airbus H145 transport helicopters finished in 2021. Other acquisitions have included eight Grob G120TP training aircraft in 2020; three Airbus C295M transport aircraft in 2014–15; seven H125M (AS550) Fennec multi-role helicopters in 2012–16; and four H125 (AS350B2/AS350B3) Ecureuil helicopters in 2011 and 2018. In recent years the army has received little investment and continues to operate legacy French and Brazilian armoured vehicles, while naval requirements are being addressed through work at the local ASTINAVE shipyard: the yard is expected to deliver an MPV70 MKII offshore-patrol ship next year.

JUNE

PERU DEFENCE MODERNISATION

Peru’s defence ministry approved a ministerial resolution (no. 0268-2021-DE) establishing a set of institutional reforms, ranging from policy development to the acquisition process. The new framework appears to acknowledge that the existing acquisition law has failed to achieve standardisation targets for defence equipment. Peru’s defence procurements have tended to focus on the acquisition of small numbers of equipment platforms, because of only limited funding. This has had the effect of increasing interoperability challenges within the armed forces. The Joint Command of the Armed Forces will now act as the deciding authority on acquisition priorities and will also encourage offset agreements, particularly through technology transfer and local production.

OCTOBER

ARGENTINA LOOKS TO IMPROVE ITS CAPABILITIES

The chief of the general staff of Argentina’s air force, Brigadier Major Xavier Julián Isaac, restated Argentina’s requirement for a fourth-generation fighter aircraft. This came after the ministry of defence allocated USD664m for the acquisition of 12 fighter aircraft in its latest budget, having received offers mainly from Russia (the MiG-29 and MiG-35 Fulcrum) and China and Pakistan (the JF-17 Thunder). Buenos Aires is also waiting for possible proposals from the US, while India is reportedly preparing a bid with the Tejas. Plans to acquire aircraft from other sources have foundered in recent years, reportedly as a result of pressure from the UK. The National Defence Fund (Fondo Nacional de la Defensa (FONDEF)), launched in September 2020, secures funding in the overall government budget exclusively for defence procurement. Starting at 0.35% in 2020, it will grow to 0.8% by 2023 and aims to benefit local industry.

NOVEMBER

BRAZIL TO REDUCE KC-390 ORDER

The Brazilian Air Force (FAB) announced that, following the breakdown of negotiations with Embraer, it will seek to unilaterally reduce the number of KC-390 aircraft on order and decrease the production rate to two aircraft a year, down from the previous plan of eight to ten per year. This comes as budget constraints have forced the service to prioritise certain programmes. The FAB awarded Embraer a BRL7.26 billion (USD3.08bn) contract in May 2014 for 28 aircraft, with deliveries expected to begin in 2016 and estimated completion in 2026. The contract was reworked later in 2014 in order to protect the programme from currency volatility. This split the funding, so that some was paid in Brazilian reals and some in US dollars for importing subsystems and parts. Embraer has so far only secured two export orders for the aircraft (Portugal 5, Hungary 2) and although Brazilian series production deliveries began in 2019, the collapse in 2020 of a potential marketing deal with Boeing (and merger of civil aircraft production), combined with post-coronavirus budgetary constraints, could mean that KC-390 production will continue at a reduced rate into the near future.

Latin America and the Caribbean 391

Argentina: defence procurement since 2010

Contract Equipment Date

Type

Quantity Value (USD)

2013

Medium transport helicopter

n.k.

2013 G 120TP Feb 2013 Bell 412EP Twin Huey

Training aircraft Multi-role helicopter

10 2

26.56m 17.43m

Dec 2013

Model 56 pack howitzer

105mm towed artillery

n.k.

2014

C-212-200

Light transport aircraft 2

H225

Oct 2014 KC-130H Hercules; C-130H Hercules

10.12m

Prime contractor M

Deliveries Second- Service hand?

Airbus

2016

Coast Guard

Grob Aircraft Bell (through Canadian Commercial Corporation) Oto Melara

2013–14 2015

N One of two

Air Force Army

2015

Army

Airbus

2016

Army

Tanker/transport aircraft 2; 3 upgrade; medium transport aircraft upgrade Jan 2015 Cessna 550 Citation; Light transport aircraft 1; 2 Cessna 208EX Grand Caravan 2016 AW169 Light transport 1 helicopter

68.76m

L3Harris Technologies

2016– ongoing

Air Force

10.87m

Textron Aviation

2015

Army

n.k.

Leonardo

2018

Gendarmerie

2016

Cessna 208EX Grand Caravan

Light transport aircraft 2

n.k.

Textron Aviation

2016

Army

May 2016

Bell 206B Jet Ranger II

Light transport helicopter

2.9m

2017–18

Army

Dec 2016

Shaldag II

Fast patrol boat

49m

Italian government surplus Israel Shipyards

2018

Coast Guard

Apr 2017 T-6C+ Texan II

Training aircraft

135.28m

Textron Aviation

2017–19

Air Force

Jun 2017 Bell 412EP Twin Huey Nov Super Etendard Modernisé 2017

Multi-role helicopter

54.45m

Bell

2017–18

Army

Fighter ground-attack aircraft

16.04m

2019

Navy

Dec 2017

IA-63 Pampa III

Training aircraft

21.77m

2018

Air Force

Nov 2018

Bouchard (Gowind OPV 90)

Offshore patrol ship with hangar

378.39m

French government surplus Fábrica Argentina de Aviones (FAdeA) Naval Group

2019– ongoing

One of four

Navy

Mar 2019

IA-63 Pampa III

Training aircraft

18.69m

2019–20

Air Force

Oct 2020 IA-63 Pampa III

Training aircraft

15.9m

2021

Air Force

Jan 2021 B-737-700

Passenger transport aircraft

9.75m

2021

Air Force

Apr 2021 UC-12B Huron; TC-12B

Light transport aircraft; 1; 9 training aircraft

16.67m

2021– ongoing

Air Force

May 2021

Training aircraft

101.7m

Fábrica Argentina de Aviones (FAdeA) Fábrica Argentina de Aviones (FAdeA) Aero Capital Solutions (ACS) US government surplus Fábrica Argentina de Aviones (FAdeA)

By end of N 2023

Air Force

IA-63 Pampa III

M – multinational

Latin America and the Caribbean

Table 11

392 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2022

Argentina ARG

Antigua and Barbuda ATG East Caribbean Dollar XCD GDP per capita

2020

2021

XCD

3.70bn

3.79bn

USD

1.37bn

1.41bn

2022

Argentine Peso ARS GDP

2020

2021

ARS

27.5tr

43.6tr

USD

389bn

455bn 9,929

USD

13,967

14,118

USD

8,572

Growth

-20.0

1.0

Growth

-9.9

7.5

Inflation

1.1

1.6

Inflation [a]

42.0

n/a

Def bdgt [a]

XCD

21.3m

20.0m

USD

7.87m

7.40m

2.70

USD1=XCD

per capita

Def bdgt

ARS

205bn

246bn

USD

2.90bn

2.57bn

70.63

95.69

USD1=ARS

[a] Budget for the Ministry of Legal Affairs, Public Safety, Immigration & Labour

2022

[a] No inflation figure published by the IMF for 2021 Real-terms defence budget trend (USDbn, constant 2015)

Real-terms defence budget trend (USDm, constant 2015)

6.34

8.77 2.00 2008

2015

Population

2021

99,175

Age

0–14

15–19

20–24

25–29

30–64 65 plus

Male

11.3%

3.7%

4.1%

3.7%

20.3%

4.0%

Female

11.0%

3.7%

4.2%

3.9%

24.7%

5.3%

Capabilities The Antigua and Barbuda Defence Force (ABDF) focuses on internal security and disaster relief, and also contributes to regional counter-narcotics efforts. It comprises a light-infantry element, which carries out internal-security duties, and a coastguard, which is tasked with fishery protection and counter-narcotics. Antigua and Barbuda is a member of the Caribbean Community and the Caribbean Regional Security System. There are defence ties with the UK and the US. The ABDF has participated in US SOUTHCOM’s Tradewinds disaster-response exercise, though it has no independent capacity to deploy forces other than in its immediate neighbourhood. There is no heavy land-forces equipment, while the coastguard maintains ex-US patrol vessels and a number of smaller boats. Aside from limited maintenance facilities, there is no indigenous defence industry.

ACTIVE 180 (Army 130 Coast Guard 50) (all services form combined Antigua and Barbuda Defence Force)

RESERVE 80 (Joint 80)

ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE Army 130 FORCES BY ROLE MANOEUVRE Light 1 inf bn HQ 1 inf coy COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT 1 spt gp (1 engr unit, 1 med unit)

Coast Guard 50 EQUIPMENT BY TYPE PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS • PB 2: 1 Dauntless; 1 Swift

3.38 2008

Population

2015

2021

45,864,941

Age

0–14

15–19

20–24

25–29

Male

12.3%

4.0%

3.8%

3.7%

30–64 65 plus 20.5%

5.2%

Female

11.6%

3.7%

3.6%

20.9%

7.1%

Capabilities Argentina’s armed forces have sufficient training and equipment to fulfil internal-security tasks, although any power-projection ambition is limited by funding shortfalls. The armed forces principally focus on border security, surveillance and counter-narcotics operations, and there is some cooperation with Bolivia and Paraguay. In 2020, the government repealed 2018 legislation, passed under the previous administration, that had allowed greater latitude in deploying the armed forces to tackle external challenges including from organised-crime groups. There is military cooperation with the US and the armed forces participate in multinational exercises and bilateral peacekeeping exercises with neighbour Chile. There are limited deployment capabilities, and the equipment inventory is increasingly obsolete, with modernisation hampered by funding problems. The air force faces significant equipment-availability challenges and the navy has seen its capability decline in areas such as anti-submarine warfare, mine warfare and airborne early warning. Argentina possesses an indigenous defence-manufacturing and maintenance capacity covering land, sea and air systems, although industry fortunes have dipped in recent years because of a lack of investment.

ACTIVE 72,100 (Army 42,800 Navy 16,400 Air 12,900) Gendarmerie & Paramilitary 31,250

ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE Army 42,800

Regt and gp are usually bn-sized FORCES BY ROLE MANOEUVRE Mechanised 1 (1st) div (1 armd bde (1 armd recce regt, 3 tk regt, 1 mech inf regt, 1 SP arty gp, 1 cbt engr bn, 1 int coy, 1 sigs sqn, 1 log coy), 1 (3rd) jungle bde (2 jungle inf regt, 2 jungle inf coy, 1 arty gp, 1 engr coy, 1 int coy, 1

Latin America and the Caribbean 393

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES MBT 231: 225 TAM, 6 TAM S21 LT TK 117: 107 SK-105A1 Kuerassier; 6 SK-105A2 Kuerassier; 4 Patagón RECCE 47 AML-90 IFV 232: 118 VCTP (incl variants); 114 M113A2 (20mm cannon) APC 278 APC (T) 274: 70 M113A1-ACAV; 204 M113A2 APC (W) 4 WZ-551B1 ENGINEERING & MAINTENANCE VEHICLES ARV Greif ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE MSL • SP 3 M1025 HMMWV with TOW-2A RCL 105mm 150 M-1968 ARTILLERY 1,108 SP 155mm 42: 23 AMX F3; 19 VCA 155 Palmaria TOWED 172: 105mm 64 Model 56 pack howitzer; 155mm 108: 28 CITEFA M-77/CITEFA M-81; 80 SOFMA L-33 MRL 8: 105mm 4 SLAM Pampero; 127mm 4 CP-30 MOR 886: 81mm 492; SP 107mm 25 M106A2; 120mm 330 Brandt; SP 120mm 39 TAM-VCTM

AIRCRAFT TPT • Light 16: 1 Beech 80 Queen Air; 3 C-212-200 Aviocar; 4 Cessna 208EX Grand Caravan; 1 Cessna 500 Citation (survey); 1 Cessna 550 Citation Bravo; 3 DA42 (to be converted to ISR role); 2 DHC-6 Twin Otter; 1 Sabreliner 75A (Gaviao 75A) TRG 5 T-41 Mescalero HELICOPTERS MRH 5: 4 SA315B Lama; 1 Z-11 TPT 62: Medium 3 AS332B Super Puma; Light 59: 1 Bell 212; 25 Bell 205 (UH-1H Iroquois – 6 armed); 5 Bell 206B3; 13 UH-1H-II Huey II; 15 AB206B1 AIR DEFENCE SAM • Point-defence RBS-70 GUNS • TOWED 229: 20mm 200 GAI-B01; 30mm 21 HS L81; 35mm 8 GDF-002 (Skyguard fire control)

Navy 16,400

Commands: Surface Fleet, Submarines, Naval Avn, Marines FORCES BY ROLE SPECIAL FORCES 1 (diver) SF gp EQUIPMENT BY TYPE SUBMARINES • SSK 1 Santa Cruz (GER TR-1700) (non-operational, undergoing MLU since 2015) with 6 single 533mm TT with SST-4 HWT; 1 Salta (GER T-209/1100) (nonoperational since 2013) with 8 single 533mm TT with Mk 37/SST-4 HWT) PRINCIPAL SURFACE COMBATANTS 5 DESTROYERS • DDH 1 Hercules (UK Type-42) (utilised as a fast troop-transport ship), with 1 114mm gun (capacity 2 SH-3H Sea King hel) FRIGATES • FFGHM 4 Almirante Brown (GER MEKO 360) (of which 1†) with 2 quad lnchr with MM40 Exocet AShM, 1 octuple Albatros lnchr with Aspide SAM, 2 triple ILAS-3 (B-515) 324mm TT with A244/S LWT, 1 127mm gun (capacity 1 AS555 Fennec hel) PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 24 CORVETTES 9: FSGH 6 Espora (GER MEKO 140) with 2 twin lnchr with MM38 Exocet AShM, 2 triple 324mm ILAS-3 (B515) ASTT with A244/S LWT, 1 76mm gun (capacity 1 AS555 Fennec hel) FSG 3 Drummond (FRA A-69) (of which 2†) with 2 twin lnchr with MM38 Exocet AShM, 2 triple 324mm ILAS-3 (B-515) ASTT with A244/S LWT, 1 100mm gun PSOH 3 Bouchard (FRA OPV 87) (of which 1 ex-FRA L'Adroit) (capacity 1 hel) PSO 2: 1 Irigoyen (ex-US Cherokee); 1 Teniente Olivieri (ex-US oilfield tug) PCFGT 1 Intrepida (GER Lurssen 45m) with 2 single lnchr with MM38 Exocet AShM, 2 single 533mm TT with SST-4 HWT, 1 76mm gun PCF 1 Intrepida (GER Lurssen 45m) with 1 76mm gun PCO 1 Murature (ex-US King – trg/river-patrol role) with 2 105mm gun PB 7: 4 Baradero (ISR Dabur); 2 Punta Mogotes (ex-US Point); 1 Zurubi

Latin America and the Caribbean

sigs coy, 1 log coy, 1 med coy); 1 (12th) jungle bde (2 jungle inf regt, 1 jungle inf coy, 1 arty gp, 1 engr bn, 1 int coy, 1 sigs coy, 1 log coy, 1 med coy), 2 engr bn, 1 sigs bn, 1 log coy) 1 (3rd) div (1 armd bde (1 armd recce sqn, 3 tk regt, 1 mech inf regt, 1 SP arty gp, 1 cbt engr sqn, 1 int coy, 1 sigs sqn, 1 log coy); 1 mech bde (1 armd recce regt, 1 tk regt, 2 mech inf regt, 1 SP arty gp, 1 cbt engr bn, 1 int coy, 1 sigs coy, 1 log coy); 1 mech bde (1 armd recce regt, 1 tk regt, 2 mech inf regt, 1 SP arty gp, 1 cbt engr bn, 1 int coy, 1 sigs coy, 1 log coy); 1 int bn, 1 sigs bn, 1 log coy, 1 AD gp (2 AD bn)) 1 (Rapid Deployment Force) div (1 SF gp; 1 mech bde (1 armd recce regt, 3 mech inf regt, 1 arty gp, 1 MRL gp, 1 cbt engr coy, 1 sigs coy,1 log coy); 1 AB bde (1 recce sqn, 2 para regt, 1 air aslt regt, 1 arty gp, 1 cbt engr coy, 1 sigs coy, 1 log coy)) Light 1 (2nd) mtn inf div (1 mtn inf bde (1 recce regt, 3 mtn inf regt, 1 mtn inf coy, 2 arty gp, 1 cbt engr bn, 1 sigs coy, 1 log coy); 1 mtn inf bde (1 recce regt, 3 mtn inf regt, 1 mtn inf coy, 1 arty gp, 1 cbt engr bn, 1 sigs coy, 1 log coy); 1 mtn inf bde (1 recce regt, 2 mtn inf regt, 2 arty gp, 1 cbt engr bn, 1 sigs coy, 1 construction coy, 1 log coy), 1 arty gp, 1 AD bn, 1 sigs bn) 1 mot cav regt (presidential escort) COMBAT SUPPORT 1 engr bn 1 CBRN coy 1 sigs gp (1 EW bn, 1 sigs bn, 1 maint bn) 1 sigs bn 1 sigs coy COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT 3 maint bn HELICOPTER 1 avn gp (bde) (1 avn bn, 1 tpt hel bn, 1 atk/ISR hel sqn)

394 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2022 AMPHIBIOUS 6 LCVP LOGISTICS AND SUPPORT 16 ABU 3 Red AFS 4 Puerto Argentina (ex-RUS Neftegaz) AGB 1 Almirante Irizar (damaged by fire in 2007; returned to service in mid-2017) AGHS 3: 1 Austral (ex-GER Sonne); 1 Cormoran; 1 Puerto Deseado (ice-breaking capability, used for polar research) AGOR 1 Commodoro Rivadavia AK 2 Costa Sur (capacity 4 LCVP) AOR 1 Patagonia (ex-FRA Durance) with 1 hel platform AXS 1 Libertad

Naval Aviation 2,000 EQUIPMENT BY TYPE AIRCRAFT 16 combat capable FGA (5 Super Etendard Modernisé non-operational and undergoing modernisation; 11 Super Etendard in store) ASW 6: 2 S-2T Tracker; 4 P-3B Orion† TPT • Light 7 Beech 200F/M King Air TRG 10 T-34C Turbo Mentor* HELICOPTERS ASW 2 SH-3H (ASH-3H) Sea King MRH 1 AS555 Fennec TPT • Medium 4 UH-3H Sea King AIR-LAUNCHED MISSILES AAM • IR R-550 Magic AShM AM39 Exocet

Marines 2,500 FORCES BY ROLE MANOEUVRE Amphibious 1 (fleet) force (1 cdo gp, 1 (AAV) amph bn, 1 mne bn, 1 arty bn, 1 ADA bn) 1 (fleet) force (2 mne bn, 2 navy det) 1 force (1 mne bn) EQUIPMENT BY TYPE ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES RECCE 12 ERC-90F Sagaie APC • APC (W) 31 VCR AAV 11 LVTP-7 ENGINEERING & MAINTENANCE VEHICLES ARV AAVR 7 ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE RCL 105mm 30 M-1974 FMK-1 ARTILLERY 89 TOWED 19: 105mm 13 Model 56 pack howitzer; 155mm 6 M114 MOR 70: 81mm 58; 120mm 12 AIR DEFENCE SAM • Point-defence RBS-70 GUNS 40mm 4 Bofors 40L

Air Force 12,900

4 Major Comds – Air Operations, Personnel, Air Regions, Logistics, 8 air bde

Air Operations Command FORCES BY ROLE GROUND ATTACK 2 sqn with A-4/OA-4 (A-4AR/OA-4AR) Skyhawk

2 (tac air) sqn with EMB-312 Tucano (on loan for border surv/interdiction) ISR 1 sqn with Learjet 35A SEARCH & RESCUE/TRANSPORT HELICOPTER 2 sqn with Bell 212; Bell 412; Mi-171, SA-315B Lama TANKER/TRANSPORT 1 sqn with C-130H Hercules; KC-130H Hercules; L-10030 TRANSPORT 1 sqn with Beech A200 King Air (UC-12B Huron); Cessna 182 Skylane 1 sqn with DHC-6 Twin Otter; Saab 340 1 sqn with F-28 Friendship 1 sqn with Learjet 35A; Learjet 60 1 (Pres) flt with B-737-700; B-757-23ER; S-70A Black Hawk, S-76B TRAINING 1 sqn with AT-63 Pampa II 1 sqn with EMB-312 Tucano 1 sqn with Grob 120TP 1 sqn with IA-63 Pampa III* 1 sqn with T-6C Texan II 1 hel sqn with Hughes 369; SA-315B Lama TRANSPORT HELICOPTER 1 sqn with Hughes 369; MD-500; MD-500D EQUIPMENT BY TYPE AIRCRAFT 21 combat capable ATK 12: 10 A-4 (A-4AR) Skyhawk (of which 6†); 2 OA-4 (OA-4AR) Skyhawk (of which 1†) ELINT 1 Learjet 35A TKR/TPT 2 KC-130H Hercules TPT 22: Medium 4: 3 C-130H Hercules; 1 L-100-30; Light 14: 1 Beech A200 King Air (UC-12B Huron); 4 Cessna 182 Skylane; 2 DHC-6 Twin Otter; 3 Learjet 35A (of which 2 test and calibration and 1 medevac); 1 Learjet 60 (VIP); 1 PA-28-236 Dakota; 2 Saab 340 (jointly operated with LADE); PAX 4: 1 B-737; 1 B-737-700; 1 B-757-23ER; 1 F-28 Fellowship TRG 45: 2 AT-63 Pampa II* (LIFT); 11 EMB-312 Tucano; 9 Grob 120TP; 7 IA-63 Pampa III*; 6 P2002JF Sierra; 10 T-6C Texan II (8 EMB-312 Tucano in store) HELICOPTERS MRH 29: 6 Bell 412EP; 11 Hughes 369; 3 MD-500; 4 MD-500D; 5 SA315B Lama TPT 12: Medium 3: 2 Mi-171E; 1 S-70A Black Hawk (VIP); Light 9: 7 Bell 212; 2 S-76B (VIP) AIR DEFENCE GUNS 88: 20mm: 86 Oerlikon/Rh-202 with 9 Elta EL/ M-2106 radar; 35mm: 2 GDF-001 with Skyguard radar AIR-LAUNCHED MISSILES AAM • IR AIM-9L Sidewinder; R-550 Magic; Shafrir 2‡

Gendarmerie & Paramilitary 31,250 Gendarmerie 18,000 Ministry of Security FORCES BY ROLE COMMAND 7 regional comd

Latin America and the Caribbean 395

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES RECCE S52 Shorland APC (W) 87: 47 Grenadier; 40 UR-416 ARTILLERY • MOR 81mm AIRCRAFT TPT 13: Light 12: 3 Cessna 152; 3 Cessna 206; 1 Cessna 336; 1 PA-28 Cherokee; 2 PC-6B Turbo Porter; 2 PC-12; PAX 1 Learjet 35 HELICOPTERS MRH 2 MD-500C TPT • Light 17: 3 AW119 Koala; 2 Bell 206 Jet Ranger (AB-206); 7 AS350 Ecureuil; 1 H135; 1 H155; 3 R-44 Raven II TRG 1 S-300C

Prefectura Naval (Coast Guard) 13,250

Ministry of Security

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 71 PCO 7: 1 Correa Falcon; 1 Delfin; 5 Mantilla (F30 Halcón – undergoing modernisation) PCC 1 Mariano Moreno PB 58: 1 Dorado; 25 Estrellemar; 2 Lynch (US Cape); 18 Mar del Plata (Z-28); 1 Surel; 8 Damen Stan 2200; 3 Stan Tender 1750 PBF 4 Shaldag II PBR 1 Tonina LOGISTICS & SUPPORT 11 AAR 1 Tango AFS 1 Prefecto Garcia AG 2 ARS 1 Prefecto Mansilla AX 5: 1 Mandubi; 4 other AXS 1 Dr Bernardo Houssay AIRCRAFT MP 1 Beech 350ER King Air TPT • Light 6: 5 C-212 Aviocar; 1 Beech 350ER King Air TRG 2 Piper PA-28 Archer III HELICOPTERS SAR 3 AS565MA Panther MRH 1 AS365 Dauphin 2 TPT 7: Medium 3: 1 H225 Puma; 2 SA330L (AS330L) Puma; Light 4: 2 AS355 Ecureuil II; 2 Bell 206 (AB-206) Jet Ranger TRG 4 S-300C

DEPLOYMENT CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC: UN • MINUSCA 2 CYPRUS: UN • UNFICYP 249; 2 inf coy; 1 hel flt with 2 Bell 212 INDIA/PAKISTAN: UN • UNMOGIP 2

MIDDLE EAST: UN • UNTSO 3 WESTERN SAHARA: UN • MINURSO 3

Bahamas BHS Bahamian Dollar BSD

2020

2021

GDP

BSD

9.91bn

10.7bn

USD

9.91bn

10.7bn

per capita

USD

25,734

27,437

Growth

-14.5

2.0

Inflation

0.0

3.0

Def bdgt

BSD

85.8m

95.4m

USD

85.8m

95.4m

1.00

USD1=BSD

2022

Real-terms defence budget trend (USDm, constant 2015) 152 52 2008

Population

2015

2021

352,655

Age

0–14

15–19

20–24

25–29

Male

11.0%

3.6%

3.9%

4.1%

30–64 65 plus 22.6%

3.6%

Female

10.7%

3.5%

3.8%

4.0%

23.7%

5.5%

Capabilities The Royal Bahamas Defence Force (RBDF) is primarily a naval force tasked with disaster relief, maritime security and counternarcotics duties. Its single commando squadron is tasked with base protection and internal security. The Bahamas is a member of the Caribbean Community, and the RBDF maintains training relationships with the UK and US. The RBDF has participated in US SOUTHCOM’s Tradewinds disaster-response exercise. There is little independent capacity to deploy abroad, aside from recent regional disaster-relief efforts. The RBDF’s Sandy Bottom Project, the largest-ever capital investment in the service, includes the acquisition of patrol craft and the development of bases and port facilities. The maritime wing is focused around patrol vessels and smaller patrol boats, while the air wing has a small inventory of light aircraft. Apart from limited maintenance facilities, the Bahamas has no indigenous defence industry.

ACTIVE 1,500

ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE Royal Bahamas Defence Force 1,500 FORCES BY ROLE MANOEUVRE Amphibious 1 mne coy (incl marines with internal- and base-security duties) EQUIPMENT BY TYPE PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 21 PCC 2 Bahamas PB 19: 4 Arthur Dion Hanna (Damen Stan Patrol 4207); 2 Dauntless; 4 Lignum Vitae (Damen 3007); 1 Safe 33; 4 Safe 44; 2 Sea Ark 12m; 2 Sea Ark 15m

Latin America and the Caribbean

SPECIAL FORCES 1 SF unit MANOEUVRE Other 17 paramilitary bn Aviation 1 (mixed) avn bn

396 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2022 LOGISTICS & SUPPORT • AKR 1 Lawrence Major (Damen 5612) AIRCRAFT • TPT • Light 3: 1 Beech A350 King Air; 1 Cessna 208 Caravan; 1 P-68 Observer

FOREIGN FORCES Guyana Navy: Base located at New Providence Island

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 6 PB 6: 1 Dauntless; 2 Enterprise (Damen Stan 1204); 3 Trident (Damen Stan Patrol 4207)

Belize Dollar BZD

Barbados Dollar BBD BBD USD per capita

HQ located at HMBS Pelican, Spring Garden

Belize BLZ

Barbados BRB GDP

Coast Guard 110

2021

BZD

3.41bn

3.82bn

USD

1.71bn

1.91bn

4.65bn

per capita

USD

4,077

4,458

16,105

Growth

-14.0

8.5

0.1

3.1

2020

2021

8.84bn

9.30bn

4.42bn

USD

2020

GDP

15,346

2022

Growth

-18.0

3.3

Inflation

2.9

2.5

Def bdgt [a]

BBD

81.0m

79.6m

USD

40.5m

39.8m

USD1=BBD

2.00

BZD

49.1m

40.0m

USD

24.5m

20.0m

2.00

USD1=BZD

2022

[a] Excludes funds allocated to Coast Guard and Police Service

2.00

Real-terms defence budget trend (USDm, constant 2015)

[a] Defence and security expenditure

Real-terms defence budget trend (USDm, constant 2015) 38

2008

Population Age

31 2021

2015

301,865 0–14

15–19

20–24

25–29

n.k.

2008

Population

2015

2021

405,633

Age

0–14

15–19

20–24

25–29

30–64 65 plus

Male

16.3%

5.4%

4.7%

4.3%

17.0%

2.2%

15.6%

5.0%

4.3%

4.1%

18.4%

2.4%

Male

8.6%

3.0%

3.2%

24.5%

6.0%

Female

8.6%

3.0%

3.1%

3.3%

25.4%

8.4%

Capabilities

30–64 65 plus

Belize maintains a small Defence Force (BDF) and coastguard to provide national security, particularly control of the borders with Guatemala and Mexico. The National Security and Defence Strategy (2018–21) identifies territorial defence and combating transnational crime as key objectives. The UK has a long-standing security relationship with Belize and maintains a small training unit there, and the BDF also trains with US SOUTHCOM. Overall training levels are limited but generally sufficient for the BDF’s tasks. Belize is a member of the Caribbean Community. The BDF does not deploy internationally and logistics support is adequate for border-security missions. The conventional equipment inventory is limited and there is no significant domestic defence industry.

Maritime security and resource protection are the main tasks of the Barbados Defence Force (BDF), but it has a secondary publicsafety role in support of the police force. The BDF has undertaken counter-narcotics work, while troops have also been tasked with supporting law enforcement. There are plans to improve disasterrelief capabilities. Barbados is a member of the Caribbean Community, and the Caribbean Regional Security System is headquartered there. The BDF has participated in US SOUTHCOM’s Tradewinds disaster-response exercise. There is limited capacity to deploy independently within the region, such as on hurricane-relief duties. The inventory consists principally of a small number of patrol vessels. Apart from limited maintenance facilities, Barbados has no indigenous defence industry.

ACTIVE 1,500 (Army 1,500) Gendarmerie & Paramilitary 550

ACTIVE 610 (Army 500 Coast Guard 110)

RESERVE 700 (Joint 700)

RESERVE 430 (Joint 430)

ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE

Army ε1,500

Army 500 FORCES BY ROLE MANOEUVRE Light 1 inf bn (cadre)

FORCES BY ROLE SPECIAL FORCES 1 SF unit MANOEUVRE Light 2 inf bn (3 inf coy)

Latin America and the Caribbean 397 COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT 1 spt gp EQUIPMENT BY TYPE ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE • RCL 84mm Carl Gustaf ARTILLERY • MOR 81mm 6

Air Wing EQUIPMENT BY TYPE AIRCRAFT TPT • Light 2: 1 BN-2B Defender†; 1 Cessna 182 Skylane† TRG 1 T-67M-200 Firefly HELICOPTERS TPT • Light 3: 2 Bell 205 (UH-1H Iroquois); 1 Bell 407

forces have been formed and dispatched to border regions to combat smuggling, and a series of border posts have been established. Airspace control is an emerging strategic priority. The armed forces have also been playing a greater role in disaster-relief operations, with a new dedicated battalion activated in 2021. There is defence-technology cooperation with Russia, but China remains a significant supplier of military materiel. Bolivia cooperates with Peru and Paraguay on countering illicit trafficking and on providing disaster relief. The armed forces have stressed the need to improve conditions for personnel, amid greater internal deployments to border areas on counter-trafficking tasks. An aerospace R&D centre was created in 2018 in the military-engineering school, with the objective of developing munitions and ISR UAVs. There is some local maintenance, repair and overhaul capacity.

ACTIVE 34,100 (Army 22,800 Navy 4,800 Air 6,500) Gendarmerie & Paramilitary 37,100

Conscript liability 12 months voluntary conscription for both males and females

Reserve FORCES BY ROLE MANOEUVRE Light 1 inf bn (3 inf coy)

ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE

Capabilities

FORCES BY ROLE COMMAND 6 mil region HQ 10 div HQ SPECIAL FORCES 3 SF regt MANOEUVRE Reconnaissance 1 mot cav gp Armoured 1 armd bn Mechanised 1 mech cav regt 2 mech inf regt Light 1 (aslt) cav gp 5 (horsed) cav gp 3 mot inf regt 21 inf regt Air Manoeuvre 2 AB regt (bn) Other 1 (Presidential Guard) inf regt COMBAT SUPPORT 6 arty regt (bn) 6 engr bn 1 int coy 1 MP bn 1 sigs bn COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT 2 log bn AVIATION 2 avn coy AIR DEFENCE 1 ADA regt

The armed forces are constitutionally tasked with maintaining sovereignty and territorial defence, though principal tasks are counter-narcotics and internal and border security. Joint task

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES LT TK 54: 36 SK-105A1 Kuerassier; 18 SK-105A2 Kuerassier

Coast Guard 550 EQUIPMENT BY TYPE All operational patrol vessels under 10t FLD

FOREIGN FORCES United Kingdom BATSUB 12

Bolivia BOL Bolivian Boliviano BOB

2020

2021

GDP

BOB

253bn

264bn

USD

36.8bn

38.5bn

per capita

USD

3,168

3,267

Growth

-8.8

5.0

Inflation

0.9

1.3

BOB

3.28bn

3.26bn

USD

479m

476m

6.86

Def bdgt USD1=BOB

2022

Real-terms defence budget trend (USDm, constant 2015) 519

2008

Population

293 2021

2015

11,758,869

Age

0–14

15–19

20–24

25–29

Male

15.0%

5.0%

4.6%

4.4%

30–64 65 plus 17.8%

2.7%

Female

14.4%

4.8%

4.5%

4.3%

18.9%

3.5%

Latin America and the Caribbean

Army 9,800; 13,000 conscript (total 22,800)

Gendarmerie & Paramilitary 550

398 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2022 RECCE 24 EE-9 Cascavel APC 148+ APC (T) 87+: 50+ M113, 37 M9 half-track APC (W) 61: 24 EE-11 Urutu; 22 MOWAG Roland; 15 V-100 Commando AUV 19 Tiger 4×4 ENGINEERING & MAINTENANCE VEHICLES ARV 4 Greif; M578 LARV ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE MSL SP 2 Koyak with HJ-8 MANPATS HJ-8 RCL 90mm M67; 106mm M40A1 ARTILLERY 311+ TOWED 61: 105mm 25 M101A1; 122mm 36 M-30 (M1938) MOR 250+: 81mm 250 M29; Type-W87; 107mm M30; 120mm M120 AIRCRAFT TPT • Light 3: 1 Fokker F-27-200; 1 Beech 90 King Air; 1 C-212 Aviocar HELICOPTERS MRH 6 H425 TRG 1 Robinson R44 AIR DEFENCE • GUNS • TOWED 37mm 18 Type-65

Navy 4,800 Organised into six naval districts with HQ located at Puerto Guayaramerín EQUIPMENT BY TYPE PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 7 PBR 7: 1 Santa Cruz; 6 Type 928 YC LOGISTICS AND SUPPORT 3 AG 1 Mojo Huayna AH 2

Marines 1,700 (incl 1,000 Naval Military Police) FORCES BY ROLE MANOEUVRE Mechanised 1 mech inf bn Amphibious 6 mne bn (1 in each Naval District) COMBAT SUPPORT 4 (naval) MP bn

Air Force 6,500 (incl conscripts) FORCES BY ROLE GROUND ATTACK 1 sqn with K-8WB Karakorum ISR 1 sqn with Cessna 206; Cessna 402; Learjet 25B/25D (secondary VIP role) SEARCH & RESCUE 1 sqn with AS332B Super Puma; H125 Ecureuil; H145 TRANSPORT 1 (TAM) sqn with B-727; B-737; MA60 1 (TAB) sqn with C-130A Hercules; MD-10-30F 1 sqn with C-130B/H Hercules

1 sqn with F-27-400M Troopship 1 (VIP) sqn with Beech 90 King Air; Beech 200 King Air Beech 1900; Falcon 900EX; Sabreliner 60; Falcon 50EX 6 sqn with Cessna 152/206; IAI-201 Arava; PA-32 Saratoga; PA-34 Seneca TRAINING 1 sqn with DA40; T-25; Z-242L 1 sqn with Cessna 152/172 1 sqn with PC-7 Turbo Trainer 1 hel sqn with R-44 Raven II TRANSPORT HELICOPTER 1 (anti-drug) sqn with Bell 205 (UH-1H Iroquois) AIR DEFENCE 1 regt with Oerlikon; Type-65 EQUIPMENT BY TYPE AIRCRAFT 21 combat capable TPT 77: Heavy 1 MD-10-30F; Medium 4: 1 C-130A Hercules; 2 C-130B Hercules; 1 C-130H Hercules; Light 64: 1 Aero Commander 690; 3 Beech 90 King Air; 2 Beech 200 King Air; 1 Beech 250 King Air; 1 Beech 350 King Air; 3 C-212-100; 6 Cessna 152; 2 Cessna 172; 18 Cessna 206; 3 Cessna 210 Centurion; 1 Cessna 402; 8 DA40; 1 F-27-400M Troopship; 4 IAI-201 Arava; 2 Learjet 25B/D; 2 MA60†; 1 PA-32 Saratoga; 4 PA-34 Seneca; 1 Sabreliner 60; PAX 8: 1 B-727; 3 B-737-200; 1 Falcon 50EX; 1 Falcon 900EX (VIP); 2 RJ70 TRG 35: 5 K-8WB Karakorum*; 6 T-25; 16 PC-7 Turbo Trainer*; 8 Z-242L HELICOPTERS MRH 1 SA316 Alouette III TPT 35: Medium 6 H215 Super Puma; Light 29: 2 H125 Ecureuil; 19 Bell 205 (UH-1H Iroquois); 2 H145; 6 R-44 Raven II AIR DEFENCE • GUNS • TOWED 18+: 20mm Oerlikon; 37mm 18 Type-65

Gendarmerie & Paramilitary 37,100+ National Police 31,100+ FORCES BY ROLE MANOEUVRE Other 27 frontier sy unit 9 paramilitary bde 2 (rapid action) paramilitary regt

Narcotics Police 6,000+

FOE (700) – Special Operations Forces

DEPLOYMENT CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC: UN • MINUSCA 3 DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO: UN • MONUSCO 4 SOUTH SUDAN: UN • UNMISS 4 SUDAN: UN • UNISFA 4

Latin America and the Caribbean 399

ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE

Brazil BRZ

per capita

2020

2021

BRL

7.45tr

8.70tr

USD

1.44tr

1.65tr 7,741

USD

6,823

Growth

-4.1

5.2

Inflation

3.2

7.7

Def bdgt [a]

BRL

115bn

USD

22.2bn

21.8bn

5.16

5.28

USD1=BRL

2022

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE SATELLITES • COMMUNICATIONS 1 SGDC-1 (civil– military use)

117bn

[a] Includes military pensions Real-terms defence budget trend (USDbn, constant 2015) 26.9 21.8 2008

Population

2015

2021

213,445,417

Age

0–14

15–19

20–24

25–29

Male

10.6%

4.0%

4.1%

3.9%

30–64 65 plus 22.6%

4.1%

Female

10.2%

3.9%

4.0%

3.8%

23.5%

5.5%

Capabilities The armed forces are among the most capable in the region. Brazil seeks to enhance its power-projection capabilities, boost surveillance of the Amazon region and coastal waters, and further develop its defence industry. Security challenges from organised crime have seen the armed forces deploy on internal-security operations. Brazil maintains military ties with most of its neighbours including personnel exchanges and joint military training with Chile and Colombia. There is also defence cooperation with France, Sweden and the US, centred on procurement, technical advice and personnel training. Brazil’s air-transport fleet enables it to independently deploy forces. It contributes small contingents to several UN missions. Brazil is attempting to modernise its equipment across all domains. Major platform developments include PROSUB (one nuclear-powered and four diesel-electric submarines) and the acquisition in 2018 of a former UK helicopter carrier. Projects to boost aerospace capabilities are also underway including the FX-2 project to procure the Saab Gripen combat aircraft, as well as the plan to introduce the Embraer KC-390 transport aircraft. Brazil has a well-developed defence-industrial base, across all domains, with a capability to design and manufacture equipment. Aerospace firms Avibras and Embraer also export some products. Local companies are also involved in the SISFRON border-security programme. There are industrial partnerships, including technology transfers and R&D support, with France’s Naval Group (PROSUB) and Sweden’s Saab (FX-2 fighter).

ACTIVE 366,500 (Army 214,000 Navy 85,000 Air 67,500) Gendarmerie & Paramilitary 395,000 Conscript liability 12 months (can go to 18; often waived)

RESERVE 1,340,000

Space

Army 102,000; 112,000 conscript (total 214,000) FORCES BY ROLE COMMAND 8 mil comd HQ 12 mil region HQ 7 div HQ (2 with regional HQ) SPECIAL FORCES 1 SF bde (1 SF bn, 1 cdo bn) 1 SF coy MANOEUVRE Reconnaissance 3 mech cav regt Armoured 1 (5th) armd bde (1 mech cav sqn, 2 tk regt, 2 mech inf bn, 1 SP arty bn, 1 engr bn, 1 sigs coy, 1 log bn) 1 (6th) armd bde (1 mech cav sqn, 2 tk regt, 2 mech inf bn, 1 SP arty bn, 1 AD bty, 1 engr bn, 1 sigs coy, 1 log bn) Mechanised 4 (1st, 3rd & 4th) mech cav bde (1 armd cav regt, 3 mech cav regt, 1 arty bn, 1 engr coy, 1 sigs coy, 1 log bn) 1 (2nd) mech cav bde (1 armd cav regt, 2 mech cav regt, 1 SP arty bn, 1 engr coy, 1 sigs coy, 1 log bn) 1 (15th) mech inf bde (3 mech inf bn, 1 arty bn, 1 engr coy, 1 log bn) Light 1 (3rd) mot inf bde (1 mech cav sqn, 1 mech inf bn, 1 mot inf bn, 1 inf bn, 1 arty bn, 1 engr coy, 1 sigs coy, 1 log bn) 1 (4th) mot inf bde (1 mech cav sqn, 1 mot inf bn, 1 inf bn, 1 mtn inf bn, 1 arty bn, 1 sigs coy, 1 log bn) 1 (7th) mot inf bde (3 mot inf bn, 1 arty bn) 1 (8th) mot inf bde (1 mech cav sqn, 3 mot inf bn, 1 arty bn, 1 log bn) 1 (10th) mot inf bde (1 mech cav sqn, 4 mot inf bn, 1 inf coy, 1 arty bn, 1 engr coy, 1 sigs coy) 1 (13th) mot inf bde (1 mot inf bn, 2 inf bn, 1 inf coy, 1 arty bn) 1 (14th) mot inf bde (1 mech cav sqn, 3 inf bn, 1 arty bn) 1 (11th) lt inf bde (1 mech cav regt, 3 inf bn, 1 arty bn, 1 engr coy, 1 sigs coy, 1 MP coy, 1 log bn) 10 inf bn 1 (1st) jungle inf bde (1 mech cav sqn, 2 jungle inf bn, 1 arty bn) 4 (2nd, 16th, 17th & 22nd) jungle inf bde (3 jungle inf bn) 1 (23rd) jungle inf bde (1 cav sqn, 4 jungle inf bn, 1 arty bn, 1 sigs coy, 1 log bn) Air Manoeuvre 1 AB bde (1 cav sqn, 3 AB bn, 1 arty bn, 1 engr coy, 1 sigs coy, 1 log bn)

Latin America and the Caribbean

Brazilian Real BRL GDP

400 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2022 1 (12th) air mob bde (1 cav sqn, 3 air mob bn, 1 arty bn, 1 engr coy, 1 sigs coy, 1 log bn) Other 1 (9th) mot trg bde (3 mot inf bn, 1 arty bn, 1 log bn) 1 (18th) sy bde (2 sy bn, 2 sy coy) 1 sy bn 7 sy coy 3 gd cav regt 1 gd inf bn COMBAT SUPPORT 3 SP arty bn 6 fd arty bn 1 MRL bn 1 STA bty 6 engr bn 1 engr gp (1 engr bn, 4 construction bn) 1 engr gp (4 construction bn, 1 construction coy) 2 construction bn 1 CBRN bn 1 EW coy 1 int coy 8 MP bn 2 MP coy 4 sigs bn 2 sigs coy COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT 5 log bn 1 tpt bn 4 spt bn HELICOPTER 1 avn bde (3 hel bn, 1 maint bn) 1 hel bn AIR DEFENCE 1 ADA bde (5 ADA bn) EQUIPMENT BY TYPE ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES MBT 296: 41 Leopard 1A1BE; 220 Leopard 1A5BR; 35 M60A3/TTS LT TK 50 M41C RECCE 408 EE-9 Cascavel IFV 13 VBTP-MR Guarani 30mm APC 1,370 APC (T) 660: 198 M113A1; 386 M113BR; 12 M113A2; 64 M577A2 APC (W) 710: 223 EE-11 Urutu; 487 VBTP-MR Guarani 6×6 AUV IVECO LMV (LMV-BR) ENGINEERING & MAINTENANCE VEHICLES AEV 7+: Greif; 2 Sabiex HART; 5 Pionierpanzer 2 Dachs ARV 13+: 9 BPz-2; 4 M88A1; M578 LARV VLB 5+: XLP-10; 5 Leopard 1 with Biber ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE MSL • MANPATS Eryx; Milan; MSS-1.2 AC RCL 194+: 84mm Carl Gustaf; 106mm 194 M40A1 ARTILLERY 1,881 SP 169: 155mm 169: 37 M109A3; 100 M109A5; 32 M109A5+ TOWED 431: 105mm 336: 233 M101/M102; 40 L118 Light Gun; 63 Model 56 pack howitzer; 155mm 95 M114

MRL 127mm 36: 18 ASTROS II Mk3M; 18 ASTROS II Mk6 MOR 1,245: 81mm 1,168: 453 L16, 715 M936 AGR; 120mm 77 M2 HELICOPTERS MRH 51: 22 AS565 Panther (HM-1); 12 AS565 K2 Panther (HM-1); 17 AS550A2 Fennec (HA-1 – armed) TPT 40: Heavy 13 H225M Caracal (HM-4); Medium 12: 8 AS532 Cougar (HM-3); 4 S-70A-36 Black Hawk (HM-2); Light 15 AS350L1 Ecureuil (HA-1) AIR DEFENCE SAM • Point-defence RBS-70; 9K38 Igla (RS-SA-18 Grouse); 9K338 Igla-S (RS-SA-24 Grinch) GUNS 100: SP 35mm 34 Gepard 1A2 TOWED 66: 35mm 39 GDF-001 towed (some with Super Fledermaus radar); 40mm 27 L/70 (some with BOFI)

Navy 85,000 Organised into 9 districts with HQ I Rio de Janeiro, HQ II Salvador, HQ III Natal, HQ IV Belém, HQ V Rio Grande, HQ VI Ladario, HQ VII Brasilia, HQ VIII Sao Paulo, HQ IX Manaus FORCES BY ROLE SPECIAL FORCES 1 (diver) SF gp EQUIPMENT BY TYPE SUBMARINES • SSK 5: 2 Tupi (GER T-209/1400) (of which 1 in refit) with 8 single 533mm TT with Mk 24 Tigerfish HWT 2 Tupi (GER T-209/1400) with 8 single 533mm TT with Mk 48 HWT 1 Tikuna (GER T-209/1450) (in refit) with 8 single 533mm TT with Mk 24 Tigerfish HWT PRINCIPAL SURFACE COMBATANTS 7 FRIGATES 7 FFGHM 6: 1 Greenhalgh (ex-UK Broadsword) with 4 single lnchr with MM40 Exocet Block 2 AShM, 2 sextuple lnchr with Sea Wolf SAM, 2 triple 324mm STWS Mk.2 ASTT with Mk 46 LWT (capacity 2 Super Lynx Mk21A hel) 5 Niterói with 2 twin lnchr with MM40 Exocet Block 2 AShM, 1 octuple Albatros lnchr with Aspide SAM, 2 triple 324mm SVTT Mk 32 ASTT with Mk 46 LWT, 1 twin 375mm Bofors ASW Rocket Launcher System A/S mor, 1 115mm gun (capacity 1 Super Lynx Mk21A hel) FFGH 1 Barroso with 2 twin lnchr with MM40 Exocet Block 2 AShM, 2 triple 324mm SVTT Mk 32 ASTT with Mk 46 LWT, 1 115mm gun (capacity 1 Super Lynx Mk21A hel) PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 44 CORVETTES • FSGH 1 Inhaúma with 2 twin lnchr with MM40 Exocet Block 2 AShM, 2 triple 324mm SVTT Mk 32 ASTT with Mk 46 LWT, 1 115mm gun (1 Super Lynx Mk21A hel) PSO 3 Amazonas with 1 hel landing platform

Latin America and the Caribbean 401

Naval Aviation 2,100 FORCES BY ROLE GROUND ATTACK 1 sqn with A-4M (AF-1B) Skyhawk; TA-4M (AF-1C) Skyhawk ANTI SURFACE WARFARE 1 sqn with Super Lynx Mk21A/B ANTI SUBMARINE WARFARE 1 sqn with S-70B Seahawk (MH-16) TRAINING 1 sqn with Bell 206B3 Jet Ranger III

TRANSPORT HELICOPTER 3 sqn with AS350 Ecureuil (armed) 1 sqn with AS350 Ecureuil (armed); AS355 Ecureuil II (armed); H135 (UH-17) 1 sqn with AS332 Super Puma; AS532 Cougar (UH-14) 1 sqn with H225M Caracal (UH-15) EQUIPMENT BY TYPE AIRCRAFT 3 combat capable ATK 3: 2 A-4M (AF-1B) Skyhawk; 1 TA-4M (AF-1C) Skyhawk (15 A-4 (AF-1) Skyhawk; 2 TA-4 (AF-1A) Skyhawk in store) HELICOPTERS ASW 18: 9 Super Lynx Mk21A; 3 Super Lynx Mk21B; 6 S-70B Seahawk (MH-16) CSAR 3 H225M Caracal (UH-15A) TPT 55: Heavy 8 H225M Caracal (UH-15); Medium 7: 5 AS332 Super Puma; 2 AS532 Cougar (UH-14); Light 40: 15 AS350 Ecureuil (armed); 8 AS355 Ecureuil II (armed); 15 Bell 206B3 Jet Ranger III (IH-6B); 2 H135 (UH-17) AIR-LAUNCHED MISSILES • AShM: AM39 Exocet; Sea Skua; AGM-119 Penguin

Marines 16,000 FORCES BY ROLE SPECIAL FORCES 1 SF bn MANOEUVRE Amphibious 1 amph div (1 lt armd bn, 3 mne bn, 1 arty bn) 1 amph aslt bn 7 (regional) mne gp 1 rvn bn COMBAT SUPPORT 1 engr bn COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT 1 log bn EQUIPMENT BY TYPE ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES LT TK 18 SK-105 Kuerassier APC 60 APC (T) 30 M113A1 (incl variants) APC (W) 30 Piranha IIIC AAV 47: 13 AAV-7A1; 20 AAVP-7A1 RAM/RS; 2 AAVC-7A1 RAM/RS (CP); 12 LVTP-7 ENGINEERING VEHICLES • ARV 2: 1 AAVR-7; 1 AAVR-7A1 RAM/RS ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE MSL• MANPATS RB-56 Bill; MSS-1.2 AC ARTILLERY 65 TOWED 41: 105mm 33: 18 L118 Light Gun; 15 M101; 155mm 8 M114 MRL 127mm 6 ASTROS II Mk6 MOR 81mm 18 M29 AIR DEFENCE • GUNS 40mm 6 L/70 (with BOFI)

Latin America and the Caribbean

PCO 6: 4 Bracuí (ex-UK River); 1 Imperial Marinheiro with 1 76mm gun; 1 Parnaiba with 1 hel landing platform PCC 2 Macaé (FRA Vigilante) PCR 5: 2 Pedro Teixeira with 1 hel landing platform; 3 Roraima PB 23: 12 Grajaú; 6 Marlim (ITA Meatini derivative); 5 Piratini (US PGM) PBR 4 LPR-40 MINE WARFARE • MINE COUNTERMEASURES 3 MSC 3 Aratù (GER Schutze) AMPHIBIOUS PRINCIPAL AMPHIBIOUS SHIPS 2 LPD 1 Bahia (ex-FRA Foudre) (capacity 4 hels; 8 LCM, 450 troops) LPH 1 Atlântico (ex-UK Ocean) (capacity 18 hels; 4 LCVP; 40 vehs; 800 troops) LANDING SHIPS 2 LST 1 Mattoso Maia (ex-US Newport) with 1 Mk 15 Phalanx CIWS (capacity 3 LCVP; 1 LCPL; 400 troops) LSLH 1 Almirante Sabóia (ex-UK Sir Bedivere) (capacity 1 med hel; 18 MBT; 340 troops) LANDING CRAFT 16: LCM 12: 10 EDVM-25; 2 Icarai (ex-FRA CTM) LCT 1 Marambaia (ex-FRA CDIC) LCU 3 Guarapari (LCU 1610) LOGISTICS AND SUPPORT 43 ABU 5: 4 Comandante Varella; 1 Faroleiro Mario Seixas ABUH 1 Almirante Graça Aranha (lighthouse tender) AFS 1 Potengi AGHS 5: 1 Caravelas (riverine); 4 Rio Tocantin AGOS 2: 1 Ary Rongel with 1 hel landing platform; 1 Almirante Maximiano (capacity 2 AS350/AS355 Ecureuil hel) AGS 8: 1 Aspirante Moura; 1 Cruzeiro do Sul; 1 Antares; 3 Amorim do Valle (ex-UK River (MCM)); 1 Rio Branco; 1 Vital de Oliveira AGSH 1 Sirius AH 5: 2 Oswaldo Cruz with 1 hel landing platform; 1 Dr Montenegro; 1 Tenente Maximiano with 1 hel landing platform; 1 Soares de Meirelles AOR 1 Almirante Gastão Motta AP 3: 1 Almirante Leverger; 1 Paraguassu; 1 Pará (all river transports) ARS 3 Mearim ASR 1 Guillobel ATF 2 Tritao AX 1 Brasil (Niterói mod) with 1 hel landing platform AXL 3 Nascimento AXS 1 Cisne Branco

402 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2022

Air Force 67,500

Brazilian airspace is divided into 7 air regions, each of which is responsible for its designated air bases. Air assets are divided among 4 designated air forces (I, II, III & V) for operations (IV Air Force temporarily deactivated) FORCES BY ROLE FIGHTER 4 sqn with F-5EM/FM Tiger II FIGHTER/GROUND ATTACK 2 sqn with AMX (A-1A/B) GROUND ATTACK/ISR 4 sqn with EMB-314 Super Tucano (A-29A/B)* MARITIME PATROL 1 sqn with P-3AM Orion 2 sqn with EMB-111 (P-95A/B/M) ISR 1 sqn with AMX-R (RA-1)* 1 sqn with Learjet 35 (R-35A); EMB-110B (R-95) AIRBORNE EARLY WARNING & CONTROL 1 sqn with EMB-145RS (R-99); EMB-145SA (E-99); EMB145SA (E-99M) SEARCH & RESCUE 1 sqn with C295M Amazonas (SC-105); UH-60L Black Hawk (H-60L) TANKER/TRANSPORT 1 sqn with C-130H/KC-130H Hercules TRANSPORT 1 VIP sqn with A319 (VC-1A); EMB-190 (VC-2); AS355 Ecureuil II (VH-55); H135M (VH-35); H225M Caracal (VH-36) 1 VIP sqn with EMB-135BJ (VC-99B); ERJ-135LR (VC99C); ERJ-145LR (VC-99A); Learjet 35A (VU-35); Learjet 55C (VU-55C) 2 sqn with C-130E/H Hercules 2 sqn with C295M (C-105A) 7 (regional) sqn with Cessna 208/208B (C-98); Cessna 208-G1000 (C-98A); EMB-110 (C-95); EMB-120 (C-97) 1 sqn with ERJ-145 (C-99A) 1 sqn with EMB-120RT (VC-97), EMB-121 (VU-9) TRAINING 1 sqn with EMB-110 (C-95) 2 sqn with EMB-312 Tucano (T-27) (incl 1 air show sqn) 1 sqn with T-25A/C ATTACK HELICOPTER 1 sqn with Mi-35M Hind (AH-2) TRANSPORT HELICOPTER 1 sqn with H225M Caracal (H-36) 1 sqn with AS350B Ecureuil (H-50); AS355 Ecureuil II (H-55) 1 sqn with Bell 205 (H-1H); H225M Caracal (H-36) 2 sqn with UH-60L Black Hawk (H-60L) ISR UAV 1 sqn with Hermes 450/900 EQUIPMENT BY TYPE AIRCRAFT 186 combat capable FTR 49: 46 F-5EM Tiger II; 3 F-5FM Tiger II FGA 24: 15 AMX/AMX-T (A-1A/B); 8 AMX A-1M; 1 AMX A-1BM ASW 9 P-3AM Orion

MP 18: 10 EMB-111 (P-95A Bandeirulha)*; 8 EMB-111 (P-95BM Bandeirulha)* ISR: 8: 4 AMX-R (RA-1)*; 4 EMB-110B (R-95) ELINT 6: 3 EMB-145RS (R-99); 3 Learjet 35A (R-35A) AEW&C 5: 3 EMB-145SA (E-99); 2 EMB-145SA (E-99M) SAR 7: 3 C295M Amazonas (SC-105); 4 EMB-110 (SC-95B) TKR/TPT 2 KC-130H TPT 185: Medium 24: 4 C-130E Hercules; 16 C-130H Hercules; 4 KC390; Light 153: 11 C295M (C-105A); 7 Cessna 208 (C-98); 9 Cessna 208B (C-98); 13 Cessna 208G1000 (C-98A); 52 EMB-110 (C-95A/B/C/M); 16 EMB-120 (C-97); 4 EMB-120RT (VC-97); 5 EMB-121 (VU-9); 7 EMB135BJ (VC-99B); 3 EMB-201R Ipanema (G-19); 2 EMB202A Ipanema (G-19A); 4 EMB-550 Legacy 500 (IU-50); 2 ERJ-135LR (VC-99C); 7 ERJ-145 (C-99A); 1 ERJ-145LR (VC-99A); 9 Learjet 35A (VU-35); 1 Learjet 55C (VU-55); PAX 8: 1 A319 (VC-1A); 3 EMB-190 (VC-2); 4 Hawker 800XP (EU-93A – calibration) TRG 213: up to 50 EMB-312 Tucano (T-27); 38 EMB314 Super Tucano (A-29A)*; 44 EMB-314 Super Tucano (A-29B)*; 81 T-25A/C HELICOPTERS ATK 12 Mi-35M Hind (AH-2) MRH 2 H135M (VH-35) TPT 58: Heavy 14 H225M Caracal (12 H-36 & 2 VH-36); Medium 16 UH-60L Black Hawk (H-60L); Light 28: 24 AS350B Ecureuil (H-50); 4 AS355 Ecureuil II (H-55/VH-55) UNINHABITED AERIAL VEHICLES ISR 7: Heavy 2 Heron 1; Medium 5: 4 Hermes 450; 1 Hermes 900 AIR-LAUNCHED MISSILES AAM • IR MAA-1 Piranha; R-550 Magic 2; Python 3; IIR Python 4; SARH Super 530F; ARH Derby AShM AM39 Exocet ARM MAR-1 (in development)

Gendarmerie & Paramilitary 395,000 Public Security Forces 395,000 opcon Army State police organisation technically under army control. However, military control is reducing, with authority reverting to individual states

DEPLOYMENT CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC: EU • EUTM RCA 6; UN • MINUSCA 10 CYPRUS: UN • UNFICYP 2 DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO: UN • MONUSCO 23 LEBANON: UN • UNIFIL 9 SOUTH SUDAN: UN • UNMISS 12 SUDAN: UN • UNISFA 2 WESTERN SAHARA: UN • MINURSO 11

Latin America and the Caribbean 403

Army 37,650

Chile CHL 2020

2021

200tr

241tr

GDP

CLP USD

253bn

331bn

per capita

USD

12,993

16,799

Growth

-5.8

11.0

Inflation

3.0

4.2

CLP

3.21tr

3.07tr

USD

4.05bn

4.22bn

792.17

727.06

Def bdgt [a] USD1=CLP

2022

[a] Includes military pensions Real-terms defence budget trend (USDbn, constant 2015) 4.16 2.93 2008

Population

2015

2021

18,307,925

Age

0–14

15–19

20–24

25–29

Male

10.0%

3.2%

3.6%

3.9%

30–64 65 plus 23.2%

5.1%

Female

9.6%

3.1%

3.5%

3.8%

23.7%

7.1%

Capabilities Chile’s 2017 defence white paper noted core roles of assuring sovereignty and territorial integrity, but also indicated an increasing shift towards non-traditional military roles such as disaster relief, humanitarian assistance and peacekeeping. In 2021, the armed forces were also granted authority to fight people trafficking and illegal migration in border areas. There is R&D cooperation with Brazil and Colombia, as well as exchange programmes. Defence cooperation with the US is centred on procurement, technical advice and personnel training. There is routine national training, and the armed forces participate in international exercises. Chile has a limited capacity to deploy independently beyond its borders. The plans to upgrade the country’s F-16s to prolong service life have been temporarily suspended due to the lack of available funding. Capability priorities reflect a focus on littoral and blue-water surveillance. Two frigates were bought from Australia, arriving in 2020. Chile has a developed defence-industrial base, with ENAER conducting aircraft maintenance. ASMAR and FAMAE are key maritime and land firms respectively, with the former building a new icebreaker that will enhance Chile’s ability to support operations in Antarctica. The air force is also currently contributing to the development of the first indigenously built satellite constellation.

ACTIVE 68,500 (Army 37,650 Navy 19,800 Air 11,050) Gendarmerie & Paramilitary 44,700

Conscript liability Army 12 months; Navy 18 months; Air Force 12 months. Legally, conscription can last for 2 years

RESERVE 19,100 (Army 19,100)

ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE Space EQUIPMENT BY TYPE SATELLITES ISR 1 SSOT (Sistema Satelital de Observación de la Tierra)

FORCES BY ROLE Currently being reorganised into 1 SF bde, 4 armd bde, 1 armd det, 4 mot bde, 2 mot det, 4 mtn det and 1 avn bde COMMAND 6 div HQ SPECIAL FORCES 1 SF bde (1 SF bn, 1 (mtn) SF gp, 1 para bn, 3 cdo coy, 1 log coy) MANOEUVRE Reconnaissance 4 cav sqn 2 recce sqn 2 recce pl Armoured 1 (1st) armd bde (1 armd recce pl, 1 armd cav gp, 1 mech inf bn, 2 arty gp, 1 AT coy, 1 engr coy, 1 sigs coy) 2 (2nd & 3rd) armd bde (1 armd recce pl, 1 armd cav gp, 1 mech inf bn, 1 arty gp, 1 AT coy, 1 engr coy, 1 sigs coy) 1 (4th) armd bde (1 armd recce pl, 1 armd cav gp, 1 mech inf bn, 1 arty gp, 1 engr coy) 1 (5th) armd det (1 armd cav gp, 1 mech inf coy, 1 arty gp) Mechanised 1 (1st) mech inf regt Light 1 (1st) mot inf bde (1 recce coy, 1 mot inf bn, 1 arty gp, 3 AT coy, 1 engr bn) 1 (4th) mot inf bde (1 mot inf bn, 1 MRL gp, 2 AT coy, 1 engr bn) 1 (24th) mot inf bde (1 mot inf bn, 1 arty gp, 1 AT coy) 1 (Maipo) mot inf bde (3 mot inf regt, 1 arty regt) 1 (6th) reinforced regt (1 mot inf bn, 1 arty gp, 1 sigs coy) 1 (10th) reinforced regt (1 mot inf bn, 2 AT coy, 1 engr bn) 1 (11th) mot inf det (1 inf bn, 1 arty gp) 1 (14th) mot inf det (1 mot inf bn, 1 arty gp, 1 sigs coy, 1 AT coy) 4 mot inf regt 1 (3rd) mtn det (1 mtn inf bn, 1 arty gp, 1 engr coy) 1 (9th) mtn det (1 mtn inf bn, 1 engr coy, 1 construction bn) 2 (8th & 17th) mtn det (1 mtn inf bn, 1 arty coy) COMBAT SUPPORT 1 engr regt 4 sigs bn 1 sigs coy 1 int bde (7 int gp) 2 int regt 1 MP regt COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT 1 log div (2 log regt) 4 log regt 6 log coy 1 maint div (1 maint regt) AVIATION 1 avn bde (1 tpt avn bn, 1 hel bn, 1 spt bn)

Latin America and the Caribbean

6 military administrative regions

Chilean Peso CLP

404 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2022 EQUIPMENT BY TYPE ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES MBT 170: 30 Leopard 1V; 140 Leopard 2A4 IFV 191: 173 Marder 1A3; 18 YPR-765 PRI APC 445 APC (T) 306 M113A1/A2 APC (W) 139: 121 Piranha 6×6; 18 Piranha 8×8 ENGINEERING & MAINTENANCE VEHICLES AEV 6 Pionierpanzer 2 Dachs ARV 30 BPz-2 VLB 13 Biber MW 8+: Bozena 5; 8 Leopard 1 MW ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE MSL • MANPATS Spike-LR; Spike-ER RCL 84mm Carl Gustaf; 106mm 213 M40A1 ARTILLERY 1,398 SP 155mm 48: 24 M109A3; 24 M109A5+ TOWED 239: 105mm 191: 87 M101; 104 Model 56 pack howitzer; 155mm 48 M-68 MRL 160mm 12 LAR-160 MOR 1,099: 81mm 744: 295 ECIA L65/81; 192 FAMAE; 257 Soltam; 120mm 284: 171 ECIA L65/120; 16 FAMAE; 97 M-65; SP 120mm 71: 35 FAMAE (on Piranha 6×6); 36 Soltam (on M113A2) AIRCRAFT TPT • Light 8: 2 C-212-300 Aviocar; 3 Cessna 208 Caravan; 3 CN235 HELICOPTERS ISR 9 MD-530F Lifter (armed) TPT 17: Medium 12: 8 AS532AL Cougar; 2 AS532ALe Cougar; 2 SA330 Puma; Light 5: 4 H125 Ecureuil; 1 AS355F Ecureuil II AIR DEFENCE SAM • Point-defence Mistral GUNS 41: SP 20mm 17 Piranha/TCM-20 TOWED 20mm 24 TCM-20

Navy 19,800 5 Naval Zones; 1st Naval Zone and main HQ at Valparaiso; 2nd Naval Zone at Talcahuano; 3rd Naval Zone at Punta Arenas; 4th Naval Zone at Iquique; 5th Naval Zone at Puerto Montt FORCES BY ROLE SPECIAL FORCES 1 (diver) SF comd EQUIPMENT BY TYPE SUBMARINES • SSK 4: 2 O’Higgins (Scorpène) with 6 single 533mm TT with SM39 Exocet Block 2 AShM/Black Shark HWT 2 Thomson (GER T-209/1400) (of which 1 in refit) with 8 single 533mm TT with SM39 Exocet Block 2 AShM/ Black Shark HWT/SUT HWT PRINCIPAL SURFACE COMBATANTS 8 FRIGATES • FFGHM 8: 3 Almirante Cochrane (ex-UK Norfolk Type-23) with 2 quad lnchr with RGM-84C Harpoon Block 1B AShM, 1 32-cell VLS with Sea Ceptor SAM, 2 twin 324mm ASTT with Mk 46 mod 2 LWT, 1 114mm gun (capacity 1 AS532SC Cougar)

2 Almirante Latorre (ex-AUS Adelaide) with 1 Mk 13 GMLS with RGM-84L Harpoon Block II AShM/SM-2 Block IIIA SAM, 1 8-cell Mk 41 VLS with RIM-162B ESSM SAM, 2 triple 324mm SVTT Mk 32 ASTT with MU90 LWT, 1 76mm gun (capacity 2 AS532SC Cougars) 2 Almirante Riveros (ex-NLD Karel Doorman) with 2 quad lnchr with MM40 Exocet Block 3 AShM, 1 8-cell Mk 48 VLS with RIM-7P Sea Sparrow SAM, 4 single 324mm SVTT Mk 32 mod 9 ASTT with Mk 46 mod 5 HWT, 1 76mm gun (capacity 1 AS532SC Cougar) 1 Almirante Williams (ex-UK Broadsword Type-22) with 2 quad lnchr with RGM-84 Harpoon AShM, 2 8-cell VLS with Barak-1 SAM; 2 triple 324mm ASTT with Mk 46 LWT, 1 76mm gun (capacity 1 AS532SC Cougar) PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 12 PSOH 4: 2 Piloto Pardo; 2 Piloto Pardo with 1 76mm gun (ice-strengthened hull) PCG 3: 2 Casma (ISR Sa’ar 4) with 6 single lnchr with Gabriel I AShM, 2 76mm guns 1 Casma (ISR Sa’ar 4) with 4 single lnchr with Gabriel I AShM, 2 twin lnchr with MM40 Exocet AShM, 2 76mm guns PCO 5 Micalvi AMPHIBIOUS PRINCIPAL AMPHIBIOUS SHIPS • LPD 1 Sargento Aldea (ex-FRA Foudre) with 3 twin Simbad lnchr with Mistral SAM (capacity 4 med hel; 1 LCT; 2 LCM; 22 tanks; 470 troops) LANDING SHIPS 3 LSM 1 Elicura LST 2 Maipo (FRA Batral) with 1 hel landing platform (capacity 7 tanks; 140 troops) LANDING CRAFT 3 LCT 1 CDIC (for use in Sargento Aldea) LCM 2 (for use in Sargento Aldea) LOGISTICS AND SUPPORT 13 ABU 1 George Slight Marshall with 1 hel landing platform AFD 3 AGOR 1 Cabo de Hornos AGHS 1 Micalvi AOR 2: 1 Almirante Montt (ex-US Henry J. Kaiser) with 1 hel landing platform; 1 Araucano AP 1 Aguiles (1 hel landing platform) ATF 3: 1 Janequeo; 2 Veritas AXS 1 Esmeralda

Naval Aviation 600 EQUIPMENT BY TYPE AIRCRAFT 14 combat capable ASW 4: 2 C295ASW Persuader; 2 P-3ACH Orion MP 4: 1 C295MPA Persuader; 3 EMB-111 Bandeirante* ISR 7 P-68 TRG 7 PC-7 Turbo Trainer* HELICOPTERS ASW 5 AS532SC Cougar MRH 8 AS365 Dauphin TPT 10: Medium 2 H215 (AS332L1) Super Puma; Light 8: 4 Bo-105S; 2 Bell 206 Jet Ranger; 2 H125 AIR-LAUNCHED MISSILES • AShM AM39 Exocet

Marines 3,600 FORCES BY ROLE MANOEUVRE Amphibious 1 amph bde (2 mne bn, 1 cbt spt bn, 1 log bn) 2 coastal def unit EQUIPMENT BY TYPE ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES LT TK 15 FV101 Scorpion APC • APC (W) 25 MOWAG Roland AAV 12 AAV-7 ARTILLERY 39 TOWED 23: 105mm 7 KH-178; 155mm 16 M-71 MOR 81mm 16 COASTAL DEFENCE • AShM MM38 Exocet AIR DEFENCE • SAM • Point-defence 14: 4 M998 Avenger; 10 M1097 Avenger

Coast Guard

Integral part of the Navy EQUIPMENT BY TYPE PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 55 PBF 26 Archangel PB 29: 18 Alacalufe (Protector); 4 Grumete Diaz (Dabor); 6 Pelluhue; 1 Ona

Air Force 11,050 FORCES BY ROLE FIGHTER 1 sqn with F-5E/F Tiger III+ 2 sqn with F-16AM/BM Fighting Falcon FIGHTER/GROUND ATTACK 1 sqn with F-16C/D Block 50 Fighting Falcon (Puma) ISR 1 (photo) flt with; DHC-6-300 Twin Otter; Gulfstream IV AIRBORNE EARLY WARNING 1 flt with B-707 Phalcon TANKER/TRANSPORT 1 sqn with B-737-300; C-130B/H Hercules; KC-130R Hercules; KC-135 Stratotanker TRANSPORT 3 sqn with Bell 205 (UH-1H Iroquois); C-212-200/300 Aviocar; Cessna O-2A; Cessna 525 Citation CJ1; DHC6-100/300 Twin Otter; PA-28-236 Dakota; Bell 205 (UH1H Iroquois) 1 VIP flt with B-767-300ER; B-737-500; Gulfstream IV TRAINING 1 sqn with EMB-314 Super Tucano* 1 sqn with Cirrus SR-22T; T-35A/B Pillan TRANSPORT HELICOPTER 1 sqn with Bell 205 (UH-1H Iroquois); Bell 206B (trg); Bell 412 Twin Huey; S-70A Black Hawk AIR DEFENCE 1 AD regt (5 AD sqn) with Crotale; NASAMS; Mistral; M163/M167 Vulcan; Oerlikon GDF-005 EQUIPMENT BY TYPE AIRCRAFT 92 combat capable FTR 48: 10 F-5E Tigre III+; 2 F-5F Tigre III+; 29 F-16AM Fighting Falcon; 7 F-16BM Fighting Falcon

FGA 10: 6 F-16C Block 50 Fighting Falcon; 4 F-16D Block 50 Fighting Falcon ATK 16 C-101CC Aviojet (A-36 Halcón) ISR 3 Cessna O-2A AEW&C 1 B-707 Phalcon TKR 3 KC-135 Stratotanker TKR/TPT 2 KC-130R Hercules TPT 33: Medium 3: 1 C-130B Hercules; 2 C-130H Hercules; Light 24: 2 C-212-200 Aviocar; 1 C-212-300 Aviocar; 4 Cessna 525 Citation CJ1; 3 DHC-6-100 Twin Otter; 7 DHC-6-300 Twin Otter; 7 PA-28-236 Dakota; PAX 6: 1 B-737-300; 1 B-737-500 (VIP); 1 B-767-300ER (VIP); 3 Gulfstream IV (VIP/aerial photography) TRG 57: 8 Cirrus SR-22T; 22 EMB-314 Super Tucano*; 27 T-35A/B Pillan HELICOPTERS MRH 12 Bell 412EP Twin Huey TPT 25: Medium 7: 1 S-70A Black Hawk; 6 S-70i (MH60M) Black Hawk; Light 18: 13 Bell 205 (UH-1H Iroquois); 5 Bell 206B (trg) UNINHABITED AERIAL VEHICLES ISR • Medium 3 Hermes 900 AIR DEFENCE SAM Short-range 17: 5 Crotale; 12 NASAMS Point-defence Mistral (including some Mygale/Aspic) GUNS • TOWED 20mm M163/M167 Vulcan; 35mm Oerlikon GDF-005 AIR-LAUNCHED MISSILES AAM • IR AIM-9J/M Sidewinder; Python 3; Shafrir‡; IIR Python 4; ARH AIM-120C AMRAAM; Derby ASM AGM-65G Maverick BOMBS Laser-guided Paveway II INS/GPS guided JDAM

Gendarmerie & Paramilitary 44,700 Carabineros 44,700 Ministry of Interior; 15 zones, 36 districts, 179 comisaria EQUIPMENT BY TYPE ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES APC • APC (W) 20 MOWAG Roland ARTILLERY • MOR 81mm AIRCRAFT TPT • Light 4: 1 Beech 200 King Air; 1 Cessna 208; 1 Cessna 550 Citation V; 1 PA-31T Cheyenne II HELICOPTERS • TPT • Light 16: 5 AW109E Power; 1 AW139; 1 Bell 206 Jet Ranger; 2 BK-117; 5 Bo-105; 2 H135

DEPLOYMENT BOSNIA-HERZEGOVINA: EU • EUFOR • Operation Althea 8 CYPRUS: UN • UNFICYP 6 MIDDLE EAST: UN • UNTSO 3

Latin America and the Caribbean

Latin America and the Caribbean 405

406 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2022

ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE

Colombia COL Colombian Peso COP GDP per capita

2020

2021

COP

1003tr

1114tr

USD

272bn

301bn 5,892

USD

5,391

Growth

-6.8

7.6

Inflation

2.5

3.2

Def bdgt [a] FMA (US)

COP

20.2tr

22.1tr

USD

5.48bn

5.97bn

USD

USD1=COP

45.5m

20.0m

3693.27

3704.35

2022

23.7tr 4.0m

[a] Excludes security budget Real-terms defence budget trend (USDbn, constant 2015) 6.98 5.57 2008

Population

2015

2021

50,355,650

Age

0–14

15–19

20–24

25–29

Male

12.5%

4.0%

4.1%

4.2%

30–64 65 plus 21.1%

3.6%

Female

11.9%

3.8%

3.9%

4.1%

21.9%

5.0%

Capabilities Colombia’s armed forces have improved their training and overall capabilities in recent decades. Internal security remains a priority, and the armed forces are focused on conducting counterinsurgency and counter-narcotics operations. While the armed forces are looking towards new security roles and organisations for the post-FARC era, the emergence of a FARC splinter group in mid-2019 means that internal security remains a key concern. In response to the humanitarian and security challenge from Venezuela, Colombia is strengthening cooperation with Brazil on border controls. There are military ties with Argentina, Chile and Peru. The US is Colombia’s closest international military partner, with cooperation in equipment procurement, technical advice and personnel training. In May 2018, Colombia joined NATO as a global partner. The forces train regularly, including multilateral exercises. Although the equipment inventory mainly comprises legacy systems, Colombia has the capability to independently deploy force elements beyond national borders. The army is planning to modernise its armoured vehicles, while the navy has improved its offshore-patrol capacities in recent years. The air force’s groundattack capabilities remain limited, though it is in the process of renewing its fleet of basic trainers. Colombia’s defence industry is active in all domains. CIAC is developing its first indigenous UAVs, while CODALTEC is developing an air-defence system for regional export. COTECMAR has supplied patrol boats and amphibious ships for national and export markets.

ACTIVE 255,950 (Army 185,900, Navy 56,400 Air 13,650) Gendarmerie & Paramilitary 172,400 Conscript liability 18 months’ duration with upper age limit of 24, males only

RESERVE 34,950 (Army 25,050 Navy 6,500 Air 3,400)

Army 185,900 FORCES BY ROLE SPECIAL FORCES 1 SF div (3 SF regt) 1 (anti-terrorist) SF bn MANOEUVRE Mechanised 1 (1st) mech div (1 (2nd) mech bde (2 mech inf bn, 1 mtn inf bn, 1 engr bn, 1 MP bn, 1 spt bn, 2 Gaula antikidnap gp); 1 (10th) mech bde (1 (urban) spec ops bn, 1 armd recce bn, 1 mech cav bn, 1 mech inf bn, 1 mtn inf bn, 3 sy bn, 2 arty bn, 1 engr bn, 1 spt bn, 2 Gaula anti-kidnap gp)) Light 1 (2nd) inf div (1 (1st) inf bde (1 mech cav bn, 2 inf bn, 1 mtn inf bn, 1 sy bn, 1 arty bn, 1 spt bn, 1 Gaula antikidnap gp); 1 (5th) inf bde (3 inf bn, 1 jungle inf bn, 1 sy bn, 1 arty bn, 1 engr bn, 1 spt bn, 1 Gaula antikidnap gp); 1 (30th) inf bde (1 mech cav bn, 2 inf bn, 1 sy bn, 1 arty bn, 1 engr bn, 1 spt bn); 1 AD bn; 1 sy gp (1 (urban) spec ops bn, 4 COIN bn, 3 sy bn); 1 (rapid reaction) sy bde) 1 (3rd) inf div (1 (3rd) inf bde (2 inf bn, 1 mtn inf bn, 1 COIN bn, 1 arty bn, 1 engr bn, 1 cbt spt bn, 1 MP bn, 1 log bn, 1 Gaula anti-kidnap gp); 1 (23rd) inf bde (1 cav gp, 1 lt inf bn, 1 jungle inf bn, 1 spt bn, 1 log bn); 1 (29th) mtn bde (1 mtn inf bn, 1 inf bn, 2 COIN bn, 1 spt bn, 1 log bn); 1 lt cav bde (2 lt cav gp); 1 mtn inf bn; 2 (rapid reaction) sy bde) 1 (4th) inf div (1 (7th) air mob bde (1 (urban) spec ops bn, 2 air mob inf bn, 1 lt inf bn, 1 COIN bn, 1 engr bn, 1 spt bn, 1 log bn, 1 Gaula anti-kidnap gp); 1 (22nd) jungle bde (1 air mob inf bn, 1 lt inf bn, 1 jungle inf bn, 1 COIN bn, 1 spt bn, 1 log bn); 1 (31st) jungle bde (1 lt inf bn, 1 jungle inf bn)) 1 (5th) inf div (1 (6th) lt inf bde (2 lt inf bn, 1 mtn inf bn, 3 COIN bn, 1 EOD bn, 2 spt bn, 1 Gaula anti-kidnap gp); 1 (8th) inf bde (1 inf bn, 1 mtn inf bn, 1 arty bn, 1 engr bn, 1 spt bn, 1 Gaula anti-kidnap gp); 1 (9th) inf bde (1 (urban) spec ops bn, 2 inf bn, 1 arty bn, 1 COIN bn, 1 sy bn, 1 spt bn, 1 Gaula anti-kidnap gp); 1 (13th) inf bde (1 recce bn, 3 inf bn, 1 mtn inf bn, 1 air mob bn, 1 COIN bn, 1 arty bn, 1 engr bn, 2 MP bn, 1 spt bn, 1 Gaula anti-kidnap gp)) 1 (6th) inf div (1 (12th) inf bde (1 (urban) spec ops bn, 1 inf bn, 1 jungle inf bn, 1 mtn inf bn, 1 COIN bn, 1 engr bn, 1 spt bn, 1 Gaula anti-kidnap gp); 1 (26th) jungle bde (1 jungle inf bn, 1 spt bn); 1 (27th) jungle inf bde (1 inf bn, 1 jungle inf bn, 1 sy bn, 1 arty bn, 1 engr bn, 1 spt bn); 1 (13th) mobile sy bde; 2 COIN bn) 1 (7th) inf div (1 (4th) inf bde (1 (urban) spec ops bn; 1 mech cav gp, 3 inf bn, 1 sy bn, 1 arty bn, 1 engr bn, 1 MP bn, 1 spt bn, 2 Gaula anti-kidnap gp); 1 (11th) inf bde (1 inf bn, 1 air mob bn, 1 sy bn, 1 spt bn, 2 Gaula anti-kidnap gp); 1 (14th) inf bde (2 inf bn, 1 sy bn, 1 engr bn, 1 spt bn); 1 (15th) jungle bde (1 inf bn, 2 COIN bn, 1 engr bn); 1 (17th) inf bde (2 inf bn, 1 engr bn, 1 spt bn))

Latin America and the Caribbean 407

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES RECCE 121 EE-9 Cascavel IFV 60: 28 Commando Advanced; 32 LAV III APC 114 APC (T) 54: 28 M113A1 (TPM-113A1); 26 M113A2 (TPM-113A2) APC (W) 56 EE-11 Urutu PPV 4+: some Hunter XL; 4 RG-31 Nyala AUV 38 M1117 Guardian ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE MSL SP 77 Nimrod MANPATS TOW; Spike-ER RCL 106mm 73 M40A1 ARTILLERY 1,796 TOWED 120: 105mm 107: 22 LG1 MkIII; 85 M101; 155mm 13 155/52 APU SBT-1 MOR 1,676: 81mm 1,507; 120mm 169 AIRCRAFT ELINT 3: 2 Beech B200 King Air; 1 Beech 350 King Air TPT • Light 23: 2 An-32B; 2 Beech B200 King Air; 3 Beech 350 King Air; 1 Beech C90 King Air; 2 C-212 Aviocar (Medevac); 8 Cessna 208B Grand Caravan; 1 Cessna 208BEX Grand Caravan; 4 Turbo Commander 695A HELICOPTERS MRH 19: 8 Mi-17-1V Hip; 6 Mi-17MD; 5 Mi-17V-5 Hip TPT 92: Medium 53: 46 UH-60L Black Hawk; 7 S-70i Black Hawk; Light 39: 24 Bell 205 (UH-1H Iroquois); 15 Bell 212 (UH-1N Twin Huey) AIR DEFENCE • GUNS • TOWED 40mm 4 M1A1

Navy 56,400 (incl 12,100 conscript) HQ located at Bogotá EQUIPMENT BY TYPE SUBMARINES 4 SSK 2 Pijao (GER T-209/1200) each with 8 single 533mm TT each with SeaHake (DM2A3) HWT SSC 2 Intrépido (ex-GER T-206A) each with 8 single 533mm TT each with SeaHake (DM2A3) HWT

PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 49 CORVETTES 6 FSGHM 4 Almirante Padilla with 2 quad lnchr with Hae Sung I AShM, 2 twin Simbad lnchr with Mistral SAM, 2 triple 324mm ILAS-3 (B-515) ASTT each with A244/S LWT, 1 76mm gun (capacity 1 Bo-105/ AS555SN Fennec hel) FSG 1 Almirante Tono (Ex-ROK Po Hang (Flight IV)) 2 twin lnchr with Hae Sung I AShM, 2 triple 324mm ASTT with Mk 46, 2 76mm guns FS 1 Narino (ex-ROK Dong Hae) with 2 triple 324mm SVTT Mk 32 ASTT with Mk 46 LWT PSOH 3: 2 20 de Julio (CHL Piloto Pardo); 1 20 de Julio (CHL Piloto Pardo) with 1 76mm gun PCR 10: 2 Arauca with 1 76mm guns; 8 Nodriza (PAF I-IV) with hel landing platform PBR 30: 5 Diligente; 7 LPR-40; 3 Swiftships; 9 Tenerife (US Bender Marine 12m); 2 PAF-L; 4 others AMPHIBIOUS 16 LCT 6 Golfo de Tribuga LCU 2 Morrosquillo (LCU 1466) UCAC 8 Griffon 2000TD LOGISTICS AND SUPPORT 9 ABU 1 Quindio AG 2: 1 Inirida; 1 Luneburg (ex-GER, depot ship for patrol vessels) AGHS 2: 1 Caribe; 1 Roncador AGOR 2 Providencia AGS 1 Gorgona AXS 1 Gloria

Coast Guard EQUIPMENT BY TYPE PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 16 PCO 2: 1 San Andres (ex-US Balsam); 1 Valle del Cauca Durable (ex-US Reliance) with 1 hel landing platform PCC 3 Punta Espada (CPV-46) PB 11: 1 11 de Noviembre (CPV-40) (GER Fassmer); 2 Castillo y Rada (Swiftships 105); 2 Jaime Gomez (ex-US Peterson Mk 3); 1 José Maria Palas (Swiftships 110); 3 Point; 2 Toledo (US Bender Marine 35m) LOGISTICS AND SUPPORT • ABU 1 Isla Albuquerque

Naval Aviation 150 EQUIPMENT BY TYPE AIRCRAFT MP 3 CN235 MPA Persuader ISR 1 PA-31 Navajo (upgraded for ISR) TPT • Light 11: 1 C-212 (Medevac); 4 Cessna 206; 3 Cessna 208 Caravan; 1 PA-31 Navajo; 1 PA-34 Seneca; 1 Beech 350 King Air HELICOPTERS SAR 2 AS365 Dauphin MRH 8: 1 AS555SN Fennec; 3 Bell 412 Twin Huey; 4 Bell 412EP Twin Huey TPT • Light 8: 1 Bell 212; 4 Bell 212 (UH-1N); 1 BK117; 2 Bo-105

Marines 22,250 FORCES BY ROLE SPECIAL FORCES 1 SF bde (4 SF bn)

Latin America and the Caribbean

1 (8th) inf div (1 (16th) lt inf bde (1 recce bn, 1 inf bn, 1 spt bn, 1 Gaula anti-kidnap gp); 1 (18th) inf bde (1 (urban) spec ops bn; 1 air mob gp, 5 sy bn, 1 arty bn, 1 engr bn, 1 spt bn); 1 (28th) jungle bde (2 inf, 2 COIN, 1 spt bn); , 1 (rapid reaction) sy bde, 4 COIN bn) 3 COIN mobile bde (each: 4 COIN bn, 1 spt bn) COMBAT SUPPORT 1 cbt engr bde (1 SF engr bn, 1 (emergency response) engr bn, 1 EOD bn, 1 construction bn, 1 demining bn, 1 maint bn) 1 int bde (2 SIGINT bn, 1 log bn, 1 maint bn) COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT 2 spt/log bde (each: 1 spt bn, 1 maint bn, 1 supply bn, 1 tpt bn, 1 medical bn, 1 log bn) AVIATION 1 air aslt div (1 counter-narcotics bde (4 counternarcotics bn, 1 spt bn); 1 (25th) avn bde (4 hel bn; 5 avn bn; 1 avn log bn); 1 (32nd) avn bde (1 avn bn, 2 maint bn, 1 trg bn, 1 spt bn); 1 SF avn bn)

408 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2022 MANOEUVRE Amphibious 1 mne bde (1 SF (Gaula) bn, 5 mne bn, 2 rvn bn, 1 spt bn) 1 mne bde (1 SF bn, 2 mne bn, 2 rvn bn, 1 spt bn) 1 rvn bde (1 SF bn, 1 mne bn, 2 rvn bn, 1 spt bn) 1 rvn bde (4 rvn bn) 1 rvn bde (3 rvn bn) COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT 1 log bde (6 spt bn) 1 trg bde (7 trg bn, 1 spt bn) EQUIPMENT BY TYPE ARTILLERY • MOR 82: 81mm 74; 120mm 8 AIR DEFENCE • SAM • Point-defence Mistral

Air Force 13,650 FORCES BY ROLE FIGHTER/GROUND ATTACK 1 sqn with Kfir C-10/C-12/TC-12 GROUND ATTACK/ISR 1 sqn with A-37B/OA-37B Dragonfly 1 sqn with AC-47T; ECN235; IAI Arava 1 sqn with EMB-312 Tucano* 2 sqn with EMB-314 Super Tucano* (A-29) GROUND ATTACK 1 sqn with AC-47T Spooky (Fantasma); Bell 205 (UH-1H Huey II); Cessna 208 Grand Caravan 1 sqn with Cessna 208 Grand Caravan; C-212; UH-60L Black Hawk EW/ELINT 2 sqn with Beech 350 King Air; Cessna 208; SA 2-37; Turbo Commander 695 ELINT 2 sqn with Cessna 560 TRANSPORT 1 (Presidential) sqn with AW139; B-737BBJ; EMB-600 Legacy; Bell 412EP; F-28 Fellowship; UH-60L Black Hawk 1 sqn with B-727; B-737-400; Beech C90GTx King Air; C-130B/H Hercules; C-212; C295M; CN235M; KC-767 1 sqn with Beech 350C King Air; Bell 212; Cessna 208B; EMB-110P1 (C-95) 1 sqn with Beech C90 King Air TRAINING 1 sqn with Cessna 172 1 sqn with Lancair Synergy (T-90 Calima) 1 sqn with T-6C Texan II 1 hel sqn with Bell 206B3 1 hel sqn with TH-67 HELICOPTER 1 sqn with AH-60L Arpia III 1 sqn with UH-60L Black Hawk (CSAR) 1 sqn with Hughes 500M 1 sqn with Bell 205 (UH-1H Huey II) 1 sqn with Bell 206B3 Jet Ranger III 1 sqn with Bell 212; Bell 205 (UH-1H Huey II) ISR UAV 1 sqn with Hermes 450; Hermes 900 EQUIPMENT BY TYPE AIRCRAFT 72 combat capable FGA 22: 10 Kfir C-10; 9 Kfir C-12; 3 Kfir TC-12

ATK 12: 6 A-37B/OA-37B Dragonfly; 6 AC-47T Spooky (Fantasma) ISR 11: 5 Cessna 560 Citation II; 6 SA 2-37 ELINT 13: 3 Beech 350 King Air; 6 Cessna 208 Grand Caravan; 2 Cessna 337G; 1 ECN235; 1 Turbo Commander 695 TKR/TPT 1 KC-767 TPT 70: Medium 10: 3 C-130B Hercules; 6 C-130H Hercules; 1 B-737F; Light 49: 7 ATR-42; 2 Beech 300 King Air; 1 Beech 350C King Air (medevac); 1 Beech 350i King Air (VIP); 2 Beech 350 King Air (medevac); 2 Beech C90 King Air; 3 Beech C90GTx King Air; 4 C-212; 6 C295M; 4 Cessna 172; 1 Cessna 182R; 12 Cessna 208B (medevac); 1 CN235M; 2 EMB-110P1 (C-95); 1 IAI-201 Arava; PAX 11: 2 B-727; 2 B-737-400; 1 B-737BBJ (VIP); 1 EMB-600 Legacy; 2 ERJ-145; 1 F-28-1000 Fellowship; 1 F-28-3000 Fellowship; 1 Learjet 60 TRG 69: 14 EMB-312 Tucano*; 24 EMB-314 Super Tucano (A-29)*; 23 Lancair Synergy (T-90 Calima); 6 T-41D Mescalero; 2 T-6C Texan II HELICOPTERS MRH 18: 4 AH-60L Arpia III; 10 AH-60L Arpia IV; 1 AW139 (VIP); 1 Bell 412EP Twin Huey (VIP); 2 Hughes 500M TPT 46: Medium 13 UH-60L Black Hawk (incl 1 VIP hel); Light 33: 10 Bell 205 (UH-1H Huey II); 12 Bell 206B3 Jet Ranger III; 11 Bell 212 TRG 60 TH-67 UNINHABITED AERIAL VEHICLES • ISR • Medium 8: 6 Hermes 450; 2 Hermes 900 AIR-LAUNCHED MISSILES AAM • IR Python 3; IIR Python 4; Python 5; ARH Derby; I-Derby ER (reported) ASM Spike-ER; Spike-NLOS BOMBS Laser-guided Paveway II INS/GPS guided Spice

Gendarmerie & Paramilitary 172,400 National Police Force 172,400 EQUIPMENT BY TYPE AIRCRAFT ELINT 5 C-26B Metroliner TPT • Light 43: 5 ATR-42; 3 Beech 200 King Air; 2 Beech 300 King Air; 2 Beech 1900; 1 Beech C99; 4 BT-67; 3 C-26 Metroliner; 3 Cessna 152; 3 Cessna 172; 9 Cessna 206; 2 Cessna 208 Caravan; 2 DHC-6 Twin Otter; 1 DHC-8; 3 PA-31 Navajo HELICOPTERS MRH 5: 2 Bell 407GXP; 1 Bell 412EP; 2 MD-500D TPT 80: Medium 22: 10 UH-60A Black Hawk; 9 UH60L Black Hawk; 3 S-70i Black Hawk; Light 58: 34 Bell 205 (UH-1H-II Huey II); 6 Bell 206B; 5 Bell 206L/L3/L4 Long Ranger; 8 Bell 212; 5 Bell 407

DEPLOYMENT CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC: UN • MINUSCA 2 EGYPT: MFO 275; 1 inf bn

Latin America and the Caribbean 409

Public Force 9,000

LEBANON: UN • UNIFIL 1

11 regional directorates

WESTERN SAHARA: UN • MINURSO 2

Coast Guard Unit 550

United States US Southern Command: 50

Costa Rica CRI Costa Rican Colon CRC GDP per capita

2020

2021

CRC

36.2tr

37.9tr

USD

61.8bn

61.5bn 11,860

USD

12,057

Growth

-4.1

3.9

Inflation

0.7

1.3

CRC

267bn

USD

457m

434m

Sy Bdgt [a] FMA (US)

USD

USD1=CRC

7.5m

0.0m

585.03

616.14

2022

270bn 0.0m

[a] Paramilitary budget

Population

2015

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE AIRCRAFT • TPT • Light 14: 2 Cessna T210 Centurion; 4 Cessna U206G Stationair; 2 PA-31 Navajo; 2 PA-34 Seneca; 1 Piper PA-23 Aztec; 1 Cessna 182RG; 2 Y-12E HELICOPTERS MRH 3: 1 MD-500E; 2 MD-600N TPT • Light 4 Bell 212 (UH-1N)

Cuba CUB

463

USD

per capita

USD

224

Growth

2021

Age

0–14

15–19

20–24

25–29

Male

11.2%

3.6%

3.9%

4.1%

30–64 65 plus 23.0%

4.2%

Female

10.7%

3.5%

3.8%

4.0%

23.0%

4.9%

Capabilities Costa Rica’s armed forces were constitutionally abolished in 1949, and the country relies on police and coastguard organisations for internal security, maritime and air domain awareness, and counter-narcotics tasks. A new National Security Strategy was adopted in 2018 in order to help tackle rising crime. Colombia and the US have provided assistance and training, focused on policing and internal-security tasks rather than conventional military operations. The Special Intervention Unit (UEI) has received specialist training from non-regional states, including the US. The Public Force, Coast Guard and Air Surveillance units have little heavy equipment, and recent modernisation has depended on donations from countries such as China and the US. Apart from limited maintenance facilities, Costa Rica has no domestic defence industry.

ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE Gendarmerie & Paramilitary 9,950 Special Intervention Unit

2021

2022

Inflation Def exp

Gendarmerie & Paramilitary 9,950

2020

GDP

5,151,140

FORCES BY ROLE SPECIAL FORCES 1 spec ops unit

Air Surveillance Unit 400

Cuban Peso CUP

Real-terms defence budget trend (USDm, constant 2015)

2008

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 10 PB 10: 2 Cabo Blanco (US Swift 65); 1 Isla del Coco (US Swift 105); 3 Libertador Juan Rafael Mora (ex-US Island); 2 Point; 1 Primera Dama (US Swift 42); 1 Puerto Quepos (US Swift 36)

CUP USD

USD1=CUP Population

11,032,343

*definitive data not available Age

0–14

15–19

20–24

25–29

Male

8.4%

2.9%

3.1%

30–64 65 plus 24.9%

7.3%

Female

7.9%

2.7%

2.9%

2.8%

25.2%

8.8%

Capabilities Cuba’s armed forces are principally focused on protecting territorial integrity, and rely on a mass-mobilisation system. Military capability is limited by equipment obsolescence and a largely conscript-based force. Cuba maintains military ties with China and Russia, and the latter has supplied oil and fuel following Venezuela’s economic collapse. Defence cooperation with Russia is largely centred around technical and maintenance support. Cooperation with China appears to be on a smaller scale and involves training agreements and personnel exchanges. The armed forces are no longer designed for expeditionary operations and have little logistical capability to support operational deployments abroad. The inventory is almost entirely composed of legacy Soviet-era systems with varying degrees of obsolescence. Serviceability appears a problem, with much equipment at a low level of availability and maintenance demands growing as fleets age. Much of the aviation fleet is reported to be in storage. Training levels are uncertain and flying hours are likely to be low due to limited availability of aircraft. It is unlikely that significant equipment recapitalisation can be financed in the near term. Cuba has little in the way of domestic defence industry, apart from some upgrade and maintenance capacity. Cuba continues to send maintenance personnel to South Africa, highlighting not just

Latin America and the Caribbean

FOREIGN FORCES

410 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2022 revenue-raising requirements for its forces but also the potential effect such activities might have on remaining maintenance capacity in Cuba.

ACTIVE 49,000 (Army 38,000 Navy 3,000 Air 8,000) Gendarmerie & Paramilitary 26,500

Conscript liability 2 years

RESERVE 39,000 (Army 39,000) Gendarmerie & Paramilitary 1,120,000 Ready Reserves (serve 45 days per year) to fill out Active and Reserve units; see also Paramilitary

ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE Army ε38,000 FORCES BY ROLE COMMAND 3 regional comd HQ 3 army comd HQ COMMAND 3 SF regt MANOEUVRE Armoured 1 tk div (3 tk bde) Mechanised 2 (mixed) mech bde Light 2 (frontier) bde Air Manoeuvre 1 AB bde AIR DEFENCE 1 ADA regt 1 SAM bde

Reserves 39,000 FORCES BY ROLE MANOEUVRE Light 14 inf bde EQUIPMENT BY TYPE† ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES MBT ε900 T-34/T-54/T-55/T-62 LT TK PT-76 ASLT BTR-60 100mm RECCE BRDM-2; AIFV ε50 BMP-1/1P APC ε500 BTR-152/BTR-50/BTR-60 ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE MSL SP 2K16 Shmel (RS-AT-1 Snapper) MANPATS 9K11 Malyutka (RS-AT-3 Sagger) GUNS 600+: 57mm 600 ZIS-2 (M-1943); 85mm D-44 ARTILLERY 1,715+ SP 40+: 100mm AAPMP-100; CATAP-100; 122mm 2S1 Gvozdika; AAP-T-122; AAP-BMP-122; Jupiter III; Jupiter IV; 130mm AAP-T-130; Jupiter V; 152mm 2S3 Akatsiya TOWED 500: 122mm D-30; M-30 (M-1938); 130mm M-46; 152mm D-1; M-1937 (ML-20) MRL • SP 175: 122mm BM-21 Grad; 140mm BM-14

MOR 1,000: 82mm M-41; 82mm M-43; 120mm M-43; M-38 AIR DEFENCE SAM Short-range 2K12 Kub (RS-SA-6 Gainful) Pont-defence 200+: 200 9K35 Strela-10 (RS-SA-13 Gopher); 9K33 Osa (RS-SA-8 Gecko); 9K31 Strela-1 (RSSA-9 Gaskin); 9K36 Strela-3 (RS-SA-14 Gremlin); 9K310 Igla-1 (SA-16 Gimlet); 9K32 Strela-2 (RS-SA-7 Grail)‡ GUNS 400 SP 23mm ZSU-23-4; 30mm BTR-60P SP; 57mm ZSU57-2 TOWED 100mm KS-19/M-1939/85mm KS-12/57mm S-60/37mm M-1939/30mm M-53/23mm ZU-23

Navy ε3,000

Western Comd HQ at Cabanas; Eastern Comd HQ at Holquin EQUIPMENT BY TYPE SUBMARINES • SSW 1 Delfin PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 9 PCG 2 Rio Damuji with two single P-22 (RS-SS-N-2C Styx) AShM, 2 57mm guns, 1 hel landing platform PCM 1 Project 1241PE (FSU Pauk II) with 1 quad lnchr (manual aiming) with 9K32 Strela-2 (RS-SA-N-5 Grail) SAM, 2 RBU 1200 A/S mor, 1 76mm gun PBF 6 Project 205 (FSU Osa II)† each with 4 single lnchr (for P-20U (RS-SS-N-2B Styx) AShM – missiles removed to coastal-defence units) MINE WARFARE AND MINE COUNTERMEASURES 5 MHI 3 Korund (Project 1258 (Yevgenya))† MSC 2 Yakhont (FSU Project 1265 (Sonya))† LOGISTICS AND SUPPORT 2 ABU 1 AX 1

Coastal Defence EQUIPMENT BY TYPE ARTILLERY • TOWED 122mm M-1931/37; 130mm M-46; 152mm M-1937 COASTAL DEFENCE • AShM 4+: Bandera IV (reported); 4 4K51 Rubezh (RS-SSC-3 Styx)

Naval Infantry 550+ FORCES BY ROLE MANOEUVRE Amphibious 2 amph aslt bn

Anti-aircraft Defence and Revolutionary Air Force ε8,000 (incl conscripts) Air assets divided between Western Air Zone and Eastern Air Zone FORCES BY ROLE FIGHTER/GROUND ATTACK 3 sqn with MiG-21bis/UM Fishbed; MiG-23ML/UB/UM Flogger; MiG-29/MiG-29UB Fulcrum TRANSPORT 1 (VIP) tpt sqn with An-24 Coke; Mi-8P Hip

Latin America and the Caribbean 411

Gendarmerie & Paramilitary 26,500 active State Security 20,000 Ministry of Interior

Border Guards 6,500

Ministry of Interior PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 20 PCC 2 Stenka PB 18 Zhuk

Youth Labour Army 70,000 reservists Civil Defence Force 50,000 reservists Territorial Militia ε1,000,000 reservists

FOREIGN FORCES United States US Southern Command: 650 (JTF-GTMO) at Guantanamo Bay

Dominican Republic DOM Dominican Peso DOP

2020

2021

DOP

4.46tr

5.13tr

USD

78.9bn

89.5bn

USD

7,554

8,492

Growth

-6.7

9.5

Inflation

3.8

7.8

Def bdgt

DOP

33.3bn

33.2bn

USD

589m

579m

56.47

57.34

GDP per capita

USD1=DOP

2022

41.8bn

Real-terms defence budget trend (USDm, constant 2015) 622 296 2008

Population

2015

2021

10,597,348

Age

0–14

15–19

20–24

25–29

Male

13.5%

4.6%

4.5%

4.3%

30–64 65 plus 20.6%

3.1%

Female

13.0%

4.4%

4.1%

20.0%

3.4%

Capabilities The principal tasks for the Dominican armed forces include internal- and border-security missions, as well as disaster relief. Training and operations increasingly focus on counter-narcotics and include collaboration with the police in an inter-agency task force. The US sends training teams to the country under the terms of a 2015 military-partnership agreement, and the navy has trained with French forces. The Dominican Republic has participated in US SOUTHCOM’s Tradewinds disaster-response exercise. The army has strengthened its presence along the border with Haiti, establishing new surveillance posts; in 2021 it deployed over 7,000 troops to its border in response to the Haiti crisis. There is little capacity to deploy and sustain forces abroad. The army’s limited number of armoured vehicles are obsolete and likely difficult to maintain. The air force operates a modest number of light fixed-wing and rotarywing assets, and the navy a small fleet of mainly ex-US patrol craft of varying sizes. Apart from maintenance facilities, the country does not have a domestic defence industry.

ACTIVE 56,050 (Army 28,750 Navy 11,200 Air 16,100) Paramilitary 15,000

ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE Army 28,750 5 Defence Zones FORCES BY ROLE SPECIAL FORCES 3 SF bn MANOEUVRE Light 4 (1st, 2nd, 3rd & 4th) inf bde (3 inf bn) 2 (5th & 6th) inf bde (2 inf bn) Air Manoeuvre 1 air cav bde (1 cdo bn, 1 (6th) mtn bn, 1 hel sqn with Bell 205 (op by Air Force); OH-58 Kiowa; R-22; R-44 Raven II)

Latin America and the Caribbean

ATTACK HELICOPTER 2 sqn with Mi-17 Hip H; Mi-35 Hind TRAINING 2 (tac trg) sqn with L-39C Albatros (basic); Z-142 (primary) EQUIPMENT BY TYPE AIRCRAFT 31 combat capable FTR 26: 16 MiG-23ML Flogger; 1+ MiG-23UB Flogger; 4 MiG-23UM Flogger; 2 MiG-29 Fulcrum†; 3 MiG-29UB Fulcrum†; (6 MiG-23ML Flogger; 2 MiG-23UM Flogger in store) FGA 5: 3 MiG-21bis Fishbed; 2 MiG-21UM Fishbed ISR 1 An-30 Clank† TPT 25: Heavy 2 Il-76 Candid; Light 11: 1 An-24 Coke (Aerogaviota); 3 An-26 Curl (Aerogaviota); 5 ATR-42500 (Cubana & Aergaviota); 2 ATR-72-500 (Cubana); PAX 12: 6 An-158 (Cubana); 3 Il-96-300 (Cubana); 3 Tu204E-100 (Cubana) TRG 25+: up to 25 L-39 Albatros; some Z-142C HELICOPTERS ATK 4 Mi-35 Hind† (8 more in store) MRH 8 Mi-17 Hip H (12 more in store) TPT • Medium 2 Mi-8P Hip AIR DEFENCE • SAM Medium-range S-75 Dvina (RS-SA-2 Guideline); S-75 Dvina mod (RS-SA-2 Guideline – on T-55 chassis) Short-range S-125M/M1 Pechora-M/M1 (RS-SA-3 Goa); S-125M1 Pechora-M1 mod (RS-SA-3 Goa – on T-55 chassis) AIR-LAUNCHED MISSILES AAM • IR R-3‡ (RS-AA-2 Atoll); R-60 (RS-AA-8 Aphid); R-73 (RS-AA-11A Archer); IR/SARH R-23/24‡ (RS-AA-7 Apex); R-27 (RS-AA-10 Alamo) ASM Kh-23‡ (RS-AS-7 Kerry)

412 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2022 Other 1 (Presidential Guard) gd regt 1 (MoD) sy bn COMBAT SUPPORT 1 cbt spt bde (1 lt armd bn; 1 arty bn; 1 engr bn; 1 sigs bn) EQUIPMENT BY TYPE ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES LT TK 12 M41B (76mm) APC • APC (W) 8 LAV-150 Commando ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE RCL 106mm 20 M40A1 GUNS 37mm 20 M3 ARTILLERY 104 TOWED 105mm 16: 4 M101; 12 Reinosa 105/26 MOR 88: 81mm 60 M1; 107mm 4 M30; 120mm 24 Expal Model L HELICOPTERS ISR 8: 4 OH-58A Kiowa; 4 OH-58C Kiowa TPT • Light 6: 4 R-22; 2 R-44 Raven II

Navy 11,200

HQ located at Santo Domingo FORCES BY ROLE SPECIAL FORCES 1 (SEAL) SF unit MANOEUVRE Amphibious 1 mne sy unit EQUIPMENT BY TYPE PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 18 PCO 1 Almirante Didiez Burgos (ex-US Balsam) PCC 2 Tortuguero (ex-US White Sumac) PB 15: 2 Altair (Swiftships 35m); 4 Bellatrix (US Sewart Seacraft); 1 Betelgeuse (Damen Stan Patrol 2606); 2 Canopus (Swiftships 110); 3 Hamal (Damen Stan Patrol 1505); 3 Point AMPHIBIOUS • LANDING CRAFT LCU 1 Neyba (ex-US LCU 1675) LOGISTICS AND SUPPORT 1 AX 1 Almirante Juan Bautista Cambiaso

Air Force 16,100 FORCES BY ROLE GROUND ATTACK 1 sqn with EMB-314 Super Tucano* SEARCH & RESCUE 1 sqn with Bell 205 (UH-1H Huey II); Bell 205 (UH-1H Iroquois); Bell 430 (VIP); OH-58 Kiowa (CH-136); S-333 TRANSPORT 1 sqn with C-212-400 Aviocar; PA-31 Navajo TRAINING 1 sqn with T-35B Pillan AIR DEFENCE 1 ADA bn with 20mm guns EQUIPMENT BY TYPE AIRCRAFT 8 combat capable ISR 1 AMT-200 Super Ximango TPT • Light 13: 3 C-212-400 Aviocar; 1 Cessna 172; 1 Cessna 182; 1 Cessna 206; 1 Cessna 207; 1 Commander 690; 3 EA-100; 1 PA-31 Navajo; 1 P2006T

TRG 12: 8 EMB-314 Super Tucano*; 4 T-35B Pillan HELICOPTERS ISR 9 OH-58 Kiowa (CH-136) TPT • Light 16: 8 Bell 205 (UH-1H Huey II); 5 Bell 205 (UH-1H Iroquois); 1 H155 (VIP); 2 S-333 AIR DEFENCE • GUNS 20mm 4

Paramilitary 15,000 National Police 15,000

Ecuador ECU 2020

2021

GDP

United States Dollar USD USD

98.8bn

104bn

per capita

5,884

2022

USD

5,643

Growth

-7.8

2.8

Inflation

-0.3

0.0

Def bdgt

USD

1.55bn

1.59bn

1.58bn

FMA (US)

USD

0.0m

5.0m

Real-terms defence budget trend (USDbn, constant 2015) 2.02 1.47 2008

Population

2015

2021

17,093,159

Age

0–14

15–19

20–24

25–29

Male

12.9%

4.4%

4.5%

4.2%

30–64 65 plus 19.5%

4.0%

Female

12.4%

4.3%

4.2%

20.7%

4.5%

Capabilities Ecuador’s armed forces are able to fulfil internal-security tasks, although the crisis in Venezuela and resulting refugee flows have added to existing security challenges in the northern border area. These security conditions led the armed forces to create a joint task force for counter-insurgency and counter-narcotics operations. Defence cooperation with Peru includes demining efforts on the border. Military ties with Washington have been revived, which has led to the re-establishment of bilateral training programmes. The armed forces train regularly and have participated in multinational military exercises. There is limited capability to deploy independently beyond national borders. The equipment inventory is derived from a variety of sources, though obsolescence and low availability is a challenge. Modernisation plans are modest in scope and are currently focused on aviation as well as maritimepatrol capabilities. Ecuador’s defence industries are centred on the army’s Office of Industries (DINE), which produces military equipment through army-run enterprises. The state-owned shipyard ASTINAVE has some construction, maintenance and repair capabilities, although the navy’s submarines are being modernised in Chile.

ACTIVE 41,250 (Army 25,650 Navy 9,400 Air 6,200) Paramilitary 500 Conscript liability Voluntary conscription

RESERVE 118,000 (Joint 118,000) Ages 18–55

Latin America and the Caribbean 413

Army 25,650 FORCES BY ROLE gp are bn sized COMMAND 4 div HQ SPECIAL FORCES 1 (9th) SF bde (3 SF gp, 1 SF sqn, 1 para bn, 1 sigs sqn, 1 log comd) MANOEUVRE Mechanised 1 (11th) armd cav bde (3 armd cav gp, 1 mech inf bn, 1 SP arty gp, 1 engr gp) 1 (5th) inf bde (1 SF sqn, 2 mech cav gp, 2 inf bn, 1 cbt engr coy, 1 sigs coy, 1 log coy) Light 1 (1st) inf bde (1 SF sqn, 1 armd cav gp, 1 armd recce sqn, 3 inf bn, 1 med coy) 1 (3rd) inf bde (1 SF gp, 1 mech cav gp, 1 inf bn, 1 arty gp, 1 hvy mor coy, 1 cbt engr coy, 1 sigs coy, 1 log coy) 1 (7th) inf bde (1 SF sqn, 1 armd recce sqn, 1 mech cav gp, 3 inf bn, 1 jungle bn, 1 arty gp, 1 cbt engr coy, 1 sigs coy, 1 log coy, 1 med coy) 1 (13th) inf bde (1 SF sqn, 1 armd recce sqn, 1 mot cav gp, 3 inf bn, 1 arty gp, 1 hvy mor coy, 1 cbt engr coy, 1sigs coy, 1 log coy) 2 (17th & 21st) jungle bde (3 jungle bn, 1 cbt engr coy, 1 sigs coy, 1 log coy) 1 (19th) jungle bde (3 jungle bn, 1 jungle trg bn, 1 cbt engr coy, 1 sigs coy, 1 log coy) COMBAT SUPPORT 1 (27th) arty bde (1 SP arty gp, 1 MRL gp, 1 ADA gp, 1 cbt engr coy, 1 sigs coy, 1 log coy) 1 (23rd) engr bde (3 engr bn) 2 indep MP coy 1 indep sigs coy COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT 1 (25th) log bde (1 log bn, 1 tpt bn, 1 maint bn, 1 med bn) 9 indep med coy AVIATION 1 (15th) avn bde (2 tpt avn gp, 2 hel gp, 1 mixed avn gp) AIR DEFENCE 1 ADA gp EQUIPMENT BY TYPE ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES LT TK 25 AMX-13 RECCE 42: 10 EE-3 Jararaca; 32 EE-9 Cascavel APC 151 APC (T) 102: 82 AMX-VCI; 20 M113 APC (W) 49: 17 EE-11 Urutu; 32 UR-416 ARTILLERY 486 SP 155mm 5 Mk F3 TOWED 106: 105mm 84: 36 M101; 24 M2A2; 24 Model 56 pack howitzer; 155mm 22: 12 M114; 10 M198 MRL 122mm 18 BM-21 Grad MOR 81mm 357 M29

AIRCRAFT TPT • Light 11: 1 Beech 200 King Air; 2 C-212; 1 CN235; 2 Cessna 172; 2 Cessna 206; 1 Cessna 500 Citation I; 1 IAI201 Arava; 1 M-28 Skytruck TRG 4: 2 MX-7-235 Star Rocket; 2 T-41D Mescalero HELICOPTERS MRH 33: 7 H125M (AS550C3) Fennec; 6 Mi-17-1V Hip; 2 SA315B Lama; 18 SA342L Gazelle (13 with HOT for antiarmour role) TPT 13: Medium 9: 5 AS332B Super Puma; 2 Mi-171E; 2 SA330 Puma; Light 4: 2 H125 (AS350B2) Ecureuil; 2 H125 (AS350B3) Ecureuil AIR DEFENCE SAM • Point-defence Blowpipe; 9K32 Strela-2 (RS-SA-7 Grail)‡; 9K38 Igla (RS-SA-18 Grouse) GUNS 240 SP 20mm 44 M163 Vulcan TOWED 196: 14.5mm 128 ZPU-1/-2; 20mm 38: 28 M-1935, 10 M167 Vulcan; 40mm 30 L/70/M1A1 AIR-LAUNCHED MISSILES • ASM HOT

Navy 9,400 (incl Naval Aviation, Marines and Coast Guard) EQUIPMENT BY TYPE SUBMARINES 2 SSK 2 Shyri (GER T-209/1300) with 8 single 533mm TT each with A184 mod 3 HWT PRINCIPAL SURFACE COMBATANTS • FRIGATES 2 FFGH 2 Moran Valverde (ex-UK Leander batch II) with 1 quad lnchr with MM40 Exocet AShM, 2 triple 324mm ILAS-3 (B-515) ASTT with A244 LWT, 1 Mk 15 Phalanx CIWS, 1 twin 114mm gun (capacity 1 Bell 230 hel) PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 11 CORVETTES • FSGM 6 5 Esmeraldas (ITA Tipo 550) with 2 triple lnchr with MM40 Exocet AShM, 1 quad Albatros lnchr with Aspide SAM, 2 triple 324mm ILAS-3 (B-515) ASTT with A244 LWT, 1 76mm gun, 1 hel landing platform 1 Esmeraldas (ITA Tipo 550) with 2 triple lnchr with MM40 Exocet AShM, 1 quad Albatros lnchr with Aspide SAM, 1 76mm gun, 1 hel landing platform PCFG 3 Quito (GER Lurssen TNC-45 45m) with 4 single lnchr with MM38 Exocet AShM, 1 76mm gun (upgrade programme ongoing) PCC 2 Hae Uri (ex-ROK) LOGISTICS AND SUPPORT 8 AE 1 Calicuchima AG 1 Hualcopo (ex-PRC Fu Yuan Yu Leng 999) (utilised in transport ship role) AGOS 1 Orion with 1 hel landing platform AGS 1 Sirius AKL 1 Isla Bartolome (operated by TRANSNAVE) ATF 1 Chimborazo AWT 1 Atahualpa AXS 1 Guayas

Naval Aviation 380 EQUIPMENT BY TYPE AIRCRAFT MP 1 CN235-300M

Latin America and the Caribbean

ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE

414 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2022 ISR 3: 2 Beech 200T King Air; 1 Beech 300 Catpass King Air TPT • Light 3: 1 Beech 200 King Air; 1 Beech 300 King Air; 1 CN235-100 TRG 3 T-35B Pillan HELICOPTERS TPT • Light 9: 3 Bell 206A; 3 Bell 206B; 1 Bell 230; 2 Bell 430 UNINHABITED AERIAL VEHICLES ISR 4: Heavy 2 Heron; Medium 2 Searcher Mk.II

Marines 1,950 FORCES BY ROLE SPECIAL FORCES 1 cdo bn MANOEUVRE Amphibious 5 mne bn EQUIPMENT BY TYPE ARTILLERY • MOR 32+ 81mm/120mm AIR DEFENCE • SAM • Point-defence 9K38 Igla (RSSA-18 Grouse)

Air Force 6,200 Operational Command FORCES BY ROLE FIGHTER 1 sqn with Cheetah C/D GROUND ATTACK 1 sqn with EMB-314 Super Tucano*

Military Air Transport Group FORCES BY ROLE ISR 1 sqn with Beech 350i King Air; Gulfstream G-1159; Sabreliner 40 SEARCH & RESCUE/TRANSPORT HELICOPTER 1 sqn with AW119 Koala; Bell 206B Jet Ranger II; H145 1 sqn with Cessna 206; PA-34 Seneca TRANSPORT 1 sqn with C295M 1 sqn with DHC-6-300 Twin Otter 1 sqn with B-727; B-737-200; EMB-135BJ Legacy 600; L-100-30 TRAINING 1 sqn with DA20-C1 1 sqn with G-120TP EQUIPMENT BY TYPE AIRCRAFT 17 combat capable TPT 20: Medium 1 L-100-30; (2 C-130B Hercules; 1 C-130H Hercules in store); Light 12: 1 Beech E90 King Air; 1 Beech 350i King Air; 3 C295M; 1 Cessna 206; 3 DHC6 Twin Otter; 1 EMB-135BJ Legacy 600; 1 PA-34 Seneca; 1 Sabreliner 40; PAX 7: 2 A320 (operated by TAME); 2 B-727; 1 B-737-200; 1 Falcon 7X; 1 Gulfstream G-1159 TRG 36: 11 DA20-C1; 17 EMB-314 Super Tucano*; 8 G-120TP HELICOPTERS • TPT • Light 13: 4 AW119 Koala; 6 Bell 206B Jet Ranger II; 3 H145

AIR-LAUNCHED MISSILES • AAM • IR Python 3; R-550 Magic; IIR Python 4 AIR DEFENCE SAM • Point-defence 10+: 10 9K33 Osa (RS-SA-8 Gecko); 9K310 Igla-1 (RS-SA-16 Gimlet) GUNS • TOWED 52: 23mm 34 ZU-23; 35mm 18 GDF002 (twin)

Paramilitary 500 Coast Guard 500 EQUIPMENT BY TYPE PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 19 PCC 5: 3 Isla Fernandina (Vigilante); 2 Isla San Cristóbal (Damen Stan Patrol 5009) PB 13: 2 Espada; 2 Manta (GER Lurssen 36m); 1 Point; 4 Rio Coca; 4 Isla Santa Cruz (Damen Stan 2606) PBR 1 Rio Puyango

DEPLOYMENT SOUTH SUDAN: UN • UNMISS 3 SUDAN: UN • UNISFA 3 WESTERN SAHARA: UN • MINURSO 2

El Salvador SLV United States Dollar USD

2020

2021

GDP

USD

24.6bn

27.7bn

per capita

4,244

USD

3,799

Growth

-7.9

9.0

Inflation

-0.4

3.6

Def bdgt

USD

172m

248m

2022

Real-terms defence budget trend (USDm, constant 2015) 232 132 2008

Population

2015

2021

6,528,135

Age

0–14

15–19

20–24

25–29

Male

13.1%

4.3%

4.9%

4.7%

30–64 65 plus 17.5%

3.4%

Female

12.5%

4.1%

4.8%

21.4%

4.4%

Capabilities The primary challenge for El Salvador’s armed forces is tackling organised crime and narcotics trafficking in support of the National Civil Police. A new Territorial Control Plan implemented in 2019 has seen mixed military and police patrols deployed to areas with high crime rates. El Salvador participates in a tri-national border task force with Guatemala and Honduras. The armed forces have long-standing training programmes, including with regional states and with the US, focused on internal security, disaster relief and support to civilian authorities. El Salvador has deployed on UN peacekeeping missions up to company strength but lacks the logistical support to sustain independent international deployments. The armed forces have received little new heavy military equipment in recent years and are dependent on an inventory of Cold War-era platforms; the majority of these are operational,

Latin America and the Caribbean 415

ACTIVE 24,500 (Army 20,500 Navy 2,000 Air 2,000) Paramilitary 17,000

Conscript liability 12 months (selective); 11 months for officers and NCOs

RESERVE 9,900 (Joint 9,900)

ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE Army 20,500 FORCES BY ROLE SPECIAL FORCES 1 spec ops gp (1 SF coy, 1 para bn, 1 (naval inf) coy) MANOEUVRE Reconnaissance 1 armd cav regt (2 armd cav bn) Light 6 inf bde (3 inf bn) Other 1 (special) sy bde (2 border gd bn, 2 MP bn) COMBAT SUPPORT 1 arty bde (2 fd arty bn, 1 AD bn) 1 engr comd (2 engr bn) EQUIPMENT BY TYPE ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES RECCE 5 AML-90 (4 more in store) APC • APC (W) 38: 30 VAL Cashuat (mod); 8 UR-416 ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE RCL 399: 106mm 20 M40A1 (incl 16 SP); 90mm 379 M67 ARTILLERY 229+ TOWED 66: 105mm 54: 36 M102; 18 M-56 (FRY); 155mm 12 M198 MOR 163+: 81mm 151 M29; 120mm 12+: 12 UBM 52; (some M-74 in store) AIR DEFENCE • GUNS 35: 20mm 31 M-55; 4 TCM-20

Navy 2,000 EQUIPMENT BY TYPE PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 10 PB 10: 3 Camcraft (30m); 1 Defiant 85; 1 Point; 1 Swiftships 77; 1 Swiftships 65; 4 Type-44 (ex-US) AMPHIBIOUS • LANDING CRAFT • LCM 4 LCM 8 (of which 3†)

Naval Inf (SF Commandos) 90 FORCES BY ROLE SPECIAL FORCES 1 SF coy

Air Force 2,000 FORCES BY ROLE FIGHTER/GROUND ATTACK/ISR 1 sqn with A-37B/OA-37B Dragonfly; O-2A/B Skymaster* TRANSPORT 1 sqn with BT-67; Cessna 210 Centurion; Cessna 337G; Commander 114; IAI-202 Arava; SA-226T Merlin IIIB

TRAINING 1 sqn with R-235GT Guerrier; T-35 Pillan; T-41D Mescalero; TH-300 TRANSPORT HELICOPTER 1 sqn with Bell 205 (UH-1H Iroquois); Bell 407; Bell 412EP Twin Huey; MD-500E; MD-530F; UH-1M Iroquois EQUIPMENT BY TYPE AIRCRAFT 25 combat capable ATK 14 A-37B Dragonfly ISR 11: 6 O-2A/B Skymaster*; 5 OA-37B Dragonfly* TPT • Light 10: 2 BT-67; 2 Cessna 210 Centurion; 1 Cessna 337G Skymaster; 1 Commander 114; 3 IAI-201 Arava; 1 SA-226T Merlin IIIB TRG 9: 5 R-235GT Guerrier; 3 T-35 Pillan; 1 T-41D Mescalero HELICOPTERS MRH 18: 4 Bell 412EP Twin Huey; 8 MD-500E; 4+ MD530F; 2 UH-1M Iroquois TPT• Light 9: 8 Bell 205 (UH-1H Iroquois); 1 Bell 407 (VIP tpt, govt owned) TRG 5 TH-300 AIR-LAUNCHED MISSILES • AAM • IR Shafrir‡

Gendarmerie & Paramilitary 17,000 National Civilian Police 17,000

Ministry of Public Security AIRCRAFT ISR 1 O-2A Skymaster TPT • Light 1 Cessna 310 HELICOPTERS MRH 2 MD-520N TPT • Light 3: 1 Bell 205 (UH-1H Iroquois); 2 R-44 Raven II

DEPLOYMENT LEBANON: UN • UNIFIL 54; 1 inf pl MALI: UN • MINUSMA 176; 1 hel sqn with 3 MD-500E SOUTH SUDAN: UN • UNMISS 2 WESTERN SAHARA: UN • MINURSO 1

FOREIGN FORCES United States US Southern Command: 1 Forward Operating Location (Military, DEA, USCG and Customs personnel)

Latin America and the Caribbean

indicating adequate support and maintenance. El Salvador lacks a substantive defence industry but has successfully produced light armoured vehicles based upon commercial vehicles.

416 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2022

Guatemala GUA Guatemalan Quetzal GTQ GDP per capita

2020

2021

GTQ

599bn

651bn

USD

77.6bn

83.3bn

USD

4,317

4,542

Growth

-1.5

5.5

Inflation

3.2

4.8

Def bdgt

GTQ

2.83bn

2.63bn

USD

366m

337m

7.72

7.81

USD1=GTQ

2022

3.16bn

Real-terms defence budget trend (USDm, constant 2015) 328 206 2008

Population

2015

2021

17,422,821

Age

0–14

15 –19

20–24

25–29

30–64 65 plus

Male

16.8%

5.0%

4.8%

4.5%

16.3%

2.2%

Female

16.2%

4.9%

4.8%

4.5%

17.3%

2.7%

Capabilities The armed forces are refocusing on border security, having drawn down their decade-long direct support for the National Civil Police in 2018 as part of the inter-agency Plan Fortaleza. Guatemala maintains an inter-agency task force with neighbouring El Salvador and Honduras. The army has trained with US SOUTHCOM, as well as with regional partners such as Brazil and Colombia. Training for conventional military operations is limited by budget constraints and the long focus on providing internal security. Guatemala has participated in UN peacekeeping missions to company level. The equipment inventory is small and ageing. The US has provided several soft-skinned vehicles to the army, while there has been modest recapitalisation of the air force’s fixed-wing transport and surveillance capacity. Funding is being sought for additional maritime- and air-patrol capabilities. Aside from limited maintenance facilities, the country has no domestic defence industry.

ACTIVE 18,050 (Army 15,550 Navy 1,500 Air 1,000) Gendarmerie & Paramilitary 25,000

RESERVE 63,850 (Navy 650 Air 900 Armed Forces

MANOEUVRE Light 1 (strategic reserve) mech bde (1 inf bn, 1 cav regt, 1 log coy) 6 inf bde (1 inf bn) Air Manoeuvre 1 AB bde with (2 AB bn) Amphibious 1 mne bde Other 1 (Presidential) gd bde (1 gd bn, 1 MP bn, 1 CSS coy) COMBAT SUPPORT 1 engr comd (1 engr bn, 1 construction bn) 2 MP bde with (1 MP bn)

Reserves FORCES BY ROLE MANOEUVRE Light ε19 inf bn EQUIPMENT BY TYPE ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES RECCE (7 M8 in store) APC 47 APC (T) 10 M113 (5 more in store) APC (W) 37: 30 Armadillo; 7 V-100 Commando ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE RCL 120+: 75mm M20; 105mm 64 M-1974 FMK-1 (ARG); 106mm 56 M40A1 ARTILLERY 149 TOWED 105mm 76: 12 M101; 8 M102; 56 M-56 MOR 73: 81mm 55 M1; 107mm (12 M30 in store); 120mm 18 ECIA AIR DEFENCE • GUNS • TOWED 32: 20mm 32: 16 GAI-D01; 16 M-55

Navy 1,500 EQUIPMENT BY TYPE PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 10 PB 10: 6 Cutlass; 1 Dauntless; 1 Kukulkan (US Broadsword 32m); 2 Utatlan (US Sewart) AMPHIBIOUS • LANDING CRAFT 3 LCT 1 Quetzal (COL Golfo de Tribuga) LCP 2 Machete LOGISTICS AND SUPPORT • AXS 3

62,300)

Marines 650 reservists

(National Armed Forces are combined; the army provides log spt for navy and air force)

FORCES BY ROLE MANOEUVRE Amphibious 2 mne bn(-)

ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE Army 15,550 15 Military Zones FORCES BY ROLE SPECIAL FORCES 1 SF bde (1 SF bn, 1 trg bn) 1 SF bde (1 SF coy, 1 ranger bn) 1 SF mtn bde

Air Force 1,000 2 air comd FORCES BY ROLE TRANSPORT 1 sqn with Beech 90/200/300 King Air 1 (tactical support) sqn with Cessna 206 TRAINING 1 sqn with T-35B Pillan

Latin America and the Caribbean 417

Tactical Security Group

Air Military Police

Gendarmerie & Paramilitary 25,000

Guyana GUY Guyanese Dollar GYD

2020

2021

GYD

1.14tr

1.53tr

USD

5.47bn

7.40bn

USD

6,953

9,369

Growth

43.5

20.4

Inflation

0.7

3.2

Def bdgt

GYD

13.7bn

14.8bn

GDP per capita

USD USD1=GYD

65.8m

71.4m

208.51

207.22

2022

Real-terms defence budget trend (USDm, constant 2015) 88

2008

2015

Population

2021

787,971

Age

0–14

15–19

20–24

25–29

National Civil Police 25,000

Male

12.3%

5.6%

5.8%

3.8%

20.3%

3.2%

FORCES BY ROLE SPECIAL FORCES 1 SF bn MANOEUVRE Other 1 (integrated task force) paramilitary unit (incl mil and treasury police)

Female

11.8%

5.4%

3.5%

18.8%

4.1%

DEPLOYMENT CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC: UN • MINUSCA 4 DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO: UN • MONUSCO 155; 1 spec ops coy LEBANON: UN • UNIFIL 2 MALI: UN • MINUSMA 2 SOUTH SUDAN: UN • UNMISS 7 SUDAN: UN • UNISFA 3

30–64 65 plus

Capabilities The Guyana Defence Force (GDF) is focused on border control, support for law-enforcement operations and assistance to the civil power. The government is planning to restructure the GDF to improve its flexibility. Guyana is part of the Caribbean Basin Security Initiative. It has close military ties with Brazil, with whom it cooperates on border security via annual regional military exchange meetings. The country also has bilateral agreements with China, France and the US. The GDF trains regularly and takes part in bilateral and multinational exercises. A training initiative with China helped two Guyanese pilots to acquire air-combat certification although Guyana has no combat aircraft in its inventory. There is no expeditionary or associated logistics capability. Equipment is mostly composed of second-hand platforms, mainly of Brazilian and North American manufacture. The air force has expanded its modest air-transport capabilities with some secondhand utility aircraft. Apart from maintenance facilities, there is no defence-industrial sector.

ACTIVE 3,400 (Army 3,000 Navy 200 Air 200) Active numbers combined Guyana Defence Force

RESERVE 670 (Army 500 Navy 170)

ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE Army 3,000 FORCES BY ROLE SPECIAL FORCES 1 SF sqn MANOEUVRE Light 3 inf bn COMBAT SUPPORT 1 arty coy 1 (spt wpn) cbt spt coy 1 engr bn

Latin America and the Caribbean

TRANSPORT HELICOPTER 1 sqn with Bell 212 (armed); Bell 407GX; Bell 412 Twin Huey (armed) EQUIPMENT BY TYPE Serviceability of ac is less than 50% AIRCRAFT TPT • Light 16: 1 Beech 90 King Air; 2 Beech 200 King Air; 2 Beech 300 King Air (VIP); 2 Cessna 206; 3 Cessna 208B Grand Caravan; 1 DHC-6 Twin Otter; 2 PA-28 Archer III; 1 PA-31 Navajo; 2 PA-34 Seneca; (5 Cessna R172K Hawk XP in store) TRG 1 SR22; (4 T-35B Pillan in store) HELICOPTERS MRH 2 Bell 412 Twin Huey (armed) TPT • Light 6: 2 Bell 206B Jet Ranger; 2 Bell 212 (armed); 2 Bell 407GX

418 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2022

Capabilities

COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT 1 spt bn

Reserve FORCES BY ROLE MANOEUVRE Amphibious 1 inf bn EQUIPMENT BY TYPE ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES RECCE 9: 6 EE-9 Cascavel (reported); 3 S52 Shorland ARTILLERY 54 TOWED 130mm 6 M-46† MOR 48: 81mm 12 L16A1; 82mm 18 M-43; 120mm 18 M-43

Navy 200 EQUIPMENT BY TYPE PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 5 PCO 1 Essequibo (ex-UK River (MCM))† PB 4 Barracuda (ex-US Type-44) (of which 1 under repair)

Air Force 200

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE AIRCRAFT • TPT • Light 6: 2 BN-2 Islander; 1 Cessna 206; 2 SC.7 3M Skyvan; 1 Y-12 (II) HELICOPTERS MRH 2: 1 Bell 412 Twin Huey†; 1 Bell 412EPI Twin Huey TPT • Light 2 Bell 206

Haiti HTI Haitian Gourde HTG

per capita

2020

2021

HTG

1.45tr

1.67tr

USD

14.5bn

20.1bn

USD

1,235

1,692

Growth

-3.3

-0.7

Inflation

22.9

16.2

HTG

998m

2.99bn

USD

10.0m

36.0m

99.94

83.03

Def bdgt [a] USD1=HTG

ACTIVE 500 (Army 500) Gendarmerie & Paramilitary 50

ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE Army 500

FORCES BY ROLE TRANSPORT 1 unit with Bell 206; Cessna 206; Y-12 (II)

GDP

Haiti possesses almost no military capability. A small coastguard is tasked with maritime security and law enforcement and the country’s army is still in the very early stages of development, though it is hoped this will eventually number around 5,000 personnel. Plans for military expansion were outlined in the 2015 White Paper on Security and Defence. A road map for the re-establishment of the Haitian armed forces was distributed to ministers in early 2017 and in March 2018 an army high command was established. Ecuador and Brazil have both pledged to assist with training the new army. The army’s initial mandate will be to provide disaster relief and border security. However, in the wake of a presidential assassination, the armed forces’ ability to defend the country has been brought into question. The armed forces also struggled to respond swiftly to the country’s most recent earthquake, where their ability to deliver aid and shelter was tested. Haiti is a member of the Caribbean Community and has participated in US SOUTHCOM’s Tradewinds disaster-response exercise. There is no heavy military equipment, and no defence industry.

2022

FORCES BY ROLE MANOEUVRE 1 inf bn (forming)

Gendarmerie & Paramilitary 50 Coast Guard ε50 EQUIPMENT BY TYPE PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS PB 8: 5 Dauntless; 3 3812-VCF

Honduras HND Honduran Lempira HNL GDP per capita

2020

2021

HNL

586bn

642bn

USD

23.8bn

26.3bn 2,602

USD

2,397

Growth

-9.0

4.9

Inflation

3.5

4.6

HNL

8.48bn

8.46bn

USD

345m

347m

24.58

24.41

Def bdgt [a]

2022

9.34bn

[a] 2021 increase in defence budget due to greater investment in infrastructure and new COVID-19 responsibilities of the Haitian Armed Forces

[a] Defence and national security budget

Real-terms defence budget trend (USDm, constant 2015)

USD1=HNL

338

27 n.k.

n.k. n.k. n.k. n.k.

2008

Population

2015

2021

120

0 2008

Population

11,198,240

2015

2021

9,346,277

Age

0–14

15–19

20–24

25–29

30–64 65 plus

Age

0–14

15–19

20–24

25–29

Male

15.3%

5.1%

4.7%

17.2%

1.9%

Male

14.9%

5.4%

5.1%

4.3%

16.5%

2.5%

Female

15.4%

5.2%

5.1%

4.7%

17.8%

2.5%

Female

14.5%

5.4%

5.1%

4.6%

18.7%

3.1%

30–64 65 plus

Latin America and the Caribbean 419

The armed forces have been deployed in support of the police to combat organised crime and narcotics trafficking since 2011. Honduras maintains diplomatic relations with Taiwan, which has supplied surplus military equipment, and also receives US security assistance. Honduras hosts a US base at Soto Cano airfield and is also part of a tri-national border-security task force with neighbouring El Salvador and Guatemala. Training remains focused on internal- and border-security requirements, and training for conventional military action is limited. Honduras does not have the capability to maintain substantial overseas deployments. Most equipment is ageing, with serviceability in doubt. There have been reports of security assistance from Israel. Apart from limited maintenance facilities, the country has no domestic defence industry.

ACTIVE 14,950 (Army 7,300 Navy 1,350 Air 2,300 Military Police 4,000) Gendarmerie & Paramilitary 8,000

RESERVE 60,000 (Joint 60,000; Ex-servicemen

registered)

ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE Army 7,300 FORCES BY ROLE SPECIAL FORCES 1 (special tac) spec ops gp (2 spec ops bn, 1 inf bn; 1 AB bn; 1 arty bn) MANOUEVRE Mechanised 1 inf bde (1 mech cav regt, 1 inf bn, 1 arty bn) Light 1 inf bde (3 inf bn, 1 arty bn) 3 inf bde (2 inf bn) 1 indep inf bn Other 1 (Presidential) gd coy COMBAT SUPPORT 1 engr bn 1 sigs bn EQUIPMENT BY TYPE ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES LT TK 12 FV101 Scorpion RECCE 57: 1 FV105 Sultan (CP); 3 FV107 Scimitar; 40 FV601 Saladin; 13 RBY-1 ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE RCL 50+: 84mm Carl Gustaf; 106mm 50 M40A1 ARTILLERY 118+ TOWED 28: 105mm: 24 M102; 155mm: 4 M198 MOR 90+: 81mm; 120mm 60 FMK-2; 160mm 30 M-66

Navy 1,350 EQUIPMENT BY TYPE PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 15 PCO 1 General Cabañas (ISR OPV 62 Sa’ar) PB 14: 2 Lempira (Damen Stan Patrol 4207 – leased); 1 Chamelecon (Swiftships 85); 1 Tegucigalpa (US Guardian 32m); 3 Guaymuras (Swiftships 105); 5 Nacaome (Swiftships 65); 1 Río Aguán (Defiant 85); 1 Rio Coco (US PB Mk III)

AMPHIBIOUS • LANDING CRAFT 3 LCT 1 Gracias a Dios (COL Golfo de Tribugá) LCM 3: 2 LCM 8; 1 Punta Caxinas

Marines 1,000 FORCES BY ROLE MANOEUVRE Amphibious 2 mne bn

Air Force 2,300 FORCES BY ROLE FIGHTER/GROUND ATTACK 1 sqn with A-37B Dragonfly 1 sqn with F-5E/F Tiger II GROUND ATTACK/ISR/TRAINING 1 unit with Cessna 182 Skylane; EMB-312 Tucano; MXT7-180 Star Rocket TRANSPORT 1 sqn with Beech 200 King Air; C-130A Hercules; Cessna 185/210; IAI-201 Arava; PA-42 Cheyenne; Turbo Commander 690 1 VIP flt with PA-31 Navajo; Bell 412EP/SP Twin Huey TRANSPORT HELICOPTER 1 sqn with Bell 205 (UH-1H Iroquois); Bell 412SP Twin Huey AIR DEFENCE 1 ADA bn EQUIPMENT BY TYPE AIRCRAFT 17 combat capable FTR 11: 9 F-5E Tiger II†; 2 F-5F Tiger II† ATK 6 A-37B Dragonfly TPT 17: Medium 1 C-130A Hercules; Light 16: 1 Beech 200 King Air; 2 Cessna 172 Skyhawk; 2 Cessna 182 Skylane; 1 Cessna 185; 3 Cessna 208B Grand Caravan; 1 Cessna 210; 1 EMB-135 Legacy 600; 1 IAI-201 Arava; 1 L-410 (leased); 1 PA-31 Navajo; 1 PA-42 Cheyenne; 1 Turbo Commander 690 TRG 15: 9 EMB-312 Tucano; 6 MXT-7-180 Star Rocket HELICOPTERS MRH 7: 1 Bell 412EP Twin Huey (VIP); 4 Bell 412SP Twin Huey; 2 Hughes 500 TPT • Light 7: 6 Bell 205 (UH-1H Iroquois); 1 H125 Ecureuil AIR DEFENCE • GUNS 20mm 48: 24 M-55A2; 24 TCM20 AIR-LAUNCHED MISSILES • AAM • IR Shafrir‡

Military Police 4,000 FORCES BY ROLE MANOUEVRE Other 8 sy bn

Gendarmerie & Paramilitary 8,000 Public Security Forces 8,000

Ministry of Public Security and Defence; 11 regional comd

Latin America and the Caribbean

Capabilities

420 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2022

DEPLOYMENT WESTERN SAHARA: UN • MINURSO 10

FOREIGN FORCES United States US Southern Command: 400; 1 avn bn with CH-47F Chinook; UH-60 Black Hawk

Reserves

Jamaica JAM Jamaican Dollar JMD GDP per capita

2020

2021

JMD

1.98tr

2.19tr

USD

14.0bn

14.9bn

USD

5,103

5,422

Growth

-10.0

4.6

Inflation

5.2

5.6

Def bdgt

JMD

33.8bn

30.9bn

USD

238m

209m

141.66

147.63

USD1=JMD

2022

246 102 2008

2015

2021

2,816,602

Age

0–14

15–19

20–24

25–29

Male

12.6%

4.5%

3.9%

19.5%

4.5%

Female

12.2%

4.4%

4.0%

20.7%

4.9%

30–64 65 plus

Capabilities The Jamaica Defence Force (JDF) is focused principally on maritime and internal security, including support to police operations. Jamaica maintains military ties, including for training purposes, with Canada, the UK and the US and is a member of the Caribbean Community. The defence force has participated in US SOUTHCOM’s Tradewinds disaster-response exercise. Jamaica is host to the Caribbean Special Tactics Centre, which trains special-forces units from Jamaica and other Caribbean nations. The JDF does not have any capacity to support independent deployment abroad. Funds have been allocated to procure new vehicles and helicopters, and new patrol craft are being procured. Other than limited maintenance facilities, Jamaica has no domestic defence industry.

ACTIVE 5,950 (Army 5,400 Coast Guard 300 Air 250) (combined Jamaican Defence Force)

RESERVE 2,580 (Army 2,500 Coast Guard 60 Air 20)

ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE Army 5,400 FORCES BY ROLE MANOUEVRE Light 4 inf bn COMBAT SUPPORT 1 engr regt (4 engr sqn)

FORCES BY ROLE MANOEUVRE Light 3 inf bn COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT 1 spt bn

Coast Guard 300

Real-terms defence budget trend (USDm, constant 2015)

Population

1 MP bn 1 cbt spt bn (1 (PMV) lt mech inf coy) COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT 1 spt bn (1 med coy, 1 log coy, 1 tpt coy) EQUIPMENT BY TYPE ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES AUV 12 Bushmaster ARTILLERY • MOR 81mm 12 L16A1

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 10 PCC 1 Nanny of the Maroons (Damen Fast Crew Supplier 5009) PBF 3 PB 6: 2 County (Damen Stan Patrol 4207); 4 Dauntless

Air Wing 250

Plus National Reserve FORCES BY ROLE MARITIME PATROL/TRANSPORT 1 flt with Beech 350ER King Air; BN-2A Defender SEARCH & RESCUE/TRANSPORT HELICOPTER 1 flt with Bell 407 1 flt with Bell 412EP TRAINING 1 unit with Bell 206B3 Jet Ranger; Bell 505; DA40-180FP Diamond Star EQUIPMENT BY TYPE AIRCRAFT MP 1 Beech 350ER King Air TPT • Light 2 DA40-180FP Diamond Star (1 BN-2A Defender in store) HELICOPTERS MRH 1 Bell 412EP Twin Huey (1 more in store) TPT • Light 13: 1 Bell 206B3 Jet Ranger; 3 Bell 407; 3 Bell 429; 6 Bell 505

Age

0–14

15–19

20–24

25–29

Male

13.1%

4.3%

4.2%

4.1%

19.8%

3.5%

FORCES BY ROLE SPECIAL FORCES 1 (1st) SF bde (5 SF bn) 1 (2nd) SF bde (7 SF bn) 1 (3rd) SF bde (4 SF bn) MANOEUVRE Reconnaissance 3 (2nd, 3rd & 4th Armd) mech bde (2 armd recce bn, 2 lt mech bn, 1 arty bn, 1 (Canon) AT gp) 25 mot recce regt Light 1 (1st) inf corps (1 (1st Armd) mech bde (2 armd recce bn, 2 lt mech bn, 1 arty bn, 1 (Canon) AT gp), 3 (2nd, 3rd & 6th) inf bde (each: 3 inf bn, 1 arty regt, 1 (Canon) AT gp), 1 cbt engr bde (3 engr bn)) 3 (1st, 4th & 5th) indep lt inf bde (2 lt inf bn, 1 (Canon) AT gp) 92 indep inf bn 25 indep inf coy Air Manoeuvre 1 para bde with (1 (GAFE) SF gp, 3 bn, 1 (Canon) AT gp) COMBAT SUPPORT 1 indep arty regt

Female

12.5%

4.1%

4.0%

21.7%

4.4%

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE

Mexico MEX 2020

2021

GDP

Mexican Peso MXN MXN

23.1tr

25.9tr

USD

1.07tr

1.29tr

per capita

USD

8,404

9,967

Growth

-8.3

6.2

Inflation

3.4

5.4

Def bdgt [a]

MXN

115bn

136bn

USD

5.35bn

6.76bn

21.49

20.13

USD1=MXN

2022

116bn

[a] National security expenditure Real-terms defence budget trend (USDbn, constant 2015) 6.42 2.87 2008

Population

2015

2021

130,207,371 30–64 65 plus

Capabilities Mexico’s armed forces are the most capable in Central America, though they have been committed to providing internal-security support within Mexico for nearly a decade. Under the National Plan for Peace and Security 2018–24, the armed forces are now to hand over lead responsibility for tackling drug cartels and other organised crime to the National Guard gendarmerie. Mexico has a close defence relationship with the US, which has provided equipment and training to Mexican forces under the Mérida Initiative, as well as through bilateral programmes via the Pentagon. The armed forces have a moderate capability to deploy independently, but do not do so in significant numbers. There are plans to recapitalise diverse and ageing conventional combat platforms across all three services. In 2020, Mexico brought back to service some of its ageing F-5 combat aircraft. State-owned shipyards have produced patrol craft for the navy. Army factories have produced light armoured utility vehicles for domestic use. Airbus Helicopters operates a manufacturing plant in Querétaro.

ACTIVE 216,000 (Army 157,500 Navy 50,500 Air 8,000) Gendarmerie & Paramilitary 124,500 Conscript liability 12 months (partial, selection by ballot) from age 18, serving on Saturdays; voluntary for women; conscripts allocated to reserves.

RESERVE 81,500 (National Military Service)

ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE Space EQUIPMENT BY TYPE SATELLITES • COMMUNICATIONS 2 Mexsat

Army 157,500 12 regions (total: 46 army zones)

ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES RECCE 255: 19 DN-5 Toro; 127 ERC-90F1 Lynx (7 trg); 40 M8; 37 MAC-1; 32 VBL IFV 390 DNC-1 (mod AMX-VCI) APC 309 APC (T) 73: 40 HWK-11; 33 M5A1 half-track APC (W) 236: 95 BDX; 16 DN-4; 2 DN-6; 28 LAV-100 (Pantera); 26 LAV-150 ST; 25 MOWAG Roland; 44 VCR (3 amb; 5 cmd post) AUV 347: 100 DN-XI; 247 SandCat ENGINEERING & MAINTENANCE VEHICLES ARV 7: 3 M32 Recovery Sherman; 4 VCR ARV ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE MSL • SP 8 VBL with Milan RCL • 106mm 1,187+ M40A1 (incl some SP) GUNS 37mm 30 M3 ARTILLERY 1,390 TOWED 123: 105mm 123: 40 M101; 40 M-56; 16 M2A1, 14 M3; 13 NORINCO M90 MOR 1,267: 81mm 1,100: 400 M1; 400 Brandt; 300 SB 120mm 167: 75 Brandt; 60 M-65; 32 RT-61 AIR DEFENCE • GUNS • TOWED 80: 12.7mm 40 M55; 20mm 40 GAI-B01

Navy 50,500 Two Fleet Commands: Gulf (6 zones), Pacific (11 zones) EQUIPMENT BY TYPE PRINCIPAL SURFACE COMBATANTS • FRIGATES 1 FFGHM 1 Benito Juárez (Damen SIGMA 10514) with 2 quad lnchr with RGM-84L Harpoon Block II AShM, 1 8-cell Mk 56 VLS with RIM-162 ESSM SAM, 1 21-cell Mk 49 lnchr with RIM-116C RAM Block 2 SAM, 2 triple 324mm SVTT Mk 32 ASTT with Mk 54 LWT, 1 57mm gun (capacity 1 med hel)

Latin America and the Caribbean

Latin America and the Caribbean 421

422 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2022 PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 128 PSOH 8: 4 Oaxaca with 1 76mm gun (capacity 1 AS565MB Panther hel) 4 Oaxaca (mod) with 1 57mm gun (capacity 1 AS565MB Panther hel) PCOH 16: 4 Durango with 1 57mm gun (capacity 1 Bo-105 hel) 4 Holzinger (capacity 1 MD-902 Explorer) 3 Sierra with 1 57mm gun (capacity 1 MD-902 Explorer) 5 Uribe (ESP Halcon) (capacity 1 Bo-105 hel) PCO 9: 6 Valle (US Auk MSF) with 1 76mm gun; 3 Valle (US Auk MSF) with 1 76mm gun, 1 hel landing platform PCGH 1 Huracan (ex-ISR Aliya) with 4 single lnchr with Gabriel II AShM, 1 Mk 15 Phalanx CIWS PCC 2 Democrata PBF 72: 6 Acuario; 2 Acuario B; 48 Polaris (SWE CB90); 16 Polaris II (SWE IC 16M) PB 20: 3 Azteca; 3 Cabo (ex-US Cape Higgon); 2 Lago; 2 Punta (US Point); 10 Tenochtitlan (Damen Stan Patrol 4207) AMPHIBIOUS • LANDING SHIPS LST 4: 2 Monte Azules with 1 hel landing platform; 1 Papaloapan (ex-US Newport) with 2 twin 76mm guns, 1 hel landing platform; 1 Papaloapan (ex-US Newport) with 1 hel landing platform LOGISTICS AND SUPPORT 26 AGOR 2 Altair (ex-US Robert D. Conrad) AGS 8: 5 Arrecife; 1 Onjuku; 1 Río Hondo; 1 Río Tuxpan AK 1 Río Suchiate AOTL 2 Aguascalientes AP 2: 1 Isla María Madre (Damen Fast Crew Supplier 5009); 1 Nautla ATF 4 Otomi with 1 76mm gun ATS 4 Kukulkan AX 2 Huasteco (also serve as troop transport, supply and hospital ships) AXS 1 Cuauhtemoc

Naval Aviation 1,250 FORCES BY ROLE MARITIME PATROL 5 sqn with MX-7-180 Star Rocket; T-6C+ Texan II 1 sqn with Beech 350ER King Air; CN235-300 MPA Persuader TRANSPORT 1 (VIP) sqn with DHC-8 Dash 8 TRANSPORT HELICOPTER 2 sqn with AS555 Fennec; AS565MB/AS565MBe Panther; MD-902 5 sqn with Mi-17-1V/V-5 Hip TRAINING 1 sqn with Z-242L; Z-143Lsi EQUIPMENT BY TYPE AIRCRAFT 3 combat capable MP 6 CN235-300 MPA Persuader ISR 2 Z-143Lsi TPT 20: Light 18: 5 Beech 350ER King Air (4 used for ISR); 3 Beech 350i King Air; 4 C295M; 2 C295W; 1 DHC8 Dash 8; 2 Learjet 31A; 1 Learjet 60; PAX 2: 1 CL-605 Challenger; 1 Gulfstream 550 TRG 47: 7 MX-7-180 Star Rocket; 13 T-6C+ Texan II; 27 Z-242L

HELICOPTERS MRH 22: 2 AS555 Fennec; 16 Mi-17-1V Hip; 4 Mi-17V-5 Hip SAR 14: 4 AS565MB Panther; 10 AS565MBe Panther TPT 26: Heavy 3 H225M Caracal; Medium 9 UH-60M Black Hawk; Light 14: 1 AW109SP; 5 MD-902 (SAR role); 8 S-333 TRG 4 Schweizer 300C

Marines 21,500 FORCES BY ROLE SPECIAL FORCES 3 SF unit MANOEUVRE Light 32 inf bn(-) Air Manoeuvre 1 AB bn Amphibious 1 amph bde (4 inf bn, 1 amph bn, 1 arty gp) Other 1 (Presidential) gd bn (included in army above) COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT 2 spt bn EQUIPMENT BY TYPE ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES APC • APC (W) 29: 3 BTR-60 (APC-60); 26 BTR-70 (APC-70) ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE RCL 106mm M40A1 ARTILLERY 22+ TOWED 105mm 16 M-56 MRL 122mm 6 Firos-25 MOR 81mm some AIR DEFENCE • SAM • Point-defence 9K38 Igla (RSSA-18 Grouse)

Air Force 8,000 FORCES BY ROLE FIGHTER 1 sqn with F-5E/F Tiger II GROUND ATTACK/ISR 4 sqn with T-6C+ Texan II* 1 sqn with PC-7* ISR/AEW 1 sqn with Beech 350ER King Air; EMB-145AEW Erieye; EMB-145RS TRANSPORT 1 sqn with C295M; PC-6B 1 sqn with B-737; Beech 90 King Air 1 sqn with C-27J Spartan; C-130K-30 Hercules; L-100-30 5 (liaison) sqn with Cessna 182 1 (anti-narcotic spraying) sqn with Bell 206 1 (Presidential) gp with AS332L Super Puma; AW109SP; B-737; B-757; B-787; Gulfstream 150/450/550; H225; Learjet 35A; Learjet 36; Turbo Commander 680 1 (VIP) gp with B-737; Beech 200 King Air; Beech 350i King Air; Cessna 501 Citation; CL-605 Challenger; Gulfstream 550; Learjet 35A; S-70A-24 Black Hawk

Latin America and the Caribbean 423

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE AIRCRAFT 80 combat capable FTR 5: 4 F-5E Tiger II; 1 F-5F Tiger II ISR 2 Cessna 501 Citation ELINT 8: 6 Beech 350ER King Air; 2 EMB-145RS AEW&C 1 EMB-145AEW Erieye TPT 99: Medium 7: 4 C-27J Spartan; 2 C-130K-30 Hercules; 1 L-100-30; Light 79: 2 Beech 90 King Air; 1 Beech 200 King Air; 1 Beech 350i King Air; 6 C295M; 2 C295W; 59 Cessna 182; 1 Cessna 501 Citation; 2 Learjet 35A; 1 Learjet 36; 3 PC-6B; 1 Turbo Commander 680; PAX 13: 6 B-737; 1 B-757; 1 B-787; 1 CL-605 Challenger; 2 Gulfstream 150; 1 Gulfstream 450; 1 Gulfstream 550 TRG 100: 25 Grob G120TP; 20 PC-7* (30 more possibly in store); 55 T-6C+ Texan II* HELICOPTERS MRH 41: 14 Bell 407GXP; 11 Bell 412EP Twin Huey; 16 Mi-17 Hip H ISR 11: 3 MD-530MF; 8 MD-530MG TPT 109: Heavy 12 H225M Caracal; Medium 28: 3 AS332L Super Puma (VIP); 2 H225 (VIP); 6 S-70A-24 Black Hawk; 17 UH-60M Black Hawk Light 69: 5 AW109SP; 45 Bell 206; 13 Bell 206B Jet Ranger II; 6 Bell 206L UNINHABITED AERIAL VEHICLES • ISR 9: Medium 4: 3 Hermes 450; 1 Hermes 900; Light 5 S4 Ehécatl

Gendarmerie & Paramilitary 124,500 Federal Ministerial Police 4,500 EQUIPMENT BY TYPE HELICOPTERS TPT • Light 25: 18 Bell 205 (UH-1H); 7 Bell 212 UNINHABITED AERIAL VEHICLES ISR • Heavy 2 Dominator XP

National Guard 102,600 Public Security Secretariat. Gendarmerie created in 2019 from elements of the Army, Navy, Air Force and Federal Police FORCES BY ROLE MANOEUVRE Other 12 sy bde (3 sy bn) EQUIPMENT BY TYPE HELICOPTERS MRH 5: 1+ Bell 407GX; 4 Mi-17 Hip H TPT • Medium 7 UH-60M Black Hawk

Rural Defense Militia 17,400 FORCES BY ROLE MANOEUVRE Light 13 inf unit 13 (horsed) cav unit

DEPLOYMENT CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC: UN • MINUSCA 2 INDIA/PAKISTAN: UN • UNMOGIP 1 MALI: UN • MINUSMA 4 WESTERN SAHARA: UN • MINURSO 6

Nicaragua NIC Nicaraguan Cordoba Oro NIO GDP NIO

2020

2021

433bn

474bn

USD

12.6bn

13.4bn

USD

1,943

2,047

Growth

-2.0

5.0

Inflation

3.7

4.1

NIO

2.71bn

2.74bn

USD

78.9m

77.4m

34.35

35.38

per capita

Def bdgt USD1=NIO

2022

Real-terms defence budget trend (USDm, constant 2015) 90 43 2008

Population

2015

2021

6,243,931

Age

0–14

15–19

20–24

25–29

Male

12.8%

4.7%

4.9%

5.1%

30–64 65 plus 18.6%

2.7%

Female

12.2%

4.6%

4.8%

5.2%

21.0%

3.4%

Capabilities Nicaragua’s armed forces are primarily a territorial light-infantry force, with limited coastal-patrol capability. They are tasked with border and internal security, as well as with support for disasterrelief efforts and ecological protection. Nicaragua has training relationships with Russia and the US, as well as with neighbouring and regional states, including Cuba and Venezuela. Training is largely focused on key internal- and border-security tasks, although the mechanised brigade has received Russian training. The armed forces do not undertake significant international deployments and lack the logistical support for large-scale military operations, although the mechanised brigade can deploy internally. Equipment primarily consists of ageing Cold War-era platforms. Russia has supplied some second-hand tanks and armoured vehicles to help re-equip the mechanised brigade and has supported the establishment of a repair workshop to maintain the vehicles incountry. There are maintenance facilities but no domestic defence industry.

ACTIVE 12,000 (Army 10,000 Navy 800 Air 1,200)

Latin America and the Caribbean

TRAINING 1 sqn with Cessna 182 1 sqn with PC-7; T-6C+ Texan II 1 sqn with Grob G120TP TRANSPORT HELICOPTER 4 sqn with Bell 206B; Bell 407GX 1 (anti-narcotic spraying) sqn with Bell 206 1 sqn with MD-530MF/MG 1 sqn with Mi-17 Hip 1 sqn with H225M Caracal; Bell 412EP Twin Huey; S-70A-24 Black Hawk 1 sqn with UH-60M Black Hawk ISR UAV 1 unit with Hermes 450; Hermes 900; S4 Ehécatl

424 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2022

ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE Army ε10,000 FORCES BY ROLE SPECIAL FORCES 1 SF bde (2 SF bn) MANOEUVRE Mechanised 1 mech inf bde (1 armd recce bn, 1 tk bn, 1 mech inf bn, 1 arty bn, 1 MRL bn, 1 AT coy) Light 1 regional comd (3 lt inf bn) 1 regional comd (2 lt inf bn; 1 arty bn) 3 regional comd (2 lt inf bn) 2 indep lt inf bn Other 1 comd regt (1 inf bn, 1 sy bn, 1 int unit, 1 sigs bn) 1 (ecological) sy bn COMBAT SUPPORT 1 engr bn COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT 1 med bn 1 tpt regt EQUIPMENT BY TYPE ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES MBT 82: 62 T-55 (65 more in store); 20 T-72B1MS LT TK (10 PT-76 in store) RECCE 20 BRDM-2 IFV 17+ BMP-1 APC • APC (W) 90+: 41 BTR-152 (61 more in store); 45 BTR-60 (15 more in store); 4+ BTR-70M ENGINEERING & MAINTENANCE VEHICLES AEV IMR VLB TMM-3 ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE MSL SP 12 9P133 Malyutka (RS-AT-3 Sagger) MANPATS 9K11 Malyutka (RS-AT-3 Sagger) RCL 82mm B-10 GUNS 281: 57mm 174 ZIS-2; (90 more in store); 76mm 83 ZIS-3; 100mm 24 M-1944 ARTILLERY 766 TOWED 12: 122mm 12 D-30; (152mm 30 D-20 in store) MRL 151: 107mm 33 Type-63: 122mm 118: 18 BM-21 Grad; 100 Grad 1P (BM-21P) (single-tube rocket launcher, man portable) MOR 603: 82mm 579; 120mm 24 M-43; (160mm 4 M-160 in store) AIR DEFENCE • SAM • Point-defence 9K36 Strela-3 (RS-SA-14 Gremlin); 9K310 Igla-1 (RS-SA-16 Gimlet); 9K32 Strela-2 (RS-SA-7 Grail)‡

Navy ε800 EQUIPMENT BY TYPE PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS PB 12: 3 Dabur; 2 Farallones; 1 Río Segovia (Zhuk 1400ME); 4 Rodman 101; 2 Soberanía (ex-JAM Damen Stan Patrol 4207)

Marines FORCES BY ROLE MANOEUVRE Amphibious 1 mne bn

Air Force 1,200 FORCES BY ROLE TRANSPORT 1 sqn with An-26 Curl; Beech 90 King Air; Cessna U206; Cessna 404 Titan (VIP) TRAINING 1 unit with Cessna 172; PA-18 Super Cub; PA-28 Cherokee TRANSPORT HELICOPTER 1 sqn with Mi-17 Hip H (armed) AIR DEFENCE 1 gp with ZU-23 EQUIPMENT BY TYPE AIRCRAFT TPT • Light 9: 3 An-26 Curl; 1 Beech 90 King Air; 1 Cessna 172; 1 Cessna U206; 1 Cessna 404 Titan (VIP); 2 PA-28 Cherokee TRG 2 PA-18 Super Cub HELICOPTERS MRH 7 Mi-17 Hip H (armed)† TPT • Medium 3: 2 Mi-171E; 1 Mi-8MTV-1 Hip AIR DEFENCE • GUNS 23mm 18 ZU-23 AIR-LAUNCHED MISSILES • ASM 9M17 Skorpion (RSAT-2 Swatter)

Panama PAN Panamanian Balboa PAB

2020

2021

PAB

52.9bn

60.1bn

USD

52.9bn

60.1bn

USD

12,373

13,861

Growth

-17.9

12.0

Inflation

-1.6

1.4

PAB

753m

830m

USD

753m

830m

1.00

GDP per capita

Def bdgt [a] USD1=PAB

2022

[a] Public security expenditure Real-terms defence budget trend (USDm, constant 2015) 812 314 2008

Population

2015

2021

3,928,646

Age

0–14

15–19

20–24

25–29

Male

12.7%

4.2%

3.9%

30–64 65 plus 20.9%

4.3%

Female

12.2%

4.0%

4.1%

3.8%

20.6%

5.0%

Capabilities Panama abolished its armed forces in 1990, but retains a border service, a police force and an air/maritime service for low-level security tasks. The primary security focus is on the southern border

Latin America and the Caribbean 425 TRG (2 T-35D Pillan in store) HELICOPTERS MRH 10: 8 AW139; 1 Bell 412EP; 1 MD-500E TPT • Light 5: 1 AW109; 2 Bell 212; 2 Bell 407

Paraguay PRY Paraguayan Guarani PYG

2020

2021

Gendarmerie & Paramilitary 27,700

GDP

PYG

242tr

255tr

ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE

USD

35.7bn

37.0bn

per capita

USD

4,918

5,028

Growth

-0.6

4.5

Inflation

1.8

3.5

Def bdgt

PYG

1.88tr

1.89tr

USD

278m

274m

6771.15

6900.82

Gendarmerie & Paramilitary 27,700 National Border Service 4,000 FORCES BY ROLE SPECIAL FORCES 1 SF gp MANOEUVRE Other 1 sy bde (5 sy bn(-)) 1 indep sy bn

National Police Force 20,000

No hvy mil eqpt, small arms only FORCES BY ROLE SPECIAL FORCES 1 SF unit MANOEUVRE Other 1 (presidential) gd bn(-)

National Aeronaval Service 3,700 FORCES BY ROLE TRANSPORT 1 sqn with C-212M Aviocar; Cessna 210; PA-31 Navajo; PA-34 Seneca 1 (Presidential) flt with ERJ-135BJ; S-76C TRAINING 1 unit with Cessna 152; Cessna 172; T-35D Pillan TRANSPORT HELICOPTER 1 sqn with AW139; Bell 205; Bell 205 (UH-1H Iroquois); Bell 212; Bell 407; Bell 412EP; H145; MD-500E EQUIPMENT BY TYPE PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 15 PCO 1 Independencia (ex-US Balsam) PCC 1 Saettia PB 13: 1 Cocle (ex-US Swift); 1 Chiriqui (ex-US PB MkIV); 2 Panquiaco (UK Vosper 31.5m); 5 3 De Noviembre (exUS Point), 4 Type-200 AMPHIBIOUS • LANDING CRAFT 1 LCU 1 General Estaban Huertas LOGISTICS AND SUPPORT 2 AG 1 Lina María AKR 1 Manuel Amador Guerror (Damen Stan Lander 5612) AIRCRAFT TPT • Light 16: 1 Beech 100 King Air; 1 Beech 350 King Air; 2 DHC-6-400 Twin Otter; 3 C-212M Aviocar; 1 Cessna 152, 1 Cessna 172; 2 Cessna 208B; 1 Cessna 210; 1 ERJ-135BJ; 1 PA-31 Navajo; 2 PA-34 Seneca

USD1=PYG

2022

1.93tr

Real-terms defence budget trend (USDm, constant 2015) 316 144 2008

2015

Population

2021

7,272,639

Age

0–14

15–19

20–24

25–29

Male

11.6%

4.1%

4.4%

4.7%

30–64 65 plus 21.2%

4.0%

Female

11.2%

4.0%

4.4%

4.7%

21.0%

4.4%

Capabilities The armed forces are small by regional standards and the equipment inventory for all services is ageing and largely obsolete. The country faces internal challenges from insurgency and transnational organised crime, chiefly drug trafficking. Conscript numbers have reduced in recent years, and there are a significant number of higher ranks in the force structure. Key formations have long been under-strength. Paraguay has had a consistent if limited tradition of contributing to UN peacekeeping operations since 2001. There is only limited ability to self-sustain forces abroad, and no effective power-projection capacity. There is a small force of river-patrol craft, and some of the oldest vessels have finally been retired. Armoured capability is very limited. Recent acquisitions of heavy equipment have been confined to small quantities of engineering and transport capabilities. There is some local maintenance capacity but the effectiveness of systems is limited by age. While there is some R&D and manufacturing cooperation with local research institutes, there is no traditional defence-industrial base.

ACTIVE 13,950 (Army 7,400 Navy 3,800 Air 2,750) Gendarmerie & Paramilitary 14,800

Conscript liability 12 months

RESERVE 164,500 (Joint 164,500)

ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE Army 7,400 Much of the Paraguayan army is maintained in a cadre state during peacetime; the nominal inf and cav divs are effectively only at coy strength. Active gp/regt are usually coy sized

Latin America and the Caribbean

with Colombia, and the majority of the border service is deployed there. Both Colombia and the US have provided training and support. Training is focused on internal and border security rather than conventional military operations and there is no capability to mount significant external deployments. None of Panama’s security services maintain heavy military equipment, focusing instead on light-transport, patrol and surveillance capabilities. Aside from limited maintenance facilities, the country has no domestic defence industry.

426 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2022 FORCES BY ROLE MANOEUVRE Light 3 inf corps (total: 6 inf div(-), 3 cav div(-), 6 arty bty) Other 1 (Presidential) gd regt (1 SF bn, 1 inf bn, 1 sy bn, 1 log gp) COMBAT SUPPORT 1 arty bde with (2 arty gp, 1 ADA gp) 1 engr bde with (1 engr regt, 3 construction regt) 1 sigs bn

Reserves FORCES BY ROLE MANOEUVRE Light 14 inf regt (cadre) 4 cav regt (cadre) EQUIPMENT BY TYPE ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES RECCE 28 EE-9 Cascavel APC • APC (W) 12 EE-11 Urutu ARTILLERY 99 TOWED 105mm 19 M101 MOR 81mm 80 AIR DEFENCE • GUNS 22: SP 20mm 3 M9 half track TOWED 19: 40mm 13 M1A1, 6 L/60

Navy 3,800 EQUIPMENT BY TYPE PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 18 PCR 1 Itaipú (BRZ Roraima) with 1 hel landing platform PBR 17: 1 Capitán Cabral; 2 Capitán Ortiz (ROC Hai Ou); 2 Novatec; 4 Type-701 (US Sewart); 3 Croq 15 (AUS Armacraft); 5 others AMPHIBIOUS • LANDING CRAFT • LCVP 3

Naval Aviation 100 FORCES BY ROLE TRANSPORT 1 (liaison) sqn with Cessna 150; Cessna 210 Centurion; Cessna 310 TRANSPORT HELICOPTER 1 sqn with AS350 Ecureuil (HB350 Esquilo) EQUIPMENT BY TYPE AIRCRAFT • TPT • Light 6: 2 Cessna 150; 1 Cessna 210 Centurion; 2 Cessna 310 HELICOPTERS • TPT • Light 2 AS350 Ecureuil (HB350 Esquilo)

Marines 700; 200 conscript (total 900) FORCES BY ROLE MANOEUVRE Amphibious 3 mne bn(-) ARTILLERY • TOWED 105mm 2 M101

Air Force 2,750 FORCES BY ROLE GROUND ATTACK/ISR 1 sqn with EMB-312 Tucano* TRANSPORT 1 gp with C-212-200/400 Aviocar; DHC-6 Twin Otter 1 VIP gp with Beech 58 Baron; Bell 427; Cessna U206 Stationair; Cessna 208B Grand Caravan; Cessna 402B; PA-32R Saratoga (EMB-721C Sertanejo) TRAINING 1 sqn with T-25 Universal; T-35A/B Pillan TRANSPORT HELICOPTER 1 gp with AS350 Ecureuil (HB350 Esquilo); Bell 205 (UH1H Iroquois) MANOEUVRE Air Manoeuvre 1 AB bde EQUIPMENT BY TYPE AIRCRAFT 6 combat capable TPT 18: Light 17: 1 Beech 58 Baron; 4 C-212-200 Aviocar; 1 C-212-400 Aviocar; 5 Cessna 208B Grand Caravan; 1 Cessna 310; 1 Cessna 402B; 2 Cessna U206 Stationair; 1 DHC-6 Twin Otter; 1 PA-32R Saratoga (EMB-721C Sertanejo); PAX 1 Cessna 680 Sovereign TRG 21: 6 EMB-312 Tucano*; 6 T-25 Universal; 6 T-35A Pillan; 3 T-35B Pillan HELICOPTERS • TPT • Light 11: 3 AS350 Ecureuil (HB350 Esquilo); 6 Bell 205 (UH-1H Iroquois); 1 Bell 407; 1 Bell 427 (VIP)

Gendarmerie & Paramilitary 14,800 Special Police Service 10,800; 4,000 conscript (total 14,800)

DEPLOYMENT CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC: UN • MINUSCA 4 CYPRUS: UN • UNFICYP 12 DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO: UN • MONUSCO 7 SOUTH SUDAN: UN • UNMISS 3

Latin America and the Caribbean 427

Army 47,500

Peru PER GDP per capita

2020

2021

PEN

718bn

853bn

USD

205bn

226bn

USD

6,134

6,677

Growth

-11.0

10.0

Inflation

1.8

3.1

Def bdgt

PEN

7.45bn

7.05bn

USD

2.13bn

1.87bn

3.50

3.77

USD1=PEN

2022

6.98bn

Real-terms defence budget trend (USDbn, constant 2015) 2.47 1.17 2008

Population

2015

2021

32,201,224

Age

0–14

15–19

20–24

25–29

Male

12.7%

4.2%

4.3%

4.4%

30–64 65 plus 19.5%

3.9%

Female

12.3%

4.1%

4.3%

4.5%

21.4%

4.4%

Capabilities Peru’s armed forces are primarily orientated towards preserving territorial integrity and security, focusing on counter-insurgency and counter-narcotics operations, while also strengthening their disaster-relief capabilities. Their training and capabilities are sufficient to fulfil domestic-security tasks, although they are limited by economic constraints and an increasingly ageing equipment inventory. Peru maintains close ties with Colombia, including a cooperation agreement on air control, humanitarian assistance and counter-narcotics. The armed forces train regularly and take part in national and multilateral exercises, and Peru hosted the 2021 iteration of the UNITAS exercise. The armed forces are capable of independently deploying externally and contribute to UN missions abroad. There has been some aviation modernisation, though not across the whole fleet. Tanker/transport capabilities have been boosted with the recent acquisition of two second-hand KC-130Hs. The navy is looking to acquire new corvettes and to modernise its ageing submarines. The state-owned shipyard SIMA and aviation firm SEMAN are key players in Peru’s defence industry, both in terms of manufacturing and maintenance. In 2017, SEMAN completed final assembly for the last Korean-designed KT-1 trainer, and in 2018 the navy commissioned the first locally built and South Korean-designed multipurpose vessel.

ACTIVE 81,000 (Army 47,500 Navy 24,000 Air 9,500) Gendarmerie & Paramilitary 77,000 Conscript liability 12 months voluntary conscription for both males and females

RESERVE 188,000 (Army 188,000)

ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE Space EQUIPMENT BY TYPE SATELLITES • ISR PERÚSAT-1

FORCES BY ROLE SPECIAL FORCES 1 (1st) SF bde (2 spec ops bn, 2 cdo bn, 1 cdo coy, 1 CT coy, 1 airmob arty gp, 1 MP coy, 1 cbt spt bn) 1 (3rd) SF bde (1 spec ops bn, 2 cdo bn, 1 airmob arty gp, 1 MP coy) 1 (6th) SF bde (2 spec ops bn, 2 cdo bn, 1 cdo coy, 1 MP coy) MANOEUVRE Armoured 1 (3rd) armd bde (2 tk bn, 1 armd inf bn, 1 arty gp, 1 AT coy, 1 AD gp, 1 engr bn, 1 cbt spt bn) 1 (9th) armd bde (2 tk bn, 1 armd inf bn, 1 SP arty gp, 1 ADA gp) Mechanised 1 (3rd) armd cav bde (3 mech cav bn, 1 mot inf bn, 1 arty gp, 1 AD gp, 1 engr bn, 1 cbt spt bn) 1 (1st) cav bde (4 mech cav bn, 1 MP coy, 1 cbt spt bn) Light 2 (2nd & 31st) mot inf bde (4 mot inf bn, 1 arty gp, 1 MP coy, 1 log bn) 3 (1st, 7th & 32nd) inf bde (3 inf bn, 1 MP coy, 1 cbt spt bn) 1 (33rd) inf bde (4 inf bn) 1 (4th) mtn bde (1 armd regt, 3 mot inf bn, 1 arty gp, 1 MP coy, 1 cbt spt bn) 1 (5th) mtn bde (1 armd regt, 2 mot inf bn, 3 jungle coy, 1 arty gp, 1 MP coy, 1 cbt spt bn) 1 (6th) jungle inf bde (4 jungle bn, 1 engr bn, 1 MP coy, 1 cbt spt bn) 1 (35th) jungle inf bde (1 SF gp, 3 jungle bn, 3 jungle coy, 1 jungle arty gp, 1 AT coy, 1 AD gp, 1 jungle engr bn) COMBAT SUPPORT 1 arty gp (bde) (4 arty gp, 2 AD gp, 1 sigs gp) 1 (3rd) arty bde (4 arty gp, 1 AD gp, 1 sigs gp) 1 (22nd) engr bde (3 engr bn, 1 demining coy) COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT 1 (1st Multipurpose) spt bde AVIATION 1 (1st) avn bde (1 atk hel/recce hel bn, 1 avn bn, 2 aslt hel/tpt hel bn) AIR DEFENCE 1 AD gp (regional troops) EQUIPMENT BY TYPE ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES MBT 165 T-55; (75† in store) LT TK 96 AMX-13 RECCE 95: 30 BRDM-2; 15 Fiat 6616; 50 M9A1 APC 295 APC (T) 120 M113A1 APC (W) 175: 150 UR-416; 25 Fiat 6614 ENGINEERING & MAINTENANCE VEHICLES ARV M578 VLB GQL-111 ANTI-TANK-ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE MSL SP 22 M1165A2 HMMWV with 9K135 Kornet E (RSAT-14 Spriggan)

Latin America and the Caribbean

4 mil region

Peruvian Sol PEN

428 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2022 MANPATS 9K11 Malyutka (RS-AT-3 Sagger); HJ-73C; 9K135 Kornet E (RS-AT-14 Spriggan); Spike-ER RCL 106mm M40A1 ARTILLERY 1,011 SP 155mm 12 M109A2 TOWED 290: 105mm 152: 44 M101; 24 M2A1; 60 M-56; 24 Model 56 pack howitzer; 122mm; 36 D-30; 130mm 36 M-46; 155mm 66: 36 M114, 30 Model 50 MRL 122mm 35: 22 BM-21 Grad; 13 Type-90B MOR 674+: 81mm/107mm 350; SP 107mm 24 M106A1; 120mm 300+ Brandt/Expal Model L AIRCRAFT TPT • Light 17: 2 An-28 Cash; 3 An-32B Cline; 1 Beech 350 King Air; 1 Beech 1900D; 4 Cessna 152; 1 Cessna 208 Caravan; 1 Cessna 560 Citation; 2 Cessna U206 Stationair; 1 PA-31T Cheyenne II; 1 PA-34 Seneca TRG 4 IL-103 HELICOPTERS MRH 7 Mi-17 Hip H TPT 33: Heavy (3 Mi-26T Halo in store); Medium 21 Mi171Sh; Light 12: 1 AW109K2; 9 PZL Mi-2 Hoplite; 2 R-44 TRG 4 F-28F AIR DEFENCE SAM • Point-defence 9K36 Strela-3 (RS-SA-14 Gremlin); 9K310 Igla-1 (RS-SA-16 Gimlet); 9K32 Strela-2 (RS-SA-7 Grail)‡ GUNS 165 SP 23mm 35 ZSU-23-4 TOWED 23mm 130: 80 ZU-23-2; 50 ZU-23

Navy 24,000 (incl 1,000 Coast Guard) Commands: Pacific, Lake Titicaca, Amazon River EQUIPMENT BY TYPE SUBMARINES • SSK 6: 4 Angamos (GER T-209/1200) with 8 single 533mm TT with SST-4 HWT (of which 1 in refit) 2 Islay (GER T-209/1100) with 8 single 533mm TT with SUT 264 HWT PRINCIPAL SURFACE COMBATANTS • FRIGATES 7 FFGHM 7: 2 Aguirre (ex-ITA Lupo) with 8 single lnchr with Otomat Mk2 AShM, 1 octuple Mk 29 lnchr with RIM-7P Sea Sparrow SAM, 2 triple 324mm ASTT with A244 LWT, 1 127mm gun (capacity 1 Bell 212 (AB-212)/SH-3D Sea King) 2 Aguirre (ex-ITA Lupo) with 2 twin lnchr with MM40 Exocet Block 3 AShM, 1 octuple Mk 29 lnchr with RIM-7P Sea Sparrow SAM, 2 triple 324mm ASTT with A244 LWT, 1 127mm gun (capacity 1 Bell 212 (AB212)/SH-3D Sea King) 1 Carvajal (ITA Lupo mod) with 8 single lnchr with Otomat Mk2 AShM, 1 octuple Albatros lnchr with Aspide SAM, 2 triple 324mm ASTT with A244 LWT, 1 127mm gun (capacity 1 Bell 212 (AB-212)/SH-3D Sea King) 2 Carvajal (ITA Lupo mod) with 2 twin lnchr with MM40 Exocet Block 3 AShM, 1 octuple Albatros lnchr with Aspide SAM, 2 triple 324mm ASTT with A244 LWT, 1 127mm gun (capacity 1 Bell 212 (AB-212)/SH3D Sea King)

PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 13 CORVETTES 7 FSG 6 Velarde (FRA PR-72 64m) with 4 single lnchr with MM38 Exocet AShM, 1 76mm gun FS 1 Ferré (ex-ROK Po Hang) with 1 76mm gun PCR 6: 2 Amazonas with 1 76mm gun; 2 Manuel Clavero; 2 Marañon with 2 76mm guns AMPHIBIOUS PRINCIPAL AMPHIBIOUS SHIPS • LPD 1 Pisco (IDN Makassar) (capacity 2 LCM; 3 hels; 24 IFV; 450 troops) LANDING SHIPS • LST 2 Paita (capacity 395 troops) (ex-US Terrebonne Parish) LANDING CRAFT • UCAC 7 Griffon 2000TD (capacity 22 troops) LOGISTICS AND SUPPORT 24 AG 6 Río Napo AGOR 1 Humboldt AGORH 1 Carrasco AGS 5: 1 Zimic (ex-NLD Dokkum); 2 Van Straelen; 1 La Macha, 1 Stiglich (river survey vessel for the upper Amazon) AH 4 (river hospital craft) AO 2 Noguera AORH 1 Tacna (ex-NLD Amsterdam) ATF 1 Morales AWT 1 Caloyeras AXS 2: 1 Marte; 1 Unión

Naval Aviation ε800 FORCES BY ROLE MARITIME PATROL 1 sqn with Beech 200T; Bell 212 ASW (AB-212 ASW); F-27 Friendship; Fokker 60; SH-2G Super Seasprite; SH3D Sea King TRANSPORT 1 flt with An-32B Cline; Cessna 206; Fokker 50 TRAINING 1 sqn with F-28F; T-34C Turbo Mentor TRANSPORT HELICOPTER 1 (liaison) sqn with Bell 206B Jet Ranger II; Mi-8 Hip EQUIPMENT BY TYPE AIRCRAFT MP 8: 4 Beech 200T; 4 Fokker 60 ELINT 1 F-27 Friendship TPT • Light 5: 2 An-32B Cline; 1 Cessna 206; 2 Fokker 50 TRG 5 T-34C Turbo Mentor HELICOPTERS ASW 6: 2 Bell 212 ASW (AB-212 ASW); 1 SH-2G Super Seasprite; 3 SH-3D Sea King MRH 3 Bell 412SP TPT 10: Medium 7: 1 Mi-8 Hip; 6 UH-3H Sea King; Light 3 Bell 206B Jet Ranger II TRG 5 F-28F MSL • AShM AM39 Exocet

Marines 4,000 FORCES BY ROLE SPECIAL FORCES 3 cdo gp

Latin America and the Caribbean 429

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES RECCE 7 RAM Mk3 APC • APC (W) 47+: 32 LAV II; V-100 Commando; 15 V-200 Chaimite ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE RCL 84mm Carl Gustaf; 106mm M40A1 ARTILLERY 18+ TOWED 122mm D-30 MOR 18+: 81mm some; 120mm ε18 AIR DEFENCE • GUNS 20mm SP (twin)

Air Force 9,500

Divided into five regions – North, Lima, South, Central and Amazon FORCES BY ROLE FIGHTER 1 sqn with MiG-29S/SE Fulcrum C; MiG-29UBM Fulcrum B FIGHTER/GROUND ATTACK 1 sqn with Mirage 2000E/ED (2000P/DP) 2 sqn with A-37B Dragonfly 1 sqn with Su-25A Frogfoot A; Su-25UBK Frogfoot B ISR 1 (photo-survey) sqn with Learjet 36A; SA-227-BC Metro III (C-26B) TRANSPORT 1 sqn with B-737; An-32 Cline 1 sqn with DHC-6 Twin Otter; DHC-6-400 Twin Otter; PC-6 Turbo Porter 1 sqn with L-100-20 TRAINING 2 (drug interdiction) sqn with EMB-312 Tucano 1 sqn with MB-339A* 1 sqn with Z-242 1 hel sqn with Enstrom 280FX; Schweizer 300C ATTACK HELICOPTER 1 sqn with Mi-25/Mi-35P Hind TRANSPORT HELICOPTER 1 sqn with Mi-17-1V Hip 1 sqn with Bell 206 Jet Ranger; Bell 212 (AB-212); Bell 412 Twin Huey 1 sqn with Bo-105LS AIR DEFENCE 6 bn with S-125 Pechora (RS-SA-3 Goa) EQUIPMENT BY TYPE AIRCRAFT 60 combat capable FTR 19: 9 MiG-29S Fulcrum C; 3 MiG-29SE Fulcrum C; 5 MiG-29SMP Fulcrum; 2 MiG-29UBM Fulcrum B FGA 12: 2 Mirage 2000ED (2000DP); 10 Mirage 2000E (2000P) (some†)

ATK 19: 15 A-37B Dragonfly; 2 Su-25A Frogfoot A; 2 Su25UBK Frogfoot B; (8 Su-25A Frogfoot A; 6 Su-25UBK Frogfoot B in store) ISR 5: 2 Learjet 36A; 3 SA-227-BC Metro III (C-26B) TKR/TPT 2 KC-130H Hercules TPT 37: Medium 6: 4 C-27J Spartan; 2 L-100-20; Light 29: 4 An-32 Cline; 7 Cessna 172 Skyhawk; 3 DHC-6 Twin Otter; 12 DHC-6-400 Twin Otter; 1 Learjet 45 (VIP); 1 PA-44; 1 PC-6 Turbo-Porter; PAX 2 B-737 TRG 74: 7 CH-2000; 19 EMB-312 Tucano†; 20 KT-1P; 10 MB-339A*; 6 T-41A/D Mescalero; 12 Z-242 HELICOPTERS ATK 18: 16 Mi-25 Hind D; 2 Mi-35P Hind E MRH 12: 2 Bell 412 Twin Huey; up to 10 Mi-17-1V Hip TPT 25: Medium 3 Mi-171Sh; Light 22: 8 Bell 206 Jet Ranger; 6 Bell 212 (AB-212); 6 Bo-105LS; 2 Enstrom 280FX TRG 4 Schweizer 300C AIR DEFENCE • SAM Short-range S-125 Pechora (RS-SA-3 Goa) Point-defence Javelin AIR-LAUNCHED MISSILES AAM • IR R-3 (RS-AA-2 Atoll)‡; R-60 (RS-AA-8 Aphid)‡; R-73 (RS-AA-11A Archer); R-550 Magic; IR/SARH R-27 (RS-AA-10 Alamo); ARH R-77 (RS-AA-12 Adder) ASM AS-30; Kh-29L (RS-AS-14A Kedge) ARM Kh-58 (RS-AS-11 Kilter)

Gendarmerie & Paramilitary 77,000 National Police 77,000 (100,000 reported) EQUIPMENT BY TYPE ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES APC (W) 120: 20 BMR-600; 100 MOWAG Roland AIRCRAFT TPT • Light 5: 1 An-32B Cline; 1 Beech 1900C; 3 Cessna 208B HELICOPTERS MRH 4 Mi-17 Hip H TPT • Light 16: 5 H145; 2 Mi-171Sh; 9 UH-1H Huey II

General Police 43,000 Security Police 21,000 Technical Police 13,000 Coast Guard 1,000 Personnel included as part of Navy EQUIPMENT BY TYPE PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 45 PSOH 1 Carvajal (ITA Lupo mod) with 1 127mm gun (capacity 1 Bell 212 (AB-212)/SH-3D Sea King) PCC 10: 6 Río Pativilca (ROK Tae Geuk); 4 Río Nepeña PB 13: 6 Chicama (US Dauntless); 2 Punta Sal (Defiant 45); 1 Río Chira; 1 Río Itaya; 3 Río Santa PBR 21: 1 Río Viru; 8 Parachique; 12 Zorritos LOGISTICS AND SUPPORT • AH 1 Puno AIRCRAFT TPT • Light 3: 1 DHC-6 Twin Otter; 2 F-27 Friendship

Latin America and the Caribbean

MANOEUVRE Light 2 inf bn 1 inf gp Amphibious 1 mne bde (1 SF gp, 1 recce bn, 2 inf bn, 1 amph bn, 1 arty gp) Jungle 1 jungle inf bn

430 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2022

Rondas Campesinas Peasant self-defence force. Perhaps 7,000 rondas ‘gp’, up to pl strength, some with small arms. Deployed mainly in emergency zone

DEPLOYMENT CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC: UN • MINUSCA 217; 1 engr coy DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO: UN • MONUSCO 6 LEBANON: UN • UNIFIL 1 SOUTH SUDAN: UN • UNMISS 5 SUDAN: UN • UNISFA 3

Suriname Dollar SRD

2020

2021

SRD

38.4bn

58.7bn

USD

2.88bn

2.82bn

USD

4,787

4,620

Growth

-15.9

0.7

Inflation

34.9

54.4

Def bdgt

SRD

n.k.

per capita

USD USD1=SRD Population

n.k.

13.30

20.83

2022

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE HELICOPTERS • MRH 3 SA316B Alouette III (Chetak)

Trinidad and Tobago TTO

Age

0–14

15–19

20–24

25–29

Male

11.6%

4.2%

4.5%

4.0%

30–64 65 plus 23.0%

3.1%

Female

11.2%

4.0%

4.3%

3.8%

22.4%

3.9%

Capabilities The armed forces are principally tasked with preserving territorial integrity. They also assist the national police in internal- and border-security missions, as well as tackling transnational criminal activity and drug trafficking and have also been involved in disaster-relief and humanitarian-assistance operations. Suriname is a member of the Caribbean Disaster Emergency Management Agency and the Caribbean Basin Security Initiative. Ties with Brazil, China, India and the US have been crucial for the supply of equipment, including a limited number of armoured vehicles and helicopters, as well as training activity. The armed forces take part in US SOUTHCOM’s Tradewinds disaster-response exercise. The armed forces are not sized or equipped for power projection. Resource challenges and limited equipment serviceability means the armed forces are constrained in providing sufficient border and coastal control and surveillance. There is no capability to design and manufacture modern military equipment and Suriname has looked to its foreign-military cooperation to improve not just trade training but also maintenance capacity.

ACTIVE 1,840 (Army 1,400 Navy 240 Air 200) (All services form part of the army)

ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 13 PB 8: 2 FPB 72 Mk II; 1 FPB 98 Mk I; 3 Rodman 101†; 2 others PBR 5 Rodman 55

Air Force ε200

614,749

Army 1,400

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES RECCE 6 EE-9 Cascavel APC • APC (W) 15 EE-11 Urutu ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE RCL 106mm M40A1 ARTILLERY • MOR 81mm 6

Navy ε240

Suriname SUR GDP

FORCES BY ROLE MANOEUVRE Mechanised 1 mech cav sqn Light 1 inf bn (4 coy) COMBAT SUPPORT 1 MP bn (coy)

Trinidad and Tobago Dollar TTD GDP TTD

2020

2021

146bn

USD

21.6bn

USD

15,425

15,353

Growth

-7.9

-1.0

Inflation

0.6

1.0

Def bdgt

TTD

6.44bn

5.23bn

USD

954m

773m

6.75

6.76

per capita

USD1=TTD

2022

5.66bn

Real-terms defence budget trend (USDm, constant 2015) 1706 617 2008

Population

2015

2021

1,221,047

Age

0–14

15–19

20–24

25–29

Male

9.4%

3.0%

2.9%

3.0%

30–64 65 plus 26.6%

5.7%

Female

9.1%

2.8%

2.6%

2.8%

24.9%

7.2%

Capabilities The Trinidad and Tobago Defence Force (TTDF) focuses on border protection and maritime security, as well as counter-narcotics tasks. A larger role in law-enforcement support is planned for the army. Trinidad and Tobago is a member of the Caribbean Community and cooperates with other countries in the region in disaster-relief efforts. There are plans to establish a joint training academy in Trinidad and a proposal for a new coastguard base in Tobago. The TTDF has taken part in US SOUTHCOM’s Tradewinds

Latin America and the Caribbean 431 disaster-response exercise and has sent personnel to the US and UK for training. Trinidad and Tobago has no capacity to deploy and maintain troops abroad, and apart from limited maintenance facilities has no domestic defence industry.

Uruguay URY 2020

2021

ACTIVE 4,650 (Army 3,000 Coast Guard 1,600 Air

GDP

UYU

2.25tr

2.58tr

USD

56.6bn

60.1bn

(All services form the Trinidad and Tobago Defence Force)

per capita

USD

16,023

16,965

RESERVE 650

Growth

-5.9

3.1

Inflation

9.8

7.5

ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE

Def bdgt

UYU

21.3bn

22.5bn

USD

535m

525m

Army ε3,000

USD1=UYU

39.82

42.86

FORCES BY ROLE SPECIAL FORCES 1 SF unit MANOEUVRE Light 2 inf bn COMBAT SUPPORT 1 engr bn COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT 1 log bn EQUIPMENT BY TYPE ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE RCL 84mm Carl Gustaf ARTILLERY • MOR 81mm 6 L16A1

Coast Guard 1,600 FORCES BY ROLE COMMAND 1 mne HQ EQUIPMENT BY TYPE PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 17 PCO 3: 2 Port of Spain (AUS Cape); 1 Nelson II (ex-PRC Shuke III) PCC 6: 2 Point Lisas (Damen Fast Crew Supplier 5009); 4 Speyside (Damen Stan Patrol 5009) PB 8: 2 Gaspar Grande†; 6 Scarlet Ibis (Austal 30m)

Air Guard 50 EQUIPMENT BY TYPE AIRCRAFT TPT • Light 2 SA-227 Metro III (C-26) HELICOPTERS MRH 4 AW139 TPT • Light 1 S-76

2022

22.9bn

Real-terms defence budget trend (USDm, constant 2015) 537 412 2008

Population

2015

2021

3,398,239

Age

0–14

15–19

20–24

25–29

Male

9.8%

3.6%

3.9%

30–64 65 plus 21.2%

6.0%

Female

9.5%

3.5%

3.8%

22.1%

8.9%

Capabilities Principal tasks for the armed forces are assuring sovereignty and territorial integrity. In 2019, parliament approved a new Military Law, which aims, among other measures, to reduce the number of senior officers and address promotion issues across all services. Uruguay and Argentina have a joint peacekeeping unit and conduct joint exercises. In 2018 a defence-cooperation agreement was signed with Russia, including training exchanges. The armed forces participate regularly in multinational exercises and deployments, notably on UN missions. The air force is focused on the counter-insurgency role, but ambitions to purchase a light fighter aircraft remain hampered by funding problems. The acquisition of air-defence radars may have improved the armed forces’ ability to monitor domestic airspace, but the lack of interdiction capability will continue to limit the capacity to respond to contingencies. Much equipment is second-hand, and there is little capacity for independent power projection. Maintenance work is sometimes outsourced to foreign companies, such as Chile’s ENAER.

ACTIVE 21,100 (Army 13,500 Navy 5,000 Air 2,600) Gendarmerie & Paramilitary 1,400

ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE Army 13,500 Uruguayan units are substandard size, mostly around 30%. Div are at most bde size, while bn are of reinforced coy strength. Regts are also coy size, some bn size, with the largest formation being the 2nd armd cav regt FORCES BY ROLE COMMAND 4 mil region/div HQ MANOEUVRE Mechanised 2 (1st & 2nd Cav) mech bde (1 armd cav regt, 2 mech cav regt)

Latin America and the Caribbean

Guard 50)

Uruguayan Peso UYU

432 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2022 1 (3rd Cav) mech bde (2 mech cav regt, 1 mech inf bn) 3 (2nd, 3rd & 4th Inf) mech bde (2 mech inf bn; 1 inf bn) 1 (5th Inf) mech bde (1 armd cav regt; 1 armd inf bn; 1 mech inf bn) Light 1 (1st Inf) inf bde (2 inf bn) Air Manoeuvre 1 para bn COMBAT SUPPORT 1 (strategic reserve) arty regt 5 fd arty gp 1 (1st) engr bde (2 engr bn) 4 cbt engr bn AIR DEFENCE 1 AD gp EQUIPMENT BY TYPE ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES MBT 15 Tiran-5 LT TK 47: 22 M41A1UR; 25 M41C RECCE 15 EE-9 Cascavel IFV 18 BMP-1 APC 376 APC (T) 27: 24 M113A1UR; 3 MT-LB APC (W) 349: 54 Condor; 48 GAZ-39371 Vodnik; 53 OT64; 47 OT-93; 147 Piranha ENGINEERING & MAINTENANCE VEHICLES AEV MT-LB ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE MSL • MANPATS Milan RCL 106mm 69 M40A1 ARTILLERY 185 SP 122mm 6 2S1 Gvozdika TOWED 44: 105mm 36: 28 M101A1; 8 M102; 155mm 8 M114A1 MOR 135: 81mm 91: 35 M1, 56 Expal Model LN; 120mm 44 Model SL UNINHABITED AERIAL VEHICLES • ISR • Light 1 Charrua AIR DEFENCE • GUNS • TOWED 14: 20mm 14: 6 M167 Vulcan; 8 TCM-20 (w/Elta M-2106 radar)

Navy 5,000 HQ at Montevideo EQUIPMENT BY TYPE PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 16 CORVETTES • FS 1 Uruguay (ex-PRT Joao Belo) (FRA Commandant Riviere) with 2 triple 324mm SVTT Mk 32 ASTT with Mk 46 LWT, 2 100mm gun PB 15: 2 Colonia (ex-US Cape); 1 Paysandu; 9 Type-44; 3 PS MINE WARFARE • MINE COUNTERMEASURES 2 MSO 2 Temerario (Kondor II) AMPHIBIOUS 3: 2 LCVP; 1 LCM LOGISTICS AND SUPPORT 10 AAR 2 Islas de Flores (ex-GER Hermann Helms) ABU 1 Sirius AG 2: 1 Artigas (GER Freiburg, general spt ship with replenishment capabilities); 1 Maldonado (also used as patrol craft) AGS 2: 1 Helgoland; 1 Trieste (in refit)

ARS 1 Vanguardia AXS 2: 1 Capitan Miranda; 1 Bonanza

Naval Aviation 210 FORCES BY ROLE MARITIME PATROL 1 flt with Beech 200T*; Cessna O-2A Skymaster SEARCH & RESCUE/TRANSPORT HELICOPTER 1 sqn with AS350B2 Ecureuil (Esquilo); Bell 412SP Twin Huey TRANSPORT/TRAINING 1 flt with T-34C Turbo Mentor TRAINING 1 hel sqn with Bell 412SP Twin Huey; OH-58 Kiowa EQUIPMENT BY TYPE AIRCRAFT 2 combat capable ISR 4: 2 Beech 200T*; 2 Cessna O-2A Skymaster TRG 2 T-34C Turbo Mentor HELICOPTERS ISR 1 OH-58 Kiowa MRH 4: 2 Bell 412 (AB-412); 2 Bell 412SP Twin Huey TPT • Light 1 AS350B2 Ecureuil (Esquilo)

Naval Infantry 700 FORCES BY ROLE MANOEUVRE Amphibious 1 mne bn(-)

Air Force 2,600 FORCES BY ROLE FIGHTER/GROUND ATTACK 1 sqn with A-37B Dragonfly ISR 1 flt with EMB-110 Bandeirante TRANSPORT 1 sqn with C-130B Hercules; C-212 Aviocar; EMB–110C Bandeirante; EMB-120 Brasilia 1 (liaison) sqn with Cessna 206H; T-41D 1 (liaison) flt with Cessna 206H TRAINING 1 sqn with PC-7U Turbo Trainer 1 sqn with Beech 58 Baron (UB-58); SF-260EU TRANSPORT HELICOPTER 1 sqn with AS365 Dauphin; Bell 205 (UH–1H Iroquois); Bell 212 EQUIPMENT BY TYPE AIRCRAFT 13 combat capable ATK 12 A-37B Dragonfly ISR 4: 1 EMB-110 Bandeirante*; 3 O-2A Skymaster TKR/TPT 2 KC-130H Hercules TPT 25: Medium 2 C-130B Hercules; Light 22: 1 BAe125-700A; 2 Beech 58 Baron (UB-58); 6 C-212 Aviocar; 9 Cessna 206H; 1 Cessna 210; 2 EMB-110C Bandeirante; 1 EMB-120 Brasilia; PAX 1 C-29 Hawker TRG 17: 5 PC-7U Turbo Trainer; 12 SF-260EU HELICOPTERS MRH 2 AS365N2 Dauphin II TPT • Light 8: 5 Bell 205 (UH–1H Iroquois); 3 Bell 212

Latin America and the Caribbean 433

Gendarmerie & Paramilitary 1,400

China, Cuba and Russia. There is little logistics capability to support deployment abroad. Equipment is relatively modern and much is of Chinese and Russian manufacture. However, the economic crisis has affected the government’s ability to sustain military expenditure. Maintenance and further procurement have suffered as a consequence. Venezuela’s defence industry is based on a series of small, state-owned companies, mainly focused on the production of small arms and munitions. Local platform production has been limited to small coastal-patrol boats.

Guardia Nacional Republicana 1,400

DEPLOYMENT CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC: UN • MINUSCA 3 DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO: UN • MONUSCO 822; 1 inf bn; 1 hel sqn

ACTIVE 123,000 (Army 63,000 Navy 25,500 Air 11,500 National Guard 23,000) Gendarmerie & Paramilitary 220,000

EGYPT: MFO 41; 1 engr/tpt unit INDIA/PAKISTAN: UN • UNMOGIP 3

Conscript liability 30 months selective, varies by region for all services

LEBANON: UN • UNIFIL 1 SUDAN: UN • UNISFA 2

RESERVE 8,000 (Army 8,000)

SYRIA/ISRAEL: UN • UNDOF 232; 1 mech inf coy

ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE

Venezuela VEN

per capita Growth

2020

2021

VES

n.k

USD

47.3bn

44.9bn

USD

1,691

1,627

-30.0

-5.0

Inflation

2355.2

2700.0

Def bdgt

VES [a]

n.k

USD

n.k

USD1=VES

2022

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE SATELLITES • COMMUNICATIONS 1 Venesat-1

Army ε63,000

[a] Defence budget allocations have been difficult to track since 2017 due to high levels of currency volatility and reduced transparency in public expenditure Real-terms defence budget trend (USDbn, constant 2015) 10.3 n.k. n.k. n.k. n.k. 2008

Population

2015

Space

2021

29,069,153

Age

0–14

15–19

20–24

25–29

Male

13.0%

4.1%

4.0%

30–64 65 plus 20.8%

3.8%

Female

12.4%

4.0%

3.9%

4.0%

21.4%

4.6%

Capabilities The armed forces and national guard are tasked with protecting sovereignty, assuring territorial integrity and assisting with internalsecurity and counter-narcotics operations. They have sufficient capabilities and funding to fulfil internal-security tasks and their regime-protection role, but economic challenges have affected equipment availability and training levels. Incidents such as the apparent assassination attempt against President Nicolás Maduro in 2018 and the attack on the supreme court in 2017 point to some internal stresses in the armed forces. Venezuela is almost completely isolated regionally, with frictions relating to the humanitarian crisis and to the presence of irregular Colombian armed groups leading to troop deployments near the Colombia–Venezuela border. There are close ties with China and Russia, with Caracas relying on both countries for procurements and technical support. The armed forces train regularly and civil–military cooperation has increased. Venezuela has also taken part in joint combined exercises with

FORCES BY ROLE MANOEUVRE Armoured 1 (4th) armd div (1 armd bde, 1 lt armd bde, 1 AB bde, 1 arty bde) Mechanised 1 (9th) mot cav div (1 mot cav bde, 1 ranger bde, 1 sy bde) Light 1 (1st) inf div (1 SF bn, 1 armd bde, 1 mech inf bde, 1 ranger bde, 1 inf bde, 1 arty unit, 1 spt unit) 1 (2nd) inf div (1 mech inf bde, 1 inf bde, 1 mtn inf bde) 1 (3rd) inf div (1 inf bde, 1 ranger bde, 1 sigs bde, 1 MP bde) 1 (5th) inf div (1 SF bn, 1 cav sqn, 2 jungle inf bde, 1 engr bn) COMBAT SUPPORT 1 cbt engr corps (3 engr regt) COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT 1 log comd (2 log regt) AVIATION 1 avn comd (1 tpt avn bn, 1 atk hel bn, 1 ISR avn bn)

Reserve Organisations 8,000 FORCES BY ROLE MANOEUVRE Armoured 1 armd bn Light 4 inf bn 1 ranger bn COMBAT SUPPORT 1 arty bn 2 engr regt EQUIPMENT BY TYPE ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES MBT 173: 81 AMX-30V; 92 T-72B1 LT TK 109: 31 AMX-13; 78 Scorpion-90

Latin America and the Caribbean

Venezuelan Bolivar soberano VES GDP

434 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2022 RECCE 121: 42 Dragoon 300 LFV2; 79 V-100/V-150 IFV 237: 123 BMP-3 (incl variants); 114 BTR-80A (incl variants) APC 81 APC (T) 45: 25 AMX-VCI; 12 AMX-PC (CP); 8 AMXVCTB (Amb) APC (W) 36 Dragoon 300 ENGINEERING & MAINTENANCE VEHICLES ARV 5: 3 AMX-30D; BREM-1; 2 Dragoon 300RV; Samson VLB Leguan NBC VEHICLES 10 TPz-1 Fuchs NBC ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE MSL • MANPATS IMI MAPATS RCL 106mm 175 M40A1 GUNS • SP 76mm 75 M18 Hellcat ARTILLERY 515 SP 60: 152mm 48 2S19 Msta-S; 155mm 12 Mk F3 TOWED 92: 105mm 80: 40 M101A1; 40 Model 56 pack howitzer; 155mm 12 M114A1 MRL 56: 122mm 24 BM-21 Grad; 160mm 20 LAR SP (LAR-160); 300mm 12 9A52 Smerch GUN/MOR 120mm 13 2S23 NONA-SVK MOR 294: 81mm 165; SP 81mm 21 Dragoon 300PM; AMX-VTT; 120mm 108: 60 Brandt; 48 2S12 AIRCRAFT TPT • Light 28: 1 Beech 90 King Air; 1 Beech 200 King Air; 1 Beech 300 King Air; 1 Cessna 172; 6 Cessna 182 Skylane; 2 Cessna 206; 2 Cessna 207 Stationair; 1 IAI-201 Arava; 2 IAI-202 Arava; 11 M-28 Skytruck HELICOPTERS ATK 9 Mi-35M2 Hind MRH 32: 10 Bell 412EP; 2 Bell 412SP; 20 Mi-17V-5 Hip H TPT 9: Heavy 3 Mi-26T2 Halo; Medium 2 AS-61D; Light 4: 3 Bell 206B Jet Ranger, 1 Bell 206L3 Long Ranger II

Navy ε22,300; ε3,200 conscript (total ε25,500) EQUIPMENT BY TYPE SUBMARINES 1 SSK 1 Sábalo (in refit; 1 more non-operational) (GER T-209/1300) with 8 single 533mm TT with SST-4 HWT PRINCIPAL SURFACE COMBATANTS • FRIGATES 2 FFGHM 2 Mariscal Sucre (ITA Lupo mod)† (1 more nonoperational) with 8 single lnchr with Otomat Mk2 AShM, 1 octuple Albatros lnchr with Aspide SAM, 2 triple 324mm ASTT with A244 LWT, 1 127mm gun (capacity 1 Bell 212 (AB-212) hel) PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 10 PSOH 3 Guaiqueri with 1 Millennium CIWS, 1 76mm gun PBG 3 Federación (UK Vosper 37m) with 2 single lnchr with Otomat Mk2 AShM PB 4: 3 Constitucion (UK Vosper 37m) with 1 76mm gun; 1 Fernando Gomez de Saa (Damen Stan Patrol 4207) AMPHIBIOUS LANDING SHIPS • LST 4 Capana (ROK Alligator) capacity 12 tanks; 200 troops) LANDING CRAFT 3: LCU 2 Margarita (river comd) UCAC 1 Griffon 2000TD LOGISTICS AND SUPPORT 10 AGOR 1 Punta Brava AGS 2 Gabriela

AKR 4 Los Frailes AORH 1 Ciudad Bolívar ATF 1 Almirante Franciso de Miranda (Damen Salvage Tug 6014) AXS 1 Simón Bolívar

Naval Aviation 500 FORCES BY ROLE ANTI-SUBMARINE WARFARE 1 sqn with Bell 212 ASW (AB-212 ASW) MARITIME PATROL 1 flt with C-212-200 MPA TRANSPORT 1 sqn with Beech 200 King Air; C-212 Aviocar; Turbo Commander 980C TRAINING 1 hel sqn with Bell 206B Jet Ranger II; TH-57A Sea Ranger TRANSPORT HELICOPTER 1 sqn with Bell 412EP Twin Huey; Mi-17V-5 Hip H EQUIPMENT BY TYPE AIRCRAFT 2 combat capable MP 2 C-212-200 MPA* TPT • Light 7: 1 Beech C90 King Air; 1 Beech 200 King Air; 4 C-212 Aviocar; 1 Turbo Commander 980C HELICOPTERS ASW 4 Bell 212 ASW (AB-212 ASW) MRH 12: 6 Bell 412EP Twin Huey; 6 Mi-17V-5 Hip H TPT • Light 1 Bell 206B Jet Ranger II (trg) TRG 1 TH-57A Sea Ranger

Marines ε15,000 FORCES BY ROLE COMMAND 1 div HQ SPECIAL FORCES 1 spec ops bde MANOEUVRE Amphibious 1 amph aslt bde 3 mne bde 3 (rvn) mne bde COMBAT SUPPORT 1 cbt engr bn 1 MP bde 1 sigs bn COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT 1 log bn EQUIPMENT BY TYPE ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES LT TK 10 VN-16 IFV 21: 11 VN-1; 10 VN-18 APC • APC (W) 37 EE-11 Urutu AAV 11 LVTP-7 ENGINEERING & MAINTENANCE VEHICLES ARV 1 VN-16 ARV AEV 1 AAVR7 ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE RCL 84mm Carl Gustaf; 106mm M40A1 ARTILLERY 30 TOWED 105mm 18 M-56 MOR 120mm 12 Brandt

Latin America and the Caribbean 435

Coast Guard 1,000 EQUIPMENT BY TYPE PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 22 PSO 2 Guaicamacuto (1 additional vessel in build; 1 other sank April 2020) with 1 Millennium CIWS, 1 76mm gun (capacity 1 Bell 212 (AB-212) hel) PB 20: 12 Gavion; 2 Pagalo (Damen Stan Patrol 2606); 4 Petrel (US Point); 2 Protector LOGISTICS AND SUPPORT 4 AG 1 Los Taques (salvage ship) AKSL 1 AP 2

Air Force 11,500 FORCES BY ROLE FIGHTER/GROUND ATTACK 1 sqn with F-5 Freedom Fighter (VF-5) 2 sqn with F-16A/B Fighting Falcon 4 sqn with Su-30MKV Flanker 2 sqn with K-8W Karakorum* GROUND ATTACK/ISR 1 sqn with EMB-312 Tucano* ELECTRONIC WARFARE 1 sqn with Falcon 20DC; SA-227 Metro III (C-26B) TRANSPORT 1 sqn with Y-8; C-130H Hercules; KC-137 1 sqn with A319CJ; B-737 4 sqn with Cessna T206H; Cessna 750 1 sqn with Cessna 500/550/551; Falcon 20F; Falcon 900 1 sqn with G-222; Short 360 Sherpa TRAINING 1 sqn with Cessna 182N; SF-260E 2 sqn with DA40NG; DA42VI 1 sqn with EMB-312 Tucano* TRANSPORT HELICOPTER 1 VIP sqn with AS532UL Cougar; Mi-172 3 sqn with AS332B Super Puma; AS532 Cougar 2 sqn with Mi-17 Hip H EQUIPMENT BY TYPE AIRCRAFT 81 combat capable FTR 18: 15 F-16A Fighting Falcon†; 3 F-16B Fighting Falcon† FGA 22 Su-30MKV Flanker EW 4: 2 Falcon 20DC; 2 SA-227 Metro III (C-26B) TKR 1 KC-137 TPT 75: Medium 14: 5 C-130H Hercules (some in store); 1 G-222; 8 Y-8; Light 56: 6 Beech 200 King Air; 2 Beech 350 King Air; 10 Cessna 182N Skylane; 12 Cessna 206 Stationair; 4 Cessna 208B Caravan; 1 Cessna 500 Citation I; 3 Cessna 550 Citation II; 1 Cessna 551; 1 Cessna 750 Citation X; 2 Do-228-212; 1 Do-228-212NG; 11 Quad City Challenger II; 2 Short 360 Sherpa; PAX 5: 1 A319CJ; 1 B-737; 1 Falcon 20F; 2 Falcon 900 TRG 83: 24 DA40NG; 6 DA42VI; 17 EMB-312 Tucano*; 24 K-8W Karakorum*; 12 SF-260E

HELICOPTERS MRH 8 Mi-17 (Mi-17VS) Hip H TPT 22: Medium 14: 3 AS332B Super Puma; 7 AS532 Cougar; 2 AS532UL Cougar; 2 Mi-172 (VIP); Light 8+ Enstrom 480B AIR-LAUNCHED MISSILES AAM • IR AIM-9L/P Sidewinder; R-73 (RS-AA-11A Archer); PL-5E; R-27T/ET (RS-AA-10B/D Alamo); IR Python 4; SARH R-27R/ER (RS-AA-10A/C Alamo); ARH R-77 (RS-AA-12 Adder) ASM Kh-29L/T (RS-AS-14A/B Kedge); Kh-59M (RS-AS-18 Kazoo) AShM Kh-31A (RS-AS-17B Krypton); AM39 Exocet ARM Kh-31P (RS-AS-17A Krypton)

Air Defence Command (CODAI)

Joint service command with personnel drawn from other services FORCES BY ROLE AIR DEFENCE 5 AD bde COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT 1 log bde (5 log gp) EQUIPMENT BY TYPE AIR DEFENCE SAM Long-range 12 S-300VM (RS-SA-23) Medium-range 53: 9 9K317M2 Buk-M2E (RS-SA-17 Grizzly); 44 S-125 Pechora-2M (RS-SA-26) Point-defence 9K338 Igla-S (RS-SA-24 Grinch); ADAMS; Mistral; RBS-70 GUNS 440+ SP 40mm 12+: 6+ AMX-13 Rafaga; 6 M42 TOWED 428+: 20mm: 114 TCM-20; 23mm ε200 ZU-232; 35mm; 40mm 114+: 114+ L/70; Some M1

National Guard (Fuerzas Armadas de Cooperacion) 23,000 (Internal sy, customs) 9 regional comd

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES APC • APC (W) 44: 24 Fiat 6614; 20 UR-416 AUV 121 VN4 ARTILLERY • MOR 50 81mm PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS PB 34: 12 Protector; 12 Punta; 10 Rio Orinoco II AIRCRAFT TPT • Light 34: 1 Beech 55 Baron; 1 Beech 80 Queen Air; 1 Beech 90 King Air; 1 Beech 200C King Air; 3 Cessna 152 Aerobat; 2 Cessna 172; 2 Cessna 402C; 4 Cessna U206 Stationair; 6 DA42 MPP; 1 IAI-201 Arava; 12 M-28 Skytruck TRG 3: 1 PZL 106 Kruk; 2 PLZ M2-6 Isquierka HELICOPTERS MRH 13: 8 Bell 412EP; 5 Mi-17V-5 Hip H TPT • Light 18: 9 AS355F Ecureuil II; 4 AW109; 4 Bell 206B/L Jet Ranger/Long Ranger; 1 Bell 212 (AB 212); TRG 5 F-280C

Gendarmerie & Paramilitary ε220,000 Bolivarian National Militia ε220,000

Latin America and the Caribbean

PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS PBR 23: 18 Constancia; 2 Manaure; 3 Terepaima (Cougar) AMPHIBIOUS • LANDING CRAFT • 1 LCU; 1 LCM; 12 LCVP

436 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2022

Chapter Nine

Sub-Saharan Africa Defence spending continues to reduce in sub-Saharan Africa, but the balance has shifted between its subregions. Defence spending in 2021 (USD16 billion) has reduced, in real terms, to the same level as that seen in 2012, but West African spending now accounts for 40.6% of total regional spending, and now exceeds Southern African states. France is reshaping its military posture in Africa but will retain its significant role in operations in the Sahel, as well as in security assistance more broadly. The long-running Barkhane operation will draw down, with emphasis instead on the special forces-focused Takuba mission which will feature significant French components as well as troops from European partners. Sweden took over command of Takuba, from France, in November 2021 and will command the mission until early 2022. Russia continues to make inroads into security assistance on the continent, in the form of formal

Sub-Saharan Africa defence spending, 2021 – top 5

military advisory roles and military assistance agreements, as well as the activities of private military contractors. Defence policy in the Horn of Africa and East Africa was increasingly nationalised in 2021, with tensions between states putting pressure on established multilateral mechanisms and agreements. The conflict in Ethiopia, meanwhile, raised fears not only for that country’s broader stability but also about the effect the conflict might have on the wider region. Rwanda’s armed forces have demonstrated their ability to operate at reach from the homeland, deploying into the Central African Republic and also sending over 1,000 troops to Mozambique in 2021, where they played a significant role in reversing the gains made by Islamist groups in the northern province of Cabo Delgado. Rwanda is not part of the SADC, but deployed alongside SADC nations in support of Mozambican government forces.

Active military personnel – top 10 (10,000 per unit)

Eritrea 201,750

United States USD754bn

Global total 19,605,000

Nigeria 143,000 Ethiopia 138,000 Democratic Republic of the Congo 134,250

Total sub-Saharan Africa spending USD18bn

Angola 107,000 Sudan 104,300 South Africa

Nigeria

USD3.1bn

USD2.5bn

Uganda

Kenya

Angola

USD1.2bn

USD1.1bn

USD1.0bn

South Africa 74,000 South Sudan 53,000 Uganda 45,000 Chad 33,250

Regional total 7.5% 1,463,000

Sub-Saharan Africa 437

Regional defence policy and economics

438 ►

Armed forces data section

450 ►

Arms procurements and deliveries

452 ►

Sub-Saharan Africa: Defence spending by sub-region, 2008–21 60

% share of total

50 40 30 20 10 0

2008

2009

2010

2011

2012

2013

Southern Africa

2014

2015

West Africa

2016

2017

East Africa

2018

2019

2021

2020

Central Africa

France in the Sahel: from Barkhane to Takuba

6,000 5,000 4,000 3,000 2,000

Non-state armed groups: areas of operation Ansarul Islam Dozo militias ISGS JNIM Katiba Macina (JNIM) Self-defence groups

KIDAL 2014

2016

2017

2019

Operation Barkhane base Closed Operation Barkhane base Task Force Takuba Permanent base

Tessalit

TAOUDÉNIT

1,000 0

International presence EU Training Mission base

ALGERIA Aguelhok

MALI

2020

GAO

Aguelal

Kidal MÉNAKA

Ber Timbuktu Goundam TOMBOUCTOU

MAURITANIA

Diabaly SENEGAL

KAYES

KOULIKORO SÉGOU Koulikoro

MOPTI Douentza Mopti

Gossi

Gao* Ansongo

SIKASSO

Ouagadougou

Sources: IISS; Operation Barkhane; MINUSMA; Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project (ACLED), www.acleddata.com

BURKINA FASO

Ménaka** Chinagodrar

Djibo

Bamako GUINEA

NIGER

Niamey Combat air component

Task force Sabre

GHANA

NIGERIA BENIN

TOGO *UK transport helicopter detachment; **Partners in Task Force Takuba: BEL, CZE, EST, FRA, ITA, SWE. Others are due to join in 2022.

Sub-Saharan Africa

Operation Barkhane: French troop numbers 2014–20

438 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2022

Sub-Saharan Africa WEST AFRICA Security remains fragile in West Africa and the Sahel. Military coups in Mali and Guinea, and continued military rule in Chad after the death of president Idriss Déby in April, highlighted established challenges to state stability, including from the weakness of defence and broader governmental institutions, economic fragility and from the continued activity of Islamist groups in the Sahel. Military activity by regional states and external actors continues in the Sahel, and while France has indicated that it is reframing the nature of its defence support, Paris continues to lead international military efforts in the region. Meanwhile, regional efforts to develop a robust institutional framework for tackling security risks have made little progress. The Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) 2020–24 Action Plan for the ‘eradication’ of terrorism, adopted in 2019 (based on another plan drafted in 2013 but not implemented), has been relatively unsuccessful, while effective coordination with and through the various regional security initiatives remains challenging. Moreover, security problems continue to transcend the boundaries established by regional organisations’ memberships. For instance, the challenge posed first by Boko Haram and now by a range of other Islamist groups concerns both ECOWAS, because of its member states Niger and Nigeria, and the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS), due to its members Chad and Cameroon. These boundaries were straddled by the creation of the Multi-National Joint Task Force (MNJTF) and the G5 Sahel and its Joint Force; the latter integrated Chad with other West African states. However, attacks in the Sahel continue, with insurgent groups remaining active in Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger, and scores of civilians and troops killed in 2021. These included personnel trained for counter-insurgency, such as Nigerien troops deployed on Operation Almahaou (intended to combat Islamist groups in the border area between Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger). Insurgent tactics remain relatively consistent, blending guerrilla

warfare and terrorism, and exploiting mobility and dispersal through the extensive use of pickup trucks and motorcycles. This further necessitates not only good military skills and effective employment by government forces of military equipment, such as surveillance assets, but also better coordination (for instance, reducing any overlap in the differing national doctrines used by international trainers) and the effective employment of military trades, such as military intelligence. It also makes it more important that defence organisations gain the confidence of the local population to improve information gathering. This is more difficult in environments where trust in state authorities may already be low. In June 2021, French President Emmanuel Macron announced that Operation Barkhane, which has operated in the region since 2014, would end in 2022. Although this move does not herald a reduction in France’s military commitment to the region, according to French officials, it does signal a reduction in numbers and a reshaping of France’s military contribution. In the future this will be focused on the international Takuba task force – usually led by France and supported by other European states – designed to offer special-forces support to local armed forces. While Operation Barkhane has provided significant operational experience for French forces – and highlighted capability gaps (such as heavy rotary-wing airlift), as well as showcasing new equipment (such as the Griffon vehicles deployed in 2021) – it has also meant sustained operational costs, as well as wear and tear on both personnel and equipment. France’s decision to end the operation is, moreover, a reflection of reality on the ground. The mission has achieved tactical successes, yet the threat remains persistent, while local security forces continue to be hampered by institutional weaknesses. At a press conference in June, Macron explained, ‘we cannot secure areas that are falling back into lawlessness because states decide not to shoulder their responsibilities. It is impossible, or else it is endless work.’ France had earlier suspended cooperation with Malian forces because the government failed to commit to holding

Sub-Saharan Africa 439

▼ Map 8 Maritime security in the Gulf of Guinea Maritime-security challenges persist in the Gulf of Guinea despite efforts to boost regional maritime capacity. The region accounts for 25% of African maritime traffic. The economic importance of its natural resources, such as hydrocarbons and fisheries, has helped motivate regional states to try and improve maritime security. These measures have included increased cooperation and intelligence sharing within the framework of the Yaoundé Architecture for Maritime Security, which was agreed in 2013 by Central and West African leaders. Pressure on ECCAS, ECOWAS and the Gulf of Guinea Commission to improve maritime security led to the establishment of two regional centres, CRESMAO and CRESMAC, designed to help local navies share information and coordinate activities at sea. However, financial problems continue to affect their readiness and training. Efforts to improve maritime security capacity are also supported by international partners, notably France and the United States. Both countries deploy assets to the region and have organised exercises with regional states to improve maritime capacity. Overall, enhanced coordination between local countries is important, as are better maritime capabilities, but effectively tackling maritime insecurity in the Gulf of Guinea depends as much on addressing its underlying causes.

Senegal Cape Verde Gambia Guinea-Bissau Guinea Sierra Leone

Algeria

Mali

Libya

Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) Economic Community of West African States – Coastal States Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS) Economic Community of Central African States – Coastal States

Egypt

Niger

Togo

Yaoundé: Inter-regional Coordination Centre (ICC)

Pointe-Noire: Central Africa Regional Centre for Maritime Security (CRESMAC) headquarters

Ethiopia

South Sudan

Central African Rep.

Somalia

Uganda

Republic Gabon of Congo

Kenya

Rwanda

Democratic Rep. of the Congo

Burundi

Angola Zambia

Malawi

Zimbabwe

Mozambique

Nigeria, 41

Congo, 5

Madagascar

Mauritius

Botswana

Attacks by pirates and bandits, by type, 2020

Others, 11 Gabon, 3 Equatorial Guinea, 4 Guinea, 5

Seychelles

Tanzania

Namibia

Attacks by pirates and bandits, by country, 2020

Eritrea Djibouti

Cameroon

Equatorial Guinea

Sudan

Chad

Burkina Faso Benin Nigeria Ghana

Côte Liberia d’Ivoire

Abidjan: West Africa Regional Centre for Maritime Security (CRESMAO) headquarters

The Yaoundé Architecture for Maritime Security

Tunisia

Morocco

Assailants took control of the ship or crew members, 21

Robbery or theft within territorial waters, 45

Cameroon, 5

Assailants used weapons or launched an attack without taking control of a vessel, 30

Angola, 11 Benin, 13

Ghana, 16

Others: 2 – Côte d’Ivoire, Liberia, São Tomé, Sierra Leone, Togo; 1 – Democratic Republic of the Congo

An attempted attack on a vessel or a clear intent to attack, 18

Source: French Navy: Maritime Information Cooperation & Awareness Center, ‘Worldwide Maritime Piracy and Robbery Annual Report 2020’

Sub-Saharan Africa

Maritime zones These zones are coordinated by five multinational centres in Angola, Cameroon, Benin, Ghana and Cape Verde. A D E F G

440 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2022

free elections. Paris hopes that the international community will support Takuba and further extend funding support to the G5 Sahel states. But the move likely also reflects frustration, not only with persistent institutional weaknesses, but also over reports of debates in some regional capitals about the possibility of negotiations with some of the armed groups. This is rejected by France, though the former chief of staff said in 2020 that ‘this does not mean, however, that we do not negotiate with an enemy. … And so that will one day raise the question of a political agreement that will be made with people who at one time or another have been the enemies of the Barkhane force, the enemies of the Malian armed forces. It is not a choice of the military, it is a choice of politicians, starting with Malian politicians.’ International involvement in West Africa is growing in other ways. In 2019 Russia signed a defence cooperation agreement with Mali. More recently, there have been a number of apparent protests against Western military support in Mali, calling instead for cooperation with Russia. In October 2021 Washington and Paris expressed concern over reports that the government in Bamako was exploring a defence support agreement with the Russian private military company (PMC) the Wagner Group.

EAST AFRICA International defence relationships in the Horn of Africa and East Africa changed in 2021. The United States withdrew its troops from Somalia by mid-January, although US troops continue to visit the country to deliver security cooperation, and US counter-terrorist airstrikes continue. Four months later, the US imposed restrictions on its economic and security assistance programmes for Ethiopia. France also withdrew defence support from Ethiopia, citing concerns over the conflict in Tigray. In their place, Russia has renewed relationships, including by signing a defence assistance agreement with Ethiopia in July 2021, and continues to seek Red Sea access in both Eritrea and Somaliland. China has maintained quieter support, linked to the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation Beijing Action Plan (2019–21) which calls for security cooperation under the Belt and Road Initiative. Chinese cooperation includes military training, intelligence sharing and counter-terrorism efforts. The need for rearmament following the Ethiopian National

Defense Force (ENDF) losses to the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF), and lessons on the utility of uninhabited aerial vehicles (UAVs), have reportedly sent Ethiopia in the direction of new suppliers, with both Iran and Turkey mentioned in media reporting. In the meantime, the United Kingdom cemented its defence relationship in the region with the signing of a new agreement with Kenya in July 2021. In March 2021 the African Union Mission to Somalia (AMISOM) was granted an extension to December 2021. The continuing lack of success in developing a coherent and effective Somali security sector, combined with the lessons of the withdrawal from Afghanistan, seems likely to guarantee the future of AMISOM at least to the end of 2022. This is under consideration by the African Union, but decisions on the nature of the mission and the troopcontributing nations are yet to be made. The 4th Session of the IGAD (Intergovernmental Authority on Development) Special Task Force on the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden was held in Ethiopia in July 2021 following a series of six national consultative meetings over the previous two years. IGAD member states endorsed initiatives relating to peace and security as well as capacity-building, and recommended the development of a Common IGAD Position, Regional Plan of Action and Convention on the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden.

Intra-regional tensions

Defence policy in the Horn of Africa and East Africa was increasingly nationalised in 2021, with tensions between states putting pressure on established multi-lateral mechanisms and agreements. This has been most visible in the near-conflict between Sudan and Ethiopia over the disputed al-Fashaga triangle. This dispute is likely to endure given the Sudanese military occupation of 90% of the triangle, which was previously largely overseen by Ethiopian regional and federal forces, and the construction of new roads and bridges over the Atbara River firmly connecting the triangle to the Sudanese state and economy. Some reports have linked Sudan’s action in al-Fashaga with the tension between Egypt, Ethiopia and Sudan over the continuing Ethiopian construction and filling of the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD). For instance, although bilateral Egyptian and Sudanese military exercises in Sudan in November 2020 and April 2021 did not explicitly target Ethiopia, the exercises – which included the dispatch of Egyptian combat

Sub-Saharan Africa 441

Ethiopia was being held in North Gondar and North Wollo in Amhara. In the meantime, the federal government has initiated a recruiting drive for the ENDF, while reports have also emerged of new UAV acquisitions including platforms of Chinese, Iranian and Turkish design. Some ENDF armoured vehicles and equipment were returned to Ethiopia from UNAMID in Sudan via Djibouti in midAugust 2021. The Amhara regional leadership have also started to mobilise men of military age both for the ASF and as militias to defend Amhara land against TDF incursions. Ethiopia’s regional forces, and Eritrea The close operational relationship between the ENDF and the ASF, and between other Ethiopian regional special forces, has raised questions about the constitutional legitimacy of quasi-military forces under the control of Ethiopia’s regional governments. As a result, and following a study lasting over three years about the future of policing in Ethiopia (conducted latterly by the federal Ministry of Peace), there have been calls, including from the political opposition, for the regional special forces to be incorporated into the ENDF. Some elements of the Oromia and Somali regions’ special forces are already reported to have been operating with the ENDF in ENDF uniform. Should the Tigray conflict be resolved, it is possible that there will be pressure from the federal government to bring the regional special forces into the Ethiopian Federal Police and the ENDF. These regional special forces vary in their number of troops. In 2019, analysts estimated that they numbered between 3,000 and 25,000 between the nine regions and two city administrations of Ethiopia. By the start of the conflict, Tigray had reorganised its special forces, police and militia into a force perhaps up to 250,000-strong. Following battlefield losses by the ENDF and regional recruitment drives, especially in Amhara and Oromia, the regional special forces now outnumber the ENDF, though precise figures are unavailable. By their existence the regional special forces represent a challenge to federal control of the regions, and the federal government in Addis Ababa wishes to reduce their autonomy. As such, developing clearer and more formal command and control links between the ENDF and the regional forces is likely to be a priority. In order to redress the balance between the roughly 60,000 ENDF troops available in November 2020 to fight in Tigray (those in Tigray or close enough to engage) and the much larger TDF, the Ethiopian government requested the assistance of the EDF. The EDF deployed into Tigray in large numbers, with

Sub-Saharan Africa

The Ethiopian National Defense Force (ENDF) traditionally saw its role as territorial defence against external threats, notably from Eritrea and Somalia, but also from more distant potential adversaries such as Egypt. As a result, the ENDF was organised into four commands, each focused outwards towards one of Ethiopia’s borders with Eritrea, Somaliland/Somalia, South Sudan and Sudan. Since 2016 the tensions within Ethiopia and the widespread unrest and deployment of small (company to battalion-size) contingents to operate in support of the regional and federal police forces have resulted in a redeployment of one command from Shire to Hawassa in the south and the establishment of new commands at Addis Ababa in the centre of the country and Nekemte in western Oromia. The ENDF has had mixed fortunes since the start of the conflict between the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF) and the federal government in November 2020. It appears to have maintained its organisational and command and control structures despite suffering battlefield losses in two distinct phases in early November 2020 and in May and June 2021. An early loss of initiative and equipment was addressed by the extensive deployment of armed UAVs and the involvement of the Eritrean Defense Force (EDF), Amhara Special Forces (ASF) and Amhara militias from mid-November 2020. (The ASF are formally part of the Amhara region’s police force, a model that has been implemented by all regions in Ethiopia for at least five years.) The ENDF’s air superiority, in terms of fixed-wing aircraft, helicopters and UAVs, was apparent in engagements in November, when the TPLF’s Tigray Defense Force (TDF) lost a series of positional battles resulting in the loss of the regional capital and re-establishment of an interim political administration in Tigray by the federal state. However, failure to subsequently locate and neutralise the key political and military leadership of the TDF, or to capture the remaining forces, allowed the TDF to transition into an insurgent campaign in which the equipment advantage of the ENDF, EDF and ASF was successfully overcome by the TDF’s ability to deny freedom of movement by the use of ambushes. In late June 2021, following the retaking of Mekele by the TDF and the declaration of a unilateral ‘humanitarian ceasefire’ and withdrawal of the ENDF from central Tigray by the federal government, the TDF resumed more conventional operations and attacked the Amhara and Afar regions. It remains to be seen whether the TDF can continue to prevail conventionally, and as of early September 2021 there were signs that the TDF offensive

442 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2022

some analysts estimating a peak perhaps of 100,000. Analysts report that relationships between the ENDF and EDF were strained and, although joint operations were conducted in central Tigray, command relationships remained national with no overall ENDF command of all forces in the field. Lessons for the ENDF The loss of Tigray meant that four of the ENDF’s key training schools – signals, intelligence, logistics and engineering – were lost, as was the Northern Command headquarters. However, the tank, artillery, mechanised training, officer training, recruit training and air and aviation training bases are all located in central and southern Ethiopia and remain under ENDF control. The re-establishment of the Ethiopian Navy, announced at a formation ceremony in early May 2021, illustrates that the ENDF has not been solely focused on the war, while large ENDF contingents remain in Somalia, South Sudan and Sudan on UN and African Union peacekeeping missions. However, building a new ENDF while concurrently fighting the war in the north will prove challenging. Until the war in Tigray, the US and France were key development partners for the ENDF, while much technical equipment was purchased from China. The suspension of Western military cooperation agreements has paved the way for non-traditional partners to offer support: a military-technical cooperation agreement was signed with Russia in July 2021. The ENDF has been engaged in a similar conflict and on the same terrain to that fought by the army of the Ethiopian Derg regime that ruled from 1974 to 1991, but with significant differences. The Tigrayans do not now have the strategic depth afforded to them previously by Eritrea and do not have access to support and supply from Sudan. The ENDF’s early successes came when it employed modern surveillance systems and precision weapons from UAVs to strike Tigrayan equipment while also denying communications. Nevertheless, the ENDF has been subjected to tactical defeats on the ground in Tigray whenever it has emulated the tactics of the Derg

aircraft to Sudan – coincided with the start of a new round of negotiations over the second filling of the GERD. Despite these exercises, Ethiopia continued filling the dam in July 2021. Meanwhile, the African Union–United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID) force was withdrawn from Sudan’s Darfur region by the time a UN report was issued on 27 July. Some contingent equipment remained to be shipped back to various countries or redeployed

army – manoeuvring on roads in hilly terrain in lightly armoured ex-Soviet vehicles with only limited air cover. Another consideration relates to personnel strength. The recruitment drive underway in 2021 could indicate either the need to replace combat losses, or perhaps also the ENDF’s intention to grow larger than its total strength of around 138,000 at the start of 2021; indeed, analysts considered that this total was insufficient when the armed forces were called on to operate across the country for an extended period of time. It is also possible that the ENDF will look to bolster its air superiority, precision weapons, and intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance capabilities, while new UAVs will likely continue to feature in future acquisition requirements. Key precision-strike capabilities such as the A200 and PHL-03 long-range rockets were not secured by the ENDF before the conflict, were lost to the TDF and subsequently used to strike Gondar, Bahir Dar and Asmara, though efforts will have been made to either destroy or recapture these weapons. Such key capabilities will in future be held in more secure locations. Another lesson likely relates to communications. Destruction of mobile telephone and communications infrastructure has been a feature of the conflict, as has denial of internet services to areas held by TDF forces. These tactics are likely to continue in any future conflicts in Ethiopia and the ENDF will seek communications capabilities, including SATCOM, that mitigate the effects of any disruption to communications. It remains to be seen what precise lessons will be drawn from the conflict by regional states, but it seems likely that all will have paid close attention to the use of indigenous UAV and long-range missile capabilities by the ENDF and TPLF. Possible acquisition and integration of capabilities like UAVs – particularly armed UAVs – would not only have an effect were they to be used in combat, but would also complicate the monopoly currently held by some states, such as by the US against al-Shabaab in Somalia. At the same time, it would raise similar questions about the quality and legality of the associated targeting processes and protocols as have been raised elsewhere.

to other missions. In October, one month after a failed coup attempt in Sudan, and amid continued tensions between the armed forces and civilian authorities, the armed forces succeeded in toppling the administration and detaining the prime minister and other government figures. The military effort was apparently led by General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan, who had been chair of the administration’s powersharing Sovereign Council.

Tensions between Somalia and Kenya over issues including gas exploration rights off the coast of southern Somalia caused a public rift between the two countries in early 2021 in advance of Somali elections. This rift is exacerbated by the tripartite cooperation between Eritrea, Ethiopia and Somalia which has divided the Horn of Africa since Ethiopia gave up the IGAD chair, handing it to Sudan in November 2019. As a result of these tensions, IGAD influence and engagement in Horn security affairs cannot be assumed. Meanwhile, the motivations underlying Eritrea’s involvement in the Horn of Africa remain difficult to gauge. The 2018 peace deal with Ethiopia has continued to give Eritrea’s President Isaias Afwerki access and influence within the region and beyond that he did not enjoy from 2000–18. However, Eritrea’s involvement in the Tigray conflict in November 2020 was instrumental in the early defeat of the TPLF’s armed forces, the Tigray Defense Forces, though reports of the Eritrean Defence Forces’ (EDF) subsequent ill treatment of and crimes against Tigrayan civilians has once more placed Eritrea in the international spotlight: in August the US sanctioned the Eritrean armed forces’ chief of staff and later, in November, placed the EDF itself on its sanctions list. The EDF’s positions along the Ethiopia–Sudan border in the al-Fashaga area illustrate the difficult and contentious position that Eritrea continues to adopt with regional neighbours.

CENTRAL AND SOUTHERN AFRICA The insurgency in Mozambique’s northern Cabo Delgado province continues to attract international concern and has led to the deployment of a military mission by the Southern African Development Community (SADC), as well as by Rwandan forces. The decision by energy firm Total to halt production and withdraw staff from its gas project at Afungi in the north of the province in April 2021, declaring ‘force majeure’, highlighted the gravity of the situation. Insurgents had captured the coastal town of Mocímboa da Praia in August 2020, and in March 2021 captured the town of Palma. Government forces lacked the strength, mobility and air support to contain the insurgency, and private military companies engaged earlier by Maputo had failed to stem the attacks. In April, the government agreed to an SADC ‘technical assessment mission’, which recommended deployment of SADC forces,

proposing a light infantry brigade plus a naval force to interdict supplies coming by sea. Meanwhile, Mozambique’s President Filipe Nyusi visited Rwanda in April to request assistance. From 9 July, 1,000 Rwandan troops and police, along with infantry fighting vehicles and small interceptor craft, started deploying. They immediately went on the offensive, securing the Afungi Peninsula on 10 July, the key crossroads at Awasse on 24 July, Palma on 4 August and Mocímboa da Praia on 8 August, together with elements of Mozambique’s army and navy. Meanwhile, President Nyusi signed the status of forces agreement with the SADC on 16 July, and Botswana and South African special forces deployed by C-130 Hercules to Pemba on 21 July, with larger elements following by road, the Botswana contingent through Zimbabwe, and a South African Navy patrol vessel arrived at Pemba on 1 August. The SADC mission was formally launched by President Nyusi in Pemba on 9 August. South Africa committed around 1,500 personnel, including an infantry battalion, a special forces group with supporting elements, a naval element and an air element with two Oryx helicopters and a Cessna Caravan deploying to Pemba in August and a C-130 Hercules providing transport capacity. Botswana committed 296 personnel, including special forces, and deployed using its own C-130Bs, while Lesotho deployed a company. Zimbabwe declined to join the combat force but undertook to provide 300 instructors and a staff officer, while Angola provided an Il-76 transport aircraft and ten staff officers. Tanzania had already deployed force elements along the Ruvuma River to prevent overspill and was reported to have deployed troops to Pemba in early August. This still left the force short of two infantry battalions, and it was not clear whether South Africa would be able to deploy and sustain other maritime forces, possibly including a submarine and frigates. However, even if the full strength of some 3,000 is reached, the combined forces of the SADC and Rwanda will still face a significant task, with a premium placed on air mobility and support. Another challenge will be coordination. The SADC force has its own command structure, but must coordinate with the Rwandans, Mozambique forces and, at least to some extent, with the European Union training mission (agreed by Brussels on 12 July) and its protection force, and a US training team. Meanwhile, instability persists elsewhere. There was a surge in violence in the Central African

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Republic (CAR) at the end of 2020, which was halted by forces from the UN Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic (MINUSCA), Rwandan personnel, and the Russian private military company Wagner Group. Official Russian military advisers also remain in the country. Conflict continues in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), particularly in its eastern provinces, involving guerrillas from Burundi, Rwanda and Uganda who use the DRC as a base, as well as local tribal militias and criminal groups. This is despite a large peacekeeping force that includes an offensive brigade but is arguably too small for the task with only minimal organic air support. There were other foreign deployments, including troops from Zambia in 2020 in Tanganyika (where there is a territorial dispute between the DRC and Zambia), while elsewhere Burundian and Rwandan troops partnered in operations with government forces. However, DRC forces continue to suffer from institutional weakness, while disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration (DDR) programmes have met only limited success.

SOUTH AFRICA The effect of South Africa’s defence funding challenges was highlighted in July 2021 when the South African National Defence Force (SANDF) was tasked to deploy in support of the police during unrest in the KwaZulu-Natal and Gauteng provinces. Only two C-130s were available, out of a nominal total of six, reflecting an approach of maintaining only a limited number of each type for operations, cycling the fleet between operations and storage (analysts report that this has affected more than just the C-130 fleet). The deployment additionally coincided with demands on airlift related to the deployment to Mozambique as part of the SADC intervention force. In late July, the navy dispatched one of its Warrior-class patrol craft, while the intention apparently remains to deploy a frigate, though maintaining vessels on station will require significant sustainment capacities. With defence funding moribund, maintaining the availability and utility of equipment is also determined by the level of funding available for operations, training and maintenance. For instance, one of the South African Navy’s four frigates and one of the three submarines have been refitted, but there are few precision weapons on the Gripen

fighters, Rooivalk attack helicopters and Super Lynx naval helicopters. IRIS-T imaging infrared air-to-air missiles and Paveway II laser-guided bombs have been integrated on the Gripen, but it lacks beyondvisual-range missiles. The reduction in funding levels – with the 2021 budget down by 19.5% in real terms compared to 2020 figures – means that available funding has to cover day-to-day costs as well as maintenance and operational costs, not to mention modernisation and upgrades. Meanwhile, some 61% of the budget is consumed by personnel costs, partly because a large number of staff are over-age for their rank, with some at the top of their pay scales and receiving family allowances and possibly other benefits. Without funding for severance packages, however, it can prove difficult for armed forces to retire such personnel. Low levels of funding for upgrades and acquisitions has not only meant that the SANDF has had to retain old equipment – much of the army’s equipment dates from the 1970s–80s – it has also hindered its ability to address capability gaps, such as maritime surveillance aircraft. Challenges for the force include the army’s infantry budget, which fell by 19.8% between 2020 and 2021 (reducing from ZAR6.71 billion to ZAR5.38bn or USD408 million to USD364m respectively) with no funding for the new Badger (project Hoefyster) infantry fighting vehicles. In the same period, the air force reduced its operational flying hours from 17,200 to 15,000, and ‘air combat capability’ funding was reduced by 60%, from ZAR867m (USD52.7m) in 2020 to ZAR343m (USD23.2m) in 2021. Also, the Special Defence Account, used to fund multi-year acquisition and major upgrades, is set to be reduced to zero in the 2021/22 financial year. Meanwhile, operational employment remains high. In addition to a combat group and a mixed helicopter unit in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), and border patrol duties, SANDF personnel deployed during 2020 to assist other government departments with their coronavirus response, dispatched 25,000 troops to deal with unrest in July and August 2021, and sent around 1,500 personnel to Mozambique as part of the SADC intervention force. The challenge of reconciling funding and commitments is becoming more pressing.

Defence industry

South Africa’s defence industry continues to struggle, affected by low levels of acquisition

funding and export support among other factors. The 2017 Defence Industry Strategy envisaged an increase in acquisition funding and government support for defence exports, as well as a streamlined process for export permits, but analysts report that there has been little progress on this or the aims of the 2020 Aerospace and Defence Masterplan. State-owned Denel, the country’s primary defence manufacturer, was already facing a severe liquidity crisis before the pandemic, with the company struggling to pay staff wages since 2019. In 2019–20, Denel reported losses of ZAR1.96bn (USD119m). The company is undergoing a restructuring effort to raise funds through divestments in order to increase cash flow and improve the balance sheet. It is also reported to have lost a number of engineers, notably in its missile and UAV division, Denel Dynamics. For several years Denel reportedly resisted taking foreign partners and it remains hard to gauge the level of interest that the firm would now generate. Analysts note challenges for other local firms, though Paramount’s maritime division continues to sell patrol craft to states in West Africa. Other large defence companies are foreign owned, including subsidiaries of Hensoldt, Rheinmetall and Saab, while smaller firms include Thales and ASELSAN, the latter focusing on research and development (R&D), initially in optronics. Hensoldt has started to establish a radar development arm in South Africa to complement its electronic warfare and optronics companies, working closely with the Council for Scientific and Industrial Research. Smaller companies that provide components or services and rely on orders from the SANDF or Denel face a challenging business climate. Some, like Incomar, have secured international R&D contracts, but permit delays are reported to have hampered some export-focused firms.

DEFENCE ECONOMICS Macroeconomics

The International Monetary Fund (IMF) estimate of a 1.8% economic contraction in sub-Saharan Africa for 2020 may seem mild in comparison to the global average of 3.2%, but this estimate masks some of the challenges facing the region. The contraction represents the deepest recession since the 1960s in a region that faces continued waves of COVID-19 infections but lacks the purchasing power to fund the extensive vaccination programmes or

the generous fiscal support schemes that have been offered in advanced economies. The region is struggling to vaccinate even essential frontline workers, with widespread vaccine availability unlikely in several countries before 2023, while most have entered the second wave of the coronavirus pandemic with depleted fiscal and monetary buffers which further restricts the support options available. Access to external financing on accommodative terms is also more limited than in advanced economies. Sub-Saharan Africa was the world’s slowestgrowing region in economic terms in 2021, amid an uneven global recovery. The regional real GDP growth of 3.4% and 4.1% projected for 2021 and 2022 respectively is based on expectations of an improvement in export performance with stronger external demand from trading partners like China and the US, higher commodity prices, and a mild recovery in consumption and investment. However, global output projections of 6.0% and 4.9% growth for 2021 and 2022 respectively indicate that sub-Saharan African development will continue to lag behind the rest of the world. According to the IMF, many countries across the region will not see per capita incomes return to pre-crisis levels before 2025 and cumulative output losses will amount to almost 12% of GDP over 2020–21. The economic outlook varies across the region too. Tourism-dependent economies, such as those of Cabo Verde, Mauritius and the Seychelles, experienced double-digit contractions in real GDP in 2020 and will see sluggish growth in 2021 as global travel restrictions persist. According to the World Bank, a reduction in external demand meant that in 2020, economies contracted in many of the region’s industrial and agricultural-commodity exporters, such as Angola, Mali and the Republic of Congo. However, recoveries are underway. For instance, strengthening oil prices mean that Angola’s economy is expected to expand in 2021 for the first time since 2015. Meanwhile, the economies in Benin, Ethiopia and Guinea did not contract in 2020 as their COVID-19 infection rates remained low, minimising disruption to economic activity, although all experienced reduced rates of growth. IMF data suggests that the economic impact on Ethiopia was more severe in the first quarter of 2021 as continued coronavirus-related uncertainty depressed non-agricultural activity, locust swarms impacted agricultural output and the conflict with

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446 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2022

the TPLF precipitated the closure of factories and mines at an estimated cost of USD20 million per month to Ethiopia’s economy. More broadly, employment across the region fell by more than 8% in 2020 with more than 32m people falling into extreme poverty and longer-term prospects challenged by prolonged school closures and widespread disruption to education caused by the pandemic. According to the IMF, sub-Saharan Africa needs additional external financing to the tune of USD425 billion from 2021–25 to help strengthen coronavirus-response spending and recover the ground lost during the pandemic. The fragile regional recovery is subject to several risks beyond the uncertainty surrounding the trajectory of the pandemic and vaccine programmes. The World Bank cites food insecurity as a key risk, with food inflation in some countries

exacerbated by currency depreciation. Moreover, supply-chain disruptions stemming from the pandemic meant that inflation rates spiked across the region in 2020, a situation that persisted into 2021. This increases the likelihood that regional populations (primarily in Eastern and Southern Africa) will be at a higher risk from hunger or food crises should conflict or other hazards like natural disasters further disrupt agricultural production. Meanwhile, there is also a possibility that social unrest may affect recovery efforts. For instance, the widespread protests in South Africa resulted in significant business and supply-chain disruption in summer 2019. Meanwhile, financial concerns remain acute. Fiscal pressure on governments will likely increase should sovereign borrowing costs rise, limiting their ability to provide broader domestic support.

▼ Map 9 Sub-Saharan Africa: regional defence spending1

Mali

Senegal

Cape Verde

Chad

Gambia

Eritrea

Sudan

Burkina Faso

Guinea-Bissau

Djibouti Guinea

Côte d’Ivoire

Sierra Leone Liberia

Niger

Nigeria

Central African Rep.

South Sudan Ethiopia

Ghana Benin Togo Equatorial Guinea

Gabon

[1] Map illustrating 2021 planned defencespending levels (in USD at market exchange rates), as well as the annual real percentage change in planned defence spending between 2020 and 2021 (at constant 2015 prices and exchange rates). Percentage changes in defence spending can vary considerably from year to year, as states revise the level of funding allocated to defence. Changes indicated here highlight the short-term trend in planned defence spending between 2020 and 2021. Actual spending changes prior to 2020, and projected spending levels post-2021, are not reflected.

Somalia

Cameroon Uganda Rwanda Republic of Congo Democratic

Kenya

Burundi Seychelles

Rep. of the Congo Tanzania

Angola Zambia Botswana

Malawi Mozambique Zimbabwe Madagascar

Namibia South Africa

Swaziland Lesotho

Mauritius

Sub-Saharan Africa 447

Defence economics

Economic constraints continue to subdue defence expenditure in sub-Saharan Africa. In 2014, regional defence spending accounted for 1.5% of the global total, a proportion that has steadily fallen every year since, to just 0.9% in 2021. After strong, double-digit real-terms growth in 2013 and 2014, regional spending contracted by 3.9% annually on average every year up to and including 2019. There was a brief rise in 2020, when regional spending increased by 7.5% as a result of an increase in Nigeria’s budget, though this was reversed in 2021 when regional spending contracted by 7.4% in real terms. This means that regional spending has fallen to the same level as in 2012 in real terms, to USD16bn. Nigeria’s 2020 defence budget rose by 41% in real terms, to NGN878bn or USD2.44bn (compared to NGN594bn or USD1.83bn in 2019), with spending primarily directed towards army personnel costs. An emergency appropriations bill, signed in response to the coronavirus pandemic, implemented spending measures that included an increase to NGN900bn (USD2.51bn) for defence in 2020. The 2021 budget of NGN966bn (USD2.54bn) is a 7% nominal increase from 2020 but with inflation running at 16%, this translates to a 6.9% cut in real terms. Nonetheless, Nigerian spending is still considerably higher than the levels seen over the last decade, and the real-terms cut in 2021 is offset by increases in other West African countries including Benin, Burkina Faso, Ghana, Mali and Senegal. As a result, West African spending has grown to account

for 39.0% of total spending in sub-Saharan Africa and now exceeds that in Southern African states. South Africa’s defence budget has stagnated over the last decade and Angolan spending has declined every year since 2015, which has meant that sub-regional spending reduced from 60.7% of the regional total in 2009 to 34.3% in 2021. Indeed, Nigeria’s 2021 defence budget is just USD300m less than that of South Africa, which is a fraction of the USD3bn difference that existed between the two budgets as recently as 2012. If trends continue, Nigeria’s defence budget could exceed South Africa’s in 2022. South Africa’s defence budget fell to ZAR46.3bn (USD3.13bn) in 2021 from ZAR54.2bn (USD3.29bn) in 2020. In real terms, the budget fell to USD2.65bn (in 2015 US dollars), almost USD1bn less than the 2012 level of USD3.84bn (in 2015 US dollars), signalling a decade of stagnation in military spending. The Medium-Term Expenditure Framework (MTEF) to 2023/24 projects that the Department of Defence (DoD) budget will grow modestly to ZAR46.8bn (USD3.15bn) in 2022/23 and to ZAR47.2bn (USD3.18bn) in 2023/24. As such, the budget does not build in any significant growth, making a return to 2012 peak levels of defence spending unlikely until the latter half of the 2020s. Investment spending accounted for 9.7% of the budget in 2021/22 and will fall to just 2.2% in 2022/23 before recovering slightly to 4.0% by 2023/24 according to the MTEF. Even before the pandemic, South African public spending had been restricted by a poorly

▼ Figure 27 Sub-Saharan Africa: regional defence spending as % of GDP (average) 2.0 1.59

1.53

% of GDP

1.5

1.40

1.35

1.49

1.42

Other East Africa, 1.5% Ethiopia, 2.2% Tanzania, 4.7%

Central Africa, 5.4% South Africa, 17.6%

Kenya 6.2%

Angola 5.4%

Uganda 6.8%

Botswana 2.9%

1.0

0.5

0.0

Other Southern Africa 8.3%

Other West Africa 16.2% 2016

2017

2018

2019

2020

2021

Note: Analysis excludes Djibouti, Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, Guinea Bissau, Seychelles, Somalia, Sudan

Côte d’Ivoire, 3.6%

Nigeria, 14.3% Mali, 4.9%

Note: Analysis excludes Djibouti, Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, Guinea Bissau, Seychelles, Somalia, Sudan

Sub-Saharan Africa

▼ Figure 28 Sub-Saharan Africa: defence spending by country and sub-region, 2021

USDbn (constant, 2015)

5 0

-5

0 2008

2009

2010

2011

Southern Africa

2012

2013

West Africa

2014

2015

East Africa

2016

2017

Central Africa

2018

2019

Real growth

2020

2021

-10

Regional defence spending % growth year on year

448 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2022

▲ Figure 29 Sub-Saharan Africa: total defence spending by sub-region, 2008–21

performing economy and rising unemployment, among other factors. In the 2021 DoD Annual Performance Plan, then-minister of defence and military veterans, Nosiviwe Noluthando MapisaNqakula, acknowledged that the DoD has been operating on a constrained budget in recent years and that the burden has become more pronounced as the pandemic necessitated shifts in government funding from various departments to mitigate the impact of the crisis. The minister continued that ‘this has had a dire effect on the operational effectiveness of the South African National Defence Force’ and that the current performance plan is intended as a guide to navigate through these ‘difficult times’. Angola’s defence budget increased from AGO586bn in 2020 to AGO627bn in 2021, but this mild 7% nominal increase is not reflected in US dollar terms as the Angolan kwanza continues to devalue against the US dollar. In 2014, one US dollar was worth 98 kwanza. By 2020, the currency had fallen to AGO716 to the dollar and the currency further devalued to AGO789 to the dollar in 2021. Consequently, the defence budget fell in dollar terms from USD1.01bn in 2020 to USD0.96bn in 2021, a fraction of the 2014 high of USD6.85bn. The inflation rate in Angola has also averaged 24% annually since 2015, negating the effect of any nominal spending increases and leading to six consecutive years of real cuts to the defence budget: in 2021 it fell by 22.2% compared to 2020 spending. Angola’s financial difficulties pre-date the economic fallout of the pandemic and primarily stem from the 2014–16 collapse in oil prices. The oil sector accounts for between one-third and one-half of Angola’s annual GDP. This dependence will endure in the medium

term as plans to transform the economy from one dependent on oil prices to one based on privatesector growth will take time. The picture is different in East Africa. Consistent spending in Tanzania, combined with a 2020 jump in Uganda’s defence budget, means that the sub-region now accounts for 21.2% of total regional spending, up from 11.2% in 2010. However, spending in Central Africa continues to stagnate with the sub-region now accounting for 5.4% of the sub-Saharan Africa total, down from a high of 7.4% in 2016.

Defence industry

The lack of sustained growth in defence spending and the low proportions allocated to investment and R&D have severely restricted the development of indigenous capabilities and local defence industries. The South African DoD Strategic Plan 2020–2025 acknowledged that the economic outlook and persistently low defence budget allocations had constrained the implementation of the National Policy on Defence (the Defence Review 2015), ‘with a profound adverse impact on the availability and modernisation of required defence capabilities’. State-owned Denel, the country’s primary defence manufacturer, was already facing a severe liquidity crisis before the pandemic with the company struggling to pay staff wages in 2019. Denel reported 2019/20 losses of ZAR1.96bn (USD119m) and the company is undergoing a restructuring effort to raise funds through divestments in order to increase cash flow and improve the balance sheet. Meanwhile, Nigeria’s efforts to bolster indigenous capabilities have also been restricted by economic conditions, such as persistently low oil prices since 2015, which have hampered investment.

Sub-Saharan Africa 449

capital spending has fallen from 26.6% of the budget in 2019 to 12.9% in 2020 and 12.6% in 2021. Similarly, while allocations to the state-owned Defence Industries Corporation of Nigeria (DICON) have been maintained over the last five years, allocations have fallen proportionally, from 1.1% of the defence budget in 2016 to just 0.43% in 2021.

Sub-Saharan Africa

Conflicting budget priorities, including the drive to professionalise the armed forces and the need to counter insurgent groups, creates a higher personnel and operational burden within the budget, further constricting R&D funds. Indeed, the personnel account was principally responsible for the 2020 surge in Nigeria’s defence spending. As a result,

450 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2022

Arms procurements and deliveries – Sub-Saharan Africa Significant events in 2021

MARCH

DENEL AND PROJECT HOEFYSTER

The South African parliament’s joint standing committee on defence convened to discuss Project Hoefyster, which has been delayed for nine years, and the financial difficulties of Denel, South Africa’s state-owned defence manufacturer. Project Hoefyster is an indigenous new-generation infantry combat vehicle programme, launched in 2006, for the procurement of 243 Badger infantry fighting vehicles (IFVs) to replace the South African National Defence Force (SANDF)’s ageing Ratel IFV by 2023. The project is organised in five phases, under which Denel Land Systems is to develop and acquire the Badger through an agreement with Finland’s Patria, including the initial supply of hulls, technology transfer and local production. The first and second phases of the project have not been completed, largely due to Denel’s financial problems and a lack of technical and production capacity. The committee was advised to cancel the programme. Denel has been South Africa’s leading equipment supplier and 40% of Denel’s order book comes from the SANDF. However, the firm’s debt amounts to ZAR3.4bn (USD210.44m) despite a cash injection by the government of ZAR2.37bn (USD146.68m) in four tranches in 2007, 2013, 2020 and 2021. In August, Denel outlined plans to restructure the company’s six divisions into two (engineering-and-manufacturing and maintenance) over a five-year period.

MARCH

ARMSCOR ANNUAL PROCUREMENT PLAN

South Africa’s defence procurement agency, the Armaments Corporation of South Africa (ARMSCOR), published its annual procurement plan containing a list of 71 tenders to be completed by April 2022. The list covers mostly industrial-equipment acquisition and infrastructure-upgrade work to modernise local industry. As part of ARMSCOR’s defence-industry enterprise and supplier development (ESD) scheme, local bidders who comply with at least Level 4 of the Broad-Based Black Economic Empowerment (B-BBEE) strategy will be preferred. The agency also placed a tender notice worth ZAR350m (USD21.66m) in August indicating that it also ‘had a vested interest in the advancement of [ESD] beneficiary entities which are at least 51% black owned’. The majority (79.5%) of ARMSCOR’s funding comes from the national defence budget and the agency generated a revenue of ZAR1.8bn (USD109.38m) in 2020.

JULY

TURKISH MRAP SALES TO SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA

Turkish company Katmerciler announced it had secured a USD91.42m contract to supply Kenya with 118 Hizir protected patrol vehicles with deliveries to take place in 2022 and 2023. This is the company’s largest export contract to date and its second Hizir sale to sub-Saharan Africa after a USD20.7m contract with Ghana signed in 2019. This follows a trend of growing Turkish exports to the region, with at least 57 and 40 Cobra armoured vehicles delivered to Ghana and Burkina Faso, respectively, since 2018. Nigeria has been the biggest customer in the region to date, taking delivery of 204 wheeled armoured vehicles from Turkey between 2007 and 2008.

AUGUST

NIGERIAN AIR FORCE RECAPITALISATION

The Nigerian Air Force (NAF) formally introduced into service the first six of 12 A-29 Super Tucano trainer/ light attack aircraft, marking another milestone in the NAF’s equipment-modernisation drive of recent years. The USD500m contract was agreed with the US government in 2018 and is currently the largest Foreign Military Sale contract in sub-Saharan Africa. Earlier in 2021, three JF-17 Thunder fighter aircraft, from Pakistan, entered service. These are Nigeria’s first new fast jets since 2009. In the past several years, the NAF has taken delivery of attack and transport helicopters from Russia and Italy as the force has recapitalised its equipment inventory to fight the continuing insurgency in the north of the country.

Sub-Saharan Africa 451

▼Figure 30

Sudan: defence imports since 2005

Erratic economic growth and high inflation have limited procurements since the end of the civil war in 2005. Defence acquisitions during this time have typically consisted of second-hand Cold War-era armoured vehicles, helicopters and attack aircraft from Belarus, Russia and, most significantly, Ukraine. However, from 2015 China has sold Sudan small numbers of fighter ground-attack aircraft, armed uninhabited aerial vehicles (UAVs) and also an intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) satellite. No major procurement

has been observed since former president Omar al-Bashir was deposed in April 2019. A military coup in October 2021 led to weeks of mass protests and ultimately the formal reinstatement of the civilian prime minister in November 2021. Prior to the coup, the government was working with the IMF to stabilise the economy and the currency. It is likely that a resumption of procurement activity is dependent not only on improved economic circumstances, but also on greater political stability.

Ukraine Main Battle Tank

Belarus

T-72M1

Ground-Attack Cairo Aircraft

T-55

Su-25 Frogfoot EGYPT

Reconnaissance Vehicle

BRDM-2

Infantry Fighting Vehicle

BTR-3E1

Russia Attack Helicopter

Mi-24 Hind

Medium Transport Helicopter

Mi-8MT Hip

BMP-1 Self-Propelled Artillery

2S1 Gvozdika

Multiple Rocket Launcher Fighter Aircraft

BM-21 Grad MiG-29UB Fulcrum B

SUDAN ERITREA

Khartoum

CHAD

ETHIOPIA

White Nile

China Fighter Ground- FTC-2000 Attack Aircraft Addis Ababa DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO

SOUTH SUDAN

Heavy Combat ISR UAV

CH-3

ISR Satellite

SRSS-1

CH-4

Sub-Saharan Africa

Blue Nile

452 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2022

Angola ANG Angolan Kwanza AOA GDP per capita

2020

2021

AOA

33.8tr

46.1tr

USD

58.4bn

70.3bn 2,201

USD

1,881

Growth

-5.4

-0.7

Inflation

22.3

24.4

Def bdgt

AOA

586bn

627bn

USD

1.01bn

956m

578.26

656.03

USD1=AOA

2022

Real-terms defence budget trend (USDbn, constant 2015) 5.41 1.41 2008

Population

2015

2021

33,642,646

Age

0–14

15–19

20–24

25–29

30–64 65 plus

Male

23.8%

5.2%

4.0%

3.3%

11.6%

1.0%

Female

23.8%

5.4%

4.2%

3.6%

12.8%

1.3%

Capabilities Though numerically one of the region’s largest and best-equipped armed forces, Angola’s available inventory faces maintenance and readiness challenges. The armed forces are constitutionally tasked with ensuring sovereignty and territorial integrity, and there is growing attention to the protection of offshore resources and maritime-security cooperation with regional and external powers. Defence ties with Russia continue, mainly in the form of equipment deliveries, though there are plans to boost defence-industrial cooperation. There are increasing military ties with China, and Luanda is looking to Beijing for help in military modernisation and defence-industrial development. Angola retains conscription and, in recent years, force health and education have been investment priorities. The armed forces train regularly and have participated in multinational exercises. Angola is the only regional state with a strategic-airlift capacity, and though availability has been questioned, an Il-76 was employed to transport SADC personnel to Mozambique in 2021, along with a small Angolan military contingent. Improving the military-logistics system has been identified as a key requirement, but progress is unclear. Modernisation and equipment-purchasing plans have been curtailed by the fall in oil prices and a reduced defence budget, though there have nonetheless been some orders and acquisitions. The defence industry is limited to in-service maintenance facilities, but Angola has ambitions to develop greater capacity by partnering with countries such as Brazil, China, Portugal and Russia.

ACTIVE 107,000 (Army 100,000 Navy 1,000 Air 6,000) Gendarmerie & Paramilitary 10,000 Conscript liability 2 years

ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE Army 100,000 FORCES BY ROLE MANOEUVRE Armoured 1 tk bde

Light 1 SF bde 1 (1st) div (1 mot inf bde, 2 inf bde) 1 (2nd) div (3 mot inf bde, 3 inf bde, 1 arty regt) 1 (3rd) div (2 mot inf bde, 3 inf bde) 1 (4th) div (1 tk regt, 5 mot inf bde, 2 inf bde, 1 engr bde) 1 (5th) div (2 inf bde) 1 (6th) div (1 mot inf bde, 2 inf bde, 1 engr bde) COMBAT SUPPORT Some engr units COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT Some log units EQUIPMENT BY TYPE† ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES MBT 300: ε200 T-55AM2; 50 T-62; 50 T-72M1 LT TK 10 PT-76 ASLT 9+ PTL-02 Assaulter RECCE 600 BRDM-2 IFV 250 BMP-1/BMP-2 APC 246 APC (T) 31 MT-LB APC (W) 170+: ε170 BTR-152/BTR-60/BTR-80; WZ-551 (CP) PPV 45 Casspir NG2000 ENGINEERING & MAINTENANCE VEHICLES ARV T-54/T-55 MW Bozena ARTILLERY 1,439+ SP 16+: 122mm 2S1 Gvozdika; 152mm 4 2S3 Akatsiya; 203mm 12 2S7 Pion TOWED 575: 122mm 523 D-30; 130mm 48 M-46; 152mm 4 D-20 MRL 98+: 122mm 98: 58 BM-21 Grad; 40 RM-70; 240mm BM-24 MOR 750: 82mm 250; 120mm 500 ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE MSL • MANPATS 9K11 (RS-AT-3 Sagger) RCL 500: 400 82mm B-10/107mm B-11†; 106mm 100 M40† GUNS • SP 100mm SU-100† AIR DEFENCE SAM • Point-defence 9K32 Strela-2 (RS-SA-7 Grail)‡; 9K36 Strela-3 (RS-SA-14 Gremlin); 9K310 Igla-1 (RSSA-16 Gimlet) GUNS SP 23mm ZSU-23-4 TOWED 450+: 14.5mm ZPU-4; 23mm ZU-23-2; 37mm M-1939; 57mm S-60

Navy ε1,000 EQUIPMENT BY TYPE PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 24 PCO 2 Ngola Kiluange with 1 hel landing platform (Ministry of Fisheries) PCC 5 Rei Bula Matadi (Ministry of Fisheries) PBF 8: 3 HSI 32; 5 PVC-170 PB 9: 4 Mandume; 5 Comandante Imperial Santana (Ministry of Fisheries)

Sub-Saharan Africa 453

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE COASTAL DEFENCE • AShM 4K44 Utyos (RS-SSC-1B Sepal – at Luanda)

Air Force/Air Defence 6,000 FORCES BY ROLE FIGHTER 1 sqn with MiG-21bis/MF Fishbed 1 sqn with Su-27/Su-27UB/Su-30K Flanker FIGHTER/GROUND ATTACK 1 sqn with MiG-23BN/ML/UB Flogger 1 sqn with Su-22 Fitter D GROUND ATTACK 1 sqn with Su-25 Frogfoot MARITIME PATROL 1 sqn with Cessna 500 Citation 1; C-212 Aviocar TRANSPORT 3 sqn with An-12 Cub; An-26 Curl; An-32 Cline; An72 Coaler; BN-2A Islander; C-212 Aviocar; Do-28D Skyservant; EMB-135BJ Legacy 600 (VIP); Il-76TD Candid MA60 TRAINING 1 sqn with Cessna 172K/R 1 sqn with EMB-312 Tucano 1 sqn with L-29 Delfin; L-39 Albatros 1 sqn with PC-7 Turbo Trainer; PC-9* 1 sqn with Z-142 ATTACK HELICOPTER 2 sqn with Mi-24/Mi-35 Hind; SA342M Gazelle (with HOT) TRANSPORT HELICOPTER 2 sqn with AS565; SA316 Alouette III (IAR-316) (trg) 1 sqn with Bell 212 1 sqn with Mi-8 Hip; Mi-17 Hip H 1 sqn with Mi-171Sh AIR DEFENCE 5 bty with S-125M1 Pechora-M1 (RS-SA-3 Goa); 5 coy with 9K35 Strela-10 (RS-SA-13 Gopher)†; 2K12-ML Kvadrat-ML (RS-SA-6 Gainful); 9K33 Osa (RS-SA-8 Gecko); 9K31 Strela-1 (RS-SA-9 Gaskin) EQUIPMENT BY TYPE† AIRCRAFT 97 combat capable FTR 36: 6 Su-27/Su-27UB Flanker; 12 Su-30K Flanker; 18 MiG-23ML Flogger FGA 41: 20 MiG-21bis/MF Fishbed; 8 MiG-23BN/UB Flogger; 13 Su-22 Fitter D ATK 10: 8 Su-25 Frogfoot; 2 Su-25UB Frogfoot MP 1 Cessna 500 Citation I TPT 57: Heavy 4 Il-76TD Candid; Medium 6 An-12 Cub; Light 47: 12 An-26 Curl; 2 An-32 Cline; 8 An-72 Coaler; 8 BN-2A Islander; 2 C-212 Aviocar; 5 Cessna 172K; 6 Cessna 172R; 1 Do-28D Skyservant; 1 EMB-135BJ Legacy 600 (VIP); 2 MA60 TRG 54: 13 EMB-312 Tucano; 6 EMB-314 Super Tucano*; 12 K-8W Karakorum; 6 L-29 Delfin; 2 L-39C Albatros; 5 PC-7 Turbo Trainer; 4 PC-9*; 6 Z-142 HELICOPTERS ATK 56: 34 Mi-24 Hind; 22 Mi-35 Hind MRH 63: 8 AS565 Panther; 4 AW139; 8 SA316 Alouette III

(IAR-316) (incl trg); 8 SA342M Gazelle; 27 Mi-8 Hip/Mi17 Hip H; 8 Mi-171Sh Terminator TPT • Light 10: 2+ AW109E; 8 Bell 212 AIR DEFENCE • SAM 73 Short-range 28: 16 2K12-ML Kvadrat-ML (RS-SA-6 Gainful); 12 S-125M1 Pechora-M1 (RS-SA-3 Goa) Point-defence 45: 10 9K35 Strela-10 (RS-SA-13 Gopher)†; 15 9K33 Osa (RS-SA-8 Gecko); 20 9K31 Strela-1 (RS-SA-9 Gaskin) AIR-LAUNCHED MISSILES AAM IR R-3 (RS-AA-2 Atoll)‡; R-60 (RS-AA-8 Aphid); R-73 (RS-AA-11A Archer) IR/SARH R-23/24 (RS-AA-7 Apex)‡; R-27 (RS-AA-10 Alamo) ASM 9M17M Falanga-M (RS-AT-2 Swatter); HOT ARM Kh-28 (RS-AS-9 Kyle)

Gendarmerie & Paramilitary 10,000 Rapid-Reaction Police 10,000

DEPLOYMENT MOZAMBIQUE: SADC • SAMIM 18

Benin BEN CFA Franc BCEAO XOF

2020

2021

GDP

XOF

9.01tr

9.89tr

USD

15.7bn

18.1bn

per capita

USD

1,291

1,447

Growth

3.8

5.5

Inflation

3.0

XOF

32.0bn

125bn

USD

55.7m

228m

574.76

547.34

Def bdgt USD1=XOF

2022

Real-terms defence budget trend (USDm, constant 2015) 196 52 2008

Population

2015

2021

13,301,694

Age

0–14

15–19

20–24

25–29

Male

23.0%

5.4%

4.7%

3.7%

30–64 65 plus 11.4%

1.1%

Female

22.6%

5.4%

4.8%

4.0%

12.8%

1.3%

Capabilities The armed forces focus on border- and internal-security issues, as well as combating illicit trafficking. Border patrols and security have increased following concern over the regional threat from Islamist groups. Maritime security is a priority in light of continuing piracy in the Gulf of Guinea. A National Guard was reportedly created in 2020 and there have been reports of efforts to improve soldiers’ living conditions. There is a military-cooperation agreement with France, whose Senegal-based forces have delivered training to boost Benin’s border-surveillance capacity. Armoured vehicles have also been received from China. The US has provided

Sub-Saharan Africa

Coastal Defence

454 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2022 similar training to the army and national police. US forces have also delivered pre-deployment training to the armed forces and training in professional ethics, anti-corruption and accountability to the Republican Police. Benin contributes personnel to the Multinational Joint Task Force fighting Boko Haram. There is a limited capacity to deploy beyond neighbouring states without external support. There is some maintenance capability but no defencemanufacturing sector.

ACTIVE 7,250 (Army 6,500 Navy 500 Air 250)

Gendarmerie & Paramilitary 4,800 Republican Police 4,800 EQUIPMENT BY TYPE ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES APC • PPV Casspir NG

DEPLOYMENT

Gendarmerie & Paramilitary 4,800

CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC: UN • MINUSCA 6

Conscript liability 18 months (selective)

CHAD: Lake Chad Basin Commission • MNJTF 150

ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE

DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO: UN • MONUSCO 9

Army 6,500 FORCES BY ROLE MANOEUVRE Armoured 2 armd sqn Light 1 (rapid reaction) mot inf bn 8 inf bn Air Manoeuvre 1 AB bn COMBAT SUPPORT 2 arty bn 1 engr bn 1 sigs bn COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT 1 log bn 1 spt bn EQUIPMENT BY TYPE ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES LT TK 18 PT-76† RECCE 34: 3 AML-90; 14 BRDM-2; 7 M8; 10 VBL APC 34 APC (T) 22 M113; APC (W) 2 Bastion APC PPV 10 Casspir NG AUV Dongfeng Mengshi ARTILLERY 16+ TOWED 105mm 16: 12 L118 Light Gun; 4 M101 MOR 81mm some; 120mm some

Navy ε500 EQUIPMENT BY TYPE PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS • PB 6: 2 Matelot Brice Kpomasse (ex-PRC); 3 FPB 98; 1 27m (PRC)

Air Force 250 EQUIPMENT BY TYPE AIRCRAFT TPT 3: Light 1 DHC-6 Twin Otter†; PAX 2: 1 B-727; 1 HS-748† TRG (1 LH-10 Ellipse non-operational) HELICOPTERS TPT • Light 5: 4 AW109BA; 1 AS350B Ecureuil†

MALI: UN • MINUSMA 260; 1 mech inf coy(+) SOUTH SUDAN: UN • UNMISS 5 SUDAN: UN • UNISFA 2

Botswana BWA Botswana Pula BWP GDP per capita

2020

2021

BWP

173bn

194bn

USD

15.1bn

17.6bn

USD

6,420

7,350

Growth

-8.5

9.2

Inflation

1.9

5.8

BWP

6.42bn

5.76bn

USD

560m

522m

11.45

11.05

Def bdgt [a] USD1=BWP

2022

[a] Defence, Justice and Security Budget Real-terms defence budget trend (USDm, constant 2015) 627 297 2008

Population

2015

2021

2,350,667

Age

0–14

15–19

20–24

25–29

Male

15.2%

4.6%

4.3%

30–64 65 plus 17.3%

2.3%

Female

14.9%

4.7%

4.5%

4.4%

20.1%

3.3%

Capabilities The Botswana Defence Force (BDF) comprises ground forces and a small but comparatively well-equipped air wing. The BDF’s primary responsibility is to ensure territorial integrity; its other tasks include tackling poaching. There is a history of involvement in peacekeeping operations. The BDF has reportedly been working on a defence doctrine that is believed to be influenced by US concepts and practices. Botswana has a good relationship with the US and regularly sends its officers to train there. The armed forces also train with other African nations, including Namibia, with whom it holds biannual exercises. The operations centre for the Southern African Development Community (SADC) Standby Force is located in Gaborone. Recent personnel priorities include improving conditions of service and overhauling retirement ages. Recruitment into the BDF is voluntary. Relations with China are improving, and Botswana joined the Belt and Road Initiative in 2021. Some BDF military personnel have travelled to China for training. The air force has

Sub-Saharan Africa 455 a modest airlift capacity and the BDF is able to deploy a small force by air if required. There is interest in replacing the ageing fleet of F-5 combat aircraft, though a successor type has yet to be ordered due to financial constraints. While reports suggest a limited maintenance capacity, there is no defence-manufacturing sector.

ACTIVE 9,000 (Army 8,500 Air 500)

ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE Army 8,500

ISR 1 sqn with O-2 Skymaster TRANSPORT 2 sqn with BD-700 Global Express; BN-2/-2B Defender*; Beech 200 King Air (VIP); C-130B Hercules; C-212300/400 Aviocar; CN-235M-100; Do-328-110 (VIP) TRAINING 1 sqn with PC-7 MkII Turbo Trainer* TRANSPORT HELICOPTER 1 sqn with AS350B Ecureuil; Bell 412EP/SP Twin Huey; EC225LP Super Puma

FORCES BY ROLE MANOEUVRE Armoured 1 armd bde(-) Light 2 inf bde (1 armd recce regt, 4 inf bn, 1 cdo unit, 1 engr regt, 1 log bn, 2 ADA regt) COMBAT SUPPORT 1 arty bde 1 engr coy 1 sigs coy COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT 1 log gp AIR DEFENCE 1 AD bde(-)

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE AIRCRAFT 28 combat capable FTR 13: 8 F-5A Freedom Fighter; 5 F-5D Tiger II ISR 5 O-2 Skymaster TPT 20: Medium 3 C-130B Hercules; Light 16: 4 BN-2 Defender*; 6 BN-2B Defender*; 1 Beech 200 King Air (VIP); 1 C-212-300 Aviocar; 1 C-212-400 Aviocar; 2 CN235M-100; 1 Do-328-110 (VIP); PAX 1 BD700 Global Express TRG 5 PC-7 MkII Turbo Trainer* HELICOPTERS MRH 7: 2 Bell 412EP Twin Huey; 5 Bell 412SP Twin Huey TPT 9: Medium 1 EC225LP Super Puma; Light 8 AS350B Ecureuil

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES LT TK 45: ε20 SK-105 Kurassier; 25 FV101 Scorpion RECCE 72+: RAM-V-1; ε8 RAM-V-2; 64 VBL IFV 22+ Piranha V UT-30 APC 157: APC (W) 145: 50 BTR-60; 50 LAV-150 Commando (some with 90mm gun); 45 Piranha III PPV 12 Casspir AUV 6 FV103 Spartan ENGINEERING & MAINTENANCE VEHICLES ARV Greif; M578 MW Aardvark Mk2 ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE MSL SP V-150 TOW MANPATS TOW RCL 84mm Carl Gustaf ARTILLERY 78 TOWED 30: 105mm 18: 12 L118 Light Gun; 6 Model 56 pack howitzer; 155mm 12 Soltam MRL 122mm 20 APRA-40 MOR 28: 81mm 22; 120mm 6 M-43 AIR DEFENCE SAM Short-range VL MICA Point-defence 9K32 Strela-2 (RS-SA-7 Grail)‡; 9K310 Igla-1 (RS-SA-16 Gimlet); Javelin; Mistral GUNS • TOWED 20mm 7 M167 Vulcan; 37mm PG-65

DEPLOYMENT

Air Wing 500 FORCES BY ROLE FIGHTER/GROUND ATTACK 1 sqn with F-5A Freedom Fighter; F-5D Tiger II

DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO: UN • MONUSCO 3 MOZAMBIQUE: SADC • SAMIM 110

Burkina Faso BFA 2020

2021

XOF

9.99tr

10.9tr

USD

17.4bn

19.9bn

USD

831

926

Growth

1.9

6.7

Inflation

1.9

3.0

Def bdgt

XOF

223bn

254bn

per capita

USD USD1=XOF

388m

464m

574.77

547.36

2022

Sub-Saharan Africa

CFA Franc BCEAO XOF GDP

Real-terms defence budget trend (USDm, constant 2015) 381 97 2008

Population

2015

2021

21,382,659

Age

0–14

15–19

20–24

25–29

Male

21.9%

5.6%

4.7%

3.7%

30–64 65 plus 11.7%

1.4%

Female

21.3%

5.4%

4.7%

4.0%

13.8%

1.8%

Capabilities In recent years, Burkina Faso’s security forces have been challenged by an increasing terrorist threat, which has led Ouagadougou to

456 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2022 refocus its military efforts particularly on the north of the country. Burkina Faso is part of the G5 Sahel grouping and, as part of its support for this framework, it cooperates with Mali and Niger, particularly on border security. There is also defence cooperation with France. In July, the US donated armoured vehicles and other equipment. Aviation capacity is slowly improving with the arrival of additional helicopters, though financial challenges hinder broader capability developments. Without external support, deployment capacity is limited to neighbouring countries. While there are maintenance facilities, there is no defence-manufacturing sector.

ACTIVE 11,200 (Army 6,400 Air 600 Gendarmerie 4,200) Gendarmerie & Paramilitary 250

ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE Army 6,400

Three military regions. In 2011, several regiments were disbanded and merged into other formations, including the new 24th and 34th régiments interarmes FORCES BY ROLE MANOEUVRE Mechanised 1 cbd arms regt Light 1 cbd arms regt 6 inf regt Air Manoeuvre 1 AB regt (1 CT coy) COMBAT SUPPORT 1 arty bn (2 arty tp) 1 engr bn EQUIPMENT BY TYPE ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES RECCE 91+: 19 AML-60/AML-90; 8+ Bastion Patsas; 24 EE-9 Cascavel; 30 Ferret; 2 M20; 8 M8 APC 100 APC (W) 25: 13 Panhard M3; 12 Bastion APC PPV 75: 6 Gila; 31 Puma M26-15; 14 Puma M36; 24 Stark Motors Storm AUV 39 Cobra ENGINEERING & MAINTENANCE VEHICLES MW 3 Shrek-M ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE RCL 75mm Type-52 (M20); 84mm Carl Gustaf ARTILLERY 50+ TOWED 14: 105mm 8 M101; 122mm 6 MRL 9: 107mm ε4 Type-63; 122mm 5 APR-40 MOR 27+: 81mm Brandt; 82mm 15; 120mm 12 AIR DEFENCE SAM • Point-defence 9K32 Strela-2 (RS-SA-7 Grail)‡ GUNS • TOWED 42: 14.5mm 30 ZPU; 20mm 12 TCM-20

Air Force 600 FORCES BY ROLE GROUND ATTACK/TRAINING 1 sqn with SF-260WL Warrior*; Embraer EMB-314 Super Tucano* TRANSPORT 1 sqn with AT-802 Air Tractor; B-727 (VIP); Beech 200 King Air; 1 C295W; CN235-220; PA-34 Seneca; Tetras

ATTACK/TRANSPORT HELICOPTER 1 sqn with AS350 Ecureuil; Mi-8 Hip; Mi-17 Hip H; Mi-35 Hind AW 139; UH-1Y Huey EQUIPMENT BY TYPE AIRCRAFT 5 combat capable ISR 1 DA42M (reported) TPT 10: Light 9: 1 AT-802 Air Tractor; 2 Beech 200 King Air; 1 C295W; 1 CN235-220; 1 PA-34 Seneca; 3 Tetras; PAX 1 B-727 (VIP) TRG 5: 3 EMB-314 Super Tucano*; 2 SF-260WL Warrior* HELICOPTERS ATK 2 Mi-35 Hind MRH 3: 2 Mi-17 Hip H; 1 AW139 TPT 3: Medium 1 Mi-8 Hip; Light 2: 1 AS350 Ecureuil; 1 UH-1H Huey

Gendarmerie 4,200 FORCES BY ROLE SPECIAL FORCES 1 spec ops gp (USIGN) EQUIPMENT BY TYPE ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES APC • APC (W) some Bastion APC

Gendarmerie & Paramilitary 250 People’s Militia (R) 45,000 reservists (trained) Security Company 250

DEPLOYMENT CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC: UN • MINUSCA 7 DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO: UN • MONUSCO 5 MALI: UN • MINUSMA 936; 1 inf bn

FOREIGN FORCES France Operation Barkhane 4000; 1 SF gp; 2 Tiger; 2 AS532UL; 2 H225M; 3 Gazelle

Sub-Saharan Africa 457

Burundi Franc BIF GDP per capita

2020

2021

BIF

5.82tr

6.27tr

USD

3.04bn

3.19bn

USD

256

261

Growth

-1.0

1.6

Inflation

7.3

5.6

Def bdgt

BIF

119bn

129bn

USD

62.3m

65.8m

1914.93

1962.36

USD1=BIF

2022

136bn

Real-terms defence budget trend (USDm, constant 2015) 83 62 2008

Population

2015

2021

12,241,065

Age

0–14

15–19

20–24

25–29

Male

21.9%

5.5%

4.5%

3.7%

30–64 65 plus 12.8%

1.4%

Female

21.5%

5.5%

4.5%

3.7%

13.3%

1.8%

Capabilities The political crisis in 2015 tested the cohesion of the armed forces and largely halted military-training activity with international partners. Cross-border security challenges continue, though there are signs of improving relations with Rwanda. Burundi signed a cooperation agreement with Russia in 2018 on counterterrorism and joint training. The experience accumulated during UN operations, where troops have gained valuable military experience, boosts training levels. The armed forces have a limited capability to deploy externally and maintain a deployment to the AMISOM mission in Somalia. Peacekeeping missions help to fund the armed forces, though financial and equipment deficiencies otherwise restrict military effectiveness. Apart from limited maintenance facilities, the country has no domestic defenceindustrial capability.

ACTIVE 30,050 (Army 30,000 Navy 50) Gendarmerie & Paramilitary 1,000

ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE Army 30,000 FORCES BY ROLE MANOEUVRE Mechanised 2 lt armd bn (sqn) Light 7 inf bn Some indep inf coy COMBAT SUPPORT 1 arty bn 1 engr bn AIR DEFENCE 1 AD bn

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES RECCE 55: 6 AML-60; 12 AML-90; 30 BRDM-2; 7 S52 Shorland APC 114 APC (W) 70: 20 BTR-40; 10 BTR-80; 10 Fahd-300; 9 Panhard M3; 15 Type-92; 6 Walid PPV 44: 12 Casspir; 12 RG-31 Nyala; 10 RG-33L; 10 Springbuck 4×4 AUV 15 Cougar 4×4 ARTILLERY 120 TOWED 122mm 18 D-30 MRL 122mm 12 BM-21 Grad MOR 90: 82mm 15 M-43; 120mm ε75 ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE MSL • MANPATS Milan (reported) RCL 75mm Type-52 (M20) AIR DEFENCE SAM • Point-defence 9K32 Strela-2 (RS-SA-7 Grail)‡ GUNS • TOWED 150+: 14.5mm 15 ZPU-4; 135+ 23mm ZU-23/37mm Type-55 (M-1939)

Air Wing 200 EQUIPMENT BY TYPE AIRCRAFT 1 combat capable TPT • Light 2 Cessna 150L† TRG 1 SF-260W Warrior* HELICOPTERS ATK 2 Mi-24 Hind MRH 2 SA342L Gazelle TPT • Medium (2 Mi-8 Hip non-op)

Reserves FORCES BY ROLE MANOEUVRE Light 10 inf bn (reported)

Navy 50 EQUIPMENT BY TYPE PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS • PB 4 AMPHIBIOUS • LCT 2

Gendarmerie & Paramilitary ε1,000 General Administration of State Security ε1,000

DEPLOYMENT CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC: UN • MINUSCA 760; 1 inf bn MALI: UN • MINUSMA 1 SOMALIA: AU • AMISOM 4,000; 5 inf bn SUDAN: UN • UNISFA 4

Sub-Saharan Africa

Burundi BDI

458 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2022

Cameroon CMR 2020

2021

GDP

CFA Franc BEAC XAF XAF

23.0tr

24.6tr

USD

39.9bn

44.8bn

per capita

USD

1,505

1,646

Growth

-1.5

3.6

Inflation

2.4

2.3

XAF

234bn

246bn

USD

407m

448m

574.76

549.22

Def bdgt USD1=XAF

2022

Real-terms defence budget trend (USDm, constant 2015) 393 297 2008

Population

2015

2021

28,524,175

Age

0–14

15–19

20–24

25–29

Male

21.3%

5.4%

4.6%

4.0%

30–64 65 plus 13.1%

1.5%

Female

20.9%

5.4%

4.6%

4.0%

13.6%

1.7%

Capabilities Internal security is a key concern for Cameroon’s armed forces, as is the cross-border challenge from Boko Haram. Cameroon is part of the Multinational Joint Task Force engaged on operations against Boko Haram. There are long-standing military ties with France, including for support and training. There is a military-assistance agreement with China and the two countries have cooperated over a floating dock at Kribi, which it is hoped will improve operational readiness. The AU maintains its continental logistics base at Douala. The armed forces are considered well organised, though allegations of abuses led the US in February 2019 to halt some military assistance. Although deployments continue to UN peacekeeping operations, there is only limited organic power-projection capability without external support. Much of the equipment inventory is ageing, but infantry fighting vehicles and protected patrol vehicles have been acquired from China and South Africa and gifted by the US. The armed forces are improving their ISR capability with fixed-wing aircraft and small UAVs. Additional patrol vessels have in recent years improved maritime capability. Cameroon has no defence-industrial capacity, bar maintenance facilities.

ACTIVE 25,400 (Army 23,500 Navy 1,500 Air 400) Gendarmerie & Paramilitary 9,000

ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE Army 23,500 5 Mil Regions FORCES BY ROLE MANOEUVRE Light 1 rapid reaction bde (1 armd recce bn, 1 AB bn, 1 amph bn) 1 mot inf bde (4 mot inf bn, 1 spt bn) 5 mot inf bde (3 mot inf bn, 1 spt bn) 6 rapid reaction bn 4 inf bn

Air Manoeuvre 1 cdo/AB bn Other 1 (Presidential Guard) gd bn COMBAT SUPPORT 1 arty regt (5 arty bty) 5 engr regt AIR DEFENCE 1 AD regt (6 AD bty) EQUIPMENT BY TYPE ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES ASLT 18: 6 AMX-10RC; ε12 PTL-02 mod (Cara 105) RECCE 64: 31 AML-90; 15 Ferret; 8 M8; 5 RAM Mk3; 5 VBL IFV 42: 8 LAV-150 Commando with 20mm gun; 14 LAV150 Commando with 90mm gun; 12 Ratel-20 (Engr); ε8 Type-07P APC 73 APC (T) 12 M3 half-track APC (W) 45: 24 Bastion APC; 21 LAV-150 Commando PPV 16 Gaia Thunder AUV 6+: 6 Cougar 4×4; Panthera T6 ENGINEERING & MAINTENANCE VEHICLES ARV WZ-551 ARV ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE MSL SP 24 TOW (on Jeeps) MANPATS Milan RCL 53: 75mm 13 Type-52 (M20); 106mm 40 M40A2 ARTILLERY 106+ SP 155mm 18 ATMOS 2000 TOWED 52: 105mm 20 M101; 130mm 24: 12 M-1982 (reported); 12 Type-59 (M-46); 155mm 8 M-71 MRL 122mm 20 BM-21 Grad MOR 16+: 81mm (some SP); 120mm 16 Brandt AIR DEFENCE • GUNS SP 20mm RBY-1 with TCM-20 TOWED 54: 14.5mm 18 Type-58 (ZPU-2); 35mm 18 GDF-002; 37mm 18 Type-63

Navy ε1,500 HQ located at Douala EQUIPMENT BY TYPE PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 16 PCC 3: 1 Dipikar (ex-FRA Flamant); 2 Le Ntem (PRC Limam El Hidrami) PB 11: 2 Aresa 2400; 2 Aresa 3200; 2 Rodman 101; 4 Rodman 46; 1 Quartier Maître Alfred Motto† PBR 2 Swift-38 AMPHIBIOUS • LANDING CRAFT 4 LCU 2 Type-067 (Yunnan) LCM 2: 1 Aresa 2300; 1 Le Moungo

Fusiliers Marin FORCES BY ROLE MANOEUVRE Amphibious 3 mne bn

Sub-Saharan Africa 459

FORCES BY ROLE FIGHTER/GROUND ATTACK 1 sqn with Alpha Jet*† TRANSPORT 1 sqn with C-130H/H-30 Hercules; PA-23 Aztec 1 VIP unit with AS332 Super Puma; AS365 Dauphin 2; Bell 206B Jet Ranger; Gulfstream III TRAINING 1 unit with Tetras ATTACK HELICOPTER 1 sqn with SA342 Gazelle (with HOT); Mi-24 Hind TRANSPORT HELICOPTER 1 sqn with Bell 206L-3; Bell 412; SA319 Alouette III EQUIPMENT BY TYPE AIRCRAFT 6 combat capable ISR 2 Cessna 208B Grand Caravan TPT 17: Medium 3: 2 C-130H Hercules; 1 C-130H-30 Hercules; Light 13: 1 CN235 (1 IAI-201 Arava in store); 2 J.300 Joker; 1 MA60; 2 PA-23 Aztec; 7 Tetras; PAX 1 Gulfstream III TRG 6 Alpha Jet*† HELICOPTERS ATK 2 Mi-24 Hind MRH 15: 1 AS365 Dauphin 2; 4 Bell 412 Twin Huey; 2 Mi-17 Hip H; 2 SA319 Alouette III; 4 SA342 Gazelle (with HOT); 2 Z-9 TPT 6: Medium 4: 2 AS332 Super Puma; 2 SA330J Puma; Light 2: 1 Bell 206B Jet Ranger; 1 Bell 206L3 Long Ranger AIR-LAUNCHED MISSILES ASM HOT

Fusiliers de l’Air FORCES BY ROLE MANOEUVRE Other 1 sy bn

Gendarmerie & Paramilitary 9,000

Cape Verde CPV Cape Verde Escudo CVE

2020

2021

CVE

165bn

174bn

USD

1.71bn

1.89bn

USD

3,065

3,347

Growth

-14.8

4.0

Inflation

0.6

1.5

CVE

1.12bn

USD

11.6m

12.1m

96.61

92.30

GDP per capita

Def bdgt USD1=CVE

2022

Real-terms defence budget trend (USDm, constant 2015) 11 7 2008

2015

Population

2021

589,451

Age

0–14

15–19

20–24

25–29

Male

13.7%

4.5%

4.6%

30–64 65 plus 18.9%

2.2%

Female

13.6%

4.5%

4.6%

4.7%

20.5%

3.5%

Capabilities In its legislative programme for 2016–21, the government outlined defence priorities including territorial defence, maritime security, and EEZ and airspace protection. A new law, issued in September 2021, set out defence-ministerial structures and modernisation aspirations for the armed forces. Reports in the same year indicated an intention to improve airspace monitoring and related procurement aspirations, including for aircraft. The government is interested in greater regional and international defence engagement. International partners provide some maritime-security training support and China reportedly donated equipment including trucks and buses to the armed forces in 2021. The armed forces take part in multinational regional exercises and cooperative activities. Equipment capabilities remain limited and there is no defence industry, beyond maintenance facilities.

Gendarmerie 9,000

ACTIVE 1,200 (Army 1,000 Coast Guard 100 Air 100)

FORCES BY ROLE MANOEUVRE Reconnaissance 3 (regional spt) paramilitary gp

Conscript liability Selective conscription (14 months)

DEPLOYMENT CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC: UN • MINUSCA 808; 1 inf bn DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO: UN • MONUSCO 3 MALI: UN • MINUSMA 3

ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE Army 1,000 FORCES BY ROLE MANOEUVRE Light 2 inf bn (gp) COMBAT SUPPORT 1 engr bn EQUIPMENT BY TYPE ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES RECCE 10 BRDM-2 ARTILLERY • MOR 18: 82mm 12; 120mm 6 M-1943 AIR DEFENCE SAM • Point-defence 9K32 Strela (RS-SA-7 Grail)‡ GUNS • TOWED 30: 14.5mm 18 ZPU-1; 23mm 12 ZU-23

Sub-Saharan Africa

Air Force 300–400

460 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2022

Coast Guard ε100

ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 5 PCC 2: 1 Guardião; 1 Kondor I PB 2: 1 Espadarte; 1 Tainha (PRC 27m) PBF 1 Archangel AIRCRAFT • TPT • Light 1 Do-228

Army ε9,000 FORCES BY ROLE MANOEUVRE Light 1 spec ops bn 7 inf bn Amphibious 1 amph coy

Air Force up to 100 FORCES BY ROLE MARITIME PATROL 1 sqn with An-26 Curl EQUIPMENT BY TYPE AIRCRAFT • TPT • Light 3 An-26 Curl†

Central African Republic CAR CFA Franc BEAC XAF

2020

2021

GDP

XAF

1.37tr

1.39tr

USD

2.39bn

2.59bn

per capita

USD

494

526

1.0

-1.0

Growth Inflation Def exp

2.3

3.7

XAF

23.8bn

24.0bn

USD

41.4m

44.5m

574.73

538.46

USD1=XAF

2022

Air Force 150

Real-terms defence budget trend (USDm, constant 2015) 56 26 2008

Population

2015

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES MBT 3 T-55† RECCE 28: 8 Ferret†; 20 BRDM-2 IFV 18 Ratel APC • APC (W) 14+: 4 BTR-152†; 10+ VAB† AUV Cobra (reported) ARTILLERY • MOR 12+: 81mm†; 120mm 12 M-1943† ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE RCL 106mm 14 M40† PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS • PBR 9†

2021

5,357,984

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE AIRCRAFT • TPT 6: Medium (1 C-130A Hercules in store); Light 6: 3 BN-2 Islander; 1 Cessna 172RJ Skyhawk; 2 J.300 Joker HELICOPTERS ATK 1 Mi-24V Hind E MRH some SA341B Gazelle TPT 2: Medium 1 Mi-8T Hip; Light 1 AS350 Ecureuil

FOREIGN FORCES

Age

0–14

15–19

20–24

25–29

30–64 65 plus

Male

20.2%

5.6%

5.0%

4.1%

13.3%

1.5%

Female

19.2%

5.2%

4.7%

4.2%

15.0%

2.0%

Capabilities Effective military and security organisations remain largely absent in the wake of violence in 2013 and the armed forces remain unable to fully address the country’s internal-security challenges. Under the National Recovery and Peacebuilding Plan 2017–21, attempts to improve security focus on DDR and SSR. The UN’s MINUSCA mission remains the principal security provider in the country. Russia has been deepening its military ties in the CAR and has donated small arms and armoured vehicles and dispatched teams of military instructors. Russian private military contractors are also active in the country. Apart from some equipment deliveries, the country remains under a UN arms embargo, though the terms of this were eased in late 2019. The armed forces receive training from UN forces and an EU training mission. Poor infrastructure and logistics capacity limit the armed forces’ ability to provide security across the country. There is no independent capability to deploy troops externally, while the lack of financial resources and defenceindustrial capacity makes equipment maintenance problematic.

ACTIVE 9,150 (Army 9,000 Air 150) Gendarmerie & Paramilitary 1,000 Conscript liability Selective conscription 2 years; reserve obligation thereafter, term n.k.

MINUSCA unless stated Argentina 2 Bangladesh 1,301; 1 cdo coy; 1 inf bn; 1 med coy; 1 hel coy Benin 6 Belgium EUTM RCA 60 Bhutan 5 Bolivia 3 Bosnia-Herzegovina EUTM RCA 3 Brazil 10 • EUTM RCA 6 Burkina Faso 7 Burundi 760; 1 inf bn Cambodia 210; 1 engr coy Cameroon 808; 1 inf bn Colombia 2 Congo 12 Côte d’Ivoire 1 Czech Republic 3 Egypt 1,022; 1 inf bn; 1 tpt coy France 8 • EUTM RCA 100 • Army 160 Gabon 43 Gambia 10 Georgia EUTM RCA 35 Ghana 13 Guatemala 4 Indonesia 230; 1 engr coy

Sub-Saharan Africa 461

Capabilities

Italy EUTM RCA 2 Jordan 10 Kenya 15 Lithuania EUTM RCA 2 Macedonia, North EUTM RCA 2 Mauritania 464; 1 inf bn(-) Mexico 2 Moldova 4 Morocco 767; 1 inf bn Nepal 752; 1 inf bn; 1 MP pl Niger 5 Nigeria 5 Pakistan 1,314; 1 inf bn; 2 engr coy; 1 hel sqn Paraguay 4 Peru 217; 1 engr coy Philippines 2 Poland EUTM RCA 1 Portugal 189; 1 AB coy • EUTM RCA 55 Romania EUTM RCA 13 Russia 8 Rwanda 1,690; 2 inf bn; 1 fd hospital Senegal 9 Serbia 76; 1 med coy • EUTM RCA 7 Sierra Leone 5 Slovakia EUTM RCA 2 Spain EUTM RCA 8 Sri Lanka 113; 1 hel sqn Sweden EUTM RCA 9 Tanzania 456; 1 inf bn(-) Togo 10 Tunisia 134; 1 hel sqn with 3 Bell 205 United States 8 Uruguay 3 Vietnam 7 Zambia 932; 1 inf bn Zimbabwe 2

Chad’s principal security concerns relate to instability in West Africa and the Sahel and counter-insurgency operations against Boko Haram in the Lake Chad Basin area. Although the armed forces are combat experienced, some observers judge that improvements are required in strategy and doctrine, and command and control. The country is a key contributor to the G5 Sahel and is an important component of the Multinational Joint Task Force fighting Boko Haram. There is close defence cooperation with France and Operation Barkhane is headquartered in N’Djamena. Chadian military skills are widely recognised by partners, though training levels are not uniform across the force. After the death of president Idriss Déby in 2021, his son assumed the role of leader of an interim administration. This body passed reform plans for the armed forces, which if implemented would increase the size of the army. However, implementation is now dependent on the transitional council appointed in September. A lack of logistical capacity has hindered routine rotations for deployed forces. The country’s ISR capability improved with the arrival of aircraft from the US, following improvements in ground-attack and medium-airlift capability. Apart from maintenance facilities, there is no domestic defenceindustrial capacity.

ACTIVE 33,250 (Army 27,500 Air 350 State Security Service 5,400) Gendarmerie & Paramilitary 11,900 Conscript liability Conscription authorised

ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE Army ε27,500

Chad CHA CFA Franc BEAC XAF GDP per capita Growth

2020

2021

XAF

6.23tr

6.78tr

USD

10.8bn

12.3bn

USD

660

730

-0.8

0.9

Inflation

4.5

2.6

Def bdgt

XAF

157bn

159bn

USD USD1=XAF

274m

289m

574.74

549.23

2022

Real-terms defence budget trend (USDm, constant 2015) 266 103 2008

Population

2015

2021

17,414,108

Age

0–14

15–19

20–24

25–29

30–64 65 plus

Male

23.8%

5.7%

4.4%

3.5%

11.1%

1.1%

Female

23.2%

5.6%

4.4%

3.5%

12.4%

1.4%

FORCES BY ROLE MANOEUVRE Armoured 1 armd bn Light 7 inf bn COMBAT SUPPORT 1 arty bn 1 engr bn 1 sigs bn COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT 1 log gp EQUIPMENT BY TYPE ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES MBT 74: 60 T-55; 14 ZTZ-59G ASLT ε20 PTL-02 Assaulter RECCE 318+: 132 AML-60/-90; 22 Bastion Patsas; ε100 BRDM-2; 20 EE-9 Cascavel; 9 ERC-90D Sagaie; 4 ERC-90F Sagaie; 31+ RAM Mk3 IFV 131: 80 BMP-1; 42 BMP-1U; 9 LAV-150 Commando with 90mm gun APC 129 APC (W) 103: 4+ Bastion APC; 24 BTR-80; 12 BTR-3E; ε20 BTR-60; ε10 Black Scorpion; 25 VAB-VTT; 8 WZ-523 PPV 26: 6+ KrAZ Cougar; 20 Proforce Ara 2 AUV 30 Terrier LT-79 ARTILLERY 28+ SP 122mm 10 2S1 Gvozdika TOWED 7: 105mm 5 M2; 122mm 2+ D-74

Sub-Saharan Africa

7 Mil Regions

462 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2022 MRL 11+: 107mm some PH-63; 122mm 11: 6 BM-21 Grad; 5 PHL-81 MOR 81mm some; 120mm AM-50 ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE MSL • MANPATS Eryx; Milan RCL 106mm M40A1 AIR DEFENCE SAM Short-range 4 2K12 Kub (RS-SA-6 Gainful) Point-defence 9K310 Igla-1 (RS-SA-16 Gimlet) GUNS SP 23mm ZSU-23-4 Shilka TOWED 14.5mm ZPU-1/-2/-4; 23mm ZU-23

Air Force 350 FORCES BY ROLE GROUND ATTACK 1 unit with PC-7; PC-9*; SF-260WL Warrior*; Su-25 Frogfoot TRANSPORT 1 sqn with An-26 Curl; C-130H-30 Hercules; Mi-17 Hip H; Mi-171 1 (Presidential) Flt with B-737BBJ; Beech 1900; DC-9-87; Gulfstream II ATTACK HELICOPTER 1 sqn with AS550C Fennec; Mi-24V Hind; SA316 Alouette III MANOEUVRE Other 1 sy bn EQUIPMENT BY TYPE AIRCRAFT 10 combat capable FTR (1 MiG-29S Fulcrum C in store) ATK 7: 6 Su-25 Frogfoot (2 more in store); 1 Su-25UB Frogfoot B (1 more in store) ISR 2 Cessna 208B Grand Caravan TPT 10: Medium 3: 2 C-27J Spartan; 1 C-130H-30 Hercules; Light 4: 3 An-26 Curl; 1 Beech 1900; PAX 3: 1 B-737BBJ; 1 DC-9-87; 1 Gulfstream II TRG 4: 2 PC-7 (only 1*); 1 PC-9 Turbo Trainer*; 1 SF260WL Warrior* HELICOPTERS ATK 5 Mi-24V Hind MRH 8: 3 AS550C Fennec; 3 Mi-17 Hip H; 2 SA316 TPT • Medium 2 Mi-171

State Security Service General Direction (DGSSIE) 5,400 Gendarmerie & Paramilitary 11,900 active

WESTERN SAHARA: UN • MINURSO 2

FOREIGN FORCES Benin MNJTF 150 France Operation Barkhane 1,500; 1 mech inf BG; 1 FGA det with 4 Mirage 2000D; 1 tpt det with 1 C-130H; 2 CN235M; 1 UAV det with 1 MQ-9A Reaper

Congo, Republic of COG CFA Franc BEAC XAF

2020

2021

XAF

5.94tr

6.98tr

USD

10.3bn

12.7bn

USD

2,206

2,656

Growth

-8.2

-0.2

Inflation

1.8

2.0

Def bdgt

XAF

179bn

174bn

USD

311m

317m

574.74

547.36

GDP per capita

USD1=XAF

590 n.k.

2008

2015

Population

2021

5,417,414

Age

0–14

15–19

20–24

25–29

Male

20.8%

4.8%

3.9%

3.6%

15.5%

1.5%

Female

20.4%

4.8%

3.9%

3.6%

15.4%

1.8%

Congo’s small armed forces have low levels of training and limited overall capability, and utilise ageing equipment. They have struggled to recover from the brief but devastating civil war in the late 1990s. France provides advisory assistance and capacity-building support in military administration and military and police capability. A military-cooperation agreement was signed with Russia in 2019. The troop contingent deployed to the CAR was withdrawn by the government in mid-2017, amid allegations of indiscipline. Deployment capability is limited to neighbouring countries without external support. The air force is effectively grounded for lack of spares and serviceable equipment. The navy is largely a riverine force, despite the need for maritime security on the country’s small coastline. A modernisation effort is under way and several MRAPs have been bought. Maintenance facilities are limited and the country has no domestic defence-industrial capability.

ACTIVE 10,000 (Army 8,000 Navy 800 Air 1,200)

National and Nomadic Guard (GNNT) 7,400

ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE

MALI: UN • MINUSMA 1,451; 1 SF coy; 2 inf bn NIGER: G5 Sahel 600; 1 inf bn

30–64 65 plus

Capabilities

Gendarmerie & Paramilitary 2,000

DEPLOYMENT

164bn

Real-terms defence budget trend (USDm, constant 2015)

Gendarmerie 4,500 Police Mobile Intervention Group (GMIP)

2022

Army 8,000 FORCES BY ROLE MANOEUVRE Armoured 2 armd bn

Sub-Saharan Africa 463

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE† ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES MBT 40: 25 T-54/T-55; 15 Type-59; (some T-34 in store) LT TK 13: 3 PT-76; 10 Type-62 RECCE 25 BRDM-1/BRDM-2 APC 133+ APC (W) 78+: 28 AT-105 Saxon; 20 BTR-152; 30 BTR-60; Panhard M3 PPV 55: 18 Mamba; 37 Marauder ARTILLERY 56+ SP 122mm 3 2S1 Gvozdika TOWED 15+: 122mm 10 D-30; 130mm 5 M-46; 152mm D-20 MRL 10+: 122mm 10 BM-21 Grad; 140mm BM-14; 140mm BM-16 MOR 28+: 82mm; 120mm 28 M-43 ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE RCL 57mm M18 GUNS 15: 57mm 5 ZIS-2 (M-1943); 100mm 10 M-1944 AIR DEFENCE • GUNS SP 23mm ZSU-23-4 Shilka TOWED 14.5mm ZPU-2/-4; 37mm 28 M-1939; 57mm S-60; 100mm KS-19

Gendarmerie & Paramilitary 2,000 active Gendarmerie 2,000 FORCES BY ROLE MANOEUVRE Other 20 paramilitary coy

Presidential Guard some FORCES BY ROLE MANOEUVRE Other 1 paramilitary bn

DEPLOYMENT CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC: UN • MINUSCA 12

Côte d’Ivoire CIV CFA Franc BCEAO XOF

2020

2021

GDP

XOF

35.2tr

37.8tr

USD

61.2bn

68.8bn

per capita

USD

2,271

2,489

Growth

2.0

6.0

Inflation

2.4

3.0

XOF

349bn

354bn

Def bdgt [a]

USD USD1=XOF

608m

644m

574.76

549.22

2022

[a] Defence budget only – order and security expenses excluded Real-terms defence budget trend (USDm, constant 2015) 606

Navy ε800 EQUIPMENT BY TYPE PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 8 PCC 4 5 Février 1979 PBR 4

Air Force 1,200 FORCES BY ROLE FIGHTER/GROUND ATTACK 1 sqn with Mirage F-1AZ TRANSPORT 1 sqn with An-24 Coke; An-32 Cline; CN235M-100 EQUIPMENT BY TYPE† 3 combat capable AIRCRAFT FGA up to 3 Mirage F-1AZ TPT • Light 4: 1 An-24 Coke; 2 An-32 Cline; 1 CN235M-100 HELICOPTERS ATK (2 Mi-35P Hind in store) TPT • Medium (3 Mi-8 Hip in store) AIR-LAUNCHED MISSILES • AAM • IR R-3 (RS-AA-2 Atoll)‡

336 2008

Population

2015

2021

28,088,455

Age

0–14

15–19

20–24

25–29

Male

19.0%

5.5%

4.7%

4.1%

30–64 65 plus 15.6%

1.3%

Female

18.9%

5.5%

4.7%

4.1%

15.0%

1.6%

Capabilities The armed forces are still regenerating and SSR initiatives continue. A 2015 law detailed defence zones and military regions as well as the creation of a general staff and general inspectorate for the armed forces. It stressed the armed forces’ role in assisting societal development. In 2016 a Military Programme Law for 2016–20 was adopted. The plan was to reduce military strength in order to enable an increase in the size of the gendarmerie, though the precise outcome remains unclear. The authorities have standardised promotion and salary structures in order to boost professionalisation and are also looking to improve military infrastructure. There is close defence cooperation with France, which has a significant training mission in the country. The armed-forces school at Zambakro runs courses for Ivorian as well as regional personnel, and the second Higher Defence Studies course graduated in late 2021 with personnel from across the region. In 2021, with French assistance, Côte d’Ivoire opened the International Academy for the Fight Against Terrorism (AILCT) in Abidjan, to help develop

Sub-Saharan Africa

Light 2 inf bn (gp) each with (1 lt tk tp, 1 arty bty) 1 inf bn Air Manoeuvre 1 cdo/AB bn COMBAT SUPPORT 1 arty gp (with MRL) 1 engr bn

464 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2022 regional as well as Ivorian counter-terrorist capability. Except for limited maintenance facilities, there is no domestic defence-industrial capability.

ACTIVE 27,400 (Army 23,000 Navy 1,000 Air 1,400 Special Forces 2,000) Gendarmerie & Paramilitary n.k. Moves to restructure and reform the armed forces continue

ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE Army ε23,000 FORCES BY ROLE MANOEUVRE Armoured 1 armd bn Light 7 inf bn Air Manoeuvre 1 cdo/AB bn COMBAT SUPPORT 1 arty bn 1 engr bn COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT 1 log bn AIR DEFENCE 1 AD bn EQUIPMENT BY TYPE ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES MBT 10 T-55† RECCE 18: 13 BRDM-2; 5 Cayman BRDM IFV 10 BMP-1/BMP-2† APC 41 APC (W) 40: 9 Bastion APC; 6 BTR-80; 12 Panhard M3; 13 VAB PPV 1 Snake ENGINEERING & MAINTENANCE VEHICLES VLB MTU ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE MSL • MANPATS 9K111-1 Konkurs (RS-AT-5 Spandrel) (reported); 9K135 Kornet (RS-AT-14 Spriggan) (reported) RCL 106mm ε12 M40A1 ARTILLERY 36+ TOWED 4+: 105mm 4 M-1950; 122mm (reported) MRL 122mm 6 BM-21 MOR 26+: 81mm; 82mm 10 M-37; 120mm 16 AM-50 AIRCRAFT • TPT • Medium 1 An-12 Cub† AIR DEFENCE SAM • Point-defence 9K32 Strela-2 (RS-SA-7 Grail)‡ (reported) GUNS 21+ SP 20mm 6 M3 VDAA TOWED 15+: 20mm 10; 23mm ZU-23-2; 40mm 5 L/60

Navy ε1,000 EQUIPMENT BY TYPE PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 4 PB 4: 3 L’Emergence; 1 Atchan 2 AMPHIBIOUS • LANDING CRAFT 1 LCM 1 Aby

Air Force ε1,400 EQUIPMENT BY TYPE† AIRCRAFT TPT 3: Light 2: 1 An-26 Curl; 1 C295W; PAX 1 B-727 HELICOPTERS ATK 3 Mi-24V Hind E MRH 2 Mi-8P Hip TPT • Medium 2 SA330L Puma (IAR-330L)

Special Forces ε2,000 FORCES BY ROLE SPECIAL FORCES 1 spec ops bde

Gendarmerie & Paramilitary n.k. Republican Guard n.k. Gendarmerie n.k. EQUIPMENT BY TYPE† ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES RECCE 3 Cayman BRDM IFV BMP-1 APC APC (W) BTR-80; VAB PPV RG-31 Nyala; Springbuck HD; Streit Spartan PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS • PB 1 Bian

DEPLOYMENT CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC: UN • MINUSCA 1 MALI: UN • MINUSMA 802; 1 mech inf bn; 1 sy coy MALI: UN • MINURSO 2

FOREIGN FORCES France 950; 1 (Marine) inf bn; 1 hel unit with 1 AS555 Fennec; 2 SA330 Puma; 2 SA342 Gazelle

Sub-Saharan Africa 465 new regiments, the latest in a sequence of reorganisations designed to integrate non-state armed groups. The actual combat effectiveness of many formations is doubtful

Congolese Franc CDF GDP per capita

2020

2021

CDF

90.2tr

110tr

USD

48.7bn

54.8bn 594

USD

544

Growth

1.7

4.9

Inflation

11.4

9.4

CDF

641bn

580bn

USD

346m

290m

1851.50

2000.64

Def bdgt USD1=CDF

2022

Real-terms defence budget trend (USDm, constant 2015) 490 n.k. 1 2008

Population

2015

2021

105,044,646

Age

0–14

15–19

20–24

25–29

Male

23.3%

5.2%

4.5%

3.8%

30–64 65 plus 12.1%

1.1%

Female

23.0%

5.2%

4.5%

3.8%

12.2%

1.4%

Capabilities On paper, the DRC has the largest armed forces in Central Africa. However, given the country’s size and the poor levels of training, morale and equipment, they are unable to provide security throughout the country. Kinshasa has pursued several militarymodernisation programmes, though plans to re-examine doctrine and organisation have seen little positive impact. When conflict finally abates in the east, significant attention to wide-ranging DDR and SSR will be required, to continue the work intermittently undertaken over the past decade. The mandate of the UN’s MONUSCO mission in the DRC was renewed in December 2019 and the UN’s Force Intervention Brigade (FIB) remains active in the east. Training will have improved for units operating with the FIB, and there is also foreign assistance in training and capacity-building. The armed forces have incorporated a number of non-state armed groups. There remains significant scope to improve training, recruitment and retention. Deployment capability is limited and the lack of logistics vehicles significantly reduces transport capacity. The lack of sufficient tactical airlift and helicopters is a brake on military effectiveness and there is some reliance on MONUSCO capabilities, which are also insufficient given the geographical scale of the country. Much of the inventory is in poor repair and, while new equipment has been acquired, the absence of any defence sector apart from limited maintenance capability will also hinder military efficiency.

ACTIVE ε134,250 (Central Staffs ε14,000, Army 103,000 Republican Guard 8,000 Navy 6,700 Air 2,550)

ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE Army (Force Terrestre) ε103,000 The DRC has 11 Military Regions. In 2011, all brigades in North and South Kivu provinces were consolidated into 27

FORCES BY ROLE MANOEUVRE Light 6 (integrated) inf bde ε3 inf bde (non-integrated) 27+ inf regt COMBAT SUPPORT 1 arty regt 1 MP bn EQUIPMENT BY TYPE† (includes Republican Guard eqpt) ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES MBT 174: 12–17 Type-59†; 32 T-55; 25 T-64BV-1; 100 T-72AV LT TK 40: 10 PT-76; 30 Type-62† RECCE up to 52: up to 17 AML-60; 14 AML-90; 19 EE-9 Cascavel; 2 RAM-V-2 IFV 20 BMP-1 APC 104+: APC (T) 9: 3 BTR-50; 6 MT-LB APC (W) 95+: 30–70 BTR-60PB; 58 Panhard M3†; 7 TH 390 Fahd ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE RCL 57mm M18; 73mm SPG-9; 75mm M20; 106mm M40A1 GUNS 85mm 10 Type-56 (D-44) ARTILLERY 726+ SP 16: 122mm 6 2S1 Gvozdika; 152mm 10 2S3 Akatsiya TOWED 125: 122mm 77 M-30 (M-1938)/D-30/Type-60; 130mm 42 Type-59 (M-46)/Type-59-I; 152mm 6 D-20 (reported) MRL 57+: 107mm 12 Type-63; 122mm 24+: 24 BM-21 Grad; some RM-70; 128mm 6 M-51; 130mm 3 Type-82; 132mm 12 MOR 528+: 81mm 100; 82mm 400; 107mm M30; 120mm 28: 10 Brandt; 18 other AIR DEFENCE SAM • Point-defence 9K32 Strela-2 (RS-SA-7 Grail)‡ GUNS • TOWED 64: 14.5mm 12 ZPU-4; 37mm 52 M-1939

Republican Guard 8,000 FORCES BY ROLE MANOEUVRE Armoured 1 armd regt Light 3 gd bde COMBAT SUPPORT 1 arty regt

Navy 6,700 (incl infantry and marines) EQUIPMENT BY TYPE PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 1 PB 1 Type-062 (Shanghai II)†

Sub-Saharan Africa

Democratic Republic of the Congo DRC

466 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2022

Air Force 2,550 EQUIPMENT BY TYPE AIRCRAFT 4 combat capable ATK 4 Su-25 Frogfoot TPT 4: Medium 1 C-130H Hercules; Light 1 An-26 Curl; PAX 2 B-727 HELICOPTERS ATK 7: 4 Mi-24 Hind; 3 Mi-24V Hind TPT • Medium 3: 1 AS332L Super Puma; 2 Mi-8 Hip

Paramilitary National Police Force Incl Rapid Intervention Police (National and Provincial)

People’s Defence Force

Senegal 6 Serbia 1 Sierra Leone 3 South Africa (Operation Mistral) 939; 1 inf bn; 1 hel sqn Switzerland 1 Tanzania 854; 1 spec ops coy; 1 inf bn Tunisia 13 Ukraine 260; 1 atk hel sqn United Kingdom 3 United States 3 Uruguay 822; 1 inf bn; 1 hel sqn Zambia 7 Zimbabwe 3

Djibouti DJB

FOREIGN FORCES

Djiboutian Franc DJF

2020

2021

All part of MONUSCO unless otherwise specified Algeria 2 Bangladesh 1,632; 1 inf bn; 1 engr coy; 1 avn coy; 1 hel coy Belgium 1 Benin 9 Bhutan 2 Bolivia 4 Bosnia-Herzegovina 3 Botswana 3 Brazil 23 Burkina Faso 5 Cameroon 3 Canada (Operation Crocodile) 8 China, People’s Republic of 232; 1 engr coy; 1 fd hospital Czech Republic 2 Egypt 11 France 2 Gambia 2 Ghana 20 Guatemala 155; 1 SF coy India 1,858; 2 inf bn; 1 med coy Indonesia 1,035; 1 inf bn; 1 engr coy Ireland 3 Jordan 14 Kenya 262 Malawi 718; 1 inf bn Malaysia 6 Mali 4 Mongolia 2 Morocco 926; 1 inf bn; 1 fd hospital Nepal 899; 1 inf bn; 1 engr coy Niger 3 Nigeria 10 Pakistan 1,974; 2 inf bn; 1 hel sqn Paraguay 7 Peru 6 Poland 2 Romania 6 Russia 10

GDP

DJF

611bn

649bn

USD

3.44bn

3.65bn

per capita

USD

3,482

3,646

Growth

1.0

5.0

Inflation

1.8

1.2

Def exp FMA (US)

DJF

n.k

USD

n.k

USD

USD1=DJF Population

177.71

177.70

2022

938,413

Age

0–14

15–19

20–24

25–29

Male

14.7%

4.8%

4.7%

4.5%

30–64 65 plus 15.0%

1.8%

Female

14.6%

5.0%

5.6%

5.8%

21.3%

2.2%

Capabilities Djibouti’s strategic location and relative stability have led a number of foreign states to station forces in the country. The armed forces’ main responsibility is internal and border security, as well as counter-insurgency operations. The 2017 defence white paper highlighted a requirement to modernise key capabilities, but funds remain limited. Djibouti maintains close defence cooperation with France as it hosts its largest foreign military base. The US also operates its Combined Joint Task Force–Horn of Africa from Djibouti. Japan has based forces there for regional counter-piracy missions and the EU and NATO have at various times maintained a presence to support their operations. Djibouti also hosts an Italian base with a focus on anti-piracy activities. China’s first overseas military base, including dock facilities, was officially opened in Djibouti in 2017. France and the US provide training assistance. EU NAVFOR Somalia has delivered maritimesecurity training to the navy and coastguard. Djibouti participates in a number of regional multinational exercises and contributes personnel to the AMISOM mission in Somalia but has limited capacity to independently deploy beyond its territory. Army equipment consists predominantly of older French and Soviet-era equipment. There are some maintenance facilities, but no defence manufacturing sector.

ACTIVE 10,450 (Army 8,000 Navy 200 Air 250

Gendarmerie 2,000) Gendarmerie & Paramilitary 2,650

Sub-Saharan Africa 467

Army ε8,000 FORCES BY ROLE 4 military districts (Tadjourah, Dikhil, Ali-Sabieh and Obock) MANOEUVRE Mechanised 1 armd regt (1 recce sqn, 3 armd sqn, 1 (anti-smuggling) sy coy) Light 4 inf regt (3-4 inf coy, 1 spt coy) 1 rapid reaction regt (4 inf coy, 1 spt coy) Other 1 (Republican Guard) gd regt (1 sy sqn, 1 (close protection) sy sqn, 1 cbt spt sqn (1 recce pl, 1 armd pl, 1 arty pl), 1 spt sqn) COMBAT SUPPORT 1 arty regt 1 demining coy 1 sigs regt 1 CIS sect COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT 1 log regt 1 maint coy EQUIPMENT BY TYPE ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES ASLT 3+ PTL-02 Assaulter RECCE 38: 4 AML-60†; 17 AML-90; 2 BRDM-2; 15 VBL IFV 28: 8 BTR-80A; 16-20 Ratel APC 43 APC (W) 30+: 12 BTR-60†; 4+ AT-105 Saxon; 14 Puma PPV 13: 3 Casspir; 10 RG-33L AUV 22: 10 Cougar 4×4 (one with 90mm gun); 2 CS/ VN3B; 10 PKSV ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE RCL 106mm 16 M40A1 ARTILLERY 76 SP 155mm 10 M109L TOWED 122mm 9 D-30 MRL 12: 107mm 2 PKSV AUV with PH-63; 122mm 10: 6 (6-tube Toyota Land Cruiser 70 series); 2 (30-tube Iveco 110-16); 2 (30-tube) MOR 45: 81mm 25; 120mm 20 Brandt AIR DEFENCE • GUNS 15+ SP 20mm 5 M693 TOWED 10: 23mm 5 ZU-23-2; 40mm 5 L/70

Navy ε200 EQUIPMENT BY TYPE PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 12 PBF 2 Battalion-17 PB 10: 1 Plascoa†; 2 Sea Ark 1739; 1 Swari†; 6 others AMPHIBIOUS • LANDING CRAFT 1 LCT 1 EDIC 700

Air Force 250 EQUIPMENT BY TYPE AIRCRAFT TPT • Light 6: 1 Cessna U206G Stationair; 1 Cessna 208 Caravan; 2 Y-12E; 1 L-410UVP Turbolet; 1 MA60 HELICOPTERS ATK (2 Mi-35 Hind in store) MRH 6: 4 AS365 Dauphin; 1 Mi-17 Hip H; 1 Z-9WE TPT 3: Medium 1 Mi-8T Hip; Light 2 AS355F Ecureuil II

Gendarmerie 2,000+

Ministry of Defence FORCES BY ROLE MANOEUVRE Other 1 paramilitary bn EQUIPMENT BY TYPE AFV • AUV 2 CS/VN3B PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS • 1 PB

Gendarmerie & Paramilitary ε2,650 National Police Force ε2,500 Ministry of Interior

Coast Guard 150 EQUIPMENT BY TYPE PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS • PB 11: 2 Khor Angar; 9 other

DEPLOYMENT SOMALIA: AU • AMISOM 1,800; 2 inf bn

FOREIGN FORCES China 240: 1 mne coy(-); 1 med unit; 2 ZTL-11; 8 ZBL-08; 1 LPD; 1 ESD France 1,450: 1 SF unit; 1 (Marine) combined arms regt (2 recce sqn, 2 inf coy, 1 arty bty, 1 engr coy); 1 hel det with 2 SA330 Puma; 2 SA342 Gazelle; 1 LCM; 1 air sqn with 4 Mirage 2000-5; 1 CN235M; 2 SA330 Puma Italy BMIS 147 Japan 180; 2 P-3C Orion Spain Operation Atalanta 1 P-3M Orion United States US Africa Command: 4,000; 1 tpt sqn with C-130H/J-30 Hercules; 1 tpt sqn with 6 MV-22B Osprey; 2 KC-130J Hercules; 1 spec ops sqn with MC-130H; PC-12 (U-28A); 1 CSAR sqn with HH-60G Pave Hawk; 1 CISR sqn with MQ-9A Reaper; 1 naval air base

Sub-Saharan Africa

ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE

468 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2022

Equatorial Guinea EQG CFA Franc BEAC XAF

2020

2021

GDP

XAF

5.77tr

6.74tr

USD

10.0bn

12.5bn

per capita

USD

7,137

8,626

Growth

-4.9

4.1

Inflation

4.8

0.5

XAF

n.k

USD

n.k

574.77

538.34

Def exp USD1=XAF Population

2022

PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 10 CORVETTES • FSG 1 Bata with 2 Katran-M RWS with Barrier SSM, 2 AK630 CIWS, 1 76mm gun PCC 2 OPV 62 PBF 2 Shaldag II PB 5: 1 Daphne†; 2 Estuario de Muni; 2 Zhuk LOGISTICS AND SUPPORT AKRH 1 Capitán David Eyama Angue Osa with 1 76mm gun

Air Force 100

857,008

Age

0–14

15–19

20–24

25–29

30–64

65 plus

Male

19.3%

5.4%

4.7%

4.0%

14.7%

1.7%

Female

18.8%

5.2%

4.6%

3.9%

15.2%

2.4%

Capabilities The army dominates the armed forces, with internal security the principal task. Equatorial Guinea has been trying for several years to modernise its armed forces. France maintains a military detachment in Malabo, advising on defence-institutional development and delivering capacity-building support at the naval-focused regional school at Tica. These personnel also engage in some training activities with French forces based in Gabon and more generally in the region as part of France's Corymbe mission. There is only limited capability for power projection and deployments are limited to neighbouring countries without external support. Recent naval investments include both equipment and onshoreinfrastructure improvements at Bata and Malabo, although naval capabilities overall remain limited. Maritime-security concerns in the Gulf of Guinea have resulted in an increased emphasis on boosting maritime-patrol capacity. There is limited maintenance capacity and no defence industrial sector.

ACTIVE 1,450 (Army 1,100 Navy 250 Air 100)

ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE Army 1,100 FORCES BY ROLE MANOEUVRE Light 3 inf bn(-) EQUIPMENT BY TYPE ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES MBT 3 T-55 RECCE 6 BRDM-2 IFV 20 BMP-1 APC 35 APC (W) 10 BTR-152 PPV 25 Reva (reported)

Navy ε250 EQUIPMENT BY TYPE PRINCIPAL SURFACE COMBATANTS • FRIGATES 1 FF 1 Wele Nzas with 2 MS-227 Ogon’ 122mm MRL, 2 AK630 CIWS, 2 76mm guns

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE AIRCRAFT 4 combat capable ATK 4: 2 Su-25 Frogfoot; 2 Su-25UB Frogfoot B TPT 4: Light 3: 1 An-32B Cline; 2 An-72 Coaler; PAX 1 Falcon 900 (VIP) TRG 2 L-39C Albatros HELICOPTERS ATK 5 Mi-24P/V Hind MRH 1 Mi-17 Hip H TPT 4: Heavy 1 Mi-26 Halo; Medium 1 Ka-29 Helix; Light 2 Enstrom 480

Gendarmerie & Paramilitary Guardia Civil FORCES BY ROLE MANOEUVRE Other 2 paramilitary coy

Coast Guard n.k.

Eritrea ERI Eritrean Nakfa ERN GDP per capita

2020

2021

ΕRN

31.4bn

34.0bn

USD

2.08bn

2.25bn 626

USD

588

Growth

-0.6

2.9

Inflation

4.8

4.3

Def exp

ΕRN

n.k

USD

n.k

15.07

15.08

USD1=ERN Population

2022

6,147,398

Age

0–14

15–19

20–24

25–29

Male

18.9%

5.8%

4.5%

3.7%

30–64 65 plus 14.6%

1.6%

Female

18.7%

5.8%

4.6%

3.8%

15.4%

2.4%

Capabilities Eritrea has maintained large armed forces mainly because of historical military tensions and conflict with Ethiopia, though tensions eased after a September 2018 peace agreement. The peace agreement may have afforded the armed forces the opportunity to consider restructuring and recapitalisation. Fighting in the neighbouring Ethiopian province of Tigray from late 2020 saw Eritrean forces deploy over the border in support of Ethiopian government forces. However, the extent of Eritrea’s involvement in this conflict and the level of ongoing support for Ethiopian forces remain

Sub-Saharan Africa 469 MOR 150+: 82mm 50+; 120mm/160mm 100+ AIR DEFENCE SAM • Point-defence 9K32 Strela-2 (RS-SA-7 Grail)‡ GUNS 70+ SP 23mm ZSU-23-4 Shilka TOWED 23mm ZU-23

Navy 1,400

ACTIVE 201,750 (Army 200,000 Navy 1,400 Air 350)

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 12 PBF 9: 5 Battalion-17; 4 Super Dvora PB 3 Swiftships AMPHIBIOUS 3 LANDING SHIP 2 LST 2: 1 Chamo† (Ministry of Transport); 1 Ashdod† LANDING CRAFT 1 LCU 1 T-4† (in harbour service)

Conscript liability 18 months (4 months mil trg) between ages 18 and 40

Air Force ε350

RESERVE 120,000 (Army ε120,000)

ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE Army ε200,000 Heavily cadreised FORCES BY ROLE COMMAND 4 corps HQ MANOEUVRE Mechanised 1 mech bde Light 19 inf div 1 cdo div

Reserve ε120,000 FORCES BY ROLE MANOEUVRE Light 1 inf div EQUIPMENT BY TYPE ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES MBT 270 T-54/T-55 RECCE 40 BRDM-1/BRDM-2 IFV 15 BMP-1 APC 35 APC (T) 10 MT-LB† APC (W) 25 BTR-152/BTR-60 ENGINEERING & MAINTENANCE VEHICLES ARV T-54/T-55 reported VLB MTU reported ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE MSL • MANPATS 9K11 Malyutka (RS-AT-3 Sagger); 9K111-1 Konkurs (RS-AT-5 Spandrel) GUNS 85mm D-44 ARTILLERY 258 SP 45: 122mm 32 2S1 Gvozdika; 152mm 13 2S5 Giatsint-S TOWED 19+: 122mm D-30; 130mm 19 M-46 MRL 44: 122mm 35 BM-21 Grad; 220mm 9 9P140 Uragan

FORCES BY ROLE FIGHTER/GROUND ATTACK 1 sqn with MiG-29/MiG-29SE/MiG-29UB Fulcrum 1 sqn with Su-27/Su-27UBK Flanker TRANSPORT 1 sqn with Y-12(II) TRAINING 1 sqn with L-90 Redigo 1 sqn with MB-339CE* TRANSPORT HELICOPTER 1 sqn with Bell 412EP Twin Huey 1 sqn with Mi-17 Hip H EQUIPMENT BY TYPE AIRCRAFT 14 combat capable FTR 8: 4 MiG-29 Fulcrum; 2 MiG-29UB Fulcrum; 1 Su-27 Flanker; 1 Su-27UBK Flanker FGA 2 MiG-29SE Fulcrum TPT • Light 5: 1 Beech 200 King Air; 4 Y-12(II) TRG 16+: 8 L-90 Redigo; 4 MB-339CE*; 4+ Z-143/Z-242 HELICOPTERS MRH 8: 4 Bell 412EP Twin Huey (AB-412EP); 4 Mi-17 Hip H AIR-LAUNCHED MISSILES AAM • IR R-60 (RS-AA-8 Aphid); R-73 (RS-AA-11A Archer); IR/SARH R-27 (RS-AA-10 Alamo)

DEPLOYMENT ETHIOPIA: Tigray: up to 20,000 (reported)

Sub-Saharan Africa

unclear. Maritime insecurity, including piracy, remains a challenge. It appears that the foreign military presence and related facilities at Assab, which had been used to support Gulf states’ participation in the Yemen campaign, had been wound down by mid-2021. Eritrea maintains a large army due to mandatory conscription. For some the term of service is reportedly indefinite, and significant numbers of conscripts have chosen to leave the country or otherwise evade service. These factors likely affect overall military cohesion and effectiveness. Eritrea has demonstrated limited capacity to deploy beyond its immediate borders. The armed forces’ inventory primarily comprises outdated Soviet-era systems and modernisation was restricted by the UN arms embargo, until it was lifted in 2018. The arms embargo will have resulted in serviceability issues, notwithstanding allegations of external support. The navy remains capable of only limited coastal-patrol and interception operations. There is some maintenance capability, but no defence-manufacturing sector.

470 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2022 Other 1 (Republican Guard) gd div

Ethiopia ETH Ethiopian Birr ETB GDP per capita

2020

2021

ΕTB

3.37tr

4.08tr

USD

96.6bn

92.8bn 940

USD

994

Growth

6.1

2.0

Inflation

20.4

25.2

ETB

15.0bn

16.5bn

USD

429m

375m

34.93

43.97

Def bdgt USD1=ETB

2022

Real-terms defence budget trend (USDm, constant 2015) 492 278 2008

Population

2015

2021

110,871,031

Age

0–14

15–19

20–24

25–29

30–64 65 plus

Male

19.9%

5.3%

4.5%

3.9%

14.7%

1.6%

Female

19.6%

5.2%

4.5%

4.0%

14.9%

1.9%

Capabilities Ethiopia’s armed forces, among the region’s largest and most capable, have been engaged in fighting armed groups in and around the northern province of Tigray since November 2020. This has created a humanitarian crisis, and both Tigrayan and government forces and their allies have been subject to allegations of human-rights violations. In 2021, the conflict began to involve other ethnic groups in Ethiopia. Nonetheless, countering al-Shabaab remains an ongoing military commitment and Ethiopia continues to contribute to the AMISOM mission in Somalia and also to the UN mission in South Sudan. The armed forces are experienced by regional standards, following a history of combat operations and international peacekeeping deployments. The authorities are now trying to expand personnel numbers. The country’s inventory comprises mostly Soviet-era equipment, though surplus stocks have been acquired from China, Hungary, Ukraine and the US, and modern air-defence systems purchased from Russia. Armed UAVs have recently been bought from aboard. The loss of Northern Command bases in the early fighting led to equipment losses, but reports of recent imports from other sources remain unconfirmed, as does the extent of equipment attrition during the conflict. There is a modest local defence-industrial base, with some licensed production of light armoured vehicles. There is adequate maintenance capability but only a limited capacity to support advanced platforms.

ACTIVE 138,000 (Army 135,000 Air 3,000)

ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE Army 135,000 FORCES BY ROLE MANOEUVRE Mechanised 5 mech inf div(-) Light 18 inf div(-)

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES MBT 370: ε180 T-55/T-62; ε190 T-72B/UA1 RECCE ε100 BRDM-1/BRDM-2 IFV ε20 BMP-1 APC 375+ APC (T) some ZSD-89 APC (W) 300+: ε300 BTR-60/BTR-152; some WZ-551 PPV 75 Gaia Thunder AUV some Ze’ev ENGINEERING & MAINTENANCE VEHICLES ARV T-54/T-55 ARV reported; 3 BTS-5B VLB GQL-111; MTU reported MW Bozena ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE MSL • MANPATS 9K11 Malyutka (RS-AT-3 Sagger); 9K111 Fagot (RS-AT-4 Spigot); 9K135 Kornet-E (RS-AT-14 Spriggan) RCL 82mm B-10; 107mm B-11 GUNS 85mm D-44 ARTILLERY 450+ SP 10+: 122mm 2S1 Gvozdika; 152mm 10 2S19 Msta-S TOWED 400+: 122mm ε400 D-30/M-30 (M-1938); 130mm M-46; 155mm AH2 MRL 40+: 107mm PH-63; 122mm ε40 BM-21 Grad; 300mm AR-2 MOR 81mm M1/M29; 82mm M-1937; 120mm M-1944 AIR DEFENCE SAM Medium-range ε4 S-75M3 Volkhov (RS-SA-2 Guideline) Short-range ε4 S-125M1 Pechora-M1 (RS-SA-3 Goa) Point-defence 9K32 Strela-2 (RS-SA-7 Grail)‡; 9K310 Igla-1 (RS-SA-16 Gimlet); ε6 96K6 Pantsir-S1 (RS-SA-22 Greyhound) GUNS SP 23mm ZSU-23-4 Shilka TOWED 23mm ZU-23; 37mm M-1939; 57mm S-60

Air Force 3,000 FORCES BY ROLE FIGHTER/GROUND ATTACK 1 sqn with MiG-23BN/UB Flogger H/C 1 sqn with Su-27/Su-27UB Flanker TRANSPORT 1 sqn with An-12 Cub; An-26 Curl; An-32 Cline; C-130B Hercules; DHC-6 Twin Otter; L-100-30; Yak-40 Codling (VIP) TRAINING 1 sqn with L-39 Albatros 1 sqn with G 120TP ATTACK/TRANSPORT HELICOPTER 2 sqn with Mi-24/Mi-35 Hind; Mi-8 Hip; Mi-17 Hip H; SA316 Alouette III EQUIPMENT BY TYPE AIRCRAFT 20 combat capable FTR 11: 8 Su-27 Flanker; 3 Su-27UB Flanker FGA 6+ MiG-23BN/UB Flogger H/C ATK 3: 1 Su-25T Frogfoot; 2 Su-25UB Frogfoot

Sub-Saharan Africa 471

DEPLOYMENT

GUNS TOWED 23mm ZU-23; 37mm M-1939

FOREIGN FORCES Eritrea Army: up to 20,000 (reported)

Gabon GAB CFA Franc BEAC XAF GDP per capita

2020

2021

XAF

8.82tr

10.0tr

USD

15.3bn

18.3bn 8,569

USD

7,277

Growth

-1.8

1.5

Inflation

1.3

2.0

XAF

156bn

173bn

USD

272m

315m

574.75

549.21

Def bdgt [a] USD1=XAF

2022

[a] Includes funds allocated to Republican Guard Real-terms defence budget trend (USDm, constant 2015) 269

MALI: UN • MINUSMA 1 SOMALIA: AU • AMISOM 4,000; 5 inf bn SOUTH SUDAN: UN • UNMISS 1,523; 3 inf bn

112 2008

2015

2021

SUDAN: UN • UNISFA 3,306; 3 inf bn; 2 arty coy; 1 engr coy; 1 sigs coy; 1 log coy; 1 med bn

Population Age

0–14

15–19

20–24

25–29

TERRITORY WHERE THE GOVERNMENT DOES NOT EXERCISE EFFECTIVE CONTROL

Male

18.2%

5.9%

5.4%

5.1%

15.2%

2.0%

Female

17.7%

5.5%

4.9%

4.3%

13.7%

2.0%

Political tensions between Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed's federal government and the Tigray People's Liberation Front resulted in the outbreak of open fighting between the Tigray Defense Force and the Ethiopian National Defense Force in November 2020. Following early reverses, federal government forces were subsequently reinforced by forces from other Ethiopian regions as well as troops from the Eritrean Defense Forces.

Capabilities

Tigray Defense Forces (TDF)

A significant amount of Ethiopian National Defense Force heavy equipment, including long-range rocket and missile artillery, was captured by the TDF early in the conflict. It is unclear how much of this materiel remains in operation. EQUIPMENT BY TYPE ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES MBT T-55; T-62; T-72B APC APC (T) ZSD-89 APC (W) WZ-551 ARTILLERY TOWED 107mm PH-63; 122mm D-30; 130mm M-46; 155mm AH-2 MRL 122mm BM-21 AIR DEFENCE SAM Short-range S-125M1 Pechora-M1 (RS-SA-3 Goa) Point-defence 9K310 Igla-1 (RS-SA-16 Gimlet)

2,284,912 30–64 65 plus

Oil revenues have allowed the government to support small but regionally capable armed forces, while the country has benefited from the long-term presence of French troops acting as a security guarantor. There is regular training with French forces, including with France’s regionally deployed naval units, as well as with the US and other international partners. There are reports of a developing security relationship with Russia. Gabonese forces have taken part in the US Navy-led Obangame Express exercise. A new maritimeoperations centre was built by the US in 2019. Military medicine is well regarded. The armed forces retain sufficient airlift to ensure mobility within the country, but very limited capability to project power by sea and air. Apart from limited maintenance facilities, there is no domestic defence-industrial capacity.

ACTIVE 4,700 (Army 3,200 Navy 500 Air 1,000) Gendarmerie & Paramilitary 2,000

ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE Army 3,200 Republican Guard under direct presidential control FORCES BY ROLE MANOEUVRE Light 1 (Republican Guard) gd gp (bn) (1 armd/recce coy, 3 inf coy, 1 arty bty, 1 ADA bty) 8 inf coy

Sub-Saharan Africa

TPT 14: Medium 8: 3 An-12 Cub; 2 C-130B Hercules; 2 C-130E Hercules; 1 L-100-30; Light 6: 1 An-26 Curl; 1 An32 Cline; 3 DHC-6 Twin Otter; 1 Yak-40 Codling (VIP) TRG 24: 12 G 120TP; 12 L-39 Albatros HELICOPTERS ATK 18: 15 Mi-24 Hind; 3 Mi-35 Hind MRH 19: 1 AW139; 6 SA316 Alouette III; 12 Mi-8 Hip/ Mi-17 Hip H UNINHABITED AERIAL VEHICLES CISR • Heavy some Wing Loong I; Medium some Mohajer 6 (reported); some Bayraktar TB2; some Mohajer 6 (reported). AIR-LAUNCHED MISSILES AAM • IR R-3 (RS-AA-2 Atoll)‡; R-60 (RS-AA-8 Aphid); R-73 (RS-AA-11A Archer); IR/SARH R-23/R-24 (RSAA-7 Apex); R-27 (RS-AA-10 Alamo) ASM Kh-25ML (RS-AS-12B Kegler); Kh-29T (RS-AS-14B Kedge); TL-2 (reported) BOMBS TV-guided KAB-500KR

472 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2022 Air Manoeuvre 1 cdo/AB coy COMBAT SUPPORT 1 engr coy EQUIPMENT BY TYPE ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES RECCE 77: 24 AML-60/AML-90; 12 EE-3 Jararaca; 14 EE-9 Cascavel; 6 ERC-90F4 Sagaie; 7 RAM V-2; 14 VBL IFV 17: 12 EE-11 Urutu (with 20mm gun); 5 VN-1† APC 77 APC (W) 35: 9 LAV-150 Commando; 5 Bastion APC; 3 WZ-523; 5 VAB; 12 VXB-170; 1 Pandur PPV 42: 8 Aravis; 34 Ashok Leyland MPV ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE MSL • MANPATS Milan RCL 106mm M40A1 ARTILLERY 67 TOWED 105mm 4 M101 MRL 24: 107mm 16 PH-63; 140mm 8 Teruel MOR 39: 81mm 35; 120mm 4 Brandt AIR DEFENCE • GUNS 41 SP 20mm 4 ERC-20 TOWED 37+: 14.5mm ZPU-4; 23mm 24 ZU-23-2; 37mm 10 M-1939; 40mm 3 L/70

Navy ε500 HQ located at Port Gentil EQUIPMENT BY TYPE PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 10 PB 10: 1 Patra†; 4 Port Gentil (FRA VCSM); 4 Rodman 66; 1 Vice Amiral d'Escadre Jean Léonard Mbini (PRC 66m) AMPHIBIOUS • LANDING CRAFT 1 LCM 1 Mk 9 (ex-UK)

Air Force 1,000 FORCES BY ROLE FIGHTER/GROUND ATTACK 1 sqn with Mirage F-1AZ TRANSPORT 1 (Republican Guard) sqn with AS332 Super Puma; ATR42F; Falcon 900; Gulfstream IV-SP/G650ER 1 sqn with C-130H Hercules; CN-235M-100 ATTACK/TRANSPORT HELICOPTER 1 sqn with Bell 412 Twin Huey (AB-412); SA330C/H Puma; SA342M Gazelle EQUIPMENT BY TYPE AIRCRAFT 8 combat capable FGA 6 Mirage F-1AZ MP (1 EMB-111* in store) TPT 6: Medium 1 C-130H Hercules; (1 L-100-30 in store); Light 2: 1 ATR-42F; 1 CN-235M-100; PAX 3: 1 Falcon 900; 1 Gulfstream IV-SP; 1 Gulfstream G650ER TRG 2 MB-326 Impala I* (4 CM-170 Magister in store) HELICOPTERS MRH 2: 1 Bell 412 Twin Huey (AB-412); 1 SA342M Gazelle; (2 SA342L Gazelle in store) TPT 7: Medium 4: 1 AS332 Super Puma; 3 SA330C/H Puma; Light 3: 2 H120 Colibri; 1 H135 AIR-LAUNCHED MISSILES • AAM • IR U-Darter (reported)

Gendarmerie & Paramilitary 2,000 Gendarmerie 2,000 FORCES BY ROLE MANOEUVRE Armoured 2 armd sqn Other 3 paramilitary bde 11 paramilitary coy Aviation 1 unit with AS350 Ecureuil; AS355 Ecureuil II EQUIPMENT BY TYPE HELICOPTERS • TPT • Light 4: 2 AS350 Ecureuil; 2 AS355 Ecureuil II

DEPLOYMENT CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC: UN • MINUSCA 43

FOREIGN FORCES France 350; 1 inf bn

Gambia GAM Gambian Dalasi GMD GDP

2020

2021

GMD

96.0bn

106bn

USD

1.9bn

2.0bn

USD

770

819

Growth

-0.2

4.9

Inflation

5.9

7.0

Def bdgt

GMD

762m

834m

USD

15m

16m

51.58

51.73

per capita

USD1=GMD Population

2022

2,221,301

Age

0–14

15–19

20–24

25–29

Male

17.6%

5.2%

4.7%

4.4%

30–64 65 plus 15.6%

1.7%

Female

17.5%

5.3%

4.9%

4.6%

16.4%

2.1%

Capabilities Reform of Gambia’s security structure, and the armed forces, has been a key objective of the SSR process that was implemented following political instability in 2016–17. The SSR process is supported by UN organisations, the AU, ECOWAS, EU, France, the UK and the US. A National Defence Policy is under development. Gambia’s small forces have traditionally focused on maritime security and countering human trafficking. France, Germany, Turkey, the UK and US have delivered military support in recent years. There is also cooperation with neighbouring states and with the AU, which maintains a technical-support mission to assist in the SSR process, including on defence reform, military reorganisation and the rule of law. The ECOMIG deployment remains in place, with its mandate extended until the end of 2021, after which it is scheduled to transform into a police mission. The armed forces participate in some multinational exercises and have deployed

Sub-Saharan Africa 473

ACTIVE 4,100 (Army 3,500 Navy 300 National Guard

300)

ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE Gambian National Army 3,500 FORCES BY ROLE MANOEUVRE Light 4 inf bn COMBAT SUPPORT 1 engr sqn

Air Wing EQUIPMENT BY TYPE AIRCRAFT TPT 5: Light 2 AT-802A Air Tractor; PAX 3: 1 B-727; 1 CL-601; 1 Il-62M Classic (VIP)

Ghana GHA 2020

2021

GDP

Ghanaian Cedi GHS GHS

383bn

447bn

USD

68.5bn

75.5bn

per capita

USD

2,226

2,413

Growth

0.4

4.7

Inflation

9.9

9.3

Def bdgt

GHS

1.54bn

2.10bn

USD

276m

355m

5.60

5.92

USD1=GHS

2022

Real-terms defence budget trend (USDm, constant 2015) 309 87 2008

Population

2015

2021

32,372,889

Age

0–14

15–19

20–24

25–29

Male

19.3%

4.9%

4.2%

3.7%

14.6%

1.9%

Gambia Navy 300

Female

19.0%

4.9%

4.3%

4.0%

16.7%

2.4%

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 8 PBF 4: 2 Rodman 55; 2 Fatimah I PB 4: 1 Bolong Kanta†; 3 Taipei (ROC Hai Ou) (one additional damaged and in reserve)

Capabilities

Republican National Guard 300 FORCES BY ROLE MANOEUVRE Other 1 gd bn (forming)

DEPLOYMENT CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC: UN • MINUSCA 10 DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO: UN • MONUSCO 2 MALI: UN • MINUSMA 6 SOUTH SUDAN: UN • UNMISS 5

FOREIGN FORCES Ghana ECOMIG 50 Nigeria ECOMIG 197 Senegal ECOMIG 250

30–64 65 plus

Ghana’s armed forces are among the most capable in the region, with a long-term development plan covering both the current and next decade. The ability to control its EEZ is of increasing importance, and this underpins the navy’s expansion plans, including the opening of a new forward-operating base. Internal and maritime security are central military tasks, along with peacekeeping missions. The US delivers training and support and there is also significant and long-standing defence engagement with the UK. Air-force training, close-air support and airlift capabilities have developed in recent years. There are plans to boost training and exercises, as well as to improve military infrastructure. The army is a regular contributor to UN peacekeeping operations. The development of forward-operating bases continues, with the principal objective of protecting energy resources. There is a limited defence-industrial base, including maintenance facilities and ammunition manufacturing as well as a more recent armouredvehicle production capability.

ACTIVE 15,500 (Army 11,500 Navy 2,000 Air 2,000)

ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE Army 11,500 FORCES BY ROLE COMMAND 2 comd HQ MANOEUVRE Reconnaissance 1 armd recce regt (2 recce sqn) 1 armd recce regt (forming) Light 1 (rapid reaction) mot inf bn 6 inf bn Air Manoeuvre 2 AB coy

Sub-Saharan Africa

in support of UN missions in Africa. The equipment inventory is limited, with serviceability in doubt for some types. Gambia has no significant defence-industrial capabilities.

474 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2022 COMBAT SUPPORT 1 arty regt (1 arty bty, 2 mor bty) 1 fd engr regt (bn) 1 sigs regt 1 sigs sqn COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT 1 log gp 1 tpt coy 2 maint coy 1 med coy 1 trg bn EQUIPMENT BY TYPE ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES RECCE 3 EE-9 Cascavel IFV 48: 24 Ratel-90; 15 Ratel-20; 4 Piranha 25mm; 5+ Type-05P 25mm APC 105 APC (W) 55+: 46 Piranha; 9+ Type-05P PPV 50 Streit Typhoon AUV 73 Cobra/Cobra II ARTILLERY 87+ TOWED 122mm 6 D-30 MRL 3+: 107mm Type-63; 122mm 3 Type-81 MOR 78: 81mm 50; 120mm 28 Tampella ENGINEERING & MAINTENANCE VEHICLES AEV 1 Type-05P AEV ARV Piranha reported ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE RCL 84mm Carl Gustaf AIR DEFENCE SAM • Point-defence 9K32 Strela-2 (RS-SA-7 Grail)‡ GUNS • TOWED 8+: 14.5mm 4+: 4 ZPU-2; ZPU-4; 23mm 4 ZU-23-2

TRANSPORT HELICOPTER 1 sqn with AW109A; Bell 412SP Twin Huey; Mi-17V-5 Hip H; SA319 Alouette III; Z-9EH EQUIPMENT BY TYPE† AIRCRAFT 8 combat capable ATK (3 MB-326K in store) TPT 10: Light 10: 1 BN-2 Defender; 3 C295; 3 Cessna 172; 3 DA42; (PAX 1 F-28 Fellowship (VIP) in store) TRG 8: 4 K-8 Karakorum*; 2 L-39ZO*; 2 MB-339A* HELICOPTERS MRH 10: 1 Bell 412SP Twin Huey; 3 Mi-17V-5 Hip H; 2 SA319 Alouette III; 4 Z-9EH TPT 6: Medium 4 Mi-171Sh; Light 2 AW109A

DEPLOYMENT CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC: UN • MINUSCA 13 CYPRUS: UN • UNFICYP 1 DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO: UN • MONUSCO 20 GAMBIA: ECOWAS • ECOMIG 50 LEBANON: UN • UNIFIL 877; 1 recce coy; 1 mech inf bn MALI: UN • MINUSMA 154; 1 engr coy SOMALIA: UN • UNSOM 1; UN • UNSOS 1 SOUTH SUDAN: UN • UNMISS 881; 1 inf bn SUDAN: UN • UNISFA 8 SYRIA/ISRAEL: UN • UNDOF 6 WESTERN SAHARA: UN • MINURSO 17

Guinea GUI 2020

2021

Navy 2,000

GDP

GNF

147tr

172tr

Naval HQ located at Accra; Western HQ located at Sekondi; Eastern HQ located at Tema

USD

15.4bn

16.7bn

per capita

USD

1,102

1,168

Growth

7.1

5.2

Inflation

10.6

11.6

GNF

2.02tr

2.41tr

USD

211m

234m

9565.11

10301.34

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 14 PCO 2 Anzone (US) PCC 10: 2 Achimota (GER Lurssen 57m) with 1 76mm gun; 2 Dzata (GER Lurssen 45m); 4 Snake (PRC 47m); 2 Yaa Asantewa (ex-GER Albatros) PBF 1 Stephen Otu (ROK Sea Dolphin) PB 1 David Hansen (US)

Guinean Franc GNF

Def bdgt USD1=GNF

2022

Real-terms defence budget trend (USDm, constant 2015) 221

Special Boat Squadron FORCES BY ROLE SPECIAL FORCES 1 SF unit

Air Force 2,000 FORCES BY ROLE GROUND ATTACK 1 sqn with K-8 Karakorum*; L-39ZO*; MB-339A* ISR 1 unit with DA42 TRANSPORT 1 sqn with BN-2 Defender; C295; Cessna 172

39 2008

Population

2015

2021

12,877,894

Age

0–14

15–19

20–24

25–29

Male

20.7%

5.3%

4.5%

3.7%

30–64 65 plus 14.0%

1.8%

Female

20.4%

5.2%

4.4%

3.7%

14.1%

2.2%

Capabilities Guinea’s armed forces remain limited in size and conventional capacity. Special-forces troops toppled the government of former president Alpha Condé in September 2021, with their leader, Col. Mamady Doumbouya, sworn in as interim leader a month later.

Sub-Saharan Africa 475

ACTIVE 9,700 (Army 8,500 Navy 400 Air 800) Gendarmerie & Paramilitary 2,600 Conscript liability 9–12 months (students, before graduation)

ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE Army 8,500 FORCES BY ROLE MANOEUVRE Armoured 1 armd bn Light 1 SF bn 5 inf bn 1 ranger bn 1 cdo bn Air Manoeuvre 1 air mob bn Other 1 (Presidential Guard) gd bn COMBAT SUPPORT 1 arty bn 1 AD bn 1 engr bn EQUIPMENT BY TYPE ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES MBT 38: 30 T-34; 8 T-54 LT TK 15 PT-76 RECCE 27: 2 AML-90; 25 BRDM-1/BRDM-2 IFV 2 BMP-1 APC 59 APC (T) 10 BTR-50 APC (W) 30: 16 BTR-40; 8 BTR-60; 6 BTR-152 PPV 19: 10 Mamba†; some Puma M26; 9 Puma M36 ENGINEERING & MAINTENANCE VEHICLES ARV T-54/T-55 reported ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE MSL • MANPATS 9K11 Malyutka (RS-AT-3 Sagger); 9K111-1 Konkurs (RS-AT-5 Spandrel) RCL 82mm B-10 GUNS 6+: 57mm ZIS-2 (M-1943); 85mm 6 D-44 ARTILLERY 47+ TOWED 24: 122mm 12 M-1931/37; 130mm 12 M-46 MRL 220mm 3 9P140 Uragan MOR 20+: 82mm M-43; 120mm 20 M-1938/M-1943

AIR DEFENCE SAM • Point-defence 9K32 Strela-2 (RS-SA-7 Grail)‡ GUNS • TOWED 24+: 30mm M-53 (twin); 37mm 8 M-1939; 57mm 12 Type-59 (S-60); 100mm 4 KS-19

Navy ε400 EQUIPMENT BY TYPE PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 4 PB 4: 1 Swiftships†; 3 RPB 20

Air Force 800 EQUIPMENT BY TYPE† AIRCRAFT FGA (3 MiG-21 Fishbed non-op) TPT • Light 4: 2 An-2 Colt; 2 Tetras HELICOPTERS ATK 4 Mi-24 Hind MRH 5: 2 MD-500MD; 2 Mi-17-1V Hip H; 1 SA342K Gazelle TPT 2: Medium 1 SA330 Puma; Light 1 AS350B Ecureuil AIR-LAUNCHED MISSILES AAM • IR R-3 (RS-AA-2 Atoll)‡

Gendarmerie & Paramilitary 2,600 active Gendarmerie 1,000 Republican Guard 1,600 People’s Militia 7,000 reservists

DEPLOYMENT MALI: UN • MINUSMA 666; 1 mech inf bn SOUTH SUDAN: UN • UNMISS 3 SUDAN: UN • UNISFA 1 WESTERN SAHARA: UN • MINURSO 4

Guinea-Bissau GNB CFA Franc BCEAO XOF GDP per capita

2020

2021

XOF

824bn

874bn

USD

1.43bn

1.59bn 858

USD

790

Growth

-1.4

3.3

Inflation

1.5

1.9

Def bdgt

XOF

n.k

USD

n.k

574.65

549.15

USD1=XOF

2022 Sub-Saharan Africa

ECOWAS has sanctioned the new leadership and called for elections within six months. Since 2010, there have been plans to bring the armed forces under political control and begin a professionalisation process. Piracy in the Gulf of Guinea is a key concern, as is illegal trafficking and fishing. A military-programme law for the period 2015–20 was not fully implemented due to funding issues. Defence cooperation in recent years with France and the US has led to financial and training assistance, including for personnel earmarked for deployment to Mali. Much of the country’s military equipment is ageing and of Soviet-era vintage; serviceability will be questionable for some types. There is limited organic airlift and France is supporting the development of a light aviation observation capability. Guinea is also attempting to improve its logistics and military-health capacities. There are no significant defenceindustrial capabilities.

Real-terms defence budget trend (USDm, constant 2015) 26 n.k. n.k. n.k. n.k. n.k. n.k. 2008

Population

2015

2021

1,976,187

Age

0–14

15–19

20–24

25–29

Male

21.6%

5.5%

4.5%

3.7%

30–64 65 plus 12.2%

1.3%

Female

21.4%

5.6%

4.8%

4.1%

13.5%

1.8%

476 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2022

Capabilities Guinea-Bissau’s armed forces have limited capabilities and are in the midst of DDR and SSR programmes. The UN expressed concern about the armed forces’ role in politics, following political disputes after the late-2019 election. Defence policy is focused mainly on tackling internal-security challenges, in particular drug trafficking. The ECOWAS and UN missions withdrew before the end of 2020. Training remains limited and there are problems with recruitment and retention, as well as in developing adequate noncommissioned-officer structures. Much of the country’s military equipment is ageing and maintenance likely limits military effectiveness. There is no defence-manufacturing sector.

Kenya KEN Kenyan Shilling KES

2020

2021

GDP

KES

10.8tr

12.0tr

USD

102bn

109bn

per capita

USD

2,104

2,199

Growth

-0.3

5.6

Inflation

5.2

6.0

Def bdgt [a]

KES

117bn

120bn

USD

1.11bn

1.09bn

104.98

109.38

2022

ACTIVE 4,450 (Army 4,000 Navy 350 Air 100)

USD1=KES

Conscript liability Selective conscription Personnel and eqpt totals should be treated with caution. A number of draft laws to restructure the armed services and police have been produced

Real-terms defence budget trend (USDm, constant 2015)

ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE Army ε4,000 FORCES BY ROLE MANOEUVRE Reconnaissance 1 recce coy Armoured 1 armd bn (sqn) Light 5 inf bn COMBAT SUPPORT 1 arty bn 1 engr coy EQUIPMENT BY TYPE ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES MBT 10 T-34 LT TK 15 PT-76 RECCE 10 BRDM-2 APC • APC (W) 55: 35 BTR-40/BTR-60; 20 Type-56 (BTR152) ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE RCL 75mm Type-52 (M20); 82mm B-10 GUNS 85mm 8 D-44 ARTILLERY 26+ TOWED 122mm 18 D-30/M-30 (M-1938) MOR 8+: 82mm M-43; 120mm 8 M-1943 AIR DEFENCE SAM • Point-defence 9K32 Strela-2 (RS-SA-7 Grail)‡ GUNS • TOWED 34: 23mm 18 ZU-23; 37mm 6 M-1939; 57mm 10 S-60

[a] Includes national intelligence funding 1199 713 2008

Population

2015

2021

54,685,051

Age

0–14

15–19

20–24

25–29

Male

19.1%

5.8%

4.7%

3.8%

15.3%

1.4%

Female

18.9%

5.7%

4.7%

3.8%

15.3%

1.7%

Capabilities The armed forces are concerned with threats to regional stability and tackling security challenges, particularly from neighbouring Somalia, though there is also concern about the possibility of overspill from the conflict in Ethiopia. A separate coastguard service was established in late 2018 to boost maritime security. The long-standing defence and security agreement with the UK was reaffirmed with a new five-year Defence Cooperation Agreement in 2021, which has included a permanent UK training unit within the country and dedicated support for maritime security and a counter-IED training centre. There are also significant defence ties with the US and evidence of developing relationships with the Chinese and Jordanian armed forces. Regular operational deployments have increased military experience and confidence. Kenya has been a key contributor to AMISOM in Somalia, demonstrating limited capacity to project power immediately beyond its own territory. The armed forces also provide smaller contributions to other UN missions and are a leading element of the East African Standby Force. Kenya’s armed forces regularly participate in multinational exercises. Involvement in regional security missions and multinational exercises may also foster improved levels of cooperation and interoperability. Training has received attention, given the need to prepare for AU deployments. Recent equipment investments have focused on improving counter-insurgency capabilities and transport capacity to support regional deployments. There is a limited defence industry focused on equipment maintenance as well as the manufacture of small arms and ammunition.

ACTIVE 24,100 (Army 20,000 Navy 1,600 Air 2,500)

Navy ε350

Gendarmerie & Paramilitary 5,000

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 4 PB 4: 2 Alfeite†; 2 Rodman 55m

ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE

Air Force 100 EQUIPMENT BY TYPE AIRCRAFT • TPT • Light 1 Cessna 208B

30–64 65 plus

Army 20,000 FORCES BY ROLE SPECIAL FORCES 1 spec ops bn 1 ranger regt (1 ranger bn, 1 AB bn)

Sub-Saharan Africa 477

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES MBT 78 Vickers Mk 3 RECCE 92: 72 AML-60/AML-90; 12 Ferret; 8 S52 Shorland APC 200 APC (W) 95: 52 UR-416; 31 WZ-551; 12 Bastion APC; (10 M3 Panhard in store) PPV 105 Puma M26-15; CS/VP14 ENGINEERING & MAINTENANCE VEHICLES ARV 7 Vickers ARV MW Bozena ARTILLERY 111 SP 155mm 2+ Nora B-52 TOWED 105mm 47: 40 L118 Light Gun; 7 Model 56 pack howitzer MOR 62: 81mm 50; 120mm 12 Brandt ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE MSL • MANPATS Milan RCL 84mm Carl Gustaf HELICOPTERS MRH 42: 2 Hughes 500D†; 12 Hughes 500M†; 10 Hughes 500MD Scout Defender† (with TOW); 9 Hughes 500ME†; 6 MD-530F; 3 Z-9W AIR DEFENCE • GUNS • TOWED 94: 20mm 81: 11 Oerlikon; ε70 TCM-20; 40mm 13 L/70 AIR-LAUNCHED MISSILES • ASM TOW

Navy 1,600 (incl 120 marines)

TRANSPORT HELICOPTER 1 sqn with SA330 Puma† EQUIPMENT BY TYPE† AIRCRAFT 32 combat capable FTR 21: 17 F-5E Tiger II; 4 F-5F Tiger II TPT 20: Medium 3 C-27J Spartan; Light 16: 4 DHC5D Buffalo†; 3 DHC-8†; 2 M-28 Skytruck (C-145A); 7 Y-12(II)†; (6 Do-28D-2 in store); PAX 1 F-70 (VIP) TRG 33: 8 Bulldog 103/127†; 11 EMB-312 Tucano†*; 5 G 120A; 9 G 120TP HELICOPTERS ATK 3 AH-1F Cobra MRH 12: 3 AW139; 9 H125M (AS550) Fennec TPT 19: Medium 11: 1 Mi-171E; 10 SA330 Puma†; Light 8 Bell 205 (UH-1H Huey II) AIR-LAUNCHED MISSILES AAM • IR AIM-9 Sidewinder ASM AGM-65 Maverick

Gendarmerie & Paramilitary 5,000 Police General Service Unit 5,000 EQUIPMENT BY TYPE ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES APC • PPV 25 CS/VP3 AUV 30: some Streit Cyclone; 30 VN-4 PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 5 PB 5 (2 on Lake Victoria)

Air Wing EQUIPMENT BY TYPE AIRCRAFT • TPT • Light 6: 2 Cessna 208B Grand Caravan; 3 Cessna 310; 1 Cessna 402 HELICOPTERS MRH 3 Mi-17 Hip H TPT 5: Medium 1 Mi-17V-5; Light 4: 2 AW139; 1 Bell 206L Long Ranger; 1 Bo-105 TRG 1 Bell 47G

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 7 PCO 1 Jasiri with 1 AK630 CIWS, 1 76mm gun PCF 2 Nyayo PCC 3: 1 Harambee II (ex-FRA P400); 1 Shujaa with 1 76mm gun; 1 Shujaa PBF 1 Archangel AMPHIBIOUS • LANDING CRAFT 2 LCM 2 Galana LOGISTICS AND SUPPORT • AP 2

CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC: UN • MINUSCA 15

Air Force 2,500

DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO: UN • MONUSCO 262; 1 inf coy(+)

FORCES BY ROLE FIGHTER/GROUND ATTACK 2 sqn with F-5E/F Tiger II TRANSPORT Some sqn with DHC-5D Buffalo†; DHC-8†; F-70† (VIP); Y-12(II)†; C-27J Spartan; M-28 Skytruck (C-145A) TRAINING Some sqn with Bulldog 103/Bulldog 127†; EMB-312 Tucano†*

Coast Guard

Ministry of Interior EQUIPMENT BY TYPE PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 1 PCC 1 Doria with 1 hel landing platform

DEPLOYMENT

LEBANON: UN • UNIFIL 4 MALI: UN • MINUSMA 10 SOMALIA: AU • AMISOM 4,000: 3 inf bn; UN • UNSOS 1 SOUTH SUDAN: UN • UNMISS 19

FOREIGN FORCES United Kingdom BATUK 350; 1 trg unit

Sub-Saharan Africa

MANOEUVRE Armoured 1 armd bde (2 armd recce bn, 2 armd bn) Mechanised 1 mech inf bde (3 mech inf bn) Light 3 inf bde (3 inf bn) COMBAT SUPPORT 1 arty bde (2 arty bn, 1 ADA bn, 1 mor bty) 1 engr bde (2 engr bn) HELICOPTER 1 air cav bn

478 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2022

Lesotho LSO Lesotho Loti LSL GDP

2020

2021

LSL

32.7bn

35.4bn

USD

2.00bn

2.48bn

USD

970

1,188

Growth

-5.4

2.8

Inflation

5.0

5.8

per capita

Def bdgt

LSL

621m

519m

USD

37.9m

36.3m

16.37

14.30

USD1=LSL

2022

Air Wing 110

Real-terms defence budget trend (USDm, constant 2015) 53 30 2008

Population

2015

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES MBT 1 T-55 RECCE 30: 4 AML-90; 2 BRDM-2†; 6 RAM Mk3; 10 RBY-1; 8 S52 Shorland ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE RCL 106mm 6 M40 ARTILLERY 12 TOWED 105mm 2 MOR 81mm 10

2021

2,177,740

AIRCRAFT TPT • Light 3: 2 C-212-300 Aviocar; 1 GA-8 Airvan HELICOPTERS MRH 3: 1 Bell 412 Twin Huey; 2 Bell 412EP Twin Huey TPT • Light 4: 1 Bell 206 Jet Ranger; 3 H125 (AS350) Ecureuil

DEPLOYMENT

Age

0–14

15–19

20–24

25–29

Male

16.8%

5.2%

4.7%

4.3%

30–64 65 plus 16.4%

2.0%

Female

16.6%

5.2%

4.6%

4.1%

16.8%

3.4%

MOZAMBIQUE: SADC • SAMIM 71

Liberia LBR

Capabilities

Liberian Dollar LRD

2020

2021

Lesotho has a small ground force and an air wing for light transport and liaison. It is a SADC member state, and a force from that organisation deployed to the country in late 2017 to support the government following the assassination of the army chief. The mission concluded at the end of November 2018. The Lesotho Defence Force (LDF) is charged with protecting territorial integrity and sovereignty and ensuring internal security. The armed forces are comprised of volunteers. India has provided training to the LDF since 2001. In April 2020 the army was briefly deployed internally by the prime minister. The armed forces, and military facilities, were also utilised in the country’s coronavirus response. There is limited capacity to deploy and sustain missions beyond national borders, though Lesotho deployed personnel to Mozambique in 2021 as part of the SADC mission, with some moved by an Angolan Il-76. Lesotho’s limited inventory is obsolescent by modern standards and there is little possibility of significant recapitalisation, although there is an aspiration to acquire light helicopters. Except for limited maintenance capacity, there is no defence-industrial base.

GDP

LRD

3.04bn

3.38bn

USD

3.04bn

3.38bn

per capita

USD

647

703

Growth

-3.0

3.6

Inflation

17.0

5.9

ACTIVE 2,000 (Army 2,000)

ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE Army ε2,000 FORCES BY ROLE MANOEUVRE Reconnaissance 1 recce coy Light 7 inf coy Aviation 1 sqn COMBAT SUPPORT 1 arty bty(-) 1 spt coy (with mor)

Def bdgt

LRD

12.2m

19.6m

USD

12.2m

19.6m

1.00

USD1=LRD

2022

Real-terms defence budget trend (USDm, constant 2015) 34 5 2008

Population

2015

2021

5,214,030

Age

0–14

15–19

20–24

25–29

Male

21.8%

5.4%

4.8%

3.3%

30–64 65 plus 13.2%

1.4%

Female

21.3%

5.4%

4.8%

3.4%

13.6%

1.4%

Capabilities A revised National Security Strategy was produced in 2017, reportedly clarifying the roles of Liberia’s security institutions; priorities include improving infrastructure, training, operational readiness and personnel welfare. A new National Security Agency headquarters was opened in 2021. There are plans to establish an air wing. US military assistance has in recent years focused on areas such as force health, including schemes to improve recruitment and retention, as well as maritime security and military medicine, training and the provision of spare parts (including for the coastguard). The armed forces are able to deploy and sustain small units, such as to the MINUSMA mission in Mali. Equipment recapitalisation will depend on finances and the development of a supporting force structure but will also be dictated by the armed

Sub-Saharan Africa 479

ACTIVE 2,010 (Army 1,950, Coast Guard 60)

ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE Army 1,950 FORCES BY ROLE MANOEUVRE Light 1 (23rd) inf bde with (2 inf bn, 1 engr coy, 1 MP coy) COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT 1 trg unit (forming) ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES APC • PPV 3+ Streit Cougar

Coast Guard 60 All operational patrol vessels under 10t FLD

DEPLOYMENT MALI: UN • MINUSMA 162; 1 inf coy SOUTH SUDAN: UN • UNMISS 2 SUDAN: UN • UNISFA 2

Madagascar MDG Malagsy Ariary MGA

2020

2021

MGA

49.9tr

54.5tr

USD

13.2bn

14.1bn

USD

462

499

Growth

-6.1

2.9

Inflation

4.2

6.0

Def bdgt

MGA

407bn

390bn

USD

107m

101m

3787.80

3861.86

GDP per capita

USD1=MGA

2022

Real-terms defence budget trend (USDm, constant 2015) 101 53 2008

Population

2015

2021

27,534,354

Age

0–14

15–19

20–24

25–29

Male

19.3%

5.3%

4.7%

4.2%

30–64 65 plus 14.8%

1.7%

Female

18.9%

5.2%

4.7%

4.2%

14.9%

2.0%

Capabilities Madagascar’s principal defence aspirations include ensuring sovereignty and territorial integrity. Maritime security is also an area of focus. The army is the largest armed service. The armed forces intervened in domestic politics in 2009. Madagascar is a member of the SADC and its regional Standby Force. In 2018, the country signed an ‘umbrella defence agreement’ with India to explore closer defence ties and an intergovernmental agreement with

Russia on military cooperation. China has also embarked on outreach activities to foster better relations with Madagascar. There is no independent capacity to deploy and support operations beyond national borders. The equipment inventory is obsolescent, and with economic development a key government target, equipment recapitalisation is unlikely to be a key priority. A small number of second-hand transport aircraft and helicopters were acquired in 2019, modestly boosting military mobility. In 2020, UAE-manufactured protected patrol vehicles were observed at a parade.

ACTIVE 13,500 (Army 12,500 Navy 500 Air 500) Gendarmerie & Paramilitary 8,100

Conscript liability 18 months (incl for civil purposes)

ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE Army 12,500+ FORCES BY ROLE MANOEUVRE Light 2 (intervention) inf regt 10 (regional) inf regt COMBAT SUPPORT 1 arty regt 3 engr regt 1 sigs regt COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT 1 log regt AIR DEFENCE 1 ADA regt EQUIPMENT BY TYPE ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES LT TK 12 PT-76 RECCE 73: ε35 BRDM-2; 10 FV701 Ferret; ε20 M3A1; 8 M8 APC • APC (T) ε30 M3A1 half-track AUV 6 Panthera T4 ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE RCL 106mm M40A1 ARTILLERY 25+ TOWED 17: 105mm 5 M101; 122mm 12 D-30 MOR 8+: 82mm M-37; 120mm 8 M-43 AIR DEFENCE • GUNS • TOWED 70: 14.5mm 50 ZPU4; 37mm 20 PG-55 (M-1939)

Navy 500 (incl some 100 Marines) EQUIPMENT BY TYPE PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 8 PCC 1 Trozona PB 7 (ex-US CG MLB) AMPHIBIOUS • LCT 1 (ex-FRA EDIC)

Air Force 500 FORCES BY ROLE TRANSPORT 1 sqn with An-26 Curl; Yak-40 Codling (VIP) 1 (liaison) sqn with Cessna 310; Cessna 337 Skymaster; PA-23 Aztec TRAINING 1 sqn with Cessna 172; J.300 Joker; Tetras

Sub-Saharan Africa

forces’ role in national development objectives. Apart from limited maintenance-support capacities, Liberia has no domestic defence industry.

480 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2022 TRANSPORT HELICOPTER 1 sqn with SA318C Alouette II

ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE AIRCRAFT • TPT 22: Light 20: 1 An-26 Curl; 4 Cessna 172; 5 Cessna 206; 1 Cessna 310; 2 Cessna 337 Skymaster; 1 CN235M; 2 J.300 Joker; 1 PA-23 Aztec; 1 Tetras; 2 Yak-40 Codling (VIP); PAX 2 B-737 HELICOPTERS MRH 3 SA318C Alouette II TPT • Light 4: 3 AS350 Ecureuil; 1 BK117

Gendarmerie & Paramilitary 8,100 Gendarmerie 8,100

Malawi MWI Malawian Kwacha MWK

2020

2021

GDP

MWK

8.82tr

9.77tr

USD

11.8bn

12.2bn 566

per capita

USD

568

Growth

0.9

2.2

Inflation

8.6

9.5

Def bdgt

MWK

51.1bn

65.8bn

USD

68.7m

81.8m

744.10

804.42

USD1=MWK

2022

Real-terms defence budget trend (USDm, constant 2015) 73 26 2008

Population

2015

2021

20,308,502

Age

0–14

15–19

20–24

25–29

30–64 65 plus

Male

19.9%

5.5%

4.7%

4.0%

13.2%

1.7%

Female

20.2%

5.7%

4.9%

4.2%

14.0%

2.0%

Capabilities The Malawi Defence Forces (MDF) are constitutionally tasked with ensuring sovereignty and territorial integrity. Additional tasks include providing military assistance to civil authorities and support to the police, and in recent years the army has been used to help with infrastructure development, attempts to control illegal deforestation and the government’s coronavirus response. The army is the largest of the armed forces. Counter-trafficking is a role for the MDF’s small air force, previously an air wing, and its naval unit. Development priorities include improving combat readiness and military medicine and engineering. Malawi is a member of the SADC and its Standby Force. The armed forces have contributed to AU and UN peacekeeping operations, including in Côte d’Ivoire and the DRC. The UK provided training and support for the deployment to the DRC (to the Force Intervention Brigade), and the UK also supports the MDF’s counter-poaching operations. The armed forces have no independent capacity to deploy and support operations beyond national borders.

ACTIVE 10,700 (Army 10,500 Air Force 200) Gendarmerie & Paramilitary 4,200

Army 10,500 FORCES BY ROLE MANOEUVRE Mechanised 1 mech bn Light 2 inf bde (2 inf bn) 1 inf bde (1 inf bn) Air Manoeuvre 1 para bn COMBAT SUPPORT 3 lt arty bty 1 engr bn COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT 12 log coy EQUIPMENT BY TYPE ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES RECCE 66: 30 Eland-90; 8 FV701 Ferret; 20 FV721 Fox; 8 RAM Mk3 APC • PPV 31: 14 Casspir; 9 Marauder; 8 Puma M26-15 ARTILLERY 107 TOWED 105mm 9 L118 Light Gun MOR 81mm 98: 82 L16A1; 16 M3 AIR DEFENCE • GUNS • TOWED 72: 12.7mm 32; 14.5mm 40 ZPU-4

Navy 220 EQUIPMENT BY TYPE PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS • PB 3: 1 Kasungu (ex-FRA Antares)†; 2 Mutharika (PRC)

Air Force 200 EQUIPMENT BY TYPE AIRCRAFT • TPT • Light 1 Do-228 HELICOPTERS • TPT 8: Medium 3: 1 AS532UL Cougar; 1 SA330H Puma; 1 H215 Super Puma Light 5: 1 AS350L Ecureuil; 4 SA341B Gazelle

Gendarmerie & Paramilitary 4,200 Police Mobile Service 4,200 EQUIPMENT BY TYPE ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES RECCE 8 S52 Shorland AIRCRAFT TPT • Light 4: 3 BN-2T Defender (border patrol); 1 SC.7 3M Skyvan HELICOPTERS • MRH 2 AS365 Dauphin 2

DEPLOYMENT DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO: UN • MONUSCO 718; 1 inf bn

Sub-Saharan Africa 481

SOUTH SUDAN: UN • UNISFA 6 SUDAN: UN • UNISFA 3 WESTERN SAHARA: UN • MINURSO 4

Mali MLI CFA Franc BCEAO XOF GDP per capita

2020

2021

XOF

10.1tr

10.7tr

USD

17.5bn

19.6bn 966

USD

890

Growth

-1.6

4.0

Inflation

0.5

3.0

XOF

452bn

474bn

USD

787m

863m

574.77

549.22

Def bdgt [a] USD1=XOF

2022

[a] Defence and security budget Real-terms defence budget trend (USDm, constant 2015) 724 159 2008

Population

2015

2021

20,137,527

Age

0–14

15–19

20–24

25–29

30–64 65 plus

Male

23.9%

5.2%

3.9%

3.0%

11.1%

1.5%

Female

23.6%

5.5%

4.5%

3.7%

12.5%

1.5%

Capabilities The armed forces remain focused on countering rebel and Islamist groups. A defence-reform process is ongoing, but the objectives of the 2015–19 military-programming law have been only partly achieved. Improvements are still required in recruitment and training, as well as in basic administrative support. Mali is supported by neighbouring states in the G5 Sahel partnership, and has received training assistance from the EU, France and the US. However, two military coups in August 2020 and May 2021 have cast doubt on international support. The EU temporarily suspended its training mission after the 2020 coup, and Estonia, France and the US also temporarily suspended support. France maintains bases, personnel and equipment in Mali as part of Operation Barkhane, but is partly withdrawing from the northern part of the country; other states currently supporting Barkhane also deploy personnel and equipment in-country. The armed forces also participate in multinational exercises, particularly those focused on counterterrorism capabilities, but still suffer from operational deficiencies as well as broader institutional weakness. Despite vehicle deliveries by external partners, and the acquisition of several aircraft, the armed forces remain under-equipped. Mali does not possess a defence-manufacturing industry and, with limited equipment and maintenance capabilities, equipment serviceability will likely be variable.

ACTIVE 21,000 (Army 19,000 Air Force 2,000) Gendarmerie & Paramilitary 20,000

ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE Army ε19,000

FORCES BY ROLE The remnants of the pre-conflict Malian army are being reformed into new combined-arms battlegroups, each of which comprises one lt mech coy, three mot inf coy, one arty bty and additional recce, cdo and cbt spt elms MANOEUVRE Light 9 mot inf bn 1 inf coy (Special Joint Unit) 5 inf coy (ULRI) Air Manoeuvre 1 para bn COMBAT SUPPORT 1 engr bn COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT 1 med unit EQUIPMENT BY TYPE ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES LT TK 2+ PT-76 RECCE BRDM-2† APC 232: APC (W) 46+: 27 Bastion APC; 10+ BTR-60PB; 9 BTR70 PPV 186: 50 Casspir; 13 Marauder; 30 Puma M26-15/ Puma M36; 24 Stark Motors Storm Light; 30 Streit Cougar; 4 Streit Gladiator; 5+ Streit Python; 30 Streit Typhoon† ARTILLERY 30+ TOWED 122mm D-30 MRL 122mm 30+ BM-21 Grad

Air Force 2,000 FORCES BY ROLE TRANSPORT 1 sqn with BT-67; C295W; Y-12E TRAINING 1 sqn with Tetras TRANSPORT/ATTACK HELICOPTER 1 sqn with H215; Mi-24D Hind; Mi-35M Hind EQUIPMENT BY TYPE AIRCRAFT 3 combat capable ISR 1 Cessna 208 Caravan TPT • Light 11: 1 BT-67; 1 C295W; 7 Tetras; 2 Y-12E (1 An-24 Coke; 2 An-26 Curl; 2 BN-2 Islander all in store) TRG 3 A-29 Super Tucano* (6 L-29 Delfin; 2 SF-260WL Warrior* all in store) HELICOPTERS ATK 6: 2 Mi-24D Hind; 4 Mi-35M Hind TPT 7: Medium 6: 2 H215 (AS332L1) Super Puma; 4 Mi-171Sh Hip; (1 Mi-8 Hip in store); Light (1 AS350 Ecureuil in store)

Gendarmerie & Paramilitary 20,000 active Gendarmerie 6,000 FORCES BY ROLE MANOEUVRE Other 8 paramilitary coy 1 air tpt gp (2 sy coy; 1 tpt coy)

Sub-Saharan Africa

MOZAMBQIUE: SADC • SAMIM 1

482 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2022 EQUIPMENT BY TYPE ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES APC • PPV 1+ RG-31 Nyala

National Guard 10,000 FORCES BY ROLE MANOEUVRE Reconnaissance 6 (camel) cav coy Light 1 inf coy (Anti-terrorist special force) EQUIPMENT BY TYPE ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES APC • PPV 1+ RG-31 Nyala

National Police 1,000 Militia 3,000

DEPLOYMENT DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO: UN • MONUSCO 4

FOREIGN FORCES All under MINUSMA comd unless otherwise specified Armenia 1 Australia 1 Austria 2 • EUTM Mali 21 Bangladesh 1,118; 1 inf bn; 1 engr coy; 2 sigs coy; 1 tpt coy Belgium 53 • Operation Barkhane 3 • EUTM Mali 15 Benin 260; 1 mech inf coy Bhutan 5 Bosnia-Herzegovina 2 Bulgaria EUTM Mali 4 Burkina Faso 936; 1 inf bn Burundi 1 Cambodia 289; 2 engr coy; 1 EOD coy Cameroon 3 Canada 5 Chad 1,451; 1 SF coy; 2 inf bn China 426; 1 sy coy; 1 engr coy; 1 fd hospital Côte d’Ivoire 802; 1 mech inf bn; 1 sy coy Czech Republic 4 • Operation Barkhane 60; 1 SF unit • EUTM Mali 120 Denmark 2 Egypt 1,066; 1 SF coy; 1 sy bn; 1 MP coy El Salvador 176; 1 hel sqn with 3 MD-500E Estonia 2 • Operation Barkhane 75; 1 SF unit • EUTM Mali 10 Ethiopia 1 Finland 4 • EUTM Mali 12 France 21 • Operation Barkhane 2,500; 1 mech inf BG; 1 log bn; 1 tpt unit with 1 CN235M; 1 PC-6B; 1 hel unit with 5 Tiger; 5 AS532UL Cougar; 5 NH90 TTH; 4 SA342 Gazelle • EUTM Mali 13 Gambia 6 Georgia EUTM Mali 1

Germany 426; 1 obs; 1 sy coy; 1 int coy; 1 UAV sqn • EUTM Mali 120 Ghana 154; 1 engr coy Greece EUTM Mali 2 Guatemala 2 Guinea 666; 1 inf bn Hungary EUTM Mali 20 Indonesia 9 Ireland EUTM Mali 20 Italy 2 • Operation Barkhane 100 • EUTM Mali 14 Jordan 329; 1 mech inf coy(+) Kenya 10 Latvia 1 • EUTM Mali 4 Liberia 162; 1 sy coy Lithuania 45 • EUTM Mali 2 Luxembourg EUTM Mali 15 Mauritania 7 Mexico 4 Moldova EUTM Mali 3 Montenegro EUTM Mali 2 Nepal 202; 1 EOD coy Netherlands 5 • Operation Barkhane 4 • EUTM Mali 6 Niger 873; 1 inf bn Nigeria 78; 1 fd hospital Norway 13; 1 tpt flt with 1 C-130J Pakistan 217; 1 hel sqn Portugal 67; 1 tpt flt with 1 C295M • Operation Barkhane 2; • EUTM Mali 11 Romania 5 • EUTM Mali 1 Senegal 1,003; 1 inf bn; 1 engr coy Sierra Leone 18 Slovakia EUTM Mali 15 Slovenia EUTM Mali 8 Spain 1 • EUTM Mali 540; 1 hel unit with 3 NH90 TTH Sri Lanka 242; 1 sy coy Sweden 187; 1 int coy • Operation Barkhane 150; 1 SF unit; 1 hel unit with 3 UH-60M • EUTM Mali 8 Switzerland 6 Togo 931; 1 mech inf bn; 1 fd hospital Tunisia 87; 1 tpt flt with 1 C-130J-30 Ukraine 12 United Kingdom 256; 1 recce sqn • Operation Barkhane 90; 1 hel flt with 3 CH-47SD Chinook HC5 United States 8 Zambia 3

Sub-Saharan Africa 483

Coast Guard ε800

Mauritius MUS GDP per capita

2020

2021

MUR

430bn

457bn

USD

10.9bn

11.0bn 8,682

USD

8,619

Growth

-14.9

5.0

Inflation

2.5

5.1

MUR

8.86bn

8.42bn

USD

225m

203m

39.35

41.52

Def bdgt [a] USD1=MUR

2022

10.4bn

Real-terms defence budget trend (USDm, constant 2015) 251 106 2008

2015

Police Air Wing EQUIPMENT BY TYPE HELICOPTERS MRH 9: 1 H125 (AS555) Fennec; 2 Dhruv; 1 SA315B Lama (Cheetah); 5 SA316 Alouette III (Chetak)

[a] Police service budget

Population

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 17 PCO 1 Barracuda with 1 hel landing platform PCC 2 Victory (IND Sarojini Naidu) PB 14: 10 (IND Fast Interceptor Boat); 1 P-2000; 1 SDBMk3; 2 Rescuer (FSU Zhuk) AIRCRAFT • TPT • Light 4: 1 BN-2T Defender; 3 Do228-101

2021

Mozambique MOZ Mozambique Metical MZN

2020

2021

MZN

975bn

1.06tr

USD

14.0bn

15.8bn

USD

449

492

Growth

-1.2

2.5

Inflation

3.1

6.2

Def bdgt

MZN

9.11bn

9.35bn

USD

131m

140m

69.46

66.72

GDP

1,386,129

Age

0–14

15–19

20–24

25–29

30–64 65 plus

Male

9.8%

3.5%

3.6%

3.8%

23.6%

4.8%

Female

9.4%

3.4%

3.5%

3.8%

24.2%

6.8%

Capabilities The country has no standing armed forces; instead, responsibility for security lies with the Mauritius Police Force’s Special Mobile Force (SMF), formed as a motorised infantry battalion. The SMF is tasked with ensuring internal and external territorial and maritime security. India provides support to the Mauritian National Coast Guard, which is also a branch of the police force, through training, equipment maintenance and leasing. The SMF trains along traditional military lines but has no ability to deploy beyond national borders. Apart from very limited maintenance facilities there is no defence industry.

ACTIVE NIL Gendarmerie & Paramilitary 2,550

ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE Gendarmerie & Paramilitary 2,550 Special Mobile Force ε1,750 FORCES BY ROLE MANOEUVRE Reconnaissance 2 recce coy Light 5 (rifle) mot inf coy COMBAT SUPPORT 1 engr sqn COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT 1 spt pl EQUIPMENT BY TYPE ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES IFV 2 VAB with 20mm gun APC • APC (W) 12: 3 Tactica; 9 VAB ARTILLERY • MOR 81mm 2

per capita

USD1=MZN

2022

Real-terms defence budget trend (USDm, constant 2015) 455 69 2008

Population

2015

2021

30,888,034

Age

0–14

15–19

20–24

25–29

Male

23.0%

5.5%

4.5%

3.6%

30–64 65 plus 11.2%

1.4%

Female

22.4%

5.4%

4.6%

3.8%

13.0%

1.5%

Capabilities Mozambique faces a growing internal threat from Islamist groups that continue to challenge national defence forces, with attacks being carried out in the country’s northern province of Cabo Delgado. As a result, in 2021, SADC deployed a force comprising multiple regional states, while there has also been support from Portugal, Rwanda and the United States. The armed forces are tasked with ensuring territorial integrity and internal security, as well as tackling piracy and human trafficking. The integration of Resistência Nacional Moçambicana (RENAMO) personnel into the military is a long-standing objective. Talks between the government and RENAMO from July 2019 resulted in most RENAMO fighters disarming, although some rebels have splintered into separate groups. Mozambique has defence relationships with China, Portugal and Russia, although US forces have delivered training to the Mozambican military in response to the growing insurgency. Private military contractors have also allegedly been hired to provide training to Mozambican forces. The armed forces have no capacity to deploy beyond Mozambique’s borders without assistance. Soviet-era equipment makes up the majority of the inventory and maintaining this will be problematic, not least in the

Sub-Saharan Africa

Mauritian Rupee MUR

484 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2022 absence of any local defence industry. Moreover, Mozambique’s recent economic performance will likely limit the government’s ability to recapitalise.

ACTIVE 11,200 (Army 10,000 Navy 200 Air 1,000) Conscript liability 2 years

ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE Army ε9,000–10,000 FORCES BY ROLE SPECIAL FORCES 3 SF bn MANOEUVRE Light 7 inf bn COMBAT SUPPORT 2-3 arty bn 2 engr bn COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT 1 log bn EQUIPMENT BY TYPE† Equipment estimated at 10% or less serviceability ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES MBT 60+ T-54 RECCE 30 BRDM-1/BRDM-2 IFV 40 BMP-1 APC 338 APC (T) 30 FV430 APC (W) 285: 160 BTR-60; 100 BTR-152; 25 AT-105 Saxon PPV 23+: 11 Casspir; 12 Marauder; some Tata Motors MRAP AUV 9+ Tiger 4×4 ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE MSL • MANPATS 9K11 Malyutka (RS-AT-3 Sagger); 9K111 Fagot (RS-AT-4 Spigot) RCL 75mm; 82mm B-10; 107mm 24 B-12 GUNS 85mm 18: 6 D-48; 12 PT-56 (D-44) ARTILLERY 126 TOWED 62: 100mm 20 M-1944; 105mm 12 M101; 122mm 12 D-30; 130mm 6 M-46; 152mm 12 D-1 MRL 122mm 12 BM-21 Grad MOR 52: 82mm 40 M-43; 120mm 12 M-43 AIR DEFENCE • GUNS 290+ SP 57mm 20 ZSU-57-2 TOWED 270+: 20mm M-55; 23mm 120 ZU-23-2; 37mm 90 M-1939; (10 M-1939 in store); 57mm 60 S-60; (30 S-60 in store)

Navy ε200 EQUIPMENT BY TYPE PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 28 PBF 24: 20+ DV 15; 2 HSI 32; 2 Namilti (ex-IND C-401) PB 4: 3 Ocean Eagle 43 (capacity 1 Camcopter S-100 UAV); 1 Pebane (ex-ESP Conejera) UNINHABITED AERIAL VEHICLES ISR • Light 1 S-100 Camcopter

Air Force 1,000 FORCES BY ROLE FIGHTER/GROUND ATTACK 1 sqn with MiG-21bis Fishbed; MiG-21UM Mongol B

TRANSPORT 1 sqn with An-26 Curl; FTB-337G Milirole; Cessna 150B; Cessna 172; PA-34 Seneca ATTACK/TRANSPORT HELICOPTER 1 sqn with Mi-24 Hind† EQUIPMENT BY TYPE AIRCRAFT 8 combat capable FGA 8: 6 MiG-21bis Fishbed; 2 MiG-21UM Mongol B ISR 2 FTB-337G Milirole TPT 6: Light 5: 1 An-26 Curl; 2 Cessna 150B; 1 Cessna 172; 1 PA-34 Seneca; (4 PA-32 Cherokee non-op); PAX 1 Hawker 850XP TRG 3: 1 Aerostar R40S Festival; 2 L-39 Albatros HELICOPTERS ATK 2 Mi-24V Hind E MRH 2+ SA314B Gazelle TPT • Medium 2 Mi-8 Hip

FOREIGN FORCES Angola SAMIM 18 Botswana SAMIM 110 Lesotho SAMIM 71 Malawi SAMIM 1 Portugal EUTM Mozambqiue 120 Rwanda Army: 1,500 South Africa SAMIM 272 Tanzania SAMIM 277 Zimbabwe SAMIM 1

Namibia NAM Namibian Dollar NAD GDP per capita

2020

2021

NAD

176bn

186bn

USD

10.7bn

12.2bn

USD

4,276

4,693

Growth

-8.0

1.3

Inflation

2.2

4.0

Def bdgt

NAD

6.23bn

5.43bn

USD

378m

357m

16.46

15.20

USD1=NAD

2022

Real-terms defence budget trend (USDm, constant 2015) 567 249 2008

Population

2015

2021

2,678,191

Age

0–14

15–19

20–24

25–29

Male

17.8%

5.4%

4.8%

4.3%

30–64 65 plus 15.1%

1.7%

Female

17.4%

5.3%

4.8%

4.4%

16.8%

2.2%

Capabilities The Namibian defence authorities aim to develop a small, mobile professional force. According to the constitution, the primary mission of the Namibian Defence Force (NDF) is territorial defence. Secondary roles include assistance to the civil power and sup-

Sub-Saharan Africa 485

ACTIVE 9,900 (Army 9,000 Navy 900) Gendarmerie

& Paramilitary 6,000

ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE Army 9,000 FORCES BY ROLE MANOEUVRE Reconnaissance 1 recce regt Light 3 inf bde (total: 6 inf bn) Other 1 (Presidential Guard) gd bn COMBAT SUPPORT 1 arty bde with (1 arty regt) 1 AT regt 1 engr regt 1 sigs regt COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT 1 log bn AIR DEFENCE 1 AD regt EQUIPMENT BY TYPE ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES MBT T-54/T-55†; T-34† RECCE 12 BRDM-2 IFV 7: 5 Type-05P mod (with BMP-1 turret); 2 Wolf Turbo 2 mod (with BMP-1 turret) APC 61 APC (W) 13: 10 BTR-60; 3 Type-05P PPV 48: 20 Casspir; 28 Wolf Turbo 2 ENGINEERING & MAINTENANCE VEHICLES ARV T-54/T-55 reported ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE RCL 82mm B-10 GUNS 12+: 57mm ZIS-2; 76mm 12 ZIS-3 ARTILLERY 72 TOWED 140mm 24 G-2 MRL 122mm 8: 5 BM-21 Grad; 3 PHL-81 MOR 40: 81mm; 82mm AIR DEFENCE SAM • Point-defence FN-6 (CH-SA-10)

GUNS 65 SP 23mm 15 Zumlac TOWED 50+: 14.5mm 50 ZPU-4; 57mm S-60

Navy ε900 EQUIPMENT BY TYPE PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 7 PSO 1 Elephant with 1 hel landing platform PCC 3: 2 Daures (ex-PRC Haiqing (Type-037-IS)) with 2 FQF-3200 A/S mor; 1 Oryx PB 3: 1 Brendan Simbwaye (BRZ Grajaú); 2 Terrace Bay (BRZ Marlim) AIRCRAFT • TPT • Light 1 F406 Caravan II HELICOPTERS • TPT • Medium 1 S-61L

Marines ε700 Air Force FORCES BY ROLE FIGHTER/GROUND ATTACK 1 sqn with F-7 (F-7NM); FT-7 (FT-7NG) ISR 1 sqn with O-2A Skymaster TRANSPORT Some sqn with An-26 Curl; Falcon 900; Learjet 36; Y-12 TRAINING 1 sqn with K-8 Karakorum* ATTACK/TRANSPORT HELICOPTER 1 sqn with H425; Mi-8 Hip; Mi-25 Hind D; SA315 Lama (Cheetah); SA316B Alouette III (Chetak) EQUIPMENT BY TYPE AIRCRAFT 11+ combat capable FTR 7: 5 F-7 (F-7NM); 2 FT-7 (FT-7NG) ISR 5 Cessna O-2A Skymaster TPT 6: Light 5: 2 An-26 Curl; 1 Learjet 36; 2 Y-12; PAX 1 Falcon 900 TRG 4+ K-8 Karakorum* HELICOPTERS ATK 2 Mi-25 Hind D MRH 5: 1 H425; 1 SA315 Lama (Cheetah); 3 SA316B Alouette III (Chetak) TPT • Medium 1 Mi-8 Hip

Gendarmerie & Paramilitary 6,000 Police Force • Special Field Force 6,000 (incl Border Guard and Special Reserve Force)

DEPLOYMENT SOUTH SUDAN: UN • UNMISS 4 SUDAN: UN • UNISFA 7

Sub-Saharan Africa

porting the AU, SADC and UN. The NDF Development Strategy 2012–22 states that the NDF design should be based on a conventional force with a force-projection capability. The navy exercises with the SADC as part of the SADC’s Standing Maritime Committee. It also has conducted multinational training missions organised by US forces. Annual meetings of a permanent commission on defence and security between Namibia and Botswana were elevated in 2021 to a biannual commission, chaired by the two countries’ heads of state. While the NDF receives a comparatively large proportion of the state budget, there have been recent problems in adequately funding training. Namibia has deployed on AU and UN missions, but there is only limited capacity for independent power projection. The NDF is equipped for the most part with ageing or obsolescent systems, but economic difficulties make recapitalisation unlikely in the near term. There is a limited defence-manufacturing sector mainly focused on armoured vehicles, tactical communications and ammunition.

486 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2022

Niger NER CFA Franc BCEAO XOF

2020

2021

GDP

XOF

7.91tr

8.56tr

USD

13.8bn

15.6bn

per capita

USD

568

622

3.6

5.4

Growth Inflation

2.9

Def bdgt

XOF

121bn

112bn

USD USD1=XOF

211m

205m

574.77

547.36

2022

Real-terms defence budget trend (USDm, constant 2015) 206 44 2008

Population

2015

2021

23,605,767

Age

0–14

15–19

20–24

25–29

Male

25.3%

5.7%

4.3%

3.2%

30–64 65 plus 9.8%

1.3%

Female

24.9%

5.8%

4.5%

3.3%

10.5%

1.4%

Capabilities Principal military roles include maintaining internal and border security, in light of the regional threat from Islamist groups. The country is a member of the G5 Sahel group and part of the Multi-National Joint Task Force fighting Boko Haram in the Lake Chad Basin. France has conducted joint counter-terrorism operations with Niger’s armed forces. Niamey hosts air contingents from France, Germany (an air-transport base to supply its troops in neighbouring Mali) and the US, which maintains a detachment of UAVs. Niger’s armed forces are combat experienced and relatively well trained, and there is training support from France, Italy and the US. Combat operations have also been conducted with US forces. There is limited capacity to deploy beyond neighbouring countries without external support. Operations in austere environments have demonstrated adequate sustainment and manoeuvre capacity. While there have been moves to integrate better-protected armoured vehicles, the armed forces are generally under-equipped and under-resourced. Apart from limited maintenance facilities, the country has no domestic defenceindustrial capability.

ACTIVE 5,300 (Army 5,200 Air 100) Gendarmerie &

COMBAT SUPPORT 1 engr coy COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT 1 log gp AIR DEFENCE 1 AD coy EQUIPMENT BY TYPE ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES RECCE 132: 35 AML-20/AML-60; 90 AML-90; Bastion Patsas; 7 VBL APC 148 APC (W) 55: 13 Bastion APC; 22 Panhard M3; 20 WZ551 PPV 93+: 15 IAG Guardian Xtreme; 57 Mamba Mk7; 21 Puma M26-15; some Puma M36 ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE RCL 14: 75mm 6 M20; 106mm 8 M40 ARTILLERY • MOR 40: 81mm 19 Brandt; 82mm 17; 120mm 4 Brandt AIR DEFENCE • GUNS 39 SP 20mm 10 Panhard M3 VDAA TOWED 20mm 29

Air Force 100 EQUIPMENT BY TYPE AIRCRAFT 2 combat capable ATK 2 Su-25 Frogfoot ISR 6: 4 Cessna 208 Caravan; 2 DA42 MPP Twin Star TPT 8: Medium 2 C-130H Hercules; Light 5: 1 An-26 Curl; 2 Cessna 208 Caravan; 1 Do-28 Skyservant; 1 Do228-201; PAX 1 B-737-700 (VIP) HELICOPTERS ATK 2 Mi-35P Hind MRH 5: 2 Mi-17 Hip; 3 SA342 Gazelle

Gendarmerie & Paramilitary 5,400 Gendarmerie 1,400 Republican Guard 2,500 National Police 1,500

DEPLOYMENT

Paramilitary 5,400

CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC: UN • MINUSCA 5

Conscript liability Selective conscription, 2 years

DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO: UN • MONUSCO 3

ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE

MALI: UN • MINUSMA 873; 1 inf bn

Army 5,200

FOREIGN FORCES

FORCES BY ROLE MANOEUVRE Reconnaissance 4 armd recce sqn Light 7 inf coy Air Manoeuvre 2 AB coy

Belgium METT 130 Chad G5 Sahel 600; 1 inf bn France Operation Barkhane 1,000; 1 FGA det with 4 Mirage 2000C/D; 1 tkr/tpt det with 1 Atlantique 2; 1 C-135FR; 1 C-130J-30; 1 UAV det with 6 MQ-9A Reaper Italy MISIN 295; 1 inf coy; 1 engr unit; 1 CBRN unit; 1 med unit; 1 trg unit; 1 ISR unit United States 800; 1 ISR UAV sqn with MQ-9A Reaper

3 Mil Districts

Nigeria NGA Nigerian Naira NGN

2020

GDP per capita

2021

NGN

154tr

183tr

USD

429bn

480bn 2,273

USD

2,083

Growth

-1.8

2.6

Inflation

13.2

16.9

Def bdgt

NGN

900bn

966bn

USD

2.51bn

2.54bn

359.21

380.00

USD1=NGN

2022

1.4tr

Real-terms defence budget trend (USDbn, constant 2015) 2.91 1.31 2008

Population

2015

2021

219,463,862

Age

0–14

15–19

20–24

25–29

30–64 65 plus

Male

21.1%

5.7%

4.7%

3.7%

13.7%

1.6%

Female

20.2%

5.5%

4.6%

3.7%

13.8%

1.8%

Capabilities Nigeria is West Africa’s principal military power and faces numerous security challenges, including from the Islamic State West African Province, Boko Haram and militants in the Delta. Reform initiatives have developed after relative military weaknesses were exposed during counter-insurgency operations. There have been operational changes, including attempts to implement counter-insurgency tactics, forward-operating bases and quickreaction groups. Nigeria is part of the Multinational Joint Task Force and is a key member of the ECOWAS Standby Force. Nigeria is strengthening its cooperation with Pakistan while military and security assistance is either discussed or under way with Germany, the UK and the US. The UK bases its British Defence Staff for West Africa in Nigeria. Efforts have been made to improve training, notably in the air force with the establishment of Air Training Command and Ground Training Command. Contractors have also been used to improve training and maintenance levels. Nigeria is able to mount regional operations, though its deployment capacities remain limited. Important acquisitions have been made in every domain, including the introduction of fighter groundattack aircraft and combat-capable trainers as well as new tanks and howitzers. Patrol boats and a number of small coastal-patrol boats have been acquired in light of security requirements in the Delta region. Nigeria is developing its defence-industrial capacity, including local production facilities for small arms and protected patrol vehicles.

ACTIVE 143,000 (Army 100,000 Navy 25,000 Air 18,000) Gendarmerie & Paramilitary 80,000 Reserves planned, none org

ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE Army 100,000 FORCES BY ROLE SPECIAL FORCES 1 spec ops bn

3 (mobile strike team) spec ops units 1 ranger bn MANOEUVRE Armoured 1 (3rd) armd div (1 armd bde, 1 arty bde) Mechanised 1 (1st) mech div (1 recce bn, 1 mech bde, 1 mot inf bde, 1 arty bde, 1 engr regt) 1 (2nd) mech div (1 recce bn, 1 armd bde, 1 arty bde, 1 engr regt) 1 (81st) composite div (1 recce bn, 1 mech bde, 1 arty bde, 1 engr regt) Light 1 (6th) inf div (1 amph bde, 2 inf bde) 1 (7th) inf div (1 spec ops bn, 1 recce bn(-), 1 armd bde, 7 (task force) inf bde, 1 arty bde, 1 engr regt) 1 (8th Task Force) inf div (2 inf bde) 1 (82nd) composite div (1 recce bn, 3 mot inf bde, 1 arty bde, 1 engr regt) 1 (Multi-National Joint Task Force) bde (2 inf bn(-)) Other 1 (Presidential Guard) gd bde (4 gd bn) AIR DEFENCE 1 AD regt EQUIPMENT BY TYPE ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES MBT 319+: 100 T-55†; 10 T-72AV; 31 T-72M1; 172 Vickers Mk 3; 6+ VT-4 LT TK 154 FV101 Scorpion ASLT 6+ ST-1 RECCE 384: 88 AML-60; 40 AML-90; 70 EE-9 Cascavel; 44 ERC-90F1 Lynx; 50 FV721 Fox; 20 FV601 Saladin Mk2; 72 VBL IFV 31: 9 BTR-4EN; 22 BVP-1 APC 866+ APC (T) 373: 248 4K-7FA Steyr; 65 MT-LB; 60 ZSD-89 APC (W) 172+: 10 FV603 Saracen; 110 AVGP Grizzly mod/Piranha I 6x6; 47 BTR-3UN; 5 BTR-80; some EE-11 Urutu (reported); PPV 321+: 14 Caiman; some Conqueror; 160 CS/VP3; 47 Ezugwu; 5+ Isotrex Phantom II; some Marauder; 7+ Maxxpro; 8 Proforce Ara-1; 13 Proforce Ara-2; 23 REVA III 4×4; 10 Streit Spartan; 9 Streit Cougar (Igirigi); 25 Streit Typhoon AUV 107 Cobra; FV103 Spartan ENGINEERING & MAINTENANCE VEHICLES ARV 17+: AVGP Husky; 2 Greif; 15 Vickers ARV VLB MTU-20; VAB ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE MSL • MANPATS Shershen RCL 84mm Carl Gustaf; 106mm M40A1 ARTILLERY 518+ SP 43+: 105mm 4+ SH-5; 122mm some SH-2; 155mm 39 Palmaria TOWED 104: 105mm 49 M-56; 122mm 48 D-30/D-74; 130mm 7 M-46; (155mm 24 FH-77B in store) MRL 122mm 41: 9 BM-21 Grad; 25 APR-21; 7 RM-70 MOR 330+: 81mm 200; 82mm 100; 120mm 30+ AIR DEFENCE SAM • Point-defence 16+: 16 Roland; Blowpipe; 9K32 Strela-2 (RS-SA-7 Grail)‡

Sub-Saharan Africa

Sub-Saharan Africa 487

488 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2022 GUNS 89+ SP 23mm 29 ZSU-23-4 Shilka TOWED 60+: 20mm 60+; 23mm ZU-23; 40mm L/70

Navy 25,000 (incl Coast Guard)

Western Comd HQ located at Apapa; Eastern Comd HQ located at Calabar; Central Comd HQ located at Brass EQUIPMENT BY TYPE PRINCIPAL SURFACE COMBATANTS • FRIGATES FFGHM (1 Aradu (GER MEKO 360) (non-operational) with 8 single lnchr with Otomat Mk1 AShM, 1 octuple Albatros lnchr with Aspide SAM, 2 triple 324mm ASTT with A244/S LWT, 1 127mm gun (capacity 1 med hel)) PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 122 CORVETTES • FSM (1 Erinomi (UK Vosper Mk 9) (non-operational) with 1 triple lnchr with Seacat† SAM, 1 twin 375mm Bofors ASW Rocket Launcher System A/S mor, 1 76mm gun) PSOH 4: 2 Centenary with 1 76mm gun (capacity 1 Z-9 hel); 2 Thunder (ex-US Hamilton) with 1 76mm gun PCFG 1 Siri (FRA Combattante IIIB)† with 2 twin lnchr with MM38 Exocet AShM, 1 76mm gun PCF 2 Siri (FRA Combattante IIIB) with 1 76mm gun PCO 4 Kyanwa (ex-US CG Balsam) PCC 4: 2 Ekpe (GER Lurssen 57m)† with 1 76mm gun; 2 Kano (Damen Fast Crew Supplier 4008) PBF 26: 2 ARESA 1700; 4 C-Falcon; 12 Manta MkIII (Suncraft 17m); 3 Shaldag II; 2 Torie (Nautic Sentinel 17m); 3 Wave Rider PB 81: 1 Andoni; 1 Dorina (FPB 98); 4 FPB 110 MkII; 8 Okpoku (FPB 72); 1 Karaduwa; 1 Sagbama; 2 Sea Eagle (Suncraft 38m); 15 Stingray (Suncraft 16m); 40 Suncraft 12m; 4 Swiftships; 2 Town (of which one laid up); 2 Yola† MINE WARFARE • MINE COUNTERMEASURES 2 MCC 2 Ohue (ITA Lerici mod)† AMPHIBIOUS • LANDING CRAFT 4 LCVP 4 Stingray 20 LOGISTICS AND SUPPORT 2 AGHS 1 Lana (OSV 190) AX 1 Prosperity

Naval Aviation EQUIPMENT BY TYPE HELICOPTERS MRH 2 AW139 (AB-139) TPT • Light 3 AW109E Power†

Special Boat Service 200 EQUIPMENT BY TYPE FORCES BY ROLE SPECIAL FORCES 1 SF unit

Air Force 18,000 FORCES BY ROLE Very limited op capability FIGHTER/GROUND ATTACK 1 sqn with F-7 (F-7NI); FT-7 (FT-7NI) MARITIME PATROL 1 sqn with ATR-42-500 MP; Do-128D-6 Turbo SkyServant; Do-228-100/200

TRANSPORT 2 sqn with C-130H Hercules; C-130H-30 Hercules; G-222 1 (Presidential) gp with B-727; B-737BBJ; BAe-125-800; Beech 350 King Air; Do-228-200; Falcon 7X; Falcon 900; Gulfstream IV/V TRAINING 1 unit with Air Beetle† 1 unit with Alpha Jet* 1 unit with L-39 Albatros†*; MB-339AN* 1 unit with Super Mushshak; DA40NG 1 hel unit with Mi-34 Hermit (trg) ATTACK HELICOPTER 1 sqn with Mi-24/Mi-35 Hind† TRANSPORT HELICOPTER 1 sqn with H215 (AS332) Super Puma; (AS365N) Dauphin; AW109LUH; H135 EQUIPMENT BY TYPE† AIRCRAFT 74 combat capable FTR 12: 10 F-7 (F-7NI); 2 FT-7 (FT-7NI) FGA 3 JF-17 Thunder Block II ELINT 2 ATR-42-500 MP ISR 1 Beech 350 King Air MP 1 Cessna 525 Citation CJ3 (operated on behalf of NIMASA) TPT 32: Medium 5: 1 C-130H Hercules (4 more in store†); 1 C-130H-30 Hercules (2 more in store); 3 G.222† (2 more in store†); Light 18: 1 Beech 350 King Air; 1 Cessna 550 Citation; 8 Do-128D-6 Turbo SkyServant; 1 Do-228-100; 2 Do-228-101; 5 Do-228-200 (incl 2 VIP); PAX 9: 1 B-727; 1 B-737BBJ; 1 BAe 125-800; 2 Falcon 7X; 2 Falcon 900; 1 Gulfstream IV; 1 Gulfstream V TRG 129: 58 Air Beetle† (up to 20 awaiting repair); 2 Alpha Jet A*; 10 Alpha Jet E*; 2 DA40NG; 12 EMB-314 Super Tucano (A-29B)*; 23 L-39ZA Albatros*†; 12 MB-339AN* (all being upgraded); 10 Super Mushshak HELICOPTERS ATK 16: 2 Mi-24P Hind; 4 Mi-24V Hind; 3 Mi-35 Hind; 2 Mi-35P Hind; 5 Mi-35M Hind MRH 11+: 6 AW109LUH; 2 Bell 412EP; 3+ SA341 Gazelle TPT 24: Medium 12: 2 AW101; 5 H215 (AS332) Super Puma (4 more in store); 3 AS365N Dauphin; 1 Mi-171Sh; 2 Mi-171E; Light 11: 4 H125 (AS350B) Ecureuil; 1 AW109; 2 AW109M; 1 Bell 205; 3 H135 UNINHABITED AERIAL VEHICLES 5+ CISR • Heavy 3: 1+ CH-3; 2+ Wing Loong II ISR 2: Heavy 1+ Yabhon Flash-20; Medium (9 Aerostar non-operational); Light 1+ Tsaigami AIR-LAUNCHED MISSILES AAM • IR R-3 (RS-AA-2 Atoll)‡; PL-9C ASM AGR-20A APKWS; AR-1 BOMBS • INS/GPS guided FT-9

Gendarmerie & Paramilitary ε80,000 Security and Civil Defence Corps 80,000 EQUIPMENT BY TYPE ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES APC 80+ APC (W) 74+: 70+ AT105 Saxon†; 4 BTR-3U; UR-416 PPV 6 Springbuck 4x4

Sub-Saharan Africa 489 AIRCRAFT • TPT • Light 4: 1 Cessna 500 Citation I; 2 PA-31 Navajo; 1 PA-31-350 Navajo Chieftain HELICOPTERS • TPT • Light 5: 2 Bell 212 (AB-212); 2 Bell 222 (AB-222); 1 Bell 429

some acquisitions of modern artillery and armoured vehicles. There is limited maintenance capacity but no defence manufacturing sector.

ACTIVE 33,000 (Army 32,000 Air 1,000) Gendarmerie & Paramilitary 2,000

DEPLOYMENT CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC: UN • MINUSCA 5

ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE

DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO: UN • MONUSCO 10

Army 32,000

LEBANON: UN • UNIFIL 1 MALI: UN • MINUSMA 78; 1 fd hospital SOUTH SUDAN: UN • UNMISS 14 SUDAN: UN • UNISFA 4 WESTERN SAHARA: UN • MINURSO 5

FOREIGN FORCES United Kingdom 80 (trg teams)

Rwanda RWA Rwandan Franc RWF

2020

2021

GDP

RWF

9.75tr

10.4tr

USD

10.3bn

10.4bn

per capita

USD

816

802

Growth

-3.4

5.1

Inflation

7.7

2.4

Def bdgt

RWF

121bn

151bn

USD

128m

150m

943.28

1004.11

USD1=RWF

2022

178bn

Real-terms defence budget trend (USDm, constant 2015) 164 69 2008

Population

2015

2021

12,943,132

Age

0–14

15–19

20–24

25–29

Male

19.9%

5.5%

4.7%

3.8%

30–64 65 plus 14.1%

1.1%

Female

19.5%

5.4%

4.7%

3.8%

16.0%

1.6%

Capabilities Rwanda is one of the principal security actors in East Africa, with disciplined and well-trained armed forces. Their key missions are to defend territorial integrity and national sovereignty. The country fields a relatively large army, but units are lightly equipped, with little mechanisation. Rwanda signed a Mutual Defence Treaty with Kenya and Uganda in 2014 and participates in the East African Standby Force. A law on downsizing and demobilising elements of the armed forces was published in October 2015 and there have in recent years been official retirement ceremonies for those reaching rank-related retirement ages. The lack of fixed-wing aircraft limits the armed forces’ ability to independently deploy much overseas beyond personnel. There have been

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES MBT 34: 24 T-54/T-55; 10 Tiran-5 RECCE 106: ε90 AML-60/AML-90; 16 VBL IFV 38+: BMP; 13+ Ratel-23; 10 Ratel-60; 15 Ratel-90 APC 60+ APC (W) 20+: BTR; Buffalo (Panhard M3); 20 WZ-551 (reported) PPV 40 RG-31 Nyala AUV 76 Cobra/Cobra II ENGINEERING & MAINTENANCE VEHICLES ARV T-54/T-55 ARV reported ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE MSL • SP HJ-9A (on Cobra) ARTILLERY 177+ SP 17: 122mm 12: 6 CS/SH-1; 6 SH-3; 155mm 5 ATMOS 2000 TOWED 35+: 105mm some; 122mm 6 D-30; 152mm 29 Type-54 (D-1)† MRL 10: 122mm 5 RM-70; 160mm 5 LAR-160 MOR 115: 81mm; 82mm; 120mm AIR DEFENCE SAM • Point-defence 9K32 Strela-2 (SA-7 Grail)‡ GUNS ε150: 14.5mm; 23mm; 37mm

Air Force ε1,000 FORCES BY ROLE ATTACK/TRANSPORT HELICOPTER 1 sqn with Mi-17/Mi-17MD/Mi-17V-5/Mi-17-1V Hip H; Mi-24P/V Hind EQUIPMENT BY TYPE HELICOPTERS ATK 5: 2 Mi-24V Hind E; 3 Mi-24P Hind MRH 12: 1 AW139; 4 Mi-17 Hip H; 1 Mi-17MD Hip H; 1 Mi-17V-5 Hip H; 5 Mi-17-1V Hip H TPT • Light 1 AW109S

Gendarmerie & Paramilitary District Administration Security Support Organ ε2,000

Sub-Saharan Africa

FORCES BY ROLE MANOEUVRE Light 2 cdo bn 4 inf div (3 inf bde) COMBAT SUPPORT 1 arty bde

GAMBIA: ECOWAS • ECOMIG 197

490 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2022

ACTIVE 13,600 (Army 11,900 Navy 950 Air 750)

DEPLOYMENT

Gendarmerie & Paramilitary 5,000

CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC: UN • MINUSCA 1,690; 2 inf bn; 1 fd hospital

Conscript liability Selective conscription, 24 months

MOZAMBIQUE: Army 1,500

ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE

SOUTH SUDAN: UN • UNMISS 2,640; 3 inf bn; 2 hel sqn SUDAN: UN • UNISFA 8

7 Mil Zone HQ

Senegal SEN CFA Franc BCEAO XOF

2020

2021

GDP

XOF

14.2tr

15.1tr

USD

24.7bn

27.6bn

per capita

USD

1,474

1,603

Growth

1.5

4.7

Inflation

2.5

2.4

XOF

199bn

263bn

USD

346m

479m

574.75

549.22

Def bdgt USD1=XOF

2022

Real-terms defence budget trend (USDm, constant 2015) 416 167 2008

Population

Army 11,900 (incl conscripts)

2015

2021

16,082,442

Age

0–14

15–19

20–24

25–29

Male

19.9%

5.5%

4.7%

4.0%

30–64 65 plus 12.9%

1.4%

Female

19.7%

5.4%

4.7%

4.2%

15.6%

1.9%

Capabilities Senegal’s armed forces have strong international relationships and are experienced in foreign deployments. Their focus is internal and border security, including counter-insurgency in the country’s south and Islamist activity in neighbouring states, as well as combating narcotics trafficking. Under the ‘Horizon 2025’ programme, the defence authorities intend to reorganise and re-equip key defence organisations and renew infrastructure. Professional military education is a focus. A new navy school and National Defence Institute are under development; the latter will contain a higher war college, staff college and doctrine centre. Other areas for improvement include mobility and firepower, and air and naval modernisation. Despite limited resources, there are plans to improve operational capabilities and training. France remains Senegal’s principal defence partner and retains a military presence in the country. French military forces deliver training assistance to the armed forces and gendarmerie, including training in 2021 on the SIMBAD air-defence system that will equip new patrol ships. There is also defence cooperation with Spain and the UK, while an agreement was signed with Mauritania in 2021 regarding offshore energy-related maritime security. The US also provides security assistance, including to the national police and gendarmerie. A US-funded counter-terrorism training centre was opened in September 2018. The armed forces are able to deploy personnel using organic airlift, but short-notice movements of heavy equipment would be problematic without external assistance. Apart from maintenance facilities, the country has no domestic defenceindustrial capability.

FORCES BY ROLE MANOEUVRE Reconnaissance 5 armd recce bn Light 1 cdo bn 6 inf bn Air Manoeuvre 1 AB bn Other 1 (Presidential Guard) horse cav bn COMBAT SUPPORT 1 arty bn 1 engr bn 3 construction coy 1 sigs bn COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT 1 log bn 1 med bn 1 trg bn EQUIPMENT BY TYPE ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES ASLT 27 PTL-02 Assaulter RECCE 165: 30 AML-60; 74 AML-90; 20 BRDM-2; 10 M8; 4 M20; 27 RAM Mk3 IFV 26 Ratel-20 APC 91 APC (T) 12 M3 half-track APC (W) 22: 2 Oncilla; 16 Panhard M3; 4 WZ-551 (CP) PPV 57: 8 Casspir; 39 Puma M26-15; 10 Puma M36 ENGINEERING & MAINTENANCE VEHICLES ARV 2 Puma M36 ARV ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE MSL • MANPATS Milan ARTILLERY 82 TOWED 20: 105mm 6 HM-2/M101; 155mm 14: ε6 Model-50; 8 TR-F1 MRL 122mm 6 BM-21 Grad (UKR Bastion-1 mod) MOR 56: 81mm 24; 120mm 32 AIR DEFENCE • GUNS • TOWED 39: 14.5mm 6 ZPU-4 (tch); 20mm 21 M693; 40mm 12 L/60

Navy (incl Coast Guard) 950 FORCES BY ROLE SPECIAL FORCES 1 cdo coy EQUIPMENT BY TYPE PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 10 PCO 1 Fouladou (OPV 190 Mk II) PCC 1 Njambour (FRA SFCN 59m) with 2 76mm gun

Sub-Saharan Africa 491

Air Force 750 FORCES BY ROLE MARITIME PATROL/SEARCH & RESCUE 1 sqn with C-212 Aviocar; CN235; Bell 205 (UH-1H Iroquois) ISR 1 unit with BN-2T Islander (anti-smuggling patrols) TRANSPORT 1 sqn with B-727-200 (VIP); F-27-400M Troopship TRAINING 1 sqn with R-235 Guerrier*; TB-30 Epsilon; KA-1S* ATTACK/TRANSPORT HELICOPTER 1 sqn with AS355F Ecureuil II; Bell 206; Mi-35P Hind; Mi171Sh EQUIPMENT BY TYPE AIRCRAFT 5 combat capable MP 1 CN235 TPT 10: Light 8: 1 BN-2T Islander (govt owned, mil op); 1 C-212-100 Aviocar; 2 CN235; 2 Beech B200 King Air; 2 F-27-400M Troopship (3 more in store); PAX 2: 1 A319; 1 B-727-200 (VIP) TRG 11: 4+ KA-1S*; 1 R-235 Guerrier*; 6 TB-30 Epsilon HELICOPTERS ATK 4: 2 Mi-24V Hind D; 2 Mi-35P Hind MRH 1 AW139 TPT 8: Medium 2 Mi-171Sh; Light 6: 1 AS355F Ecureuil II; 1 Bell 205 (UH-1H Iroquois); 2 Bell 206; 2 PZL Mi-2 Hoplite

Gendarmerie & Paramilitary 5,000 Gendarmerie 5,000 EQUIPMENT BY TYPE ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES RECCE 13: 2 Bastion Patsas; 11 RAM Mk3 APC 56 APC (W) 24: 7 Bastion APC; 5 EE-11 Urutu; 12 VXB170† PPV 32: 24 Ejder Yalcin; 8 Gila

DEPLOYMENT CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC: UN • MINUSCA 9 DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO: UN • MONUSCO 6 GAMBIA: ECOWAS • ECOMIG 250 MALI: UN • MINUSMA 1,003; 1 mech inf bn; 1 engr coy SOUTH SUDAN: UN • UNMISS 2

FOREIGN FORCES France 350; 1 Falcon 50MI Spain Operation Barkhane 65; 2 C295M

Seychelles SYC Seychelles Rupee SCR

2020

2021

GDP

SCR

20.0bn

23.6bn

USD

1.14bn

1.29bn

per capita

USD

11,702

13,140

Growth

-12.9

6.9

Inflation

1.2

10.0

Def exp

SCR

n.k

USD

n.k

17.59

18.31

USD1=SCR Population

2022

96,387

Age

0–14

15–19

20–24

25–29

30–64 65 plus

Male

9.5%

3.1%

3.3%

3.9%

28.4%

3.5%

Female

9.0%

2.9%

2.8%

3.4%

25.1%

5.0%

Capabilities The Seychelles maintains one of the smallest standing armed forces in the world. Its proximity to key international shipping lanes increases its strategic significance. The Seychelles People’s Defence Force (PDF) primarily focuses on maritime security and counterpiracy operations. The country hosts US military forces conducting maritime-patrol activities on a rotational basis, including the operation of unarmed UAVs. India maintains strong defence ties with the Seychelles, donating equipment, providing maintenance and supporting efforts to enhance its maritime-patrol and -surveillance capability. There are plans to improve defence cooperation with China, which has already led to some equipment deliveries. The Seychelles continues to participate in and host a number of multinational maritime-security exercises. The PDF does not deploy overseas and has a limited capacity to deploy and support troops operating in the archipelago. Modern platforms in the air force and coastguard comprise donations from China, India and the UAE. There are limited maintenance facilities but no domestic defence manufacturing sector.

ACTIVE 420 (Land Forces 200; Coast Guard 200; Air Force 20)

ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE People’s Defence Force Land Forces 200 FORCES BY ROLE SPECIAL FORCES 1 SF unit MANOEUVRE Light 1 inf coy Other 1 sy unit COMBAT SUPPORT 1 MP unit EQUIPMENT BY TYPE ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES RECCE 6 BRDM-2† ARTILLERY• MOR 82mm 6 M-43†

Sub-Saharan Africa

PBF 6: 3 Anambe (Shaldag II); 2 Ferlo (RPB 33); 1 Lac Retba (Shaldag V) PB 2: 1 Conejera; 1 Kedougou AMPHIBIOUS • LANDING CRAFT 2 LCT 2 EDIC 700 LOGISTICS AND SUPPORT• AG 1

492 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2022 AIR DEFENCE • GUNS • TOWED 14.5mm ZPU-2†; ZPU-4†; 37mm M-1939†

Coast Guard 200 (incl 80 Marines) EQUIPMENT BY TYPE PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 11 PCO 3: 1 Andromache (ITA Pichiotti 42m); 2 Topaz (exIND Trinkat) PCC 1 Zoroaster PBF 3: 1 Hermes (ex-IND Coastal Interceptor Craft); 2 Wave Rider PB 4: 1 Etoile (Shanghai II mod); 2 Le Vigilant (ex-UAE Rodman 101); 1 Fortune (UK Tyne)

Air Force 20 EQUIPMENT BY TYPE AIRCRAFT TPT • Light 5: 1 DHC-6-320 Twin Otter; 2 Do-228; 2 Y-12

Sierra Leone SLE Sierra Leonean Leone SLL

2020

2021

GDP

SLL

41.3tr

47.7tr

USD

4.20bn

4.41bn

USD

527

541

Growth

-2.2

3.2

Inflation

13.4

11.3

SLL

70.8bn

109bn

USD

7.19m

10.1m

9839.13

10821.25

per capita

Def bdgt USD1=SLL

2022

124bn

Real-terms defence budget trend (USDm, constant 2015) 29 9 2008

Population

2015

2021

6,807,277 30–64 65 plus

keeping missions. Limited capability in areas including air and maritime surveillance was modestly boosted by the arrival of additional inshore-patrol craft in 2020, donated by South Korea. There is limited maintenance capacity and no defence-manufacturing capability.

ACTIVE 8,500 (Joint 8,500)

ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE Armed Forces 8,500 FORCES BY ROLE MANOEUVRE Reconnaissance 1 recce unit Light 3 inf bde (total: 12 inf bn) COMBAT SUPPORT 1 engr regt 1 int unit 1 MP unit 1 sigs unit COMBAT SUPPORT 1 log unit 1 fd hospital EQUIPMENT BY TYPE ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES APC • PPV 4: 3 Casspir; 1 Mamba Mk5 ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE RCL 84mm Carl Gustaf ARTILLERY 37 TOWED 122mm 6 PL-96 (D-30) MOR 31: 81mm ε27; 82mm 2; 120mm 2 HELICOPTERS • MRH 2 Mi-17 Hip H/Mi-8 Hip† AIR DEFENCE • GUNS 14.5mm 3

Maritime Wing ε200 EQUIPMENT BY TYPE PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 2 PB 2: 1 Type-062/I (ex-PRC Shanghai III)†; 1 Isle of Man

Age

0–14

15–19

20–24

25–29

Male

20.5%

5.1%

4.2%

3.6%

13.7%

1.6%

DEPLOYMENT

Female

20.5%

5.2%

4.4%

3.9%

15.0%

2.2%

CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC: UN • MINUSCA 5

Capabilities

DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO: UN • MONUSCO 3

The armed forces’ primary task is to ensure internal and border security and provide forces for peacekeeping missions. With international support, there remains a focus on building defence institutions, generating formal defence documentation and improving planning functions. Canada, China, France, the UK and US are among the nations supporting military capacity-building. UK training is also intended to boost the capacity of the police force. Freetown’s Horton Academy delivers professional military education training to national and regional personnel. Defence ties with China include personnel exchanges and support for the development of military infrastructure, and officers’ quarters have been built with Chinese support. Other construction activities are focusing on barracks accommodation and NCO messes. The armed forces’ ability to deploy anything other than small units is constrained by force size and logistics-support capacity. There are plans to generate a company-sized quick-reaction force for peace-

LEBANON: UN • UNIFIL 3 MALI: UN • MINUSMA 18 SOMALIA: UN • UNSOM 1; UN • UNSOS 1 SOUTH SUDAN: UN • UNMISS 1 SUDAN: UN • UNISFA 10

Sub-Saharan Africa 493

Somalia SOM 2020

2021

GDP

USD

4.99bn

5.42bn

per capita

USD

n.k.

Growth

-0.7

1.6

Inflation

n.k.

Def bdgt

USD

USD1=SOS

n.k.

1.00

2022

Gendarmerie & Paramilitary Coast Guard

*Definitive economic data unavailable Population

All operational patrol vessels under 10t FLD

12,094,640

Age

0–14

15–19

20–24

25–29

30–64 65 plus

FOREIGN FORCES

Male

20.9%

5.3%

4.6%

3.6%

14.9%

1.0%

Female

21.0%

5.4%

4.6%

3.4%

13.8%

1.5%

Under UNSOM command unless stated Burundi AMISOM 4,000; 5 inf bn Djibouti AMISOM 1,800; 2 inf bn Ethiopia AMISOM 4,000; 6 inf bn Finland EUTM Somalia 10 Ghana 1 • UNSOS 1 India 1 Italy EUTM Somalia 154 Kenya AMISOM 4,000; 3 inf bn • UNSOS 1 Mauritania UNSOS 1 Pakistan UNSOS 1 Portugal EUTM Somalia 2 Romania EUTM Somalia 1 Serbia EUTM Somalia 6 Sierra Leone 1 • UNSOS 1 Spain EUTM Somalia 20 Sweden EUTM Somalia 9 Turkey Army: 200 (trg base) Uganda 626; 1 sy bn • AMISOM 5,800; 7 inf bn • UNSOS 1 United Kingdom 2 • UNSOS 10 • Army: 65 (trg team)

Capabilities Internal stability remains fragile following decades of conflict and insurgency, with al-Shabaab and other extremist groups still active in the country. Deployed international forces look to provide security, stabilisation and capacity-building assistance. However, continued challenges have required revisions to the 2018 transition plan under which Somali forces were to assume security responsibility in 2021, acknowledging the need for continued African Union support into 2022. The Somali National Army (SNA) remains weak in terms of both organisation and military capability, although a multi-clan US-mentored force, the Danab Brigade, has displayed greater capability and is slated for modest expansion. US forces are deployed independently to Somalia and target militant groups. Plans to professionalise, legitimatise and unite the loose collections of clan-based militia groups that form the SNA have yet to be fully realised. Training programmes for enlisted and, more recently, senior commissioned personnel have been delivered by a number of countries, organisations and private security companies, but even though NATO standards were adopted as a training objective in 2018, reports indicate that coordination remains difficult in practice. Moreover, it remains difficult to grow a training staff within the SNA, to enable continuation training within the force itself. There is no capacity to deploy beyond national borders, while there is minimal national infrastructure available to support domestic operations. The equipment inventory is limited and eclectic, and government plans to re-establish and equip Somalia’s air and maritime forces remain unfulfilled. There is no domestic defence-industrial capability.

TERRITORY WHERE THE GOVERNMENT DOES NOT EXERCISE EFFECTIVE CONTROL Data presented here represents the de facto situation. This does not imply international recognition as a sovereign state. Much of this equipment is in poor repair or inoperable

ACTIVE 13,900 (Army 13,900)

Somaliland

ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE

Army ε12,500

Army 13,900 FORCES BY ROLE COMMAND 4 div HQ MANOEUVRE Light Some cdo bn(+) 12 inf bde (3 inf bn) 2 indep inf bn Other 1 gd bn

FORCES BY ROLE MANOUEVRE Armoured 2 armd bde Mechanised 1 mech inf bde Light 14 inf bde COMBAT SUPPORT 2 arty bde COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT 1 spt bn

Sub-Saharan Africa

Somali Shilling SOS

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES APC 73+ APC (W) 38+: 25+ AT-105 Saxon; 13 Bastion APC; Fiat 6614 PPV 35+: Casspir; MAV-5; 20 Kirpi; 9+ Mamba Mk5; 6 Puma M36; RG-31 Nyala AUV 12 Tiger 4×4

494 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2022 EQUIPMENT BY TYPE† ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES MBT T-54/55 RECCE Fiat 6616 APC • APC(W) Fiat 6614 ARTILLERY • MRL various incl BM-21 Grad AIR DEFENCE • GUNS • 23mm ZU-23-2

the Force Intervention Brigade in the Democratic Republic of the Congo since its inception. It is a member of the SADC Standby Force. In 2021, South Africa sent 1,500 personnel to neighbouring Mozambique as part of a SADC force to combat the Islamist insurgency in the north of the country. Troops were also deployed domestically in 2021 to help counter internal unrest. Historically, South African forces have also played a key role in training and supporting other regional forces. The SANDF can independently deploy its forces and as well as peacekeeping missions it participates in national and multinational exercises. The SANDF has a credible modernisation plan on paper but reduced funding has undermined these ambitions, resulting in programmes being behind schedule and difficulties in maintaining and replacing obsolete equipment. Budget cuts are also likely to have an adverse effect on training. South Africa has the continent’s most capable defence industry, including the state-owned Armaments Corporation of South Africa (ARMSCOR) and weapons manufacturer Denel, which continues to experience financial difficulties. Cuban personnel remain engaged on a project for the maintenance and refurbishment of land vehicles.

Ministry of the Interior Coast Guard 600

All operational patrol vessels under 10t FLD

Puntland Army ε3,000 (to be integrated into Somali National Army) Maritime Police Force ε1,000 EQUIPMENT BY TYPE PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS All operational patrol vessels under 10t FLD AIRCRAFT • TPT 4: Light 3 Ayres S2R; PAX 1 DC-3 HELICOPTERS • MRH SA316 Alouette III

South Africa RSA South African Rand ZAR GDP

2020

2021

ZAR

5.52tr

6.15tr

USD

335bn

415bn

USD

5,625

6,861

Growth

-6.4

5.0

Inflation

3.3

4.4

Def bdgt

ZAR

54.2bn

46.3bn

USD

3.29bn

3.13bn

16.46

14.80

per capita

USD1=ZAR

2022

ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE

Army 38,000

2.65

Population

RESERVE 15,050 (Army 12,250 Navy 850 Air 850 South African Military Health Service Reserve 1,100)

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE SATELLITES • ISR 1 Kondor-E

3.84

2015

South African Military Health Service 7,300 Other 12,250)

Space

Real-terms defence budget trend (USDbn, constant 2015)

2008

ACTIVE 74,000 (Army 38,000 Navy 6,650 Air 9,800

2021

56,978,635

Age

0–14

15–19

20–24

25–29

Male

13.9%

4.2%

4.1%

4.2%

30–64 65 plus 20.4%

2.6%

Female

13.9%

4.2%

4.4%

20.2%

3.6%

Capabilities South Africa's armed forces are on paper the most capable in the region, but economic and structural problems are eroding capability. Principal roles include maintaining territorial integrity and supporting the police service. The Department of Defence Strategic Plan 2020–2025 is the South African National Defence Force's (SANDF) primary policy instrument. The first of six strategicplanning milestones is to arrest the decline of critical military capabilities. However, the 2019/20 Defence Annual Report said that funding constraints would negatively affect this ambition, resulting in an inability to meet future SANDF requirements and objectives outlined in the 2015 Defence Review. South Africa contributes to UN operations and has been a key component of

FORCES BY ROLE Regt are bn sized. A new army structure is planned with 3 mixed regular/reserve divisions (1 mechanised, 1 motorised and 1 contingency) comprising 12 brigades (1 armoured, 1 mechanised, 7 motorised, 1 airborne, 1 airlanded and 1 sea landed) COMMAND 2 bde HQ SPECIAL FORCES 2 SF regt(-) MANOEUVRE Reconnaissance 1 armd recce regt Armoured 1 tk regt(-) Mechanised 2 mech inf bn Light 8 mot inf bn 1 lt inf bn Air Manoeuvre 1 AB bn 1 air mob bn Amphibious 1 amph bn COMBAT SUPPORT 1 arty regt

Sub-Saharan Africa 495

Reserve 12,250 reservists (under-strength) FORCES BY ROLE MANOEUVRE Reconnaissance 3 armd recce regt Armoured 4 tk regt Mechanised 6 mech inf bn Light 14 mot inf bn 3 lt inf bn (converting to mot inf) Air Manoeuvre 1 AB bn 2 air mob bn Amphibious 1 amph bn COMBAT SUPPORT 7 arty regt 2 engr regt AIR DEFENCE 5 AD regt EQUIPMENT BY TYPE ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES MBT 24 Olifant 2 (133 Olifant 1B in store) ASLT 50 Rooikat-76 (126 in store) IFV 534 Ratel-20/Ratel-60/Ratel-90 APC • PPV 810: 370 Casspir; 440 Mamba ENGINEERING & MAINTENANCE VEHICLES ARV Gemsbok VLB Leguan MW Husky ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE MSL SP ZT-3 Swift MANPATS Milan ADT/ER RCL 106mm M40A1 (some SP) ARTILLERY 1,240 SP 155mm 2 G-6 (41 in store) TOWED 155mm 6 G-5 (66 in store) MRL 127mm 6 Valkiri Mk II MARS Bataleur; (26 Valkiri Mk I and 19 Valkiri Mk II in store) MOR 1,226: 81mm 1,190 (incl some SP on Casspir & Ratel); 120mm 36 UNINHABITED AERIAL VEHICLES ISR • Light up to 4 Vulture AIR DEFENCE SAM • Point-defence Starstreak GUNS 40 SP 23mm (36 Zumlac in store) TOWED 35mm 40: 22 GDF-002; 18 GDF-005A/007

Navy 6,650 Fleet HQ and Naval base located at Simon’s Town; Naval stations located at Durban and Port Elizabeth EQUIPMENT BY TYPE SUBMARINES 2 SSK 2 Heroine (Type-209/1400 mod) (1 additional boat in refit since 2014, awaiting funds to complete) with 8 533mm TT with SUT 264 HWT PRINCIPAL SURFACE COMBATANTS • FRIGATES 4 FFGHM 4 Valour (MEKO A200) with 2 quad lnchr with MM40 Exocet Block 2 AShM (upgrade to Block 3 planned); 2 16-cell VLS with Umkhonto-IR SAM, 1 Denel Dual Purpose Gun (DPG) CIWS, 1 76mm gun (capacity 1 Super Lynx 300 hel) PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 4 PCC 3 Warrior (ISR Reshef) with 1 76mm gun PB 1 Tobie (2 additional in reserve) MINE WARFARE • MINE COUNTERMEASURES 3 MHC 3 River (GER Navors) (limited operational roles; training and dive support) (1 additional in reserve) LOGISTICS AND SUPPORT 2 AGHS 1 Protea (UK Hecla) with 1 hel landing platform AORH 1 Drakensberg (capacity 2 Oryx hels; 100 troops)

Maritime Reaction Squadron FORCES BY ROLE MANOEUVRE Amphibious 1 mne patrol gp 1 diving gp 1 mne boarding gp COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT 1 spt gp

Air Force 9,800 Air Force HQ, Pretoria, and 4 op gps Command & Control: 2 Airspace Control Sectors, 1 Mobile Deployment Wg, 1 Air Force Command Post FORCES BY ROLE FIGHTER/GROUND ATTACK 1 sqn with Gripen C/D (JAS-39C/D) GROUND ATTACK/TRAINING 1 sqn with Hawk Mk120* TRANSPORT 1 (VIP) sqn with B-737 BBJ; Cessna 550 Citation II; Falcon 50; Falcon 900 1 sqn with C-47TP 2 sqn with Beech 200/300 King Air; C-130B/BZ; C-212 ATTACK HELICOPTER 1 (cbt spt) sqn with AH-2 Rooivalk TRANSPORT HELICOPTER 4 (mixed) sqn with AW109; BK-117; Oryx EQUIPMENT BY TYPE AIRCRAFT 50 combat capable FGA 26: 17 Gripen C (JAS-39C); 9 Gripen D (JAS-39D) TPT 23: Medium 6: 2 C-130B Hercules; 4 C-130BZ Hercules; Light 13: 3 Beech 200C King Air; 1 Beech 300 King Air; 3 C-47TP (maritime); 2 C-212-200 Aviocar†; 1 C-212-300 Aviocar†; 2 Cessna 550 Citation II; 1 PC-12; (9

Sub-Saharan Africa

1 engr regt 1 construction regt 3 sigs regt COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT 1 engr spt regt AIR DEFENCE 1 ADA regt

496 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2022 Cessna 208 Caravan in store) PAX 4: 1 B-737BBJ; 2 Falcon 50; 1 Falcon 900 TRG 59: 24 Hawk Mk120*; 35 PC-7 Mk II Astra HELICOPTERS ATK 11 AH-2 Rooivalk MRH 4 Super Lynx 300 TPT 69: Medium 36 Oryx; Light 33: 25 AW109; 8 BK-117 AIR-LAUNCHED MISSILES • AAM • IIR IRIS-T BOMBS • Laser-guided GBU-12 Paveway II

Ground Defence FORCES BY ROLE MANOEUVRE Other 12 sy sqn (SAAF regt)

Forces (SSPDF) remains limited. The level of progress in professionalising these rebranded government forces remains unclear, and reports of child-soldier recruitment and the use of sexual and gender-based violence continue. In 2018, South Sudan reportedly signed a defence agreement with South Africa, including scope to cooperate on procurement and training. There is no capacity to deploy and sustain military units beyond national borders. Equipment is primarily of Soviet origin with some light arms of Chinese origin, and there have been efforts to expand the small air force. Sanctions remain in place, with both the EU and UN arms embargoes widened in 2018 to include all types of military equipment. South Sudan has no established domestic defence industry but has reportedly sought to develop an ammunition-manufacturing capacity in recent years.

ACTIVE 53,000 (Army 53,000)

South African Military Health Service 7,300

ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE

DEPLOYMENT

Army ε53,000 (in training)

DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO: UN • MONUSCO • Operation Mistral 939; 1 inf bn; 1 hel sqn MOZAMBIQUE: SADC • SAMIM 272 MOZAMBIQUE CHANNEL: Navy • 1 FFGHM

South Sudan SSD South Sudanese Pound SSP GDP SSP

737bn

1.08tr

USD

4.44bn

3.26bn 230

per capita

2020

2021

USD

322

Growth

-6.6

5.3

Inflation

24.0

23.0

SSP

16.4bn

14.3bn

USD

98.7m

43.1m

165.89

331.81

Def bdgt [a] USD1=SSP

2022

[a] Security and law enforcement spending Real-terms defence budget trend (USDm, constant 2015) 1125 n.k. n.k. n.k.

155

2008

Population

2015

2021

10,984,074

Age

0–14

15–19

20–24

25–29

30–64 65 plus

Male

21.2%

5.7%

5.1%

4.1%

13.8%

1.5%

Female

20.4%

5.7%

4.7%

3.5%

13.2%

1.1%

Capabilities South Sudan’s civil war formally ended in 2020. The September 2020 peace deal built on a 2018 accord that laid out a peace framework for opposition and government forces, resulting in changes to the number and demarcation of federal states, which had been a stumbling block in peace negotiations. Although major fighting between government and opposition forces has halted, skirmishes still occur, with violence also continuing between the various armed groups and militias. Progress to disarm these parties and unify them under the banner of the South Sudan People’s Defence

FORCES BY ROLE 3 military comd MANOEUVRE Light 8 inf div COMBAT SUPPORT 1 engr corps EQUIPMENT BY TYPE ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES MBT 80+: some T-55†; 80 T-72AV† APC • PPV Streit Typhoon; Streit Cougar; Mamba ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE MSL • MANPATS HJ-73; 9K115 Metis (RS-AT-7 Saxhorn) RCL 73mm SPG-9 (with SSLA) ARTILLERY SP 122mm 2S1 Gvozdika; 152mm 2S3 Akatsiya TOWED 130mm Some M-46 MRL 122mm BM-21 Grad; 107mm PH-63 MOR 82mm; 120mm Type-55 look-alike AIR DEFENCE SAM Short-range 16 S-125 Pechora (RS-SA-3 Goa)† Point-defence 9K32 Strela-2 (RS-SA-7 Grail)‡; QW-2 GUNS 14.5mm ZPU-4; 23mm ZU-23-2; 37mm Type-65/74

Air Force EQUIPMENT BY TYPE AIRCRAFT 2 combat capable TPT • Light 1 Beech 1900 TRG ε2 L-39 Albatros* HELICOPTERS ATK 5: 2 Mi-24V Hind; 3 Mi-24V-SMB Hind MRH 9 Mi-17 Hip H TPT 3: Medium 1 Mi-172 (VIP); Light 2 AW109 (civ livery)

FOREIGN FORCES All UNMISS, unless otherwise indicated Albania 2 Australia 13 Azerbaijan 2

Sub-Saharan Africa 497 Vietnam 68 Zambia 11 Zimbabwe 13

Sudan SDN Sudanese Pound SDG

2020

2021

GDP

SDG

5.17tr

15.60tr

USD

34.4bn

35.9bn

per capita

USD

776

789

Growth

-3.6

0.9

Inflation

163.3

194.6

Def exp

SDG

n.k

USD

n.k

150.37

434.23

USD1=SDG Population

2022

46,751,152

Age

0–14

15–19

20–24

25–29

Male

21.0%

5.9%

4.8%

3.7%

30–64 65 plus 13.0%

1.6%

Female

20.4%

5.8%

4.7%

3.5%

13.9%

1.5%

Capabilities Political uncertainty and internal division continue in Sudan in the wake of the October 2021 military coup. This replaced the civilian and military Sovereign Council formed to lead a transition to civilian rule following the 2019 ousting of President Omar al-Bashir after 30 years in power, though the civilian prime minister was later reinstated. The armed forces remain focused on internal security, though a peace deal was signed with five rebel groups in August 2020. Border issues remain a concern with neighbouring Ethiopia, and there have been reports of cross-border incursions amid the continuing conflict between Addis Ababa and Tigrayan forces. Sudan is part of the Saudi-led coalition intervention in Yemen. A defence agreement with Iran in 2008 reportedly included assistance in developing the domestic arms industry. Growing military cooperation with Egypt has also been demonstrated through joint exercises in 2020 and 2021. The armed forces are conscript-based and will have gained operational experience from internal-security deployments and the intervention in Yemen. By regional standards, Sudan’s armed forces are relatively well equipped, with significant holdings of both ageing and modern systems. While there is a UN arms embargo in place, it is limited to equipment used within Darfur. Recent acquisitions have included Russian and Ukrainian government surplus and also new Chinese aircraft. The state-run Military Industry Corporation manufactures a range of ammunition, small arms and armoured vehicles for the domestic and export market. The majority of the corporation’s products are based on older Chinese and Russian systems.

ACTIVE 104,300 (Army 100,000 Navy 1,300 Air 3,000) Gendarmerie & Paramilitary 40,000 Conscript liability 2 years for males aged 18–30

ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE Space EQUIPMENT BY TYPE SATELLITES • ISR 1 SRSS-1

Sub-Saharan Africa

Bangladesh 1,623; 1 inf coy; 2 rvn coy; 2 engr coy Benin 5 Bhutan 4 Bolivia 4 Brazil 12 Cambodia 86; 1 MP unit Canada 6 China, People’s Republic of 1,054; 1 inf bn; 1 engr coy; 1 fd hospital Ecuador 3 Egypt 4 El Salvador 2 Ethiopia 1,523; 3 inf bn Fiji 4 Gambia 5 Germany 14 Ghana 881; 1 inf bn Guatemala 7 Guinea 3 India 2,372; 2 inf bn; 1 engr coy; 1 sigs coy; 1 fd hospital Indonesia 4 Japan 4 Jordan 6 Kenya 19 Korea, Republic of 274; 1 engr coy Kyrgyzstan 2 Liberia 2 Moldova 5 Mongolia 871; 1 inf bn Morocco 2 Namibia 4 Nepal 1,752; 2 inf bn New Zealand 3 Nigeria 14 Norway 14 Pakistan 285; 1 engr coy Papua New Guinea 2 Paraguay 3 Peru 5 Philippines 2 Poland 1 Romania 6 Russia 2 Rwanda 2,640; 3 inf bn; 2 hel sqn Senegal 2 Sierra Leone 1 Sri Lanka 66; 1 fd hospital; 1 hel sqn Switzerland 1 Tanzania 9 Thailand 276; 1 engr coy Togo 2 Tunisia 3 Uganda 2 Ukraine 4 United Kingdom 4 United States 7

498 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2022

Army 100,000+ FORCES BY ROLE SPECIAL FORCES 5 SF coy MANOEUVRE Reconnaissance 1 indep recce bde Armoured 1 armd div Mechanised 1 mech inf div 1 indep mech inf bde Light 15+ inf div 6 indep inf bde Air Manoeuvre 1 air aslt bde Amphbious 1 mne div Other 1 (Border Guard) sy bde COMBAT SUPPORT 3 indep arty bde 1 engr div (9 engr bn) EQUIPMENT BY TYPE ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES MBT 465: 20 M60A3; 60 Type-59/Type-59D; 305 T-54/T-55; 70 T-72AV; 10 Al-Bashier (Type-85-IIM) LT TK 115: 70 Type-62; 45 Type-63 RECCE 206: 6 AML-90; 70 BRDM-1/2; 50–80 FV701 Ferret; 30–50 FV601 Saladin IFV 145: 135 BMP-1/-2; 10 BTR-3 APC 405+ APC (T) 66: 20-30 BTR-50; 36 M113 APC (W) 339+: 50–80 BTR-152; 20 OT-62; 50 OT-64; 3+ Rakhsh; 10 WZ-551; WZ-523; 55-80 V-150 Commando; 96 Walid PPV some Sarsar-2; some Streit Spartan AUV 4+ Nimr Ajban 440A ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE MSL • MANPATS 9K11 Malyutka (RS-AT-3 Sagger); HJ8; 9K135 Kornet (RS-AT-14 Spriggan) RCL 106mm 40 M40A1 GUNS 76mm ZIS-3; 100mm M-1944; 85mm D-44 ARTILLERY 860+ SP 66: 122mm 56 2S1 Gvozdika; 155mm 10 Mk F3 TOWED 128+: 105mm 20 M101; 122mm 21+: 21 D-30; D-74; M-30; 130mm 75 M-46/Type-59-I; 155mm 12 M114A1 MRL 666+: 107mm 477 Type-63; 122mm 188: 120 BM-21 Grad; 50 Saqr; 18 Type-81; 302mm 1+ WS-1 MOR 81mm; 82mm; 120mm AM-49; M-43; W86 AIR DEFENCE SAM • Point-defence 4+: 9K32 Strela-2 (RS-SA-7 Grail)‡; 4+ 9K33 Osa (RS-SA-8 Gecko); FN-6 (CH-SA-10) GUNS 966+ SP 20: 20mm 8 M163 Vulcan; 12 M3 VDAA TOWED 946+: 740+ 14.5mm ZPU-2/14.5mm ZPU4/37mm Type-63/57mm S-60/85mm M-1944; 20mm 16

M167 Vulcan; 23mm 50 ZU-23-2; 37mm 80 M-1939; (30 M-1939 unserviceable); 40mm 60

Navy 1,300 EQUIPMENT BY TYPE PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 11 PBR 4 Kurmuk PB 7: 1 13.5m; 1 14m; 2 19m; 3 41m (PRC) AMPHIBIOUS • LANDING CRAFT • LCVP 5 LOGISTICS AND SUPPORT 4 AG 3 AXL 1 Petrushka (ex-RUS)

Air Force 3,000 FORCES BY ROLE FIGHTER 2 sqn with MiG-29SE/UB Fulcrum FIGHTER/GROUND ATTACK 1 sqn with FTC-2000* GROUND ATTACK 1 sqn with Su-24M/MR Fencer 1 sqn with Su-25K/Su-25UB Frogfoot TRANSPORT Some sqn with An-30 Clank; An-32 Cline; An-72 Coaler; An-74TK-200/300; C-130H Hercules; Il-76 Candid; Y-8 1 VIP unit with Falcon 20F; Falcon 50; Falcon 900; F-27; Il-62M Classic TRAINING 1 sqn with K-8 Karakorum* ATTACK HELICOPTER 2 sqn with Mi-24/Mi-24P/Mi-24V/Mi-35P Hind TRANSPORT HELICOPTER 2 sqn with Mi-8 Hip; Mi-17 Hip H; Mi-171 EQUIPMENT BY TYPE AIRCRAFT 59 combat capable FTR 22: 20 MiG-29SE Fulcrum C; 2 MiG-29UB Fulcrum B FGA 6 FTC-2000G ATK 20: 6 Su-24M/MR Fencer; 14 Su-25K/UB Frogfoot; (15 A-5 Fantan in store) ISR 2 An-30 Clank TPT 24: Heavy 1 Il-76 Candid; Medium 6: 4 C-130H Hercules; 2 Y-8; Light 13: ε3 An-26 Curl; 2 An-32 Cline; 2 An-72 Coaler; 4 An-74TK-200; 2 An-74TK-300; PAX 4: 1 Falcon 20F (VIP); 1 Falcon 50 (VIP); 1 Falcon 900; 1 Il-62M Classic TRG 15+: 11 K-8 Karakorum*; some SAFAT-03; 3 Utva-75 HELICOPTERS ATK 40: 25 Mi-24 Hind; 2 Mi-24P Hind; 7 Mi-24V Hind E; 6 Mi-35P Hind MRH ε3 Mi-17 Hip H TPT 27: Medium 23: 21 Mi-8 Hip; 2 Mi-171; Light 4: 1 Bell 205; 3 Bo-105 TRG some SAFAT 02 UNINHABITED AERIAL VEHICLES CISR • Heavy CH-3; CH-4 AIR DEFENCE • SAM • Medium-range: (18 S-75M Dvina (RS-SA-2 Guideline)‡ (non-operational)) AIR-LAUNCHED MISSILES • AAM • IR R-3 (RS-AA-2 Atoll)‡; R-60 (RS-AA-8 Aphid); R-73 (RS-AA-11A Archer); ARH R-77 (RS-AA-12A Adder)

Sub-Saharan Africa 499

The Popular Defence Forces were officially disbanded in 2019, but it is unclear if elements still exist in some form

Rapid Support Force 40,000 EQUIPMENT BY TYPE ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES IFV 7 BTR-80A; WZ-523 IFV APC • APC (W) 20+ BTR-70M Kobra 2 AIR DEFENCE • GUNS SP 14.5mm ZPU-2 (tch)

DEPLOYMENT SAUDI ARABIA: Operation Restoring Hope 3 Su-24M/MR Fencer YEMEN: Operation Restoring Hope 650; 1 mech BG; T-72AV, BTR-70M Kobra 2

FOREIGN FORCES All UNISFA unless otherwise indicated Bangladesh 3 Benin 2 Bhutan 2 Bolivia 4 Brazil 2 Burundi 4 Cambodia 1 China, People’s Republic of 86; 1 hel flt Ecuador 3 Ethiopia 3,306; 3 inf bn; 2 arty coy; 1 engr coy; 1 sigs coy; 1 log coy; 1 med bn Ghana 8 Guatemala 3 Guinea 1 India 4 Indonesia 4 Kyrgyzstan 1 Liberia 2 Malawi 3 Malaysia 2 Mongolia 4 Namibia 7 Nepal 8 Nigeria 4 Pakistan 4 Peru 3 Russia 2 Rwanda 8 Sierra Leone 10 Tanzania 1 Uganda 2 Ukraine 6 Uruguay 2 Zambia 4 Zimbabwe 11

Tanzania TZA Tanzanian Shilling TZS

2020

2021

GDP

TZS

149tr

160tr

USD

64.4bn

69.2bn

per capita

USD

1,110

1,159

Growth

4.8

4.0

Inflation

3.3

3.2

TZS

1.85tr

1.92tr

USD

803m

831m

2306.14

2314.74

Def bdgt USD1=TZS

2022

Real-terms defence budget trend (USDm, constant 2015) 809 204 2008

Population

2015

2021

62,092,761

Age

0–14

15–19

20–24

25–29

30–64 65 plus

Male

21.3%

5.4%

4.5%

3.8%

13.5%

1.4%

Female

20.8%

5.3%

4.5%

3.8%

13.8%

1.9%

Capabilities Non-state actors pose the principal threat to Tanzania’s security, with terrorism, poaching and piracy of concern. A developing relationship with China has led to a series of procurements and training contacts. There are also defence-related ties with Israel, Pakistan and Russia. The armed forces take part in multinational exercises in Africa and have provided some training assistance to other African forces. Training relationships also exist with extraregional armed forces, including the US. Tanzania’s contribution to the UN’s Force Intervention Brigade in the eastern DRC, notably its special forces, will have provided lessons for force development. However, there is only a limited capacity to project power independently beyond the country’s borders. Budget constraints have limited recapitalisation ambitions and, although heavy equipment is ageing, airlift capacity has improved with the delivery of new helicopters. There are local ammunition facilities, but otherwise Tanzania relies on imports for its military equipment.

ACTIVE 27,000 (Army 23,000 Navy 1,000 Air 3,000) Gendarmerie & Paramilitary 1,400 Conscript liability Three months basic military training combined with social service, ages 18–23

RESERVE 80,000 (Joint 80,000)

ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE Army ε23,000 FORCES BY ROLE SPECIAL FORCES 1 SF unit MANOEUVRE Armoured 1 tk bde Light 5 inf bde

Sub-Saharan Africa

Gendarmerie & Paramilitary 40,000

500 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2022 COMBAT SUPPORT 4 arty bn 1 mor bn 2 AT bn 1 engr regt (bn) COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT 1 log gp AIR DEFENCE 2 ADA bn EQUIPMENT BY TYPE† ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES MBT 45: 30 T-54/T-55; 15 Type-59G LT TK 57+: 30 FV101 Scorpion; 25 Type-62; 2+ Type-63A RECCE 10 BRDM-2 APC • APC (W) 14: ε10 BTR-40/BTR-152; 4 Type-92 ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE RCL 75mm Type-52 (M20) GUNS 85mm 75 Type-56 (D-44) ARTILLERY 344+ TOWED 130: 122mm 100: 20 D-30; 80 Type-54-1 (M-30); 130mm 30 Type-59-I GUN/MOR 120mm 3+ Type-07PA MRL 61+: 122mm 58 BM-21 Grad; 300mm 3+ A100 MOR 150: 82mm 100 M-43; 120mm 50 M-43

Navy ε1,000 EQUIPMENT BY TYPE PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 14 PCC 2 Mwitongo (ex-PRC Haiqing) PHT 2 Type-025 (Huchuan) each with 2 single 533mm ASTT PB 10: 2 Ngunguri; 2 Type-062 (PRC Shanghai II); 2 VT 23m; 4 Mambwe (Damen Fast Crew Supplier 3307) AMPHIBIOUS 3 LCT 1 Kasa LCM 2 Mbono (ex-PRC Yunnan)

Air Defence Command ε3,000 FORCES BY ROLE FIGHTER 3 sqn with F-7/FT-7; FT-5; K-8 Karakorum* TRANSPORT 1 sqn with Cessna 404 Titan; DHC-5D Buffalo; F-28 Fellowship; F-50; Gulfstream G550; Y-12 (II) TRANSPORT HELICOPTER 1 sqn with Bell 205 (AB-205); Bell 412EP Twin Huey EQUIPMENT BY TYPE† AIRCRAFT 17 combat capable FTR 11: 9 F-7 (F-7TN); 2 FT-7 (FT-7N) ISR 1 SB7L-360 Seeker TPT 12: Medium 2 Y-8; Light 7: 2 Cessna 404 Titan; 3 DHC-5D Buffalo; 2 Y-12(II); PAX 3: 1 F-28 Fellowship; 1 F-50; 1 Gulfstream G550 TRG 9: 3 FT-5 (JJ-5); 6 K-8 Karakorum* HELICOPTERS MRH 1 Bell 412EP Twin Huey TPT 2: Medium 1+ H225; Light 1 Bell 205 (AB-205) AIR DEFENCE SAM Short-range 2K12 Kub (RS-SA-6 Gainful)† Point-defence 9K32 Strela-2 (RS-SA-7 Grail)‡

GUNS 200 TOWED 14.5mm 40 ZPU-2/ZPU-4†; 23mm 40 ZU-232; 37mm 120 M-1939

Gendarmerie & Paramilitary 1,400 active Police Field Force 1,400

18 sub-units incl Police Marine Unit

Air Wing EQUIPMENT BY TYPE AIRCRAFT • TPT • Light 1 Cessna U206 Stationair HELICOPTERS TPT • Light 4: 2 Bell 206A Jet Ranger (AB-206A); 2 Bell 206L Long Ranger TRG 2 Bell 47G (AB-47G)/Bell 47G2

Marine Unit 100 EQUIPMENT BY TYPE PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS All operational patrol vessels under 10t FLD

DEPLOYMENT CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC: UN • MINUSCA 456; 1 inf bn(-) DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO: UN • MONUSCO 854; 1 spec ops coy; 1 inf bn LEBANON: UN • UNIFIL 125; 1 MP coy MOZAMBIQUE: SADC • SAMIM 277 SOUTH SUDAN: UN • UNMISS 9 SUDAN: UN • UNISFA 1

Sub-Saharan Africa 501

CFA Franc BCEAO XOF

2020

2021

GDP

XOF

4.36tr

4.65tr

USD

7.59bn

8.49bn

per capita

USD

916

1,000

1.8

4.8

Growth Inflation

1.8

2.7

Def bdgt

XOF

66.6bn

65.6bn

USD USD1=XOF

116m

120m

574.72

547.38

2022

Real-terms defence budget trend (USDm, constant 2015) 107 47 2008

Population

2015

2021

8,283,189

Age

0–14

15–19

20–24

25–29

Male

20.0%

5.0%

4.1%

3.8%

30–64 65 plus 14.6%

1.7%

Female

19.5%

4.9%

4.2%

3.9%

15.8%

2.4%

Capabilities Defence authorities are increasingly concerned by the challenge from piracy and other illicit maritime activities in the Gulf of Guinea. As a result, regional cooperation is now being strengthened. In 2020 Togo adopted a new military-programming law, leading to the creation of a special-forces group. France continues to deliver military training, including for Togolese peacekeeping contingents. There is also a peacekeeping training centre in Lomé. The United States’ Africa Contingency Operations Training and Assistance programme has provided assistance with training. Togo’s deployment capabilities are limited without external support, while financial challenges limit capability development more broadly. There are some maintenance facilities but there is no defence-manufacturing sector.

ACTIVE 8,550 (Army 8,100 Navy 200 Air 250) Gendarmerie & Paramilitary 750 Conscript liability Selective conscription, 2 years

ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE Army 8,100+ FORCES BY ROLE MANOEUVRE Reconnaissance 1 armd recce regt Mechanised 1 armd bn Light 2 cbd arms regt 2 inf regt 1 rapid reaction force Air Manoeuvre 1 cdo/para regt (3 cdo/para coy)

Other 1 (Presidential Guard) gd regt (1 gd bn, 1 cdo bn, 2 indep gd coy) COMBAT SUPPORT 1 cbt spt regt (1 fd arty bty, 2 ADA bty, 1 engr/log/tpt bn) EQUIPMENT BY TYPE ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES MBT 2 T-54/T-55 LT TK 18 FV101 Scorpion RECCE 86: 3 AML-60; 7 AML-90; 29 Bastion Patsas; 36 EE-9 Cascavel; 6 M8; 3 M20; 2 VBL IFV 20 BMP-2 APC 86 APC (T) 4 M3A1 half-track APC (W) 32: 2 Mbombe 4; 30 UR-416 PPV 50 Mamba Mk7 AUV 1 FV103 Spartan ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE RCL 75mm Type-52 (M20)/Type-56; 82mm Type-65 (B-10) GUNS 57mm 5 ZIS-2 ARTILLERY 30+ SP 122mm 6 TOWED 105mm 4 HM-2 MRL 122mm PHL-81 mod (SC6 chassis) MOR 82mm 20 M-43 AIR DEFENCE • GUNS • TOWED 43 14.5mm 38 ZPU-4; 37mm 5 M-1939

Navy ε200 (incl Marine Infantry unit) EQUIPMENT BY TYPE PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 3 PBF 1 Agou (RPB 33) PB 2 Kara (FRA Esterel)

Air Force 250 FORCES BY ROLE TRANSPORT 1 sqn with Beech 200 King Air 1 VIP unit with DC-8; F-28-1000 TRAINING 1 sqn with TB-30 Epsilon* TRANSPORT HELICOPTER 1 sqn with SA315 Lama; SA316 Alouette III; SA319 Alouette III; SA342L1 Gazelle EQUIPMENT BY TYPE† AIRCRAFT 3 combat capable TPT 5: Light 2 Beech 200 King Air; PAX 3: 1 DC-8; 2 F-28-1000 (VIP) TRG 3 TB-30 Epsilon* (3 Alpha Jet*; 4 EMB-326G* in store) HELICOPTERS MRH 6: 2 SA315 Lama; 1 SA316 Alouette III; 1 SA319 Alouette III; 2 SA342L1 Gazelle TPT • Medium 2 Mi-8T Hip C (1 SA330 Puma in store)

Sub-Saharan Africa

Togo TGO

502 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2022

Special Forces Group

signed a Mutual Defence Treaty with Kenya and Rwanda. Training levels are adequate, particularly for the special forces, and are improving after recent experiences. There is regular training with international partners, including at Uganda’s own facilities. Airlift is limited though rotary-wing aviation has improved in recent years, partly due to US assistance. Motorised infantry formations still lack sufficient transport and logistics capacity. Mechanised forces are relatively well equipped, though heavy equipment is disparate and ageing. Improvements include the arrival of MRAPs and other protected vehicles. There is limited defence-industrial capacity, though there is some manufacturing of light armoured vehicles. Uganda’s 2015–19 Security Sector Development plan included the establishment of an engineering centre and a defence-research facility.

FORCES BY ROLE SPECIAL FORCES 1 SF unit

Gendarmerie & Paramilitary 750 Gendarmerie 750 Ministry of Interior FORCES BY ROLE 2 reg sections SPECIAL FORCES 1 SF unit MANOEUVRE Other 1 (mobile) paramilitary sqn ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES APC • PPV Mamba Mk7

ACTIVE 45,000 (Ugandan People’s Defence Force 45,000) Gendarmerie & Paramilitary 1,400

RESERVE 10,000

ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE

DEPLOYMENT CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC: UN • MINUSCA 10 MALI: UN • MINUSMA 931; 1 mech inf bn; 1 fd hospital SOUTH SUDAN: UN • UNMISS 2 WESTERN SAHARA: UN • MINURSO 2

Uganda UGA Ugandan Shilling UGX GDP per capita

2020

2021

UGX

144tr

157tr

USD

38.1bn

43.2bn 1,018

USD

925

Growth

-0.8

4.7

Inflation

2.8

2.2

Def bdgt

UGX

3.62tr

4.35tr

USD USD1=UGX

960m

1.20bn

3772.95

3630.53

2022

3.87tr

Real-terms defence budget trend (USDm, constant 2015) 962 182 2008

Population

2015

2021

44,712,143

Age

0–14

15–19

20–24

25–29

Male

24.2%

5.7%

4.2%

3.3%

30–64 65 plus 10.2%

1.0%

Female

23.7%

5.8%

4.7%

4.0%

11.9%

1.4%

Capabilities Uganda’s armed forces are well equipped and are important contributors to East African security. Operational experience and training have led to improvements in administration and planning, as well as in military skills including counter-IED and urban patrolling. A number of years spent targeting the Lord’s Resistance Army has also developed counter-insurgency experience. There are plans to establish a National Defence College. Uganda is one of the largest contributors to the East Africa Standby Force and in 2014

Ugandan People’s Defence Force ε40,000– 45,000 FORCES BY ROLE MANOEUVRE Armoured 1 armd bde Light 1 cdo bn 5 inf div (total: 16 inf bde) Other 1 (Special Forces Command) mot bde COMBAT SUPPORT 1 arty bde AIR DEFENCE 2 AD bn EQUIPMENT BY TYPE† ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES MBT 279+: 140 T-54/T-55; 45 T-55AM2; 40 T-72A; 10 T-72B1; 44 T-90S; ZTZ-85-IIM LT TK ε20 PT-76 RECCE 46: 40 Eland-20; 6 FV701 Ferret IFV 37 BMP-2 APC 185 APC (W) 58: 15 BTR-60; 20 Buffel; 4 OT-64; 19 Bastion APC PPV 127+: 42 Casspir; some Chui; 35 Hizir; 40 Mamba; 10 RG-33L AUV 15 Cougar ENGINEERING & MAINTENANCE VEHICLES ARV 1 BTS-4; T-54/T-55 reported VLB MTU reported MW Husky ARTILLERY 333+ SP 155mm 6 ATMOS 2000 TOWED 243+: 122mm M-30; 130mm 221; 155mm 22: 4 G-5; 18 M-839 MRL 6+: 107mm (12-tube); 122mm 6+: BM-21 Grad; 6 RM-70 MOR 78+: 81mm L16; 82mm M-43; 120mm 78 Soltam

Sub-Saharan Africa 503

Marines ε400

All operational patrol vessels under 10t FLD FORCES BY ROLE MANOEUVRE Amphibious 1 mne bn

Air Wing FORCES BY ROLE FIGHTER/GROUND ATTACK 1 sqn with Su-30MK2 Flanker TRANSPORT 1 unit with Y-12 1 VIP unit with Gulfstream 550; L-100-30 TRAINING 1 unit with L-39ZA/ZO Albatros* ATTACK/TRANSPORT HELICOPTER 1 sqn with Bell 412 Twin Huey; Mi-Mi-17/171E Hip; Mi-24V/P Hind E/F; Mi-17A1 (VIP) EQUIPMENT BY TYPE AIRCRAFT 13 combat capable FGA 6 Su-30MK2 Flanker (3+ MiG-21bis Fishbed; 1 MiG-21UM Mongol B in store) TPT 10: Medium 1 L-100-30; Light 8: 4 Cessna 172; 2 Cessna 208B; 2 Y-12; PAX 1 Gulfstream 550 TRG 7 L-39ZA/ZO Albatros* HELICOPTERS ATK ε7 Mi-24V/P Hind E/F MRH 6: 2 Bell 412 Twin Huey; 5 Mi-17/171E Hip TPT 3: Medium 1 Mi-171A1 (VIP) AIR-LAUNCHED MISSILES AAM • IR R-73 (RS-AA-11A Archer); SARH R-27 (RS-AA-10 Alamo); ARH R-77 (RS-AA-12 Adder) (reported) ARM Kh-31P (RS-AS-17A Krypton) (reported)

Gendarmerie & Paramilitary ε600 active Border Defence Unit ε600 Equipped with small arms only

Zambia ZMB Zambian Kwacha ZMW GDP

2020

2021

ZMW

354bn

456bn

USD

19.3bn

21.7bn

USD

1,023

1,115

Growth

-3.0

1.0

Inflation

15.7

22.8

Def bdgt

ZMW

6.57bn

5.64bn

USD

358m

268m

18.34

21.02

per capita

USD1=ZMW

433 201 2008

Population

2015

2021

19,077,816

Age

0–14

15–19

20–24

25–29

30–64 65 plus

Male

21.9%

5.6%

4.6%

3.8%

13.0%

1.2%

Female

21.5%

5.6%

4.6%

3.8%

13.1%

1.5%

Capabilities Zambia faces no immediate external threat, though there is a border dispute with the Democratic Republic of the Congo. The armed forces’ principal tasks are ensuring territorial integrity and border security, and there is also a commitment to international peacekeeping operations, though these roles could be challenged by equipment obsolescence and a comparatively small establishment strength. Ties have developed with China over the past decade, including in military training and weapons sales. There are reports that some equipment may have been procured from Israeli firms. Zambia is a member of the AU and SADC and the armed services have participated in exercises with international and regional partners including for the SADC Standby Force. Zambia’s largest peacekeeping contribution is to the MINUSCA operation in the Central African Republic (CAR). In April 2017, Zambia signed a defence deal with Russia for spare-parts support. The armed forces are all-volunteer. The US has provided funding and material support for army and air-force pre-deployment training for the CAR peacekeeping mission. The armed forces have limited capacity to independently deploy and sustain forces beyond national borders. While there is a need to modernise the inventory, funds remain limited. The country has no defence-industrial base, apart from limited ammunition production.

ACTIVE 15,100 (Army 13,500 Air 1,600)

SOMALIA: AU • AMISOM 5,800; 7 inf bn; UN • UNSOM 626; 1 sy bn; UN • UNSOS 1

RESERVE 3,000 (Army 3,000)

SUDAN: UN • UNISFA 2

3.25bn

Real-terms defence budget trend (USDm, constant 2015)

DEPLOYMENT SOUTH SUDAN: UN • UNMISS 2

2022

Gendarmerie & Paramilitary 1,400

ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE Army 13,500 FORCES BY ROLE COMMAND 3 bde HQ SPECIAL FORCES 1 cdo bn

Sub-Saharan Africa

AIR DEFENCE SAM • Point-defence 9K32 Strela-2 (RS-SA-7 Grail)‡; 9K310 Igla-1 (RS-SA-16 Gimlet) GUNS • TOWED 20+: 14.5mm ZPU-1/ZPU-2/ZPU-4; 37mm 20 M-1939

504 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2022 MANOEUVRE Armoured 1 armd regt (1 tk bn, 1 armd recce regt) Light 6 inf bn COMBAT SUPPORT 1 arty regt (2 fd arty bn, 1 MRL bn) 1 engr regt EQUIPMENT BY TYPE Some equipment† ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES MBT 30: 10 T-55; 20 ZTZ-59 LT TK 30 PT-76 RECCE 70 BRDM-1/BRDM-2 (ε30 serviceable) IFV 23 Ratel-20 APC • APC (W) 47+: 13 BTR-60; 20 BTR-70; 10 BTR-80; 4+ WZ-551 AUV 22 Tigr ENGINEERING & MAINTENANCE VEHICLES ARV T-54/T-55 reported ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE MSL • MANPATS 9K11 Malyutka (RS-AT-3 Sagger) RCL 12+: 57mm 12 M18; 75mm M20; 84mm Carl Gustaf ARTILLERY 194 SP 6 Atmos M-46 TOWED 61: 105mm 18 Model 56 pack howitzer; 122mm 25 D-30; 130mm 18 M-46 MRL 122mm 30 BM-21 Grad (ε12 serviceable) MOR 917: 81mm 55; 82mm 24; 120mm 12 SP 120mm 6+ Elbit Spear Mk2 AIR DEFENCE SAM • MANPAD 9K32 Strela-2 (RS-SA-7 Grail)‡ GUNS SP 23mm 4 ZSU-23-4 Shilka TOWED 136: 14.5mm ZPU-4; 20mm 50 M-55 (triple); 23mm ZU-23; 37mm 40 M-1939; PG-65; 40mm L/70; 57mm ε30 S-60; 85mm 16 M-1939 KS-12

Reserve 3,000 FORCES BY ROLE MANOEUVRE Light 3 inf bn

Air Force 1,600 FORCES BY ROLE FIGHTER/GROUND ATTACK 1 sqn with K-8 Karakorum* 1 sqn with L-15* TRANSPORT 1 sqn with MA60; Y-12(II); Y-12(IV) 1 (VIP) unit with AW139; HS-748 1 (liaison) sqn with Do-28 TRAINING 2 sqn with MB-326GB; MFI-15 Safari TRANSPORT HELICOPTER 1 sqn with Mi-17 Hip H 1 (liaison) sqn with Bell 47G; Bell 205 (UH-1H Iroquois/ AB-205)

AIR DEFENCE 2 bty with S-125M Pechora-M (RS-SA-3 Goa) EQUIPMENT BY TYPE† Very low serviceability AIRCRAFT 21 combat capable TPT 19: Medium 2 C-27J Spartan; Light 15: 1 Cessna 208B Grand Caravan; 5 Do-28; 2 MA60; 3 Y-12(II); 4 Y-12(IV); PAX 2: 1 Gulfstream G650ER; 1 HS-748 TRG 51: 15 K-8 Karakorum*; 6 L-15*; 10 MB-326GB; 8 MFI-15 Safari; 12 SF-260TW HELICOPTERS MRH 5: 1 AW139; 4 Mi-17 Hip H TPT • Light 12: 9 Bell 205 (UH-1H Iroquois/AB-205); 3 Bell 212 TRG 5 Bell 47G UNINHABITED AERIAL VEHICLES 3+ ISR • Medium 3+ Hermes 450 AIR DEFENCE SAM • Short-range 6 S-125M Pechora-M (RS-SA-3 Goa) AIR-LAUNCHED MISSILES AAM • IR PL-5E-II ASM 9K11 Malyutka (RS-AT-3 Sagger)

Paramilitary 1,400 Police Mobile Unit 700 FORCES BY ROLE MANOEUVRE Other 1 police bn (4 police coy)

Police Paramilitary Unit 700 FORCES BY ROLE MANOEUVRE Other 1 paramilitary bn (3 paramilitary coy) EQUIPMENT BY TYPE ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES APC • PPV 9+: 3+ Marauder; 6 CS/VP3

DEPLOYMENT CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC: UN • MINUSCA 932; 1 inf bn DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO: UN • MONUSCO 7 LEBANON: UN • UNIFIL 2 MALI: UN • MINUSMA 3 MIDDLE EAST: UN • UNTSO 1 SOUTH SUDAN: UN • UNMISS 11 SUDAN: UN • UNISFA 4

Sub-Saharan Africa 505

Zimbabwe Dollar ZWL GDP per capita

2020

2021

ZWL

1.12tr

2.20tr

USD

21.9bn

25.8bn 1,665

USD

1,443

Growth

-4.1

5.1

Inflation

557.2

92.5

Def bdgt

ZWL

3.11bn

23.3bn

USD

38.9m

287m

80.00

81.00

USD1=ZWL

2022

Real-terms defence budget trend (USDm, constant 2015) 395 1 2008

Population

2015

2021

14,829,988

Age

0–14

15–19

20–24

25–29

30–64 65 plus

Male

18.9%

5.2%

4.6%

4.3%

14.3%

1.8%

Female

19.3%

5.4%

4.9%

4.3%

14.2%

2.7%

Capabilities Zimbabwe’s political instability and weak economy remain key challenges for the government, and have been exacerbated by the coronavirus pandemic. Principal military tasks include ensuring sovereignty, territorial integrity and border security, as well as providing internal-security support to the police. The armed forces take an active political role. Zimbabwe is a member of the AU and the SADC and takes part in SADC Standby Force exercises. Zimbabwe has also sent military forces as part of an SADC deployment to Mozambique to combat the Islamist insurgency there. There are defence ties with China and an emergent defence relationship with Belarus, while Russia in mid-2019 reportedly said it would consider alternative payment means for military cooperation. Military leaders have identified training as a development priority. Small numbers of personnel have deployed on peacekeeping operations but there is no capacity to sustain a force far beyond national borders. Equipment recapitalisation is also a priority, though much will depend on domestic economic health and perhaps the extent to which China and Russia provide support. There are plans to revive state-owned small-arms and munitions manufacturer Zimbabwe Defence Industries, although these may be hindered by continuing US and EU sanctions.

ACTIVE 29,000 (Army 25,000 Air 4,000) Gendarmerie & Paramilitary 21,800

ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE Army ε25,000 FORCES BY ROLE COMMAND 1 SF bde HQ 1 mech bde HQ 5 inf bde HQ SPECIAL FORCES 1 SF regt

MANOEUVRE Armoured 1 armd sqn Mechanised 1 mech inf bn Light 15 inf bn 1 cdo bn Air Manoeuvre 1 para bn Other 3 gd bn 1 (Presidential Guard) gd gp COMBAT SUPPORT 1 arty bde 1 fd arty regt 2 engr regt AIR DEFENCE 1 AD regt EQUIPMENT BY TYPE ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES MBT 40: 30 Type-59†; 10 Type-69† RECCE 115: 20 Eland-60/90; 15 FV701 Ferret†; 80 EE-9 Cascavel (90mm) IFV 2+ YW307 APC • APC (T) 30: 8 ZSD-85 (incl CP); 22 VTT-323 ENGINEERING & MAINTENANCE VEHICLES ARV T-54/T-55 reported; ZJX-93 ARV VLB MTU reported ARTILLERY 254 SP 122mm 12 2S1 Gvozdika TOWED 122mm 20: 4 D-30; 16 Type-60 (D-74) MRL 76: 107mm 16 Type-63; 122mm 60 RM-70 MOR 146: 81mm/82mm ε140; 120mm 6 M-43 AIR DEFENCE SAM • Point-defence 9K32 Strela-2 (RS-SA-7 Grail)‡ GUNS • TOWED 116: 14.5mm 36 ZPU-1/ZPU-2/ZPU-4; 23mm 45 ZU-23-2; 37mm 35 M-1939

Air Force 4,000 FORCES BY ROLE FIGHTER 1 sqn with F-7 II†; FT-7† FIGHTER/GROUND ATTACK 1 sqn with K-8 Karakorum* GROUND ATTACK/ISR 1 sqn with Cessna 337/O-2A Skymaster* ISR/TRAINING 1 sqn with SF-260F/M; SF-260TP*; SF-260W Warrior* TRANSPORT 1 sqn with BN-2 Islander; CASA 212-200 Aviocar (VIP) ATTACK/TRANSPORT HELICOPTER 1 sqn with Mi-35 Hind; Mi-35P Hind (liaison); SA316 Alouette III; AS532UL Cougar (VIP) 1 trg sqn with Bell 412 Twin Huey, SA316 Alouette III AIR DEFENCE 1 sqn EQUIPMENT BY TYPE AIRCRAFT 45 combat capable FTR 9: 7 F-7 II†; 2 FT-7†

Sub-Saharan Africa

Zimbabwe ZWE

506 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2022 ISR 2 O-2A Skymaster TPT • Light 25: 5 BN-2 Islander; 7 C-212-200 Aviocar; 13 Cessna 337 Skymaster*; (10 C-47 Skytrain in store) TRG 33: 10 K-8 Karakorum*; 5 SF-260M; 8 SF-260TP*; 5 SF-260W Warrior*; 5 SF-260F HELICOPTERS ATK 6: 4 Mi-35 Hind; 2 Mi-35P Hind MRH 8: 7 Bell 412 Twin Huey; 1 SA316 Alouette III TPT • Medium 2 AS532UL Cougar (VIP) AIR-LAUNCHED MISSILES • AAM • IR PL-2; PL-5 (reported) AD • GUNS 100mm (not deployed); 37mm (not deployed); 57mm (not deployed)

Gendarmerie & Paramilitary 21,800 Zimbabwe Republic Police Force 19,500 incl air wg

Police Support Unit 2,300

PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS All operational patrol vessels under 10t FLD

DEPLOYMENT CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC: UN • MINUSCA 2 DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO: UN • MONUSCO 3 MOZAMBIQUE: SADC • SAMIM 1 SOUTH SUDAN: UN • UNMISS 13 SUDAN: UN • UNISFA 11

Chapter Nine

Military cyber capabilities

Strategic documents Strategic documents are assessed as they provide insights into national strategy developments that influence military roles in cyberspace. They include national security strategies; national cyber-security strategies; strategy documents at the national, ministry and service levels; joint command publications; military doctrines; and relevant white papers.

Cyber force structure These indicators are intended to provide insight into force structures and command and control. A country may have multiple military cyber forces and a number of organisations structured into unified joint-service commands – as stand-alone services or as unified independent branches (the latter including structures like Russia’s Main Directorate of the General Staff, GRU). Defence- or military-intelligence organisations with cyber capabilities are also included in this category. Force-structure indicators seek to help determine whether a country’s principal cyber force has the capabilities to conduct offensive cyber operations. As part of its broader work on cyber power, the IISS assesses that offensive cyber capability is determined by factors including the ability to research system vulnerabilities and develop exploits; to write

or use malware to deliver destructive, degradative and disruptive payloads; and to maintain command and control (if required) via exploited technologies, domain names of phishing pages, botnet servers and virtual private networks. These three conditions are individually necessary and jointly sufficient to constitute the possession of offensive capabilities. There is also assessment of whether the cyber force has ever used offensive capabilities in an operational context. Offensive cyber operations encompass the use of capabilities with payloads that deny, degrade, disrupt or destroy adversaries’ networks, computers and devices, or the information they contain. These effects can be either digital or physical. Such capabilities can be used independently or they can be integrated with more conventional capabilities. Espionage and theft are only considered as attacks when information or systems are destroyed. The methodology credits the cyber force with offensive cyber operations if these are either independently executed by the armed forces’ cyber force elements or executed by these cyber force elements in conjunction with third-party proxies. State-sponsored operations are excluded where a third party conducts an attack but government cyber forces do not play an active role in the operation.

Cyber exercises Cyber exercises are assessed to shed light on their purposes, the development of indigenous staging capability and the degree to which an armed force is outwardly engaging in exercises. The type of exercise forces conduct can provide lessons about the maturity of military cyber forces. For example, tabletop exercises rely entirely on written material and do not require modelling of threat environments; the goal is to find and document solutions to different scenarios. ‘Root cause’ pre-mortem exercises are tabletop exercises. Synthetic training exercises take place in a virtual training environment (isolated from real networks) using computer simulations that mimic live-fire situations. These include ‘capture the flag’ exercises, where participants or teams score points by finding ‘flags’ (e.g., lines of code) in a system or network. Field training exercises occur on self-contained networks, such as those

Military cyber capabilities

The IISS methodology for assessing military cyber capability is intended to provide a rigorous foundation for data collection and the construction of meaningful indicators for the subsequent comparative analysis of military cyber forces. It primarily applies to active-duty military forces with responsibility for cyberspace operations, although information has also been gathered on some reservist units. Military Balance assessments focus on military-owned cyber power. To fully assess national cyber power, civil-sector and whole-of-government cyber capacities need to be considered. Moreover, information availability (and a resulting requirement to focus on operationally relevant factors) leads to a focus on select indicators. These factors are given broader context with short text summaries of national military cyber power. Three examples are given below.

508 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2022

▼ Figure 31 Cyber force structures The graphic below assesses cyber-force structures for China, Russia and the United States. It details the principal cyber force(s) for each country, and their command authorities and subordinate component commands. The graphic also details the composition of the principal cyber forces according to the roles assigned to individual units, in order to aid comparison between states and provide a proxy indicator for capability development. The data does not capture the overall size of each

force in terms of, for instance, personnel complement. Instead, the graphic captures the percentage of units with particular assigned roles in relation to the entire principal cyber force. Grey boxes indicate headquarters elements; blue represents incident-response functions; green represents intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) roles; yellow represents strategic-communications functions; and red represents the units responsible for producing effects in cyberspace.

United States Principal cyber force(s) US Cyber Command Type Unified Joint-Service Command Immediate relevant components of principal force(s) • Army Cyber Command • Air Forces Cyber • Fleet Cyber Command • Marine Corps Forces Cyberspace Command • Coast Guard Cyber Command • National Guard

Distribution of roles across principal cyber force(s) by number of units

9.8% 54.5%

3.9% 2.8%

29.0%

Russia Principal cyber force(s) Information Operations Troops Type Independent Branch Immediate relevant components of principal force(s)* • Western Military District Cyber Center • Southern Military District Cyber Center • Central Military District Cyber Center • Eastern Military District Cyber Center

Principal cyber force(s) Main Directorate of the General Staff (GRU) Type Unified Independent Branch

Distribution of roles across principal cyber force(s) by number of units

80%

20%

50%

33.3%

16.7%

*It is as yet unclear whether there is a similar function within the Northern Fleet Military District

China Principal cyber force(s) Strategic Support Force Type Stand-alone Service Immediate relevant components of principal force(s) • Network Systems Department

Distribution of roles across principal cyber force(s) by number of units

Strategic communications Effects

54.5%

18.2%

9.1%

Military cyber capabilities 509

China China is a highly capable cyber power that has shown significant improvements in its military cyber capabilities in the last decade. China first indicated that it considered cyberspace to be a war-fighting domain in its 2015 Military Strategy. A 2019 defence white paper reiterated China’s active-defence strategy in cyberspace, which was first set out in the 2015 strategy. Though China has not published a cyber-warfare doctrine, authoritative People’s Liberation Army (PLA) writings indicate that China possesses offensive cyber capabilities. Under the overall command authority of President Xi Jinping, the PLA’s Strategic Support Force Network Systems Department has primary responsibility for the PLA’s information operations. The Network Systems Department is a sub-unified component command under the Strategic Support Force, an independent PLA service. China’s stated goal is to become a world leader in technologies including artificial intelligence and quantum information by 2035. Outside formal command structures, the PLA also utilises ‘cyber militias’ mainly for defensive missions and to improve civil–military cooperation. China’s core cyber defences remain relatively weak, evidenced by its continued reliance on US-based corporations for core internet technology and its shortage of cyber-security professionals. It leverages the Military–Civil Fusion strategy not only for talent recruitment and training but also for cyberrelated research projects. The National Cybersecurity Center is the most recent effort aimed at cultivating talent of all types – from full-time students to mid-

career cyber-security professionals. This body also supports private-sector and government research in indigenous cyber-security technologies. While China’s cyber-security industry is at an early stage of development, recent government plans to cultivate ‘high-quality’ industrial development are expected to boost military cyber defences. The PLA has begun to integrate offensive cyber operations into its military exercises. For instance, in 2020, the Tibet military command reportedly held a field training exercise in September 2020 in which live-fire offensive cyber operations were integrated as part of joint air–ground combat drills. These developments occur within the context of broader PLA modernisation efforts set out in 2017.

Russia Russia is a highly capable cyber power. Cyber capabilities are part of a broader framework of information operations, and strategic documents generally refer to cyber security under the rubric of ‘information security’. In July 2021, Russia released the latest update to its National Security Strategy, which devoted a section to information security and indicated attention on the further development of military cyber forces and capabilities. In 2017, Defence Minister Sergei Shoigu announced the establishment of information-operations forces within the Russian armed forces, noting that these troops are more effective than those used in the past in countering propaganda. The GRU takes the leading role in military cyber operations. It is a unified independent branch under the command of the General Staff and the defence minster. Offensive cyber operations have been attributed to Unit 26165 (85th Main Special Services Centre) with the monikers ‘Fancy Bear’, ‘Strontium’ and ‘APT 28’, and Unit 74455 (the Main Centre for Special Technologies) dubbed ‘Sandworm hackers’. Other paramilitary and civilian intelligence agencies such as the Federal Security Service (FSB) and the Foreign Intelligence Service (SVR) also play a prominent role in carrying out cyber operations. In 2020, the armed forces announced the goal of forming an operational cyber-security centre in each military district. Their operational status is not known. Russia introduced information-security units into its Strategic Rocket Forces for the first time only in 2014. The training of military information-security specialists is mainly undertaken by Krasnodar Higher Military School.

Military cyber capabilities

used in emulation ranges, or in network environments that map realistic networks and servers onto a physical network infrastructure to mirror production networks, such as the actual operating network used by the respective military service. Live-fire exercises entail real-time incident response by a defensive team against either an automated or human opponent. Live-fire in this context implies factors including the injection of malicious code into networks by ‘adversary’ role players. In contrast to field training exercises, live-fire exercises can have a component taking place on production networks by using overlay ranges – a network environment created to run in conjunction with production networks. Importantly, such environments are not limited to the simulation of a single security scenario and offer dynamic training experiences.

510 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2022

Despite import-substitution policies, Russia’s domestic cyber-defence and ICT sectors remain largely dependent on foreign suppliers and vendors. The country lags in adapting to emerging technologies and struggles with the domestic recruitment of cyber-security specialists. To these ends, in 2018 the defence ministry launched ‘ERA Technopolis’, a research centre and technology park intended, among other things, to create and develop military and dualuse technologies. In 2021, the US Treasury sanctioned ERA Technopolis, alleging that it supported and housed GRU units that carry out offensive cyber operations. In September 2021, there were reports that Russia’s major Zapad strategic-level exercise contained a cyber component. Earlier, in July 2021, the country held a multi-day exercise to operationally test Russia’s internet domain, which has been labelled RuNET.

United States The US is the world’s most capable cyber power. US Cyber Command (USCYBERCOM), raised to the level of a unified combatant command in 2018, coordinates military cyber operations and defends Department of Defense (DoD) networks. The commander of USCYBERCOM is simultaneously the director of the National Security Agency (NSA) and the Central Security Service. Both are part of the Department of Defense. USCYBERCOM’s command vision, released in 2018, emphasises the need to achieve and maintain

superiority over adversaries in the cyber domain. It also describes a policy of ‘persistent engagement’ and a construct of ‘defend forward’ to deter unacceptable operations by foreign countries. USCYBERCOM leads cyber forces across all branches of the armed forces apart from the Space Force. The bulk of these cyber forces are housed in the US Army, Navy, Air Force and Marine Corps. USCYBERCOM has also announced plans to expand its Cyber Mission Force (CMF) by 2024 with 14 new teams. This will expand USCYBERCOM’s CMF teams from 133 to 147. USCYBERCOM’s 2022 budget request reportedly includes funds for standing up four of the 14 new CMF teams. It has recently launched a Joint Cyber Warfare Architecture to promote interoperability amongst its combat service components. The US has several government-level highereducation initiatives aimed at increasing the number of cyber-security specialists. The Department of Homeland Security and the NSA have sponsored the National Centers of Academic Excellence in Cybersecurity. The DoD also launched its Defense Industrial Base Cybersecurity Program in 2020, which is intended to include collaboration with the private sector. USCYBERCOM conducts a range of cyber exercises annually including tabletop and live-fire exercises, also participating in international drills. The command’s premier annual synthetic training exercise, Cyber Flag, was last held in June 2021.

Explanatory Notes 511

Explanatory notes

General arrangement and contents The introduction is an assessment of global defence developments and key themes in the 2022 edition. There are three analytical essays, followed by a graphical section analysing comparative defence statistics by domain, as well as key trends in defence economics. Regional chapters begin with analysis of the military and security issues that drive nationaldefence policy developments, and key trends in regional defence economics. These are followed by focused analysis, for certain countries, of defence policy and capability issues, and defence economics, and then a section assessing important regional arms procurements and deliveries. Next, detailed data on regional states’ military forces and equipment, and defence economics, is presented in alphabetical order. The book closes with a reference section containing comparisons of defence economics and personnel statistics.

The Military Balance wall chart The Military Balance 2022 wall chart is an assessment of Arctic security dynamics. Using text, data and graphics, the chart assesses key security issues concerning states with territory within the Arctic Circle, or with significant interests there, within a broader context of declining sea ice levels and an increasingly competitive strategic environment. Selected military bases within the Arctic Circle are detailed, along with principal units and capabilities, information on territorial claims, Arctic-related strategy and policy documents, military exercises, and icebreakers and ice-capable patrol ships.

Using The Military Balance The country entries assess personnel strengths, organisation and equipment holdings of the world’s armed forces.

Abbreviations and definitions Qualifier ‘At least’

Total is no less than the number given

‘Up to’

Total is at most the number given, but could be lower

‘About’

Total could be higher than given

‘Some’

Precise inventory is unavailable at time of press

‘In store’

Equipment held away from front-line units; readiness and maintenance varies

Billion (bn) 1,000 million (m) Trillion (tr) 1,000 billion $

US dollars unless otherwise stated

Estimated

Aircraft counted by the IISS as combat capable

Part of a unit is detached/less than

Unit reinforced/more than

†

IISS assesses that the serviceability of equipment is in doubta

‡

Equipment judged obsolete (weapons whose basic design is more than four decades old and which have not been significantly upgraded within the past decade)a

[a]

Not to be taken to imply that such equipment cannot be used

Force-strength and equipment-inventory data is based on the most accurate data available, or on the best estimate that can be made. In estimating a country’s total capabilities, old equipment may be counted where it is considered that it may still be deployable. The data presented reflects judgements based on information available to the IISS at the time the book is compiled. Where information differs from previous editions, this is mainly because of changes in national forces, but it is sometimes because the IISS has reassessed the evidence supporting past entries.

Country entries Information on each country is shown in a standard format, although the differing availability of information and differences in nomenclature result in some variations. Country entries include economic, demographic and military data. Population figures are based on demographic statistics taken from the US Census Bureau. Military data includes personnel numbers, conscript liability where relevant, outline organisation, number of formations and units, and an inventory of the major equipment of each

Reference

The Military Balance provides an assessment of the armed forces and defence economics of 171 countries and territories. Each edition contributes to the provision of a unique compilation of data and information, enabling the reader to discern trends by studying editions as far back as 1959. The data in the current edition is accurate according to IISS assessments as of November 2021, unless specified. Inclusion of a territory, country or state in The Military Balance, or terminology or boundaries used in graphics or mapping, does not imply legal recognition or indicate support for any government or administration.

512 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2022 service. Details of national forces stationed abroad and of foreign forces stationed within the given country are also provided.

Arms procurements and deliveries A series of thematic tables, graphics and text follow the regional text. These are designed to illustrate key trends, principal programmes and significant events in regional defence procurements. More detailed information on defence procurements, organised by country, equipment type and manufacturing company, can be found on the IISS Military Balance+ database (https://www.iiss.org/militarybalanceplus). The information in this section meets the threshold for a Military Balance country entry and as such does not feature information on sales of small arms and light weapons.

Defence economics Country entries include annual defence budgets (and expenditure where applicable), selected economic-performance indicators and demographic aggregates. All country entries are subject to revision each year as new information, particularly regarding actual defence expenditure, becomes available. On pp. 521–6, there are also international comparisons of defence expenditure and military personnel, giving expenditure figures for the past three years in per capita terms and as a % of gross domestic product (GDP). The aim is to provide a measure of military expenditure and the allocation of economic resources to defence. Individual country entries show economic performance over the past two years and current demographic data. Where this data is unavailable, information from the last available year is provided. All financial data in the country entries is shown in both national currency and US dollars at current – not constant – prices. US-dollar conversions are calculated from the exchange rates listed in the entry. The use of market exchange rates has limitations, particularly because it does not consider the varying levels of development or the differing cost of inputs (principally personnel, equipment and investment, factors that help determine a country’s military capability) specific to each country’s national context. An alternative approach is to make conversions using purchasing power parity (PPP) exchange rates, which at least partially takes these cost differentials into account. However, the suitability of PPP conversions depends on the extent to which a country is self-sufficient in developing and producing the armaments required by its armed forces. For Russia and China they are appropriate, as imported systems play almost no role in Russia’s case and only a small and decreasing one in that of China. However, PPP conversions are less suitable when assessing the spending of countries such as India and Saudi Arabia,

which rely heavily on imports of military equipment from relatively high-cost producers. For those countries it would be necessary to adopt a hybrid approach to determine defence expenditure in dollars, with the market exchange rate used for converting defence procurement and the PPP conversion rate applied to all other defence expenditure (personnel, operations, etc.). As such, to produce standardised international comparisons, PPP conversions would have to be applied to all countries. In the absence of defence-based PPP rates, analysts would have to use the GDP-based PPP rates that are available for all countries. However, these are also statistical estimates and, as such, difficult to apply to military expenditure because they reflect the purchasing power of the wider economy, primarily civilian goods and services.

Definitions of terms Despite efforts by NATO and the UN to develop a standardised definition of military expenditure, many countries prefer to use their own definitions (which are often not made public). In order to present a comprehensive picture, The Military Balance lists three different measures of militaryrelated spending data. • •

•

For most countries, an official defence-budget figure is provided. For those countries where other militaryrelated outlays, over and above the defence budget, are known or can be reasonably estimated, an additional measurement referred to as defence expenditure is also provided. Defenceexpenditure figures will naturally be higher than official budget figures, depending on the range of additional factors included. For NATO countries, a defence-budget figure, as well as defence expenditure reported by NATO in local-currency terms and converted using IMF exchange rates, is quoted.

NATO’s military-expenditure definition (the most comprehensive) is cash outlays of central or federal governments to meet the costs of national armed forces. The term ‘armed forces’ includes strategic, land, naval, air, command, administration and support forces. It also includes other forces if they are trained, structured and equipped to support defence forces and are realistically deployable. Defence expenditures are reported in four categories: Operating Costs, Procurement and Construction, Research and Development (R&D) and Other Expenditure. Operating Costs include salaries and pensions for military and civilian personnel; the cost of maintaining and training units, service organisations, headquarters and support elements; and the cost of servicing and repairing

Explanatory Notes 513

Units and formation strength Company

100–200

Battalion

500–1,000

Brigade Division Corps or Army

3,000–5,000 15,000–20,000 50,000–100,000

General defence data Personnel The ‘Active’ total comprises all servicemen and women on full-time duty (including conscripts and long-term assignments from the Reserves). When a gendarmerie or equivalent is under control of the defence ministry, they may be included in the active total. Only the length of conscript liability is shown; where service is voluntary there is no entry. ‘Reserve’ describes formations and units not fully manned or operational in peacetime, but which can be mobilised by recalling reservists in an emergency. Some countries have more than one category of reserves, often kept at varying degrees of readiness. Where possible, these differences are denoted using the national descriptive title, but always under the heading of ‘Reserves’ to distinguish them from full-time active forces. All personnel figures are rounded to the nearest 50, except for organisations with under 500 personnel, where figures are rounded to the nearest ten.

Other forces Many countries maintain forces whose training, organisation, equipment and control suggest that they may be used to support or replace regular military forces or be used more broadly by states to deliver militarily relevant effect. They include some forces that may have a constabulary role or are classed as gendarmerie forces, with more formal lawenforcement responsibilities. These are called ‘Gendarmerie & Paramilitary’ and are detailed after the military forces of each country. Their personnel numbers are not normally included in the totals at the start of each entry.

Forces by role and equipment by type Quantities are shown by function (according to each nation’s employment) and type, and represent what are believed to be total holdings, including active and reserve operational and training units. Inventory totals for missile systems relate to launchers and not to missiles. Equipment held ‘in store’ is not counted in the main inventory totals.

Deployments The Military Balance mainly lists permanent bases and operational deployments abroad, including peacekeeping opera-

Reference

military equipment and infrastructure. Procurement and Construction expenditure covers national equipment and infrastructure spending, as well as common infrastructure programmes. R&D is defence expenditure up to the point at which new equipment can be put in service, regardless of whether new equipment is actually procured. Foreign Military Assistance (FMA) contributions are also noted – primarily the IISS tracks Foreign Military Financing (FMF) allocations from the US. For many non-NATO countries the issue of transparency in reporting military budgets is fundamental. Not every UN member state reports defence-budget data (even fewer report real defence expenditures) to their electorates, the UN, the IMF or other multinational organisations. In the case of governments with a proven record of transparency, official figures generally conform to the standardised definition of defence budgeting, as adopted by the UN, and consistency problems are not usually a major issue. The IISS cites official defence budgets as reported by either national governments, the UN, the OSCE or the IMF. For those countries where the official defence-budget figure is considered to be an incomplete measure of total military-related spending, and appropriate additional data is available, the IISS will use data from a variety of sources to arrive at a more accurate estimate of true defence expenditure. The most frequent instances of budgetary manipulation or falsification typically involve equipment procurement, R&D, defence-industrial investment, covert weapons programmes, pensions for retired military and civilian personnel, paramilitary forces and non-budgetary sources of revenue for the military arising from ownership of industrial, property and land assets. There will be several countries listed in The Military Balance for which only an official defence-budget figure is provided but where, in reality, true defence-related expenditure is almost certainly higher. Percentage changes in defence spending are referred to in either nominal or real terms. Nominal terms relate to the percentage change in numerical spending figures, and do not account for the impact of price changes (i.e., inflation) on defence spending. By contrast, real terms account for inflationary effects, and may therefore be considered a more accurate representation of change over time. The principal sources for national economic statistics cited in the country entries are the IMF, the OECD, the World Bank and three regional banks (the Inter-American, Asian and African Development banks). For some countries, basic economic data is difficult to obtain. GDP figures are nominal (current) values at market prices. GDP growth is real, not nominal growth, and inflation is the year-onyear change in consumer prices. When real-terms defencespending figures are mentioned, these are measured in constant 2015 US dollars.

514 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2022 tions. Domestic deployments are not included, with the exception of overseas territories. Information in the countrydata sections details troop deployments and, where available, the role and equipment of deployed units. Personnel figures are not generally included for embassy staff or standing multinational headquarters.

Land forces To make international comparison easier and more consistent, The Military Balance categorises forces by role and translates national military terminology for unit and formation sizes. Typical personnel strength, equipment holdings and organisation of formations such as brigades and divisions vary from country to country. In addition, some unit terms, such as ‘regiment’, ‘squadron’, ‘battery’ and ‘troop’, can refer to significantly different unit sizes in different countries. Unless otherwise stated, these terms should be assumed to reflect standard British usage where they occur.

Naval forces Classifying naval vessels according to role is complex. A post-war consensus on primary surface combatants revolved around a distinction between independently operating cruisers, air-defence escorts (destroyers) and antisubmarine-warfare escorts (frigates). However, ships are increasingly performing a range of roles. Also, modern ship design has meant that the full-load displacement (FLD) of different warship types has evolved and in some cases overlaps. For these reasons, The Military Balance now classifies vessels by an assessed combination of role, equipment fit and displacement.

Air forces Aircraft listed as combat capable are assessed as being equipped to deliver air-to-air or air-to-surface ordnance. The definition includes aircraft designated by type as bomber, fighter, fighter/ground attack, ground attack and antisubmarine warfare. Other aircraft considered to be combat capable are marked with an asterisk (*). Operational groupings of air forces are shown where known. Typical squadron aircraft strengths can vary both between aircraft types and from country to country. When assessing missile ranges, The Military Balance uses the following range indicators:

• Short-range ballistic missile (SRBM): less than 1,000 km; • Medium-range ballistic missile (MRBM): 1,000–3,000 km; • Intermediate-range ballistic missile (IRBM): 3,000–5,000 km; • Intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM): over 5,000 km.

Cyber The Military Balance+ database is integrating information on military-owned cyber capacities. The research taxonomy focuses on enablers, including indicators of capability from the armed forces. The methodology includes military or militarily relevant cyber strategy and doctrine; organisations and principal cyber units and military cyber exercises; with these categories framed by a brief prose assessment. However, military-owned cyber capabilities only constitute one part of national cyber capabilities and, because of this, care must be taken when looking at this information for judgements of national ‘cyber power’.

Attribution and acknowledgements The International Institute for Strategic Studies owes no allegiance to any government, group of governments, or any political or other organisation. Its assessments are its own, based on the material available to it from a wide variety of sources. The cooperation of governments of all listed countries has been sought and, in many cases, received. However, some data in The Military Balance is estimated. Care is taken to ensure that this data is as accurate and free from bias as possible. The Institute owes a considerable debt to a number of its own members, consultants and all those who help compile and check material. The Director-General and Chief Executive and staff of the Institute assume full responsibility for the data and judgements in this book. Comments and suggestions on the data and textual material contained within the book, as well as on the style and presentation of data, are welcomed and should be communicated to the Editor of The Military Balance at: IISS, Arundel House, 6 Temple Place, London, WC2R 2PG, UK, email: milbal@ iiss.org. Copyright on all information in The Military Balance belongs strictly to the IISS. Application to reproduce limited amounts of data may be made to the publisher: Taylor & Francis, 4 Park Square, Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon, OX14 4RN. Email: [emailprotected]. Unauthorised use of data from The Military Balance will be subject to legal action.

Explanatory Notes 515

Principal land definitions FORCES BY ROLE Command:

free-standing, deployable formation headquarters (HQs).

Special Forces (SF):

elite units specially trained and equipped for unconventional warfare and operations in enemy-controlled territory. Many are employed in counter-terrorist roles.

Manoeuvre:

combat units and formations capable of manoeuvring. These are subdivided as follows:

Reconnaissance:

combat units and formations whose primary purpose is to gain information.

Armoured:

units and formations principally equipped with main battle tanks (MBTs) and infantry fighting vehicles (IFVs) to provide heavy mounted close-combat capability. Units and formations intended to provide mounted close-combat capability with lighter armoured vehicles, such as light tanks or wheeled assault guns, are classified as light armoured.

Mechanised:

units and formations primarily equipped with lighter armoured vehicles such as armoured personnel carriers (APCs). They have less mounted firepower and protection than their armoured equivalents, but can usually deploy more infantry.

Light:

units and formations whose principal combat capability is dismounted infantry, with few, if any, organic armoured vehicles. Some may be motorised and equipped with softskinned vehicles.

Air Manoeuvre:

units and formations trained and equipped for delivery by transport aircraft and/or helicopters.

Amphibious:

amphibious forces are trained and equipped to project force from the sea.

Other Forces:

includes security units such as Presidential Guards, paramilitary units such as border guards and combat formations permanently employed in training or demonstration tasks.

Combat Support:

combat support units and formations not integral to manoeuvre formations. Includes artillery, engineers, military intelligence, nuclear, biological and chemical defence, signals and information operations.

Combat Service Support (CSS):

includes logistics, maintenance, medical, supply and transport units and formations.

Light Weapons:

small arms, machine guns, grenades and grenade launchers and unguided man-portable anti-armour and support weapons have proliferated so much and are sufficiently easy to manufacture or copy that listing them would be impractical.

Crew-Served Weapons:

crew-served recoilless rifles, man-portable ATGW, MANPADs and mortars of greater than 80mm calibre are listed, but the high degree of proliferation and local manufacture of many of these weapons means that estimates of numbers held may not be reliable.

Armoured Fighting Vehicles (AFVs):

armoured combat vehicles with a combat weight of at least six metric tonnes, further subdivided as below:

Main Battle Tank (MBT):

armoured, tracked combat vehicles, armed with a turret-mounted gun of at least 100mm calibre and with a combat weight of between 35 and 75 metric tonnes.

Light Tank (LT TK):

armoured, tracked combat vehicles, armed with a turret-mounted gun of at least 75mm calibre and with a combat weight of between 15 and 40 metric tonnes.

Wheeled Assault Gun (ASLT):

armoured, wheeled combat vehicles, armed with a turret-mounted gun of at least 75mm calibre and with a combat weight of at least 15 metric tonnes.

Armoured Reconnaissance (RECCE):

armoured vehicles primarily designed for reconnaissance tasks with no significant transport capability and either a main gun of less than 75mm calibre or a combat weight of less than 15 metric tonnes, or both.

Infantry Fighting Vehicle (IFV):

armoured combat vehicles designed and equipped to transport an infantry squad and armed with a cannon of at least 20mm calibre.

Reference

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE

516 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2022

Armoured Personnel Carrier (APC):

lightly armoured combat vehicles designed and equipped to transport an infantry squad but either unarmed or armed with a cannon of less than 20mm calibre.

Airborne Combat Vehicle (ABCV):

armoured vehicles designed to be deployable by parachute alongside airborne forces.

Amphibious Assault armoured vehicles designed to have an amphibious ship-to-shore capability. Vehicle (AAV): Armoured Utility Vehicle (AUV):

armoured vehicles not designed to transport an infantry squad, but capable of undertaking a variety of other utility battlefield tasks, including light reconnaissance and light transport.

Specialist Variants:

variants of armoured vehicles listed above that are designed to fill a specialised role, such as command posts (CP), artillery observation posts (OP), signals (sigs) and ambulances (amb), are categorised with their parent vehicles.

Engineering and includes armoured engineer vehicles (AEV), armoured repair and recovery vehicles (ARV), Maintenance Vehicles: assault bridging (VLB) and mine-warfare vehicles (MW). Nuclear, Biological armoured vehicles principally designed to operate in potentially contaminated terrain. and Chemical Defence Vehicles (NBC): Anti-Tank/AntiInfrastructure (AT):

guns, guided weapons and recoilless rifles designed to engage armoured vehicles and battlefield hardened targets.

Surface-to-Surface Missile Launchers (SSM):

launch vehicles for transporting and firing surface-to-surface ballistic and cruise missiles.

Artillery:

weapons (including guns, howitzers, gun/howitzers, multiple-rocket launchers, mortars and gun/mortars) with a calibre greater than 100mm for artillery pieces and 80mm and above for mortars, capable of engaging ground targets with indirect fire.

Coastal Defence:

land-based coastal artillery pieces and anti-ship-missile launchers.

Air Defence (AD):

guns, directed-energy (DE) weapons and surface-to-air missile (SAM) launchers designed to engage fixed-wing, rotary-wing and uninhabited aircraft. Missiles are further classified by maximum notional engagement range: point-defence (up to 10 km); short-range (10–30 km); medium-range (30–75 km); and long-range (75 km+). Systems primarily intended to intercept missiles rather than aircraft are categorised separately as Missile Defence.

Principal naval definitions To aid comparison between fleets, the following definitions, which do not always conform to national definitions, are used as guidance: Submarines:

all vessels designed to operate primarily under water. Submarines with a dived displacement below 250 tonnes are classified as midget submarines (SSW); those below 500 tonnes are coastal submarines (SSC).

Principal Surface Combatants:

all surface ships designed for combat operations on the high seas, with an FLD above 2,200 tonnes. Aircraft carriers (CV), including smaller support carriers (CVS) embarking STOVL aircraft and helicopter carriers (CVH), are vessels with a flat deck primarily designed to carry fixed- and/or rotary-wing aircraft, without specialised amphibious capability. Other principal surface combatants include cruisers (C) (FLD above 9,750 tonnes), destroyers (DD) (FLD 4,500–9,749 tonnes with a primary area air-defence weapons fit and role) and frigates (FF) (FLD 2,200–9,000 tonnes and a primary antisubmarine/general-purpose weapons fit and role).

Explanatory Notes 517

Patrol and Coastal Combatants:

surface vessels designed for coastal or inshore operations. These include corvettes (FS), which usually have an FLD between 500 and 2,199 tonnes and are distinguished from other patrol vessels by their heavier armaments. Also included in this category are offshore-patrol ships (PSO), with an FLD greater than 1,500 tonnes; patrol craft (PC), which have an FLD between 250 and 1,499 tonnes; and patrol boats (PB) with an FLD between ten and 250 tonnes. Vessels with a top speed greater than 35 knots are designated as ‘fast’ .

Mine warfare vessels:

all surface vessels configured primarily for mine laying (ML) or countermeasures. Countermeasures vessels are either: sweepers (MS), which are designed to locate and destroy mines in an area; hunters (MH), which are designed to locate and destroy individual mines; or countermeasures vessels (MC), which combine both roles.

Amphibious vessels:

vessels designed to transport combat personnel and/or equipment onto shore. These include aviation-capable amphibious assault ships (LHA), which can embark rotary-wing or STOVL air assets and may have a well deck for LCACs and landing craft; aviationcapable amphibious assault ships with a well dock for LCACs and landing craft (LHD), which can embark rotary-wing or STOVL assets; landing platform helicopters (LPH), which have a primary role of launch and recovery platform for rotary-wing or STOVL assets; landing platform docks (LPD), which do not have a through deck but do have a well dock and carry both combat personnel and equipment; and land ships docks (LSD) with a well dock but focused more on equipment transport. Landing ships (LS) are amphibious vessels capable of ocean passage and landing craft (LC) are smaller vessels designed to transport personnel and equipment from a larger vessel to land or across small stretches of water. Landing ships have a hold; landing craft are open vessels. Landing craft air cushioned (LCAC) are differentiated from utility craft air cushioned (UCAC) in that the former have a bow ramp for the disembarkation of vehicles and personnel.

Auxiliary vessels:

ocean-going surface vessels performing an auxiliary military role, supporting combat ships or operations. These generally fulfil five roles: replenishment (such as oilers (AO) and solid stores (AKS)); logistics (such as cargo ships (AK) and logistics ships (AFS)); maintenance (such as cable-repair ships (ARC) or buoy tenders (ABU)); research (such as survey ships (AFS)); and special purpose (such as intelligence-collection ships (AGI) and ocean-going tugs (ATF)).

Weapons systems:

weapons are listed in the following order: land-attack cruise missiles (LACM), anti-ship missiles (AShM), surface-to-air missiles (SAM), heavy (HWT) and lightweight (LWT) torpedoes, anti-submarine weapons (A/S), CIWS, guns and aircraft. Missiles with a range less than 5 km and guns with a calibre less than 57mm are generally not included.

Organisations:

naval groupings such as fleets and squadrons frequently change and are shown only where doing so would aid qualitative judgements.

Legacy platforms:

legacy-generation platforms, unless specifically modified for a new role, may be listed with their original designations although they may not conform fully with current guidance criteria.

Bomber (Bbr):

comparatively large platforms intended for the delivery of air-to-surface ordnance. Bbr units are units equipped with bomber aircraft for the air-to-surface role.

Fighter (Ftr):

aircraft designed primarily for air-to-air combat, which may also have a limited air-tosurface capability. Ftr units are equipped with aircraft intended to provide air superiority, which may have a secondary and limited air-to-surface capability.

Fighter/Ground Attack (FGA):

multi-role fighter-size platforms with significant air-to-surface capability, potentially including maritime attack, and at least some air-to-air capacity. FGA units are multi-role units equipped with aircraft capable of air-to-air and air-to-surface attack.

Ground Attack (Atk):

aircraft designed solely for the air-to-surface task, with limited or no air-to-air capability. Atk units are equipped with fixed-wing aircraft.

Reference

Principal aviation definitions

518 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2022

Attack Helicopter (Atk rotary-wing platforms designed for delivery of air-to-surface weapons, and fitted with an hel): integrated fire-control system. Anti-Submarine Warfare (ASW):

fixed- and rotary-wing platforms designed to locate and engage submarines, many with a secondary anti-surface-warfare capability. ASW units are equipped with fixed- or rotary-wing aircraft.

Anti-Surface Warfare (ASuW):

ASuW units are equipped with fixed- or rotary-wing aircraft intended for anti-surfacewarfare missions.

Maritime Patrol (MP):

fixed-wing aircraft and uninhabited aerial vehicles (UAVs) intended for maritime surface surveillance, which may possess an anti-surface-warfare capability. MP units are equipped with fixed-wing aircraft or UAVs.

Electronic Warfare (EW):

fixed- and rotary-wing aircraft and UAVs intended for electronic warfare. EW units are equipped with fixed- or rotary-wing aircraft or UAVs.

Intelligence/ Surveillance/ Reconnaissance (ISR):

fixed- and rotary-wing aircraft and UAVs intended to provide radar, visible-light or infrared imagery, or a mix thereof. ISR units are equipped with fixed- or rotary-wing aircraft or UAVs.

Combat/Intelligence/ aircraft and UAVs that have the capability to deliver air-to-surface weapons, as well as Surveillance/ undertake ISR tasks. CISR units are equipped with armed aircraft and/or UAVs for ISR and Reconnaissance (CISR): air-to-surface missions. COMINT/ELINT/ SIGINT:

fixed- and rotary-wing platforms and UAVs capable of gathering electronic (ELINT), communications (COMINT) or signals intelligence (SIGINT). COMINT units are equipped with fixed- or rotary-wing aircraft or UAVs intended for the communications-intelligence task. ELINT units are equipped with fixed- or rotary-wing aircraft or UAVs used for gathering electronic intelligence. SIGINT units are equipped with fixed- or rotary-wing aircraft or UAVs used to collect signals intelligence.

Airborne Early Warning (& Control) (AEW (&C)):

fixed- and rotary-wing platforms capable of providing airborne early warning, with a varying degree of onboard command and control depending on the platform. AEW(&C) units are equipped with fixed- or rotary-wing aircraft.

Search and Rescue (SAR):

units are equipped with fixed- or rotary-wing aircraft used to recover military personnel or civilians.

Combat Search and Rescue (CSAR):

units are equipped with armed fixed- or rotary-wing aircraft for recovery of personnel from hostile territory.

Tanker (Tkr):

fixed- and rotary-wing aircraft designed for air-to-air refuelling. Tkr units are equipped with fixed- or rotary-wing aircraft used for air-to-air refuelling.

Tanker Transport (Tkr/Tpt):

platforms capable of both air-to-air refuelling and military airlift.

Transport (Tpt):

fixed- and rotary-wing aircraft intended for military airlift. Light transport aircraft are categorised as having a maximum payload of up to 11,340 kg; medium up to 27,215 kg; and heavy above 27,215 kg. Light transport helicopters have an internal payload of up to 2,000 kg; medium transport helicopters up to 4,535 kg; heavy transport helicopters greater than 4,535 kg. PAX aircraft are platforms generally unsuited for transporting cargo on the main deck. Tpt units are equipped with fixed- or rotary-wing platforms to transport personnel or cargo.

Trainer (Trg):

fixed- and rotary-wing aircraft designed primarily for the training role; some also have the capacity to carry light to medium ordnance. Trg units are equipped with fixed- or rotary-wing training aircraft intended for pilot or other aircrew training.

Multi-Role Helicopter (MRH):

rotary-wing platforms designed to carry out a variety of military tasks including light transport, armed reconnaissance and battlefield support.

Uninhabited Aerial Vehicles (UAVs):

remotely piloted or controlled uninhabited fixed- or rotary-wing systems. Light UAVs are those weighing 20–150 kg; medium: 150–600 kg; and large: more than 600 kg.

Loitering Munition:

an air vehicle with an integral warhead designed to be able to fly in a search or holding pattern and to be used to identify and attack a target.

Reference AAA AAM AAR AAV AB ABM ABU/H

anti-aircraft artillery air-to-air missile search-and-rescue vessel amphibious assault vehicle airborne anti-ballistic missile sea-going buoy tender/with hangar ABCV airborne combat vehicle ac aircraft ACV armoured combat vehicle ACS crane ship AD air defence ADA air-defence artillery adj adjusted AE auxiliary, ammunition carrier AEM missile support ship AEV armoured engineer vehicle AEW(&C) airborne early warning (and control) AFD/L auxiliary floating dry dock/small AFS/H logistics ship/with hangar AFSB afloat forward staging base AFV armoured fighting vehicle AG misc auxiliary AGB/H icebreaker/with hangar AGE/H experimental auxiliary ship/with hangar AGF/H command ship/with hangar AGHS hydrographic survey vessel AGI intelligence collection vessel AGM space tracking vessel AGOR oceanographic research vessel AGOS oceanographic surveillance vessel AGS/H survey ship/with hangar AH hospital ship AIP air-independent propulsion AK/L cargo ship/light aka also known as AKEH dry cargo/ammunition ship AKR/H roll-on/roll-off cargo ship/with hangar AKS/L stores ship/light ALBM air-launched ballistic missile ALCM air-launched cruise missile amb ambulance amph amphibious/amphibian AO/S oiler/small AOE fast combat support ship AOR/L/H fleet replenishment oiler with RAS capability/light/with hangar AOT/L oiler transport/light AP armour-piercing/anti-personnel/ transport ship APB barracks ship APC armoured personnel carrier AR/C/D/L repair ship/cable/dry dock/light ARG amphibious ready group ARH active radar homing ARL airborne reconnaissance low ARM anti-radiation missile

armd ARS/H

armoured rescue and salvage ship/with hangar arty artillery ARV armoured recovery vehicle AS anti-submarine/submarine tender ASBM anti-ship ballistic missile ASCM anti-ship cruise missile AShM anti-ship missile aslt assault ASM air-to-surface missile ASR submarine rescue craft ASTT anti-submarine torpedo tube ASW anti-submarine warfare ASuW anti-surface warfare AT anti-tank ATBM anti-tactical ballistic missile ATF ocean going tug ATGW anti-tank guided weapon Atk attack/ground attack ATS tug, salvage and rescue ship AUV armoured utility vehicle avn aviation AWT water tanker AX/L/S training craft/light/sail BA Budget Authority (US) Bbr bomber BCT brigade combat team bde brigade bdgt budget BG battlegroup BMD ballistic-missile defence bn battalion/billion bty battery C2 command and control C4 command, control, communications, and computers casevac casualty evacuation cav cavalry cbt combat CBRN chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, explosive cdo commando C/G/H/M/N cruiser/with surface-to-surface missile/with hangar/with SAM/ nuclear-powered CISR combat ISR CIMIC civil–military cooperation CIWS close-in weapons system COIN counter-insurgency comd command COMINT communications intelligence comms communications coy company CP command post CPX command post exercise CS combat support CSAR combat search and rescue CSS combat service support CT counter-terrorism

CV/H/L/N/S aircraft carrier/helicopter/light/ nuclear powered/STOVL CW chemical warfare/weapons DD/G/H/M destroyer/with surface-to-surface missile/with hangar/with SAM DDR disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration DE directed energy def defence det detachment div division ECM electronic countermeasures ELINT electronic intelligence elm element/s engr engineer EOD explosive ordnance disposal EPF expeditionary fast transport vessel eqpt equipment ESB expeditionary sea base ESD expeditionary transport dock EW electronic warfare excl excludes/excluding exp expenditure/expeditionary FAC forward air control fd field FF/G/H/M frigate/with surface-to-surface missile/with hangar/with SAM FGA fighter/ground attack FLD full-load displacement flt flight FMA Foreign Military Assistance FRS fleet replacement squadron FS/G/H/M corvette/with surface-to-surface missile/with hangar/with SAM Ftr fighter FTX field training exercise FY fiscal year gd guard GDP gross domestic product GLCM ground-launched cruise missile GMLS Guided Missile Launching System gp group GPS Global Positioning System HA/DR humanitarian assistance/disaster relief hel helicopter how howitzer HQ headquarters HUMINT human intelligence HWT heavyweight torpedo hy heavy IBU inshore boat unit ICBM intercontinental ballistic missile IFV infantry fighting vehicle IIR imaging infrared IMINT imagery intelligence imp improved indep independent inf infantry

Reference

Table 12 List of abbreviations for data sections

520 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2022 infoops INS int IOC IR IRBM

information operations inertial navigation system intelligence Initial operating capability infrared intermediate-range ballistic missile ISD in-service date ISR intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance ISTAR intelligence, surveillance, target acquisition and reconnaissance LACM land-attack cruise missile LC/A/AC/H/M/P/T/U/VP landing craft/assault/air cushion/ heavy/medium/personnel/tank/ utility/vehicles and personnel LCC amphibious command ship LGB laser-guided bomb LHA aviation-capable amphibious assault ship LHD aviation-capable amphibious assault ship with well dock LIFT lead-in ftr trainer LKA amphibious cargo ship LLI long-lead items lnchr launcher LoA letter of offer and acceptance log logistic LoI letter of intent LP/D/H landing platform/dock/helicopter LRIP low-rate initial production LS/D/L/H/M/T landing ship/dock/logistic/with hangar/medium/tank lt light LWT lightweight torpedo maint maintenance MANPAD man-portable air-defence system MANPATS man-portable anti-tank system MBT main battle tank MC/C/CS/D/I/O mine countermeasure coastal/ command and support/diving support/inshore/ocean MCM mine countermeasures MCMV mine countermeasures vessel MD military district mech mechanised med medium/medical medevac medical evacuation MH/C/D/I/O mine hunter/coastal/drone/ inshore/ocean mil military MIRV multiple independently targetable re-entry vehicle mk mark (model number) ML minelayer MLU mid-life update mne marine mnv enh manoeuvre enhancement mod modified/modification mor mortar mot motorised/motor MoU memorandum of understanding MP maritime patrol/military police MR maritime reconnaissance/motor rifle

MRBM medium-range ballistic missile MRH multi-role helicopter MRL multiple rocket launcher MS/C/D/I/O/R mine sweeper/coastal/drone/ inshore/ocean/river msl missile mtn mountain MW mine warfare n.a. not applicable n.k. not known NBC nuclear, biological, chemical NCO non-commissioned officer nm nautical mile nuc nuclear O&M operations and maintenance obs observation/observer OCU operational conversion unit OP observation post op/ops operational/operations OPFOR opposition training force org organised/organisation OPV offshore patrol vessel para paratroop/parachute PAX passenger/passenger transport aircraft PB/F/G/I/M/R/T patrol boat/fast/with surface-tosurface missile/inshore/with SAM/ riverine/with torpedo PC/C/F/G/H/I/M/O/R/T patrol craft/coastal/fast/with surface-to-surface missile/with hangar/inshore/with CIWS missile or SAM/offshore/riverine/with torpedo pdr pounder pers personnel PGM precision-guided munitions PH/G/M/T patrol hydrofoil/with surface-tosurface missile/with SAM/with torpedo pl platoon PKO peacekeeping operations PoR programme of record PPP purchasing-power parity PPV protected patrol vehicle PRH passive radar-homing prepo pre-positioned PSO/H peace support operations or offshore patrol ship/with hangar psyops psychological operations ptn br pontoon bridging quad quadruple R&D research and development RCL recoilless launcher recce reconnaissance regt regiment RFI request for information RFP request for proposals RL rocket launcher ro-ro roll-on, roll-off RRC/F/U rapid-reaction corps/force/unit RV re-entry vehicle rvn riverine SAM surface-to-air missile SAR search and rescue SARH semi-active radar homing

sat SDV SEAD SF SHORAD SIGINT sigs SLBM

satellite swimmer delivery vehicle suppression of enemy air defence special forces short-range air defence signals intelligence signals submarine-launched ballistic missile SLCM submarine-launched cruise missile SLEP service-life-extension programme SP self-propelled SpecOps special operations SPAAGM self-propelled anti-aircraft gun and missile system spt support sqn squadron SRBM short-range ballistic missile SS submarine SSA/N auxiliary support submarine/ nuclear-powered SSB/N ballistic missile submarine/ nuclear-powered SSC coastal submarine SSG conventionally-powered attack submarine with dedicated launch tubes for guided missiles SSGN nuclear-powered submarine with dedicated launch tubes for guided missiles SSK conventionally-powered attack submarine SSM surface-to-surface missile SSN nuclear-powered attack submarine SSR security-sector reform SSW midget submarine str strength STOVL short take-off and vertical landing surv surveillance sy security t tonnes tac tactical tch technical temp temporary tk tank tkr tanker TMD theatre missile defence torp torpedo tpt transport tr trillion trg training TRV torpedo recovery vehicle TT torpedo tube UAV uninhabited aerial vehicle UCAC utility craft air cushioned UCAV uninhabited combat air vehicle UGV uninhabited ground vehicle utl utility UUV uninhabited underwater vehicle veh vehicle VLB vehicle launched bridge VLS vertical launch system VSHORAD very short-range air defence WFU withdrawn from use wg wing

764,463

Total

419

29,696

1,824 55 1,113 27,049

Hungary

Iceland

Ireland

6,689 11,817

Poland

Reference

12,060

Netherlands

Norway 12,780

6,476

12,594

84 74

Malta

390 188

341 151

Luxembourg

Macedonia, North

Montenegro

1,161

757

2,000

4,976

52,094

1,061

Lithuania

Latvia

710

4,806

Italy

1,187

48,398

Germany

Greece

4,153 54,864

3,920 52,100

716

4,919

Finland

688

France

4,557

Denmark

Estonia

3,253

402 2,910

Czech Republic

Cyprus

997

1,249

2,067 1,047

Bulgaria

Croatia

168

5,323

165

4,817

Bosnia-Herzegovina

Belgium

3,466

198 3,238

Austria

222

794,671

774,527

20,144

2020

Albania

Europe

18,731 745,732

Canada

2019

United States

North America

Defence spending (current USDm)

13,419

7,457

14,763

209

416

1,252

835

33,785

1,280

2,633

7,728

56,051

59,342

5,962

786

5,419

3,971

523

1,071

1,282

194

6,400

3,681

246

777,251

754,019

23,232

2021

308

1,234

700

120

185

552

384

373

434

217

159

186

447

603

771

706

557

780

272

321

247

295

414

367

1,383

2,247

518

2019

334

1,184

729

121

177

620

425

402

476

229

149

205

469

650

809

745

583

838

304

331

236

179

454

391

1,431

2,328

534

2020

351

1,353

851

143

186

650

462

448

542

245

124

271

731

701

872

1,067

644

919

371

408

255

185

543

414

1,432

2,251

612

2021

Defence spending per capita (current USD)

1.98

1.65

1.32

1.42

0.53

1.25

0.48

1.96

2.11

1.35

0.28

0.22

1.12

2.34

1.24

1.91

1.46

2.24

1.31

1.15

1.61

1.72

3.03

0.82

0.90

0.73

1.29

2.28

3.49

1.08

2019

2.14

1.79

1.38

1.65

0.54

1.57

0.53

2.09

2.28

1.58

0.28

0.24

1.29

2.63

1.36

2.09

1.54

2.36

1.38

1.33

1.76

1.77

1.81

0.85

1.03

0.80

1.50

2.47

3.71

1.23

2020

Defence spending % of GDP

2.05

1.67

1.47

1.58

0.51

1.51

0.50

2.01

2.26

1.59

0.25

0.17

1.45

3.65

1.33

2.02

2.01

2.19

1.37

1.43

1.97

1.69

1.65

0.89

1.10

0.76

1.47

2.22

3.29

1.15

2021

114

162

143

183

203

1,462

1,395

2021

Active armed forces (000)

221

238

116

878

843

2021

Estimated reservists (000)

176

101

2021

Active paramilitary (000)

Reference 521

Table 13 International comparisons of defence expenditure and military personnel

601

651 310

Belarus

Georgia

46,366 89

Russia [a]

3,786 439

3,652 432

Brunei

Fiji

China

Cambodia* 56

177,075 52

188,597

1,032

31,418

29,912

Australia

Bangladesh 1,043

2,014

1,963

Asia

Afghanistan

53,500

55,453

n.k.

4,353

3,968 n.k.

n.k.

Total**

Uzbekistan

Ukraine

Turkmenistan*

Tajikistan

43,804

n.k.

Kyrgyzstan

Moldova

1,430

1,595

Kazakhstan

283

2,267

644 1,787

Azerbaijan

628

313,483

Armenia

Russia and Eurasia

299,222

Total

61,473

10,885

12,082 59,438

Turkey

United Kingdom*

7,036 5,724

6,373 5,343

Sweden

Switzerland

605 12,729

628 12,630

Slovenia

Spain

1,847

896

903 1,871

Serbia

Slovakia

5,182

4,939

Romania

2020 2,853

2,674

Portugal

2019

Defence spending (current USDm) 2021

207,340

1,024

457

4,059

34,306

1,880

55,973

n.k.

4,269

n.k.

45,802

n.k.

1,539

279

638

2,698

603

350,845

71,627

10,160

5,722

8,359

13,767

670

2,010

1,039

5,613

2,959

127

945

1,262

116

n.k.

327

n.k.

176

212

396

908

148

640

630

254

299

344

128

231

259

2019

135

946

1,234

117

n.k.

309

n.k.

222

208

411

935

133

681

690

254

288

339

128

243

277

2020

148

969

1,329

124

n.k.

322

n.k.

262

200

469

1,084

123

677

815

291

319

370

149

264

288

2021

Defence spending per capita (current USD)

1.02

1.23

3.85

3.21

1.21

2.15

10.40

2.13

n.k.

2.65

n.k.

1.09

2.74

0.36

n.k.

0.88

1.98

1.01

3.71

4.73

1.40

2.10

1.59

0.73

1.19

0.91

1.16

1.78

1.75

1.98

1.11

2019

1.15

1.27

4.10

3.66

1.17

2.31

10.00

2.38

n.k.

2.82

n.k.

1.11

2.96

0.37

n.k.

0.84

2.03

1.00

5.32

4.97

1.47

2.27

1.51

0.76

1.30

0.99

1.13

1.77

1.69

2.09

1.25

2020

Defence spending % of GDP

1.00

1.23

3.93

2.91

1.14

2.13

8.47

2.20

n.k.

2.42

n.k.

1.15

2.78

0.41

n.k.

0.79

1.68

0.97

5.12

4.43

1.48

2.30

1.28

0.71

1.34

0.96

1.10

1.72

1.71

1.95

1.18

2021

2,035

124

163

165

1,422

196

900

1,967

153

355

123

2021

Active armed forces (000)

510

3,778

900

2,000

290

300

210

1,826

379

123

212

2021

Estimated reservists (000)

500

880

102

554

110

732

157

2021

Active paramilitary (000)

522 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2022

Table 13 International comparisons of defence expenditure and military personnel

8,098

435

2,132 398

Myanmar

7,315

433,857

Total **

9,855 16,804 1,691 7,820 1,885

Israel

Jordan

Kuwait

Lebanon

Reference

17,189

Iran

Iraq

n.k.

17,234

3,353

Egypt

Libya

10,191

1,411

n.k.

575

6,823

1,719

16,549

4,106

1,405

10,300

Algeria

9,699

452,394

5,727

6,839

Bahrain

Middle East and North Africa

5,221

Vietnam*

11,010

Taiwan

Thailand

Timor-Leste

13,903

1,666

9,879 1,684

11,339

Singapore

Sri Lanka

5,269

4,684

9,332

3,287

Philippines

10,175

Pakistan

Papua New Guinea

2,673

New Zealand

Nepal

2,390

105

3,706

3,698

Malaysia

Mongolia

40,999

n.k.

49,762

n.k.

40,071

2020 63,507

n.k.

Korea, Republic of

Laos

n.k.

7,600 48,229

Indonesia

Japan

Korea, DPR of

63,306

India

2019

Defence spending (current USDm) 2021

n.k.

579

9,635

1,801

20,299

7,352

25,002

4,824

1,399

9,039

487,574

6,345

7,273

16,214

1,529

11,566

5,651

10,393

3,273

408

2,299

3,903

n.k.

46,650

n.k.

49,254

8,399

65,079

n.k.

322

2,645

158

1,965

239

205

957

243

289

106

467

1,858

584

115

n.k.

776

n.k.

383

2019

n.k.

105

2,279

159

1,987

262

195

934

226

287

589

1,591

667

114

n.k.

791

n.k.

396

2020

n.k.

110

3,178

165

2,310

185

291

916

207

316

105

688

1,972

656

116

n.k.

902

n.k.

395

2021

Defence spending per capita (current USD)

n.k.

3.80

5.74

4.75

5.05

4.32

2.96

1.54

3.67

6.02

2.14

1.60

1.87

1.34

1.80

1.98

3.03

1.25

0.32

3.70

1.27

1.17

3.10

0.72

1.01

n.k.

2.43

n.k.

0.94

0.68

2.21

2019

n.k.

3.29

6.44

4.90

5.04

6.01

1.98

1.49

4.05

6.57

2.25

1.68

2.66

1.36

2.08

2.09

2.91

1.47

0.40

3.57

1.57

1.28

2.94

0.82

1.10

n.k.

2.50

n.k.

0.99

0.77

2.39

2020

Defence spending % of GDP

n.k.

3.50

7.28

5.07

5.05

3.65

2.31

1.55

3.58

5.52

2.11

1.73

2.41

1.33

2.06

1.89

3.05

1.48

0.33

3.61

1.32

1.19

3.44

0.68

1.05

n.k.

2.56

n.k.

0.97

0.73

2.21

2021

n.k.

101

170

193

610

439

139

9,231

482

361

169

255

145

652

356

113

555

1,280

247

396

1,460

2021

Active armed forces (000)

n.k.

465

350

479

150

13,295

5,000

200

1,657

253

131

137

3,100

600

400

1,155

2021

Estimated reservists (000)

n.k.

266

397

187

3,508

291

107

100

189

280

1,608

2021

Active paramilitary (000)

Reference 523

Table 13 International comparisons of defence expenditure and military personnel

7,483

7,530

999

616

5,352

348 262 5,067

Honduras

Jamaica

Nicaragua

Haiti

Mexico

238

345

366

341

Guatemala

Guyana

172

145

1,545

589

n.k.

457

5,480

4,049

22,234

El Salvador

1,590

Dominican Republic

Ecuador

440 n.k.

5,948

Colombia

Costa Rica

4,416

Cuba

27,133

Brazil

Chile

479

23 479

Belize

86 41

92 38

Bahamas

Barbados

Bolivia

2,904

161,391

n.k.

19,826

3,281

Argentina

Antigua and Barbuda

160,476

Total**

Latin America and the Caribbean

n.k.

Yemen

19,329

n.k.

Syria

Tunisia

United Arab Emirates

6,466 52,000

6,399 50,933

Qatar

Saudi Arabia 1,153

n.k.

Palestinian Territories

Oman

5,955

4,817

Morocco

207

2020

161

Mauritania

2019

Defence spending (current USDm)

6,760

209

347

337

248

1,593

579

n.k.

434

5,970

4,219

21,752

476

2,572

166,229

n.k.

19,159

1,222

n.k.

46,667

6,258

n.k.

6,431

6,349

212

2021

n.k.

122

245

129

131

275

955

n.k.

1,964

n.k.

1,514

2,659

n.k.

2,113

139

2019

n.k.

112

223

105

138

254

920

n.k.

1,984

n.k.

1,522

2,645

n.k.

2,059

167

2020

n.k.

119

230

102

132

270

956

n.k.

1,944

103

n.k.

1,342

2,523

n.k.

1,741

177

2021

Defence spending per capita (current USD)

0.62

0.40

1.66

1.39

0.09

1.30

0.44

0.55

1.47

0.69

n.k.

0.70

1.85

1.58

1.44

1.16

1.23

0.72

0.70

0.73

0.43

4.45

n.k.

4.63

2.77

n.k.

6.42

3.64

n.k.

9.86

4.03

2.04

2019

0.63

0.50

1.71

1.45

0.07

1.20

0.47

0.70

1.56

0.75

n.k.

0.75

2.03

1.60

1.54

1.30

1.44

0.92

0.87

0.75

0.57

4.99

n.k.

5.52

3.16

n.k.

7.43

4.45

n.k.

11.81

5.20

2.56

2020

Defence spending % of GDP

0.58

0.53

1.41

1.32

0.18

0.97

0.40

0.90

1.52

0.65

n.k.

0.71

1.99

1.27

1.32

1.23

1.05

0.86

0.89

0.57

0.53

4.36

n.k.

4.67

2.95

n.k.

5.54

3.70

n.k.

7.98

5.04

2.31

2021

216

256

367

2,572

169

257

196

2021

Active armed forces (000)

118

1,340

1,683

150

2021

Estimated reservists (000)

125

172

395

1,152

100

n.k.

2021

Active paramilitary (000)

524 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2022

Table 13 International comparisons of defence expenditure and military personnel

423 n.k.

Uruguay

Venezuela

Sub-Saharan Africa

311

32 205

Central African Rep

Chad

Reference

Lesotho

1,232

211

195 n.k.

Guinea

Guinea-Bissau

Kenya

276

14 244

Gambia

Ghana

429

1,115

n.k.

272

516 267

Ethiopia

n.k.

346

608

388

Gabon

n.k. n.k.

Equatorial Guinea

Eritrea

337 n.k.

Dem Republic of the Congo

Djibouti

300

538

274

422

Cameroon

Cape Verde

Congo

407

Côte d'Ivoire

358

Burkina Faso

Burundi

560

535

Botswana

1,014

1,607

49,176

n.k.

535

954

Benin

Angola

55,044

906

Trinidad and Tobago

Total**

n.k.

2,132

2,238

Suriname

Peru

278

284

Paraguay

753

2020

805

Panama

2019

Defence spending (current USDm)

1,100

n.k.

234

355

315

375

n.k.

290

644

317

289

448

464

522

228

956

50,113

n.k.

525

773

n.k.

1,868

274

830

2021

n.k.

123

n.k.

234

116

n.k.

125

747

n.k.

209

2019

n.k.

122

n.k.

242

115

n.k.

158

789

n.k.

193

2020

n.k.

138

n.k.

222

109

n.k.

154

633

n.k.

211

2021

Defence spending per capita (current USD)

1.95

1.23

n.k.

1.45

0.36

0.80

1.58

0.56

n.k.

0.67

0.92

2.35

1.88

1.42

0.54

1.08

2.10

2.24

3.22

0.47

1.90

1.07

n.k.

0.68

3.90

n.k.

0.97

0.75

1.21

2019

1.90

1.09

n.k.

1.37

0.40

0.79

1.77

0.44

n.k.

0.71

0.99

3.01

2.52

1.73

0.68

1.02

2.05

2.23

3.72

0.36

1.74

1.18

n.k.

0.95

4.42

n.k.

1.04

0.78

1.42

2020

Defence spending % of GDP

1.46

1.00

n.k.

1.40

0.47

0.79

1.72

0.40

n.k.

0.53

0.94

2.49

2.34

1.72

0.64

1.00

2.06

2.33

2.96

1.26

1.36

1.05

n.k.

0.87

3.58

n.k.

0.83

0.74

1.38

2021

138

202

134

107

1,488

123

2021

Active armed forces (000)

120

2,132

188

165

2021

Estimated reservists (000)

n.k.

1,248

220

2021

Active paramilitary (000)

Reference 525

Table 13 International comparisons of defence expenditure and military personnel

787 225

68 722

Malawi

Mali

2,505 346 n.k. 7 n.k.

1,827 112 342 n.k. 11 n.k.

Nigeria

Rwanda

Senegal

Seychelles

Sierra Leone

55,044 16,506

Sub-Saharan Africa

17,007

49,176

161,391

452,394

53,500

313,483

794,671

17,007

358

960

116

803

n.k.

3,292

128

378

17,738

50,113

166,229

487,574

55,973

350,845

777,251

17,738

287

268

1,199

120

831

n.k.

3,126

n.k.

479

150

2,543

205

357

140

203

863

101

2021

297

116

955

289

116

396

1,383

n.k.

158

159

2019

297

115

920

287

117

411

1,431

n.k.

144

163

2020

319

109

956

316

124

469

1,432

n.k.

133

146

2021

Defence spending per capita (current USD)

1.83

1.35

1.07

4.45

2.14

2.13

1.40

2.28

1.35

0.34

1.69

1.48

1.46

1.20

n.k.

1.48

0.90

n.k.

0.26

n.k.

1.47

1.08

0.41

1.33

3.24

0.82

1.56

4.18

0.62

0.55

0.45

2019

1.99

1.49

1.18

4.99

2.25

2.38

1.47

2.47

1.49

0.18

1.85

2.52

1.53

1.25

n.k.

2.22

0.98

n.k.

0.17

n.k.

1.40

1.24

0.58

1.53

3.53

0.94

2.06

4.50

0.58

0.82

0.40

2020

Defence spending % of GDP

1.85

1.42

1.05

4.36

2.11

2.20

1.48

2.22

1.42

1.11

1.24

2.77

1.41

1.20

n.k.

1.32

0.75

n.k.

0.23

n.k.

1.74

1.44

0.53

1.31

2.92

0.89

1.84

4.41

0.67

0.72

0.58

2021

19,605

1,463

1,488

2,572

9,231

1,422

1,967

1,462

1,463

104

143

2021

Active armed forces (000)

23,803

213

2,132

1,683

13,295

3,778

1,826

878

213

2021

Estimated reservists (000)

7,793

268

1,248

1,152

3,508

880

732

268

2021

Active paramilitary (000)

Totals may not sum precisely due to rounding. * Estimates. **Totals exclude defence-spending estimates for states where insufficient official information is available in order to enable approximate comparisons of regional defence spending between years. Defence spending per capita (current USD) and Defence spending % of GDP totals are regional averages. [a] ‘National Defence’ budget chapter. Excludes other defence-related expenditures included under other budget lines (e.g., pensions) – see Table 6, p. 173. Defence spending as % of GDP includes US Foreign Military Financing programmes – other figures do not.

1,785,020 1,841,624 1,905,723

160,476

Middle East and North Africa

Latin America and the Caribbean

Global totals

55,453 433,857

Russia and Eurasia

Europe

Asia

764,463 299,222

North America

Summary

16,506

Zimbabwe

Total**

562 394

Uganda

Zambia

728 106

Tanzania

Togo

n.k.

South Sudan

Sudan

3,495

South Africa

Somalia

211

407 172

Namibia

Niger

131

219 127

Mauritius

Mozambique

107

Madagascar

2020

Liberia

2019

Defence spending (current USDm)

526 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2022

Table 13 International comparisons of defence expenditure and military personnel

Reference 527

AFG.......................................................Afghanistan ALB ................................................................Albania ALG .................................................................Algeria ANG ................................................................Angola ARG .......................................................... Argentina ARM ............................................................ Armenia ATG .................................... Antigua and Barbuda AUS..............................................................Australia AUT................................................................. Austria AZE ..........................................................Azerbaijan BDI ................................................................ Burundi BEL................................................................Belgium BEN ....................................................................Benin BFA ......................................................Burkina Faso BGD .......................................................Bangladesh BHR ...............................................................Bahrain BHS.............................................................Bahamas BIH ........................................Bosnia-Herzegovina BIOT ...................British Indian Ocean Territory BLG ...............................................................Bulgaria BLR .................................................................Belarus BLZ ................................................................... Belize BOL ..................................................................Bolivia BRB ............................................................ Barbados BRN ................................................................. Brunei BRZ .................................................................... Brazil BWA...........................................................Botswana CAM ........................................................ Cambodia CAN ...............................................................Canada CAR...............................Central African Republic CHA ....................................................................Chad CHE ........................................................Switzerland CHL .....................................................................Chile CIV .......................................................Côte d’Ivoire CMR ......................................................... Cameroon COG .........................................Republic of Congo COL ............................................................Colombia CPV ........................................................ Cape Verde CRI ............................................................Costa Rica CRO ................................................................Croatia CUB ....................................................................Cuba CYP ................................................................ Cyprus CZE ............................................... Czech Republic DJB ...............................................................Djibouti DNK ............................................................Denmark DOM.....................................Dominican Republic DPRK Korea, Democratic People’s Republic of DRC .........Democratic Republic of the Congo ECU ...............................................................Ecuador EGY ....................................................................Egypt EQG ............................................Equitorial Guinea ERI .................................................................... Eritrea ESP.....................................................................Spain EST ..................................................................Estonia ETH ...............................................................Ethiopia FIN ................................................................. Finland FJI .............................................................................Fiji FLK................................................ Falkland Islands FRA ..................................................................France GAB .................................................................Gabon GAM ............................................................. Gambia

GEO .............................................................. Georgia GER .............................................................Germany GF ..................................................... French Guiana GHA ................................................................. Ghana GIB ...............................................................Gibraltar GNB ..................................................Guinea-Bissau GRC................................................................. Greece GRL .......................................................... Greenland GUA ........................................................ Guatemala GUI..................................................................Guinea GUY ...............................................................Guyana HND...........................................................Honduras HTI .......................................................................Haiti HUN.............................................................Hungary IDN ........................................................... Indonesia IND ..................................................................... India IRL ................................................................... Ireland IRN ........................................................................ Iran IRQ ........................................................................ Iraq ISL ...................................................................Iceland ISR .......................................................................Israel ITA .........................................................................Italy JAM .............................................................. Jamaica JOR ................................................................. Jordan JPN ................................................................... Japan KAZ........................................................ Kazakhstan KEN...................................................................Kenya KGZ......................................................... Kyrgyzstan KWT................................................................ Kuwait LAO......................................................................Laos LBN ............................................................. Lebanon LBR ..................................................................Liberia LBY .................................................................... Libya LKA ............................................................. Sri Lanka LSO ............................................................... Lesotho LTU............................................................. Lithuania LUX ..................................................... Luxembourg LVA ................................................................... Latvia MDA ............................................................Moldova MDG .....................................................Madagascar MEX ................................................................Mexico MHL.............................................. Marshall Islands MKD ................................................Macedonia, North MLI........................................................................Mali MLT ....................................................................Malta MMR.......................................................... Myanmar MNE ................................................... Montenegro MNG ..........................................................Mongolia MOR ............................................................Morocco MOZ ...................................................Mozambique MRT ........................................................ Mauritania MUS........................................................... Mauritius MWI ................................................................Malawi MYS .............................................................Malaysia NAM ............................................................ Namibia NCL .................................................New Caledonia NER .................................................................... Niger NGA ................................................................Nigeria NIC ............................................................Nicaragua NLD ......................................................Netherlands NOR ...............................................................Norway

NPL ................................................................... Nepal NZL .....................................................New Zealand OMN.................................................................Oman PT ....................................... Palestinian Territories PAN............................................................... Panama PAK .............................................................. Pakistan PER ...................................................................... Peru PHL .........................................................Philippines POL ................................................................. Poland PNG ........................................ Papua New Guinea PRC ..........................China, People’s Republic of PRT ..............................................................Portugal PRY .............................................................Paraguay PYF ............................................. French Polynesia QTR ....................................................................Qatar ROC .........................Taiwan (Republic of China) ROK ..........................................Korea, Republic of ROM ........................................................... Romania RSA .......................................................South Africa RUS ...................................................................Russia RWA..............................................................Rwanda SAU......................................................Saudi Arabia SDN ................................................................. Sudan SEN ............................................................... Senegal SER....................................................................Serbia SGP ...........................................................Singapore SLB............................................... Solomon Islands SLE ....................................................... Sierra Leone SLV .......................................................... El Salvador SOM ............................................................. Somalia SSD ..................................................... South Sudan STP...................................São Tomé and Príncipe SUR ............................................................Suriname SVK ...............................................................Slovakia SVN.............................................................. Slovenia SWE .............................................................. Sweden SYC .......................................................... Seychelles SYR ......................................................................Syria TGO .................................................................... Togo THA .............................................................Thailand TJK ............................................................. Tajikistan TKM ...................................................Turkmenistan TLS ........................................................ Timor-Leste TTO ......................................Trinidad and Tobago TUN ................................................................ Tunisia TUR ..................................................................Turkey TZA ..............................................................Tanzania UAE.....................................United Arab Emirates UGA .............................................................. Uganda UK ................................................United Kingdom UKR ...............................................................Ukraine URY..............................................................Uruguay US....................................................... United States UZB.........................................................Uzbekistan VEN...........................................................Venezuela VNM ............................................................ Vietnam YEM ........................................Yemen, Republic of ZMB ...............................................................Zambia ZWE .........................................................Zimbabwe

Reference

Table 14 Index of country/territory abbreviations

528 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2022

Table 15 Index of countries and territories Afghanistan AFG . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .247 Albania ALB . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 86 Algeria ALG . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .332 Angola ANG . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .452 Antigua and Barbuda ATG . . . . . . . . . . . . .392 Argentina ARG . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .392 Armenia ARM . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .181 Australia AUS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .247 Austria AUT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 87 Azerbaijan AZE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .182 Bahamas BHS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .395 Bahrain BHR . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .334 Bangladesh BGD . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .250 Barbados BRB . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .396 Belarus BLR . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .185 Belgium BEL . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 88 Belize BLZ . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .396 Benin BEN . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .453 Bolivia BOL . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .397 Bosnia-Herzegovina BIH . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 90 Botswana BWA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .454 Brazil BRZ . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .399 Brunei BRN . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .252 Bulgaria BLG . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 91 Burkina Faso BFA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .455 Burundi BDI . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .457 Cambodia CAM . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .253 Cameroon CMR . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .458 Canada CAN . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45 Cape Verde CPV . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .459 Central African Republic CAR . . . . . . . . . .460 Chad CHA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .461 Chile CHL . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .403 China, People’s Republic of PRC. . . . . . . .255 Colombia COL . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .406 Congo, Republic of COG . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .462 Costa Rica CRI . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .409 Côte d’Ivoire CIV . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .463 Croatia CRO . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 93 Cuba CUB . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .409 Cyprus CYP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 94 Czech Republic CZE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 96 Democratic Republic of the Congo DRC . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .465 Denmark DNK . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 98 Djibouti DJB . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .466 Dominican Republic DOM . . . . . . . . . . . . .411 Ecuador ECU . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .412 Egypt EGY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .336 El Salvador SLV . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .414 Equatorial Guinea EQG . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .468 Eritrea ERI. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .468 Estonia EST . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .100 Ethiopia ETH . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .470 Fiji FJI . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .264 Finland FIN . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .102 France FRA. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .104 Gabon GAB . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .471

Gambia GAM . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .472 Georgia GEO . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .187 Germany GER . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .109 Ghana GHA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .473 Greece GRC . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .112 Guatemala GUA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .416 Guinea-Bissau GNB. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .475 Guinea GUI . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .474 Guyana GUY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .417 Haiti HTI . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .418 Honduras HND. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .418 Hungary HUN . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .115 Iceland ISL . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .116 India IND . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .265 Indonesia IDN. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .271 Iran IRN . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .340 Iraq IRQ . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .344 Ireland IRL . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .117 Israel ISR . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .347 Italy ITA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .118 Jamaica JAM . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .420 Japan JPN . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .275 Jordan JOR . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .350 Kazakhstan KAZ. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .188 Kenya KEN . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .476 Korea, Democratic People’s Republic of DPRK . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .280 Korea, Republic of ROK . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .283 Kuwait KWT. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .352 Kyrgyzstan KGZ . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .190 Laos LAO . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .287 Latvia LVA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .122 Lebanon LBN . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .354 Lesotho LSO . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .478 Liberia LBR. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .478 Libya LBY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .356 Lithuania LTU . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .124 Luxembourg LUX . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .125 Macedonia, North MKD . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .126 Madagascar MDG . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .479 Malawi MWI . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .480 Malaysia MYS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .288 Mali MLI . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .481 Malta MLT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .127 Mauritania MRT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .357 Mauritius MUS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .483 Mexico MEX . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .421 Moldova MDA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .191 Mongolia MNG. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .291 Montenegro MNE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .128 Morocco MOR . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .359 Mozambique MOZ . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .483 Multinational Organisations . . . . . . . . . . . 129 Myanmar MMR . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .292 Namibia NAM . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .484 Nepal NPL . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .294 Netherlands NLD. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .130 New Zealand NZL . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .295

Nicaragua NIC . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .423 Nigeria NGA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .487 Niger NER. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .486 Norway NOR . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .132 Oman OMN . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .361 Pakistan PAK . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .296 Palestinian Territories PT . . . . . . . . . . . . . .363 Panama PAN . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .424 Papua New Guinea PNG . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .300 Paraguay PRY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .425 Peru PER . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .427 Philippines PHL . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .301 Poland POL . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .134 Portugal PRT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .137 Qatar QTR . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .364 Romania ROM . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .139 Russia RUS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .192 Rwanda RWA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .489 Saudi Arabia SAU . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .366 Senegal SEN . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .490 Serbia SER . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .142 Seychelles SYC . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .491 Sierra Leone SLE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .492 Singapore SGP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .303 Slovakia SVK . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .144 Slovenia SVN. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .146 Somalia SOM . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .493 South Africa RSA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .494 South Sudan SSD . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .496 Spain ESP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .147 Sri Lanka LKA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .306 Sudan SDN . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .497 Suriname SUR. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .430 Sweden SWE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .151 Switzerland CHE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .153 Syria SYR. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .369 Taiwan (Republic of China) ROC . . . . . . .308 Tajikistan TJK . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .208 Tanzania TZA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .499 Thailand THA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .311 Timor-Leste TLS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .314 Togo TGO . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .501 Trinidad and Tobago TTO . . . . . . . . . . . . . .430 Tunisia TUN . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .372 Turkey TUR . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .155 Turkmenistan TKM . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .209 Uganda UGA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .502 Ukraine UKR . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .211 United Arab Emirates UAE . . . . . . . . . . . . .374 United Kingdom UK . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .158 United States US . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48 Uruguay URY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .431 Uzbekistan UZB . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .216 Venezuela VEN . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .433 Vietnam VNM . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .315 Yemen, Republic of YEM . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .376 Zambia ZMB . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .503 Zimbabwe ZWE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .505

The Military Balance 2022 - PDFCOFFEE.COM (2025)

References